Samar Mining Co.

vs Nordeutscher Lloyd Case Digest

Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs. Nordeutscher Lloyd
(132 SCRA 529)

Facts: Samar Mining imported 1 crate optima welded wire (amounting to around USD 424 or
PhP 1,700) from Germany, which was shipped on a vessel owned by Nordeutscher Lloyd (M/S
Schwabenstein). The shipment was unloaded in Manila into a barge for transshipment to
Davao and temporarily stored in a bonded warehouse owned by AMCYL. The goods never
reached Davao and were never delivered to or received by the consignee, Samar Mining Co.

CFI ruled in favor of Samar Mining holding Nordeutscher Lloyd liable. However, defendants
may recoup whatever they may pay Samar Mining by enforcing the judgment against third
party defendant AMCYL.

Issue: Whether Nordeustscher Lloyd is liable for the loss of the goods as common carrier?

Held: No. At the time of the loss of the goods, the character of possession of Nordeutscher
Lloyd shifted from common carrier to agent of Samar Mining Co.

The Bill of Lading is serves both as a receipt of goods and is likewise the contract to transport
and deliver the same as stipulated. It is a contract and is therefore the law between the parties.
The Bill of Lading in question stipulated that Nordeutscher Lloyd only undertook to transport
the goods in its vessel only up to the port of discharge from ship, which is Manila. The Bill of
Lading further stipulated that the goods were to be transshipped by the carrier from Manila to
the port of destination – Davao. By unloading the shipment in Manila and delivering the goods
to the warehouse of AMCYL, the appellant was acting within the contractual stipulations
contained in the Bill of Lading.

Article 1736 of the Civil Code relives the carrier of responsibility over the shipment as soon as
the carrier makes actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the consignee or to the person
who has a right to receive them.

Under the Civil Code provisions governing Agency, an agent can only be held liable in cases
where his acts are attended by fraud, negligence, deceit or if there is a conflict of interest
between him and the principal. Under the same law an agent is likewise liable if he appoints
a substitute when he was not given the power to appoint one or otherwise appoints one that
is notoriously incompetent or insolvent. These facts were not proven in the record.
Servando vs. Philippine Steam Navigation Co. Case Digest
Servando vs. Philippine Steam Navigation Co.
(117 SCRA 832)

Facts: Bico and Servando loaded on board the FS-176 the following cargoes: 1.528 cavans
of rice and 44 cartons of colored paper, toys and general merchandise. Upon the arrival of the
vessel, the cargoes were discharged, complete and in good order to the warehouse of the
Bureau of Customs. At 2:00 pm of the same day, a fire of unknown reasons razed the
warehouse. Before the fire, Bico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice. The petitioners
are now claiming for the value of the destroyed goods from the common carrier.

The Trial Court ordered the respondent to pay the plaintiffs the amount of their lost goods on
the basis that the delivery of the shipment to the warehouse is not the delivery contemplated
by Article 1736 of the New Civil Code, since the loss occurred before actual or constructive
delivery. The petitioners argued that the stipulation in the bills of lading does not bind them
because they did not sign the same. The stipulation states that the carrier shall not be
responsible for loss unless such loss was due to the carrier’s negligence. Neither shall it be
liable for loss due to fortuitous events such as dangers of the sea and war.

Issue: Whether or not the carrier should be held liable for the destruction of the goods

Held: No. There is nothing on record to show that the carrier incurred in delay in the
performance of its obligation. Since the carrier even notified the plaintiffs of the arrival of their
shipments and had demanded that they be withdrawn.

The carrier also cannot be charged with negligence since the storage of the goods was in the
Customs warehouse and was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. Since the
warehouse belonged and maintained by the Government, it would be unfair to impute
negligence to the appellant since it has no control over the same.
MAERSK LINES vs. CA

FACTS
Petitioner Maersk Line is engaged in the transportation of goods by sea, doing business in the
Philippines through its general agent Compania de Tabacos de Filipinas, while private respondent
Efren Castillo is the proprietor of Ethegal Laboratories, a firm engaged in the manufacture of
pharmaceutical products.

On Nov. 12, 1976, Castillo ordered from Eli Lilly, Inc. of Puerto Rico 600,000 empty gelatin capsules
for the manufacture of his pharmaceutical products. The capsules were placed in 6 drums of 100,000
capsules each valued at US$1,668.71. Shipper Eli Liily,Inc. advised Castillo through a Memorandum of
Shipment that the products were already shipped on board MV “Anders Maesrkline” and date of
arrival to be April 3, 1977.

However, for unknown reasons, said cargoes of capsules were diverted to Richmond, VA and then
transported back to Oakland, CA and with the goods finally arriving in the PI on June 10, 1977.
Consignee Castillo refused to take delivery of the goods on account of its failure to arrive on time, and
filed an action for rescission of contract with damages against Maersk and Eli Lilly alleging gross
negligence and undue delay.

Maersk contends that it is liable only in case of loss, destruction or deterioration of goods under Art
1734 NCC while Eli Lilly in its cross claim argued that the delay was due solely to the negligence of
Maersk Line. Trial Court dismissed the complaint against Eli Lilly and the latter withdrew cross claim
but TC still held Maersk liable and CA affirmed with modifications.

ISSUES

1. W/N a cause of action exists against Maersk Line given that there was a dismissal of the
complaint against Eli Lilly? Yes, but not under the cross claim rather because Maersk was an
original party.
2. W/N Castillo is entitled to damages resulting from delay in the delivery of the shipment in the
absence in the bill of lading of a stipulation on the delivery of goods? Yes.

RULING

The complaint was filed originally against Eli Lilly, Inc. as shipper-supplier and petitioner as carrier.
Petitioner Maersk Line being an original party defendant upon whom the delayed shipment is imputed
cannot claim that the dismissal of the complaint against Eli Liily inured to its benefit.

Petitioner contends as well that it cannot be held liable because there was no special contract under
which the carrier undertook to deliver the shipment on or before a specific date and that the Bill of
Lading provides that “The Carrier does not undertake that the Goods shall arrive at port of discharge
or the place of delivery at any particular time…”. However, although the SC stated that a bill of lading
being a contract of adhesion will not be voided on that basis alone, it did declare that the questioned
provision to be void because it has the effect of practically leaving the date of arrival of the subject
shipment on the sole determination and will of the carrier. It is established that without any stipulated
date, the delivery of shipment or cargo should be made within a reasonable time. In the case at hand,
the SC declared that a delay in the delivery of the goods spanning a period of 2 months and 7 days
falls way beyond the realm of reasonableness
 GANZON vs.COURT OF APPEALS and GELACIO E. TUMAMBING
(G.R. No. L-48757, May 30, 1988)

FACTS:

On November 28, 1956, Gelacio Tumambing contracted the services of Mauro B. Ganzon to
haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of Manila on board the lighter
LCT "Batman. Pursuant to that agreement, Mauro B. Ganzon sent his lighter "Batman" to
Mariveles where it docked in three feet of water. Gelacio Tumambing delivered the scrap
iron to defendant Filomeno Niza, captain of the lighter, for loading which was actually begun
on the same date by the crew of the lighter under the captain's supervision. When about half
of the scrap iron was already loaded, Mayor Jose Advincula of Mariveles, Bataan, arrived
and demanded P5,000.00 from Gelacio Tumambing. The latter resisted the shakedown and
after a heated argument between them, Mayor Jose Advincula drew his gun and fired at
Gelacio Tumambing who sustained injuries.

After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. But on December 4, 1956,
Acting Mayor Basilio Rub, accompanied by three policemen, ordered captain Filomeno Niza
and his crew to dump the scrap iron where the lighter was docked. The rest was brought to
the compound of NASSCO. Later on Acting Mayor Rub issued a receipt stating that the
Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron.

Tumabing sued Ganzon; the latter alleged that the goods have not been unconditionally
placed under his custody and control to make him liable. The trial court dismissed the case
but on appeal, respondent Court rendered a decision reversing the decision of the trial court
and ordering Ganzon to pay damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not a contract of carriage has been perfected.

HELD: Yes. By the said act of delivery, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the
possession and control of the common carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier for
transportation, the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, the petitioner-
carrier's extraordinary responsibility for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods
commenced. Pursuant to Art. 1736, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon
the delivery, actual or constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has
a right to receive them. The fact that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board the
lighter did not impair the said contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody
and control of the carrier, albeit still unloaded.

Before Ganzon could be absolved from responsibility on the ground that he was ordered by
competent public authority to unload the scrap iron, it must be shown that Acting Mayor
Basilio Rub had the power to issue the disputed order, or that it was lawful, or that it was
issued under legal process of authority. The appellee failed to establish this. Indeed, no
authority or power of the acting mayor to issue such an order was given in evidence. Neither
has it been shown that the cargo of scrap iron belonged to the Municipality of Mariveles.
What we have in the record is the stipulation of the parties that the cargo of scrap iron was
accumulated by the appellant through separate purchases here and there from private
individuals. The fact remains that the order given by the acting mayor to dump the scrap iron
into the sea was part of the pressure applied by Mayor Jose Advincula to shakedown
Tumambing for P5,000.00. The order of the acting mayor did not constitute valid authority for
Ganzon and his representatives to carry out.