1.Republic v. Madrona, G.R.
163604, 6 May 2005; Doctrine: Article 151 of the Family Code not applicable to special proceedings. The requirement
Doctrine: A petition for declaration of presumptive death is not a special proceeding.
Facts: In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P.
Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by
Order of September 29, 1999, [1] granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioner's Report [2]
and accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier,
presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the
Family Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance
of the absent spouse.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial court's order by
filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served "as
required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present
case being a special proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal
Issue: WON a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a
special proceeding.
Ruling: Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and
not an ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the
presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek t he enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of
right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
The subject Order dated January 13, 2000 denying OSGs Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice of Appeal was correctly issued. The instant
petition, being in the nature of a special proceeding, OSG should have filed, in
addition to its Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.
By the trial court's citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of
Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her
desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary
proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW,
contains the following provision, inter alia: x x x Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court,
the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Codes requiring
summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner
without regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) x x x,
Thus, there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a
summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of
Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary
proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's order sufficed.
CASE 2: Manalo vs. CA, G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001
in the Family Code involving suits between family members that there must be a ― verified
allegation of earnest efforts to compromise‖ only applies to ordinary civil actions and NOT in
special proceedings. A petition for settlement of estate is a special proceeding which does NOT
necessitate the said requirement .
Facts: Troadio Manalo, a resident of Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He
was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, who are all of legal age.
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located
in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's
Machine Shop with offices.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late
Troadio Manalo, filed a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial
settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their
brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order
'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence of
the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of
general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo,
Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which to file their
opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in
the filling of an Omnibus Motion.
Trial court issued an order 1. admiting the so-called Opposition filed by counsel only for the
purpose of considering the merits thereof; 2. denying the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary
hearing of their affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding3 Declaring that
this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;4. Denying the motion of the
oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge; and 5. Setting the application of Romeo
Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court
of Appeals, stating that in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate
proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the
same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari and the motion for reconsideration of the
said resolution was likewise dismissed. Hence the instant petition.
Issue: WON the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the
respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for
judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest
efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the
filling of the petition but that the same have failed.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil
action involving members of the same family. And the same should be dismissed under Rule 16,
Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may
be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with,
that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior
to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Ruling: The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at
bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim
that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said pet ition contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as
the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the
City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence
within he country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest. 17 The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an
enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the
deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's
prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners
therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased
father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentia lly
valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as
irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear and dispose of collateral
matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition,
the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant
nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses
contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either
thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. 21 So it should be in the
instant petition for settlement of estate.
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered
as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of
the Rules of Court vis-à-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply
as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which
provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist
the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily
include special proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions
of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased
Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it
should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied). 22
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from
the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a
court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress
of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an
action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong. 24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code
Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal
provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of
the same family,
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition
for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-
63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private respondents
herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly
recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to
participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the
limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court. 1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against
petitioners. SO ORDERED.
3.Ting v. Heirs of Lirio, 14 March 2007;
―action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to
special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action
must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure
to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status,
condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is
sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the
adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust
him therefrom.‖
Facts:
Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the
application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of title to Lot No.
18281. The decision became final and executory on January 29, 1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter
issued an order of November 10, 1982 directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the
corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
an application for registration of title to the same lot.
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, who were afforded the opportunity to file an
opposition to petitioner's application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer [2] calling
attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and
executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioner's application
on the ground of res judicata. After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the
Cebu RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioner's application on the ground of res
judicata
Issue:
WON there is res judicata and WON sec 6 rule 39 of rules of court applies to special proceedings.
Ruling:
The petition fails. After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court
to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for
the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the
person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied)
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without
opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case
may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the
whole world. [9] It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a
judgment of confirmation and registration.
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court's approval in LRC No. N-
983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza's application for registration of the lot settled its
ownership, and is binding on the whole world including petitioner.
As for Ting‗s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading: SEC. 6. Execution
by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed
on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before
it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations, the December 10, 1976
decision became ―extinct‖ in light of the failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-
interest to execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.
As for petitioner's claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment or order
may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such
time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations[,]
The December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents and/or of
their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same does
not lie.
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. [13]
enunciates the raison d'etre why Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in
land registration proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN THIS LAND
REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET
BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except
in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final,
it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to
enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to
the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within
10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions
and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so
because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured
as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a
reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the
losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or
fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is
sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by
judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary,
except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding
the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in
possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the
adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the
expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
CASE 4: ONG vs. PDICG.R. No. 175116; August 18, 2010
Doctrine: A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation is a special proceeding. An appeal
in a special proceeding requires both the filing of a notice of appeal and the record on appeal
within thirty days from receipt of the notice of judgment or final order.
FACTS: Sometime in 1982 and 1983, petitioner Jerry Ong made some money market placements
with Omnibus Finance Inc. (OFI), which later on suffered serious financial difficulties. As
petitioner's money market placements matured, he demanded from OFI the return of the same.
However, OFI's checks issued thereby were dishonored by the drawee bank. It was alleged that
OFI sought the assistance of its sister companies which included the Rural Bank of Olongapo
(RBO). On December 29, 1983, Jose Ma. Carballo, OFI President, and Cynthia Gonzales,
Chairperson of the Board of Directors of RBO, executed in favor of petitioner a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage3 over two parcels of land located in Tagaytay City covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-13769 and T-13770, which are both registered in RBO's name, as collateral to
guarantee the payment of OFI's money market obligations to petitioner in the amount of
₱863,517.02. The mortgage was executed by Gonzales by virtue of a Secretary's Certificate 4 issued
by Atty. Efren L. Legaspi, RBO's alleged Assistant Corporate Secretary, showing that Gonzales was
authorized by the RBO Board to execute such mortgage. The deed of mortgage was annotated on
TCT Nos. T-13769 and T-13770 of the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City on January 13, 1984.
As OFI failed to pay petitioner the obligation secured by the real estate mortgage, petitioner
foreclosed the mortgage on March 18, 1984. A Certificate of Sale was correspondingly issued
which was registered with the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City on July 16, 1985. Petitioner
alleged that representatives of the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank) had approached
him and borrowed TCT Nos. T-13769 and T-13770 for the on- going audit and inventory of the
assets of the RBO; however, these titles were not returned despite petitioner's demand. Petitioner
filed with the RTC of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, a case for the surrender of said titles, docketed as
TC-803. The case was subsequently dismissed for being premature as the one year redemption
period had not yet expired.
On May 22, 1984, RBO's Corporate Secretary and Acting Manager, Atty. Rodolfo C. Soriano, filed
with the RTC of Tagaytay City, an action for the annulment of real estate mortgage, extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage proceedings, sheriff's certificate of sale with damages against petitioner,
OFI, Cynthia Gonzales, the Sheriff and the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City, raffled off to Branch
18, and was docketed as Civil Case No. TG-805. However, the case was later suspended due to
OFI's pending application for rehabilitation with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
On May 9, 1985, the Central Bank, as petitioner, which was later substituted by respondent
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation5 (PDIC) filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for
assistance in the liquidation of RBO, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 170-0-85 and was raffled off to
Branch 73. Later, upon respondent's motion, Civil Case No. TG-805, i.e., for annulment of
mortgage, was consolidated with RBO's liquidation proceedings.
6 on appeal on time is an excusable neglect as the failure was due to the serious complications
On February 5, 1991, petitioner filed with Branch 79 of the RTC of Quezon City a petition for the
surrender of the titles of the Tagaytay properties against RBO, which petition was eventually
ordered dismissed by the CA after finding that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to try the case, but
without prejudice to petitioner's right to file his claim in RBO's liquidation proceedings pending
before Branch 73 of the RTC of Olongapo City.
Consequently, on February 16, 1996, petitioner filed in Sp. Proc. No. 170-0-85 a Motion to Admit
Claim against RBO's assets as a secured creditor and the winning bidder and/or purchaser of the
Tagaytay properties in the foreclosure sale. Respondent filed its Comment/Opposition to the
motion. Trial, thereafter, ensued on petitioner's claim.
On June 25, 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Philbert I. Iturralde issued an Order7 declaring
petitioner's claim against RBO valid and legitimate
Respondent filed its motion for reconsideration. Judge Renato J. Dilag reversed the June 25, 2001
Decision.
On June 17, 2003, petitioner, thru counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal12 which the RTC gave due
course in an Order.
Respondent sought reconsideration of the Order giving due course to petitioner's appeal as the
latter failed to file a record on appeal within the reglementary period; thus, the appeal was not
perfected.
RTC issued an Order that the appeal is dismissed for having been taken out of time.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction assailing the RTC Orders dated May 31, 2005 and December 7, 2005 for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
CA issued its assailed Decision on July 31, 2006, dismissing the petition.
Hence, the present petition
Issues: WON the civil case against RBO may proceed independently from liquidation
proceedings.
W/N CA GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BASED SOLELY ON
TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE.
W/N COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITHOUT
PASSING UPON THE MERIT OF PETITIONER'S APPEAL. 17
Petitioner reiterates his argument raised before the CA that his counsel's failure to submit a record
surrounding the case that led her to commit an error of judgment; that petitioner's counsel
honestly believed that their claim filed against RBO in the special proceedings and the civil case
filed by RBO against petitioner for the annulment of mortgage under Civil Case No. TG-805, which
was eventually consolidated with the special proceedings, were ordinary civil actions since they
sought the enforcement or protection of a right or prevention or redress of a wrong; thus, a mere
notice of appeal would be sufficient to perfect petitioner's appeal.
Ruling: All claims against the insolvent bank should be filed in the liquidation proceeding. The
judicial liquidation is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank. It is a
pragmatic arrangement designed to establish due process and orderliness in the liquidation of the
bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness. It is not
necessary that a claim be initially disputed in a court or agency before it is filed with the liquidation
court.
As to the main issues raised by petitioner, we find the same unmeritorious.
It has been held that a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation is classified as a special
proceeding. 20 The RTC decision, which petitioner sought to appeal from, was rendered in the
special proceeding for the liquidation of RBO's assets; thus, applying the above-quoted provisions,
an appeal in a special proceeding requires both the filing of a notice of appeal and the record on
appeal within thirty days from receipt of the notice of judgment or final order.
In this case, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal on June 17, 2003, and the RTC gave due course
to the appeal after it found that the notice of appeal was filed within the regle mentary period.
However, upon respondent's motion for reconsideration, where it argued that petitioner failed to
file a record on appeal, considering that the decision was rendered in a petition for liquidation of
RBO which was a special proceeding, the RTC reversed itself as no record on appeal was filed, and
dismissed petitioner's appeal for having been taken out of time. The RTC did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's appeal, since it is clearly stated under the Rules that
filing of the notice of appeal must be accompanied by a record on appeal to perfect one's appeal in
a special proceeding. In fact, the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's appeal was expressly allowed
under Section 13 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which states:
SECTION 13. Dismissal of appeal. – Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on
appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may motu propio or on motion to dismiss the appeal
for having been taken out of time.
Thus, we find no error committed by the CA when it sustained the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's
appeal for failure to comply with the Rules.
Withal, petitioner's ratiocinations that he failed to submit a Record on Appeal on time could be
taken as excusable neglect due to serious complications surrounding the case leading him to an
error of judgment where "an ordinary human being, courts, not excepted, is susceptible to commit,
is highly unsustainable. Petitioner counsel's honest belief that the claim of petitioner Ong and t he
civil case for annulment of mortgage under TG-085 were ordinary actions and, as such, mere filing
of a notice of appeal would be sufficient, is far from being persuasive. This is not the excusable
neglect as envisioned by the rules in order to sidestep on the strict compliance with the rules on
appeal. Petitioner was fully aware that Sp. Proc. No. 170-0-85 is a petition for liquidation because
they filed their claim in the case claiming to be a preferred creditor, participated in the trial thereof
in every step of the way, and filed the disputed Notice of Appeal under the title of the said case.
We cannot find any reason to accept petitioner's feigned ignorance that the case they were
appealing is a liquidation petition. In fine, such miscalculation of the petitioner cannot justify an
exception to the rules, and to apply the liberal construction rule.
An erroneous application of the law or rules is not excusable error." 26 Petitioner is bound by the
mistake of his counsel.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
5. In re Datukan Malang Salibo, 8 April 2015;
Doctrine :“Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken
identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being
illegally detained. . [54]‖
Facts: From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other
Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. [4] "While in Saudi Arabia, Salibo
visited and prayed in the cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah." [5] He returned to the
Philippines on December 20, 2009. [6] On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu
Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang. [7]
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating
in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by
the trial court in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. [8]
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name.
There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not hav e participated in
the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time. [9]
1.
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of his passport,
boarding passes and other documents"[10] tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo
was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19, 2009. [11]
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was not
Butukan S. Malang. [12]
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport
that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at
the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days. [13]
The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato
City, where he was detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation
and Detention Group allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents. [14]
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently
detained. [15]
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas
Corpus[16] questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty. [17] He maintained
that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. [
The Court of Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a Return of the Writ
one day before the scheduled hearing and produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing
set on September 27, 2010
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged"[29] under any resolution, information,
or amended information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended Information presented in
court did not charge Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as
there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo,
the trial court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a courtTtrial court
granted Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention.
On appeal, Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's Decision. It dismissed Salibo's
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Even assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest,
the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual
remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]"
Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration. As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner
Salibo was duly charged in court. Even assuming that he is not the Butukan S. Malang named in
the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion
to Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Issue: First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City on petitioner
Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals; and Second, whether
petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus
Ruling: We grant the Petition.
Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly appealed before the Court of
Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court
or any of its members, [50] the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by
law, [51] or the Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges. [52] The court or judge grants the
writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty
to file a return of the writ. [53] A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted. [54]
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ. [55] Should
the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower
court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower
court "acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for habeas
 corpus.]"[56] Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 153, Pasig City. The trial court then heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided
the Petition on the merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and authority to
determine the merits"[74] of petitioner Salibo's Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas
Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court
of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts, [75] respondent
Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.
2. It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to
clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo
was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing
nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any
offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant.
They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas
corpus may be issued. The police officers have deprived him of his liberty without due process of
law. Therefore, Salibo correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo
filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of
the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will
not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before CA or any
of its members, the CA or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the RTC or any of
its presiding judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having
custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the
return of the writ is then conducted.
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ. Should the
court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court
shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court
acquires the power and authority to determine the merits of the petition for habeas corpus.
Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.
CASE 6: VILLAVICENCIO vs. LUKBAN
Doctrine: Strict compliance with the technical requirements for a habeas corpus petition as
provided in the Rules of Court may be dispensed with where the allegations in the application are
sufficient to make out a case for habeas corpus. Indeed, in the landmark case of Villavicencio v.
Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, the Supreme Court declared that it is the duty of a court to issue the writ if
there is evidence that a person is unjustly restrained of his liberty within its jurisdiction even if
there is no application therefor.
Facts: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate
vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a
number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the
women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this
period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending
the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the
coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At
any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of
police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the
houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that
awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and
apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not
been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given
their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a
representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two
steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and
receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo
and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had
no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of
Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to
Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees
presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. And alleged that
the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was
made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and
Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the
writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action
should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and
Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control, and
because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. In open
court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had
been sent out of Manila without their consent.
The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the
city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of
the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the
persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.
The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which
related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the
court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in
Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on
January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the
judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the
respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible.
On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had
returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by
the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts
and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In
substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had
succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty -one women were
found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee,
renounced the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by
other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty -six could not be located. Both
counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally
asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police
of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city
of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau
of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal
requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos , (reply to respondents' memorandum)
dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus
in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific
objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties
petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person
in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the
jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits
and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and
friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it
impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the
writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of
a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's
jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be
made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of
Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice
that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be
presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule.
The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible
anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an
inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular
circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in
session, or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On
the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original
respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties
situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must
be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior
court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of
the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was
prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the
women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police
did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer
examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be pervasive of the first principles of the writ
of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible
taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other
parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion
just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or
personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where
they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties
were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to
whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the
jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who
has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan
Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley,
Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided.
Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J.,
one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy,
J., held that the writ should issue.
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs.
Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte
Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken
out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench
Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce
the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he
did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed
over by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible
for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court.
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed
to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons,
with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had
purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were
removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that
they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis
had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The
court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the
negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be
committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise
discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the
production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in
Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis
[1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S.,
624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the
respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They
could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they
could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not
safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the
parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure,
sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted;
they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that waived the
right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show
that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since been
repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a
considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is
demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned
at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted
summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until
they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from
sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate
with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more
zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were
posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer
with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in such a
bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a
failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial
compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to
see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should
receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can
be made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it,
nothing further in this connection remains to be done.
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we
cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly
disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez,
Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public
officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating
circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a
misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would
seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city
government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from
the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable
position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official
who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish
the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the
negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city government, had it
within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban,
the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His
methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only
tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The
respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in
contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office
of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The
motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de
los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So
ordered.
7. Fletcher v. Director of BuCor, UDK14071, 17 July 2009
Doctrine: A petition which is deficient in form, such as a petition-letter, may be entertained so
long as its allegations sufficiently make out a case for habeas corpus.
If it appears that the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and
that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order,
the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment
Facts:
Petitioner Martin Gibbs Fletcher seeks his release from prison in this petition for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus. He claims that his prison sentence of 12 to 17 years was commuted by then
President Fidel V. Ramos to nine to 12 years. Since he had already served 14 years, three months
and 12 days, including his good conduct allowance, his continued imprisonment is illegal. [1]
In its return to the writ, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posited that the petition should
be denied for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. In particular, the
petition was neither signed nor verified by petitioner or a person on his behalf or by his purported
counsel. Moreover, it was not accompanied by a copy of the cause of petitioner's detention or
commitment order.
The OSG further opposed the issuance of the writ on the following grounds: petitioner's prison
sentence was never commuted by then President Ramos; he had not been granted the status of a
colonist; there were other pending cases against him warranting his continued detention [2] and he
was put under custody by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
Issues: Should the petition for habeas curpos dimissed?
Ruling: We disagree with the OSG insofar as it argues that the petition should be dismissed for
failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Strict compliance with the
technical requirements for a habeas corpus petition as provided in the Rules of Court may be
dispensed with where the allegations in the application are sufficient to make out a case for
habeas corpus. In Angeles v. Director of New Bilibid Prison, [3] we held that the formalities required
for petitions for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally. The petition for the writ is required to
be verified but the defect in form is not fatal. [4] Indeed, in the landmark case of Villavicencio v.
Lukban, [5] this Court declared that it is the duty of a court to issue the writ if there is evidence that
a person is unjustly restrained of his liberty within its jurisdiction even if there is no application
therefor. So long as this Court sits, technicality cannot trump liberty. Therefore, a petition which is
deficient in form, such as petitioner's petition-letter in this case, may be entertained so long as its
allegations sufficiently make out a case for habeas corpus.
Nonetheless, we agree with the OSG that petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of the writ.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty. [10] However, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the person to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order,
the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)
Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or
imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody
over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment. [11]
It is undisputed that petitioner was convicted of estafa in Criminal Case No. 95-995. [12] On June 24,
1996, he was sentenced to imprisonment of 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and
four months of reclusion temporal as maximum, with payment of actual damages of P102,235.56
Case 8: Aquino vs. Esperon
Doctrine: The writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of
liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by a court which has jurisdiction to do
so. Since Major Aquino stands charged in court martial proceedings for alleged violations of Article
67 (attempting to begin or create a mutiny) and Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman), the legality of his arrest is settled and the writ is unavailing. Furthermore, the writ of
habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement, the writ will only lie if
what is questioned is the fact or duration of confinement.
-A regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be under the Articles of War.
- Only after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof have been made, that a charge be
referred to a general court-martial for trial.
- This Court has declared that habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of
confinement but the writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or duration
of confinement
Facts: On 3 February 2006, Major Aquino, along with several military men, allegedly met at the
resthouse of Captain Aldomovar near Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan to plot a breach of the
Camp Defense Plan of Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo and to take over Camp Aquinaldo, as well as
the Headquarters of the Philippine Army. On 26 February 2006, in the wake of the group‘s alleged
withdrawal of support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines chain of command and the current
administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Major Aquino was ordered arrested and
confined at the Intelligence Service Group of the Philippine Army in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, upon
the order of Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, (Lt. Gen. Esperon) who was then the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army. On the same day, Lt. Gen. Esperon ordered the Army Inspector
General to conduct an investigation. During the investigation, Major Aquino denied the accusations
hurled against him. He intimated, inter alia, that he had no plan nor did he make any
pronouncement of withdrawing support from the chain of command, and that he pledged to
continue to support the same and the duly constituted authorities. 7
On 4 March 2006, the panel of investigators submitted its Investigation Report to the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army. In its report, the panel of investigators found that the troop
movement 8 by some military personnel from their respective stations to Manila was illegal,
implicating Major Aquino.
The panel of investigators recommended that: 1) all implicated officers therein mentioned be
immediately relieved from their respective posts; and 2) appropriate charges be filed before the
General Court Martial against Major Aquino, among other military officers/personnel, for violations
of Article 6710 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny); and Article 97.
Further, the panel‘s Investigation Report was referred by Lt. Gen. Esperon to the Judge Advocate
General‘s Office (JAGO) of the Philippine Army for review. On 17 March 2006, the JAGO found the
existence of probable cause against Major Aquino, among other military officers, for violations of
Article 9613 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), Article 97 (Disorders and Neglects
Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline), and Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create
Mutiny) of the Articles of War.
Per said Supplemental Affidavit, it was revealed that subj Officers met at the resthouse of CPT
ALDOMOVAR near the so-called tower area in Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan, on the evening
of 03 Feb 2006, discuss and plot their plan to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp General
Emilio Aguinaldo and hatch a plan to take over Camp Aguinaldo and [the] Headquarters [of the]
Philippine Army. x x x. 14
On the basis of JAGO‘s recommendations, Col. Jose R. Recuenco (Col. Recuenco), then Army
Provost Marshal, signed under oath a charge sheet 15 against Major Aquino, charging the latter with
violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) 16 and Article 9617 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War, which was indorsed to the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
On 12 July 2006, Lt. Gen. Esperon issued an Order 18 to the Commanding Officer, 191st, MP Bn to
exercise custodial responsibility of Major Aquino, together with the other implicated military
personnel who withdrew their support from the chain of command in February 2006, and to place
them in confinement at the Philippine Army Detention Center, Camp Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal. The
same Order also designated the aforementioned Commanding Officer to exercise direct supervision
and control over the concerned detainees. 19
On 20 July 2006, the charge sheet against Major Aquino was amended to set forth more detailed
specifications of the charges. 20 It, however, retained the charges against Major Aquino as stated in
the original charge sheet—i.e. violation of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create a Mutiny) and
Article 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War.
On 20 July 2006, the Judge Advocate General of the AFP General Headquarters of the AFP issued
Office Order Number 14-06, creating a Pre-trial Investigation Panel21 for the case of Major Aquino,
et al.
On 21 July 2006, petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus22 with the Court of Appeals, praying
that the AFP Chief of Staff and the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, or whoever are
acting in their place and stead, be directed to immediately produce the body of Major Aquino and
explain forthwith why he should not be set at liberty without delay. The case was docketed as CA -
G.R. SP No. 95341.
In the meantime, the Pre-trial Investigation Panel of the AFP issued a Subpoena/Notice of Pre-trial
Investigation23 to Major Aquino, summoning him to appear in person before the panel and to
submit his counter-affidavits and affidavits of witnesses.
25 26
After hearing, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated 31 August 2006, denying the
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 31 August 2006 Decision, but, the Court of
Appeals denied the same and found no reason to disturb its judgment.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issues:
1.WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PREFERMENT OF
THE CHARGE SHEET AGAINST ARMY MAJOR AQUINO IS EQUIVALENT TO FORMALLY CHARGING
THE LATTER AS CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 70 OF THE ARTICLES OF WAR.
2.WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS LEGAL BASIS
IN PLACING ARMY MAJOR AQUINO IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN A MAXIMUM SECURITY
DETENTION FACILITY.
3.WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN RULING THAT ARMY MAJOR AQUINO‘S
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN A MAXIMUM SECURITY DETENTION FACILITY IS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 70 OF THE ARTICLES OF WAR. 32
Ruling:
Anent the first issue, petitioner assails the legality of Major Aquino‘s confinement on the ground
that the latter had not been formally charged. It is petitioner‘s theory that charges can only be
deemed formally filed after a thorough and impartial investigation shall have been made. 33 Thus,
petitioner suggests that the word "charge" as used in Article 70 34 of the Articles of War means that
a person is formally charged only after the conduct of a mandatory pre-trial investigationThus,
according to petitioner, the filing of a formal charge can only be done after the conclusion of the
pre-trial investigation, when the case is referred to the general court-martial, akin to the conduct
of a preliminary investigation in civilian courts. 35
We are not persuaded.
First, it is established that Major Aquino is governed by military law. Article 2 of the Articles of
War36 circumscribes the jurisdiction of military law only over persons subject thereto. Major
Aquino, G3 of the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) of the Special Operation Command of the
Philippine Army, is subject to military law.
As a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Major Aquino falls squarely under
Article 2 of the Articles of War. Consequently, he is subject to the applicable provisions of the
Articles of War and Executive Order No. 178; 37 or the Manual for Courts-Martial, Philippine Army.
Second, a scrutiny of the confinement of Major Aquino proves that the same is valid.
Article 70 of the Articles of War governs the cases of arrest or confinement, viz.:
Evidently, Article 70 of the Articles of War empowers the commanding officer to place, in
confinement or in arrest, any person subject to military law charged with a crime or with a serious
offense under the Articles of War. Article 70 is the authority for enabling the proper military
personnel to put an instant end to criminal or unmilitary conduct, and to impose such restraint as
may be necessary upon the person of a military offender, with a view of his trial by court -martial
We juxtapose Article 70 with Article 71 of the Articles of War. Under military law, the conduct of
investigations is governed by Article 71 of the Articles of War
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial
investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries as to the truth
of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the case should be
made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation[,] full opportunity shall be given
to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available and to present
anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating
officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded
after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of the
testimony taken on both sides.
Before directing the trial of any charge by general court-martial[,] the appointing authority will
refer it to his Staff Judge Advocate for consideration and advice.
When any person subject to military law is placed in arrest or confinement immediate steps will be
taken to try the person accused or to dismiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is
responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion shall be
punished as a court-martial may direct. When a person is held for a trial by general court-martial,
the commanding officer, within eight days after the accused is arrested or confined, if practicable,
forward the charges to the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction and furnish the
accused a copy of such charges. If the same be not practicable, he will report to superior authority
the reasons for delay. The trial judge advocate will cause to be served upon the accused a copy of
the charges upon which trial is to be had, and a failure so to serve such charges will be ground for
a continuance unless the trial be had on the charges furnished the accused as hereinbefore
provided. In time of peace[,] no person shall, against his objection, be brought to trial before a
general court-martial within a period of five days subsequent to the service of charges upon him.
(As amended by RA 242). (Emphasis supplied.)
The formal written accusation in court-martial practice consists of two parts, the technical charge
and the specification. 40 The charge, where the offense alleged is a violation of the articles, merely
indicates the article the accused is alleged to have violated while the specifications sets forth the
specific facts and circumstances relied upon as constituting the violation. 41 Each specification,
together with the charge under which it is placed, constitutes a separate accusation. 42 The term
"charges" or "charges and specifications" is applied to the formal written accusation or accusations
against an accused. 43
The first part of Article 71 of the Articles of War categorically provides that charges and
specifications must be signed by a person subject to military law, who under oath states that he
either has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the
same are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief. Further, the second paragraph of
Article 71 explicitly provides that no charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until
after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. A charge is made
followed by a thorough and impartial investigation and if the result of the investigation so
warrants, the charge is referred to the general court martial. Contrary to petitioner‘s contention,
Article 71 makes no qualification that there can be a "charge" against a person subject to military
law only if a pre-trial has been completed and the case has been referred to a court martial. What
Article 71 instructs is that no charges, i.e. charges and specifications signed by a person subject to
military law under oath, may be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough
and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. Article 71 does not make the thorough
and impartial investigation a prerequisite before charges may be filed against a person subject to
military law. Clearly, the thorough and impartial investigation is a prerequisite not to making a
charge against a person subject to military law, but to the referral of the charge to the general
court martial. It is the charge which comes prior to the investigation, and which sets into motion
the investigation.
We find that there was compliance with the requirements of the Articles of War. As shown by the
evidence on record, the amended charge sheets 44 against Major Aquino, containing the charges
and the specifications for violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) and Article
96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War, were personally signed
under oath by Capt. Armando P. Paredes, a person subject to military law. The amended charge
sheets were sworn to by the accuser, Capt. Armando P. Paredes in the manner provided under
Article 71. 45 As it is, Major Aquino stands charged in court martial proceedings for alleged
violations of the Articles of War.
Perforce, we do not find that the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioner‘s Petition for Habeas
Corpus for the person of Major Aquino. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. 50 As a general rule, the writ of
habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. 51 Its
essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a
person from it if such restraint is illegal. 52 In the case at bar, Major Aquino stands charged in court
martial proceedings for alleged violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) and
Article 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War. The legality of
Major Aquino‘s restraint having been settled, the privilege of the writ is unavailing.
We proceed to discuss jointly the second and third issues raised by the petitioner before this Court.
Petitioner contends that in his confinement, Major Aquino was not restricted to his barracks,
quarters or tent as mandated by Article 70 of the Articles of War; rather, he was placed in solitary
confinement in a maximum security detention cell. When petitioner proceeded to the detention
cell, she alleged that she was restricted from visiting her husband. 53 Petitioner asserts that these
are extreme punishments akin to treating Major Aquino as a convicted criminal. 54
We are not impressed.
At this juncture, it must be stressed that respondents deny the solitary confinement of Major
Aquino. 55 According to respondents, Major Aquino is confined in a U-shaped building without any
division/partition. 56 The place is described as a long hall with 50 double-deck beds. 57 Respondents
also asseverate that Major Aquino is confined along with 16 other military personnel who were
similarly charged in the 23-24 February 2006 incident. 58
While it is true that the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to inquire
into questions of violations of constitutional right, 59 this Court, however, does not find the
conditions of Major Aquino‘s confinement to be a proper subject of inquiry in the instant Petition.
This Court has declared that habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of
confinement.
Furthermore, the following guidelines were given by the Court to determine if an action constitutes
punishment, to wit: (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some harm or "disability," and (2)
the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. 63 It is also an additional requisite that the harm
or disability be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of
confinement. 64 We do not see the attendance of the foregoing factors in the instant case. There
are no specific facts that are brought to the attention of this Court to indicate the punitive
character of the confinement. The confinement is not herein imposed as a punishment. We do not
see that the confinement of Major Aquino causes him to suffer some harm or disability. 1avvphi1
There is no punitive hardship that exists in the case at bar. In fact, petitioner does not even allege
a single act which would show such harm or such "disability" as to prove that the same is
significantly greater than, or independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement. 1avvphi1
To be sure, the first part of Article 70 of the Articles of War grants discretion to military authorities
over the imposition of arrest or confinement of persons subject to military law charged with crime
or with serious offense.
Major Aquino is charged with violations of Article 67, for attempting to begin or create mutiny, and
Article 97, for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. According to Article 67, any person
subject to military law who attempts to create or who begins, excites, causes or joins in any
mutiny shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct. It cannot be
gainsaid that in determining the "circumstances" of arrest and confinement in Article 70 of persons
charged with crime or with serious offense, such circumstances as the gravity of the offense
charged may be considered.
Anent petitioner‘s allegation that she was restricted from visiting Major Aquino, the Court had in
the past underscored the "hands-off doctrine"—a deference given by courts to military custodians
over prison matters, especially on blanket restrictions on contact visit.
As a rule, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus does not extend into questions of conditions of
confinement; but only to the fact and duration of confinement. The high prerogative writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint. 66 Its object is to inquire into the legality of one‘s detention, and if found illegal, to order
the release of the detainee. 67 It is not a means for the redress of grievances or to seek injunctive On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report
relief or damages. against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct
(Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners
from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against
and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless
reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or he is being held for other charges/legal grounds.
damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However,
Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City‘s Prosecution Office, petitioner,
habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement. The writ of habeas
who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus
corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement. 68 (Emphasis
before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008.
supplied.)
On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein
In sum, we find the present Petition to be devoid of merit. respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause
why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the administrative case
against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the
9. Ampatuan v. Macaraig, 29 June 2010 release of the subject police officer. The petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1
Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Respondent however
Doctrine: The restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers stressed that the resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and
under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. This is that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP.
sanctioned by Sec. 52.4 of R.A. No. 8551 (New DILG Act of 1990). Even assuming that there The RTC reversed and dismissed the petition.
initially was no administrative investigation when placed in custody, the subsequent investigation
would legalize his restrictive custody.
Issues:
The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or
WON the arrest is illegal and won the writ is applicable
lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's
detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even
Ruling:
if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as
the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975
the application. [16] Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally
(also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by
confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the
Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act
custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment‖ of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative
disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary
―a petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being
actions, including restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly designated supervisors and
detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and monitoring of
equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter of internal discipline
movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of
illegal detention or restraint of liberty‖
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid
argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring
of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form
―While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. [26]
perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and
it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is
entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a
his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned
restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be
are always accounted for. [27]
dismissed‖
Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuan's restrictive custody is the administrative case filed against him,
Facts: Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner his remedy is within such administrative process.
of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila
Police District Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan.
We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody since 19 April 2008. To
Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition.
Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor‘s Office.
date, the administrative case against him should have already been resolved and the issue of his
restrictive custody should have been rendered moot and academic
Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we have
to dismiss the petition.
In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance
of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its
face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
Case 10. Harden vs. Director of Prisons
Doctrine: The writ of habeas corpus cannot be availed of in cases of detention by virtue of a
judicial process or valid judgment. Exceptions where the writ may be availed of as a po st-
conviction remedy: (JEC) (a) There has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person; (b) The court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) An excessive
penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.
The property moved into foreign jurisdiction is still covered by Philippine jurisdiction. ―While a court
cannot give its receiver authority to act in another state without the assistance of the courts
thereof, yet it may act directly upon the parties before it with respect to the property beyond the
limits of its territorial jurisdiction, and hold them in contempt if they resist the court‘s orders with
reference to its custody or disposition.‖
Facts: The proceedings for contempt arose in a civil case between Mrs. Harden as plaintiff and the
petitioner and another person as defendants, commenced on July 12, 1941, and involving the
administration of a conjugal partnership, payment of alimony, and accounting. In that case, a
receiver was appointed and a preliminary injunction was issued restraining Fred M. Harden and his
codefendant, Jose Salumbides, from transferring or alienating, except for a valuable consideration
and with the consent of the court first had and obtained, moneys, shares of stock, and other
properties and assets, real or personal, belonging to the aforesaid partnership, and which might be
found in the names of said defendants or either of them.
Fred M. Harden transferred to the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered
Bank of India, Australia & China, both in Hongkong, over P1,000,000 in drafts or cash; to Virginia
Recreation Center, Long Beach, California, P20,196.80, and to an unknown person, P50,000.
Mrs. Harden moved the court to order Harden to return all these amounts and to redeposit them
with the Manila branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China. Judge Peña granted the
motion .
After a petition for certiorari was instituted by Harden in the Supreme Court and decided, and after
various motions were filed and heard, Judge Peña, on March 27, 1948, entered an order, which
was a modification of that of October 7, 1947, directing Harden "to deposit with the Manila Branch
of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China within five days from receipt of a copy of this
order the money and drafts that he has actually in Hongkong, without prejudice to passing upon
later on the different amounts that the defendant has spent according to his attorney, after he has
submitted to the court an itemized account of those expenses.
The receiver appointed in the main case prayed that the certificates of stock of the conjugal
partnership be ordered turned over to him (receiver) so that he might have them registered in
pursuance of the provisions of Republic Act No. 62. On June 7, 1947, the court "authorized"
Harden "to register not later than June 30, 1947 the stock certificates in his possession, notifying
the court afterwards of such action.
On July 28, 1947, Mrs. Harden complained that her husband failed to comply with the above order
and prayed that he be ordered to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt. In his
"compliance" dated August 7, 1947, Harden stated that he had been granted an extension until
December 31, 1947, within which to register the Balatoc Mining Co. shares under Republic Act No.
62.
In a motion dated January 7, 1948, the receiver informed the court that, notwithstanding the
expiration on December 31, 1947, of Harden's extended time to comply with Republic Act No. 62,
the records of the Balatoc Mining Co. showed that the certificate had not been registered as of
January 7, 1948; and upon his request, an order dated January 17, 1948, was issued giving
Harden "an extension until March 31, 1948 within which to comply with the Order dated June 7,
1947."
In a motion dated March 15, 1948, Mrs. Harden prayed for the reasons therein stated, that
defendant Harden "be ordered to deliver the certificates covering the 368,553 Balatoc Mining Co.
shares either to the Clerk of this Court or to the Receiver herein for safekeeping, immediately after
registering them pursuant to Republic Act No. 62." On March 24, 1948, Harden filed a motion
stating that the registration of shares of stock under Republic Act No. 62 had been extended until
June 30, 1948, and prayed that he "be allowed to register the stock certificates in question within
such period as by law or regulations is or may be provided."
It was at this stage of the case that the present petitioner was committed to jail.
Broadly speaking, the grounds for relief by habeas corpus are only (1) deprivation of any
fundamental or constitutional rights, (2) lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence, or
(3) excessive penalty. (Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, 1 L-1083, Jan. 30, 1947, 44 Off. Gaz.,
1231.)
Issues: WON the property moved into foreign jurisdiction is still covered by Philippine jurisdiction.
Ruling: The fact that the property is in a foreign country is said to deprive the court of
jurisdiction, the remedy in such case being, it is contended, ancillary receivership. We cannot
agree with this view.
While a court can not give its receiver authority to act in another state without the assistance of
the courts thereof (53 C. J., 390-391), yet it may act directly upon the parties before it with
respect to property beyond the territorial limits of its jurisdiction, and hold them in contempt if
they resist the court's orders with reference to its custody or disposition ( Id. 118)
Whether the property was removed before or after the appointment of the receiver is likewise
immaterial.
In Sercomb vs. Catlin, 21 N. E., 606-608, the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
It is true that the property attached is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, but the
appellant, who caused it to be attached, is in this state, and within the jurisdiction of its courts. If
the superior court had no power to reach the goods in Newton's hands, it had the power to reach
appellant, who sought to prevent its receiver from getting possession of the goods. It makes no
difference that the property was in a foreign jurisdiction.
The punishment meted out to the petitioner is not excessive. It is suitable and adapted to its
objective; and it accords with section 7, Rule 64, of the Rules of Court which provides that "when
the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to
perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it.
The latter decision cites Stanley vs. South Jersey Realty Co., 83 N.J. Eq. 300, 90 A., 1042,
1043, in which the theory is expressed in this language:
In a "civil contempt" the proceeding is remedial, it is a step in the case the object of which is to
coerce one party for the benefit of the other party to do or to refrain f rom doing some act
specified in the order of the court. Hence, if imprisonment be ordered, it is remedial in purpose
and coercive in character, and to that end must relate to something to be done by the defendant
by the doing of which he many discharge himself. As quaintly expressed, the imprisoned man
"carries the keys to his prison in his own pocket."
The failure of the order of commitment to state that the acts which the contemner fails to do are
still in his power to perform, does not void the order of imprisonment. Section 7 of Rule 64 does
not require such finding to appear in the order, unlike section 1219 of the Code of Civil Procedure
of California on which the petitioner's contention is rested. Petitioner is in error in saying that
section 237 of the former Philippine Code of Civil Procedure, from which section 7 of Rule 64,
supra, has been copied, was of California origin. Former Justice Fisher is authority for the
statement that section 237 of Act No. 190 was borrowed from section 1456 of the Ohio Code of
Civil Procedure. (Fisher's Code of Civil Procedure, 3rd ed., p. 136.) The exact similarity in
substance though not in language between the two provisions is a confirmation of this statement.
At any rate, the order of commitment contains the alleged missing element if it is taken, as it
should be taken, in connection with the orders of October 7, 1947, and March 27, 1948, and with
the charges for contempt. It expressly gives non-compliance with the two last mentioned orders as
the grounds for the warrant of commitment, and thus by reference makes them part of it. The
orders of October 7, 1947, and March 27, 1948, in turn clearly specify the acts with the petitioner
was commanded to fulfill. It is equally clear from these orders that in the opinion of the court the
petitioner is in a position to bring back to the Philippines from Hongkong part of the cash and the
Balatoc shares he had remitted to that colony.
Whether or not in truth the court's findings are supported by sufficient evidence is a differe nt
matter; it is a matter of fact which can not be reviewed by habeas corpus.
In a long line of decisions, this Court has steadfastly held that habeas corpus does not lie to
correct errors of fact or law. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party
who is so charged, its judgment, order or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas
corpus. the writ of habeas corpus can not be made to perform the function of a writ of error; and
this holds true even if the judgment, orders or decree was erroneous, provided it is within the
jurisdiction of the court which rendered such judgment or issued such an order or decree. (Slade
Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, supra; Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, supra.) So whether the act
charged has been committed or can still be performed is conclusively determined by the order or
judgment of the trial court in the proceeding wherein the petitioner for habeas corpus is adjudged
in contempt. (Ex-parte Fisher, 206 S.W. 2d. 1000.).
The petition is denied with costs.
Case 11. USAN GO vs . FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA, G.R. No. 151876, June 21, 2005
Doctrine: The writ of habeas corpus cannot be availed of in cases of detention by virtue of a
judicial process or valid judgment. Exceptions where the writ may be availed of as a post-
conviction remedy: (JEC) (a) There has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person; (b) The court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) An excessive
penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.
Dimagiba‘s contention that the principle of retroactivity of penal laws would benefit him is not
correct since Adm. Cir. 12-2000 is not a law which deleted the penalty of imprisonment but a
circular which merely established a rule of preference, subject to the judge‘s discretion, in
imposing penalties under B.P. Blg. 22. The SC cannot delete the penalty of imprisonment for that
would in effect be a law which only Congress may enact. Nor would the plea of equal protection
of laws be appropriate. This is because SC A.C. No. 12-2000 as aforestated is not a law. Hence
we apply the general rule that habeas corpus is unavailing if a person is under custody by virtue
of legal process or a valid judgment .
FACTS: Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks
which were dishonored upon presentment for the reason account closed. [6] Dimagiba was
subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22. After a joint trial, the MTCC (Branch
4) rendered a Decision on July 16, 1999, convicting the accused in the 13 cases. Dimagiba
appealed but was denied. The Decision became final.
He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and prayed for the recall of the Order of Arrest a nd the
modification of the final Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment
also, should have been imposed on him. However, it was denied by the MTCC on the ground that
it had no power or authority to amend a judgment issued by the RTC. Consequently, he was
arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence. He filed with the RTC of Baguio City a
Petition[17] for a writ of habeas corpus. Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the RTC
issued an Order directing the immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him
to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment.
Petitioner Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Orders dated October 10 and 11,
2001. [25] That Motion was denied. Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court on pure
questions of law.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Petition for Habeas Corpus was validly granted.
RULING: No. The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in
which individuals are deprived of liberty. Here, there is no illegal confinement because the order
for his arrest was valid.
The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than
30 days, but not more than one year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the
check, a fine that shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment, at the
discretion of the court. [37]
SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001, [38] established a rule of preference in
imposing the above penalties. [39] When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or
a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be
considered as the preferred penalty. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative
intent behind the law. It necessarily requires a review of all factual circumstances of each case.
Such a review can no longer be done if the judgment has become final and executory.
In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17. Since his detention was
by virtue of a final judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his
sentence when the BPP granted him parole, along with six (6) others, on December 11,
2007. 19 While it is true that a convict may be released from prison on parole when he had served
the minimum period of his sentence; the pendency of another criminal case, however, is a ground
for the disqualification of such convict from being released on parole. 20 Notably, at the time he was
granted the parole, the second libel case was pending before the RTC Branch 14. 21 In fact, even
when the instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending. The issuance of
the writ under such circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There was basis for the respondent
to deny his immediate release at that time.

In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant circumstances from
which respondents conviction and sentence were based. The penalty imposed was well within the
confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City.
Eventually, the Decision attained finality. Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to
modify the lawful judgment in the guise of granting a writ of habeas corpus.

Case 13. MA. ESTRELITA D. MARTINEZ vs. Director General LEANDRO MENDOZA, G.R.
The Circular is not a law that deletes the penalty of imprisonment. As explained earlier, it is merely
No. 153795, August 17, 2006
a rule of preference as to which penalty should be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a
case. Hence, let this case be REMANDED to MTCC of Baguio City for the re-arrest of respondent
and the completion of his sentence. Doctrine: If what is alleged is forcible taking and disappearance, not arrest and detention, the
proper remedy is not habeas corpus but criminal investigation and proceeding. Here the
respondents denied having custody of the missing person and there was no adequate proof that
Case 12. MR. ALEXANDER "LEX" ADONIS vs. SUPERENTENDENT VENANCIO TESORO,
respondents had such custody. (Martinez v. Mendoza, G.R. 153795, 17 August 2006). Take note
G.R. No. 182855, June 5, 2013
however that effective 2 February 2008 the writ of amparo is available in cases of enforced
disappearance.
Doctrine : Adm. Cir. 08-2008 (Rule of preference in the imposition of penalties in libel) not a
ground for the release on habeas corpus of reporter. The circular cannot be given retroactive
FACTS: Petitioners are the mother and wife, respectively, of Michael Martinez, who was allegedly
effect where judgment in criminal case already final and executor.
abducted and taken away by seven (7) persons around 7:30 in the morning.

FACTS: Adonis was convicted by the RTC of Davao City (RTC), Branch 17 for Libel filed against
him by then Representative Prospero Nograles. He began serving his sentence on February 20,
2007. A second libel case was likewise filed against Adonis by Jeanette L. Leuterio, pending before
the RTC of Davao City, Branch 14.
On December 11, 2007, the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP) issued an order for the Discharge
on Parole of seven (7) inmates in various jails in the country, which included Adonis. On May 26,
2008, the said order was served to the respondent, 12 but the release of Adonis was not effected.
On May 30, 2008, Adonis filed the instant petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
alleging that his liberty was restrained by the respondent for no valid reason.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus is meritorious.
RULING: No. The petition is without merit. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides when a writ must not be allowed or discharge authorized, to wit: If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by
a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed.
Phillip Medel, Jr. named Michael Martinez as the person who introduced him to Rod Lauren Strunk,
the husband of Nida Blanca and alleged mastermind in her killing. In a televised interview with a
media reporter on November 26, 2001, Medel narrated that he saw Michael Martinez at the CIDG
at Camp Crame where he was being detained. Petitioners then made representations with CIDG
for the release of Michael Martinez or that they be allowed to see him, but the same were not
granted.
Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the RTC against respondents PNP
Director General LeandroMendoza. Respondents vehemently and categorically denied
any participation or involvement in the alleged abduction or disappearance of Michael
Martinez as the latter was never confined and detained by them or in their custody at
any given time. Respondents thus prayed for the dismissal of the petition for habeas
corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus is meritorious.
RULING: No. The petition is without merit. The petitioners anchor for the present case is
the disappearance of Michael. The matter of his alleged detention is, at best, merely
consequential to his disappearance. Ostensibly, his disappearance has been
stablished. However, the grant of relief in a habeas corpus proceeding is not predicated
on the disappearance of a person, but on his illegal detention. When forcible taking and
disappearance -- not arrest and detention -- have been alleged, the proper remedy is
not habeas corpus proceedings, but criminal investigation and proceedings.
Abduction or kidnapping is a crime punishable by law. Investigations with regard to crimes are first
and foremost the duty of the PNP and the NBI, not the courts. Much as this Court would want to
resolve these disappearances speedily -- as in the present case, when it is interested in
determining who are responsible for the disappearance and detention of Michael (if, indeed, he is
being detained) -- it would not want to step beyond its reach and encroach on the duties of other
duly established agencies. Instead of rendering justice to all, [13] it may render injustice if it resorts
to shortcuts through habeas corpus proceedings. In fine, this proceeding for habeas corpus cannot
be used as a substitute for a thorough criminal investigation.
Case 14. LEE YICK HON vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, G.R. No.
L-16779, March 30, 1921
Doctrine: Where the person is detained under governmental authority and the illegality of his
detention is not patent from the petition for the writ, the court may issue a preliminary citation
to the government officer having custody to show cause why the writ should not issue. When the
cause of the detention appears to be patently illegal, the court may issue a peremptory writ
requiring the unconditional production before the court of the body of the person detained at the
date and time specified.
The writ of habeas corpus may be classified as:
Preliminary citation – If the person is detained under governmental authority and the
illegality of his detention is not patent from the petition for the writ, the court issue s the
citation to the government officer having custody to show cause why the habeas corpus writ
should not issue; and
Peremptory writ – If the cause of the detention appears to be patently illegal, the court issues
the habeas corpus writ noncompliance with which is punishable
FACTS: This is an appeal by the Insular Collector of Customs from the action of the CFI of Manila
in imposing upon him a fine of P50 for an alleged contempt of court.
On July 23, 1920, a petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed in the CFI of Manila by one Lee
Yick Hon. He alleged that he had lately arrived from China at the port of Manila with a view to
entering the Philippine Islands, but was prevented from so doing by the Insular Collector of
Customs, who was detaining him for deportation.
Upon the presiding in Sala IV of said court, cited the collector to appear and show cause in writing
why the writ of habeas corpus should not be issued as prayed. Citation was served at about 11
a.m., at which house arrangement had already been perfected for the deportation of Lee Yick Hon
on a boat scheduled to leave Manila for Hongkong at noon on the same day; Insular Collector
failed to countermand the order for his embarcation on that boat. As a result:
Lee Yick Hon was deported within two or three hours after the Insular Collector had been served
with the citation to show cause in the habeas corpus proceeding. Contempt proceedings were
instituted against the Insular Collector. CFI of Manila imposed upon him a fine of P50.
Issue: W/N any lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of the court or judge below
was disobeyed or resisted by the appellant.
Ruling: No. The citation that was served upon the appellant required him to appear at a stated
time in the CFI of Manila and show cause if any there might be, why the writ prayed for should not
issue. Citation was literally complied with when, on July 30, 1920, the Attorney -General, on behalf
of the Insular Collector, filed his answer. The sole ground relied upon to sustain the judgment
finding the appellant guilty to contempt is that by allowing Lee Yick Hon to be deported under the
conditions stated he has frustrated the possible issuance of the writ of habeas corpus for which
application had been made. That it had been found that he had entered the Philippine Islands in
contravention of the Immigration and Exclusion Acts, wherefore the Insular Collector had ordered
his deportation. That answer, so far as appears in this case, has not been found to be false or
insufficient
Citation is NOT the peremptory writ of habeas corpus. At this point attention should be directed to
the fact that the order to show cause, a copy of which was served on the Insular Collector of
Customs on July 23, 1920, is not the peremptory writ of habeas corpus, unconditionally
The order served in the case was merely a preliminary citation requiring the respondent to appear
and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be granted. The practice of issuing a
preliminary citation of this character, upon applications for the writ of habeas corpus, has become
common in our courts; and upon considerations of practical convenience, the usage has must be
commend it, in cases where the necessity for the immediate issuance of the peremptory writ is not
manifest.
No Contempt. It is necessary to take account of the difference between the preliminary citation
and the real writ of habeas corpus; and when advertence is had to this point, and the actual terms
of the citation are considered, it is at one obvious that the appellant did not put himself in
contempt by allowing Lee Yick Hon to be deported.
The judge could have added to the citation an admonition to the effect that the petitioner should
not be deported until his application for the writ of habeas corpus should be heard. If a temporary
restraining order of that kind had been issued, it would no doubt have been respected.
It is well settled that a person cannot be held liable for contempt in the violation of an injunction
or in fact of any judicial order unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly
and exactly defined, so as to leave no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or
thing is forbidden or required. A party cannot be punished for contempt in failing to do something
not specified in the order. In this case, the deportation of the petitioner Lee was not forbidden by
any order of the court, and hence that act cannot be considered as disobedience to the court.
In the case, Ex parte Lake
Alleged contemner has disobeyed no order issued by the judge, for there was none of any
character made in the case, "and there was no order, decree, writ, or any other process in
existence, forbidding him form doing just what he did". Jurisdiction over the party will not confer
power to punish for contempt unless some order, decree, or process has been disobeyed or the
party is guilty of some act of the nature of malpractice in the case, or has disobeyed the
reasonable rules of the court. Judgment is reversed and the defendant absolved.
The order served in the case before us was merely a preliminary citation requiring the
respondent to appear and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be granted.
At this point, attention should be directed to the fact that the order to show cause is not
the peremptory writ of habeas corpus, unconditionally commanding the respondent to
have the body of the detained person before the court at a time and place therein
specified. The requisites of the peremptory writ of habeas corpus are stated in section
533 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
 Case 15. CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ VS. JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, G.R. No. 166470, August 7, contacted the PACER to inform them that Lulu voluntarily left with Natividad because her guardian
2009 had allegedly been maltreating her. [19]

Doctrines: Examples where the writ of habeas corpus is available where the rightful custody of On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus[20] in the CA alleging that
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto: petitioners abducted Lulu and were holding her captive in an undisclosed location in Rodriguez,
Rizal. On April 26, 2005, the CA granted the petition for habeas corpus, ruling that Jovita, as her
legal guardian, was entitled to her custody. [21 Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said
a. Parents may avail of the writ to obtain custody of their child as against the grandparent.
decision but it was denied in a resolution dated July 12, 2005. [22] Aggrieved, they filed this petition
b. Wife may avail of the writ to obtain custody of her child under 7 years of age as against her
for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 169217. ]
husband. (See Article 213, Family Code).
c. A judicial guardian who was unduly deprived of custody of her ward is entitled to a writ of
habeas corpus in order to regain custody. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus is valid.

A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the RULING: Inasmuch as respondents appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was proper, the
Family Court. However the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in her favor was also in order.
presiding judge of the Family Court, provided, however, that the regular court shall refer the
case to the Family Court as soon as its presiding judge returns to duty. The petition may also be A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the
filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where there are no Family Courts. The petition
rightful custody of person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. [35] Respondent, as the judicial
may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members. The
guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform her
writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where
obligation, respondent must have custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas
the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward. [36]
(S20, Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors).

CASE 16 MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN MILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CRISELDA M.

CADA, Petitioner, vs. RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA,Respondent., G.R. No. 210636, July
28, 2014
Doctrine: Motion to quash writ and to dismiss case denied. The petition for habeas corpus was
properly filed in the RTC of Caloocan. Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, which states that ―the
FACTS: Lulu, at age of 4, inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively petition for custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court of the province or city where the
estimated at P50 million in 1997). Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new petitioner resided or where the minor may be found,‖ is not applicable because it refers to a
family. She was then 10 years old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her violent petition for custody of minors. What is applicable is Section 20 which covers petition for a writ of
personality, Lulu stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5. Upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu habeas corpus involving custody of minors. Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a
was given full control of her estate. judicial region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under
R102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may be filed with
While living with the step-family, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought. As regards
respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. Petitioner‘s assertion that the summons was improperly served, service of summons is not required
She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners Montalban, Rizal in a habeas corpus petition, be it under R102 or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. A writ of habeas corpus
home and was receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication. plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of
said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
Respondent filed a petition for guardianship[10] in the RTC. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of FACTS: On March 24, 2011, Raquel filed before RTC-Caloocan Branch 130, a regular court, a
taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind. The RTC verified petition for writ of habeas corpus. In the said petition, she demanded the immediate
concluded that, due to her weak physical and mental condition, there was a need t o appoint a issuance of the special writ, directing Ma. Hazelina to produce before the court respondent‘s
legal guardian over the person and property of Lulu. Because guardianship was a trust biological daughter, minor Criselda, and to return to her the custody over the child. The next day,
relationship, the RTC was bound to appoint someone Lulu clearly trusted. on March 25, 2011, the RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering Ma. Hazelina to
bring the child to court on March 28, 2011. Despite diligent efforts and several attempts, however,
the Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally serving petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition
Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St., Marikina City (Marikina apartment) and was provided and of the writ. Instead, on March 29, 2011, the Sheriff left copies of the court processes at Ma.
with two housemaids tasked to care for her. Sometime in November 2003, Lulu was abducted from Hazelina‘s Caloocan residence, as witnessed by Raquel‘s counsel and barangay officials.
her Marikina apartment. Jovita immediately sought the assistance of the Police Anti-Crime Nevertheless, Ma. Hazelina failed to appear at the scheduled hearings before the RTC -Caloocan.
Emergency Response (PACER) division of the Philippine National Police.
Meanwhile, on March 31, 2011, Ma. Hazelina filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of
The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu somewhere in Rodriguez, Criselda before the RTC, Branch 89 in Quezon City (RTC-Quezon City). Raquel filed a Motion to
Rizal. Despite their initial hostility to the investigation, Ma. Victoria and Cecilio subsequently Dismiss the petition for guardianship on the ground of litis pendentia, among others. On July 12,
2011, the RTC-Quezon City granted Raquel‘s motion and dismissed the guardianship case due to
the pendency of the habeas corpus petition before RTC-Caloocan.
Then, on August 4, 2011, Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus
before the RTC-Caloocan, which was granted by the trial court on August 8, 2011. On even date,
the court directed the Sheriff to serve the alias writ upon petitioner. The Sheriff served the alias
writ on Ma. Hazelina at her office in Quezon City.
Following this development, Ma. Hazelina, by way of special appearance, moved for the quashal of
the writ and prayed before the RTC Caloocan for the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition,
claiming, among others, that she was not personally served with summons. In addition, she
argued that jurisdiction over her and Criselda‘s person was not acquired by the RTC Caloocan as
the habeas corpus petition should have been filed before the family court that has jurisdiction over
her place of residence or that of the minor or wherever the minor may be found.
RTC: 2012, issued denial of the omnibus motion and Court held that a writ of habeas corpus,
being an extraordinary process requiring immediate proceeding and action, plays a role somewhat
comparable to a summons in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the Court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, as petitioner herein. Also, personal service
does not necessarily require that service be made exclusively at petitioner‘s given address, for
service may be made elsewhere or wherever she may be found for as long as she was handed a
copy of the court process in person by anyone authorized by law. Aggrieved, hence this petition
(certiorari to CA).
CA: It held that jurisdiction was properly laid when respondent filed a habeas corpus petition to
Family Court in Caloocan City. It ruled that service of summons is not required under Section 20 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, otherwise known as the Rules on Custody of Minors and Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors. According tothe CA, the rules on summons contemplated in ordinary
civil actions have no place in petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it being a special
proceeding.
ISSUE: WON the court has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition by respondent. WON
summons is properly served.
RULING: Yes, RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding. The petition for
habeas corpus was properly filed in the RTC of Caloocan. Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, which
states that ―the petition for custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court of the province or
city where the petitioner resided or where the minor may be found,‖ is not applicable because it
refers to a petition for custody of minors. What is applicable is Section 20 which covers petition for
a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. Considering that the writ is made enforceable
within a judicial region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be
filed under R102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may be
filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought.
As regards Petitioner‘s assertion that the summons was improperly served, service of summons is
not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under R102 or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. A writ of
habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that,
by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
In the case at bar, Raquel filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan
City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC -Caloocan
can still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether Ma. Hazelina resides in the former or the latter is
immaterial in view of the above rule.
Anent Ma. Hazelina‘s insistence on the application of Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, a plain
reading of said provision reveals that the provision invoked only applies to petitions for custody of
minors, and not to habeas corpus petitions. Thus:
Section 3. Where to file petition.- The petition for custody of minors shall be filed with the Family
Court of the province or city where the petitioner resides or where the minormay be found.
(emphasis added)
Section 2. Rule 102. Who may grant the writ. — The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by
the Supreme Court, or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or
any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for the hearing and
decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on
any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.
Again, service of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas
corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by
service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
CASE 17: Thornton vs. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, August 16, 2004,
DOCTRINE: The Family Courts Act of 1997 did not revoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. (S20 SC
Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation thereto).
FACTS: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in CA's resolution
dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of
substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married in Manila. A year later,
respondent gave birth to a baby girl naed Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton. However,
after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return
to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her
friends. Whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her
friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways.
On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without
notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta.
Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this
was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then
went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did
not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification 3
that respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent‘s cellular phone bills showing calls
from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner
then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a
writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gav e family
courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This
conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the
jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide the following cases: xxxx
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter.
Issue: WON CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of
minors. WON there is an implied repeal of RA 7902 and BP 129 by R.A 8369.
Held: RA 8369 did not divest the CA and SC the jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
involving the custody of minors. CA and SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the
Family Courts in Habeas Corpus cases involving custody of minors.
According to SG, o allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas
corpus involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one
of the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount.
Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the childs
privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result
in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the child‘s welfare and well being will be
prejudiced.
As compared to Floresca case: where heirs of the miners killed in a work-related accident were
allowed to file suit to the regular courts even if claims fall under Workmen's Compensation Act
where the WC Commisioner had jurisdiction over such cases.
The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction.
On the other hand, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot
be determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable throughout
the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any
day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized
by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines , and may be made
returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any
judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First
Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself,
enforceable only within his judicial district.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one
sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the
language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity,
injustice or contradiction. In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will
result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of
children" under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This
mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the
provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and
brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament
is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not
have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal,
and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject."
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors.
Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely
incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from
issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA
8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where
the custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-
04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.
Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. - A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable
within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs. xxxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines . The writ
may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
Petition granted.
CASE 18: (Salientes v. Abanilla, G.R. 162734, 29 August 2006)
DOCTRINE: Where both parents have joint custody of a child, the writ may be availed of if a
father is deprived of his right to see his child.
Facts: This case assails the decision of CA which dismissed the petition for certiorari and MR
against the orders of the RTC.
Loran Abanilla and Marie Salientes are the parents of the minor, Lorenzo. They loved with Marie's
parents. Due to in-law problems, Abanilla suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own
house, but Salientes refused. Abanilla left the house, and was thereafter prevented from seeing his
son Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla.
Abanilla, in his personal capacity and as a representative of his son, filed a petition for habeas
corpus and custody before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The trial court ordered the Salienteses to
produce and bring before the court the body of Lorenzo, and to show cause why the child should
not be discharged from restraint.
Salienteses filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, but it was dismissed. CA stated that the order
of the trial court did not award custody but was simply a standard order issued for the production
of restrained persons. The trial court was still about to conduct a full inquiry. A subsequent MR was
likewise denied. Salienteses filed the current appeal by certiorari.
 Marie and her parents contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 of the Family Code which
provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They maintain that Loran has failed to present
any evidence of any compelling reason.
They also argue, that assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy of Loran
was not habeas corpus but a simple action for custody. They assert that habeas corpus is
unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor.
Loran, on the other hand argues that Art. 213 applies only to the second part of his petition
regarding the custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as
the father to see his son. He asserts that a writ of habeas corpus is available against any person
who restrains the minors right to see his father and vice versa. He also asserts that the complaints
filed by Marie were merely for delay.
Loran also maintains that, under the law, both him and Marie share custody of Lorenzo and when
Marie is out of the country, as required by her job as an international flight stewardess, he should
have the custody of Lorenzo and not the maternal grandparents.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari against the trial court's order.
Whether the remedy of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is available to the father.
Ruling:
1. The CA rightfully dismissed the petition for certiorari. The CA was correct in holding that
the order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely
directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his libert y.
The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial court‘s full inquiry into the
issue of custody, which was still pending before it. Thus, an interlocutory order is not appealable
but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved party
must show that the court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the
present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the order.
2. Habeas corpus is available to the father. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent
Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently
joint custody.
Although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the
court. In the absence of a juridical grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to
the custody of their child.
In the present case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his
child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the child‘s welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and
Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody,
among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
The order of the court to produce the body of the minor before the court was merely in line with
the directive contained in Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC.
Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of the custody and
serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. It is not a basis for preventing
the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or
visiting his child under seven years of age.
CASE 19. ILUSORIO v. BILDNER (GR No 139789) 12 MAY 2000
DOCTRINE: Writ of habeas corpus not available to compel a husband to live with his wife. Thus,
Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-
ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the
body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and
detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall
consider in that behalf
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife for private
reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of right.
On July 11, 1942,ERLINDA KALAW, petitioner, and Atty. Potenciano Ilusorio, contracted marriage.
They had 6 children, namely, Ramon Ilusorio, ERLINDA ILUSORIO-BILDNER, Maximo Ilusorio,
Sylvia Ilusorio, Marietta Ilusorio, & Shereen Ilusorio. The spouses lived together for 30 years.
In 1972, the spouses separated from bed and board (separated legally) for undisclosed
reasons. Potenciano then lived in a condominium in Urdaneta, Makati, when he is in Manila and at
Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club, when he‘s in Baguio City. On the other hand, ERLINDA
lived in a house in Antipolo City.
On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano‘s return from the US, he stayed with ERLINDA for 5
months in Antipolo City. Their daughters, Sylvia and Erlinda(Lin), alleged that during this time,
their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft an anti-depressant
drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, US., which in turn effected his health deterioration.
On February 24, 1998, ERLINDA filed with the RTC-Antipolo, a petition for guardianship over the
person and property of Potenciano due to his old age, frail health, poor eye-sight, and impaired
judgment.
Same year, May 31 , after attending a meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo
and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati..
March 11, 1999, ERLINDA filed a petition before the CA for writ of habeas corpus to have the
custody of Potenciano alleging that the respondents refused petitioner‘s demands to see and visit
her husband and barred Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
On April 5, 1999, after due hearing,, CA DENIED the petition for writ of habeas corpus for lack of
unlawful restraint or detention but GRANTED visitation rights to ERLINDA.
11 OCT 1999, filed an appeal via certiorari, asserting that he never refused to see her.
ISSUE: W/N the wife, ERLINDA ILUSORIO, may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel
Potenciano to live with her.
HELD: NO. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by
which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the
grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus caters only to
involuntary and or illegal restraint.
According to the evidence, there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
Potenciano‘s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that Potenciano is about 86
years of age or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated –
soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the
individual to discern his actions. Potenciano was of sound and alert mind having answered
all relevant questions asked by the court hence, he posses the capacity to make
choices. He also made it clear that he was not prevented from leaving his house or
seeing people.
The CA, Exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus
where ERLINDA never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of
subject‘s insanity. Missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor
child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife
for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without the threat of any penalty attached
to the exercise of his right.
1.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potentciano may not be the subject
of visitation rights against his free choice because such shall deprive him of his right to privacy.
Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus DISMISSED for lack of merit.
20. Bagtas v. Santos, G.R. No. 166682
Doctrine: A habeas corpus case involving a minor is not limited to the production of the minor
before the court. The main purpose of the proceeding is to determine who has rightful custody
over the child. The court should still proceed to determine who should have the rightful custody
of the child.
Facts: Maricel ran away from her parents Antonio and Rosita Gallardo to live with her boyfriend.
Maricel became pregnant and gave birth to Maryl Joy. Maricel's boyfriend left her. Maricel returned
to her parents but ran away again and went to Noel and Lydia. There, she entrusted to the two
the custody of Maryl, and left behind a note relinquishing her parental rights over Maryl in their
favor.
When Spouses Gallardo learned about this, they tried to obtain the custody of Maryl but Noel and
Lydia refused. Thus, Spouses Gallardo filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC. At the
RTC, both parties agreed to a shared custody of Maryl, where the grandparents took custody of
her during weekends. The Regional Trial Court approved the agreement. Unfortunately, Spouses
Gallardo took Maryl away and brought her to Samar. Hence, Noel and Lydia filed a motion to cite
in contempt Spouses Gallardo. They also filed a motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus
based on Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, citing the plaintiff‘s refusal to comply with a lawful order of
the court.
The RTC cited Spouses Gallardo in contempt and dismissed the petition for habeas corpus filed by
them for mootness, since Maryl was already in their custody. Noel and Lydia filed a Motion for
Reconsideration alleging that the action should have been dismissed pursuant to Section 3, Rule
17, of the Rules of Court. They prayed that Maryl Joy be returned to them to preserve the status
quo ante. The RTC denied the MR ruling that the sole purpose for the filing of the petition is to
cause the production before the Court of the person of Maryl, not a determination of the legality or
illegality of custody.
Issue: Was the sole purpose of the petition for habeas corpus the production of Maryl Joy before
the trial court and that it would be moot upon said production?
Held: No. Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court states that the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the persons entitled
thereto. In cases involving minors, the purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is not limited to the
production of the child before the court. The main purpose of the petition for habeas corpus is to
determine who has the rightful custody over the child.
The RTC erred when it hastily dismissed the action for having become moot after Maryl Joy was
produced before the trial court. It should have conducted a trial to determine who had the rightful
custody over Maryl Joy. In dismissing the action, the RTC, in effect, granted the petition for
habeas corpus and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo without sufficient
basis.
It is true that Article 214 of the Civil Code states that in case of absence or unsuitability of the
parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. Art icle 216
also states that in default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the surviving grandparent
shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child. However, in determining who has the
rightful custody over a child, the child‘s welfare is the most important consideration. The court is
not bound by any legal right of a person over the child.
There are three requisites in petitions for habeas corpus involving minors: (1) the petitioner has a
right of custody over the minor, (2) the respondent is withholding the rightful custody over the
minor, and (3) the best interest of the minor demands that he or she be in the custody of the
petitioner. In the present case, these requisites are not clearly established because the RTC hastily
dismissed the action and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to Spouses Gallardo without
conducting any trial.
Case to the RTC for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of the Antonio and
Rosita to have custody of Maryl Joy.
21. SY VS COURT OF APPEALS G.R No. 124518, December 27, 2007
Doctrine: S6 R99 expressly acknowledges and authorizes that the matter of care and custody of
the children may be raised and adjudicated as an incident to any proceeding, such as a case for
habeas corpus. (Sy v. CA, 27 December 2007). The court could also award support even if not
prayed for if the respondent failed to object to evidence on support, based on S5 R10.
FACTS: On 19 January 1994, Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition for habeas corpus against
Wilson Sy before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48, docketed as Special Proceeding No.
94-69002. Mercedes prayed that said writ be issued ordering Wilson to produce their minor
children Vanessa and Jeremiah before the court and that after hearing, their care and custody be
awarded to her as their mother. In his answer, Wilson prayed that the custody of the minors be
awarded to him instead. Petitioner maintained that Mercedes was unfit to take custody of the
minors. He adduced the following reasons: firstly, respondent abandoned her family in 1992;
secondly, she is mentally unstable; and thirdly, she cannot provide proper care to the children.
ISSUES: 1.Whether or not the custody of the minor children be given to the mother. 2. Whether
or not the father is obligated to provide financial support to the minor children not in his custody.
RULING: 1. Yes. Section 213 of the Family Code states that: ―In case of separation of the
parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court
shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ
the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.‖ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the
final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and
security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the
physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. However, the law
favors the mother if she is a fit and proper person to have custody of her children so that they may
not only receive her attention, care, and supervision but also have the advantage and benefit Of a
mother‘s love and devotion for which there is no substitute.
Generally, the love, solicitude and devotion of a mother cannot be replaced by another and are
worth more to a child of tender years than all other things combined.
xxxx No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual
and legal basis of the right sought to be protected. Xxxxxx
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition,
only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ. Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. – Upon the
filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if
on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in
case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand,
and may deputize any officer or person to serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be
2. Yes. Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation to give support is demandable
later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance‖ (emphasis supplied).
from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall
not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. The Court likewise affirms the
award of P50, 000.00 as support for the minor children. As f ound by both courts, petitioner‘s Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be issued
representations regarding his family‘s wealth and his capability to provide for his family more than and the petition will be dismissed outright.
provided a fair indication of his financial standing even though he proved to be less than for the
right on the matter. In any event, this award of support is merely provisional as the amount may
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for
be modified or altered in accordance with the increased or decreased needs of the needy party
the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty
and with the means of the giver.
and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to
petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on
22. Canlas, et al vs NAPICO matters not covered by the writ. Therefore the Petition should be dismissed (ARMANDO Q.
CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CANLAS, MARRIETA PIA vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS‘N – XIII, INC., et al.
G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008, En Banc, Reyes, R.T. J.).
Doctrine: The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final and executory judgment is
not included among the enumeration of rights in S1 RWA.
Facts: Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land. Their dwellings have been demolished or
is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. They filed a petition for writ of amparo to
WRIT OF AMPARO: A remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has
summon some unprincipled Land Officials as they allege to answer their participation in the
been violated or is threatened with violation by a public official or employee or a private
issuance of fraudulent titles to NAPICO.
individual or a private individual or entity. The writ covers extralegal killings a nd enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. (S1, Rule on the Writ of Amparo [RWA]).
Issue: Whether or not writ of amparo is proper in this case.
In Armando Canlas, et. al., vs. NAPICO Homeowners Association et al., the High court also
reiterated that the writ of amparo will not be issued where the person‘s right to life, liberty and Ruling: No, writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and
security is not threatened. Thus: security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity. The threatened demolition is not included among the
enumeration of rights protected by the writ. Their claim to their dwelling does not constitute right
Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for reconsideration for the
to life, liberty, and security.
second or third time to be filed before this Honorable Supreme Court . As such therefore,
Petitioners herein are aware of the opinion that this present petition should not in any way be
treated as such motions for reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for the possible issuance of 23. Sps. Pador v. Arcayan, 12 March 2013
the writ of amparo, although it might affect the previous rulings of the Honorable Supreme Court
in these cases, G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the powers of the
Doctrine: Writ of amparo not available against Brgy. Captain‘s alleged trespass of Petitioner‘s
Supreme Court of the Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside, even its own previous property since merely a violation of Petitioner‘s property rights.
decision that cannot be thwarted nor influenced by any one, but, only on the basis of merits and
evidence. This is the purpose of this petition for the Writ of Amparo.
Facts: On 22 March 2008, petitioners filed with the RTC a Verified Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo. Petitioners alleged that in February 2008, rumors circulated that petitioner Nerio
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this
Pador was a marijuana planter in Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City. On 17 March 2008, respondents
case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not
Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Roberto Alimorin raided their ampalaya farm to search
for marijuana plants, but found none. After the raid, petitioners Nerio and Rey Pador received
invitation letters for a conference from respondent Barangay Captain Arcayan. They referred the
invitation letters to their counsel, who advised them not to attend and, instead, send a letter-reply
to Barangay Captain Arcayan. When the latter received the letter-reply, he allegedly read its
contents, got one copy, and refused to sign a receipt of the document. Petitioners then concluded
that the conduct of the raid, the sending of the invitation letters, the refusal of
respondent barangay captain to receive their letter-reply as well as the possibility of more
harassment cases, false accusations, and possible violence from respondents gravely threatened
their right to life, liberty and security and necessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo.
The RTC then heard the Petition. On 3 July 2008, it issued the assailed Resolution finding that
petitioners' claims were based merely on hearsay, speculations, surmises and conjectures, and that
respondents had sufficiently explained the reason behind the issuance of the letters of invitat ion. It
thereafter proceeded to deny petitioners the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Issue: WON Writ of Amparo was proper
Held: No. We uphold the RTC's Resolution and deny the instant Petition. Section 1 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo provides for the grounds that may be relied upon in a petition therefor, as
follows: SEC. 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Thus, to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioners must prove by substantial evidence that
their rights to life, liberty and security are being violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission.
A closer look at the instant Petition shows that it is anchored on the following allegations: first ,
that respondents conducted a raid on the property of petitioner based on information that the
latter were cultivators of marijuana ; second, that respondent barangay captain sent them
invitation letters without stating the purpose of the invitation; third, that
respondent barangay captain refused to receive petitioners' letter-reply; and fourth, that
petitioners anticipate the possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations, and potential
violence from respondents.
All these allegations are insufficient bases for a grant of the privilege of the writ.
Finally, even assuming that the entry was done without petitioners' permission, we cannot grant
the privilege of the writ of amparo based upon a trespass on their ampalaya farm. Granting that
the intrusion occurred, it was merely a violation of petitioners' property rights. In Tapuz v. Del
Rosario, we ruled that the writ of amparo does not envisage the protection of concerns that are
purely property or commercial in nature, as follows:
[T]he writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and
effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of
or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these
Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds. (Emphasis in the original)
We therefore rule that the alleged intrusion upon petitioners' ampalaya farm is an insufficient
ground to grant the privilege of the writ of amparo.
On petitioners' second and third allegations, we find that the barangay captain's act of sending
invitation letters to petitioners and failure to sign the receiving copy of their letter-reply did not
violate or threaten their constitutional right to life, liberty or security. The records show
that Barangay Captain Arcayan sufficiently explained the factual basis for his actions. Moreover,
the records are bereft of any evidence that petitioners were coerced to attend the conference
through the use of force or intimidation. On the contrary, they had full freedom to refuse to attend
the conference, as they have in fact done in this case.
The fourth allegation of petitioner that, following these events, they can anticipate more
harassment cases, false accusations and possible violence from respondents is baseless,
unfounded, and grounded merely on pure speculations and conjectures. As such, this allegation
does not warrant the consideration of this Court.
On a final note, we reiterate that the privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy
adopted to address the special concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances. "Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest
the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing
of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection
and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations."
24. Caram v. Segui, 5 August 2014
TOPIC: Writ of amparo
FACTS: Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually became
pregnant with the latter‘s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting
pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact
she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the
child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children in Parañaque City.
On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical
Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August
13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment
to the DSWD.
On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby Julian as ―Legally
Available for Adoption.‖ On February 5, 2010, BabyJulian was ―matched‖ with Spouses Medina and
supervised trial custody was then commenced.
On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the
DSWD asking for the suspension of BabyJulian‘s adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted
her family back together.
On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD
Assistant Secretary Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available
for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed
the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively
made Baby Julian a ward of the State.
On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC
seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining
parental authority and custody of a minor child.

HELD: The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there
was no enforced disappearance in this case.
As to what constitutes ―enforced disappearance,‖ the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the
elements constituting ―enforced disappearances‖ as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g)
of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:
1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivationof liberty;
2. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization;
3. That it be followed by the State or political organization‘s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.
The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent DSWD officers
never concealed Baby Julian‘s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD‘s
Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when
she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition that the
respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is
therefore, no ―enforced disappearance‖ as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and
fourth elements are missing.
Christina‘s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing
the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to
qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but
asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.
Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the
exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
Mison v. Gallegos
Facts: On 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) of Seoul,
Republic of Korea sent a Notice to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in the location and
deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) for arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund
of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. Hence, asked Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI), for the immediate arrest and deportatio n of Ku to Korea for being an
undesirable alien. Special Prosecutor Maria Antonette Bucasas-Mangrobang charged Ku for being a
risk to public interest pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No. 2711. BI
officers, with the assistance of the Manila Police District-Warrant and Subpoena Section, arrested
Ku. Upon arrival at the BI detention center, Ku was detained
On 17 January 2014, the Republic of Korea voided Ku‘s passport. Ku filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies. Judge Gallegos, in an Order dated 22
January 2014, issued a Writ of Amparo. Also, Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order
granting the motion for issuance of TPO, entrusting Ku‘s custody to the Philippine National Red
Cross and/or its Chairman CEO Richard Gordon, and directing the Philippine National Police-Police
Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG) to protect Ku and his immediate family
Issue: w/n the writ is properly issued?
Held: Writ of Amparo not proper.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule)39 provides: SECTION 1.
Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances." It was an exercise for the first time of the Court‘s expanded power to
promulgate rules to protect our people‘ s constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance
in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime.
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of
Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo41 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of
amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats
thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico
enumerated the elements constituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined
in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851,43 to wit:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization‘s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time
Although Ku claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained by agents of
the BI, that he was not read his rights under the constitution and was not informed of the reason
for hi s arrest, nor provided a copy of any document leading to his arrest and detention,46 the
arresting officers are all consistent in testifying that, upon Ku‘s arrest, they introduced themselves
as agents of the BI, presented to Ku the Warrant of Deportation, and informed him of his
constitutional rights as well as the expiration of his visa. More importantly, there was no attempt
on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts.
Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should contain, among which is
the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with
the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits.
Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious danger of being detained for a long period
of time without any cause, and that he fears that the BI will fabricate criminal cases against him to
hold him under detention. The allegations of Ku, though, are specious. It is to be noted that t he
Amparo Rule requires the parties to establish their claims by substantial evidence. t is to be
additionally observed that Ku is guilty of forum shopping. Being the subject of a Warrant of
Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order, Ku‘s proper recourse is with the BI and,
thereafter, with the DOJ and the OP.
Navia v Pardico
Facts: A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M.
Lapore. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), a nd Benhur
Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she
saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita
where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him
that he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was
lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter,
Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land also located in
Grand Royale Subdivision.
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of
Amparobefore the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of Amparo was accordingly issued and served on the
petitioners. The trial court issued the challenged Decision granting the petition. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.
Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ of
amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened
violation of the aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert tha t
in the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on
its face as it failed to state with some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of
the petitioners constituting a violation of or a threat to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And
second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that
petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the entries in the logbook
which bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on
March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the trial court erred in issuing the
writ and in holding them responsible for Bens disappearance.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of A Writ of Amparo is proper?
Held: Under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual
or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo
petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains
an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision
in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not
work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some
covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some
governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced
disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and
proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and
proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing
persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period
of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is
likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect
authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State
participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State
complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its
agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were
impleaded or implicated in Virginia‘s amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable
persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a
hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating
his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or
accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a
private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in
an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the
disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere se curity guards at
Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a
private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would
link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed
above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the
disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State
participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing
person. DISMISSED
Ladaga v. Mapagu
―The inclusion of petitioners' names in the Order of Battle List does not, by itself, constitute an
actual threat to their rights to life, liberty and security as to warrant the issuance of a writ of
amparo.‖
Facts: Petitioners share the common circumstance of having their names included in what is
alleged to be a JCICC ―AGILA‖ 3rd Quarter 2007 Order of Battle Validation Result of the Philippine Army's
10th Infantry Division (10th ID). They perceive that by the inclusion of their names in the said Order of Battle
(OB List), they become easy targets of unexplained disappearances or extralegal killings – a real
threat to their life, liberty and security.
ATTY. LILIBETH O. LADAGA (Atty. Ladaga), first came to know of the existence of the OB List
from an undisclosed source on May 21, 2009. In the OB List, it was reflected that the ULTIMATE
GOAL is to TRY TO OUST PGMA ON 30 NOV 2007.
On the other hand, Atty. Angela Librado-Trinidad (Atty. Librado-Trinidad), delivered a privileged
speech before the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to demand the removal of her name
from said OB List. The Commission on Human Rights, for its part, announced the conduct of its
own investigation into the matter.
According to Atty. Librado-Trinidad, in the course of the performance of her dutites and functions,
she has not committed any act against national security that would justify the inclusion of her
name in the said OB List. She said that sometime in May 2008, two suspicious-looking men tailed
her vehicle. Also, on June 23, 2008 three men tried to barge into their house
Meanwhile, Atty. Carlos Isagani T. Zarate was informed that he was also included on the
OB List. In his petition, he alleged that the inclusion of his name in the said OB List was due to his
advocacies as a public interest or human rights lawyer.
The Petitioners assert that the OB List is really a military hit-list as allegedly shown by the fact that
there have already been three victims of extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths can be linked
directly to the OB List.
On June 16, 2009 filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo. The RTC
subsequently issued separate Writs of Amparo, directing the respondents to file a verified written
return.
 In the return of the respondents, they denied authorship of the OB List, and alleged that
petitioners failed to show that they were responsible for the alleged threats.
After submission of the parties‘ respective Position Papers, the RTC issued Orders finding no
substantial evidence to show that the perceived threat to petitioners‘ life, liberty and security was
attributable to the unlawful act or omission of the respondents. The privilege of the Writ was
therefore denied.
Issues: WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under the
Writ of Amparo.
Held: No, the evidence does not satisfy degree of proof for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
The Writ of Amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making powers in response
to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It
is an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty
or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary character, is not one to issue on amorphous
or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty. Justifying allegations must support the
issuance of the writ, on the following matters:
1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
2. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission;
3. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
4. The investigation conducted specifying the names, personal circumstances and addresses of
the investigating authority or individuals;
5. Actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission;
6. The relief prayed for.
Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence,
and if the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Petitioners sought to prove that the inclusion of their names in
the OB List presented a real threat to their security by attributing the violent deaths of the other
known activists to the inclusion of their names or the names of their militant organizations in the
subject OB List. However, the existence of the OB List could not be directly associated with the
menacing behaviour of suspicious men or the violent deaths of certain personalities.
The Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their names in the OB List is as real a threat as
that which brought ultimate harm to the other victims without corroborative evidence from which it
can be presumed that the suspicious deaths of these three people were in fact, on account of their
militant affiliations.
The Petitioners therefore were not able to prove by substantial evidence that there was an actual
threat to their rights to life, liberty and security. The mere inclusion of their names in the OB List is
not sufficient enough evidence for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
Santiago v. Tulfo
FACTS: Spouses Rozelle Raymond Martin (Raymart) and Claudine Margaret Santiago were in the
airport awaiting for the arrival of their baggage but were informed that it was offloaded and
transferred to a different flight. While they were lodging a complaint before the complaint desk,
Raymart saw a man taking photos of his wife. He then approached him and found out that it was
Ramon ―Mon‖ Tulfo. The confrontation then, escalated to a brawl, which came to a stop because
of the interference of the airport security personnel.
Days after the incident, the brother of Mon Tulfo aired on their TV program comments and
expletives together with a threat that they will retaliate against the Santiagos. Terrified by the
gravity of the threats hurled, petitioners filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of amparo against
respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for the issuance of a writ of amparo should be granted
HELD: In our jurisdiction, the contextual genesis, at least, for the present Amparo Rule has limited
the remedy as a response to extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.
"Extrajudicial killings," according to case law, are generally characterized as "killings committed
without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings,"27 while
"enforced disappearances," according to Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 9851, 28 otherwise
known as the "Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and
Other Crimes Against Humanity," "means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time." In Navia v. Pardico, 29 the Court held that it must be shown and proved
by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons,
with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
indispensable element of government participation. 30 Notably, the same requirement of
government participation should also apply to extralegal killings, considering that the writ
of amparo was, according to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, who headed the Committee on
the Revision of the Rules of Court that drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, intended to "hold public
authorities, those who took their oath to defend the constitution and enforce our laws, to a high
standard of official conduct and hold them accountable to our people. [In this light] [t]he
sovereign Filipino people should be assured that if their right[s] to life and liberty are threatened or
violated, they will find vindication in our courts of justice."31 Stated differently, the writ
of amparo is an extraordinary remedy that is meant to balance out the government's incredible
power in order to curtail human rights abuses on its end.
Consistent therewith, the delimitation of our current writ of amparo to extralegal killings and/or
enforced disappearances, or threats thereof, is explicit from Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC,
which reads:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
While the foregoing rule, as per Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC's first paragraph, does state that
the writ is a remedy to protect the right to life, liberty, and security of the person desiring to avail
of it, the same section's second paragraph qualifies that the protection of such rights specifically
pertain to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof, which are more
concrete cases that involve protection to the rights to life, liberty and security. The two paragraphs
should indeed be read together in order to construe the meaning of the provision. Clearly
applicable is the statutory construction rule that "clauses and phrases must not be taken as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the
statute [or, in this case, procedural rule] must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. ,
that every part of the statute must be considered together with other parts of the statute and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment."32
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners' amparo petition before the RTC does not allege any
case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the senses
above-described. Their petition is merely anchored on a broad invocation of respondents'
purported violation of their right to life and security, carried out by private individuals without any
showing of direct or indirect government participation. Thus, it is apparent that
their amparo petition falls outside the purview of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail.
Hence, the RTC, through Judge Singh, properly exercised its discretion to motu proprio dismiss the
same under this principal determination, regardless of the filing of the May 23, 2012 Motion. The
court, indeed, has the discretion to determine whether or not it has the authority to grant the relief
in the first place. And when it is already apparent that the petition falls beyond the purview of the
rule, it has the duty to dismiss the petition so as not to prejudice any of the parties through
prolonged but futile litigation.
Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo
FACTS: Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging
to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station
at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her
daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp.
Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a
writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any
threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)
to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of
gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce
documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory
averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued
during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and
dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
HELD: The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government,
albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members
in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President
may not be sued during his or her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not
be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or
law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for failure of
the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced
disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed.
―May the AFP Chief of Staff and the PNP director be included as respondents in a writ of amparo
case solely on the basis of command responsibility? Yes but not for the purpose of attaching
accountability and responsibility to them for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes but only to
determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for and has the duty to address the
disappearance and harassments complaint of in order to enable the court to devise remedial
measures‖
De Lima v. Gatdula
―The RTC judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the Respondents De Lima et al.,
to file an answer rather than a return. A return is different from and serves a different function
from an answer.‖
FACTS: February 2012, respondent Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of
a Writ of Amparo in the RTC Manila against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director
Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of
Investigation.
Respondent wanted petitioners to cease and desist from framing up Gatdula for the fake ambush
incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Gatdula in relation to the alleged
ambush incident.
RTC JUDGE PAMPILO: Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued
summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He also set the case for hearing to
determine whether a temporary protection order may be issued.
During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is
appropriate for Amparo cases
RTC ORDER: Judge said that since no writ has been issued, return is not the required pleading but
answer. The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined
that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer.
Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case. Even without a Return nor an
Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5) working days
RTC DECISION: granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim
reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection, production and inspection orders in relation to
the evidence and reports involving an on-going investigation of the attempted assassination of
Deputy Director Esmeralda.
RTC denied herein petitioners‘ MR.
Petitioners thus came to the SC assailing the RTC "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through a
Petition for Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45.
ISSUE Whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy in the
present case?
HELD. No. the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo is not the judgment or
final order contemplated under Rule 45. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet
be the proper remedy at this time.
The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be the judgment or final
order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is clear from the
tenor of the dispositive portion of the "Decision" which merely directs the issuance and service of
the Writ of Amparo.
The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary protection,
production and inspection orders were given together with the decision. The temporary protection,
production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of
the petition but before final judgment is rendered.
The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the RTC
First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the
responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an
Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy
Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with the said rule. It is clear from this rule that this type
of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could
possibly apply to proceedings in and RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of
summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding.
second was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ and the
filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.
third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima,
et al.
The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. "Accordingly this court
GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner."
Court directed Judge Pampilo to determine within forty -eight (48) hours from his receipt of this
Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and
its attached affidavits.
Yano v. Sanchez
Facts: Cleofas Sanchez filed before the Supreme Court a petition for issuance of a Writ of Amparo
with Motion for Production and Inspection directed against Gen. Esperon, the then Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Supreme Court resolved to issue a Writ of Amparo
and ordered Gen. Esperon to make a verified return of the writ before the Court of Appeals.
Cleofas amended her petition on January 14, 2008 to include Marciana Medina ) and to implead
other military officers including Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos as therein additional respondents.
In the Amended Petition, Cleofas and Marciana alleged that their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez
and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin, Barangay Bueno,
Capas, Tarlac.
On September 18, 2006 at around 1:00 a.m., the ―wives‖ of Nicolas, namely, Lourdez and Rosalie
Sanchez, who were then at home, heard gunshots and saw armed men in soldiers‘ uniforms
passing by; and that that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day, Lourdez and Rosalie went out to
check on Nicolas and He her son but only saw their caps, slippers, pana and airgun for catching
frogs, as well as bloodstains.
They likewise alleged that Josephine Galang Victoria informed them that she saw Nicolas and
Heherson at the Camp of the Bravo Company sometime in 2006. the respondents prayed for the
issuance of a writ of Amparo, the production of the victims‘ bodies during the hearing on the Writ,
the inspection of certain military camps, the issuance of temporary and permanent protection
orders, and the rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Issue: Whether or not failure of the respondents to present substantial evidence to prove that the
public officials observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duty is ground for the
grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Whether or not the grant of provisional remedy in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule is proper in cases
where the public respondents were absolved of the disappearance of the alleged victim.
Ruling: As regards the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Evidence is required in Amparo
petition. Effect of failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the
performance of their duty the requirement for a government official or employee to observe
extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty stresses the extraordinary measures expected
to be taken in safeguarding every citizen‘s constitutional rights as well as in the investigation of
cases of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances.
The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance
of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the Amparo writ. It does not
relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or
inaction on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move
and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs.
On the second issue, the Court also ruled in the negative. The interim or provisional remedies
provided in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a
judicious determination of the amparo petition – Section 14 of theAmparo Rule provides for interim
or provisional reliefs that the courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses and the
rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence, These provisional reliefs are intended to
assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition.
―While the RWA provides for the interim reliefs of TPO IO, and PO, these provisional reliefs are
intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition.
For the appellate court to, in the present case, still order the inspection of the military camps and
order the army units to conduct an investigation into the disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson
after it absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted by the appellate court to
respondents are not in sync with a finding that petitioners could not be held accountable for the
disappearance of the victims‖
―The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance
of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not
relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or
inaction on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move
and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs‖
Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 15 November 2011;
Facts: On September 6, 2009, Petitioner was forcibly taken to a military camp and was forced to
confess to his membership in the NPA. During his 11 days of captivity, he was repeatedly
threatened, detained and mauled. He was also forced to confess the whereabouts of NPA camp
and his fellow NPA comrades, sign documents declaring that he had surrendered to the military
and that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset.
order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the
writ.‖
Reyes v. Gonzalez, 3 December 2009;
―Fr. Reyes‘ petition for writ of amparo to set aside his inclusion in the HDO list was denied since he
should have filed the appropriate motion in the RTC where the rebellion case filed against him was
pending.‖
Facts: Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30,
2007. Petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest
proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of
Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes,
conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold
petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.
Upon the request of the DILG, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure
Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold
Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49
others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.
After finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion the DOJ
Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information before the RTC, Branch 150 of Makati City. RTC issued
an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable
cause. Petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case
against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists.

On his last day of incarceration, September 17, 2009, he was ordered to sign a piece of paper Every time petitioner would leave and return to the country, the immigration officers at the NAIA
stating that he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his detain and interrogate him for several minutes because of the existing HDO.
ordeal, he signed the paper and was warned not to report anything to the media.
Issue: Whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
On December 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for Writ of
Habeas Data with prayers for the Protection Order, Inspection of Place and Production of
Ruling: No, the Right to travel is not covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The rights that
Documents and Personal Properties. The Supreme Court granted the respective writs on December
fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are
15, 2009, after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged that Rodriguez had been abducted, the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.
tortured and later released by the members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.

The restriction on petitioner‘s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case
Issue: Whether or not the interim reliefs prayed for by the Petitioner maybe granted after the writs
filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was
of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor.
impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life,
liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the provisional relief, such as the interim reliefs of temporary
protection order, inspection order and production order are intended to assist the court before it
Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that
arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition. Being interim reliefs, they can only be
the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioner‘s apprehension is at best merely
granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that
speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a
the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the
petition for a writ of amparo. The new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by the
aggrieved party. Thus, since the Court grant the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo,
Supreme Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is
there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the former.
his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in
order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious
―Interim reliefs can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the
protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since petitioner was granted the privilege of the writ of
amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the former. The
Razon v. Tagitis, 3 December 2009,(2009 case)
―Technical rules of evidence not strictly observed in writ of amparo case. The fair and proper rule
is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence
otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to
the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of
adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum
test. The courts should exercise of flexibility in the consideration of evidence, including hearsay
evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases‖
Facts: Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. More than a month
after his disappearance, the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the
CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla, directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano,
et. al. The petition stated that Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch
but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives,
forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge
of his student and according to a reliable source; that he was in the custody of police intelligence
operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an
earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr.
Tagitis with the different terrorist groups; That the respondent filed a complaint with the PNP
Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, but instead of helping her she was told of an
intriguing tale by the police that her husband, subject of the petition, was not missing but was with
another woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the refusal to help and
provide police assistance in locating her missing husband.
The petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed
before the CA. Petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the
Amparo Rule.
Issue: Does the Amparo Rule intended that the petition be complete in every detail in st ating the
threatened or actual violation of a victim‘s rights for it to be given due course by the court?
Ruling: The Court ruled in negative. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c)
to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim‘s rights. As in
any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the
cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details.
In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose
of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to
describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct
or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be
hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance.
In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners
apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial
concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of
Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading
the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under
the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim‘s rights to
life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read
in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required
elements – namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened
violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present. 3 |Case Digests in Special
Proceeding
Gen Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, February 16, 2010 (2010 case)
Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration on the ruling of the Supreme Court on
December 3, 2009, finding that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG,
and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations, together with Col. Kasim, were fully
accountable6 for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.
Specifically, it was held that Col. Kasim was accountable for his failure to disclose under oath
information relating to the enforced disappearance; for the purpose of this accountability. It was
ordered that Col. Kasim be impleaded as a party to the case. And held the PNP accountable for the
suppression of vital information that Col. Kasim could, but did not, provide with the same
obligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim carries. However, before this directive was given, Col.
Kasim was already dead.
Issue: Whether or not Col. Kasim‘s death renders the directive to implead him moot and academic.
Ruling: The Court held that the directive to implead Col. Kasim as a party to the present case has
been rendered moot and academic by his death.
Nevertheless, it is resolve to deny the petitioners‘ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Undisputably, this directive can no longer be enforced, and has been rendered moot and
academic, given Col. Kasim's demise. His intervening death, however, does not necessarily signify
the loss of the information Col. Kasim may have left behind, particularly the network of "assets" he
utilized while he was in the service. Intelligence gathering is not an activity conducted in isolation,
and involves an interwoven network of informants existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships
with the police and the military. It is not farfetched that a resourceful investigator, utilizing the
extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires,13 can still access or
reconstruct the information Col. Kasim received from his "asset" or network of assets during his
lifetime.
Case # 35. GR No. 186640 February 11, 2010
Petitioners: Gen. Yano, Lt. Gen Ibrado and Maj. Gen.
Villanueva Respondents: Cleofas Sanchez and Marciana
Medina
Summary: This is a case about a petition filed by the military officers as regards the decision of
the Court of Appeals granting Reliefs to the case filed by Cleofas Sanchez and Marciana Medina.
Reliefs prior to the determination of the amparo petition should not be granted since the
petitioners (now respondents) failed to establish through substantial evidence the link between
the military officers and the disappearances.
There should be substantial evidence established for the issuance of the writ of Amparo to be
granted. Pending such determination of the writ, the court may grant reliefs to safeguard the
rights of the parties.
In this case, no substantial evidence was established hence no provisional reliefs should be
granted for the writ of Amparo does not lie. The CA however decided that no substantial
evidence exists but still granted the provisional reliefs which was no longer proper.
Facts:
September 17, 2006 at around 8:00 PM - Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina (respective sons
of respondents) were catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin, Barangay Bueno, Capas,
Tarlac.
September 18, 2006 at around 1:00 AM – Nicolas‘ ―wives‖ Lourdez and Rosalie heard gunshots
and saw armed men in soldiers‘ uniforms passing by. At around 4:00 AM of the same day,
Lourdez and Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas and Heherson but only saw their caps,
slippers, pana and airgunfor catching frogs, as well as bloodstains.
September 19, 2006 – Respondents went to Capas Station of the PNP, at the Camp Detachment of
the 71st
Army and at the Camp Bravo to search for Nicolas and Heherson but no avail.
September 21, 2006 – Respondents alleged that Josephine Galang informed them that she had
seen two men inside the Camp who later she identified as Nicolas and Heherson after
respondents had shown her their photographs. Josephine informed respondents that she saw the
victims again on September 24, 2006 and November 1, 2006 this time at the Camp Bravo.
December 21, 2006 – Respondents filed a case before the CHR which endorsed the same to the
Ombudsman for appropriate action contending that the victim‘s life, liberty and security had been
and continued to be violated on account of their forced disappearance. Respondents prayed the
production of the victims‘ bodies during the hearing and permanent protection orders, and the
rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
December 28, 2007 – Respondents Cleofes Sanchez filed before the Court a petition for issuance
of a Writ of Amparo with Motion for Production and Inspection directed against Gen. Esperon.
January 02, 2008 – The Court resolved to issue a Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to
make a verified return of the Writ before the Court of Appeals of Justice Sundiam who was
ordered to hear and decide the case.
CASE 38 and 39 lacking
40.Silverio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 178933, 16 September 2009
Facts: Beatriz Silverio died. Her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate
proceeding for the settlement of her estate.
- In Nov 2004, during the pendency of the case in RTC of Makati City, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a
petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the estate. Edmundo S. Silverio
also filed an opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate and
for the appointment of a new administrator.
- RTC granted the petition and removed Silverio Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing
Silverio Jr. as the new administrator. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
- In 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to
Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz
Silverio, without Authority from this Honorable Court.
- On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order affirming its Order dated January 3, 2005
and denying private respondent‘s motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also
authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise his duties as
administrator of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to
vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of the order.
- Silverio-Dee received a copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of
Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
which was denied by RTC in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by
private respondent on December 22, 2005.
- On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on
Appeal on January 23, 2006.
- RTC denied the appeal on two grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dee‘s appeal was against an order
denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dee‘s Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary
period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.
- Hence, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, with the CA which issued
a TRO and ruled that Notice of Appeal was filed within the reglementary period provided by the
Rules of Court applying the "fresh rule period" enunciated by this Court in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals.
Issues: WON the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 and the Order dated December 12, 2005
are Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal? [Yes, they are interlocutory orders.]
Ratio: 1. SC first cited the CA decision which ruled that the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005
was a final order. CA said that the alleged authority given by SILVERIO, SR. for Nelia S. Silverio-
Dee to occupy the property dated May 4, 2004, assuming it is not even antedated as alleged by
SILVERIO, JR., is null and void since the possession of estate property can only be given to a
purported heir by virtue of an Order from this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule 90, supra; and Sec. 2 Rule
84, Revised Rules of Court). In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the
possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased only when
it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration (See Sec. 3 Rule 84,
Revised Rules of Court). CA also reiterated that a final order is one that disposes of the subject
matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be
done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, while an interlocutory
order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided
upon.
2. The SC added that it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for
the appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The
interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when
such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.
In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground
that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes
Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue
of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in
mind that until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of
the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property. The underlying rationale is
that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co -
owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property,
in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. The Court in Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals said
that although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the
estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of
ownership over such inchoate right as provided in Art 493 of the Civil Code.
3. Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context that the subject property is part
of an estate and subject to intestate proceedings before the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note
that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, the administrator may only deliver properties of the
estate to the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court,
the properties of the estate shall only be distributed after the payment of the debts, funeral
charges, and other expenses against the estate, except when authorized by the Court.
Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties included
therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the administrator may take
possession of any property that is part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court. In the
instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from
Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real
interest in the specific property located in Forbes Park. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the
RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal.
Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the
RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed.
The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary
period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant
case. The private respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of
the RTC.
Doctrine: Once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties
included therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the administrator may
take possession of any property that is part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court.
The administrator may only deliver properties of the estate to the heirs upon order of the Court.
―The order of the intestate court for Nelly to vacate a portion of the estate property is only an
interlocutory order that may not be the subject of an appeal. It is not a final determination of the
case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It
must be borne in mind that until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to
the properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property.‖
41.Republic v. Marcos, 4 August 2009
Facts: The RTC of Pasig issued an order granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents
Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and
testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos. Pending the filing of said bond and their oath,
Commissioner LiwaywayVinzons-Chato of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby authorized to
continue her functions as Special Administrator of the Estate of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos. Later on,
the Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration to the Order granting
letters testamentary to respondents. On the other hand, Imelda Marcos filed her own motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence
and validity. Subsequently, Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance stating that he already filed a
bond in the amount of P50,000.00 as directed by the RTC and filed a Motion to Revoke the Letters
of Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato. The Motion for
reconsideration of Republic and Imelda was both denied.
Petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of the Rules of
Court, questioning the aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to respondents.
The Court issued a Resolution referring the petition to the CA which was denied later on. Hence, a
motion for reconsideration was filed to SC.
Issue: WON petition for certiorari was proper.
Held: No. Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, which was then in effect provides that, except in
criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, judgments of
regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari
in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948. The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify
or affirm on certiorarias the law or rules of court may prov ide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts as provided in the pertinent portions of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. A
reading of Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
clearly shows that the subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of granting letters
testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any ground which can be the subject of a direct
appeal to this Court. The CA was thus correct in declaring that the "issues raised by petitioner do
not fall within the purview of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 such that the Supreme Court
should take cognizance of the instant case."
―Failure to file income tax return is not an offense involving moral turpitude which would make a
person incompetent to serve as executor or administrator. Moreover the conviction was not yet
final as Bongbong Marcos had appealed therefrom‖
―From the probate court‘s order allowing the will of Ferdinand Marcos and issuing letters
testamentary to Imelda and Bongbong Marcos, the Republic should have appealed to the CA under
S1(a) R109 instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.‖
42.Aranas v Mercado, 15 Jan 2014
―Order of probate court that certain properties should be included in the inventory is interlocutory
and cannot be appealed under S1 R109. Remedy is certiorari under R65‖
Facts: Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate
Thelma filed... a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio's estate
The RTC granted the petition
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio... indicated... that at
the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal properties"
Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory
Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory
Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory... he RTC issued... an order finding and holding that
the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included
Teresita... sought the reconsideration of the order... on the ground that one of the real properties
affected... had already been sold to Mervir Realty... the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration... stating that there was no cogent reason for the reconsideration, and that the
movants' agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties should be included
or excluded... from the inventory already estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass
upon the issue.
the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for certiorari because the order of
the RTC directing a new inventory of properties was interlocutory... the sale by
Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the ownership... to Mervir Realty because the deed of
absolute sale... had been notarized
Issues: Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the
inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale
Ruling: The appeal is meritorious.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its conclusion,
ignored the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisa l of all the
real and personal estate of the deceased... which has come into his possession or knowledge.
The usage of the word all... demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the
decedent in the inventory.
Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to
belong to... the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity.
the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant to the
procedure for preparing the inventory by the administrator.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a
notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of the properties
involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in... favor of its
execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under
the deed... the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision
43.Republic v. Nishina, 15 November 2010
Facts: Nisaida was born on October 31, 1987 in Malolos, Bulacan to her Filipino mother Zenaida
and Japanese father Koichi Nishina. Her father later died and so her mother married another
Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada.As they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil
registry, respondent‘s mother caused the late registration of her birth in 1993 under the surname
of her mother‘s second husband, ―Hakamada.‖ Later on, it surfaced that her birth was in fact
originally registered at the Malolos Civil Registry under the name ―NisaidaSumeraNishina‖. Hence,
she filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birth record and
change of surname in the civil registry of Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Special Proceedings No.
106-M-2007. After hearing the petition, RTC granted respondent‘s petition and directed the Local
Civil Registry of Malolos ―to cancel the second birth record of NisaidaSumeraHakamada issued in
1993 and to change particularly the surname of respondent from Nishina to Watanabe.A copy of
the Order was received on by the OSG which filed, on behalf of petitioner, a notice of appeal.
Before the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that
petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not file a record on appeal as required
under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue: WON filing of a record on appeal is necessary in this case.
Held :No. Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or
judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal. It contemplates multiple
appeals during the pendency of special proceedings. A record on appeal – in addition to the notice
of appeal – is thus required to be filed as the original records of the case should remain with the
trial court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue
is resolved by said court and held to be final.In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal
was not necessary since no other matter remained to be heard and determined by the trial court
after it issued the appealed order granting respondent‘s petition for cancellation of birth record and
change of surname in the civil registry.
―PERIOD OF APPEAL AND HOW APPEAL TAKEN: In special proceedings and other cases of
separate or multiple appeals where a record on appeal is required, the appeal shall be taken within
30 days from notice by filing a notice of appeal and a record on appeal with the court from which
the appeal is being taken. (S2[a] & 3 R41). The test for determining if a record on appeal is
required is to ask if the court a quo notwithstanding the appeal still needs to hold on to the original
record since it has not fully disposed of or decided the case. Appeal from the RTC‘s order granting
a petition for change of name is perfected by filing a notice of appeal only. A record on appeal is
not required since the case does not involve multiple or separate appeals where the trial court
needs to retain the original record.‖