University of Santo Tomas Faculty of Civil Law

CRIMINAL LAW Questions Asked More Than Once

(QuAMTO 2017) *QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with

answers as suggested by UPLC and other distinct luminaries in the
academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the
2017 Bar Exams. *Bar questions are arranged per topic in accordance with
the bar syllabus released by the Supreme Court and were selected based
on their occurrence on past bar examinations from 1987 to 2016.

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE CAMILLE ANGELICA B. GONZALES

SECRETARY GENERAL

EMNIE VALERIE B. DURAN IRVIN L. PALANCA LARA NICOLE T.

GONZALES MARIELLA A. MARASIGAN

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

CAMILLE ANGELICA B. GONZALES

LAYOUT AND DESIGN

QUAMTO COMMITTEE MEMBERS JACKIELYN KRYSTYL NIHAMA

BANA KARL ANTHONY BULAONG MERVIN MARCOS KELLY ANN
RUBIN NESTOR FERNANDO SIAZON

ATTY. AL CONRAD B. ESPALDON ADVISER

QUAMTO (1987-2016) Q: Distinguish between crimes mala in se and mala

prohibita. (1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 Bar)

CRIMINAL LAW QUAMTO

A: In concept, crimes mala in se are those where the acts or omissions

penalized are intently bad, evil, or wrong that they are almost universally
condemned. Crimes mala prohibita are those where the acts penalized are
not inherently bad, evil, or wrong but prohibited by law for public good,
public welfare, or interest and whoever violate the prohibition are penalized.

PART I. REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK I

A. FUNDAMENTAL AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL LAW

Power of Congress to Enact Penal Laws

In legal implications, in crimes mala in se, good faith or lack of criminal

intent or negligence is a defense, while in crimes mala prohibita, good faith
or lack of criminal intent or malice is not a defense; it is enough that the
prohibition was voluntarily violated. Also, criminal liability is generally
incurred in crimes mala in se even when the crime is only attempted or
frustrated, while in crimes mala prohibita, criminal liability is generally
incurred only when the crime is consummated.

Q: What are the limitations upon the power of Congress to enact penal
laws? (1988, 2012 Bar) A: The limitations upon the power of congress to
enact penal laws are as follows: 1. 2. 3.

Congress cannot enact an ex post facto law. Congress cannot enact a bill
of attainder. Congress cannot provide for a cruel punishment.

Also in crimes mala in se, mitigating and aggravating circumstances are

appreciated in imposing the penalties, while in crimes mala prohibita, such
circumstances are not appreciated unless the special law has adopted the
scheme or scale of penalties under the Revised Penal Code.

However, other limitations may be considered like: 1. 2.

Congress cannot enact a law which shall punish for a condition. Congress
shall punish an act and not the condition or status. (Robinson v. California)
Congress should consider Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that “penalties that may be imposed. No felony shall be
punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.”
Lack of criminal intent is a valid defense in mala in se except when the
crime results from criminal negligence. Such defense is not available in
cases of mala prohibita. Q: May an act be malum in se and be, at the same
time, malum prohibitum? (1997 Bar)

Doctrine of Pro Reo (2010, 2012 Bar)

A: Yes, an act may be malum in se and malum prohibitum at the same

time. In People v. Sunico, et. al. (CA, 50 OG 5880) it was held that the
omission or failure of election inspection and poll clerks to include a voter’s
name in the registry list of voters is wrong per se because it
disenfranchises a voter of his right to vote. In this regard, it is considered as
malum in se. Since it is punished under a special law (Sec. 101 and 103,
Revised Election Code), it is considered malum prohibitum.

Q: What is the Doctrine of Pro Reo? How does it relate to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code? (2010 Bar) A: The Doctrine of Pro Reo provides that
whenever a penal law is to be construed or applied and the law admits of
two interpretations, one lenient to the offender and one strict to the
offender, that interpretation which is lenient or favorable to the offender will
be adopted. Following this doctrine, crimes under Art. 48 of the RPC are
complexed and punished with a single penalty (that prescribed for the most
serious crime and to be imposed in its maximum period). The rationale
being, that the accused who commits two crimes with a single criminal
impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes are
committed by different acts and several criminal resolutions (People v.
Comadre, G.R. No. 153559, June 8, 2004). However, Art. 48 shall be
applied only when it would bring about the imposition of a penalty lesser
than the penalties imposable for all the component crimes if prosecuted
separately.

Applicability and Effectivity of the Penal Code (1988, 1994, 1998, 2000,
2015, 2016 Bar) Q: State the characteristics of criminal law and explain
each. (1988, 1998 Bar) A: The characteristics of criminal law are as follows:
1. 2.

Q: What is the fundamental principle in applying and interpreting criminal

laws xxx? (2012 Bar) A: The fundamental principle in interpreting and
applying penal laws is the principle of pro reo. The phrase “in dubio pro
reo” means “when in doubt, for the accused” (Intestate Estate of Gonzales
v. People, GR No. 181409, February 11, 2010). This is in consonance with
the constitutional guarantee that the accused ought to be presumed
innocent until and unless his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt
(See People v. Temporary, GR No. 173473)

3.

Generality – that the law is binding upon all persons who reside to sojourn
in the Philippines, irrespective of age, sex, color, creed, or personal
circumstances. Territoriality – that the law is applicable to all crimes
committed within the limits of Philippine territory, which includes its
atmosphere interior water and maritime zone. (Art. 2) Prospectivity – that
the law does not have any retroactive effect, except if it favors the offender
unless he is a habitual delinquent (Art. 22) or the law otherwise provides.

Q: Abe, married to Liza, contracted another marriage with Connie in

Singapore. Thereafter, Abe and Connie returned to the Philippines and
lived as husband and wife in the hometown of Abe in Calamba, Laguna.
Can Abe be prosecuted for bigamy? (1994 Bar)

Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita (1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 Bar)

CRIMINAL LAW A: No. Abe may not be prosecuted for bigamy since the
bigamous marriage was contracted or solemnized in Singapore, hence,
such violation is not one of those where the Revised Penal Code, under
Art. 2 thereof, may be applied extraterritoriality. The general rule on
territoriality of criminal law governs the situation.

scene of their confrontation and seeing that nobody was there, went home
to sleep. The next day, B’s wife reported to the police station that her
husband had not yet come home. A search was conducted by the residents
of the barangay but after almost two days, B or his body could not be
located and his disappearance continued for the next few days. Based on
the testimony of C and other guests, who had seen A and B on top of the
cliff, A was arrested and charged with Murder. In his defense, he claimed
that since B’s body has not been found, there was no evidence of corpus
delicti and therefore, he should be acquitted.

Q: After drinking one (1) case of San Miguel Beer and taking two plates of
“pulutan”, Binoy, a Filipino seaman, stabbed to death Sio My, a
Singaporean seaman, aboard M/V “Princess of the Pacific”, an overseas
vessel which was sailing in the South China Sea. The vessel, although
Panamanian registered, is owned by Lucio Sy, a rich Filipino businessman.
When M/V “Princess of the Pacific” reached a Philippine Port at Cebu City,
the Captain of the vessel turned over the assailant Binoy to the Philippine
authorities. An Information for homicide was filed against Binoy in the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. He moved to quash the Information for
lack of jurisdiction. If you were the judge, will you grant the motion? Why?
(2000 Bar)

Is the defense of A tenable or not? State the reason(s) for your answer?
(2001 Bar) A: The defense of A is not tenable. “Corpus delicti” does not
refer to the body of the purported victim which had not been found. Even
without the body of the purported victim being found, the offender can be
convicted when the facts and circumstances of a crime, the body of the
crime or “corpus delicti” is established.

A: Yes. The motion to quash the information should be granted. The

Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime committed since it was
committed on the high seas or outside of Philippine territory and on board a
vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines (US v. Fowler, 1 Phil
614)

In other words, the non-recovery of the body of the victim is not a bar to the
prosecution of A for Murder, but the fact of death and identity of the victim
must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Motive and Intent

It is the registration of the vessel in accordance with the laws of the

Philippines, not the citizenship of her owner, which makes it a Philippine
ship. The vessel being registered in Panama, the laws of Panama govern
while it is in the high seas.

Q: May a crime be committed without criminal intent? (1988 Bar) A: A crime

may be committed without criminal intent in two cases: 1. In offense
punishable as mala prohibita; and 2. Felonies committed by means of
culpa.

B. FELONIES Corpus delicti

Q: Distinguish intent from motive in Criminal Law. (1996, 2004 Bar)

Q: (a) Define “Corpus delicti”. (b) What are the elements of “Corpus
delicti”? (2000 Bar)

A: Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite
result; whereas intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect
such results. Motive is not an essential element of a felony and need not be
proved for purpose of conviction, while intent is an essential element of
felonies by dolo.

A: (a) Corpus Delicti literally means “the body or substance of the crime” or
the fact that a crime has been committed, but does not include the identity
of the person who committed it. (People v. Pascal, 44 OG 2789)

Q: When is motive relevant to prove a case? When is it not necessary to be

established? Explain. (1999, 2006 Bar)

(b) Elements of corpus delicti: The actual commission by someone of the

particular crime charged. It is a compound fact made up of two things:

A: Motive is relevant to prove a case when there is doubt as to the identity

of the offender or when the act committed gives rise to variant crimes and
there is the need to determine the proper crime to be imputed to the
offender.

(1) The existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of the criminal
charge; and (2) The existence of a criminal agency as the cause of the act
or result.

It is not necessary to prove motive when the offender is positively identified

or the criminal act did not give rise to variant crimes.

The identity of the offender is not a necessary element of corpus delicti.

IMPOSSIBLE CRIME (1994, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2009, 2014)

Q: At a birthday party in Cebu, A got intoxicated and started quarreling with

B and C. At the height of their arguments, A left and took a bolo from his
house, after which he returned to the party and threatened to stab
everybody. B got scared and ran towards the seashore, with A chasing him.
B ran up a steep incline along the shore and was cornered on top of a cliff.
Out of fear, B jumped from the cliff into the sea. A returned to the UST BAR
OPERATIONS

Q: JP, Aries and Randal planned to kill Elsa, a resident of Barangay Pula,
Laurel, Batangas. They asked the assistance of Ella, who is familiar with
the place. On April 3, 1992, at about 10:00 in the evening, JP, Aries and
Randal, all armed with automatic weapons, went to Barangay Pula. Ella,
being the guide, directed her companions to the room in the house of Elsa.

QUAMTO (1987-2016) Whereupon, JP, Aries and Randal fired their guns at
her room. Fortunately, Elsa was not around as she attended a prayer
meeting that evening in another barangay in Laurel.

“Impossible Crime to Commit Kidnapping” against Enrique. Is the

prosecutor correct? (2000 Bar) A:

JP, et. al., were charged and convicted of attempted murder by the
Regional Trial Court at Tanauan, Batangas. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, all the accused ascribed to the trial court the sole error of finding
them guilty of attempted murder.
a.

b. If you were the ponente, how will you decide the appeal? (1994 Bar) A: If
I were the ponente, I will set aside the judgment convicting the accused of
attempted murder and instead find them guilty of impossible crime under
Art. 4, par. 2, RPC, in relation to Art. 59, RPC. Liability for impossible crime
arises not only when the impossibility is legal, but likewise when it is factual
or physical impossibility, as in the case at bar.

c.

Impossible crime is an act which would be an offense against person or

property, were if not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or
on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means (Art. 4,
par. 2, RPC). No, an impossible crime is not really a crime. It is only so-
called because the act gives rise to criminal liability. But actually, no felony
is committed. The accused is to be punished for his criminal tendency or
propensity although no crime was committed. Yes, A, B, C and D are liable
for destructive arson because of the destruction of the room of X with the
use of an explosive, the hand grenade. Liability for an impossible crime is
to be imposed only if the act committed would not constitute any other
crime under the Revised Penal Code. Although the facts involved are
parallel to the case of Intod v. CA (215 SCRA 52), where it was ruled that
the liability of the offender was for an impossible crime, no hand grenade
was used in the said case, which constitutes a more serious crime though
different from what was intended.

Elsa’s absence from the house is a physical impossibility which renders the
crime intended inherently incapable of accomplishment. To convict the
accused of attempted murder would make Art. 4, par. 2, practically useless
as all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will
be treated as an incident independent of the actor’s will which is an
element of attempted or frustrated felony. (Intod v. CA, 215 SCRA 52)

d.
Q: Puti detested Pula, his roommate, because Pula was courting Ganda,
whom Puti fancied. One day, Puti decided to teach Pula a lesson and went
to a veterinarian to ask for poison on the pretext that he was going to kill a
sick pet, when actually Puti was intending to poison Pula, the Vet instantly
gave Puti a non-toxic solution which, when mixed with Pula’s food, did not
kill Pula. What crime, if any, did Puti commit? (1994, 1998, 2004, 2009,
2014 Bar)

No, the prosecutor is not correct in filing a case for “impossible crime to
commit kidnapping” against Enrique. Impossible crimes are limited only to
acts which when performed would be a crime against persons or property.
As kidnapping is a crime against personal security and not against persons
or property, Enrique could not have incurred an “impossible crime” to
commit kidnapping. There is thus no impossible crime of kidnapping.
STAGES OF EXECUTION (1996, 2000, 2005, 2015)

A: Puti committed an impossible crime of murder. Puti, with intent to kill

Pula, unknowingly employed ineffectual means to accomplish the intended
felony, that is, using a non-toxic solution.

Q: Edgardo induced his friend Vicente, in consideration of money, to kidnap

a girl he is courting so that he may succeed in raping her and eventually
making her accede to marry him. Vicente asked for more money which
Edgardo failed to put up. Angered because Edgardo did not put up the
money he required, he reported Edgardo to the police. May Edgardo be
charged with attempted kidnapping? (1996 Bar)

Q: a. What is an impossible crime? b. Is an impossible crime really a

crime? c. A, B, C and D, all armed with armalites, proceeded to the house
of X, Y, a neighbor of X, who happened to be passing by, pointed to the four
culprits the room that X occupied. The four culprits peppered the room with
bullets. Not satisfied, A even threw a hand grenade that totally destroyed
X’s room. However, unknown to the four culprits, X was not inside the room
and nobody was hit or injured during the incident. Are A, B, C and D liable
for any crime? Explain. d. Carla, 4 years old, was kidnapped by Enrique,
the tricycle driver paid by her parents to bring and fetch her to and from
school. Enrique wrote a ransom note demanding P500,0 00 from Carla’s
parents in exchange for Carla’s freedom. Enrique sent the ransom note by
mail. However, before the ransom note was received by Carla’s parents,
Enrique’s hideout was discovered by the police. Carla was rescued while
Enrique was arrested and incarcerated. Considering that the ransom note
was not received by Carla’s parents, the investigating prosecutor merely
filed a case of

A: No. Edgardo may not be charged with attempted kidnapping inasmuch

as no overt act to kidnap or restrain the liberty of the girl had been
commenced. At most, what Edgardo has done in the premises was a
proposal to Vicente to kidnap the girl, which is only a preparatory act and
not an overt act. The attempt to commit a felony commences with the
commission of overt act, not preparatory act. Proposal to commit
kidnapping is not a crime. Q: Taking into account the nature and elements
of the felonies of coup d’etat and rape, may one be criminally liable for
frustrated coup d’etat or frustrated rape? Explain. (2005 Bar) A: No. A
person may not be held liable for frustrated coup d’ etat or for frustrated
rape because in a frustrated felony, it is required that all acts of execution
that could produce the felony as a consequence must have been
performed by the offender but the felony was not produced by reason of
causes independent of the will of the offender. In the said felonies, one
cannot perform all the acts of execution

CRIMINAL LAW without consummating the felony. The said felonies,

therefore, do not admit of the frustrated stage.

invited him to poker session at a rented beach cottage. When he was

losing almost all his money which to him was his savings of a lifetime, he
discovered that he was being cheated by his friends. Angered by the
betrayal, he decided to take revenge on the three cheats.

COMPLEX AND COMPOSITE CRIMES Complex crime (1987, 1989, 1991,

1994, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2007)

Harry ordered several bottles of Tanduay Rhum and gave them to his
companions to drink, as they did, until they all fell asleep. When Harry saw
his companions already sound asleep, he hacked them all to death. Then
he remembered his losses, he rifled through the pockets of his victims and
got back all the money he lost. He then ran away but not before burning the
cottage to hide his misdeed. The following day, police investigators found
among the debris the charred bodies of Jason, Manuel, Dave and the
caretaker of the resort.

Q: Jose purchased roofing materials worth P20, 000 from PY & Sons
Construction Company owned by Pedro and paid the latter a check in the
said amount. The following day, Pedro deposited the check but it was
returned dishonored because it was drawn against a closed account. Jose
failed to make good the said check despite written demands. Atty.
Saavedra, counsel for Pedro, filed two complaints against Jose with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal, one for estafa under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code and another for violation of BP Blg. 22. Atty. San
Pascual, counsel for Jose, claimed that if his client was at all liable, he
could only be liable for violation of BP 22 and not for estafa under Art. 315
of the RPC because one precludes the other and because BP 22 is more
favorable to the accused as it carries a lighter penalty.

The Provincial Prosecutor charged Harry with the complex crime of arson
with quadruple homicide and robbery. Was Harry properly charged?
Discuss. (1995 Bar) A: No. Harry was not properly charged. Harry should
have been charged with three (3) separate crimes, namely: murder, theft,
and arson.

The investigating fiscal, on his resolution, stated that only one crime was
committed, namely, the complex crime of estafa under Art. 315 of the RPC
and another under BP 22.

Harry killed Jason, Manuel and Dave with evident premeditation, as there
was considerable lapse of time before he decided to commit the crime and
the actual commission of the crime. In addition, Harry employed means
which weakened the defense of Jason, Manuel, and Dave. Harry gave
them the liquor to drink until they were drunk and fell asleep.
Is the investigating fiscal correct? (Question reframed) (1987 Bar) A: The
resolution of the investigating fiscal is erroneous. There is no complex
crime of estafa under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code and the violation
of BP 22. A complex crime refers only to felonies which are punished in the
Revised Penal Code.

The taking of the money was a mere afterthought of the killings. Hence,
Harry committed the separate crime of theft and not the complex crime of
robbery with homicide. Although theft was committed against dead
persons, it is still legally possible as the offended party are the estates of
the victims.

Q: Rodolfo, a policeman, was cleaning his service pistol inside his house
when it fell from his hand and fired. The bullet hit a neighbor on the
stomach and a second neighbor on the leg. The injuries sustained by the
two neighbors required thirty-five (35) days and nine (9) days of medical
attendance, respectively. The investigating fiscal later filed an information
for frustrated homicide and slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence against Rodolfo. Is the charge correct? Explain. (1989 Bar)

In burning the cottage, it is another separate crime of arson. The act of

burning was not necessary for the consummation of the two previous
offenses he committed. The fact that the caretaker died from the blaze did
not qualify Harry’s crime into a complex crime of arson with homicide for
there is no such crime. Hence, Harry was improperly charged with the
complex crime of arson with quadruple homicide and robbery. Harry should
have been charged with three separate crimes, murder, theft and arson.

A: The charge is not correct. One single act of accidental shooting cannot
give rise to two felonies. One of which is intentional and the other negligent.
Frustrated homicide presupposes intent to kill. The facts do not show any
intent to kill on the part of Rodolfo. At most, he was careless, and therefore
only negligent.

Q: A, actuated by malice and with the use of a fully automatic M-14 sub-
machine gun, shot a group of persons who were seated in a cockpit with
one burst of successive, continuous, automatic fire. Four (4) persons were
killed thereby, each having hit by different bullets coming from the sub-
machine gun of A. Four (4) cases of murder were filed against A.

Two separate crimes of serious physical injuries (against the first neighbor
whose injuries requires 35 days of medical attendance), and slight physical
injuries (against the second neighbor), both through reckless imprudence,
were committed by Rodolfo. Although both of these offenses were the
result of one single act, a complex crime is not committed because it is only
when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies that
a complex crime may be committed under the first clause of Article 48,
RPC. Slight physical injuries is not a grave or less grave felony.

The trial court ruled that there was only one crime committed by A for the
reason that, since A performed only one act, he having pressed the trigger
of his gun only once, the crime committed was murder. Consequently, the
trial judge sentenced A to just one penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Q: Harry, an overseas contract worker, arrived from Saudi Arabia with

considerable savings. Knowing him to be “loaded”, his friends Jason,
Manuel and Dave UST BAR OPERATIONS

(A) Was the decision of the trial judge correct? Explain.

QUAMTO (1987-2016) (B) What constitutes a complex crime? How many

crimes may be involved in a complex crime? What is the penalty therefor?
(1999 Bar)

A: In concept – An ordinary complex crime is made up of two or more

crimes being punished in distinct provisions of the Revised Penal Code but
alleged in one information either because they were brought about by a
single felonious act or because one offense is a necessary means for
committing the other offense or offenses. They are alleged in one
information so that only one penalty shall be imposed.

A: (A) The decision of the trial judge is not correct. When the offender made
use of an automatic firearm, the acts committed are determined by the
number of bullets discharged inasmuch as the firearm being automatic, the
offender need only press the trigger once and it would fire continually. For
each death caused by a distinct and separate bullet, the accused incurs
distinct criminal liability. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which
should be considered as producing the several felonies, but the number of
bullets which actually produced them. (B) A complex crime is constituted
when a single act caused two or more grave or less grave felonies or when
an offense is committed as a necessary means to commit another offense.
(Art 48, RPC)

A special complex crime, on the other hand, is made up of two or more

crimes which are considered only as components of a single indivisible
offense being punished in one provision of the Revised Penal Code. As to
penalties – In ordinary complex crime, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed and in its maximum period. In special complex
crime, only one penalty is specifically prescribed for all the component
crimes which are regarded as one indivisible offense. The component
crimes are not regarded as distinct crimes and so the penalty to be
imposed for the most serious crime is not the penalty to be imposed nor in
its maximum period. It is the penalty specifically provided for the special
complex crime that shall be applied according to the rules on imposition of
the penalty.

At least two crimes are involved in a complex crime; either two or more
grave or less grave felonies resulted from a single act, or an offense is
committed as a necessary means for committing another. The penalty for
the more serious crime shall be imposed and in its maximum period. (Art.
48, RPC)

Composite crime (1998, 1999, 2004)

Q: Distinguish between – (1) xxx (2) Between compound concepts. (2004

Bar)

and
complex

crime

Q: A, B, C and D all armed, robbed a bank and when they were about to
get out of the bank, policemen came and ordered them to surrender but
they fired on the police officers who fired back and shot it out with them.
Suppose a bank employee was killed and the bullet which killed him came
from the firearm of the police officers, with what crime shall you charge A,
B, C and D? (1998, 2004 Bar)

as

A: Compound crimes result when the offender committed only a single

felonious act from which two or more crimes resulted. This is provided for in
modified form in the first part of Article 48, RPC, limiting the resulting
crimes to only grave and/or less grave felonies. Hence, light felonies are
excluded even though resulting from the same single act.

A: A, B, C and D should be charged with the crime of robbery with homicide

because the death of the bank employee was brought about by the acts of
said offenders on the occasion of robbery. They shot it out with the
policeman, thereby causing such death by reason or on the occasion of
robbery; Hence, the composite crime of robbery with homicide.

Complex crime result when the offender has to commit an offense as a

necessary means for committing another offense. Only one Information
shall be filed and if proven, the penalty for the more serious crime shall be
imposed. Special Complex Crime (1989, 1995, 1997, 2003, 2005, 2006,
2016)

Q: Samuel, a tricycle driver, plied his usual route using a Honda motorcycle
with a sidecar. One evening, Raul rode on the sidecar, poked a knife at
Samuel and instructed him to go near a bridge. Upon reaching the bridge,
Raul alighted from the motorcycle and suddenly stabbed Samuel several
times until he was dead. Raul fled from the scene taking the motorcycle
with him. What crime(s) did Raul commit? (1998, 2004 Bar)
Q: After raping the complainant in her house, the accused struck a match to
smoke a cigarette before departing from the scene. The brief light from the
match allowed him to notice a watch in her wrist. He demanded that she
hand over the watch. When she refused, he forcibly grabbed it from her.
The accused was charged with and convicted of the special complex crime
of robbery with rape. Was the court correct? (1997 Bar) A: No. The accused
should instead be held liable for two separate crimes of robbery and rape,
since the primary intent or objective of the accused was only to rape the
complainant, and his commission of the robbery was merely an
afterthought. The robbery must precede the rape, in order to give rise to the
special complex crime for which the court convicted the accused.

A: Raul committed the composite crime of Carnapping with homicide under

Sec. 14 of RA 6539, as amended, considering that the killing “in the course
of” or “on the occasion of” a carnapping. (People v. De la Cruz, 183 SCRA
763). A motorcycle is included in the definition of a “motor vehicle” in said
Republic Act. There is no apparent motive for the killing of the tricycle driver
but for Raul to be able to take the motorcycle. The fact that the tricycle
driver was killed brings about the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

Q: Distinguish between an ordinary complex crime and a special complex

crime as to their concepts and as to the imposition of penalties. (2003 Bar)

Q: Two young men, A and B, conspired to rob a residential house of things

of value. They succeeded in the commission of their original plan to simply
rob. A,

CRIMINAL LAW however, was sexually aroused when he saw the lady
owner of the house, and so raped her.

so fast that Pat Negre fired warning shots into the air shouting for Filemon
to stop. In as much as Filemon continued running Pat. Negre fired at him
hitting and killing him. Is the plea of self-defense sustainable? Why would
you then hold Pat. Negre criminally liable? Discuss. (1993 Bar)
The lady victim testified that B did not in any way participate in the rape but
he watched the happening from a window and did nothing to stop the rape.
Is B as criminally liable as A for robbery with rape? Explain. (1999 Bar)

A:

A: Yes. B is as criminally liable for the composite crime of robbery with rape
under Art. 294 (1). Although the conspiracy of A and B was only to rob, B
was present when the rape was being committed which gave rise to a
composite crime, a single indivisible offense of robbery with rape. B would
not have been liable had he endeavored to prevent the commission of the
rape. But since he did not when he could have done so, he in effect
acquiesced with the rape as a component of the robbery and so he is also
liable for robbery with rape.

(a) Yes. Self-defense can be claimed as there is an imminent and great

peril on the life of Negre. (b) No. Self-defense is no longer sustainable as
there is no more peril on his life. Q: Osang, a married woman in her early
twenties, was sleeping on a banig on the floor of their nipa hut beside the
seashore when she was awakened by the act of a man mounting her.
Thinking that it was her husband, Gardo, who had returned from fishing in
the sea, Osang continued her sleep but allowed the man, who was actually
their neighbor, Julio, to have sexual intercourse with her. After Julio
satisfied himself, he said “Salamat Osang" as he turned to leave. Only then
did Osang realize that the man was not her husband. Enraged, Osang
grabbed a balisong from the wall and stabbed Julio to death. When tried for
homicide, Osang claimed defense of honor. Should the claim be sustained?
Why? (2000, 1998 Bar)

CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY JUSTIFYING

CIRCUMSTANCES (1993, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 1996, 2008,
2016 BAR) Q: Distinguish clearly but briefly: Between justifying and
exempting circumstances in criminal law. (2004, 1998 Bar) A: Justifying
circumstance affects the act, not the actor; while exempting circumstance
affects the actor, not the act. In justifying circumstance, no criminal and,
generally, no civil liability is incurred; while in exempting circumstance, civil
liability is generally incurred although there is no criminal liability

A: No. Osang's claim of defense of honor should not be sustained because

the aggression on her honor had ceased when she stabbed the aggressor.
In defense of rights under Art. 11(1) of the RPC, it is required inter alia that
there be (1) unlawful aggression, and (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it. The unlawful aggression must be
continuing when the aggressor was injured or disabled by the person
making a defense. Otherwise, the attack made is a retaliation and not a
defense. Hence, Osang's act of stabbing Julio to death after the sexual
intercourse was finished, is not defense of honor but an immediate
vindication of a grave offense committed against her, which is only
mitigating.

Self-Defense (Defense of Person, Rights, Property and Honor) Q: BB and

CC, both armed with knives, attacked FT. The victim's son, ST, upon seeing
the attack, drew his gun but was prevented from shooting the attackers by
AA, who grappled with him for possession of the gun. FT died from knife
wounds. AA, BB and CC were charged with murder. In his defense, AA
invoked the justifying circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or injury,
contending that by preventing ST from shooting BB and CC, he merely
avoided a greater evil. Will AA's defense prosper? Reason briefly. (2004
Bar)

Defense of Relatives Q: When A arrived home, he found B raping his

daughter. Upon seeing A, B ran away. A took his gun and shot B, killing
him. Charged with homicide, A claimed he acted in defense of his
daughter's honor. Is A correct? If not, can A claim the benefit of any
mitigating circumstance or circumstances? (2002, 2000, 1998 Bar)

A: No, AA's defense will not prosper. The act of the victim's son, ST,
appears to be a legitimate defense of relatives; hence, justified as a
defense of his father against the unlawful aggression by BB and CC. ST’s
act to defend his father's life and to stop BB and CC achieve their criminal
objective cannot be regarded as an evil inasmuch as it is, in the eyes of the
law, a lawful act. What AA did was a lawful defense, not greater evil.
Likewise, AA’s defense will not prosper because in this case there was a
conspiracy among the three of them, hence, the act of one is the act of all.

A: No. A cannot validly invoke defense of his daughter's honor in having

killed B since the rape was already consummated; moreover, B already ran
away, hence, there was no aggression to defend against and no defense to
speak of. Defense of honor as included in self-defense, must have been
done to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. There is no defense to
speak of where the unlawful aggression no longer exists.

Q: Pat. Negre saw Filemon, an inmate, escaping from jail and ordered the
latter to surrender. Instead of doing so, Filemon attacked Pat. Negre with a
bamboo spear. Filemon missed in his first attempt to hit Pat. Negre, and
before he could strike again, Pat. Negre shot and killed him.

A may, however, invoke the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of having

acted in immediate vindication of a grave offense to a descendant, his
daughter, under par. 5, Art. 13 of the RPC.

(a) Can Pat. Negre claim self defense? Explain. (b) Suppose Pat Negre
missed in his shot, and Filemon ran away without parting with his weapon.
Pat Negre pursued Filemon but the latter was running UST BAR
OPERATIONS

Q: Pedro is married to Tessie. Juan is the first cousin of Tessie. While in the
market, Pedro saw a man stabbing Juan. Seeing the attack on Juan, Pedro
picked up a spade

QUAMTO (1987-2016) nearby and hit the attacker on his head which
caused the latter’s death. Can Pedro be absolved of the killing on the
ground that it is in defense of a relative? Explain. (2016 Bar)

precise moment when the crime was being committed. The facts of the
case indicate that Romeo committed the crime with discernment and was
only diagnosed to be mentally unstable after the crime was committed. (b)
The effect of the diagnosis made by NCMH is possibly a suspension of the
proceeding against Romeo and his commitment to appropriate institution
for treatment until he could already understand the proceedings.

A: No. The relatives of the accused for purpose of defense of relative under
Art. 11(20 of the Revised Penal Code are his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters or of his
relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within
the fourth civil degree. Relative by affinity within the same degree includes
ascendant, descendant, brother or sister of the spouse of the accused. In
this case, Juan is not the ascendant, descendant, brother or sister of
Tessie, the spouse of Pedro. Relative by consanguinity within the fourth
civil degree includes first cousin. But in this case, Juan is the cousin of
Pedro by affinity but not by consanguinity. Juan, therefore, is not a relative
of Pedro for purpose of applying the provision on defense of relative.

Minority Q: While they were standing in line awaiting their vaccination at the
school clinic, Pomping repeatedly pulled the ponytail of Katreena, his 11
years, 2 months and 13 days old classmate in Grade 5 at the Sampaloc
Elementary School. Irritated, Katreena turned around and swung at
Pomping with a ball pen. The top of the ball pen hit the right eye of
Pomping which bled profusely. Realizing what she had caused, Katreena
immediately helped Pomping. When investigated, she freely admitted to the
school principal that she was responsible for the injury to Pomping's eye.
After the incident, she executed a statement admitting her culpability. Due
to the injury, Pomping lost his right eye. (2000, 1998 Bar)

Pedro, however, can invoke defense of a stranger. Under the Revised

Penal Code, a person who defends a person who is not his relative may
invoke the defense of a stranger provided that all its elements exist, to wit:
(a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel the attack; and (c) the person defending be not induced
by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.

(a) Is Katreena criminally liable? Why? (b) Discuss the attendant

circumstances and effects thereof.

Defense of Stranger
A:

Q: A chanced upon three men who were attacking B with fist blows. C, one
of the men, was about to stab B with a knife. Not knowing that B was
actually the aggressor because he had earlier challenged the three men to
a fight, A shot C as the latter was about to stab B. May A invoke the
defense of a stranger as a justifying circumstance in his favor? Why? (Bar
2002)

(a) No. Katreena is not criminally liable due to her minority. She is
exempted from criminal liability for being a minor less than fifteen (15)
years old although over nine (9) years of age. Nonetheless is she civilly
liable. (b) The attendant circumstances which may be considered are:

A: Yes. A may invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of stranger

since he was not involved in the fight and he shot C when the latter was
about to stab B. There being no indication that A was induced by revenge,
resentment or any other evil motive in shooting C, his act is justified under
par. 3, Art. 11 of the RPC.

1.

2.

EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES (1998, 2000, 2010 BAR) Insanity Q:

While his wife was on a 2-year scholarship abroad, Romeo was having an
affair with his maid Dulcinea. Realizing that the affair was going nowhere,
Dulcinea told Romeo that she was going back to the province to marry her
childhood sweetheart. Clouded by anger and jealousy, Romeo strangled
Dulcinea to death while she was sleeping in the maid’s quarters.

3.

4.

The following day, Romeo was found catatonic inside the maid’s quarters.
He was brought to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) where he
was diagnosed to be mentally unstable. Charged with murder, Romeo
pleaded insanity as a defense.

Minority of the accused as an exempting circumstance under Art. 12(3) of

RPC, where she shall be exempt from criminal liability, unless it was proved
that she acted with discernment. She is however civilly liable; If found
criminally liable, the minority of the accused is a privileged mitigating
circumstance. A discretionary penalty lower by at least two (2) degrees than
that prescribed for the crime committed shall be imposed in accordance
with Art. 68(1) of RPC. The sentence however, should automatically be
suspended in accordance with Sec. 5(a) of R.A. No. 8369 (Family Courts
Act of 1997); Likewise if found criminally liable, the ordinary mitigating
circumstance of not intending to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed under Art. 13(3) of the RPC may apply; The ordinary mitigating
circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party
immediately preceded the act.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES (1988, 1992, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2012,

2016 BAR)

(a) Will Romeo’s defense prosper? Explain. (b) What is the effect of the
diagnosis of the NCMH on the case? (2010 Bar) A:

Q: What is a privileged mitigating circumstance? Distinguish a privileged

mitigating circumstance from an ordinary mitigating circumstance as to
reduction of penalty and offsetting against aggravating circumstance/s.
(2012 Bar)

(a) No. Romeo’s defense of insanity will not prosper. Insanity as a defense
to the commission of a crime must have existed and proven to have been
existing at the

CRIMINAL LAW A: Privileged mitigating circumstances are those that

mitigate the criminal liability of the accused by graduating the imposable
penalty for the crime being modified to one or two degrees lower. These
circumstances cannot be offset by aggravating circumstance. The
circumstance of incomplete justification or exemption (when majority of the
conditions are present), and the circumstance of minority (if the child above
15 years of age acted with discernment) are privileged mitigating
circumstance. The distinctions between ordinary mitigating circumstances
are as follows: a.

and

2. 3.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES (1988, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997,

2000, 2003, 2005, 2009 BAR) Q: The robbers killed a mother and her baby,
then threw the body of the baby outside the window. Can the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty be considered in this case? Reason. (1988 Bar)

privileged

Under the rules for application of divisible penalties (RPC, Art. 64), the
presence of a mitigating circumstance, if not off-set by aggravating
circumstance, has the effect of applying the divisible penalty in its minimum
period. Under the rules on graduation of penalty (RPC, Art. 68, 69), the
presence of privileged mitigating circumstance has the effect of reducing
the penalty one to two degrees lower; Ordinary mitigating circumstances
can be off-set by aggravating circumstances. Privileged mitigating
circumstances are not subject to the off-set rule.

b.

A: Cruelty cannot be considered in this case because the aggravating

circumstance of cruelty requires deliberate prolongation of the suffering of
the victim. In this case, the baby was dead already so that there is no more
prolongation to speak of. Q: At about 9:30 in the evening, while Dino and
Raffy were walking along Padre Faura Street, Manila, Johnny hit them with
a rock injuring Dino at the back. Raffy approached Dino, but suddenly,
Bobby, Steve, Danny and Nonoy surrounded the duo. Then Bobby stabbed
Dino. Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny kept on hitting Dino and Raffy with
rocks. As a result, Dino died.

Surrender and Confession of Guilt Q: After killing the victim, the accused
absconded. He succeeded in eluding the police until he surfaced and
surrendered to the authorities about two years later. Charged with murder,
he pleaded not guilty but, after the prosecution had presented two
witnesses implicating him to the crime, he changed his plea to that of guilty.
Should the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of
guilty be considered in favor of the accused? (1997 Bar)

Bobby, Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny were charged with homicide. Can
the court appreciate the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and band?
(1994 Bar) A: No. Nighttime cannot be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance because there is no indication that the offenders deliberately
sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime or
that they took advantage of nighttime (People v. De los Reyes, 203 SCRA
707) Besides, judicial notice can be taken of the fact that Padre Faura
Street is well-lighted.

A: Voluntary surrender may not be appreciated in favor of the accused. Two

years is too long a time to consider the surrender as spontaneous (People
v. Ablao, G.R. No. 69184, March 26, 1990).

However, band should be considered as the crime was committed by more

than three armed malefactors; in a recent Supreme Court decision, stones
or rocks are considered deadly weapons. Q: Name the four (4) kinds of
aggravating circumstances and state their effect on the penalty of crimes
and nature thereof. Distinguish generic aggravating circumstance from
qualifying aggravating circumstance. (1999 Bar)

For sure the government had already incurred considerable efforts and
expenses in looking for the accused. Plea of guilty can no longer be
appreciated as a mitigating circumstance because the prosecution had
already started with the presentation of its evidence (Art. 13[7], RPC). Q:
When is surrender by an accused considered voluntary, and constitutive of
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender? (1999 Bar)
A: The four (4) kinds of aggravating circumstances are:

A: A surrender by an offender is considered voluntary when it is

spontaneous, indicative of an intent to submit unconditionally to the
authorities. To be mitigating, the surrender must be: a.

1.

2.

Spontaneous, i.e., indicative of acknowledgment of guilt and not for

convenience nor conditional; Made before the government incurs
expenses, time and effort in tracking down the offender's whereabouts; and
Made to a person in authority or the letter's agents.

b. c.

3.

4.

Q: In order that the plea of guilty may be mitigating, what requisites must
be complied with? (1999 Bar) A: For plea of guilty to be mitigating, the
requisites are: 1.

That such plea was made before the court competent to try the case and
render judgment; and That such plea was made prior to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution.

Generic aggravating or those that can generally apply to all crimes, and
can be offset by mitigating circumstances, but if not offset, would affect only
the maximum of the penalty prescribed by law; Specific aggravating or
those that apply only to particular crimes and cannot be offset by mitigating
circumstances; Qualifying circumstances or those that change the nature of
the crime to a graver one, or brings about a penalty next higher in degree,
and cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances; Inherent aggravating or
those that essentially accompany the commission of the crime and do not
affect the penalty whatsoever.

The distinctions between generic aggravating circumstances and qualifying

aggravating circumstances are as follows:

That the accused spontaneously pleaded guilty to the crime charged;

Generic aggravating circumstances: UST BAR OPERATIONS

QUAMTO (1987-2016) a. b. c. d.

criminal information for estafa, but the actual recital of facts of the offense
charged therein, if proven, would constitute not only the crime of estafa, but
also falsification of public document as a necessary means for committing
estafa. AAA invokes the absolutory cause of relationship by affinity. Which
statement is most accurate? (2012 Bar)

affects the nature of the crime or brings about a penalty higher in degree
than that ordinarily prescribed; can be offset by ordinary mitigating
circumstances; need not be alleged in the Information as long as proven
during the trial; the same shall be considered in imposing the sentence.

A: There are two views on whether the extinguishment of the marriage by

death of the spouse dissolves the relationship by affinity for purpose of
absolutory clause.

Qualifying circumstances: a. b. c.

affects the nature of the crime or brings about a penalty higher in degree
than that ordinarily prescribed; cannot be offset by mitigating
circumstances; must be alleged in the Information and proven during trial.

The first holds that the relationship by affinity terminates with the
dissolution of the marriage, while the second maintains that relationship
continues even after the death of the deceased spouse. The principle of
pro reo calls for the adoption of the continuing affinity view because it is
more favorable to the accused. However, the absolutory cause applies to
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply to theft through
falsification or estafa through falsification (Intestate estate of Gonzales v.
People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010).

Q: Rico, a member of the Alpha Rho Fraternity, was killed by Pocholo, a

member of the rival group, Sigma Phi Omega. Pocholo was prosecuted for
homicide. During the trial, the prosecution was able to prove that the killing
was committed by means of poison in consideration of a promise or reward
and with cruelty. If you were the Judge, will you consider the aggravating
circumstances of using poison, in consideration of a promise or reward and
cruelty? (2000 Bar)

Article 20: Accessories exempt from criminal liability by reason of

relationship Q: DCB, the daughter of MCB, stole the earrings of XYZ, a
stranger. MCB pawned the earrings with TBI Pawnshop as a pledge for
P500 loan. During the trial, MCB raised the defense that being the mother
of DCB, she cannot be held liable as an accessory. Will MCB's defense
prosper? Reason briefly. (2004 Bar)

A: The circumstances of using poison, in consideration of a promise or

reward and cruelty which attended the killing of Rico could only be
appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances since none of them
have been alleged in the Information to qualify the killing to murder. A
qualifying circumstance must be alleged in the Information and proven
beyond reasonable doubt during the trial to be appreciated as such.

A: No. MCB's defense will not prosper because the exemption from criminal
liability of an accessory by virtue of relationship with the principal does not
cover accessories who themselves profited from or assisted the offender to
profit by the effects or proceeds of the crime.

Q: When would qualifying circumstances be deemed, if at all, elements of a

crime? (2003 Bar) A: A qualifying circumstance would be deemed an
element of a crime when: 1. 2. 3.
This non-exemption of an accessory, though related to the principal of the
crime, is expressly provided in Art. 20 of the RPC.

It changes the nature of the crime, bringing about a more serious crime and
heavier penalty; It is essential to the crime involved, otherwise some other
crime is committed; and It is specifically alleged in the information and
proven during trial.

EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE (1988, 1991, 2001, 2007, 2015, 2016

BAR) Q: At 10:00 in the evening, upon his arrival, Marco surprised his wife,
Rosette and her former boyfriend, Raul, both naked and in the act of illicit
copulation. Raul got his revolver and upon seeing the revolver, Marco ran
toward the street, took a pedicab and proceeded to the house of his
brother, a policeman from whom he borrowed a revolver. With the weapon,
he returned to his residence. Unable to find Raul and Rosette, Marco
proceeded to a disco jointly owned and operated by Raul. It was already
11:00 that evening when he arrived at the joint. Upon seeing Raul with two
(2) male companions, A and B, drinking beer at one of the tables, Marco
fired two (2) shots at Raul, who was hit on his forehead with one of the
bullets; the other hit A, injuring him on his stomach. As a consequence of
the gunshot wound, Raul died instantaneously. Due to the timely medical
attention given to A, he survived. He was, however, hospitalized for 45
days. Marco was prosecuted for Murder for the death of Raul and for
frustrated murder in the case of A. You are Marco’s lawyer, what will be
your defense? (1991 Bar)

Q: Candido stabbed an innocent bystander who accidentally bumped him.

The innocent bystander died as a result of the stabbing. Candido was
arrested and was tested to be positive for the use of “shabu” at the time he
committed the stabbing. What should be the proper charge against
Candido? Explain. (2005 Bar) A: Candido should be charged with murder
qualified by treachery because the suddenness of the stabbing caught the
victim by surprise and was totally defenseless. Being under the influence of
dangerous drugs is a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the
commission of a crime (Sec. 25, RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous
Drug Act of 2002); Hence, the penalty for murder shall be imposed in the
maximum. ABSOLUTORY CAUSE (2004, 2008, 2012 BAR) Article 332:
Persons exempt from criminal liability for theft, swindling and malicious
mischief

A: The defense with respect to the death of Raul is death under exceptional
circumstances (Art. 247, People v. Abarca, 153 SCRA 735). Although the
killing happened one hour

Q: The wife of AAA predeceased his mother-in-law. AAA was accused of

defrauding his mother-in-law under a

CRIMINAL LAW after having surprised the spouse, that would still be within
the context of “immediately thereafter”.

Principal (1994, 2000, 2002, 1994, 2014, 2015 Bar)

With respect to the wounding of the stranger, the defense of lawful exercise
of a right is a justifying circumstance. Under Art. 11, par. 5 could be
invoked. At the time the accused shot Raul, he was not committing a
felonious act and therefore could not have been criminally liable under Art.
4, RPC.

Q: Tata owns a three-storey building. She wanted to construct a new

building but had no money to finance the construction. So, she insured the
building for P3, 000, 000.00. She then urged Yoboy and Yongsi, for
monetary consideration, to burn her building so she could collect the
insurance proceeds. Yoboy and Yongsi burned the said building resulting to
its total loss. What is their respective criminal liability? (1994 Bar)

Q: Macky, a security guard, arrived home late one night after rendering
overtime. He was shocked to see Joy, his wife and Ken, his best friend, in
the act of having sexual intercourse. Macky pulled out his service gun and
shot and killed Ken. Macky was charged with murder for the death of Ken.

A: Tata is a principal by inducement for the crime of destructive arson

because she directly induced Yoboy and Yongsi for a price or monetary
consideration, to commit arson which the latter would not have committed
were it not for such reason. Yoboy and Yongsi are principals by direct
participation (Art. 17, pars. 21 and 3, RPC).

The court found that Ken died under exceptional circumstances and
exonerated Macky of murder but sentenced him to destierro. The court also
ordered Macky to pay indemnity to the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50, 000.00. Did the court correctly order Macky to pay indemnity? (2007
Bar)

Q: Jonas convinced Jaja to lend him his .45 caliber pistol so that he could
use it to knock down Jepoy and end his arrogance. When Jepoy came out,
Jonas immediately shot him with Jaja’s .45 caliber gun but missed his
target. Instead, the bullet hit Jepoy’s five year old son who was following
behind him, killing the boy instantaneously. What is the criminal liability of
Jonas and Jepoy? (Question reframed) (2000 Bar)

A: No. Since the killing of Ken was committed under the exceptional
circumstances in Article 247, RPC, it is the consensus that no crime was
committed in the light of the pronouncement in People v. Cosicor (79 Phil
672) that banishment (destierro) is intended more for the protection of the
offender rather than as a penalty. Since the civil liability under the RPC is
the consequence of the criminal liability, there would be no legal basis for
the award of indemnity when there is no criminal liability.

A: Jonas shall be convicted as principal by direct participation and Jaja as

co-principal by indispensable cooperation for the complex crime of murder
with homicide. Jaja should be liable as co-principal and not only as an
accomplice because he knew of Jonas’ criminal design even before he lent
his firearm to Jonas and still he concurred in that criminal design by
providing the firearm.

Q: Jojo and Felipa are husband and wife. Believing that his work as a
lawyer is sufficient to provide for the needs of their family, Jojo convinced
Felipa to be a stayat-home mom and care for their children. One day, Jojo
arrived home earlier than usual and caught Felipa in the act of having
sexual intercourse with their female nanny, Alma, in their matrimonial bed.
In a fit of rage, Jojo retrieved his revolver from inside the bedroom cabinet
and shot Alma, immediately killing her.

Q: A asked B to kill C because of a grave injustice done to A by C. A

promised B a reward. B was willing to kill C, not so much because of the
reward promised to him but because he also had his own long-standing
grudge against C, who had wronged him in the past. If C killed by B, would
A be liable as a principal by inducement? (2002 Bar)

Is Art. 247 (Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional

circumstances) of the RPC applicable in this case given that the paramour
was of the same gender as the erring spouse? (2015, 2016 Bar)

A: No. A would not be liable as principal by inducement because the reward

he promised B is not the sole impelling reason which made B kill C. To
bring about the criminal liability of a co-principal, the inducement made by
the inducer must be the sole consideration which caused the person
induced to commit the crime and without which the crime would not have
been committed. The facts of the case would indicate that B, the killer
supposedly induced by A had his own reason to kill C out of a long standing
grudge.

A: The crime committed is parricide qualified by the circumstance of

relationship. Killing a spouse after having been surprised in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another woman is death under
exceptional circumstance under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

Q: Mr. Red was drinking with his buddies, Mr. White and Mr. Blue when he
saw Mr. Green with his former girlfriend, Ms. Yellow. Already drunk, Mr. Red
declared in a loud voice that if he could not have Ms. Yellow, no one can.
He then proceeded to the men’s room but told Mr. White and Mr. Blue to
take care of Mr. Green. Mr. Blue and Mr. White asked Mr. Red what he
meant but Mr. Red simply said, "You already know what I want," and then
left. Mr. Blue and Mr. White proceeded to kill Mr. Green and hurt Ms.
Yellow.
However, in this case this is not death under exceptional circumstance
because Felipa was having homosexual intercourse with another woman
and not sexual intercourse with a man. “Homosexual intercourse “is not
within the contemplation of the term “sexual intercourse” in Article 247.
However, the crime of parricide is attended by the circumstance of passion
arising from a lawful sentiment as a result of having caught his wife in the
act of infidelity with another woman (People v. Belarmino, G.R. No. L-4429,
April 18, 1952, En Banc).

(a) What, if any, are the respective liabilities of Mr. Red, Mr. White and Mr.
Blue for the death of Mr. Green? (b) What, if any, are the respective
liabilities of Mr. Red, Mr. White and Mr. Blue for the injuries of Ms. Yellow?
(2014 Bar)

PERSONS LIABLE AND DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION (a) PRINCIPALS,

ACCOMPLICES, AND ACCESSORIES (1987, 1989, 2013 BAR) UST BAR
OPERATIONS

10

QUAMTO (1987-2016) A:

the police. Can Jake’s mother and aunt be made criminally liable as
accessories to the crime of murder? Explain. (2010, 1998 Bar)

(a) Mr. Blue and Mr. White are liable for the death of Mr. Green as
principals by direct participation. They were the ones who participated in
the criminal resolution and who carried out their plan and personally took
part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end. Mr. Red
cannot be held criminally liable as principal by inducement because his
statement that Mr. Blue and Mr. White are to take care of Mr. Green was
not made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the
crime. There is no showing that the words uttered by him may be
considered as so efficacious and powerful so as to amount to physical or
moral coercion (People v. Assad, G.R. No. L-33673, February 24, 1931).
Neither is there evidence to show that Mr. Red has an ascendancy or
influence over Mr. White and Mr. Blue (People v. Abarri, F.R. No. 90815,
March 1, 1995). (b) Mr. Blue and Mr. White are liable as principals by direct
participation for the crime of physical injuries for hurting Ms. Yellow to the
extent of the injuries inflicted. Having no participation in the attack upon Ms.
Yellow, Mr. Red would have no criminal liability therefor.

A: Obviously, Jake’s mother was aware of her son’s having committed a

felony, such that her act of harbouring and concealing him renders her
liable as an accessory. But being an ascendant of Jake, she is exempt from
criminal liability by express provision of Art. 20 of the RPC. On the other
hand, the criminal liability of Jake’s aunt depends on her knowledge of his
commission of the felony, her act of harbouring and concealing Jake would
render her criminally liable as accessory to the crime of murder; otherwise,
without knowledge of Jake’s commission of the felony, she would not be
liable. (b) CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL (1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1998,
2004, 2006, 2012, 2013, 2016 BAR) Q: As Sergio, Yoyong, Zoilo and
Warlito engaged in a drinking spree at Heartthrob Disco, Special Police
Officer 3 (SPO3) Manolo Yabang suddenly approached them, aimed his
revolver at Sergio whom he recognized as a wanted killer and fatally shot
the latter. Whereupon, Yoyong Zoilo and Warlito ganged up on Yabang,
Warlito, using his own pistol, shot and wounded Yabang.

Accomplice (2007, 2012 Bar) Q: Ponciano borrowed Ruben’s gun, saying

that he would use it to kill Freddie. Because Ruben also resented Freddie,
he readily lent his gun, but told Ponciano: "O, pagkabaril mo kay Freddie,
isauli mo kaagad, ha." Later, Ponciano killed Freddie, but used a knife
because he did not want Freddie’s neighbors to hear the gunshot.

What are the criminal libailities of Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito for the injury to
Yabang? Was there conspiracy and treachery? (1992 Bar) A: If they have
to be criminally liable at all, each will be responsible for their individual acts
as there appears to be no conspiracy, as the acts of the three were
spontaneous and a reflex response to Yabang’s shooting of Sergio. There
was no concerted act that will lead to a common purpose.

(a) What, if any, is the liability of Ruben? Explain. (b) Would your answer be
the same if, instead of Freddie, it was Manuel, a relative of Ruben, who
was killed by Ponciano using Ruben’s gun? Explain. (2009 Bar)
Q: As a result of a misunderstanding during a meeting, Joe was mauled by
Nestor, Jolan, Reden, and Arthur. He ran towards his house but the four
chased and caught him. Thereafter, they tied Joe’s hands at his back and
attacked him. Nestor used a knife; Jolan, a shovel; Arthur, his fists; and
Reden, a piece of wood. After killing Joe, Reden ordered the digging of a
grave to bury Joe’s lifeless body. Thereafter, the four (4) left together.
Convicted for the killing of Joe, Arthur now claims that his conviction is
erroneous as it was not he who conflicted the fatal blow. Would you sustain
his claim? (1993 Bar)

A: (a) Ruben’s liability is that of an accomplice only because he merely

cooperated in Pociano’s determination to kill Freddie. Such cooperation is
not indispensable to the killing, as in fact the killing was carried out without
the use of Ruben’s gun. Neither may Ruben be regarded as a co-
conspirator since he was not a participant in the decision-making of
Ponciano to kill Freddie; he merely cooperated in carrying out the criminal
plan which was already in place (Art. 18, RPC). (b) No. The answer would
not be the same because Ruben lent his gun purposely for the killing of
Freddie only, not for any other killing. Ponciano’s using Ruben’s gun in
killing a person other than Freddie is beyond Ruben’s criminal intent and
willing involvement. Only Ponciano will answer for the crime against
Manuel.

A: No. Arthur’s claim is without merit. The offenders acted in conspiracy in

killing the victim and hence, liable collectively. The act of one is the act of
all. The existence of a conspiracy among the offenders can be clearly
deduced or inferred from the manner they committed the killing,
demonstrating a common criminal purpose and intent. There being a
conspiracy, the individual acts of each participant is not considered
because their liability is collective.

Q: Who is an accomplice? (2012 Bar) A: Accomplices are those persons

who, not being the principal, cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts (Art. 18, RPC).

Q: State the concept of “implied conspiracy” and give its legal effects.
(1998, 2003 Bar)

Accessory (1998, 2010, 2013 Bar)

A: An implied conspiracy is one which is only inferred or deduced from the

manner of participants in the commission of crime carried out its execution.
Where the offenders acted in concert in the commission of the crime,
meaning that their acts are coordinated or synchronized in a way indicative
that they are pursuing a common criminal

Q: Immediately after murdering Bob, Jake went to his mother to seek

refuge. His mother told him to hide in the maid’s quarters until she finds a
better place for him to hide. After two days, Jake transferred to his aunt’s
house. A week later, Jake was apprehended by

11

CRIMINAL LAW objective, they shall be deemed to be acting in conspiracy

and their criminal liability shall be collective, not individual.

instances when each spoke is unconcerned with the success of the other
spokes, there are multiple conspiracies.

The legal effects of an implied conspiracy are:

A “chain conspiracy”, on the other hand, exists when there is successive

communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate
business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then
wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. (Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002)

(1) Not all those who are present at the scene of the crime will be
considered as co-conspirators; (2) Only those who participated by criminal
acts in the commission of the crime will be considered as coconspirators;
and (3) Mere acquiescence to or approval of the commission of the crime,
without any act of criminal participation, shall not render one criminally
liable as co-conspirator.
PENALTIES (1988, 1994, 1995, 1997, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2007 Bar) Q:

Q: During a town fiesta, a free-for-all fight erupted in the public plaza. As a

result of the tumultuous affray, A sustained one fatal and three superficial
stab wounds. He died a day after. B, C, D and E were proven to be
participants in the “rumble”, each using a knife against A, but it could not be
ascertained who, among them, inflicted the mortal injury. Who shall be held
criminally liable for the death of A and for what? (1997 Bar)

(a) State the two classes of penalties under the Revised Penal Code.
Define each. (b) May censure be included in a sentence of acquittal? (1988
Bar) A: (a) The two classes of penalties under Article 25 of the RPC are as
follows:

A: B, C, D and E being participants in the tumultuous affray and having

been proven to have inflicted serious physical injuries, or at least,
employed violence upon A, are criminally liable for the latter’s death. And
because it cannot be ascertained who among them inflicted the mortal
injury on A, there being a free-for-all fight or tumultuous affray, B, C, D and
E are all liable for the crime of death caused in a tumultuous affray under
Art. 251 of the Revised Penal Code. Q: Together XA, YB and ZC planned to
rob Miss OD. They entered her house by breaking one of the windows in
her house. After taking her personal properties and as they were about to
leave, XA decided on impulse to rape OD. As XA was molesting her, YB
and ZC stood outside the door of her bedroom and did nothing to prevent
XA from raping OD.

1. 2.

(b) Censure may not be included in a sentence of acquittal because a

censure is a penalty. Censure is repugnant and is essentially inconsistent
and contrary to an acquittal (People v. Abellera, 69 Phil 623). Q: Imagine
that you are a Judge trying a case, and based on the evidence presented
and the applicable law, you have decided on the guilt of two (2) accused.
Indicate the five (5) steps you would follow to determine the exact penalty
to be imposed. Stated differently, what are the factors you must consider to
arrive at the correct penalty? (1991 Bar)

What crime/s did XA, YB and ZC commit and what is the criminal liability of
each? Explain briefly. (2004 Bar) A: The crime committed by XA, YB and
ZC is the composite crime of Robbery with Rape, a single, indivisible
offense under Art. 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.

A:

Although the conspiracy among the offenders was only to commit robbery
and only XA raped CD, the other robbers, YB and ZC, were present and
aware of the rape being committed by their co-conspirator. Having done
nothing to stop XA from committing the rape, YB and ZC thereby concurred
in the commission of the rape by their coconspirator XA.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The criminal liability of all, XA, YZ, and ZC, shall be the same, as principals
in the special complex crime of robbery with rape which is a single,
indivisible offense where the rape accompanying the robbery is just a
component. Q: Differentiate wheel conspiracy. (2016 Bar)

conspiracy

and

Determine the crime committed; Stage of execution and degree of

participation; Determine the penalty Consider the modifying circumstances;
Determine whether Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable or not.

Q: After trial, Judge Juan Laya of the Manila RTC found Benjamin Garcia
guilty of Murder, the victim having sustained several bullet wounds in his
body so that he died despite medical assistance given in the Ospital ng
Manila. Because the weapon used by Benjamin was unlicensed and the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was found to be present. Judge Laya
rendered his decision convicting Benjamin and sentencing him to "reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment". Are "reclusion perpetua" and life
imprisonment the same and can be imposed interchangeably as in the
foregoing sentence? Or are they totally different? State your reasons.
(1994, 2001, 2005 Bar)

chain

A: There are two structures of multiple conspiracies, namely: wheel or

circle conspiracy and chain conspiracy. A “wheel conspiracy” occurs when
there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or
more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts
with the hub rather than with another spoke. In the event that the spoke
shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy.
However, in the

UST BAR OPERATIONS

Principal – A principal penalty is defined as that provided for a felony and

which is imposed by court expressly upon conviction. Accessory – An
accessory penalty is defined as that deemed included in the imposition of
the principal penalty.

A: The penalty of reclusion perpetua and the penalty of life imprisonment

are totally different from each other and therefore, should not be used
interchangeably. Reclusion

12

QUAMTO (1987-2016) perpetua is a penalty prescribed by the RPC, with a

fixed duration of imprisonment from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, and
carries it with accessory penalties. Life imprisonment, on the other hand, is
a penalty prescribed by special laws, with no fixed duration of imprisonment
and without any accessory penalty.

charged with, and was convicted of, five (5) counts of rape, but the judge
did not impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. Instead,
the judge sentenced Roman to 40 years of imprisonment on the basis of
the three- fold rule. Was the judge correct? (2013 Bar)
Q: Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act (RA) No. 7959, reclusion perpetua shall be from 20 years and 1 day to
40 years. Does this mean that reclusion perpetua is now a divisible
penalty? Explain. (2005 Bar)

A: No, the three-fold rule is applicable only in connection with the service of
the sentence not in the imposition of the proper penalties. The court must
impose all penalties for all the crimes for which the accused have been
found guilty. Thus, the court should not make a computation in it decision
and sentence the accused to not more than the three-fold of the most
severe of the penalties imposable. The computation under the three-fold
rule is for the prison authorities to make.

A: No, because the Supreme Court has repeatedly called the attention of
the Bench and the Bar to the fact that the penalties of reclusion perpetua
and life imprisonment are not synonymous and should be applied correctly
and as may be specified by the applicable law. Reclusion perpetua has a
specific duration of 20 years and 1 day to 40 years (Art. 27) and accessory
penalties (Art. 41), while life imprisonment has no definite term or
accessory penalties. Also, life imprisonment is imposable on crimes
punished by special laws, and not on felonies in the Code.

Q: E and M are convicted of a penal law that imposes a penalty of fine or

imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment. The judge sentenced them to
pay the fine, jointly and severally, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. (a) Is the penalty proper? Explain. (b) May the judge impose an
alternative penalty of fine or imprisonment? Explain. (2005 Bar)

Q: What are the penalties that may be served simultaneously? (2007 Bar)
A: The penalties that may be served simultaneously are
imprisonment/destierro and – 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

A: (a) No. The penalty should be imposed individually on every person

accused of the crime. Any of the convicted accused who is insolvent and
unable to pay the fine, shall serve the subsidiary imprisonment. (b) No.
Although the law may prescribe an alternative penalty for a crime, it does
not mean that the court may impose the alternative penalties at the same
time. The sentence must be definite. Otherwise, the judgment cannot attain
finality.

Perpetual absolute disqualification; Perpetual special disqualification;

Temporary absolute disqualification; Temporary special disqualification;
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for and the
right to follow a profession or calling; Fine; and any principal penalty with its
accessory penalties.

Principles (include R.A. No. 9346 – Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines) (1988, 1997, 2004 Bar)

C. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITIES 1. EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL

LIABILITIES (1988, 1990, 2004, 2015 BAR)

Q: What offenses, if any, may be punished with the death penalty in our
jurisdiction at present? Explain. (1988, 1995 Bar)

Q: (a) How is criminal liability totally extinguished? (1988, 1990 Bar) (b)
How is criminal liability partially extinguished? (c) If an accused is acquitted
does it necessarily follow that no civil liability arising from the acts
complained of may be awarded in the same judgment? Explain briefly.
(1988 Bar)

A: At present, no offense may be punished with the death penalty in our

jurisdiction at present. The 1987 Constitution has abolished the death
penalty and the abolition affects even those who has already been
sentenced to death penalty. Therefore, unless Congress enacts a law, no
offense may be punished with the death penalty at present.

A:

Application (2005, 2013 Bar) (a) Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
provides for the following causes of total extinction of criminal liability:

Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) (Refer to SPL

Section)

1.

Q: Roman and Wendy are neighbors. On Valentine's Day, without prior

notice, Roman visited Wendy at her condo to invite her to dinner, but
Wendy turned him down and abruptly left, leaving her condo door
unlocked. Roman attempted to follow, but appeared to have second
thoughts; he simply went back to Wendy's condo, let himself in, and waited
for her return. On Wendy's arrival later that evening, Roman grabbed her
from behind and, with a knife in hand, forced her to undress. Wendy had no
choice but to comply. Roman then tied Wendy's hands to her bed and
sexually assaulted her five (5) times that night. Roman was

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

13

Death of the convict as to personal penalties, as to the pecuniary liabilities,

liability therefore is extinguished only when death occurs before final
judgment Service of sentence Amnesty Absolute pardon Prescription of the
crime Prescription of the penalty Marriage of the offended woman as
provided in Article 344.

CRIMINAL LAW (b) Article 94 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the
following causes of the partial extinction of criminal liability: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

of Ara, place it inside the trunk of her car and drive away. The dead body of
Ara was never found. Mina spread the news in the neighborhood that Ara
went to live with her grandparents in Ormoc. For fear of his life, Albert did
not tell anyone, even his parents and relatives. 20 and ½ years after the
incident, and right after his graduation in Criminology, Albert reported the
crime to NBI authorities. The crime of homicide prescribes in 20 years. Can
the State still prosecute Mina for the death of Ara despite the lapse of 20
and ½ years? Explain. (2000 Bar)

Conditional pardon Commutation of sentence Good conduct allowance

during confinement Parole Probation

(c) If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no civil

liability arising from the acts complained of may be awarded in the same
judgment except: If there is an express waiver of the liability; and if there is
a reservation to file a separate civil action (Rule 107; Padilla v. CA, People
v. Jalandoni).

A: Yes. The State can still prosecute Mina for the death of Ara despite the
lapse of 20 & ½ years. Under Article 91, RPC, the period of prescription
commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agents.

Q: AX was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The trial

court sentenced him to a prison term as well as to pay P150, 000 as civil
indemnity and damages. While his appeal was pending, AX met a fatal
accident. He left a young widow, 2 children, and a million-peso estate.
What is the effect, if any, of his death on his criminal as well as civil liability?
Explain briefly. (2004 Bar)

In the case at bar, the commission of the crime was known only to Albert,
who was not the offended party nor an authority or an agent of an authority.
It was discovered by the NBI Authorities only when Albert revealed to them
the commission of the crime. Hence, the period of prescription of 20 years
for homicide commenced to run only from the time Albert revealed the
same to the NBI Authorities.

A: The death of AX while his appeal from the judgment of the trial court is
pending, extinguishes his criminal liability. The civil liability insofar as it
arises from the crime and recoverable under the RPC is also extinguished;
but indemnity and damages may be recovered in a civil action if predicated
on a source of obligation under Art. 1157, NCC, such as law, contracts,
quasi-contracts and quasi-delicts, but not on the basis of delicts (People v.
Balagtas, 236 SCRA 239).

Q: On June 1, 1988, a complaint for concubinage committed in February

1987 was filed against Roberto in the Municipal Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite
for purposes of preliminary investigation. For various reasons, it was only
on July 3, 1998 when the judge of said court decided the case by
dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction since the crime was committed in
Manila. The case was subsequently filed with the City Fiscal of Manila but it
was dismissed on the ground that the crime had already prescribed. The
law provides that the crime of concubinage prescribes in ten (10) years.
Was the dismissal by the fiscal correct? Explain. (2001 Bar)

Prescription of crimes (1987, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2004,
2009, 2010, 2015 Bar) Q: B imitated the signature of A, registered owner of
a lot, in a special power of attorney naming him (B) as his attorney-in-fact
of A. On February 13, 1964, B mortgaged the lot to a bank using the
special power of attorney to obtain a loan. On the same day, both the
special power of attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in
the Registry of Deeds. Because of B’s failure to pay, the bank foreclosed
the mortgage and the lot was sold to X in whose name a new title was
issued. In March, 1974, A discovered that the property was already
registered in the name of X because of an ejectment case filed against him
by X.

A: No. The fiscal’s dismissal of the case on alleged prescription is not

correct. The filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, although
only for preliminary investigation, interrupted and suspended the period of
prescription inasmuch as the jurisdiction of a court in a criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, not by the
result of proof (People v. Galano, 75 SCRA 193). Q: A killed his wife and
buried her in their backyard. He immediately went into hiding in the
mountains. Three years later, the bones of A’s wife were discovered by X,
the gardener. Since X had a standing warrant of arrest, he hid the bones in
an old clay jar and kept quiet about it. After two years, Z, the caretaker,
found the bones and reported the matter to the police. After 15 years of
hiding, A left the country but returned three years later to take care of his
ailing sibling. Six years thereafter, he was charged with parricide but raised
the defense of prescription.

If you were the counsel of B, what would be your defense? Discuss. (1993
Bar) A: My defense will be prescription because the crime was committed
in 1964 and almost twenty-nine years had already elapsed since then.
Even if we take Falsification and Estafa individually, they have already
prescribed. It is to be noted that when it comes to discovery, the fact that
the crime was discovered in 1964 will be of no moment because the
offended party is considered to have constructive notice on the forgery after
the Deed of Sale where his signature had been falsified was registered in
the office of the Register of Deeds (Cabral v. Puno, 70 SCRA 606).

(a) Under the Revised Penal Code, when does the period of prescription of
a crime commence to run? (b) When is it interrupted? (c) Is A’s defense
tenable? Explain. (2000, 2004, 2009, 2010 Bar)

Q: On January 1990, while 5-year old Albert was urinating at the back of
their house, he heard a strange noise coming from the kitchen of their
neighbor and playmate, Ara. When he peeped inside, he saw Mina, Ara’s
stepmother, very angry and strangling the 5-year old Ara to death. Albert
saw Mina carry the dead body UST BAR OPERATIONS

A: (a) Generally, the period of prescription of a crime commences to run for

the date it was committed; but if the crime was committed clandestinely, the
period of prescription of the crimes under the RPC commence to

14

QUAMTO (1987-2016) run from the day on which the crime was
discovered (the discovery rule) by the offended party, the authorities or their
agents (Art. 91, RPC). (b) The running of the prescriptive period of the
crime is interrupted when “any kind of investigative proceedings is instituted
against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution.”
(Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008) (c) No, the
defense of prescription of the crime is not tenable. The crime committed is
parricide which prescribes in twenty (20) years (Art. 90, RPC). It was only
when the caretaker, Z, found the victim’s bones and reported the matter to
the police that the crime is deemed legally discovered by the authorities or
their agents and thus the prescriptive period of the crime commenced to
run. When A left the country and returned only after three (3) years, the
running of the prescriptive period of the crime is interrupted and suspended
because prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago (Art. 91, RPC). Since A had been in hiding for 15
years after the commission of the crime and the prescriptive period starting
running only after 5 years from such commission when the crime was
discovered, only 10 years lapsed and 3 years thereof should be deducted
when the prescriptive period was interrupted and suspended. Hence, the 3
years when A was out of the Philippines should be deducted from the 10
years after the prescription starts running. Adding the 7 years of
prescription and the 6 years that lapsed before the case was filed, only a
total of thirteen (13) years of the prescriptive period had lapsed. Hence, the
crime has not yet prescribed.

(b) Even if Taylor was able to go to another country which the Philippines
had no extradition treaty, I will deny the motion to quash. Going to a foreign
country with which this Government has no extradition treaty to interrupt
the running of prescription is not applicable nor even material because the
period of prescription is not applicable nor even material because the
period of prescription had not commenced to run in the first place; hence,
there is nothing to interrupt. Pardon and Amnesty (2006, 2009) Q:
Enumerate the differences between pardon and amnesty. (2006 Bar) A:
The following are the differences between pardon and amnesty: In pardon
– The convict is excused from serving the sentence but the effects of
conviction remain unless expressly remitted by the pardon; hence, for
pardon to be valid there must be a sentence already final and executory at
the time the same is granted. Moreover, the grant is in favor of individual
convicted offenders, not to a class of convicted offenders; and the crimes
subject of the grant may be common crimes or political crimes. Finally, the
grant is a private act of the Chief Executive which does not require the
concurrence of any other public officer or office. In amnesty – The criminal
complexion of the act constituting the crime is erased, as though such act
was innocent when committed; hence, the effects of the conviction are
obliterated. Amnesty is granted is in favor of a class of convicted offenders,
not to individual convicted offenders; and the crimes involved are generally
political offenses, not common crimes. Amnesty is a public act that requires
the conformity or concurrence of the Philippine Senate.

Q: Taylor was convicted of a violation of the Election Code, and was

sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one year as minimum, to three years
as maximum. The decision of the trial court was affirmed on appeal and
became final and executory. Taylor failed to appear when summoned for
execution of judgment, prompting the judge to issue an order for his arrest.
Taylor was able to use the backdoor and left for the United States. Fifteen
years later, Taylor returned to the Philippines and filed a Motion to Quash
the warrant of arrest against him, on the ground that the penalty imposed
against him had already prescribed.

2. CIVIL LIABILITIES IN CRIMINAL CASES (1987, 1990, 1991, 1992 BAR)

Q: Rico was convicted of raping Letty, his former sweetheart, by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila and he was ordered to serve the penalty of
life imprisonment, to indemnify Letty in the amount of P30, 000.00 and to
support their offspring. Pending appeal in the Supreme Court, Rico died.
His widow, Bernie, moved for a dismissal of the case.

(a) If you were the judge, would you grant Taylor's Motion to Quash?
Explain. (b) Assuming that instead of the United States, Taylor was able to
go to another country with which the Philippines had no extradition treaty,
will your answer be the same? Explain. (2015 Bar)

What is the legal effect of Rico’s death on his civil liability? State your
reasons. (1990 Bar)

A: A: The civil liability of Rico survives. (People v. Tirol, G.R. L30588,

January 31, 1981, People v. Naboa, et. al., 132 SCRA 410)

(a) If I were the judge, I will deny the motion to quash. Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall
commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the
date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of
the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by
those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the
term of his sentence. Taylor never served a single minute of his sentence,
and thus, prescription never started to run in his favor. Clearly, one who has
not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom
(Del Castillo v. Torrecampo, G.R. No. 139033, December 18, 2002).
PART II. REVISED PENAL CODE (BOOK II) A. CRIMES AGAINST
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE LAW OF NATIONS Piracy and mutiny on
the high seas or in Philippine waters (2006, 2008 Bar)

15

CRIMINAL LAW Q: The inter-island vessel M/V Viva Lines I, while cruising
off Batanes, was forced to seek shelter at the harbor of Kaoshiung, Taiwan
because of a strong typhoon. While anchored in said harbor, Max, Baldo
and Bogart arrived in a speedboat, fired a bazooka at the bow of the
vessel, boarded it and divested the passengers of their money and jewelry.
A passenger of M/V Viva Lines I, Dodong took advantage of the confusion
to settle an old grudge with another passenger, and killed him. After their
apprehension, all four were charged with qualified piracy before a
Philippine court.

with intent to gain. It is of no moment that the vessel was anchored when
deprecated so long as it was at sea. (2) The crime was qualified piracy
under Art. 123 of the RPC because it was attended by a killing committed
by the same culprits against a member of the crew of the vessel.

B. CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE STATE Arbitrary

Detention or Expulsion, Violation of Dwelling, Prohibition, Interruption, and
Dissolution of Peaceful Meeting and Crimes Against Religious Worship

(a) Was the charge of qualified piracy against the three person (Max,
Badong and Bogart) who boarded the inter-island vessel correct? Explain.
(b) Was Dodong correctly charged before the Philippine court for qualified
piracy? Explain. (2008 Bar)

ARBITRARY DETENTION AND EXPULSION (2006, 2008, 1992 BAR)

A:

Q: Major Menor, while patrolling Bago-Bago community in a police car with

SP03 Caloy Itliong blew his whistle to stop a Nissan Sentra car which
wrongly entered a one-way street. After demanding from Linda Lo Hua, the
driver, her driver’s license, Menor asked her to follow them to the police
precinct. Upon arriving there, he gave instructions to Itliong to guard Lo
Hua in one of the rooms and not to let her out of sight until he returns; then
got the car key from Lo Hua. In the meantime, the latter was not allowed to
make any phone calls but was given food and access to a bathroom.

(a) No. Dodong was not correctly charged with qualified piracy because
committing piracy was never in his mind nor did he have any involvement in
the piracy committed. He merely took advantage of the situation in killing
the passenger. He should be charged with murder since there was evident
premeditation and intent to kill. (b) The charge is correct. Qualified Piracy
was committed when the offenders seized the vessels by firing on or
boarding the same. In the problem, they even went further by divesting the
passengers of their money and jewelry. The vessel was anchored in the
harbour of Kaoshioung, Taiwan and it is submitted that the crime was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of another country. The Supreme
Court has ruled that the high seas contemplated under Art. 122 of the RPC
include the three-mile limit of any state (People v. Lollo, G.R. No. 17958,
February 27, 1922). Moreover, piracy is an offense that can be tried
anywhere because it is a crime against the Law of Nations.

When Menor showed up after two days, he brought Lo Hua to a private

house and told her that he would only release her and return the car if she
made arrangements for the delivery of P500, 000.00 in a doctor’s bag at a
certain place within the next twentyfour hours. When Menor went to the
designated spot to pick up the bag of money, he suddenly found himself
surrounded by several armed civilians who introduced themselves as NBI
agents. What criminal offense has Menor committed? Explain. (1992 Bar)

Q: While SS Nagoya Maru was negotiating the sea route from Hongkong
towards Manila, and while still 300 miles from Aparri, Cagayan, its engine
malfunctioned. The Captain ordered the ship to stop for emergency repairs
lasting for almost 15 hours. Due to exhaustion, the officers and crew fell
asleep. While the ship was anchored, a motorboat manned by renegade
Ybanags from Claveria, Cagayan, passed by and took advantage of the
situation. They cut the ship’s engines and took away several heavy crates
of electrical equipment and loaded them in their motorboat. Then they left
hurriedly towards Aparri. At daybreak, the crew found that a robbery took
place. They radioed the Aparri Port Authorites resulting in the apprehension
of the culprits.

A: Menor is liable under Art. 124, RPC (Arbitrary Detention) he being a

public officer who detained, a person without legal grounds. Violation of a
traffic ordinance by entering a one-way street is not a valid reason to arrest
and detain the driver. Such only merits the issuance of a traffic violation
ticket. Hence, when Lo Hua was ordered to follow the police officers to the
precinct (confiscating her license to compel her to do so), and confining her
in a room for two days and prohibiting her to make phone calls, is a clear
case of deprivation of personal liberty. Giving her food and access to the
bathroom will not extinguish or mitigate the criminal liability. Menor is
further liable for robbery, because money or personal properly was taken,
with intent to gain, and with intimidation. The peculiar situation of Lo Hua
practically forced her to submit to the monetary demands of the major.

(1) What crime was committed? Explain. (2) Supposing that while the
robbery was taking place, the culprits stabbed a member of the crew while
sleeping. What crime was committed? Explain. (2006 Bar)

Q: What are the 3 ways of committing arbitrary detention? Explain each.

What are the legal grounds for detention? (2006 Bar)

A: A: The three (3) ways of committing arbitrary detention are:

(1) The crime committed was piracy under Art. 122, Revised Penal Code,
the essence of which is robbery directed against a vessel and/or its
cargoes. The taking of the several heavy crates of electrical equipment
from a vessel at sea, was effected by force and undoubtedly UST BAR
OPERATIONS

a.

16
by detaining or locking up a person without any legal cause or ground
therefore purposely to restrain his liberty (RPC, Art. 124);

QUAMTO (1987-2016) b. c.

by delaying delivery to the proper judicial authority of a person lawfully

arrested without a warrant (RPC, Art. 125); and by delaying release of a
prisoner whose release has been ordered by competent authority (RPC,
Art. 126).

criminal liability to the co- conspirators, but not to a person who learned of
such and did not report to the proper authorities (US v. Vergara, 3 Phil. 432;
People vs. Atienza, 56 Phil. 353). COUP D’ ETAT (BAR 1988, 1991, 1998,
2002 BAR)

In all the above-stated ways, the principal offender should be a public

officer acting under color of his authority.

Q: Distinguish rebellion from coup d’etat. (1991, 2004 Bar)

The legal grounds for detention are: 1. 2.

A: Rebellion distinguished from coup d’etat:

commission of a crime; violent insanity or other ailment requiring

compulsory confinement in an institution established for such purpose.

As to overt acts, in rebellion, there is public uprising and taking up arms

against the Government. In coup d’etat public uprising is not necessary.
The essence of the crime is a swift attack, accompanied by violence,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly constituted
authorities of the Government, or any military camp or installation,
communication networks, public utilities, or facilities needed for the
exercise and continued possession of government power.

C. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER 1.

Rebellion, Coup d’etat, Sedition, and Disloyalty REBELLION (1991, 1994,
1998, 2004 BAR)

Q: In the early morning of 25 October 1990, the troops of the Logistics

Command (LOGCOM) of the AFP at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
headed by their Operations Officer, Col. Rito Amparo, withdrew firearms
and bullets and, per prior agreement, attacked, in separate teams, the
offices of the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and
other offices, held hostage the Chief of Staff of LOGCOM and other
officers, killed three (3) proGovernment soldiers, inverted the Philippine
flag, barricaded all entrances and exits to the camp, and announced
complete control of the camp. Because of the superiority of the pro-
Government forces, Col. Amparo and his troops surrendered at 7:00 in the
morning of that day.

As to objective or purpose, in rebellion, the purpose is to remove from the

allegiance of the Philippines, the whole or any part of the Philippines, or
any military or naval camps, deprive the Chief Executive or Congress from
performing their functions. In coup d’etat, the objective is to seize or
diminish the state powers. As to participation, in rebellion, any person may
commit. In coup d’etat, any person belonging to the military or police or
holding public office, with or without civilian participation may commit. Q:
Supposing a public school teacher participated in a coup d'etat using an
unlicensed firearm. What crime or crimes did he commit? (1998 Bar) A: The
public school teacher committed only coup d'etat for his participation
therein. His use of an unlicensed firearm is absorbed in the coup d'etat
under the new firearms law (R.A. 8294).

Did Col. Amparo and his troops commit the crime of coup d’etat (Article
134-A, RPC) or of rebellion? (1991 Bar) A: Under the facts stated, the
crime committed would be coup d’etat (R.A. 6988 incorporating Art. 134-A).

Q: If a group of persons belonging to the armed forces makes a swift

attack, accompanied by violence, intimidation and threat against a vital
military installation for the purpose of seizing power and taking over such
installation, what crime or crimes are they guilty of?
However, since the law was not yet effective as of October 25, 1990, as the
effectivity thereof (Sec. 8) is upon its approval (which is October 24, 1990)
and publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation, the
felony committed would be rebellion.

If the attack is quelled but the leader is unknown, who shall be deemed the
leader thereof? (1998, 2002 Bar) A: The perpetrators, being persons
belonging to the Armed Forces, would be guilty of the crime of coup d'etat,
under Art. 134-A of the RPC, as amended, because their attack was
against vital military installations which are essential to the continued
possession and exercise of governmental powers, and their purpose is to
seize power by taking over such installations.

Q: VC, JG, GG, and JG conspired to overthrow the Philippine Government.

VG was recognized as the titular head of the conspiracy. Several meetings
were held and the plan was finalized. JJ, bothered by his conscience,
confessed to Father Abraham that he, VG, JG and GG have conspired to
overthrow the government. Father Abraham did not report this information
to the proper authorities. Did Father Abraham commit a crime? If so, what
crime was committed? What is his criminal liability? (1994 Bar)

The leader being unknown, any person who in fact directed the others,
spoke for them, signed receipts and other documents issued in their name,
or performed similar acts, on behalf of the group shall be deemed the
leader of said coup d'etat (Art 135, RPC).

A: No. Father Abraham did not commit a crime because the conspiracy
involved is one to commit rebellion, not a conspiracy to commit treason
which makes a person criminally liable under Art 116, RPC. And even
assuming that it will fall as misprision of treason, Father Abraham is
exempted from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 7, as his failure to report
can be considered as due to "insuperable cause", as this involves the
sanctity and inviolability of a confession. Conspiracy to commit rebellion
results in

SEDITION (1987, 2007 BAR) Q: A, B, C, D, and E were former soldiers

who deserted their command in Mindanao. Jose and Pedro, two big
landowners, called A, B, C, D, and E to a conference. Jose and Pedro
proposed to these former soldiers that they

17

CRIMINAL LAW recruit their comrades and organize a group of 100 for the
purpose of challenging the government by force of arms in order to prevent
the enforcement or implementation of the Land Reform Law in Cotabato
Province. Jose and Pedro promised to finance the group and to buy
firearms for the purpose. The former soldiers agreed. After Jose and Pedro
left, A, the leader of the former soldiers, said that in the meanwhile he
needed money to support his family. D suggested that they rob a bank and
agreed to carry put the plan on the 15th day of the month. Unknown to all
of them, as they were conferring with Jose and Pedro and as they were
planning to rob the bank, Rosauro, a houseboy was within hearing
distance. On the pretext of buying cigarettes, Rosauro instead went directly
to the Police and told them what transpired. All the former soldiers, as well
as Jose and Pedro, were arrested.

Q: A, a teacher at Mapa High School, having gotten mad at X, one of his

pupils, because of the latter’s throwing paper clips at his classmates,
twisted his right ear. X went out of the classroom crying and proceeded
home located at the back of the school. He reported to his parents, Y and
Z, what A had done to him, Y and Z immediately proceeded to the school
building and because they were running and talking in loud voices, they
were seen by the barangay chairman, B, who followed them as he
suspected that an untoward incident might happen. Upon seeing A inside
the classroom, X pointed him out to his father, Y, who administered a fist
blow on A, causing him to fall down. When Y was about to kick A, B rushed
towards Y and pinned both of the latter’s arms. Seeing his father being held
by B, X went near and punched B on the face, which caused him to lose his
grip on Y. Throughout this incident, Z shouted words of encouragement at
Y, her husband, and also threatened to slap A.

(a) What crime, if any, did the former soldiers commit? (b) What about Jose
and Pedro? (1987 Bar) A:
Security guards of the school arrived, intervened and surrounded X, Y and
Z so that they could be investigated in the principal’s office. Before leaving,
Z passed near A and threw a small flower pot at him but it was deflected by
B.

(a) The former soldiers committed the crime of conspiracy to commit

sedition. What Jose and Pedro proposed to the soldiers that they recruit
their comrades and organize a group of 100 for the purpose of challenging
the government by force of arms in order to prevent the implementation of
the Land Reform Law in Cotabato Province is to commit sedition.

(a) What, if any, are the respective criminal liability of X, Y and Z? (b)
Would your answer be the same if B were a barangay tanod only? (2001
Bar)

Proposal to commit sedition is not punished. But since the soldiers agreed,
a conspiracy to commit sedition resulted which is now punishable.
Conspiracy arises on the very moment the plotters agree (People v.
Peralta, 25 SCRA 759).

A: 1.

(b) Jose and Pedro will also be liable for conspiracy to commit sedition
since they are members of the conspiracy where the act of one is the act of
all. If the soldiers did not agree to their proposal, they would not incur any
criminal liability because there is no proposal to commit sedition.

Y is liable for the complex crimes of Direct Assault with Less Serious
Physical Injuries for the fist blow on A, the teacher, which caused the latter
to fall down. For purposes of the crime in Arts. 148 and 151 of the RPC, a
teacher is considered a person in authority, and having been attacked by Y
by reason of his performance of official duty, direct assault is committed
with the resulting less serious physical injuries complexed.

Q: What are the different acts of inciting to sedition? (2007 Bar) A: The
different acts which constitute the crime of inciting to sedition are: 1. 2.
3. 4. 5.

X is liable for direct assault only, assuming the physical injuries inflicted on
B, the Barangay Chairman, to be only slight and hence, would be absorbed
in the direct assault. A Barangay Chairman is a person in authority (Art.
152, RPC) and in this case, was performing his duty of maintaining peace
and order when attacked.

Inciting others through speeches, writings, banners and other media of

representation to commit acts which constitute sedition; Uttering seditious
words, speeches or circulating scurrilous libels against the Government of
the Philippines or any of its duly constituted authorities, which tend to
disturb or obstruct the performance of official functions, or which tend to
incite others to cabal and meet for unlawful purposes; Inciting through the
same media of representation rebellious conspiracies or riots; Stirring
people to go against lawful authorities, or disturb the peace and public
order of the community or of the Government; or Knowingly concealing any
of the aforestated evil practices (Art. 142, RPC)

Z, the mother of X and wife of Y may only be liable as an accomplice to the

complex of crimes of direct assault with less serious physical injuries
committed by Y. Her participation should not be considered as that of a
coprincipal, since her reactions were only incited by her relationship to X
and Y, as the mother of X and the wife of Y. 2.

ASSAULT UPON, AND RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE TO

PERSONS IN AUTHORITY AND THEIR AGENTS (1993, 1995, 2001,
2002, 2013 BAR)

If B were a Barangay Tanod only, the act of X of laying hand on him, being
an agent of a person in authority only, would constitute the crime of
Resistance and Disobedience under Art. 151, RPC since X, a high school
pupil, could not be considered as having acted out of contempt for authority
but more of helping his father get free from the grip of B. Laying hand on an
agent of a person in authority is not ipso facto direct assault, while it would
always be direct assault if done to a person in authority in defiance to the
latter’s exercise of authority. D. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST

UST BAR OPERATIONS

18

QUAMTO (1987-2016) A: The lawyer would be liable under Article 172 of

the RPC for the offense of introducing a false document in a judicial
proceeding as he knew the same to be false.

Forgeries Q: How are "forging" and "falsification" committed?

Falsification of Public Document (1988, 1992, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2008 Bar)

A: Forging or forgery is committed by giving to a treasury or bank note or

any instrument payable to bearer or to order the appearance of a true and
genuine document; or by erasing, substituting, counterfeiting, or altering by
any means the figures, letters, words or signs contained therein.

Q: Andrea signed her husband’s name in endorsing his treasury warrants

which were delivered to her directly by the district supervisor who knew that
her husband had already died, and she used the proceeds to pay for the
expenses of her husband’s last illness and his burial. She knew that her
husband had accumulated vacation and sick leaves the money value of
which exceeded that value of the three treasury warrants, so that the
government suffered no damage. Andrea’s appeal is based on her claim of
absence of criminal intent and of good faith.

Falsification, on the other hand, is committed through – 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9.

Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric; Causing it to

appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate; Attributing to persons who have participated in
an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; Altering true dates;
Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which
changes its meaning; Issuing in an authenticated form a document
Purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original
exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from,
that of the genuine original; or Intercalating any instrument or note relative
to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.

Should she be found guilty of falsification? Discuss briefly. (1988 Bar) A:

Andrea should be held guilty of falsification of public documents. Her claim
of absence of criminal intent and of good faith cannot be considered
because she is presumed to know that her husband is dead. The element
of damage required in falsification does not refer to pecuniary damage but
damage to public interest. NB: Executive clemency can, however, be
sought for by Andrea. Q: Jose Dee Kiam, a Chinese citizen born in Macao,
having applied with a recruitment agency to work in Kuwait, went to
Quezon City Hall to procure a Community Tax Certificate, formerly called
Residence Certificate.

Counterfeiting coins; Forging treasury or bank notes, obligations and

securities; Importing and uttering false or forged notes, obligations and
securities Q: Is mere possession of false money bills punishable under
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code? (1999 Bar)

He stated therein that his name is Leo Tiampuy, a Filipino citizen born in
Binan, Laguna. As he paid for the Community Tax Certificate, Cecille
Delicious, an employee in the office recognized him and reported to her
boss that the information written in the Community Tax Certificate were all
lies. Shortly thereafter, an information was filed against Dee Kiam alias
Tiampuy.

A: No. Possession of false treasury or bank note alone without an intent to

use it, is not punishable. But the circumstances of such possession may
indicate intent to utter, sufficient to consummate the crime of illegal
possession of false notes.

(a) An information was filed against Dee Kiam. What crime, if any, may he
be indicted for? Why? (b) The accused move to quash the information on
the ground that it did not allege that he had the obligation to disclose the
truth in the Community Tax Certificate; that the same is a useless scrap of
paper which one can buy even in the Quiapo underpass and that he had no
intent of deceiving anybody. Would you grant the motion to quash? (1992
Bar)

Introduction of false documents Q: M was forced by a policeman to sign a

document entitled “Sinumpaang Salaysay” in which M implicated X as the
brain behind the robbery of a bank where P500, 000.00 were lost. The
document was prepared by the policeman upon advice of B, the bank’s
lawyer, who was present when the policeman asked M to sign the
document. As M refused to sign it, the policeman held him by the neck and
forced him to sign, which he did as he was afraid he might be bodily
harmed.

A: (a) Dee Kiam can be indicted for the felony of Falsification of a Public
Document committed by a private individual under Art. 172 of the RPC in
relation to Art. 171 thereof. A residence certificate is a public or official
document within the context of said provisions and jurisprudence. Since
Dee Kiam made an untruthful statement in a narration of facts (Art. 171(4),
RPC), and he being a private individual, he is culpable thereunder. (b)
Falsification of public documents under Arts. 171 and 172, RPC does not
require that the document is required by law. The sanctity of the public
document, a residence certificate, cannot be taken lightly as being a “mere
scrap of paper”.

During the hearing of the robbery before the Fiscal’s Office, B submitted the
“Sinumpaang Salaysay” as evidence, on the basis of which X was included
in the information filed by the Fiscal in court. When M testified in court, he
repudiated the document and told the court there was no truth to its
contents as he was merely forced to sign it. Did lawyer B commit any crime
when he used the “Sinumpaang Salaysay” as evidence?

19

CRIMINAL LAW Intent to cause damage or actual damage, is not an

indispensable requisite for falsification of public document.
Criminal liability for falsification of a private document does not arise
without damage or at least proof of intent to cause damage. It cannot co-
exist with the crime of estafa which also essentially requires damage or at
least proof of intent to cause damage.

Q: A falsified official or public document was found in the possession of the

accused. No evidence was introduced to show that the accused was the
author of the falsification. As a matter of fact, the trial court convicted the
accused of falsification of official or public document mainly on the
proposition that “the only person who could have made the erasures and
the superimposition mentioned is the one who will be benefited by the
alterations thus made” and that “he alone could have the motive for making
such alterations”.

Since the “talaan” was falsified to cover up or conceal the misappropriation

of the amount involved, whatever damage or intent to cause damage that
will attend the estafa. If such “talaan” or ledger was a commercial
document, damage or proof of intent to cause damage is not necessary.
The falsification alone if done with intent to pervert the truth, would bring
about criminal liability for falsification of a commercial document. Damage
or intent to cause damage, would sustain the estafa independently of the
falsification of the commercial document. In this case, two (2) separate
crimes are committed – estafa and falsification of the commercial
document. The falsification should not be complexed with estafa since it
was not committed as a necessary means to commit the estafa but rather
resorted to, to conceal or hide the misappropriation of the amount she
pocketed.

Was the conviction of the accused proper although the conviction was
premised merely on the aforesaid ratiocination? Explain your answer. (1999
Bar) A: Yes. The conviction is proper because there is a presumption in law
that the possessor and user of a falsified document is the one who falsified
the same. Falsification of Private Document (1989, 1991, 2007 Bar) Q: In a
civil case for recovery of a sum of money filed against him by A, B
interposed the defense of payment. In support thereof, he identified and
offered in evidence a receipt which appears to be signed by A. On rebuttal,
A denied having been paid by B and having signed the receipt. He
presented a handwriting expert who testified that the alleged signature of A
on the receipt is a forgery and that a comparison thereof with the specimen
signatures of B clearly shows that B himself forged the signature of A.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The crime committed by Fe are theft and

falsification of private document because Fe’s possession of the proceeds
of the rice mill was only physical, not juridical, possession, and having
committed the crimes with grave abuse of confidence, it is qualified theft.
The falsification is a separate crime from the theft because it was not
committed as a necessary means to commit the theft but resorted to only to
hide or conceal the unlawful taking.

(a) Is B liable for the crime of using a falsified document in a judicial

proceeding (last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code)? (b) If
he is not, what offense of offenses may he be charged with? (1991 Bar)

Simulation of birth Q: A childless couple, A and B, wanted to have a child

they could call their own. C, an unwed mother, sold her newborn baby to
them. Thereafter, A and B caused their names to be stated in the birth
certificate of the child as his parents. This was done in connivance with the
doctor who assisted in the delivery of C. What are the criminal liabilities, if
any, of the couple A and B, C and the doctor? (2002 Bar)

A: (a) No. B should not be liable for the crime of using a falsified document,
under the last paragraph of Art. 172, RPC. He would be liable for forgery of
a private document under the second mode of falsification under Art. 172,
RPC.

A: The couple, A and B, and the doctor shall be liable for the crime of
simulation of birth penalized under Article 347 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. The act of making it appear in the birth certificate of a child
that the persons named therein are the parents of the child when they are
not really the biological parents of the said child constitutes the crime of
simulation of birth.

Being the possessor and user of the falsified document he is presumed to

be the forger or falsifier and the offense of introducing falsified document is
already absorbed in the main offense of forgery or falsification. (b) If he
testified on the genuineness of the document, he should also be liable
under Art. 182, which is false testimony in civil cases.

C, the unwed mother is criminally liable for “Child Trafficking”, a violation of

Article IV, Sec. 7 of RA 7610. The law punishes inter alia the act of buying
and selling of a child.

Q: Fe is the manager of a rice mill in Bulacan. In order to support a

gambling debt, Fe made it appear that the rice mill was earning less than it
actually was by writing in a “talaan” or ledger a figure lower than what was
collected and paid by their customers. Fe then pocketed the difference.
What crime/s did Fe commit, if any? Explain your answer. (2007 Bar)

False testimony (1987, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2005, 2008 Bar) Q:
Explain and illustrate “subordination of perjury”. (1993 Bar)

A: If the “talaan” or ledger which Fe made to show a falsehood was a

private document, the only crime that Fe committed was estafa thru abuse
of confidence or unfaithfulness. UST BAR OPERATIONS

A: Subordination of perjury refers to the act of a person procuring a false

witness to testify and thereby commit perjury. The procurer is a co- principal
by inducement.

20

QUAMTO (1987-2016) Q: Sisenando purchased the share of the

stockholders of Estrella Corporation in two installments, making him the
majority stockholder thereof and eventually, its president. Because the
stockholders who sold their stocks failed to comply with their warranties
attendant to the sale, Sisenando withheld payment of the second
installment due on the shares and deposited the money in escrow instead,
subject to release once said stockholders comply with their warranties. The
stockholders concerned, in turn, rescinded the sale in question and
removed Sisenando from the Presidency of the Estrella Corp., Sisenando
then filed a verified complaint for damages against said stockholders in his
capacity as president and principal stockholder of Estrella Corp. In
retaliation, the stockholders concerned, after petitioning the Securities and
Exchange Commission to declare the rescission valid, further filed a
criminal case for perjury against Sisenando, claiming that the latter perjured
himself when he stated under oath in the verification of his complaint for
damages that he is the President of the Estrella Corporation when in fact
he had already been removed as such.

is not liable as principal by direct participation in perjury, having testified on

matters not material to an administrative case. Q: Al Chua, a Chinese
national, filed a petition under oath for naturalization, with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. In his petition, he stated that he is married to Leni Chua;
that he is living with her in Sampaloc, Manila; that he is of good moral
character; and that he has conducted himself in an irreproachable manner
during his stay in the Philippines. However, at the time of the filing of the
petition, Leni Chua was already living in Cebu, while Al was living with
Babes Toh in Manila, with whom he has an amorous relationship. After his
direct testimony, Al Chua withdrew his petition for naturalization. What
crime or crimes, if any, did Al Chua commit? Explain. (2005 Bar) A: Al Chua
committed perjury. His declaration under oath for naturalization that he is of
good moral character and residing at Sampaloc, Manila are false. This
information is material to his petition for naturalization. He committed
perjury for this wilful and deliberate assertion of falsehood which is
contained in a verified petition made for a legal purpose.

Under the facts of the case, could Sisenando be held liable for perjury?
Explain. (1996 Bar)

E. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS (1996, 1993 BAR)

A: No. Sisenando may not be held liable for perjury because it cannot be
reasonably maintained that he wilfully and deliberately made an assertion
of a falsehood when he alleged in the complaint that he is the President of
the Corporation.

Q: Pia, a bold actress living on top floor of a plush condominium in Makati

City sunbathed naked at its penthouse every Sunday morning. She was
unaware that the business executives holding office at the adjoining tall
buildings reported to office every Sunday morning and, with the use of
powerful binoculars, kept on gazing at her while she sunbathed. Eventually,
her sunbathing became the talk of the town.

Obviously, he made the allegation on the premise that his removal from the
presidency is not valid and that is precisely the issue brought about by his
complaint to the SEC. It is a fact that Sisenando has been the President of
the corporation and it is from that position that the stockholders concerned
purportedly removed him, whereupon he filed the complaint questioning his
removal. There is no wilful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood which is
a requisite of perjury.

(a) What crime, if any, did Pia commit? Explain. (b) What crime, if any, did
the business executives commit? Explain. (1996 Bar) A:

Q: A, a government employee, was administratively charged with

immorality for having an affair with B, a co-employee in the same office who
believed him to be single. To exculpate himself, A testified that he was
single and was willing to marry B, He induced C to testify and C did testify
that B was single. The truth, however, was that A had earlier married D,
now a neighbor of C.

(a) Pia did not commit a crime, the felony closest to making Pia criminally
liable is Grave Scandal, but then such act is not to be considered as highly
scandalous and offensive against decency and good customs. In the first
place, it was not done in a public place and within public knowledge or
view. As a matter of fact it was discovered by the executives accidentally
and they have to use binoculars to have public and full view of Pia
sunbathing in the nude. (b) The business executives did not commit any
crime. Their acts could not be acts of lasciviousness (as there was no overt
lustful act), or slander, as the eventual talk of the town, resulting from her
sunbathing, is not directly imputed to the business executives, and besides
such topic is not intended to defame or put Pia to ridicule.

Is A guilty of perjury? Are A and C guilty of subordination of perjury? (1997

Bar) A: No. A is not guilty of perjury because the willful falsehood asserted
by him is not material to the charge of immorality. Whether A is single or
married, the charge of immorality against him as a government employee
could proceed or prosper. In other words, A's civil status is not a defense to
the charge of immorality, hence, not a material matter that could influence
the charge.

Q: Juan and Petra are officemates. Later, intimacy developed between

them. One day, Juan sent to Petra a booklet contained in a pay envelope
which was securely sealed. The booklet is unquestionably indecent and
highly offensive to morals. Juan was thereafter charged under par. 3 of Art.
201 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. 969, which provides
that the penalty of prision mayor or a fine from P6, 000to P12, 000, or both
such imprisonment and fine shall be imposed upon those who shall sell,

There is no crime of subornation of perjury. The crime is now treated as

plain perjury with the one inducing another as the principal inducement,
and the latter, as principal by direct participation (People v. Podol, 66 Phil.
365). Since in this case, A cannot be held liable for perjury, the matter that
he testified to being immaterial, he cannot therefore be held responsible as
a principal by inducement when he induced C to testify on his status.
Consequently, C

21

CRIMINAL LAW give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or

literature which are offensive to morals.

A: Yes. Commissioner Torres violated the following:

Is Juan guilty of the crime charged? Reasons. (1993 Bar)

1.

A: No. Juan is not guilty of the crime charged because the law (Art. 201,
RPC) covers only the protection of public moral and not only the moral of
an individual.
2.

F.

3.

CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

Bribery (1990, 1993, 1994, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2006, 2010, 2014 Bar)

Q: A, who is the private complainant in a murder case pending before a

Regional Trial Court judge, gave a judge a Christmas gift, consisting of big
basket of assorted canned goods and bottles of expensive wines, easily
worth P10, 000.00. The judge accepted the gift knowing it came from A.
What crime or crimes, if any, were committed? (1997, 1993 Bar)

Q: During a PNP buy-bust operation, Cao Shih was arrested for selling 20
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) to a poseur-buyer. Cao
Shih, through an intermediary, paid Patrick, the Evidence Custodian of the
PNP Forensic Chemistry Section, the amount of P500, 000 in consideration
for the destruction by Patrick of the drug. Patrick managed to destroy the
drug.

A: The judge committed the crime of indirect bribery under Art. 211 of the
RPC. The gift was offered to the judge by reason of his office. In addition,
the judge will be liable for the violation of P.D. 46 which punishes the
receiving of gifts by public officials and employees on occasions like
Christmas.

State with reasons whether Patrick committed the following crimes: (a)
Direct bribery (b) Indirect bribery (c) Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) (d) Obstruction of Justice under PD 1829 (2005
Bar)

Qualified bribery Q: What is the crime of qualified bribery? May a judge be

charged and prosecuted for such felony? How about a public prosecutor? A
police officer? Explain. (2010 Bar)

A: Patrick committed the crimes of direct bribery under Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code, Violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA3019) and Obstruction of Justice under Section 1 (b) of
PD 1829.

A: Qualified bribery is a crime committed by a public officer who is

entrusted with law enforcement and who, in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift of offer, refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who
has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/ or death (Art.
211-A, RPC).

(a) Direct bribery was committed by Patrick when, for a consideration of

P500, 000.00, he committed a violation of PD 1829 by destroying the drugs
which were evidence entrusted to him in his official capacity. (b) Indirect
bribery is not committed because he received the P500, 000.00 as
consideration for destroying the evidence against the offender, which was
under his official custody as a public officer. The money was not delivered
to him simply as a gift or present by reason of his public office. (c) Patrick
also violated Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019 causing undue injury to the
government through evident bad faith, giving unwarranted benefit to the
offender by destroying evidence of a crime. (d) Obstruction of justice under
Section 1 (b) of P.D. 1829 is committed by destroying evidence intended to
be used in official proceedings in criminal case.

No, a judge may not be charged of this felony because his official duty as a
public officer is not law enforcement but the determination of cases already
filed in court. On the other hand, a public prosecutor may be prosecuted for
this crime in respect of the bribery committed, aside from dereliction of duty
committed in violation of Art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code, should he
refrain from prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present. Meanwhile, a police officer who refrains from
arresting such offender for the same consideration above stated, may be
prosecuted for this felony since he is a public officer entrusted with law
enforcement.
Indirect bribery Q: Commissioner Marian Torres of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) wrote solicitation letters addressed to the Filipino-Chinese
Chamber of Commerce and Industry and to certain CEOs of various
multinational corporations requesting donations of gifts for her office
Christmas party. She used the Bureau's official stationery. The response
was prompt and overwhelming so much so that Commissioner Torres'
office was overcrowded with rice cookers, radio sets, freezers, electric
stoves and toasters. Her staff also received several envelopes containing
cash money for the employees' Christmas luncheon. Has Commissioner
Torres committed any impropriety or irregularity? What laws or decrees did
she violate? (2006 Bar) UST BAR OPERATIONS

Indirect bribery (Art. 211, RPC) for receiving gifts offered by reason of
office. RA 6713 or Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees when he solicited and accept gifts (Sec. 7[d]). PD
46 making it punishable for public officials and employees to receive, and
for private persons to give gifts on any occasion, including Christmas.

Malversation of Public Funds (1987, 1988, 1990, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2001,
2005, 2006, 2008 Bar) Q: Dencio, who is the Municipal Treasurer of the
town, was also the treasurer of a charity ball of the church. Because he
was short of payroll funds for the municipal employees, he used part of the
church funds to replenish the payroll funds with the intention of returning
the same when the public funds came. (a) Is Dencio guilty of malversation
under the RPC? State your reasons.

22

QUAMTO (1987-2016) (b) Assuming that he failed to replenish the church

funds, may he be held criminally liable thereby? (1990 Bar)

purpose. The absence of such law or ordinance was, in fact, established. Is

the contention of Elizabeth legally tenable? Explain. (1996 Bar)

A: (a) No. The church funds used by Dencio do not constitute public funds
which are the proper subject of malversation. Neither does said funds
constitute the so called private funds which could be the proper subject of
malversation under Art. 222, RPC, which pertain to private property placed
in the custody of public officers by reason of their office. (b) Yes.
Momentary use of funds, since there is defraudation, is tantamount to
estafa under Art. 215 of the RPC. This is because he received the funds in
his capacity as treasurer and there was temporary damage caused.
Personal benefit is not an element of the crime of estafa.

A: Elizabeth's contention that her conviction for illegal use of public funds
(technical malversation) was erroneous is legally tenable because she was
charged for malversation of public funds under Art. 217 of the RPC but was
convicted for Illegal use of public funds which is defined and punished
under Art. 220. A public officer charged with malversation may not be
validly convicted of illegal use of public funds (technical malversation)
because the latter crime is not necessarily included nor does it necessarily
include the crime of malversation. The Sandiganbayan should have
followed the procedure provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
and order the filing of the proper Information (Parungao v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 96025, May 15, 1991). From the facts, there is no showing that
there is a law or ordinance appropriating the amount to a specific public
purpose. As a matter of fact, the problem categorically states that the
absence of such law or ordinance was, in fact, established.

Q: Randy, an NBI agent, was issued by the NBI an armalite rifle (M16) and
a Smith and Wesson Revolver Cal. 38. After a year, the NBI Director made
an inspection of all the firearms issued. Randy, who reported for work that
morning, did not show up during the inspection. He went on absence
without leave (AWOL). After two years, he surrendered to the NBI the two
firearms issued to him. He was charged with malversation of government
property before the Sandiganbayan.

So, procedurally and substantially, the Sandiganbayan's decision suffers

from serious infirmity.

Randy put up the defense that he did not appropriate the armalite rifle and
the revolver for his own use, that the delay in accounting for them does not
constitute conversion and that actually the firearms were stolen by his
friend, Chiting. Decide the case. (1994 Bar)

Q: Alex Reyes, together with Jose Santos, were former warehousemen of

the Rustan Department Store. In 1986, the PCGG sequestered the assets,
fund and properties of the owners-incorporators of the store, alleging that
they constitute "Ill-gotten wealth" of the Marcos family. Upon their
application, Reyes and Santos were appointed as fiscal agents of the
sequestered firm and they were given custody and possession of the
sequestered building and its contents, including various vehicles used in
the firm's operations.

A: Randy is guilty as charged under Art. 217, RPC. He is accountable for

the firearms they issued to him in his official capacity. The failure of Randy
to submit the firearms upon demand created the presumption that he
converted them for his own use. Even if there is no direct evidence of
misappropriation, his failure to account for the government property is
enough factual basis for a finding of malversation.

After a few months, an inventory was conducted and it was discovered that
two (2) delivery vans were missing. After demand was made upon them,
Reyes and Santos failed to give any satisfactory explanation why the vans
were missing or to turn them over to the PCGG; hence, they were charged
with Malversation of Public Property. During the trial, the two accused
claimed that they are not public accountable officers and, if any crime was
committed, it should only be Estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code.

Indeed, even his explanation that the guns were stolen is incredible for if
the firearms were actually stolen, he should have reported the matter
immediately to the authorities. Q: Elizabeth is the municipal treasurer of
Masinloc, Zambales. On January 10, 1994, she received, as municipal
treasurer, from the Department of Public Works and Highways, the amount
of P100, 000.00 known as the fund for construction, rehabilitation,
betterment, and Improvement (CRBI) for the concreting of Barangay
Phanix Road located in Masinloc, Zambales, a project undertaken on
proposal of the Barangay Captain. Informed that the fund was already
exhausted while the concreting of Barangay Phanix Road remained
unfinished, a representative of the Commission on Audit conducted a spot
audit of Elizabeth who failed to account for the P100, 000 CRBI fund.
Elizabeth, who was charged with malversation of public funds, was
acquitted by the Sandiganbayan of that charge but was nevertheless
convicted, in the same criminal case, for illegal use of public funds. On
appeal, Elizabeth argued that her conviction was erroneous as she applied
the amount of P50, 000.00 for a public purpose without violating any law or
ordinance appropriating the said amount for any specific

What is the proper offense committed? State the reason(s) for your answer.
(2001 Bar) A: The proper offense committed was Malversation of Public
Property, not estafa, considering that Reyes and Santos, upon their
application, were constituted as "fiscal agents" of the sequestered firm and
were "given custody and possession" of the sequestered properties,
including the delivery vans which later they could not account for. They
were thus made the depositary and administrator of properties deposited
by public authority and hence, by the duties of their office/position, they are
accountable for such properties. Such properties, having been sequestered
by the Government through the PCGG, are in custodia legis and therefore
impressed with the character of public property, even though the properties
belong to a private individual (Art. 222, RPC).

23

CRIMINAL LAW The failure of Reyes and Santos to give any satisfactory
explanation why the vans were missing, is prima facie evidence that they
had put the same to their personal use. Q: Allan, the Municipal Treasurer of
the Municipality of Gerona, was in a hurry to return to his office after a
daylong official conference. He alighted from the government car which
was officially assigned to him, leaving the ignition key and the car unlocked,
and rushed to his office. Jules, a bystander, drove off with the car and later
sold the same to his brother, Danny for P20, 000.00, although the car was
worth P800, 000.00.

2.

a. b. c.
(a) What are the respective crimes, if any, committed by Allan, Danny and
Jules? Explain. (b) What, if any, are their respective civil liabilities? Explain.
(2005 Bar)

(a) Allan, the municipal treasurer is liable for malversation committed

through negligence or culpa. The government car which was assigned to
him is public property under his accountability by reason of his duties. By
his act of negligence, he permitted the taking of the car by another person,
resulting in malversation, consistent with the language of Art. 217 of RPC.
3. Danny committed the crime of fencing for having bought the car which
was the proceeds of carnapping, a crime in the nature of theft or robbery of
motor vehicle. The presumption of fencing applies to him for he paid a price
so inadequate for the value of the car. Jules committed the crime of
carnapping for the unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of the government’s
motor vehicle. (Unlawful taking of a motor vehicle is now governed by the
Anti-Carnapping Act, R.A. 6539, not by the provisions of the RPC on theft
or robbery).

Meynardo, not being a public officer, is guilty of the crime of Delivering

Prisoners From Jails (Art. 156), which is committed by any person who
either removes from any jail or penal establishment any person confined
therein, or who helps the escape of such person by means of violence,
intimidation, bribery of other means. The act of Meynardo in giving to
Ernani his cigarette container is helping in the latter’s escape by other
means.

Q: Amy was apprehended and arrested by the Patrolman Bart for illegal
parking. She was detained at the police precinct, underwent investigation,
and released only after 48 hours.

(b) Allan, Jules and Danny are all civilly liable for restitution of the car to the
government or if not possible, reparation of damages caused by payment
of the replacement cost of the car minus allowance for depreciation, and to
indemnify consequential damages. Infidelity of Public Officers

(a) Is Patrolman Bart liable for any offense? Explain your answer. (b)
Suppose Amy resisted the arrest and grappled with patrolman Bart, is she
criminally liable thereby? State your reasons. (1990 Bar)

Custody of prisoners (1989, 1990, 1996, 1997, 2002, 2009, 2014 Bar)

A: (a) Patrolman Bart is liable for violation of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code – Delay on the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper
Judicial Authorities. (b) She is criminally liable for slight disobedience under
Art. 151 of the RPC – Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority
or the agents of such person.

Q: Ernani was accused of estafa. Unable to post a bail bond for his
provisional liberty pending trial of his case, he was detained in the city jail.
On the date of the hearing of the estafa case, Daniel, a policeman detailed
in the city jail, escorted Ernani to the city hall for the trial. Daniel removed
the handcuffs of Ernani and allowed him to sit on one of the chairs inside
the courtroom. As Daniel was talking to a lawyer inside the courtroom,
Ernani, with the help of a cigarette vendor, Meynardo, who used his
cigarette container as cover, surreptitiously moved out of the room and
escaped. Ernani and Meynardo went to the comfort room for a while, then
went down the stairs and lost themselves in the crowd. What crime/s were
committed by Ernani, Daniel and Meynardo? Give your reasons. (1989 Bar)

Q: During a town fiesta, A, the chief of police, permitted B, a detention

prisoner and his compadre, to leave the municipal jail and entertain visitors
in his house from 10:00 am to 8:00 pm. B returned to the municipal jail at
8:30 pm. Was there any crime committed by A? (1997 Bar) A: Yes. A
committed the crime of infidelity in the custody of a prisoner. Since B is a
detention prisoner, as Chief of Police, A has custody over B. Even if B
returned to the municipal jail at 8:30pm. A, as custodian of the prisoner, has
maliciously failed to perform the duties of his office, and when he permits
said prisoner to obtain a relaxation of his

A: Ernani, the escaped prisoner himself is not criminally liable for any
offense. The detention prisoner who

UST BAR OPERATIONS

That the offender is a public officer That he has in his custody or charge a
prisoner, either detention prisoner/s by final judgment That such prisoner
escaped from his custody thru his negligence.

All of these elements are present, Daniel, a policeman detailed in the city
jail, is a public officer. As the escort for Ernani in the latter’s trial, he had
custody of charge of a detention prisoner. Ernani escape was thru his
negligence because after removing Ernani’s handcuffs and allowing him to
sit in one of the chairs inside the courtroom, he should have taken the
necessary precautions to prevent Ernani’s escape by keeping an eye on
him. Instead, he provided the opportunity for the escape by talking with a
lawyer and not keeping watch over his prisoner.

A:

1.

escapes from detention does not commit any crime. If he were a convict by
final judgment who is serving a sentence which consists of deprivation of
liberty and he escapes during term of his sentence, he would be liable for
Evasion of Service Sentence (Art. 157). Daniel, the policeman, committed
the crime of Evasion thru Negligence, one of the forms of Infidelity in the
custody of Prisoner (Art. 224), the essential elements of which offense are:

24

QUAMTO (1987-2016) imprisonment, he consents to the prisoner escaping

the punishment of being deprived of his liberty which can be considered
real and actual evasion of service under Article 223 of the RPC (People v.
Leon Bandino, 29 Phil 459).

However, her parents drove her away so she returned to Manila and stayed
with Oniok in his boarding house. Upon learning of her pregnancy, already
in an advanced state, Oniok tried to persuade her to undergo an abortion,
but she refused. Because of their constant and bitter quarrels, she suffered
birth pangs and gave birth prematurely to a live baby girl while Oniok was
at his place of work. Upon coming home and learning what happened, he
prevailed upon Ana to conceal his dishonor. Hence, they placed the infant
in a shoe and threw it into a nearby creek. However, an inquisitive neighbor
saw them and with the help of others. Retrieved the infant who was already
dead from drowning. The incident was reported to the police who arrested
Ana and Oniok.

G. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS Parricide (1994, 1996, 1997, 2003,

2006, 2015 Bar) Q: Aldrich was dismissed from his job by his employer.
Upon reaching home, his pregnant wife, Carmi, nagged him about money
for her medicines. Depressed by his dismissal and angered by the nagging
of his wife, Aldrich struck Carmi with his fist. She fell to the ground. As a
result, she and her unborn baby died. What crime was committed by
Aldrich? (1994 Bar)

The two were charged with parricide under Article 246 of the RPC. After
trial, they were convicted of the crime charged. Was the conviction correct?
(Bar 2006)

A: Aldrich committed the crime of parricide with unintentional abortion.

When Aldrich struck his wife, Carmi, with his fist, he committed the crime of
maltreatment under Art. 266, par. 3 of the RPC. Since Carmi died because
of the felonious act of Aldrich, he is criminally liable of parricide under Art.
246, RPC in relation to Art. 4, par. 1 of the same Code. Since the unborn
baby of Carmi died in the process, but Aldrich had no intention to cause the
abortion of his wife, Aldrich committed unintentional abortion as defined in
Art. 257, RPC. Inasmuch as the single act of Aldrich produced two grave or
less grave felonies, he falls under Art. 48, RPC, i.e. a complex crime
(People v. Salufrancia, 159 SCRA 401).

A: The conviction was incorrect because: (a) Under Art. 46, Civil Code, a
newborn with an intrauterine life of less than 7 months must live for at least
24 hours before it may be considered born and hence, before it may
acquire personality of its own; (b) The newborn, therefore was still a fetus
when killed and was not yet a person. Hence, the crime in law is abortion. It
is legally a fetus who was killed, not a person or child because legally it has
no personality yet. (c) Infanticide and parricide involves a killing when the
victim is already a person.

Q: In 1975, Pedro, then a resident of Manila, abandoned his wife and their
son, Ricky, who was then only three years old. Twenty years later, an affray
took place in a bar in Olongapo City between Pedro and his companions,
on one hand, and Ricky and his friends, upon the other, without the father
and son knowing each other. Ricky stabbed and killed Pedro in the fight,
only to find out, a week later, when his mother arrived from Manila to visit
him in jail, that the man whom he killed was his own father.

Murder (1987, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2001, 2008, 2009 Bar) Q: A,
a 76-year old woman, was brought to the hospital in a coma with slight
cerebral hemorrhage. An endotracheal tube was inserted in her mouth to
facilitate her breathing. B, a hospital janitor, removed the tube. The victim
started to convulse and bleed in the mouth. Only the timely arrival of the
nurse prevented the patient’s death. The patient was then transferred to
another hospital where she died the next day of cardio-respiratory. Is B
criminally liable? If so, what crime was committed? (1991 Bar)

(1) What crime did Ricky commit? (2) Suppose Ricky knew before the
killing that Pedro is his father, but he nevertheless killed him out of
bitterness for having abandoned him and his mother, what crime did Ricky
commit? Explain. (1996 Bar)

A: Yes. B is criminally liable for Murder (qualified by treachery) because the

death of A appears to be the proximate cause of the overt acts of B.

A: (1) Ricky committed parricide because the person killed was his own
father and the law punishing the crime (Art. 246, RPC) does not require
that the crime be knowingly committed. Should Ricky be prosecuted and
found guilty of parricide, the penalty to be imposed is Art. 49 of the Revised
Penal Code for Homicide (the crime he intended to commit) but in its
maximum period. (2) The crime committed should be parricide if Ricky
knew before the killing that Pedro is his father, because the moral basis for
punishing the crime already exists. His having acted out of bitterness for
having been abandoned by his father may be considered mitigating.
A died of cardio-respiratory arrest which evidently was brought about by the
convulsion and bleeding in the mouth of the victim due to the removal by B
of the endotracheal tube twice. The two acts of B can be considered as the
result of one criminal design.

Q: Ana has been a bar girl/GRO at a beer house for more than 2 years.
She fell in love with Oniok, the bartender, who impregnated her. But Ana
did not inform about her condition and, instead, went to Cebu to conceal
her shame.

A: Murder is the unlawful killing of a person which otherwise would

constitute only homicide, had it not been attended by any of the following
circumstances:

In People v. Umaging, 107 SCRA 166, the Supreme Court ruled that
removal of the endotracheal tube is attempted murder, qualified by
treachery, because the patient did not die. Q: Define murder. What are the
elements of the crime? (1999 Bar)

1.

25

With treachery or taking advantage of superior strength, or with the aid of

armed men, or employing

CRIMINAL LAW

2. 3.

4. 5. 6.

means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford

impunity; In consideration of a price, reward or promise; By means or on
the occasion of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of
a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by
means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving
great waste and ruin; On occasion of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano,
destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity; With evident
premeditation; With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanely augmenting the
suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

For Nereo, Lino should be liable for serious physical injuries as the
wounding of Nereo was the natural and logical consequences of Lino’s
felonious act. (b) Tommy is exempted from criminal liability for the injury to
Nereo as he was performing a lawful act with due care and the injury was
caused by mere accident (Art. 12, par. 4), or that he was in lawful exercise
of a right (Art. 11, par. 6), that is, defense of a stranger. Q: In a free-for-all
brawl that ensued after some customers inside a nightclub became unruly,
guns were fired by a group, among them A and B, that finally put the
customers back to their senses. Unfortunately, one customer died.
Subsequent investigation revealed that A’s gunshot had inflicted on the
victim a slight wound that did not cause the deceased’s death nor
materially contribute to it. It was B’s gunshot that inflicted a fatal wound on
the deceased. A contended that his liability should, if at all, be limited to
slight physical injury. Would you agree? Why? (2003 Bar)

Q: Candido stabbed an innocent bystander who accidentally bumped him.

The innocent bystander died as a result of the stabbing. Candido was
arrested and was tested to be positive for the use of “shabu” at the time he
committed the stabbing. What should be the proper charge against
Candido? Explain. (2005 Bar)

A: No. I beg to disagree with A’s contention that his liability should be
limited to slight physical injury only. He should be held liable for attempted
homicide because he inflicted said injury with the use of a firearm which is
a lethal weapon. Intent to kill is inherent in the use of a firearm (Araneta, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 123).

A: Candido should be charged with murder qualified by treachery because

the suddenness of the stabbing caught the victim by surprise and was
totally defenseless. Being under the influence of dangerous drugs is a
qualifying aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime (Sec. 25,
RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). Hence, the
penalty for murder shall be imposed in the maximum.

Q: Belle saw Gaston stealing the prized cock of a neighbor and reported
him to the police. Thereafter, Gaston, while driving a car, saw Belle
crossing the street. Incensed that Belle had reported him, Gaston decided
to scare her by trying to make it appear that he was about to run her over.
He revved the engine of his car and drove towards her but he applied the
brakes. Since the road was slippery at that time, the vehicle skidded and hit
Belle causing her death. What is the liability of Gaston? Why? (2005 Bar)

Homicide (1989, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2003, 2005, 2014 Bar) Q:
Tommy saw Lino and Okito engaged in a street fight. Lino then suddenly
drew his balisong and lunged at Okito. In an effort to break up the fight,
Tommy tried to snatch the balisong from Lino but not before the latter had
inflicted a wound on Okito. As Lino withdrew the weapon and attempted to
stab Okito a second time, Tommy tried to grab the weapon again. In so
doing, his left forearm was slashed. As he succeeded in snatching away
the balisong with his right arm, it flew with such force, that it hit Nereo, a
passerby who was seriously injured.

A: Gaston is criminally liable for homicide in doing the felonious act which
caused Belle’s death, although the penalty therefor shall be mitigated by
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed (Art. 13 [3],
RPC). The act having been deliberately done with malice, is felonious and
being the proximate cause of Belle’s death, brings about criminal liability
although the wrong done.

Explain your answers fully.

Rape (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2009 Bar)

(a) What is the criminal liability of Lino with respect to Okito, Tommy and
Nereo? (b) In turn, is Tommy criminally liable to Nereo? (1992 Bar)

Q: The complainant, an eighteen-year old mental retardate with an

intellectual capacity between the ages of nine and twelve years, when
asked during the trial how she felt when she was raped by the accused,
replied “Masarap, it gave me much pleasure.”

A: (a) As far as Okito is concerned, Lino is liable for frustrated homicide,

assuming that the wound suffered by Okito is such that for reasons or
causes independent of the will of Lino (such as timely medical attention)
Okito would have died. If the injury is not serious enough, the liability is only
attempted homicide.

With the claim of the accused that the complainant consented for a fee to
the sexual intercourse, and with the foregoing answer of the complainant,
would you convict the accused of rape if you were the judge trying the
case? Explain. (1996 Bar) A: Yes, I would convict the accused of rape.
Since the victim is a mental retardate with an intellectual capacity of a child
less than 12 years old, she is legally incapable of giving a valid consent to
the sexual intercourse. The sexual intercourse is tantamount to a statutory
rape because the level of intelligence is that of a child less than 12 years of
age. Where the victim of rape is a mental retardate, violence or intimidation
is not essential to constitute rape (People v. Trimor, G.R. 106541-42, March
31, 1995). As a matter of fact,

Intent to kill is manifest because of the use of a deadly weapon. For the
injury on the arm of Tommy, Lino is liable only for physical injuries (serious,
less serious or slight, depending on the nature of the injury). Apparently,
there is no intent to kill.

UST BAR OPERATIONS

26

QUAMTO (1987-2016) R.A. No. 7659, the Heinous Crimes Law, amended
Art. 335, RPC, by adding the phrase “or is demented”.

RA No. 7610. (Amployo v. People, G.R. No. 157718, April 26, 2005) Under
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, when the victim (child subjected to sexual abuse)
is under 12 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted (for acts of
lasciviousness) under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided,
That the penalty for lasciviousness conduct when the victim is under 12
years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.

Q: Flordeluna boarded a taxi on her way home to Quezon City which was
driven by Roger. Flordeluna noticed that Roger was always placing his car
freshener in front of the car aircon ventilation but did not bother asking
Roger why. Suddenly, Flordeluna felt dizzy and became unconscious.
Instead of bringing her to Quezon City, Roger brought Flordeluna to his
house in Cavite where she was detained for two (2) weeks. She was raped
for the entire duration of her detention. May Roger be charged and
convicted of the crime of rape with serious illegal detention? (2000 Bar)

H. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY Kidnapping

(1991, 2009, 2014, 2016 Bar) Q: A charged B with the crime of rape. While
the case was pending in court, B, together with his mother and brother,
overpowered A while riding a tricycle, dragged her inside a carenderia
owned by them and detained her for two (2) days. They demanded that she
sign an affidavit of desistance and reimburse B the sum of P5, 000.00
which he paid to his lawyer in the case. She was released only after she
signed the affidavit asking for the dismissal of the case and delivered to B
P1, 000.00. She promised to deliver the balance of P4, 000.00 thirty (30)
days later. What crime/s was/were committed by B, his mother and
brother? (1991 Bar)

A: No. Roger may not be charged and convicted of the crime with serious
illegal detention. Roger may be charged and convicted of multiple rapes.
Each rape is a distinct offense and should be punished separately.
Evidently, his principal intention was to abuse Flordeluna; the detention
was only incidental to the rape. Q: A, a male, takes B, another male, to a
motel and there, through threat and intimidation, succeeds in inserting his
penis into the anus of B. What, if any, is A’s criminal liability? Why? (2002
Bar)

A: This is Kidnapping with Ransom which is kidnapping or illegal detention

committed by a private person for the purpose of extorting ransom. Since
the victim is a woman, it is serious.

A: A shall be criminally liable for rape by committing an act of sexual

assault against B, by inserting his penis into the anus of the latter. Even a
man may be a victim of rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2 of Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, “when the offender’s penis
is inserted into his mouth or anal orifice.”

Q: A, with lewd designs, took a 13-year old girl to a nipa hut in his farm and
there had sexual intercourse with her. The girl did not offer any resistance
because she was infatuated with the man, who was good-looking and
belonged to a rich and prominent family in the town. What crime, if any,
was committed by A? Why? (2002 Bar)

Q: Braulio invited Lulu, his 11-year old stepdaughter, inside the master
bedroom. He pulled out a knife and threatened her with harm unless she
submitted to his desires. He was touching her chest and sex organ when
his wife caught him in the act.

A: A committed the crime of Consented Abduction under Article 343 of the

Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The prosecutor is unsure whether to charge Braulio for acts of

lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC, for lascivious conduct under RA
7610 (Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation, and
Discrimination Act); or for rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC. What is the
crime committed? Explain. (2016 Bar) A: The acts of Braulio of touching the
chest and sex organ of Lulu who is under 12 years of age, are merely acts
of lasciviousness and not attempted rape because intent to have sexual
intercourse is not clearly shown. (People v. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060,
December 11, 2013) To be held liable of attempted rape, it must be shown
that the erectile penis is in the position to penetrate (Cruz v. People, G.R.
No. 166441, October 8, 2014) or the offender actually commenced to force
his penis into the victim’s sexual organ. (People v. Banzuela, supra)

The said Article punishes the abduction of a virgin over 12 and under 18
years of age, carried out with her consent and with lewd designs. Although
the problem did not indicate the victim to be a virgin, virginity should not be
understood in its material sense, as to exclude a virtuous woman of good
reputation, since the essence of the crime is not the injury to the woman
but the outrage and alarm to her family (Valdepeñas v. People, 16 SCRA
871). Trespass to dwelling Q: At about 11:00 in the evening, Dante forced
his way inside the house of Mamerto. Jay, Mamerto’s son, saw Dante and
accosted him. Dante pulled a knife and stabbed Jay on his abdomen.
Mamerto heard the commotion and went out of his room. Dante, who was
about to escape, assaulted Mamerto. Jay suffered injuries which, were it
not for the timely medical attendance, would have caused his death.
Mamerto sustained injuries that incapacitated him for 25 days.

The same acts of touching the chest and sex organ of Lulu under
psychological coercion or influence of her stepfather, Braulio, constitutes
sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610. (People v. Optana, G.R.
No. 133922, February 12, 2001)

What crime/s did Dante commit? (1994 Bar)

Since the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code are met, in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse
under Section 5 of RA No. 7610, and the victim is under 12 years of age,
Braulio shall be prosecuted for acts of lasciviousness under the Revised
Penal Code but the penalty imposable is that prescribed by

A: Dante committed qualified trespass to dwelling, frustrated homicide for

the stabbing of Jay, and less serious physical injuries for the assault on
Mamerto. The crime of qualified trespass to dwelling should not be
complexed with frustrated homicide because when the

27

CRIMINAL LAW trespass is committed as a means to commit a more

serious crime, trespass to dwelling is absorbed by the greater crime and
the former constitutes an aggravating circumstance of dwelling (People v.
Abedoza, 53 Phil 788).

confession without the offended party being confined in jail. (US v. Cusi, 10
Phil 143) It is noted that the offended party was merely “brought” to the
police headquarters and is thus not a detention prisoner. Had he been
validly arrested, the crime committed would be maltreatment of prisoners.

Grave Threats and Coercion (1987, 1988, 1989, 1998, 1999) Grave
Coercion

I.

CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

Q: Isagani lost his gold necklace bearing his initials. He saw Roy wearing
the said necklace. Isagani asked Roy to return to him the necklace as it
belongs to him, but Roy refused. Isagani then drew his gun and told Roy, “If
you will not give back the necklace to me, I will kill you!” Out of fear for his
life and against his will, Roy gave the necklace to Isagani. What offense did
Isagani commit? (1998 Bar)

Robbery (1987, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2012 Bar)

A: Isagani committed the crime of grave coercion (Art. 286, RPC) for
compelling Roy, by means of serious threats or intimidation, to do
something against the latter’s will, whether it be right or wrong. Serious
threats or intimidation approximating violence constitute grave coercion, not
grave threats. Such is the nature of the threat in this case because it was
committed with a gun, is a deadly weapon.

A: The offenders committed only one robbery in the eyes of the law
because when they entered the compound, they were impelled only by a
single indivisible criminal resolution to commit a robbery as they were not
aware that there were five families inside said compound, considering that
the same was enclosed by a six-foot high hollow block fence. The series of
robbery committed in the same compound at about the same time
constitutes one continued crime, motivated by one criminal impulse.

Q: Five robbers robbed one after the other five houses occupied by
different families located inside a compound enclosed by a six-foot high
hollow block fence. How many robberies did the five commit? Explain.
(1996 Bar)
The crime cannot be robbery because intent to gain, which is an essential
element of robbery, is absent since the necklace belongs to Isagani.

Q: A, brother of B, with the intention of having a night out with his friends,
took the coconut shell which is being used by B as a bank for his coins
from inside their locked cabinet using their common key. Forthwith, A broke
the coconut shell outside of their home in the presence of his friends.

Q: (a) Distinguish coercion from illegal detention. (b) Forcibly brought to the
police headquarters, a person was tortured and maltreated by agents of the
law in order to compel him to confess a crime imputed to him. The agents
failed, however, to draw from him a confession which was their intention to
obtain through the employment of such means. What crime was committed
by the agents of the law? (1999 Bar) A:

(a) What is the criminal liability of A, if any? Explain. (b) Is A exempted from
criminal liability under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code for being a
brother of B? Explain. (2000 Bar) A: (a) A is criminally liable for Robbery
with force upon things, because the coconut shell with the coins inside, was
taken with intent to gain and broken outside of their home (Art. 299 [b], [2],
RPC). (b) No. A is not exempt from criminal liability under Art. 332 because
said Article applies only to theft, swindling, or malicious mischief. Here, the
crime committed is robbery.

(a) Coercion may be distinguished from illegal detention as follows: In

coercion, the basis of criminal liability is the employment of violence or
serious intimidation approximating violence, without authority of law, to
prevent a person from doing something not prohibited by law or to compel
him to do something against his will whether it be right or wrong; while in
Illegal Detention, the basis of liability is the actual restraint or locking up of
a person thereby depriving him of his liberty without authority of law. If there
was no intent to lock up or detain the offended party unlawfully, the crime of
illegal detention is not committed. (b) Evidently, the person tortured and
maltreated by the agents of the law is a suspect and may have been
detained by them. If so and he had already been booked and put in jail, the
crime is maltreatment of prisoner and the fact that the suspect was
subjected to torture to extort a confession would bring about a higher
penalty, in addition to the offender’s liability for the physical injuries inflicted.

Q: A entered the house of another without employing force or violence upon

things. He was seen by a maid who wanted to scream but was prevented
from doing so because A threatened her with a gun. A then took money and
other valuables and left. Is A guilty of theft or robbery? Explain. (2002 Bar)
A: A is liable for robbery because the intimidation he employed on the maid
before the taking of the money and other valuables. It is the intimidation of
the person relative to the taking that qualifies the crime as robbery, instead
of simply theft. ‘ The non-employment of force upon things is of no moment
because robbery is committed not only by employing force upon things but
also by employing violence against or intimidation of persons.

But if the suspect was forcibly brought to the police headquarters to make
him admit the crime and tortured/maltreated to make him confess to such
crime, but later released because the agents failed to draw such
confession, the crime is grave coercion because of the violence employed
to compel such UST BAR OPERATIONS

Theft (1989, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2008, 2012 Bar)

28

QUAMTO (1987-2016) Q: Sunshine, a “beauteous” colegiala but a

shoplifter, went to the Ever Department Store and proceeded to the
women’s wear section. The saleslady was of the impression that she
brought to the fitting room three (3) pieces of swimsuits of different colors.
When she came out of the fitting room, she returned only two (2) pieces to
the clothes rack. The saleslady became suspicious and alerted the store
detective. Sunshine was stopped by the detective before she could leave
the store and brought to the office of the store manager. The detective and
the manager searched her and found her wearing the third swimsuit under
her blouse and pants. Was the theft consummated, frustrated, or
attempted? Explain. (2000 Bar) A: The theft was consummated because
the taking or asportation was complete. The asportation is complete when
the offender acquired the exclusive control of the personal property being
taken. In this case, when Sunshine wore the swimsuit under her blouse and
pants and was on her way out of the store, with evident intent to gain, the
taking constitutes theft and being complete, it is consummated. It is not
necessary that the offender is in a position to dispose of the property.

A: A committed the crime of qualified theft because he took the goods on

the occasion of and taking advantage of the fire which broke out in the
department store. The occasion of a calamity such as fire, when the theft
was committed, qualifies the crime under Article 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. Q: Forest Ranger Jay Velasco was patrolling the
Balara Watershed and Reservoir when he noticed a big pile of cut logs
outside the gate of the watershed. Curious, he scouted around and after a
few minutes, he saw Rene and Dante coming out of the gate with some
more newly-cut logs. He apprehended and charged them with the proper
offense. What is that offense? Explain. (2006 Bar) A: The offense
committed is qualified theft pursuant to Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 330 and Sec. 68
of P.D. No. 705 defining the offense committed by any person who directly
or indirectly cuts, gathers, removes or smuggles timber or other forest
products in violation of existing laws, rules and regulation, from any public
forest reserves, and other kinds of public forest or even privately owned
forest lands.

Q: Francis Garcia, a Jollibee waiter, found a gold bracelet in front of his

working place in Makati and, upon inspecting it, saw the name and address
of the owner engraved on the inside. Remembering his parents’ admonition
that he should not take anything which does not belong to him, he delivered
the bracelet to PO1 Jesus Reyes of the Makati quad precinct with the
instruction to locate the owner and return it to him. PO1 Reyes, instead,
sold the bracelet and misappropriated the proceeds. Subsequent events
brought out the fact that the bracelet was dropped by a snatcher who had
grabbed it from the owner a block away from where Francis had found it
and further investigation traced the last possessor as PO1 Reyes.

Q: A is the driver of B’s Mercedez Benz car. When B was on a trip to Paris,
A used the car for a joy ride with C whom he is courting. Unfortunately, A
met an accident. Upon his return, B came to know about the unauthorized
use of the car and sued A for qualified theft. B alleged that A took and used
the car with intent to gain as he derived some benefit or satisfaction from its
use. On the other hand, A argued that he has no intent of making himself
the owner of the car as he in fact returned it to the garage after the joy ride.
What crime/s, if any, were committed? Explain. (2016 Bar) A: The crime
committed by A is carnapping. The unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now
covered by the AntiCarnapping Law (RA 6539 as amended) and not by the
provisions on qualified theft or robbery. (People v. Bustinera, G.R. No.
148233, June 8, 2004) The concept of carnapping is the same as that of
robbery and theft. Hence, rules applicable to theft or robbery are also
applicable to carnapping. (People v. Asamuddin, G.R. No. 213913,
September 2, 2015) In theft, unlawful taking should be understood within
the Spanish concept of apoderamiento. In order to constitute
apoderamiento, the physical taking must be coupled with the intent oto
appropriate the object, which means intent to deprive the lawful owner of
the thing, whether permanently or temporarily. (People v. Valenzuela, G.R.
No. 160188, June 21, 2007) In this case, A took the car without the consent
of B with intent to temporarily deprive him of the car. Although the taking
was “temporary” and for a “joy ride”, the Supreme Court in People v.
Bustinera (supra), sustains as the better view which holds that when a
person, either with the object of going to a certain place, or learning how to
drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle belonging to
another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft because by
taking possession of the personal property belonging to another and using
it, his intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom utility, satisfaction,
enjoyment and pleasure.

Charged with theft, PO1 Reyes reasoned out that he had not committed
any crime because it was not he who had found the bracelet, and
moreover, it turned out to have been stolen. Resolve the case with reasons.
(2001 Bar) A: PO1 Reyes is criminally liable. His contention that he has not
committed any crime because he was not the one who found the bracelet
and it turned out to be stolen also, is devoid of merit. It is enough that the
bracelet belonged to another and the failure to restore the same to its
owner is characterized by intent to gain. The act of PO1 Reyes of selling
the bracelet which does not belong to him and which he only held to be
delivered to its owner, is furtive misappropriation with intent to gain. Where
a finder of lost or mislaid property entrusts it to another for delivery to the
owner, the person to whom such property is entrusted and who accepts the
same, assumes the relation of the finder to the owner as if he was the
actual finder; if he would misappropriate it, he is guilty of theft (People v.
Avila, 44 Phil 720). Qualified theft (1992, 2002, 2006 Bar)

Usurpation (1988, 1989, 1996 Bar) Q: Jorge is the owner of 10 hectares of

land in the foothills which he planted with lanzones. On his last visit there,
he was shocked to discover that his land had been taken over by a group
of 15 families whose members had forcibly driven away his caretaker, had

Q: A fire broke out in a department store. A, taking advantage of the

confusion, entered the store and carried away goods which he later sold.
What crime, if any, did he commit? Why? (2002 Bar)

29

CRIMINAL LAW appropriated the fruits for themselves, and were not
threatening to kill him should he try to eject them.

extensively spread. Only a portion of the house was burned. Discuss

Eddie’s liability. (2000 Bar)

What crime should Jorge charge these 15 families? Explain. (1988 Bar)

A: Eddie is liable for destructive arson in the consummated stage. It is

destructive arson because fire was resorted to in destroying the house of
Mario which is an inhabited house or dwelling. The arson is consummated
because the house was in fact already burned although not totally. In
arson, it is not required that the premises be totally burned for the crime to
be consummated. It is enough that the premises suffer destruction by
burning.

A: Jorge can charge the 15 families of 2 separate crimes namely: (a)

Violation of Article 282, Grave threats xxx (b) Violation of Article 312 which
provides that: “Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in
property. – Any person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, shall take possession of any real property or shall usurp any real
rights in property belonging to another, in addition to the penalty incurred
for the acts of violence executed by him, shall be punished by a fine...”.

J.

Adultery & Concubinage (1991, 1994, 2002, 2005, 2010 Bar) Q: A, a

married woman, had sexual intercourse with a man who was not her
husband. The man did not know she was married. What crime, if any, did
each of them commit? Why? (2002 Bar)

Q: A and B, both farmers, entered the land owned by X and planted palay
thereon. When X came to know about it, he confronted A and B and
inquired why the latter occupied his land and planted palay thereon.

A: A, the married woman, committed the crime of adultery under Article 333
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, for having sexual intercourse with
a man not her husband while her marriage is still subsisting. But the man
who had carnal knowledge of her, not knowing her to be married, shall not
be liable for adultery.

A, with a bolo in hand, replied that the land belongs to the family of S, and
not to X and at the same time said, “If you touch this land and my palay,
blood will flow on this ground.” Because of the said remark, X went to the
Chief of Police and complained. The Chief of Police filed a complex crime
of Usurpation of Real Property with Grave Threats.

Q: A is married. He has a paramour with whom he had sexual relations on

a more or less regular basis. They meet at least once a week in hotels,
motels, and other places where they can be alone. Is A guilty of any crime?
Why?

What crime/s were committed? (1989 Bar) A: The crime committed by A

and B is squatting under PD 772 and not Usurpation of Real Property
because in the latter crime, there must be violence against or intimidation
of persons employed in taking possession of any real property or in
usurping any real rights in property belonging to another (Art. 312, RPC). In
this case, it appears that A and B entered X’s land without the owner’s
consent or against his will but without any violence against or intimidation
of persons.

A: A is guilty of the crime of concubinage by having sexual intercourse

under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife. Having
sexual relations on a more or less regular basis in hotels, motels, and other
places may be considered scandalous circumstances that offends public
conscience, giving rise to criticism and general protest, such acts being
imprudent and wanton and setting a bad example (People v. Santos, 86
SCRA 705).

The crime of squatting is committed by any person, who, with the use of
force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the
property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other
purposes.

K. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR Libel (2002, 2005, 2013, 2016 Bar) Q: A

was nominated Secretary of a Department in the Executive Branch of the
government. His nomination was thereafter submitted to the Commission
on Appointments for confirmation. While the Commission was considering
the nomination, a group of concerned citizens caused to be published in
the newspapers a full-page statement objecting to A’s appointment. They
alleged that A was a drug dependent, that he had several mistresses, and
that he was corrupt, having accepted bribes or favors from parties
transacting business in his previous office, and therefore he was unfit for
the position to which he had been nominated. As a result of the publication,
the nomination was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
The official sued the concerned citizens and the newspapers for libel and
damages on account of his non-confirmation. How will you decide the
case? (2002 Bar)

The threat uttered by A, not having been used in the taking of possession
of the land, it is not absorbed in the crime of squatting. When A threatened
X that blood will flow if X touches the land and his palay, he committed the
crime of grave threats by threatening another with the infliction of a wrong
amounting to a crime. Only A is criminally liable for the crime of grave
threats. Arson (1994, 2000 Bar) Q: One early evening, there was a fight
between Eddie Gutierrez and Mario Cortez. Later that evening, at about 11
o’clock, Eddie passed by the house of Mario carrying a plastic bag
containing gasoline, threw the bag at the house of Mario who was inside
the house watching television, and then lit it. The front wall of the house
started blazing and some neighbors yelled and shouted. Forthwith, Mario
poured water on the burning portion of the house. Neighbors also rushed in
to help put the fire under control before any great damage could be inflicted
and before the flames have

UST BAR OPERATIONS

CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

A: I will acquit the concerned citizens and the newspapers involved, from
the crime of libel, because obviously they

30

QUAMTO (1987-2016) made the denunciation out of a moral or social duty

and thus there is absence of malice.

A: The publication is not defamatory because the element of intent to

defame is absent. This is a mere announcement and does not carry any
implication.

Since A was a candidate for a very important public position of a

Department Secretary, his moral, mental, and physical fitness for the public
trust in such position becomes a public concern as the interest of the public
is at stake. It is pursuant to such concern that the denunciation was made;
hence, bereft of malice.

Q: During a seminar workshop attended by government employees from

the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Internal Revenue, A, the speaker, in
the course of his lecture, lamented the fact that a great majority of those
serving in said agencies were utterly dishonest and corrupt.
Q: A is the president of the corporate publisher of the daily tabloid, Bulgar;
B is the managing editor and C is the author/writer. In his column, Direct
Hit, C wrote about X, the head examiner of the BIR-RDO Manila as follows:

The following morning, the whole group of employees in the two bureaus
who attended the seminar, as complainants, filed a criminal complaint
against A for uttering what the group claimed to be defamatory statements
of the lecturer.

“Itong si X ay talagang BUWAYA kaya ang logo ng Lacoste Tshirt niya ay

napaka swapang na buwaya. Ang nickname niya ay si Atty. Buwaya. Ang
PR niya ay 90% sa bayad ng taxpayer at ang para sa RP ay 10% lang.
Kaya ang baba ng collection ng RDO niya. Masyadong magnanakaw si X
at dapat tanggalin itong bundat na bundat na buwaya na ito at napalaki na
ng kurakot.”

In court, A filed a Motion to Quash the Information, reciting fully the above
facts, on the ground that no crime was committed. If you were the judge,
how would you resolve the motion? (2003 Bar) A: I would grant the Motion
to Quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
since there is no definite person or persons dishonored.

A, B and C were charged with libel before the RTC of Manila. The three (3)
defendants argued that the article is within the ambit of qualified privileged
communication; that there is no malice in law and in fact; and that
defamatory comments on the acts of public officials which are related to the
discharge of their official duties do not constitute libel.

The crime of libel or slander is a crime against honor such that the person/s
dishonored must be identifiable even by innuendoes. Otherwise, the crime
against honor is not committed. Moreover, A was not making a malicious
imputation, but merely stating an opinion; he was delivering a lecture with
no malice at all during a seminar workshop. Malice being inherently absent
in the utterance, the statement is not actionable as defamatory.

Was the crime of libel committed? If so, are A, B and C all liable for the
crime? Explain. (2016 Bar) A: Yes, the crime of libel is committed. Fair
comment on acts of public officers related to the discharge of their duties is
a qualified privileged communication, hence, the accused can still be held
liable for libel if actual malice is shown. In fair comment, actual malice can
be established by showing that comment was made with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
(Guingguing v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128959,
September 30, 2005) Journalists bear the burden of writing responsibly
when practicing their profession, even when writing about public figures or
matters of public interest. The report made by C describing a lawyer in the
Bureau of Customs as corrupt cannot be considered as “fair” and “true”
since he did not do research before making his allegations, and it has been
shown that these allegations were baseless. The articles are not “fair and
true reports,” but merely wild accusations. He has written and published the
subject articles with reckless disregard of whether the same were false or
not. (Erwin Tulfo v. People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008)

Slander Q: Lando and Marco are candidates in the local elections. In his
speeches, Lando attacked his opponent Marco alleging that he is the son
of Nanding, a robber and a thief who amassed his wealth through shady
deals. May Marco file a case against Lando for grave oral defamation?
State your reasons. (1990 Bar) A: Marco cannot file a case for grave oral
defamation. If at all, he may file a case for light slander. In the case of
People v. Laroga (40 OG 123), it was held that defamation in a political
meeting when feelings are running high and people could not think clearly
only amount to light slander. Moreover, his statements against Marco
pertains to a person who is running for public office wherein a wider latitude
is given . PART III. QUASI-OFFENSES

Defamation (1988, 1993, 2003 Bar) Q: Romeo Cunanan, publisher of the

Baguio Daily, was sued by Pedro Aguas for libel for the public publication of
his picture with the notice that: “This is to inform the public that Mr. Pedro
Aguas whose picture appears above has ceased to be connected with the
Sincere Insurance Company as underwriter as of December 31, 1987. Any
transaction entered into by him after the said date will not be honored.

ARTICLE 365 – CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (2001, 2007 BAR) Q: Eddie

brought his son Randy to a local faith healer known as “Mother Himala”. He
was diagnosed by the faithhealer as being possessed by an evil spirit.
Eddie thereupon authorized the conduct of a “treatment” calculated to drive
the “spirit” from the boy’s body. Unfortunately, the procedure conducted
resulted in the boy’s death.

Is the publication defamatory? Explain briefly. (1988 Bar)

The faithhealer and three others who were part of the healing ritual were
charged with murder and convicted

31

CRIMINAL LAW by the lower court. If you were the appellate court Justice,
would you sustain the conviction upon appeal? Explain your answer. (2007
Bar)

(2) The possible defenses Lt. Col. Agaton may interpose are –

A: No. The conviction for murder should not be sustained because there is
no indication that the accused acted with intent to kill Randy. On the
contrary, the facts show that the accused acted to “treat” the victim in a way
of driving the evil spirit which was believed to have “possessed” him.
Considering that the proximate cause of the victim’s death was the healing
ritual done by the accused which is not recognized in law as legitimate, the
accused are criminally liable for the victim’s death. As they may have
overdone the “healing ritual” they conducted on the victim’s body, causing
the latter’s death, although the intent to kill was absent, the accused may
be held criminally liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide.

(a) That the child is related to him by affinity, or by consanguinity within the
fourth degree or by a bond recognized in law, or local customs and
traditions; or (b) That he was only acting in pursuance of a moral, social or
legal duty [Sec. 10 (b), Art. VI, R.A. 7610] Q: Arnold, 25 years of age, was
sitting on a bench in Luneta Park, watching the statue of Jose Rizal, when,
without his permission, Leilani, 17 years of age, sat beside him and asked
for financial assistance, allegedly for payment of her tuition fee, in
exchange for sex. While they were conversing, police operatives arrested
and charged him with violation of Section 10 of RA 7610 (Special
Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act), accusing him of having in his company a minor, who is not related to
him, in a public place. It was established that Arnold was not in the
performance of a social, moral and legal duty at that time. Is Arnold libale
for the charge? Explain. (2016 Bar)

PART IV. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

A: No, Arnold is not liable. Under Section 10 of RA No. 7610, any person
who shall keep or have in his company a minor, twelve (12) years or under
or who in ten (10) years or more his junior in any public or private place,
hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or
massage parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort or similar places is liable
for child abuse.

ANTI-CHILD ABUSE LAW (R.A. NO. 7610, AS AMENDED) (1993, 2004

Bar) Q: Sometime in December 1992, retired Lt. Col. Agaton, celebrating
the first year of his compulsory retirement from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, had in his company a fourteen (14) year-old girl whose parents
were killed by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and being totally orphaned has
been living or fending for herself in the streets in Manila. They were alone
in one room in a beach resort and stayed there for two (2) nights. No
sexual intercourse took place between them. Before they parted, retired Lt.
Col. Agaton gave the girl P1, 000.00 for her services. She gladly accepted
it.

Arnold is not liable for the charge. To be held liable under Section 10(b) of
RA No. 7610, it is indispensable that the child in the company of the
offender must be 12 years or under or who in 10 years or more his junior in
a public place. In this case, Leilani is 17 years of age, and only 8 years
younger than Arnold. Moreover, Leilani sat beside Arnold without his
permission, hence, he is not in the company if a child in a public place.

(1) What crime may the retired colonel be charged with, if any? Discuss. (2)
What possible defenses can he interpose? Explain. (1993 Bar)
Lastly, applying the episdem generis principle, Arnold is not liable for child
abuse because Luneta is not a place similar to hotel, motel, beer joint,
discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or massage parlor, beach
and/or other tourist resort.

A:

ANTI-FENCING LAW (P.D 1612) (1987, 1990, 1992, 1995, 1996, 2005,
2010, 2013 Bar)

(1) The retired colonel may be charged with child abuse, the violation of
Rep. Act. 7610, a law providing special protection against child abuse,
exploitation and discrimination.

Q: Pedro, a municipal treasurer, received form the Provincial Treasurer of

the Province five (5) brand new typewriters for use in the municipal
treasurer’s office. Each typewriter is valued at P10, 000.00. Since Pedro
needed money for the hospitalization of his sick son, he sold four (4) of the
typewriters to his friend, Rodolfo, a general merchant in San Isidro for P2,
000.00 each. Rodolfo, as a general merchant knew that one typewriter
could easily be between P6, 000.00 to P10, 000.00. For this reason, he
readily agreed to buy the typewriters. Rodolfo then resold the typewriters at
P6, 000.00 thus making a profit of P16, 000.00. Two months after the
transaction, Pedro was audited and the investigation as to his
accountabilities led to the discovery that Rodolfo bought the four (4)
typewriters from Pedro. Is Rodolfo liable for violation of the AntiFencing
Law? (1987 Bar)

One of the acts of child abuse or exploitation penalized under Article VI of

RA 7610 is that of keeping company of a minor who is ten (10) years or
younger than the offender in a hotel, motel, beer house, disco joint, pension
house, cabaret, sauna or massage parlor, beach resort, and similar places.
Considering that Lt. Col Agaton is a retiree pursuant to a compulsory
retirement, while the child he kept company within a private room in the
beach resort is only 14 years old, there must be an age difference of more
than 10 years between them. This fact plus the circumstance that Lt. Col.
Agaton stayed with the child, a girl in one room at such beach resort for two
nights and thereafter he gave her P1,000.00 “for her services”, constitutes
the very evil punished, among other acts, in said law. UST BAR
OPERATIONS

32

QUAMTO (1987-2016) A: Rodolfo is not liable for violation of the Anti-

Fencing Law as this law refers only to the buy and sell of articles of value
which are the proceeds of robbery and theft. Rodolfo is liable as an
accessory to the crime of malversation as he purchased the typewriters for
P2, 000 each only although he knew it could easily be sold for P6, 000 to
P10, 000. Therefore, he profited or assisted the principal to profit from the
effects or proceeds of the commission of the crime.

(b) Is Ofelia liable under the Anti-Fencing Law? Explain. (2016 Bar) A: (a)
Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose
of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item,
object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to
have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
(Section 2, PD 1612) (b) No. Ofelia is not liable under the Anti-Fencing
Law. While under the said law mere possession of any good, article, item,
object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing, such evidence when
sufficiently overturned constitutes a defense.

Q: (1) What are the elements of fencing? (2) What is the difference
between a fence and an accessory to theft or robbery? Explain. (3) Is there
any similarity between them? (1995 Bar) A: (1) The elements of fencing
are: (a) A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (b) Accused, who
is not a principal or accomplice in the crime, buys, receives, possesses,
keeps, acquires, conceals or disposes or buys and sells or in any manner
deals in any article, item, object or anything of value , which has been
derived from the proceeds of said crime; (c) The accused knows or should
have known that said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (d) There is,
on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
In this case, Ofelia’s defense that she merely acquired the jewelries
through a legitimate transaction is sufficient. Further, there is no other
circumstance as regards the jewelries which would indicate to Ofelia, an
innocent purchaser, that the jewelries were the subject of theft. There was
even a receipt produced by Ofelia for the transaction. ANTI-GRAFT AND
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (R.A. NO. 3019, AS AMENDED) (1990,1991,
2001, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2014, 2016 Bar) Q:

(2) One difference between a fence and accessory to theft or robbery is the
penalty involved – a fence is punished as a principal under PD No. 1612
and the penalty is higher, whereas an accessory to robbery or theft under
the RPC is punished two degrees lower than the principal, unless he
bought or profited from the proceeds of theft or robbery arising from
robbery in Philippine highways under PD 532 where he is punished as an
accomplice, hence the penalty is one degree lower.

a.

Melda who is the private secretary of Judge Tolits Naya, was persuaded by
a litigant, Jumbo, to have his case calendared as early as possible for a
consideration of P500.00. May she be held criminally liable for this
accommodation? Explain your answer. b. What will be the criminal liability
of Melda if she volunteered to persuade Judge Tolits Naya to rule in
Jumbo’s favor without asking any consideration? Explain your answer.
(1990 Bar)

Also, fencing is a malum prohibitum and therefore there is no need to prove

criminal intent of the accused; this is not so in violations of the RPC.

A: a.

(3) There is similarity in the sense that all the acts of one who is an
accessory to the crimes of robbery or theft are included in the acts defined
as fencing. In fact, the accessory in the crimes of robbery or theft could be
prosecuted as such under the RPC or as a fence under PD 1612 (Dizon-
Pamintuan v. People, 234 SCRA 63)
The answer would depend or be qualified by the implication of the phrase
“to have his case calendared as early as possible”. If the phrase is
interrupted as an unjust act and in violation of the rule to give priority to the
older cases, then she would be liable under direct bribery for an act which
does not constitute a crime but is unjust. He may also be held liable under
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practicess Act, as
amended: “xxx giving any private party any unwarranted benefits”. If you
interpret the phrase as a non-violation of the rules and regulations, then
she can only be held liable for direct bribery.

Q: Ofelia engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry, was charged with
violation of PD 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, for having
been found in possession of recently stolen jewelry valued at P100, 000.00
at her jewelry shop. Her defense is that she merely bought the same from
Antonia and produced a receipt covering the sale. She presented other
receipts given to her by Antonia representing previous transactions.
Convicted of the charge, Ofelia appealed, arguing that her acquisition of
the jewelries resulted from a legal transaction and that the prosecution
failed to prove that she knew or should have known that the pieces of
jewelry which she bought from Antonia were proceeds of the crime of theft.

b.

(a) What is a “fence” under PD 1612?

33

Melda is not criminally liable because the actor volunteering to persuade is

not a criminal act. It is the act of persuading that is considered a criminal
act. The act does not fall under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code on
Direct Bribery nor does it fall under Article 211 of the RPC on Indirect
Bribery. Neither does it fall under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Section 3(a) of RA 3019 refers to acts of persuading another public official
to violate rules and regulations.

CRIMINAL LAW Q: Malo, a clerk of court of a trial court, promised the

accused in a drug case pending before the court, that he would convince
the judge to acquit him for a consideration of P5 million. The accused
agreed and delivered the money through his lawyer to the clerk of court.

(Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 79543, October 16, 1996). (B)

Under Section 2 of PD 532, highway robbery is defined as “the seizure of
any person for ransom, extortion, or other unlawful purposes, or the taking
away of the property of another by means of violence against or
intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means,
committed by any person on any Philippines highway.” Hence, the
elements of highway robbery are:

The judge, not knowing of the deal, proceeded to rule on the evidence and
convicted the accused. Malo was charged with violation of Section 3 (b),
RA 3019 which prohibits a public officer from directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit
wherein the public officer, in his official capacity, has to intervene under the
law. He was later charged also with indirect bribery under the RPC. Malo
claims he can no longer be charged under the RPC for the same act under
RA 3019. Is he correct? (2014 Bar)

(a) (b) (c) (d)

To obtain a conviction for highway robbery, the prosecution must prove that
the accused were organized for the purpose of committing robbery
indiscriminately. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only
robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants
(See People v. Mendoza, GR No. 104461, February 23, 1996).

A: No. One may be charged with violation of RA No. 3019 in addition to a

felony under the RPC for the same delictual act, either concurrently or
subsequent to being charged with a felony under the RPC. This is very
clear from Section 3 of RA 3019. Also, RA 3019 is a special law, the
elements of the crime is not the same as those punished under the RPC.

Q: Distinguish Highway Robbery under PD No. 532 from Robbery

committed on a highway. (2000 Bar)
ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY (P.D. NO. 532) (2000,
2001, 2006, 2008, 2012 Bar)

A: Highway Robbery under PPD 532 differs from ordinary Robbery

committed on a highway in these respects:

Q: A postal van containing mail matter, including checks and treasury

warrants, was hijacked along a national highway by ten (10) men, two of
whom, were armed. They used force, violence and intimidation against the
three postal employees who were occupants of the van, resulting in the
unlawful taking and aspiration of the entire van and its contents.

(1) In Highway Robbery under PD 532, the robbery is committed

indiscriminately against persons who commute in such highways,
regardless of the potentiality they offer; while in ordinary Robbery
committed on a highway, the robbery is committed only against
predetermined victims;

(A) If you were the public prosecutor, would you charge the ten (10) men
who hijacked the postal van with violation of Presidential Decree No. 532,
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and AntiHighway Robbery Law of
1974? Explain your answer. (B) If you were the defense counsel, what are
the elements of the crime of highway robbery that the prosecution should
prove to sustain a conviction? (2012 Bar) A:

(2) It is Highway Robbery under PD 532, when the offender is a brigand or

one who roams in public highways and carries out his robbery in public
highways as venue, whenever the opportunity to do so arises. It is ordinary
Robbery under the RPC when the commission thereof in a public highway
is only incidental and the offender is not a brigand; and (3) In Highway
Robbery under PD 532, there is frequency in the commission of the
robbery in public highways and against persons traveling thereat; whereas
ordinary robbery in public highways is only occasional against a
predetermined victim, without frequency in public highways.

(A) No. I would not charge the 10 men with the crime of highway robbery.
The mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would
not be the determinant for the application of PD No. 532. If a motor vehicle,
either stationary or moving on a highway is forcibly taken at a gunpoint by
the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, the location of the
vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking would not necessarily put the
offense within the ambit of PD 532.

ANTI-PLUNDER ACT (R.A. NO. 7080, AS AMENDED) (1993, 2014) Q:

Through kickbacks, percentages or commissions and other fraudulent
schemes/conveyances and taking advantage of his position, Andy, a former
mayor of a suburban town, acquired assets amounting to P10 billion which
is grossly disproportionate to his lawful income. Due to his influence and
connections and despite knowledge by the authorities of his ill-gotten
wealth, he was charged with the crime of plunder only after twenty (20)
years from his defeat in the last elections he participated in.

In this case, the crime committed is violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of

1972 (People v. Punk, GR No. 97471, February 17, 1993). Moreover, there
is no showing that the 10 men were a band of outlaws organized for the
purpose of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another. What was
shown is one isolated hijacking of a postal van. It was not stated in the
facts given that the 10 men previously attempted at similar robberies by
them to establish the “indiscriminate” commission thereof

UST BAR OPERATIONS

Intent to gain; Unlawful taking of property of another; Violence against or

intimidation of any person; Committed on a Philippine highway.

(1) May Andy still be held criminally liable? Why? (2) Can the State still
recover the properties and assets that he illegally acquired, the bulk of
which is in the name of his wife and children? Reason out. (1993 Bar)

34

QUAMTO (1987-2016) A:
notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the RPC.”

(1) Andy will not be criminally liable because Section 6 of RA 7080 provides
that the crime punishable under this Act shall prescribe in twenty years and
the problem asked whether Andy can still be charged with the crime of
plunder after 20 years. (2) Yes, because Section 6 provides that recovery of
properties unlawfully acquired by public officers from them or their
nominees or transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches or
estoppel.

As a rule, once the unlawful aggression ceased, stabbing the victim further
is not self-defense. However, even if the element of unlawful aggression in
self-defense is lacking, Ms. A, who is suffering for battered woman
syndrome, will not incur criminal and civil liability. Q: Romeo and Julia have
been married for twelve (12) years and had two (2) children. The first few
years of their marriage went along smoothly. However, on the fifth year
onwards, they would often quarrel when Romeo comes home drunk. The
quarrels became increasingly violent, marked by quiet periods when Julia
would leave the conjugal dwelling. During the times of quiet, Romeo would
court Julia with flowers and chocolates and convince her to return home,
telling her that he could not live without her; or Romeo would ask Julia to
forgive him, which she did, believing that if she humbled herself, Romeo
would change. After a month of marital bliss, Romeo would return to his
drinking habit and the quarrel would start again, verbally at first, until it
would escalate to physical violence.

ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN (R.A. NO.

9262) Battered Woman Syndrome (2010, 2014, 2015 Bar) Q: Define
"Battered Woman Syndrome." What are the three phases of the "Battered
Woman Syndrome"? Would the defense prosper despite the absence of
any of the elements for justifying circumstances of selfdefense under the
Revised Penal Code? Explain. (2010 Bar) A: “Battered Woman Syndrome”
refers to a scientifically define pattern of psychological and behavioural
symptoms found in woman living in battering relationships as a result of
cumulative abuse (Sec. 3[d], R.A. 9262). The three (3) phases of the BWS
are: (1) tension- building phase; (2) acute battering incident; and (3)
tranquil, loving, or non-violent phase (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981,
January 15, 2004).

One night, Romeo came home drunk and went straight to bed. Fearing the
onset of another violent fight, Julia stabbed Romeo, while he was asleep. A
week later, their neighbors discovered Romeo’s rotting corpse on the
marital bed. Julia and the children were nowhere to be found. Julia was
charged with parricide. She asserted “battered woman syndrome” as her
defense.

Yes, the defense will prosper. Sec. 26 of R.A. 9262 provides that victim-
survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman
syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements of justifying circumstances of selfdefense
under the RPC.

(a) Explain the cycle of violence. (b) Is Julia’s “battered woman syndrome”
defense meritorious? Explain. (2016 Bar) A:

Q: Ms. A had been married to Mr. B for 10 years. Since their marriage, Mr.
B had been jobless and a drunkard, preferring to stay with his “barkadas”
until the wee hours of the morning. Ms. A was the breadwinner and
attended to the needs of their three (3) growing children. Many times, when
Mr. B was drunk, he would beat Ms. A and their three children, and shout
invectives against them. In fact, in one of the beating incidents, Ms. A
suffered a deep stab wound on her tummy that required a prolonged stay in
the hospital. Due to the beatings and verbal abuses committed against her,
she consulted a psychologist several times, as she was slowly beginning to
lose her mind. One night, when Mr. B arrived dead drunk, he suddenly
stabbed Ms. A several times while shouting invectives against her.

(a) The Battered Woman Syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle

of violence,” which has three phases: (1) tension-building phase; (2) the
acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or at least, nonviolent)
phase. During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs – it could
be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The
woman tries to pacify the batterer through a kind, nurturing behavior; or by
simply staying out of his way. The acute battering incident is characterized
by brutality, destructiveness and sometimes, death. The battered woman
deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase,
she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. The
final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident
ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief.

Defending herself from the attack, Ms. A grappled for the possession of a
knife and she succeeded. She then stabbed Mr. B several times which
caused his instantaneous death. Medico-Legal Report showed that the
husband suffered three (3) stabbed wounds. Can Ms. A validly put up a
defense? Explain. (2014 Bar) A: Yes. Ms. A can put up the defense of
battered woman syndrome. It appears that she is suffering from physical
and psychological or emotional distress resulting from cumulative abuse by
her husband.

(b) Yes. Under Section 3(c) of RA No. 9262, “Battered Woman Syndrome”
refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral
symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of
“cumulative abuse”. Under Section 3(b), “Battery” refers to an act of
inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting in physical
and psychological or emotional distress.

Under Section 26 of RA 9262, “victim survivors who are found by the courts
to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal
and civil liability

In sum, the defense of Battered Woman Syndrome can be invoked if the

woman in marital relationship with the victim is subjected to cumulative
abuse or battery

35

CRIMINAL LAW involving the infliction of physical harm resulting to the

physical and psychological or emotional distress. Cumulative means
resulting from successive addition. In sum, there must be “at least two
battering episodes” between the accused and her intimate partner and
such final episode produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of
an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed
to use force in order to save her life. (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981,
January 15, 2004)

A: No. As long as the checks issued were issued to apply on account or for
value, and was dishonored upon presentation for payment to the drawee
bank for lack of insufficient funds on their due date, such act falls within the
ambit of B.P. Blg. 22. Said law expressly punishes any person who may
have insufficient funds in the drawee bank within ninety (90) days from the
date appearing thereon.

In this case, because of the battering episodes, Julia feared the onset of
another violent fight and honestly believed the need to defend herself even
if Romeo had not commenced an unlawful aggression. Even in the
absence of unlawful aggression, however, Battered Woman Syndrome is a
defense. Under Section 27 of RA No. 9262, Battered Woman Syndrome is
a defense notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code such as
unlawful aggression. (Section 26, RA No. 9262)

Q: B imitated the signature of A, registered owner of a lot, in special power

of attorney naming him (B) as the attorney-in-fact of A. On February 13,
1964, B mortgaged the lot to a bank using the special power of attorney to
obtain a loan of P8, 500. On the same day, both the special power of
attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of
Deeds.

Estafa (1989, 1998, 1990, 1991, 2005, 2010, 2013, 2014 Bar)

Because of B’s failure to pay, the bank foreclosed the mortgage and the lot
was sold to X in whose name a new title was issued. In March 1974, A
discovered that the property was already registered in the name of X
because an ejectment case filed against him by X.

BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. 22) (1987, 1990, 1991, 1995, 1996, 2009,
2010, 2013 Bar)

(a) If you were the lawyer of A, with what crime or crimes would you charge
B? Explain. (b) If you were the counsel of B, what would be your defense?
Discuss. (1993 Bar)

Q: As security for a loan of P50, 000.00 he obtained from his friend, Joseph
David, payable not later than 17 April 1990, Roger Vasquez drew and
delivered to Joseph a check on due date. The check was dishonored on
the ground of insufficiency of funds. After appropriate preliminary
investigation, the City Prosecutor filed against Roger an Information for
violation of B.P. Blg. No. 22 alleging therein, inter alia, that Roger “with
intent to defraud, by means of deceit, knowing fully well that he had no
funds and/or sufficient funds in the bank, for value received, did then and
there, willfully and feloniously, issue the aforesaid check” but “when the
said check was presented for encashment, said check was dishonored and
returned” on the ground of insufficiency of funds.

A: (a) The crime committed is estafa thru falsification of public document.

(b) My defense will be prescription because the crime was committed in
1964 and almost twenty nine years had already elapsed since then. xxx Q:
On March 31, 1995, Orpheus Financing Corp. received from Maricar the
sum of P500, 000 as money market placement for sixty days at fifteen (15)
percent interest, and the President of said Corp. issued a check covering
the amount including the interest due thereon, postdated May 30, 1995. On
the maturity date, however, Orpheus Financing Corp. failed to deliver back
Maricar's money placement with the corresponding interest earned,
notwithstanding repeated demands upon said Corporation to comply with
its commitment. Did the President of Orpheus Financing Corporation incur
any criminal liability for estafa for reason of the non-payment of the money
market placement? Explain. (1996 Bar)

In a decision rendered thereafter, the trial judge ruled that Roger cannot be
convicted of the offense charged because the information failed to allege
that he knew, when he issued the check, that he would have insufficient
funds for its payment in full upon its presentment to the drawee bank. Is the
judge correct? (1991 Bar) A: No. The allegation satisfies the legal definition
of the offense. The maker’s knowledge of insufficiency of his funds is
legally presumed from the dishonor of the check for lack of funds (People v.
Lagui, 171 SCRA 305).

A: No. The President of the financing corporation does not incur criminal
liability for estafa because a money market transaction partakes of the
nature of a loan, such that nonpayment thereof would not give rise to estafa
through misappropriation or conversion. In money market placement, there
is transfer of ownership of the money to be invested and therefore the
liability for its return is civil in nature. Q: A sold a washing machine to B on
credit with the understanding that B could return the appliance within two
weeks if after testing the same, B decided not to buy it. Two weeks lapsed
without B returning the appliance. A found out that B had sold the washing
machine to a third party. Is B liable for estafa? Why? (2002 Bar)

Q: The accused was convicted under BP Blg. 22 for having issued several
checks which were dishonored by the drawee bank on their due date
because the accused closed her account after the issuance of checks. On
appeal, she argued that she could not be convicted under B.P. Blg. 22 by
reason of the closing of her account because said law applies solely to
checks dishonored by reason of insufficiency of funds and that at the time
she issued the checks concerned, she had adequate funds in the bank.
While she admits that she may be held liable for estafa under Article 215 of
the Revised Penal Code, she cannot however be found guilty of having
violated B.P. Blg. 22. Is her contention correct? Explain. (1996 Bar)

UST BAR OPERATIONS

A: No. B is not liable for estafa because he is not just an entrustee of the
washing machine which he sold; he is the owner thereof by virtue of the
sale of the washing machine to him. The sale being on credit, B as buyer is
only liable for

36

QUAMTO (1987-2016) the unpaid price of the washing machine; his

obligation is only a civil obligation. There is no felonious misappropriation
that could constitute estafa.

acquittal since his acquittal is premised on the finding that his liability is
only civil in nature. (De Guzman v. Alva, 51 OG 1311).

Q: A and B agreed to meet at the latter's house to discuss B's financial

problems. On his way, one of A's car tires blew up. Before A left following
the meeting, he asked B to lend him money to buy a new spare tire. B had
temporarily exhausted his bank deposits, leaving a zero balance.
Anticipating, however, a replenishment of his account soon, B issued A a
postdated check with which A negotiated for a new tire. When presented,
the check bounced for lack of funds. The tire company filed a criminal case
against A and B. What would be the criminal liability, if any, of each of the
two accused? Explain. (2003 Bar)

COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT (R.A. 9165) (1990, 1992,

1995, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2015, 2016 Bar)
Q: (1) Distinguish entrapment from instigation. Discuss fully. (1990, 1995,
2003, 2015 Bar) (2) Suspecting that Juan was a drug pusher, SPO2
Mercado, leader of the Narcom team, gave Juan a P100-bill and asked him
to buy some marijuana cigarettes. Desirous of pleasing SPO2 Mercado,
Juan went inside the shopping mall while the officer waited at the corner of
mall. After 15 minutes, Juan returned with ten sticks of marijuana cigarettes
which he gave to SPO2 Mercado who thereupon placed Juan under arrest
and charged him with violation of The Dangerous Drugs Law by selling
marijuana cigarettes. Is Juan guilty of any offense punishable under The
Dangerous Drugs Act? Discuss fully. (1995 Bar)

A: A who negotiated the unfunded check of B in buying a new tire for his
car may only be prosecuted for estafa if he was aware at the time of such
negotiation that the check has no sufficient funds in the drawee bank;
otherwise, he is not criminally liable. B who accommodated A with his
check may nevertheless be prosecuted under B.P. 22 for having issued the
check, knowing at the time of issuance that it has no funds in the bank and
that A will negotiate it to buy a new tire, i.e., for value. B may not be
prosecuted for estafa because the facts indicate that he is not actuated by
intent to defraud in issuing the check which A negotiated. Obviously, B
issued the postdated check only to help A; criminal intent or dolo is absent.

A: (1) As to the criminal design, in entrapment, it originates from and is

already in the mind of the lawbreaker even before entrapment. In
instigation, the idea and design to bring about the commission of the crime
originated and developed in the mind of the law enforcers;

Q: DD was engaged in the warehouse business. Sometime in November

2004, he was in dire need of money. He, thus, sold merchandise deposited
in his warehouse to VR for P500, 000.00. DD was charged with theft, as
principal, while VR as accessory. The court convicted DD of theft but
acquitted VR on the ground that he purchased the merchandise in good
faith. However, the court ordered VR to return the merchandise to the
owner thereof and ordered DD to refund the P500, 000.00 to VR. DD
moved for the reconsideration of the decision insisting that he should be
acquitted of theft because being the depositary, he had juridical possession
of the merchandise. VR also moved for the reconsideration of the decision
insisting that since he was acquitted of the crime charged, and that he
purchased the merchandise in good faith, he is not obligated to return the
merchandise to its owner. Rule on the motions with reasons. (2005 Bar) A:
The motion for reconsideration of DD should be denied.

In entrapment, the law enforcers resort to ways and means for the purpose
of capturing the lawbreaker in flagrante delicto. In instigation, the law
enforcers induce, lure, or incite a person who is not minded to commit a
crime and would not otherwise commit it, into committing the crime; and
Entrapment will not bar the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker
while instigation absolves the accused from criminal liability (People v.
Dante Marcos, 185 SCRA 154, 1990). (2) Juan cannot be charged of any
offense punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Although Juan is a
suspected drug pusher, he cannot be charged on the basis of a mere
suspicion. By providing the money with which to buy marijuana cigarettes,
SPO2 Mercado practically induced and prodded Juan to commit the
offense of illegal possession of marijuana. Set against the facts instigation
is a valid defense available to Juan.

In this case, there being no proof that title to the goods was transferred to
DD, only physical possession is presumed transferred to and obtained by
DD. (U.S. v. De Vera, G.R. No. L-16961, September 19, 1921) The
principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken
while in estafa the accused received the property and converts it to his own
use or benefit. However, there maybe theft even if the accused has
possession of the property, if he was entrusted only with the material or
physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation
of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the
thing, his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa
(Santos v. People, G.R. No. 77429, January 29, 1990).

Q: Pat. Buensuceso, posing as a buyer, approached Ronnie, a suspected

drug pusher, and offered to buy P300.00 worth of shabu. Ronnie then left,
came back five minutes later and handed the aluminum foil containing the
shabu to him. Before Pat. Buensuceso was able to deliver the marked
money to Ronnie, the latter spotted a policeman at a distance, whom
Ronnie knew to be connected with the Narcotics Command of the Police.
Upon seeing the latter, Ronnie ran away but was arrested thirty minutes
later by other policemen who pursued him. Under the circumstances, would
you consider the crime of sale of a prohibited drug already consummated?
(1996 Bar)

While VR is acquitted of theft, such acquittal does not of itself negate civil
liability of VR to return the property stolen by DD. Civil liability on the part of
VR exists despite

A: Yes. The sale of prohibited drug is already consummated although the

marked money was not yet delivered. When Ronnie handed the aluminum
foil containing the shabu to

37

CRIMINAL LAW Pat. Buensuceso pursuant to their agreed sale, the crime
was consummated. Payment of the consideration is not an element of
requisite of the crime. If ever, the marked money is only evidentiary to
strengthen the case of the prosecution.
A: Chief Inspector Samuel Gamboa and PO3 Pepito Lorbes incur criminal
liability under Art. 11, Sec. 4 last par., RA No. 9165, otherwise known as the
“Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”. They acted as
“protector/coddler” to the unlawful bringing into the Philippines of the
dangerous drugs. A “protector/coddler” refers to any person who uses his
power or position in, inter alia, facilitating the escape of any person whom
he knows or believes, has violated the Dangerous Drugs Law, in order to
prevent the arrest, prosecution and conviction of the violator.

The absence of the marked money will not create a hiatus in the
prosecution’s evidence as long as the sale of the dangerous drugs is
adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented
before the court. There was a perfected contract of sale of the drug (People
v. Ong Co, 245 SCRA 733)

The two police officers are criminally liable for violation of Sec. 27. RA 9165
of the same law for misappropriation and failure to account for the
confiscated or seized dangerous drugs.

Q: Obie Juan is suspected to have in his possession an unspecified

amount of methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu”. An entrapment
operation was conducted by police officers, resulting in his arrest following
the discovery of 100 grams of the said dangerous drug in his possession.
He was subsequently charged with two crimes: Violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165 for the possession of “shabu” and violation of Section
15, Art. II of RA 9165 for the use of marijuana.

On the other hand, Dante Ong is criminally liable for the illegal importation
or bringing into the Philippines of the dangerous drugs (Art. 11, Sec. 4, RA
9165). Q: Tuburcio asked Anastacio to join their group for a “session”.
Thinking that it was for a mahjong session, Anastacio agreed. Upon
reaching Tiburcio’s house, Anastacio discovered that it was actually a
shabu session. At that precise time, the place was raided by the police, and
Anastacio was among those arrested.

(a) Are the charges proper? Explain. (b) So as not to be sentenced to

death, Obie Juan offers to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Can he do so?
Why? (1998, 2004, 2005 Bar)

What crime can Anastacio be charged with, if any? Explain. (2007 Bar)

A: (a) Proper. The mere possession of such drug is punishable, but the
charge of use of marijuana is not proper as Section 15 of R.A. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) expressly excludes
penalties for “use” of dangerous drugs when the person tested “is also
found to have in possession such quantity of any dangerous drug” provided
for in Section 11 of such Act. (b) No. Because Section 23 of R.A. 9165
expressly provides that “Any person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the
provision on plea-bargaining.” For this reason, Obie Juan cannot be
allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense.

A: Anastacio may not be charged of any crime. Sec. 7 of RA 9165 on the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs of 2002 punishes employees and
visitors of a den, dive or resort where dangerous drugs are used in any
form. But for a visitor of such place to commit the crime, it is a requisite that
he is “aware of the nature of the place as such and shall knowingly visit the
same.” These requisites are absent in the facts given. Q: Following his
arrest after a valid buy-bust operation, Tommy was convicted of violation of
Section 5, Republic Act 9165. On appeal, Tommy questioned the
admissibility of the evidence because the police officers who conducted the
buy-bust operation failed to observe the requisite "chain of custody" of the
evidence confiscated and/or seized from him.

Q: After receiving a reliable information that Dante Ong, a notorious drug

smuggler, was arriving on PAL Flight No. PR181, PNP Chief Inspector
Samuel Gamboa formed a group of anti-drug agents. When Ong arrived at
the airport, the group arrested him and seized his attaché case. Upon
inspection the Immigration holding area, the attaché case yielded 5 plastic
bags of heroin weighing 500 grams. Chief Inspector Gamboa took the
attaché case and boarded him in an unmarked car driven by PO3 Pepito
Lorbes. On the way to Camp Crame and upon nearing White Plains corner
Edsa, Chief Inspector Gamboa ordered PO3 Lorbes to stop the car. They
brought out the drugs from the case in the trunk to and got 3 plastic sacks
of heroin. They then told Ong to alight from the car. Ong left with the 2
remaining plastic sacks of heroin. Chief Inspector Gamboa advised him to
keep silent and go home which the latter did. Unknown to them, an NBI
team of agents had been following them and witnessed the transaction.
They arrested Chief Inspector Gamboa and PO3 Lorbes. Meanwhile,
another NBI team followed Ong and likewise arrested him. All of them were
later charged.

(a) What is the "chain of custody" requirement in drug offenses? What is its
rationale? (2009, 2016 Bar) (b) What is the effect of failure to observe the
requirement? (2009 Bar) A: “Chain of custody” requirement in drug
offenses refers to the duly recorded, authorized movement and custody of
seized dangerous drugs, controlled chemicals, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, and laboratory equipment of dangerous drugs from the time of
confiscation/seizure thereof from the offender, to its turn-over and receipt in
the forensic laboratory for examination, to its safekeeping and eventual
violation, and for destruction (Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1
Series of 2001) Its rationale is to preserve the authenticity of the corpus
delicti or body of the crime by rendering it improbable that the original item
seized/ confiscated in the violation has been exchanged or substituted with
another or tampered with or contaminated. It is a method of authenticating
the evidence as would support a finding beyond reasonable doubt that the
matter is what the prosecution claims to be. Failure to observe the “chain of
custody” requirement

What are their respective criminal liabilities? (2006 Bar) UST BAR
OPERATIONS

38

QUAMTO (1987-2016) renders the evidence questionable, not trustworthy

and insufficient to prove the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt.

deemed absorbed in a separate charge of rebellion filed against him.

Decide the issue. (b) Suppose Ka Jacinto, using one of the unlicensed
firearms, shot and killed his neighbor in an altercation. May the charge of
murder and illegal possession of firearms be deemed absorbed in the
separate charge of rebellion filed against him? Resolve the matter with
reasons. (1990) Bar

Hence, Tommy would be acquitted on reasonable doubt. Q: The Philippine

Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) had intelligence reports about the drug
pushing activities of Rado, but could not arrest him for lack of concrete
evidence. SP03 Relio, a PDEA team leader, approached Emilo and
requested him to act as poseurbuyer of shabu and transact with Rado.
Emilo refused, saying that he had completely been rehabilitated and did not
want to have anything to do with drugs anymore. But he was prevailed
upon to help when SP03 Relio explained that only he could help capture
Rado because he used to be his customer. SP03 Relio then gave Emilo the
marked money to be used in buying shabu from Rado. The operation
proceeded. After Emilo handed the marked money to Rado in exchange for
the sachets of shabu weighing 50 grams, and upon receiving the pre-
arranged signal from Ernilo, SP03 Relio and his team members barged in
and arrested Rado and Ernilo, who were both charged with violation of R.A.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.

A: (a) The charge of illegal possession of firearms and explosives is

deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion, such possession being a
necessary means for the perpetration of the latter crime. (Elias v.
Rodriguez, 107 Phil 659) (b) The charges here could not be absorbed in
the separate charge of rebellion as it is clear that the act of murder, coupled
with the possession of an unlicensed firearm, was not in furtherance of the
rebellion. Q: PH killed OJ, his political rival in the election campaign for
Mayor of their town. The Information against PH alleged that he used an
unlicensed firearm in the killing of the victim, and this was proved beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution. The trial court convicted PH of two
crimes: Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms. Is the conviction
correct? Reason briefly. (2004 Bar)

(a) What defense, if any, may Emilo invoke to free himself from criminal
liability? Explain. (b) May Rado adopt as his own Emilo's defense? Explain.
(2015 Bar)
A: No. The conviction of PH for two crimes is not correct. Under the new
law on illegal possession of firearms and explosives, RA 8294, a person
may only be criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm if no other
crime is committed therewith; If a homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, such use shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.

A: (a) Ernilo may invoke Section 33, Art. II of RA 9165 or the

“Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002”. He may have violated Section 11 of
RA 9165 for possession of shabu but he is immune from prosecution and
punishment because of his role as the poseur-buyer in the entrapment
operation. There was virtually instigation. He is exempted from prosecution
or punishment because the information obtained from him by the PDEA
agents, who had no direct and concrete evidence of Rado’s drug-pushing
activities, led to the whereabouts, identity and arrest of Rado. So long as
the information and testimony given are pleaded and proven, Ernilo cannot
be prosecuted for violation of RA 9165. (b) No. First, an entrapment
operation is a valid means of arresting violators of RA 9165. It is an
effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a
crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from
the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the
offense. Second, the immunity does not extend to violators of Section 5 of
RA 9165 or the sale of shabu (sec. 33, RA 9165). Lastly, he was the
offender of the crime and apparently the most guilty of the offense.

PH therefore may only be convicted of murder and the use of an

unlicensed firearm in its commission may only be appreciated as a special
aggravating circumstance, provided that such use is alleged specifically in
the Information for Murder. INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (R.A.
4103, AS AMENDED) (1988, 1989, 1990, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2005,
2007, 2009, 2010, 2013, 2016) Q: State the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. (1988, 2016 Bar) A: (a) The Indeterminate
Sentence Law (ISLaw) applies in cases where the penalty imposed is more
than one year and the ISLaw shall apply where there is a minimum penalty
which is not lower than the penalty next lower in degree provided by law
and the maximum not higher than the maximum penalty provided by law in
cases of felonies but when it comes to statutory offenses, it must be lower
than the minimum penalty provided by law and not higher than the
maximum penalty provided by law except in the following cases as
provided by Section 2 of Art. 4103:

ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS (P.D. 1866, AS AMENDED BY

R.A. NO. 8294 AND R.A. 10591) (1990, 2000, 2004 Bar) Q:

1. 2.

(a) Ka Jacinto, an NPA commander, was apprehended with unlicensed

firearms and explosives. He was accordingly charged with illegal
possession of said firearms and explosives. He now questions the filing of
the charges on the ground that they are

3. 4. 5.

39

Life imprisonment Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to

commit treason To those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion,
sedition or espionage Those convicted of piracy Those who are habitual
delinquents

CRIMINAL LAW 6. 7. 8.

Those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence

Those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive
shall have violated the terms thereof Those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by
final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Sec.
5 hereof

A: No. Macky is not entitled to the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence

Law (Act 4103, as amended) for having evaded the sentence which
banished or placed him on destierro. Sec. 2 of the said law expressly
provides that the law shall not apply to those who shall have “evaded
sentence”. Q: Bruno was charged with homicide for killing the 75 year old
owner of his rooming house. The prosecution proved that Bruno stabbed
the owner causing his death; and that the killing happened at 10 in the
evening in the house where the victim and Bruno lived. Bruno, on the other
hand, successfully proved that he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities;
that he pleaded guilty to the crime charged; that it was the victim who first
attacked and did so without any provocation on his (Bruno's) part, but he
prevailed because he managed to draw his knife with which he stabbed the
victim. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Assuming a
judgment of conviction and after considering the attendant circumstances,
what penalty should the judge impose? (2013 Bar)

Q: Itos was convicted of an offense penalized by a special law. The penalty

prescribed is not less than six years but not more than twelve years. No
modifying circumstance attended the commission of the crime. If you were
the judge, will you apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law? If so, how will
you apply it? (1994, 1999 Bar) A: If I were the judge, I will apply the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as the last sentence of
Section 1 Act 4103, specifically provides the application thereof for
violations of special laws. Under the same provision, the minimum must not
be less than the minimum provided therein (six years and one day) and the
maximum shall not be more than the maximum provided therein, i.e. twelve
years.

A: Bruno should be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence penalty of

arresto mayor in any of its period to prision correccional in its medium
period as maximum. Bruno was entitled to two privileged mitigating
circumstances of incomplete self-defense and the presence of at least two
ordinary mitigating circumstances (voluntary surrender and plea of guilt)
without any aggravating circumstance under Art. 69 and 64(5) of the RPC
respectively, which lowers the prescribed penalty for homicide which is
reclusion temporal to prision correccional.

Q: When would the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLaw) be inapplicable?

(1999, 2003 Bar) A: The ISLaw is not applicable to: 1.

Those persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-

imprisonment or reclusion perpetua; 2. Those convicted of treason,
conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; 3. Those convicted of misprision
of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; 4. Those convicted of piracy; 5.
Those who are habitual delinquents; 6. Those who shall have escaped
from confinement or evaded sentence; 7. Those who having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms
thereof; 8. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed
one year; 9. Those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of the
approval of this Act; and 10. Those whose sentence imposes penalties
which do not involve imprisonment, like destierro.

JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT (R.A. NO. 9344, AS AMENDED,

R.A. NO. 10630 AND IN RELATION TO P.D. 603) (1995, 2003, 2006, 2009,
2013 Bar) Q: Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie went to the store of Mang
Pandoy, Victor and Ricky entered the store while Rod and Ronnie posted
themselves at the door. After ordering beer, Ricky complained that he was
shortchanged although Mang Pandoy vehemently denied it. Suddenly,
Ricky whipped out a knife as he announced “Hold-up ito!” and stabbed
Mang Pandoy to death. Rod boxed the store’s salesgirl Lucy to prevent her
from helping Mang Pandoy. When Lucy ran out of the store to seek help
from people next door, she was chased by Ronnie. As soon as Ricky had
stabbed Mang Pandoy, Victor scooped up the money from the cash box.
Then Victor and Ricky dashed to the street and shouted, “Tumakbo na
kayo!” Rod was 14 and Ronnie was 17. The money and other articles
looted from the store of Mang Pandoy were later found in the houses of
Victor and Ricky.

Q: How are the maximum and the minimum terms of the indeterminate
sentence for offenses punishable under the Revised Penal Code
determined? (2002 Bar)

Are the minors Rod and Ronnie entitled to suspended sentence under The
Child and Youth Welfare Code? Explain. (1995 Bar)

A: For crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term
of the indeterminate sentence shall be the penalty properly imposable
under the same Code after considering the attending mitigating and/or
aggravating circumstances according to Art. 64 of said Code. The minimum
term of the same sentence shall be fixed within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree to that prescribed for the crime under the said Code.

A: No. Because the benefits of suspension of sentence is not available

where the youthful offender has been convicted of an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death under Art. 294 (1), RPC (People v. Galit,
230 SCRA 486). Q:

Q: While serving his sentence, Macky entered the prohibited area and had
a pot session with Ivy (Joy’s sister). Is Macky entitled to an indeterminate
sentence in case he is found guilty of use of prohibited substances?
Explain your answer. (2007 Bar)

UST BAR OPERATIONS

(a) A was 2 months below 18 years of age when he committed the crime.
He was charged with the crime 3 months later. He was 23 when he was
finally convicted and sentenced. Instead of preparing to serve a jail term,
he sought a

40

QUAMTO (1987-2016) suspension of the sentence on the ground that he

was a juvenile offender. Should he be entitled to a suspension of sentence?
Reasons. (b) Can juvenile offenders, who are recidivists, validly ask for
suspension of sentence? Explain. (2003, 2013 Bar)

commence to serve his sentence. Is “A” eligible for probation? (1989 Bar)
A: A is still eligible for probation since he filed his application for probation
within 15 days from the promulgation of the judgment. Under the Probation
Law, the accused may apply for probation within the period for perfecting
an appeal which is 15 days from promulgation or notice thereof.

A: (a) No. A is not entitled to a suspension of sentence because he is no

longer a minor at the time of promulgation of the sentence. For purposes of
suspension of sentence, the offender’s age at the time of promulgation of
the sentence is the one considered, not his age when he committed the
crime. So although A was below 18 years old when he committed the
crime, but he was already 23 years old when sentenced, he is no longer
eligible for suspension of sentence. (b) Yes. So long as the offender is still
a minor at the time of the promulgation of the sentence. The law
establishing Family Courts, RA 8369, provides to this effect: that if the
minor is found guilty, the court should promulgate the sentence and
ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred. However,
the sentence shall be suspended without the need of application pursuant
to PD 603, otherwise known as the “Child and Youth Welfare Code” (RA
8369, Sec. 5a). It is under PD 603 that an application for suspension of the
sentence is required and thereunder it is one of the conditions for
suspension of sentence that the offender be a first time convict: this has
been displaced by RA 8369.

The judge committed an error in issuing a Commitment order on the same

day of promulgation. A commitment order for the convict to begin serving
his sentence can be validly issued only if the period for perfecting an
appeal has expired with no appeal being taken. The fact that in compliance
with such order, which is void, the accused commenced to serve his
sentence does not bar him from availing himself of the benefits of the
Probation Law. While it is true under the Rules that a judgment in a criminal
case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served or the
accused has applied for probation (Sec. 7, Rule 120), Sec. 9 of the same
Rule provides that “nothing in this Rule shall be construed as affecting any
existing provision in the law governing suspension of sentence, probation
or parole.” The probation law does NOT speak of filing an application for
probation before judgment has become final. It only speaks of filing the
application WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR PERFECTING AN APPEAL. There
is nothing in the Probation Law that bars an accused who has commenced
to serve his sentence from filing an application for probation provided he
does so within the period for perfecting an appeal.

PROBATION LAW (P.D. 968, AS AMENDED) (1988, 1989, 1990, 1991,

1992, 1993, 1995, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2010 Bar)

What the Probation Law provides is that no application for probation shall
be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the
judgment or conviction. It does not say that no application shall be
entertained if the judgment has become final because the convict has
already commenced to serve his sentence.

Q: Who are the offenders disqualified from availing themselves of the

benefits of the probation law (P.D. 968, as amended)? (1988 Bar) A: The
following offenders are disqualified from availing of the benefits of the
Probation Law: 1. 2. 3.

4. 5.

Q: Boyet Mar was charged with consented abduction by a 17-year old

complainant. The accused made wedding arrangements with the girl, but
her parents insisted on the prosecution of the case. To avoid further
embarrassment of a court trial for him and the girl, the accused entered a
plea of guilty. He then filed a petition for probation before serving sentence,
but the court denied the petition on the ground that “it would be better for
the accused to serve sentence so that he would reform himself and avoid
the scandal in the community that would be caused by the grant of the
petition. The accused serve sentence but he brought the matter to the
Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari. Did the trial court act correctly in
denying the petition for probation? (1991 Bar)

Those sentenced to serve maximum term of imprisonment of more than six

years; Those convicted of subversion or any crime against the national
security of the public order; Those who have previously been convicted by
final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one
month and one day and or a fine of not less than P200; Those who have
been once on probation under the provisions of this decree; and Those
who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of
this decree applicable pursuant to Sec. 33 of P.D. 968.

Q: A was charged with theft and upon arraignment, pleaded guilty to the
charge. He was detained for failure to post bail. After two (2) months, a
decision was rendered sentencing “A” to an indeterminate sentence of six
(6) months and one (1) day as a minimum, to one (1) year and one (1)
month as maximum, and to pay the offended party the amount of P700. On
January 16, 1985, the very day the sentence was read to “A”, the Judge
issued a Commitment Order addressed to the Provincial Jail Warden. On
January 28, 1985, “A” applied for probation but his application was denied
on the ground that the sentence of conviction became final and executory
on January 16, 1985, when “A”

A: The trial court acted incorrectly. In Balleta v. Leviste (92 SCRA 719), the
Judge precisely denied the petition for probation on the same excuse
stated in the problem. The Supreme Court held that an accused must fall
within any one of the disqualifications stated in Sec. 9 of PD 960 in order to
be denied probation. Q: Johnny Gitara was convicted of the crime of estafa
by the Regional Trial Court of Manila. He was imposed the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of 3 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum and
six years as maximum, both of prision correccional and was ordered to
indemnify the offended party in the amount

41

CRIMINAL LAW of P3, 000.00. He filed an application for probation upon

the promulgation of the judgment. What is the legal effect of his application
for probation on the judgment of conviction? Does said application interrupt
the running of the period of appeal? (1992 Bar) A: The filing of the
application for probation is considered as a waiver of the right of the
accused to appeal; the decision has become final. In view of the finality of
the decision, there is no period of appeal to speak of. Q: On February 3,
1986, Roberto was convicted of arson through reckless imprudence and
sentenced to pay a fine of P15, 000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On February
10, 1986, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. Several months later, he
filed a motion to withdraw the appeal on the ground that he is applying for
probation. On May 7, 1987, the Court of Appeals granted the motion and
considered the appeal withdrawn. On June 10, 1987, the records of the
case were remanded to the trial court. Roberto filed a “Motion for
Probation” praying that execution of his sentence be suspended, and that a
probation officer be ordered to conduct an investigation and to submit a
report on his probation. The judge denied the motion on the ground that
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1990, which took effect on July 16,
1986, no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. Is the
denial of Roberto’s motion correct? (1994 Bar) A: Yes, even if at the time of
his conviction, Roberto was qualified for probation but that at the time of his
application for probation, he is no longer qualified, he is not entitled to
probation. The qualification for probation must be determined as of the time
the application is filed in Court (Bernardo v. Judge Balagot, et. al., G.R.
86561, Nov. 10, 1992). Q: Juan was convicted of the Regional Trial Court
of a crime and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
minimum of eight years. He appealed both his conviction and the penalty
imposed upon him to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court ultimately
sustained Juan’s conviction but reduced his sentence to a maximum of four
years and eight months imprisonment. Could Juan forthwith file an
application for probation? Explain. (1992, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003
Bar) A: No. Juan can no longer avail of the probation because he appealed
from the judgment of conviction of the trial court, and therefore, cannot
apply for probation anymore. Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended,
mandates that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the accused has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. Q:
May a probationer appeal from the decision revoking the grant of probation
or modifying the terms and conditions thereof? (2002 Bar) A: No. Under
Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, an order granting or denying the
probation is not appealable.