Human Nature and Collective Behavior

Author(s): Robert E. Park

Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32, No. 5 (Mar., 1927), pp. 733-741
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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 HUMAN NATURE AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR1

ROBERT E. PARK
Universityof Chicago

ABSTRACT
Studies of animal behavioremphasizethe act, i.e., the behavior,of the organism
as a whole, as over against the "response"to stimulationof some singlesegmentof
the organism-the reflex.Action involvesnew adjustment,co-ordination,and inte-
grationof the physiologicalorganism. In the evolution of the organismthe act is
primary,structuresecondary. The same logic may be applied to the descriptionof
societyand of social institutions.Collectiveaction is first.Action patternsonce es-
tablishedbecomesocial structure.The social group behaves like an organism.Insti-
tutionsare the productof collectiveaction. The individual,on the otherhand, in so
faras his behavioris controlledby customand convention,is a productof society,of
the individual'sinterpretationof his r8le,and so, indirectly,of collectiveaction. So-
cietyis not a mere aggregateof individuals,but such an aggregateas is capable of
corporateaction.

Recentattemptsto applyto the studyof humanconductthe

methodsofinvestigation firstemployedin thestudyof animalbe-
haviorhave profoundly influencedthepointofviewnotmerelyof
psychology,but of social psychology and ofsociology.Psychology,
in becomingobjective-thatis to say, behavioristic-hasempha-
sizedwhatit callsovertresponse.Incidentally, consciousnesseith-
er has been dismissedfromany consideration whateveror has
been relegatedto thepositionof an incidentin a cycleof events
whichbeginswiththephysiological reflexesand terminatesin an
act; whatThurstonecalls"thepsychological act."2
What the studentsof animalbehavioractuallyhave done in
theirlaboratoriesis to putanimalsundertestconditions and then
incitethemto appropriateaction. The mouse,in a maze,triesto
finditswayout. The lowlyearthworm, which,as reportedin a lo-
cal newspaper,a Harvardprofessor soughtto educate,was incited
byhungerand theproximity offoodtofindtheeasiestandtheleast
painfulwayofgetting it. Underthesecircumstances theanimalre-
1 Thisarticle appearedin Zeitschrift II, Heft3 (Septem-
furVolkerpsychologie,
ber,1926), pp. 209-23.
'L. L. Thurstone, TheNatureofIntelligence
(New York,I924).
733

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734 THE AMERICAN JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY

spondedin everycase,notto a singlestimulus, but to a situation;

and theresponsewas notthatofa singlereflex or instinct,butthat
oftheorganism as a whole.In otherwords,theresponsewhichthe
situationcalledforthwas nota reaction, ifwe maybe permitted to
makea distinction, but an act. A reactionpresupposesthe exist-
enceof a reflex, habit,conditioned reflex, or pattern,in whichthe
responseto a stimulusis predetermined. But an act implies,rela-
tivelyspeaking,newadjustment, co-ordination, and integration of
theexisting physiological mechanism.
The thingwhichdistinguishes an organismfroma mereaggre-
gation of individuals,or of parts,is thecapacityforconcertedac-
tion-the disposition of theparts,undercertainconditions, to act
as a unit.The structureofan organism, inheritedoracquired,serves
thisconcerted
to facilitate action.This is as trueofa socialas ofa
biologicalorganism.The fundamental differencesbetweenorgan-
isms,thecharacterwhichpermitsus to arrangethemin a progres-
siveseries,are thedifferent degreesto whichthedifferent partsof
are
whichthey composed have been integrated organizedfor
and
the purposeof corporateaction. What constitutes the organism,
then,as distinguished fromthemereassemblageofitsparts,is,ac-
cordingto Child,an action-pattern, whichcontrolsand co-ordi-
natesthereactionofthepartsso as to giveto thebehaviorof the
organism thecharacter whichI have describedas an act.
We speakoforganisms as individuals,
meaning thateachorganism repre-
sentsa moreorlessdefiniteanddiscrete orderandunity;inotherwords, a pat-
tern,whichnotonlydetermines andtherelations
itsstructure of itspartsto
eachother,butenablesit to act as a wholewithrespect to theworldaboutit.
. . . Organismicbehavior is, then,thebehavior oftheorganism as a wholeas
fromthebehavior
distinguished ... . On theotherhandthe
of singleparts
of behavior
integration is notlimited by theindividualorganism.Organisms
maybe integratedintosocialgroupsofvarioussortsandordersofmagnitude,
andin suchgroupsthebehavior of theconstituent is moreor less
individuals
intothesocialbehavior
integrated ofthegroup.3
On thewhole,thesocial groupbehaveslike an organism,and
betweengroupsmay be describedin termsof the
the differences
whichdetermines
action-pattern thebehaviorof each. The funda-
mentaldifferencebetweena cityand a village,fromthepointof
ofBehavior(New York,I924).
Foundations
'CharlesM. Child,Physiological

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 HUMAN NATURE AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 735

viewofsociology, is notthemeresizeoftheaggregates orthenum-

ber of individualsof whichtheyare composed,but the degreeto
whichthesedifferent aggregateshave been integrated and organ-
ized forconcerted action.This suggeststhatina studyofthesocial
group,as ofthebiologicalorganism, thepointofdeparture is,prop-
erly,notstructure, butactivity.The thingthatgivesa community
thecharacterof a societyis notits structure, but its capacityfor
concerted action.
The capacityforcorporateactionis, to be sure,facilitated by
structure, butis notdependentuponit. The crowdbecomesa so-
ciety,notby themerefactthata groupofpersonsare gatheredto-
getherat a givenmomentand in a particularspot,butby thefact
thatthisaggregation of individualsis capable of action. Action
may take place in the crowdwitha minimum of organization or
withno organization at all,exceptwhathas beencalledby Le Bon
"psychological organization."
Actionis first;but the effectof actionis to createan action
pattern.This actionpattern,as maybe observedin thecrowd,is
frequently extremely fragileand ephemeral, and mayexistwithout
any clearlydefinedorganization.Permanenceof the actionpat-
tern,however, is dependent upontheexistenceof structure, upona
divisionoflabor,and uponsomedegreeof specialization in thein-
dividualswhocomposethegroup.Whentheroleoftheindividuals
intheactionofthegrouphas becomefixedinhabit,and particular-
lywhentheroleofdifferent individualsand theirspecialfunctions
have becomerecognized in customand tradition, thesocialorgan-
izationgainsa newstability andpermanence whichpermitsit to be
transmitted to succeedinggenerations.In thisway thelifeof the
community and ofsocietymaybe prolonged beyondthelivesofthe
individualswhocomposeit.
Institutions and socialstructures ofeverysortmaybe regarded
as productsofcollectiveaction.War,famine, revolution, thestrug-
gle againstan externalenemyand againstinternaldisorganization
any of theordinaryexigenciesof communaland collectivelife
whichcall forcollectiveaction-may set a social patternwhich
repetitionfixesinhabits,and whicheventually becomeinstitution-
alizedincustomsand traditions.

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736 THE AMERICAN JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY

Lookedat fromthepointoftheindividualorganismor thein-

dividualmemberof a community, this functioningof the social
groupand thisevolutionof societyand of institutions presentsit-
selfas a response,an accommodation, and eventuallya biological
adaptationoftheindividualtohabitat;a physicalenvironment and
a socialmilieu.In thishabitattheindividualbecomes,in thecourse
oftime,a person,andperhapsa citizen.
The same forceswhichco-operateto createthecharacteristic
socialorganization and theacceptedmoralorderofa givensociety
or social groupdetermine at the same time,to a greateror lesser
extent,thecharacterof theindividualswhocomposethatsociety.
The individualinheritsfromhis forbearsand froma longseriesof
hisanimalancestorsthepotentialities whichare realizedin specific
charactersin the courseof his association-particularly during
childhoodand adolescence-withhis fellows.The extentto which
these potentialitiesare actuallyrealizedand the specificforms
whichtheyeventually takeis determined, notmerelybythegeneral
conditionswhicheverysocietyand everysocial milieuimposes
uponits members, but rathermoreby theextentto which,in any
givensociety,a divisionof laborhas beenachieved.It is thedivi-
sionoflabor,quiteas muchas anything else,whichdetermines the
degreetowhichtheindividualis dependent upon,and incorporated
in,thesocialorganization ofwhichhe is a member.
AdamSmithlongago recognized thatthemoststriking differ-
encesbetweenindividualsare due to thedivisionoflabor. It is not
thatthesedifferences werenot implicitin the individualsthem-
butit is thedivisionoflabor
selves,existingthereas potentialities,
and thedisciplineimposedbysocietyuponitsmembers thathas de-
velopedthem.
The difference ofnaturaltalentsin different
menis,in reality,
muchless
thanwe are awareof; andtheverydifferent geniuswhichappearsto distin-
guishmenof different whengrownup to maturity,
professions, is notupon
manyoccasions so muchthecause,as theeffect,ofthedivisionoflabor.The
between
difference themostdissimilar between
characters, a philosopheranda
common street porter,forexample,seemsto arisenotso muchfromnature, as
fromhabit,custom, andeducation.Whentheycameintotheworld,and for
thefirstsix or eightyearsof theirexistence,theywereperhapsverymuch

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 HUMAN NATURE AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 737

alike,andneither theirparents norplayfellows couldperceiveanyremarkable

difference.Aboutthatage,orsoonafter,theycometo be employed in differ-
entoccupations. The difference of talentscomesthento be takennoticeof,
andwidensbydegrees, tillat lastthevanityofthephilosopher is willingto ac-
knowledge scarceanyresemblance. Butwithout thedispositionto truck,bar-
ter,andexchange, everymanmusthaveprocured to himself
everynecessary
and conveniency oflifewhichhe wanted.All musthavehadthesameduties
to perform, andthesameworkto do,andtherecouldhavebeenno suchdif-
ferenceofemployment as couldalonegiveoccasionto anygreatdifference of
talent.
As it is thepowerof exchanging thatgivesoccasionto thedivisionof
labor,so theextentof thisdivision mustalwaysbe limitedby theextentof
thatpower,or,in otherwords,by theextentof themarket ... . Thereare
somesortsof industry, evenof thelowestkind,whichcan be carriedon no-
wherebutina greattown.4
It is not,however,
a divisionoflabor,butthefactofsocialcon-
trolthatcharacterizes humansociety.It is not,in otherwords,the
unconsciouscompetition and co-operation of individualmenand
womenwithinthe limitsof a humanhabitatthathas impressed
uponhumannatureand humansocietytheirmostdistinctive traits.
It is rathertheconsciousparticipation in a commonpurposeand a
commonlife,rendered possiblebythefactofspeechand by theex-
istenceofa fundofcommonsymbolsand meanings.The loweran-
imalshaveneither wordsnorsymbols;nothing, forthem,has what
we maydescribeas meaning.The loweranimalshave,in thewords
ofDurkheim,no "collectiverepresentations." They do notorgan-
ize processionsand carrybanners;theysing,and sometimes, we
are told,evendance,buttheydo notcelebrate;theyacquirehab-
its whichare sometimes transmitted as a kindof social tradition,
buttheyhaveno customs, and forthemnothingis eithersacredor
lawful.Aboveall, theanimalsare naturaland naive,and notcon-
cerned,as humanbeingsare,abouttheirreputations and theircon-
duct. They are nottortured by moralscruples."They do not,"as
WaltWhitmanhas putit,"sweatand whineabouttheircondition.
They do notlie awake in thedarkand weep fortheirsins." And
"over the wholeearththereis notone thatis respectableor un-
happy."
4'AdamSmith, AnInquiryintotheNatureand CausesoftheWealthofNations,
BookI, chap.ii.

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 738 THE AMERICAN JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY

But it is just-thissortof behavior-whichmakesWalt Whit-

man,as he says,"sick,"so thathe thinkshe could turnand live
withtheanimals,"theyare so placidand self-contained"-that is
mostcharacteristic ofhumannatureandhumanbehavior.Forman
is a creaturesuchthatwhenhe livesat all,he livesin his imagina-
tion,and,through hisimagination, in themindsof othermen,who
sharewithhimnotmerelytheirpossessions,but theirhopes and
theirdreams.By suggestion, by imitation,by expressionsof sym-
pathyand antipathy, meninvadeone another'slives and partici-
pateonewithanotherin theirefforts to direct,control,and giveex-
pressionto theirownconflicting impulses.
In humansocietyeveryact ofeveryindividualtendsto become
a gesture,sincewhatone does is alwaysan indicationof-whatone
intendsto do. The consequenceis thatthe individualin society
livesa moreorlesspublicexistence, inwhichall his actsare antici-
or
pated,checked,inhibited, modified by thegesturesand thein-
tentionsof his fellows.It is in thissocial conflict, in whichevery
individuallivesmoreor less in themindof everyotherindividual,
thathumannatureand theindividualmayacquiretheirmostchar-
acteristic and humantraits.
It is probablyno merehistoricalaccident,as I have said else-
where,thattheword"person,"in itsfirstmeaning, is a mask. It is
rathera recognition of the factthat everyone is always and every-
where,moreorlessconsciously, playinga role. We are parentsand
children, mastersand servants,teachersand students,clientsand
professional men,Gentilesand Jews. It is in theserolesthatwe
knoweach other;it is in theserolesthatwe knowourselves.5
One thingthatdistinguishes manfromtheloweranimalsis the
factthathe has a conception ofhimself, and oncehe has definedhis
rolehe strivesto liveup to it. He notonlyacts,buthe dressesthe
part,assumesquite spontaneously all the mannersand attitudes
thathe conceivesas properto it. Oftenenoughit happensthathe
is notfittedto therolewhichhe choosesto play. In any case, it is
an effort foranyofus to maintaintheattitudeswhichwe assume;
all themoredifficult whentheworldrefusesto take us at ourown
'Robert E. Park,"BehindOur Masks,"SurveyGraphic(May, 1926), pp.
135-39.

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 HUMAN NATURE AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 739

estimatesof ourselves.Beingactors,we are consciously or uncon-

sciouslyseekingrecognition, and failureto win it is, at the very
least,a depressing, oftena heartbreaking, experience.This is one
ofthereasonswhywe all eventually conform to theacceptedmod-
els and conceiveourselvesin someoneor otheroftheconventional
patterns.
The consequenceof this,however,is thatwe inevitably lead a
dual existence.We have a privateand a publiclife. In seekingto
liveup to therolewhichwe have assumed,and whichsocietyhas
imposeduponus, we findourselvesin constantconflict withour-
selves. Insteadofactingsimplyand naturally, as a child,respond-
ingto each naturalimpulseas it arises,we seek to conform to ac-
ceptedmodels,and conceiveourselvesin someone of the conven-
tionaland sociallyacceptedpatterns.In ourefforts to conform, we
restrainourimmediateand spontaneousimpulses,and act, notas
we are impelledto act,butratheras seemsappropriate and proper
to theoccasion.
Underthesecircumstances our manners,our politespeeches
and gestures,our conventional and properbehavior,assumethe
character ofa mask. Ourveryfacesarelivingmasks,whichreflect,
to be sure,thechanging emotions ofourinnerlives,butwhichmore
and moretendto conform to thetypewe are seekingto imperson-
ate. Not onlyeveryrace,buteverynationality has its characteris-
tic "face," its conventional mask. As Emersonpointsout in his
English Traits,"everyreligioussect has its physiognomy. The
Methodistshave acquireda face,theQuakersa face,the nunsa
face. An Englishmanwill pointout a dissenterby his manner.
Trades and professions carvetheirownlineson facesand forms."
In a sense,and in so faras thismaskrepresents theconception
whichwe have formedof ourselves,therolewhichwe are striving
to liveup to,thismaskis our"truerself,"theselfwe shouldliketo
be. So, at anyrate,ourmaskbecomesat lastan integral partofour
personality;becomessecondnature.We comeintotheworldas in-
dividuals,achievecharacter, and becomepersons.
Humanbehavior,so faras it can be distinguished fromthatof
the loweranimals,is consciousand conventional;sociallycon-
trolled,in short.Behaviorthatis controlledin thisway we may

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740 THE AMERICAN JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY

call conduct;thatis to say,behaviormorallysanctionedand sub-

jectivelyconditioned. This subjectivity,so characteristic ofhuman
nature,is at once a conditionand a productof collectivelife. So
faras itis subjectiveitcannotbe adequatelydescribedas thestrict-
er sect of behaviorists insistit shouldbe, in physiological terms;
butso faras itis socialitcannotbe describedintermsofindividual
behavior,and forthisreasonpsychology, so faras it dealswithper-
sons and personality, inevitablybecomessocial psychology.The
motiveswhichcompelmento commitsuicide,to writepoetry,and
to go to war are frequently the outcomeof longand painfulcon-
flict.The acts in whichtheyterminate have, therefore, an ante-
cedenthistory, is
and it necessaryto know thishistory under-
to
standtheacts. This is trueofmostovertacts,as it is ofindividual
opinion,religiouscreeds,and politicaldoctrines.Opinions,creeds,
and doctrinesbecomeintelligible to us onlywhenwe knowtheir
history;whenwe know,in otherwords,the experiencesout of
whichtheyhave sprung.The reasonwhyhistoryand biography
existis notmerelyto recordovertacts,but to makethemintelli-
gible.
Not onlyis it truethatwe all participatedirectlyor indirectly
in makingup themindsand determining theovertacts of our fel-
lows,butthecravingforthisparticipation in a commonlife-the
desireforsympathy, recognition, understanding, forexample-is
one of themostfundamental traitsof humannature.Justas his-
toryis,to a verylargeextent, therecordofthestruggles ofnations
and peoplesforprestigeand statusin an international society,so
thehumbler, moregarrulous, and provincialchronicleof thelocal
newspaper is largelya recordoftheconflicts ofindividualmenand
womenin seekingto finda place and a positionin sometribe,clan,
neighborhood, orhousehold.
It is because humanactionsmustbe interpreted in orderto
make themintelligible that documents-humandocuments-are
moreimportant forthe studyof humannaturethan statisticsor
formalfacts. The documentsare valuable,therefore, not merely
because theydescribeevents,but because theythrowlightupon
motives;thatis to say,uponthesubjectiveaspectsof eventsand
acts in whichhumannaturemanifestsitself.Not merelyevents,

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 HUMAN NATURE AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 74I

butinstitutions as wellbecomeintelligible whenwe knowtheirhis-

tories,and particularly whenwe know the individualexperiences
ofmenandwomeninwhichtheyhad theiroriginand onwhichthey
finallyrest.
The mostsignificant document,of course,is the one thatis
mostexpressive and revealing,and this,on thewhole,has beenthe
life-history,usingthattermin thesenseinwhichThomasand Zna-
nieckihavedefinedit in theirmonumental study,The PolishPeas-
antinEuropeand America.6
If itis notpracticalor desirableto confineourinvestigations of
humannatureto theovertresponse,as thebehaviorists definethat
term,theattemptto studyhumannatureobjectivelyhas, at any
rate,donesociologyand socialpsychology a goodturnin so faras
ithas directedattention to thepsychological act ratherthanto the
physiological reactionas a unitof investigation and analysis.For
society,as wellas mentallife,has comeintoexistencenotmerely
in theefforts ofindividualsto act,butin theirefforts to act collec-
tively.
Fromthispointof viewthemoralstruggles of individualmen
and womenand the politicalconflicts of nationsturnout to be
merelyincidents intheprocessesbywhichsocietyand socialgroups
integrate and organizetheindividualunitsofwhichtheyare com-
posed and mobilizethemforcollectiveaction. Furthermore, just
as the individualpersonmay in somesense be conceivedas the
productofindividualacts,so socialinstitutions maybe regardedas
theproductof collectiveactions.Justas customin thegroupmay
be regardedas the objectiveaspectof habitin the individual,so
moralityin theindividualmay be construedas the subjectiveas-
pectoforganization and moralein thegroup.
'W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki,The Polish Peasant in Europe and Amer-
ica: Monograph of an ImmigrantGroup. 5 vols. (Boston, I9I8).

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