1. Magallona vs.

Ermita

Facts:

Republic Act No. 3046, demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic state,
was passed by Congress in 1961 pursuant to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
(UNCLOS I). The latter codified the sovereign right of States parties over their “territorial seas.” The
breadth of said territory, however, was left undetermined.

In 1984, the Philippines ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III).
The same set the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the
Philippines. In compliance therewith, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now
under scrutiny.

Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens,
taxpayers or x x x legislators," as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on the ground,
among others, that 1) it reduces Philippine maritime territory and 2) it unconstitutionally "converts"
internal waters into archipelagic waters subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes
passage under UNCLOS III consequently exposing Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime
pollution hazards contrary to the provisions of Article 2 of the Constitution.

Issue: W/n petitioners’ argument is meritorious.

Held:

1) RA 9522 does not reduce the Philippine maritime territory. UNCLOS III favors States with a long
coastline like the Philippines. The convention creates a sui generis maritime space – the exclusive
economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III thus grants new rights to coastal
States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles.

2) The imposition of right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage through archipelagic waters under
UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters
landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters
subject to their territorial sovereignty.

The fact of sovereignty over these waters entail that, domestically, the political branches of the
Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.

2. Henares Jr. vs. LTFRB

Facts:

The petitioners, by citing statistics on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in the
Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their
concomitant emission of air pollutants, attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against
the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards.

Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid
droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions – have
caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life.
Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions from engine combustion when these
react to other pollutants.

Thus, by writ of mandamus, petitioners challenged the Court to command respondents Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as
alternative fuel. CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small
amounts of propane and butane, is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel
because it produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum.

Petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus lie in Section 16,12 Article II
of the 1987 Constitution, the Court’s ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 414 of Republic Act No.
8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."

Issue: W/n petitioners’ arguments are meritorious.

Held:

Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for issuance of
a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel.
Although both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel,
particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing a program on the use of CNG by
public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for
Public Transport (NGVPPT). Thus, the instant petition had been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.

Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ
of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is
available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law
that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At
most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant preferential and
exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the
results of the DOTC surveys." Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government
to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.

The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders
from the Court.

3. Oposa vs. Factoran Jr.

Facts:

The instant complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the petitioners, who are
minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, "are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests."

Petitioners established that scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful
ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for
forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other
uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies. Petitioners aver that such adverse and detrimental consequences of
continued deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice.

Consequently, petitioners pray that judgement be rendered ordering defendant, then DENR Secretary
Hon. Fulgencio S. Factoran Jr., later substituted by his successor Hon. Angel C. Alcala, their agents,
representatives and other persons acting in their behalf to (1) Cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country; (2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.

Issues: W/n petitioners have a cause of action.

Held:

Yes. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution. The provision provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. The right to a
balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.

Conformably with the enunciated right then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated E.O. No. 192, 14
Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall
be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and
proper use of the country's environment and natural resources.

In fact, even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special
attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No.
1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued.
The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of
dignity and well-being." As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and
guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." The latter statute, on the other hand, gave
flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No.
192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

4. Felipe Ysmael Jr. & Co.., Inc. vs. Secretary of ENR

Facts:

On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA No. 87 with
the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus it was issued a license to cut, collect, and
remove timber over 54,920 hectares of public forest land located in Maddela, Nueva Vizcaya.
In 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development issued a memorandum order stopping all
logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of
petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires. Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or
26,000 hectares of the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development
and Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half
was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license. The
latter entities were allegedly controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand
Marcos. Thus, petitioner seeks the cancellation of TLA No. 356 and the reinstitution of his previous TLA.

Issue: Is the complaint meritorious?

Held: No. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require.

Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to develop
and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all
timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previous
dispensation. In fact, both the executive and legislative departments of the incumbent administration
are presently taking stock of its environmental policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands and
developing an agenda for future programs for their conservation and rehabilitation. The administrative
reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing global concern over the
despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced
ecological system.

The courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.

5. Carino vs. Insular Government of Philippine Islands

Facts: The case is an appeal on the grant of an application to the Philippine court of land registration for
the registration of certain land. The petitioner is an Igorot of the province of Benguet. For more than
fifty years before the treaty of Paris, the petitioner and his ancestors had held the subject land as
owners. They all had been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and Carino had inherited or received the
land from his father, in accordance with Igorot custom.

The position of the government is that Spain assumed, asserted, and had title to all the land in the
Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired; that there was no
prescription against the Crown, and that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required registration
within a limited time to make the title good; that the plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore
became, if it was not always, public land; that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and so
that the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine government is bound to respect.

Issue: W/n petitioner owned the subject land.

Held: Yes. By the organic act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired there by the United
States are to be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' Thus, the Court found it hard
to believe that the United States was ready to declare in the next breath that 'any person' did not
embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by 'property' only that which had become such by
ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to
treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long association,-one of the profoundest factors
in human thought,-regarded as their own.

Furthermore, even by the law of Spain, natives were recognized as owning some lands. Book 4, Title 12,
Law 14 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems
proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or
justa prescripcion. Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754: 'Where such
possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient
possession, as a valid title by prescription.'

The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25, 1880, for the adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. This begins with the usual theoretic
assertion that, for private ownership, there must have been a grant by competent authority; but
instantly descends to fact by providing in Articles 4 and 5 that, for all legal effects, those who have been
in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners. Respondents contend that the object of this law
was to require the adjustment or registration proceedings that it described, and in that way to require
everyone to get a document of title or lose his land.

It is true that the language of arts. 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the
necessary time. The words “may prove” may mean to prove in registration proceedings. However, the
better view, in light of the other provisions, is to take such words to mean when called upon to do so in
any litigation. Although are indications that registration was expected from all, none was sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law.

6. Cruz vs. NCIP

Facts:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, specifically, the following provisions, on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in
turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable
public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private
but community property of the indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable
for not more than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and
conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.

Issue: W/n petitioner’s contention is meritorious.

Held: As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

7. Province of North Cotabato

8. Social Justice Society vs. Atienza Jr.

Facts:

Petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon seek to
compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
Said ordinance reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.

On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the
Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option." Thus, the oil companies undertook to
immediately remove/decommission twenty-eight tanks