FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126437. March 6, 2002]

JOSUE ARLEGUI, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
SPOUSES GIL AND BEATRIZ GENGUYON, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 32833, which reversed the ruling of the Pasig Regional Trial Court, Branch 67, in Civil
Case No. 58185, and disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby

ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, judgment is rendered as follows:
1) Annulling the sale of the apartment unit at issue between Mateo Tan Lu and Josue Arlegui;
2) Ordering Josue Arlegui to execute a corresponding Deed of Conveyance in favor of spouses
Gil and Beatriz Genguyon, involving Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1286 covering
the apartment unit at issue, upon payment by spouses Genguyons (sic) of the sum of
P55,000.00, without any interest, to Arlegui;
Should defendant Arlegui fail to so execute the Deed of Conveyance herein ordered within
fifteen (15) days from finality of judgment, the Branch Clerk of the court a quo shall execute
the same and the Register of Deeds shall nullify the certificate of title in the name of Arlegui
and shall issue another certificate of title in favor of spouses Gil and Beatriz Genguyon;
3) Ordering Mateo Tan Lu and Josue Arlegui to pay the Genguyons, jointly and solidarily, the
amount of P35,000.00, as damages inclusive of attorneys fees;
4) Ordering a Permanent Injunction upon the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, Branch
60, from hearing Civil Case No. 12647 entitled Josue Arlegui, plaintiff, versus Spouses Gil
and Beatriz Genguyon, defendants, and for the said Metropolitan Trial Court to dismiss the
same;
5) Dismissing the charges as to defendants-appellees Barrettos; and
6) Costs against Mateo Tan Lu and Josue Arlegui, jointly and severally.

SO ORDERED.[1]
Gleaned from the records are the following undisputed facts:
The object of the controversy is a residential apartment unit (no. 15) located at the corner of
Romualdez and Kalentong Streets in Mandaluyong City. The said property was formerly owned
by Serafia Real Estate, Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as Serafia), a company owned by
Alberto, Alfonso and Simeon, all surnamed Barretto, and their siblings Rosa B. Ochoa and
Teresita B. Alcantara. For more than twenty (20) years, unit no. 15 was leased by Serafia to the
spouses Gil and Beatriz Genguyon. In a letter dated March 26, 1984, the Genguyon spouses,
along with the other tenants in the apartment building were informed by Alberto Barretto that
Serafia and its assets had already been assigned and transferred to A.B. Barretto Enterprises.
Apprehensive that they were about to be ejected from their respective units, the tenants
formed an organization called the Barretto Apartment Tenants Association. They elected officers
from among themselves to represent them in the negotiations with A.B. Barretto Enterprises for
the purchase of their respective apartment units. Among those elected were Josue Arlegui as
vice-president and Mateo Tan Lu as auditor of the association.
Sometime thereafter, believing that negotiations were still ongoing, the Genguyons were
surprised to learn on January 23, 1987 that the unit they were leasing had already been sold to
Mateo Tan Lu. This notwithstanding, the Genguyons continued to occupy the subject premises
and paid the rentals therefor.
The following year, or on July 7, 1988, the Genguyons were informed that Mateo Tan Lu
had sold the subject apartment unit to Josue Arlegui. Not long thereafter, they received a letter
from Arleguis lawyer demanding that they vacate the premises. When they failed to accede to
Arleguis demand, the latter filed an action for ejectment against the Genguyons before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60, docketed as Civil Case No. 12647.
For their part, the Genguyon spouses filed Civil Case No. 58185 against the Barrettos,
Mateo Tan Lu and Josue Arlegui before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 67, for
annulment of sale, specific performance, redemption and damages with preliminary
injunction. The Genguyons raised therein the following issues:
1) Whether or not they were denied their right of first preference to purchase the subject
apartment unit; and
2) Whether or not failure to exercise such right is jurisdictional, the absence of such jurisdiction
rendering the sale from the Barrettos to Mateo Tan Lu, as well as the subsequent sale to
Josue Arlegui, null and void.
On January 11, 1990, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
directing the MTC to desist from taking further action in the ejectment case pending before it.[2]
On March 22, 1991, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the

above-entitled case in favor of defendant Josue Arlegui and against the plaintiffs
ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendant Arlegui the sum P3,000.00 as attorneys
fees. In view of the fact that the plaintiffs acted in gross and evident bad faith by
refusing to satisfy the defendants plainly valid, just and demandable claim (see Article
2208, No. 5, Civil Code); and to pay the cost.

Moreover, moral damages are not to be awarded to the defendant Josue Arlegui for
while plaintiffs has already acted fraudulently or in bad faith their failure to vacate the
premises is not in this Courts opinion, the breach of contract referred to in Art. 2220
of the Civil Code.
Dismissing the complaint as against defendants Alberto Barretto, Alfonso Barretto,
Simeon Barretto, Rosa B. Ochoa, Teresita B. Alcantara and Mateo Tan Lu.

Lifting the preliminary mandatory injunction issued in the instant case as against the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, Branch 60, docketed as Civil Case No.
12647.

Conformably, with what has been stated in the above-mentioned paragraphs, the
claims of the plaintiffs is hereby DISMISSED, as being purely without merit.

SO ORDERED.[3]
Not satisfied with the above-quoted disposition of the RTC, the Genguyons filed their
appeal before the Court of Appeals.[4]
While the appeal was pending, the ejectment case against the Genguyons proceeded and, on
October 6, 1992, the MTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60, rendered judgment [5] ordering the
Genguyons to: (1) vacate the subject premises; (2) pay the accrued monthly rentals from
September of 1989 to September of 1992, and the succeeding monthly rentals thereafter until
they shall have finally surrendered possession of the premises; and (3) pay attorneys fees and
costs of suit. The Genguyons appealed the decision to the RTC of Pasig, Branch 166, which
affirmed the MTC judgment in toto in a Decision[6] dated January 25, 1993.
Thereafter, or on February 14, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R.
CV No. 32833, annulling and setting aside the RTC decision. The Court of Appeals made the
following conclusions:
1) There existed between the Genguyons and the officers of the tenants association, particularly
Mateo Tan Lu and Josue Arlegui, a fiduciary relationship;
2) Mateo Tan Lu and Josue Arlegui committed a breach of trust when they purchased the
apartment unit leased by the Genguyons;
3) Josue Arlegui is not an innocent-purchaser for value nor a buyer in good faith;
4) The RTC erred in finding that the Genguyons action was premised on their right of first
preference under the Urban Land Reform Law; and
5) The Genguyons are not estopped from denying Arleguis ownership of the subject property
for no lessor-lessee relationship was established between them.
Josue Arleguis motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in an
Order[7] dated September 12, 1996. Hence, the instant petition for review, assigning the following
errors:
I

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS DID NOT BASE THEIR ALLEGED RIGHT OF FIRST
PREFERENCE ON P.D. 1517, THE URBAN LAND REFORM LAW.
 II

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE

TRUST EXISTED BETWEEN THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND MATEO
TAN LU.
III

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED, ASSUMING THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE

TRUST EXISTED, IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER IS NOT INSULATED
FROM THE EFFECTS THEREOF.
IV

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES INSTEAD OF THE
PETITIONER.
V

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE METROPOLITAN

TRIAL COURT OF MANDALUYONG FROM HEARING THE EJECTMENT
CASE FILED BY PETITIONER AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND
IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE SAID CASE, NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THAT THE SAID CASE HAD LONG BEEN DECIDED.
VI

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT RECONSIDERING ITS

DECISION, CONSIDERING THAT THE ISSUES RAISED BEFORE IT HAVE
BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC AFTER THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
VOLUNTARILY VACATED AND/OR ABANDONED THE SUBJECT UNIT
THEY WERE OCCUPYING.[8]
There are four (4) essential matters involved in this controversy. The first one is whether or
not the private respondents, spouses Gil and Beatriz Genguyon, are entitled to claim the right of
first refusal or, as stated otherwise, the right of first preference, to purchase the residential
apartment unit they were leasing first from Serafia Realty, then from A.B. Barretto Enterprises. It
appears that while the Genguyons complaint did not specifically allege that their supposed right
of first refusal was by virtue of the provisions of P.D. No. 1517, also known as the Urban Land
Reform Law,[9] Beatriz Genguyon testified on cross-examination that:
Q: Your contention is, being an occupant for more than ten (10) years of the premises, you should
have been given the right of first refusal under the Urban Land Reform Law. Is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.[10]
Indeed, it would seem that the Genguyons action is premised on the fact that they are long-
time tenants of the apartment unit, a right accorded to legitimate tenants in urban zones who have
resided on the land for ten (10) years or more and who have built their homes on the land, as well
as residents who have legally and continuously occupied the lands by contract for the last ten
(10) years.[11]
Although there is no mention of P.D. No. 1517 in their complaint, the Genguyons
nevertheless assert their alleged right of first refusal as provided by the said law. However, the
Regional Trial Court found that the Genguyons failed to present any factual or legal basis for its
application. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, found that although the Genguyons
claimed the right of first refusal, their assertion was not anchored on P.D. No. 1517. And yet, the
Genguyons have not shown during these entire proceedings any other statutory or jurisprudential
source of said right of first refusal which would support their contentions.
Hence, the trial court correctly concluded that the Genguyons claims were founded on P.D.
No. 1517. However, the said court ruled that P.D. No. 1517 cannot benefit the Genguyons, citing
the Supreme Court ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[12] to the effect that P.D. No. 1517, in
referring to the pre-emptive or redemptive right of a lease, speaks only of urban land under lease
on which a tenant has built his home and in which he has resided for ten years or more. If both
land and the building belong to the lessor, the right referred to hereinabove does not apply.
In the parallel case of Nidoy v. Court of Appeals,[13] we held that:

Clearly, the right of first refusal applies only to tenants who have resided for ten (10)
years or more on the leased land declared as within the Urban Land Reform Zone, and
who have built their homes on that land. It does not apply to apartment dwellers.
(Underscoring ours)
This Court went on to declare that P.D. No. 2016, which amended P.D. No. 1517, likewise
did not extend its benefits to apartment dwellers.
Clearly, then, as lessees of the residential apartment unit, the Genguyons have no right of
first refusal to speak of. Apartment dwellers are excluded from the protective mantle of the
Urban Land Reform Law. The said law grants the right of first refusal only to legitimate tenants
who have built their homes on the land they are leasing. The Genguyons did not lease the land
only. Neither did they build a home thereon. There is no question that both the land and the
building are owned by the lessor. Consequently, the Genguyons action for annulment of the sale
to herein petitioner and reconveyance cannot prosper if based only on the ground that they were
denied their right of first refusal under P.D. No. 1517.
Be that as it may, on the second matter of whether or not Mateo Tan Lu and petitioner Josue
Arlegui, after him, breached the trust reposed on them as officers of, and negotiators for, the
tenants association, we are constrained to affirm the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals. By acquiring for themselves the subject property without informing the respondent
spouses of the progress of the negotiations, or of their desire to purchase the said property, Mateo
Tan Lu and the petitioner did not act with the candor and honesty expected of them. Their
successful, albeit clandestine, ploy to appropriate the apartment unit that they knew fully well the
Genguyons had every intention to buy from A.B. Barretto Enterprises violated the trust and
confidence so willingly and without reservation reposed on them.
 The arguments advanced by the petitioner cannot detract from the cogency of the Court of
Appeals findings in this regard, to wit:

x x x They had a right to expect that because of their fiduciary dependence on the
officers who were conducting the negotiations in their behalf, the same would act with
good faith in relation to the trust and confidence reposed in them. But when Mateo
Tan Lu later turned out to have purchased the residential unit occupied by the
appellants (aside from the unit he commercially leased from the Barrettos), he
committed a breach of trust in utter disregard of the existing fiduciary relationship
between the trusted officers of the Association and the tenants-members thereof.

Without doubt, Mateo Tan Lu had breached the confidence reposed in him by the
Association members, and a trust was created by force of law in favor of spouses
Genguyons, long time occupants of the apartment unit (24 years: TSN, September 6,
1990, p. 4) which he surreptitiously bought. The Supreme Court has long stated that:

If a person obtains legal title to property by fraud and concealment, Courts of equity
will impress upon the title a so called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded
party. (Gayondato v. The Treasurer of the Philippines Islands, 49 Phil. 244, 249).

In a similar vein, Tolentino opined: a receiver, trustee, attorney, agent, or any other
person occupying fiduciary relations respecting property of persons, is utterly disabled
from acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to his custody x x x. No
fraud in fact need be shown and no excuse will be heard the trustee. x x x. The rule
stands on the moral obligation to refrain from placing ones self in positions which
ordinarily excite conflicts between self interest and integrity. It seeks to remove the
temptation that might arise out of such a relation to serve ones self interest at the
expense of ones integrity and duty to another, by making it impossible to profit by
yielding to temptation x x x (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1973, pp. 638-639, citing Gilbert v. Hemston, 79
Mich. 326 and Severino v. Severino, 44 Phil. 343).[14] (Underscoring ours)
The petitioner cannot claim to be innocent or unaware of Mateo Tan Lus underhanded
method of acquiring the subject property. He himself bought the said apartment unit in a manner
that cannot be countenanced by the courts. We agree with the following pronouncements of the
Court of Appeals:

x x x Like Mateo Tan Lu, Arlegui was one of the trusted officers of the Association
charged with negotiating for the purchase of the apartment units. In fact, he was the
First Vice-President thereof. Thus, he was privy to all the discussions that took place
within and between both sides. Arlegui knew that like all the other bona fide tenants
of the apartment, the Genguyons had the right to purchase their apartment unit in
accordance with the Associations original agreement with the Barrettos. And so
knowing the negotiation terms firsthand and employing the same to his own benefit
and profit, Arlegui could not be considered as an innocent purchaser for value, or a
buyer in good faith (See TSN, November 22, 1990, pp. 5-6 citing Exhs. B and C,
Records, pp. 139-142). Corollarily, he is not and cannot be insulated from the legal
effects of the Genguyons right of first preference over the unit.[15] (Underscoring ours)
The facts and evidence on record, as carefully perused by the Court of Appeals, conclusively
show that Mateo Tan Lu surreptitiously purchased the subject property from the original owners,
and that the Genguyons were not aware of his secret machinations to acquire the property for
himself. In fact, Mateo Tan Lu did not inform the Genguyons of the sale to him. It was Simeon
Barretto, Jr. who wrote the Genguyons telling them that the apartment unit had been sold to
Mateo Tan Lu and that they had six (6) months within which to vacate the premises.[16] Clearly,
Mateo Tan Lu abused the confidence and trust that the Genguyons bestowed on him. Petitioner,
fully aware of the questionable circumstances attending Mateo Tan Lus acquisition, added insult
to injury when he in turn purchased the said property from Mateo Tan Lu. The Genguyons had
no inkling that Mateo Tan Lu or petitioner Arlegui were even interested to buy the subject
property. They trusted Mateo Tan Lu and the petitioner to negotiate in behalf of the other
tenants, themselves included. They never suspected that Mateo Tan Lu and the petitioner would
appropriate for themselves the apartment unit they were leasing. That there was abuse of
confidence cannot be denied.
The petitioner denies that a constructive trust was created and maintains that there was no
fraud committed. He neither received money from the Genguyons, nor was he unjustly
enriched. However, the records show that the Genguyons, along with the other tenants and
members of the association, contributed money to enable the officers to negotiate with the
Barrettos. Besides, constructive trusts do not only arise out of fraud or duress,[17] but also by
abuse of confidence, in order to satisfy the demands of justice.[18]
The petitioner also argues that the Genguyons failed to prove the existence of an implied or
constructive trust. We disagree. There is ample documentary and testimonial evidence to
establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship between them, and that petitioners subsequent
acts betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him. Petitioner points out that his lawyer wrote
a letter informing the Genguyons that he had already bought the property and telling them to
vacate the premises. This cannot be taken as evidence of good faith.Moreover, it is rather too late
for petitioner to argue that the Genguyons could and should have negotiated directly with the
Barrettos after he had already accepted the responsibility and authority to negotiate in their
behalf.
Petitioner suggests that the Genguyons were not financially capable of buying the subject
property anyway so they have no reason to complain. We are not persuaded by petitioners
contentions. The Court of Appeals findings in this regard is more than convincing, to wit:

It is appellees contention that the Genguyons never tendered the amount to make the
payments for the unit, and that their indication of a willingness to make the purchase
does not really show a capacity to make the necessary payment. However, we note
that as early was 1987, when hearsay was preponderant among the tenants that some
of the apartment units were purchased by some officers of the Association who were
entrusted with the negotiations, the Genguyons, through Atty. Eriberto Guerrero, sent
Mateo Tan Lu a letter verifying with him the truth to the information that he, Tan Lu,
had bought their unit from the Barrettos; they also stated that they were not defaulting
from the monthly rental payments, but since they did not know the true status of the
negotiations, and since rumors were rife about the purchase of the different units, they
had put the payment for that month in the bank, after which they informed Tan Lu of
their continuing desire to buy their unit (in line with the Associations agreement with
the Barrettos) if it is indeed true that he had bought it from the same. They also told
him that they await communications from him regarding the amount of the purchase
price. A xerox copy of their bank account accompanied their letter as proof of their
capacity to pay (Records, Exh. H, p. 153).

We found no written response from Tan Lu who sold the unit to Josue Arlegui after
one year. Defendants-appellees claim that Tan Lu had offered to sell the unit to
Beatriz Genguyon (TSN, Ex Parte Proceedings of May 15, 1990, pp. 11-12). Yet,
such allegation is self-serving and is corroborated only by the self-serving testimony
of Josue Arlegui (Ibid., p. 21), which was in fact controverted by Beatriz Genguyon in
her own testimony (TSN, September 6, 1990, p. 13).[19]
It is further argued that no implied trust, as defined under Article 1456 of the New Civil
Code, was created because the petitioner did not acquire the subject property through mistake or
fraud. Nevertheless, the absence of fraud or mistake on the part of the petitioner does not prevent
the court from ruling that an implied or constructive trust was created nonetheless. In the case
of Roa, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[20] the Court held that:

While it is Our ruling that the compromise agreement between the parties did not
create an express trust not an implied trust under Art. 1456 of the New Civil
Code, We may, however, make recourse to the principles of the general law of trusts,
insofar as they are not in conflict with the New Civil Code, Code of Commerce, the
Rules of Court and special laws which under Art. 1442 of the New Civil Code are
adopted.While Articles 1448 to 1456 of the New Civil Code enumerates cases of
implied trust, Art. 1447 specifically stipulates that the enumeration of the cases of
implied trust does not exclude others established by the general law of trusts, but the
limitations laid down in Art. 1442 shall be applicable.

In American law and jurisprudence, We find the following general principles:

A constructive trust, otherwise known as a trust ex maleficio, a trust ex delicto, a trust

de son tort, an involuntary trust, or an implied trust, is a trust by operation of law
which arises contrary to intention and in invitum, against one who, by fraud, actual or
constructive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commission of wrong, or by any
form of unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means, or who
in any way against equity and good conscience, either has obtained or holds the legal
right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy. It
is raised by equity to satisfy the demands of justice. However, a constructive trust
does not arise on every moral wrong in acquiring or holding property or on every
abuse of confidence in business or other affairs; ordinarily such a trust arises and will
be declared only on wrongful acquisitions or retentions of property of which equity, in
accordance with its fundamental principles and the traditional exercise of its
jurisdiction or in accordance with statutory provision, takes cognizance. It has been
broadly ruled that a breach of confidence, although in business or social relations,
rendering an acquisition or retention of property by one person unconscionable
against another, raises a constructive trust. (76 Am. Jr. 2d, Sec. 221, pp. 446-447).

And specifically applicable to the case at bar is the doctrine that A constructive trust is
substantially an appropriate remedy against unjust enrichment. It is raised by equity in
respect of property, which has been acquired by fraud, or where, although acquired
originally without fraud, it is against equity that it should be retained by the person
holding it. (76 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 222, p. 447).

The above principle is not in conflict with the New Civil Code, Code of Commerce,
Rules of Court and special laws. And since We are a court of law and of equity, the
case at bar must be resolved on the general principles of law on constructive trust
which basically rest on equitable considerations in order to satisfy the demands of
justice, morality, conscience and fair dealing and thus protect the innocent against
fraud. As the respondent court said, It behooves upon the courts to shield fiduciary
relations against every manner of chickanery or detestable design cloaked by legal
technicalities. (Underscoring ours)
Thirdly, it is of no moment that the Genguyons filed the action for reconveyance more than
a year after the subject property was registered in favor of the petitioner. An action for
reconveyance of registered land on an implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years even if the decree
of registration is no longer open to review.[21] Besides, when the Genguyons filed the action for
reconveyance, they were at that time in possession of the subject property. This Court has held
that the 10-year prescription period applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the
trust is not in possession of the property since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in
actual possession of the property the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet
title to the property, does not prescribe.[22]
Even though the Genguyons filed the action for reconveyance after the case for ejectment
against them was instituted, the same was not rendered stale or improper. This Court has
uniformly held that the one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the
owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking
steps to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the
aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party
and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.[23]
 Petitioner also assails the award of damages to the Genguyons, arguing that he should be the
one awarded damages. The Court of Appeals ordered Mateo Tan Lu and the petitioner to pay the
Genguyons, jointly and solidarily, the amount of P35,000.00 as damages inclusive of attorneys
fees. The award was justified by the appellate court thus:

There is no doubt that because of Tan Lu and Arleguis violation of the trust and
confidence reposed in them as officers and negotiators in behalf of the tenants-
members of the Association, damages have accrued upon spouses Genguyons for
which they must be indemnified.

Article 19 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines exhorts the citizens in the correct
exercise of rights and performance of duties in this wise:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This principle of abuse of rights is based upon the famous maxim suum jus summa
injuria (the abuse of a right is the greatest possible wrong).

The acts of Tan Lu and Arlegui directly violate the principles enunciated in Art. 19
which declares that every person must practice justice, honesty and good faith in his
dealings with his fellowmen. That there was a valid pact or agreement among the
Association members and their entrusted officers charged with the negotiations, is an
accepted fact. As two of the three entrusted officers charged with the negotiations,
Tan Lu and Arlegui fall within the purview of Art. 19 which is also implemented by
Art. 21, New Civil Code, a sequent of Art. 19, which declares that [A]ny person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.[24]
In addition, Articles 2221 and 2222 of the New Civil Code provide that the Court may
award nominal damages: (1) in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded, may be vindicated or recognized; or (2) in every case where any property right has been
invaded. Under the circumstances, whether as compensatory or nominal damages, the amount of
P35,000.00, inclusive of attorneys fees, is just and reasonable.
Finally, in the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals ordered a permanent injunction
directing the MTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 60 to dismiss the ejectment case[25] against the
Genguyons. The records show that three (3) years before the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision, the ejectment case had already been decided with finality. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals can no longer interfere in the said case. Besides, the outcome of the ejectment case has
no adverse effect on the action for reconveyance which concerns title to the subject
property. Neither will the said judgment be held conclusive of the facts therein found since the
ejectment case between the same parties is based on a different cause of action involving
possession.[26] For being moot and academic, it is no longer necessary to indulge in academic
discussion on this matter.[27]
 During these proceedings, counsel for the Genguyon spouses notified the Court of their
untimely demise: Gil on April 16, 2001 and Beatriz on October 18, 2000, as evidenced by the
Death Certificates[28] submitted by their surviving heirs. The said heirs moved that they be
substituted as parties-respondents in this case.[29] There being no opposition on the part of
petitioner Arlegui, this Court granted the motion for substitution in accordance with Rule 3,
Section 17 of the Revised Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 32833 is hereby AFFIRMED and MODIFIED, as follows:
1) Annulling the sale of the apartment unit at issue between Mateo Tan Lu and Josue Arlegui;
2) Ordering Josue Arlegui to execute a corresponding Deed of Conveyance in favor of the heirs
of Gil and Beatriz Genguyon (Gilda G. Genguyon, Ira G. Genguyon, Reylan G. Genguyon,
Edwin G. Genguyon, Marilou Genguyon-Rodriguez, and Rosemarie Genguyon-Iwafe)
involving Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1286 covering the apartment unit at issue,
upon payment by said heirs of the sum of P55,000.00, without any interest, to Arlegui;
Should Josue Arlegui fail to so execute the Deed of Conveyance herein ordered within
fifteen (15) days from finality of judgment, the Branch Clerk of the court a quo shall execute
the same and the Register of Deeds shall nullify the certificate of title in the name of Arlegui
and shall issue another certificate of title in favor of the heirs;
3) Ordering Mateo Tan Lu and Josue Arlegui to pay the heirs jointly and solidarily, the amount
of P35,000.00, as nominal damages inclusive of attorneys fees;
4) Dismissing the charges as to defendants-appellees Barrettos; and
5) Costs against Mateo Tan Lu and Josue Arlegui, jointly and severally.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 128839 July 20, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-apellee,

vs.

GODOFREDO TEVES y LEMEN, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

This case is before us on automatic review 1 of the decision 2 of 14 March 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, in four (4) criminal cases, finding accused-appellant Godofredo Teves y
Lemen (hereafter GODOFREDO) guilty of the crime of multiple rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death and to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages.

On the basis of a sworn statement 3 executed by Cherry Rose Teves (hereafter CHERRY), daughter of
GODOFREDO, a criminal complaint4 for multiple rape committed "since the year 1993 up to the 1st, 8th
and 3rd day of January 1995," was filed against GODOFREDO before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Kawit, Cavite. Although not clear from the record, GODOFREDO was somehow arrested and
detained.1âwphi1.nêt

Despite due notice, GODOFREDO did not file his counter-affidavit with the MTC. After due proceedings,
the MTC found a prima facie case against GODOFREDO and thus forwarded the record of the case to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite.5

On 4 July 1995, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite filed four (4) separate informations for
rape against GODOFREDO with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 20, in Imus. The informations
were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3872-95,6 3873-95,7 3874-958 and 3875-95,9 respectively.

The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 3872-95, denominated as one for
multiple rape, reads as follows:

That sometimes [sic] in the year 1993, in the Municipality of Kawit, Province of Cavite, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage of his
superior strength over the person of his thirteen (13) year old daughter, by means of force, violence and
intimidation and with lewd designs, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have
repeated carnal knowledge of Cherry Rose Q. Teves, against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 3873-95 reads as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of January 1995, in the Municipality of Kawit, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
force, violence and intimidation, with lewd designs and taking advantage of his superior strength over
the person of his own daughter who is only thirteen years old, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of Cherry Rose Q. Teves, against her will and consent, thereby
causing her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
The accusatory portions of the informations in Criminal Case No. 3874-95 and Criminal Case No. 3875-95
are similarly worded as that in Criminal Case No. 3872-95, except as to the dates of the commission of
the crimes, which were specified as 3 January 1995 and 8 January 1995, respectively.

The four cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At his arraignment on 9 October 1995, GODOFREDO
entered a plea of not guilty in each case.10

At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the offended party, CHERRY, but dispensed with the
testimonies of the social worker, Leonida Ramos, and of the Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Owen Lebaquin,
as the parties stipulated on the substance of their testimonies.

On his part, GODOFREDO relied solely on his testimony, raising the defenses of denial and alibi. He
further imputed ill motive on the part of CHEIRRY in having filed the case.

The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of CHERRY, having been "given
spontaneously and in a straightforward manner" and which stood "unrebutted." On the other hand, the
trial court considered GODOFREDO's claim of ill motive "hollow and totally unworthy of belief."

The-trial court faithfully summarized the evidence for the prosecution and the defense, as follows:

Taking the witness stand, the victim Cherry Rose Teves narrated how she was raped by her father on
several occasions. She claimed that sometime in 1994 when she was only thirteen (13) years old and
while washing dishes, her father touched her breast. A day before New Year of 1995, her father told her
not to leave their house; that in a little while, her father laid her down, removed her panty and shorts,
touched her breast and inserted his sex thing into her organ; that after a week, while she was taking a
bath, her father asked her to hand him the dipper; that when she obeyed, he suddenly entered the
bathroom and again sexually abused her; that she even noticed blood coming out of her organ.
Continuing, she elucidated that on January 1, 1995, she was instructed by her father to clean the house
and to take care of her younger brothers and sisters after sending her twelve (12) year old brother [on]
an errand to buy cigarettes; after her brother left, she was molested by her father. The assault on her
virtue was always followed by a threat for her not to report the incident to her mother or else she
[would] be killed; that during all those times that she was abused by her father, her mother who [was] a
laundry woman, was out of the house.

When cross-examined, she declared that her father was then working as a carpenter and usually arrived
home at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon or late in the evening. She, being the eldest among the six
children in the family, was the one taking care of her little brothers and sisters because she already
stopped schooling. Nobody knew of the abused [sic] heaped upon her by her father until she confided it
to her friends who [resided] at Kaingin, Kawit, Cavite.

After presenting the victim, the parties entered into stipulations to wit:
1. That Social Worker Leonida Ramos was the one who assisted and brought the complainant to
the PC Crime Laboratory for examination resulting in the issuance of a medico-legal report;

2. That said Social Worker knew the complainant because the latter came to see her and so, she
brought her to the Kawit Police Station where her statement was taken.

In view of the above stipulations, the testimony of Social Worker Leonida Ramos was dispensed with.

Likewise, the testimony of Dr. Owen Lebaquin, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory
Service, was dispensed with after the defense admitted the findings of the said physician as contained in
Medico-Legal Report No. M-0092-95 (Exh. "B"). As stated in the Report of the Medico-Legal Officer
which was completed on January 31, 1995, the subject is in non-virgin state physically without external
signs of application of violence.

Accused . . . claimed that he knew of no reason why he was charged [with] rape, except that he did not
approve of [his] daughter coming home late from her friend at the DSWD. And because of this, he
maltreated her. He added that he only comes home on weekends, being a construction worker at the
Arcontica on a "pakyawan" basis; that there were occasions that he and his daughter were the only ones
left at their house. 11

Applying Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7659, which imposes the death penalty in rape cases committed by a parent when the victim is under 18
years of age, the trial court then decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Guilty of Multiple
Rape. He is thus sentenced to death for the rape of his 13 year old daughter and to indemnify her of the
sum of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages.

SO ORDERED.

In his Appellant's Brief, GODOFREDO's lone error is that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

GODOFREDO asserts that since his conviction rests on the uncorroborated testimony of the
complainant, there must be a careful and painstaking scrutiny of the latter; it should not be easily
accepted and believed with precipitate credulity. 12 GODOFREDO contends that CHERRY's testimony
contained "uncertain and conflicting answers" and that the following circumstances warrant CHERRY's
testimony was tainted with uncertainties and implausibilities as evidenced by inconsistencies and her
failure to recall the number of times and the dates she was allegedly raped by her father, as well as of
the details thereof; (2) CHERRY's testimony did not prove existence of force and intimidation; (3) the
evidence for the prosecution was purely speculative and conjectural; and (4) the unreasonable delay of
two years in the filing of the complaint.
In the Brief for the Appellee, the People maintain that the alleged inconsistencies in CHERRY's testimony
are not sufficient to cast serious doubt upon her credibility since victims of rape cannot be expected to
remember every grisly detail of the fact of the commission of the offense and thereafter "keep an
accurate account of her traumatic experience." 13 At any rate, the inconsistencies were only on minor
matters which, instead of weakening CHERRY's credibility, all the more strengthened it as they
eradicated the suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 14 Moreover, the assessment of credibility of
witnesses is best left to the trial court whose judgment thereon is entitled to the highest respect by
appellate courts, it having had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. This,
the People observe, is especially true in the instant case where CHERRY, a young and unschooled barrio
lass, had no evil motive to charge her father with a grievous offense.

Anent the issue of force and intimidation, the People assert that it was of no moment that the
prosecution failed to show its presence in the commission of the offense, since in a rape case committed
by a father against his daughter, the moral ascendancy and influence of the latter over the former
substitutes for the force and intimidation. 15

As to the delay in reporting the rape incident, the People contend it is settled that such delay neither
diminishes complainant's credibility nor undermines the charges of rape where the delay can be
attributed to death threats of the assailant upon the complainant. 16 Be that as it may, GODOFREDO's
contention that the charges of rape were made known only two years thereafter was baseless, for as a
matter of fact, it did not take two years before CHERRY finally broke her silence: the first rape incident
happened sometime in 1994 before New Year's day of 1995, and that on 25 January 1995, a complaint
charging GODOFREDO with rape was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Kawit, Cavite.

In reviewing rape cases we are guided by the following well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation for
rape can be made with facility:

it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in
view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. 17

Basic in every prosecution for rape is the determination of the credibility of the offended party's
testimony, for the lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is sufficient to sustain the verdict of
conviction. 18 On this note, when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to
decide the question as it heard the witnesses themlselves and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying during trial. 19 The exceptions to the rule are when such evaluation was reached arbitrarily,
or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstance of weight
and substance which could affect the result of the
case. 20 We sustain the trial court's ruling as to the credibility of CHERRY and find that GODOFREDO
miserably failed to demonstrate the existence of any of the exceptions aforementioned. Our review of
CHERRY's testimony has us fully convinced of her sincerities, candor and truthfulness as to the fact of
rape, to the extent that the only issue to be resolved is the number of times she was raped.

The following excerpt of CHERRY's testimony established with moral certainty GODOFREDO's guilt:

Q Do you remember when your father raped you?

A I cannot remember.

Q How many times were you raped by your father?

A Many times.

Q Miss Witness, how old were you when you were first raped by your father?

A 13 years old.

Q That would be sometime in 1994?

A Yes, mam [sic].

Q Can you tell the court what happened on the first occasion when you were raped by your
father?

A Yes, mam [sic].

Q What were you doing on that day when you were first raped by your father?

A I was washing dishes.

Q Do you remember what time was it [sic]? Was it morning, afternoon or evening?

A I cannot recall. It happened quite some time.

Q While you were washing dishes, what did your father do?

A He touched my breast.

Q After that what else did you do?

A Nothing happened anymore. On that day before New Year, my father told me not to go out of
the house.

Q After your father told you not to go out of the house, what happened?

A My father told me to lie on the floor. He laid me down.

Q After he laid you down, what did he do?

A He inserted his organ into my organ.

Q Were you wearing a dress at that time?

A Yes, mam [sic].

Q What were you wearing?

A T-shirt and short pants.

Q Before your father inserted his organ inside your organ, what if any, did he do with your short?

A He removed my shorts.

Q How about your pantie?

A He also removed my pantie.

Q After he removed-your shorts and pantie what else did he do?

A He inserted his organ into my organ. He touched my breast. My mother was out of the house.

Q You said that your father inserted his organ into your organ, what did you feel?

A I felt pain.

Q What did you do?

A I just bore the pain. "Tiniis ko na lang ang sakit."

Q After that, what else did your father do?

A None.
Q Did he leave the house?

A He felt [sic] asleep. He was drunk then.

Q You said awhile ago that you were raped several times by your father, after that first night when
did your father rape you again, can you remember?

A I cannot recall.

Q Could it be one week?

A After a week.

Q Can you tell the court how your father raped you on the second instance?

A I was taking a bath.

Q When you were taking a bath, what happened?

A My father asked me to give him the "tabo".

Q Where were you taking a bath at that time?

A Inside our bathroom.

Q Where is that bathroom located?

A Kaingin, Kawit, Cavite.

Q The first instance when you said your father raped you in what place were you then?

A At Kaingin, Kawit, Cavite.

Q You said that in the second instance your father asked you to hand him the the "tabo" [dipper],
what did you do when your father asked you to hand the dipper?

A I handed it to him.

Q What did you do after that?

A He suddenly entered in [sic] the bathroom.

Q After entering the bathroom, what did he do?

A He inserted his organ into my organ. I noticed blood came out of my organ.

Q You said that you were raped several times by your father, when was the last time your father
raped you?

A January 23.

Q What year?

A January 23, 1995.

Q Where were you on Jan. 23, 1995?

A I was cleaning our house.

Q While you were cleaning your house, what happened?

A My mother came and then [the] raped [sic] [did] not pushed [sic] through.

Q Madam witness in connection with this case, do you remember having executed an affidavit?

A Yes, mam [sic].

Q If you were shown that document will you be able to identify it?

A Yes, mam [sic].

Q I am showing to you this document below is a signature above the typewritten name Cherry
Rose Teves, will you please tell us if that is the statement which you said you executed?

A Yes, mam [sic].

Q Whose signature is this above the typewritten name Cherry Rose Teves?

A Mine, mam [sic].

PROS. DE CASTRO
For purposes of identification, we request that this document be marked as Exh. A and the signature of
the witness as Exh. A-1.

Q In this statement partiuclarly par. 5 the question was "Kailan ka ni rape ng iyong tatay?" Ans: "Sa
Kawit, Cavite."

Q Can you tell the court what happened on Jan. 1, 1995?

A I went out of the house and then I went home.

Q What happened after you went home on that day?

A My father called me.

Q What did you do after he called you?

A He asked my brother to buy cigarette[s].

Q After that, what happened?

A He asked me to clean our house and to take care my small brothers and sister.

Q What did you do?

A I cleaned our house.

Q After that what happened?

A I was again "raped" by my father and it happened many times.

Q During all those times when you were being raped by our father, where was your mother?

A She was not around.

Q Where was she?

A She went somewhere else. Only my small brothers and sisters were around.

Q What was the occupation of your mother?

A Laundrywoman.
Q During those times when you were raped by your father, do you remember where your mother
was?

A She was washing clothes.

Q Where?

A In the aparment a little bit near our house.

Q Why did you not tell your mother about what your father did to you the first time that you were
raped?

A I was afraid.

Q Why were you afraid?

A I did not tell my mother because father told me not to tell her.

Q What else did your father tell you?

A Not to tell the matter to my mother because if I will tell my mother he will kill me.

Q Before you were raped by your father for the first time, did you love your father?

A Yes, mam [sic].

Q How about now how do you fell [sic] towards your father?

A I am mad at him. 21

Respecting the charge that CHERRY's testimony consisted mainly of uncertain, conflicting, vague and
inconsistent answers to specific questions propounded upon her during the direct and cross-
examination, suffice it to state that her failure to remember and elaborate on every detail of her
unfortunate experience was inconsequential. What must be borne in mind was that she was merely
fourteen (14) years old when she testified; moreover, GODOFREDO did not object to her testimony as to
the time of the commission of the crime. 22 It is settled that the precise time of the commission of rape
is not an essential element of the crime. 23 Likewise, GODOFREDO's harping on CHERRY's failure to
recall the exact number of times she was raped is not persuasive. We cannot reasonably expect her to
recount in detail her humiliating experience since the accused is of her own flesh and blood. The natural
vacillation of a daughter to publicly denounce her father and to testify in an unfamiliar and unfriendly
environment on such a delicate matter very well explain the minor lapses in her testimony. More than
anything else, the alleged inconsistencies and discrepancies in CHERRY's testimony referred only to
minor and trivial matters and were, undoubtedly, insufficient to dilute the truthfulness and destroy the
probative value of her testimony. We find no iota of evidence showing that CHERRY's account was a
result of deliberate falsehood. Settled is the rule that discrepancies and inconsistencies on minor
matters do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution's evidence as a whole nor reflect on the
witness' honesty. Such inconsistencies, which may be caused by the natural fickleness of the memory,
even tend to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the witness because they erase any
suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 24

Neither can GODOFREDO be allowed to make much of the fact that the prosecution was unable to
establish forcible carnal knowledge of CHERRY. In a rape committed by a father against his daughter, the
moral dominance and parental influence that essentially flows from the reverence and respect a child
has toward their parents which are ingrained and observed in the minds of the Filipino children,
substitute for force and intimidation, which produce reasonable fear in the child. 25

The delay in instituting the present criminal prosecution likewise does not engender doubt as to
GODOFREDO's guilt, in light of the established fact that CHERRY kept silent about the incident because
of GODOFREDO's death threat. CHERRY, a young barrio lass and with a simple and unsophisticated mind,
cannot be expected to have the fortitude and courage of an adult, Mature and experienced woman who
may disregard the threat and, with promptitude, condemn in the open the shameful scandal wrought
upon her by her very own father. It is not uncommon that young girls usually conceal for some time the
assault upon their virtue because of the threats on their lives. 26

Finally, there is absolutely no showing that CHERRY was actuated by a sinister motive to falsely charge
and implicate her own father in a serious
crime. 27 Briefly, if she did admit the ignominy she had undergone, allowed her private parts to be
examined, exposed herself to the trouble and inconvenience of a public trial and endure the
embarrassments and humiliation which a public revelation of what ought to be kept secret, she had
nothing in mind except to obtain justice. 28

From the aforequoted testimony of CHERRY, it is clear to us that the rapes that were duly proved were
those committed on: (a) New Year's day of 1995; (b) a week after said New Year's day; and (c) on 23
January 1995. That committed on New Year's day of 1995 is the subject of Criminal Case No. 3837-95,
while that committed a week after New Year's day of 1995 is covered by the Information in Criminal
Case No. 3875-95. There is no factual basis for the rapes charged in the information in Criminal Cases
No. 3872-95, allegedly committed "sometime in the year 1993," and in the information in Criminal Case
No. 3874-95, on 3 January 1995. GODOFREDO has not been charged for the rape committed on 23
January 1995.1âwphi1.nêt

Concretely then, GODOFREDO might only be convicted of the crimes of rape charged in the informations
in Criminal Case No. 3873-95 and in Criminal Case No. 3875-95. It was then error for the trial court to
find him guilty of rape in the four (4) cases and, worse, impose upon him one penalty of death for
multiple rape. In view of its findings, the court a quo should have imposed the death penalty in each of
the four (4) cases.

At this point, however, we are compelled to inquire into the propriety of the imposition of capital
punishment. To repeat, the trial court so imposed the death penalty, reasoning that under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the same was warranted in rape cases
committed by a parent when the victim was under 18 years of age.

Initially, we note that the trial court found that R.A. No. 7659 "took effect in January 1994." However, in
People v. Simon, 29 as reiterated in a multitude of cases since, we categorically held that said statute
took effect on 31 December 1993.

Pursuant to Section 11 of the amendatory statute, the death penalty may be imposed in rape cases
under the last paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, when the rape is committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:

The death penalty shall also be imposed of the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consaguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim.

2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.

3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third degree of consaguinity.

4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.

5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
disease.

6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine
National Police or any law enforcement agency.

7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation. (As amended by Sec. 11, Ra 7659.)

These seven attendant circumstances, given that they alter the nature of the crime of rape and thus
increase the degree of the penalty, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances. Plainly, these
attendant circumstances added by R.A. No. 7659 are not mere aggravating circumstances, which merely
increase the period of the penalty. So we held in People v. Ramos, 30 to the effect that a qualifying
circumstance must be specifically pleaded in the information, thus:

While Republic Act No. 7659 did not give a legal designation to the crime of rape attended by any of the
seven new circumstances introduced in Article 335 on December 31, 1993, this Court has referred to
such crime as qualified rape in a number of its decisions. However, with or without a name for this kind
of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender give a
different character to the rape defined in the first part of Article 335. They raise the imposable penalty
upon a person accused of rape from reclusion perpetua to the higher and supreme penalty of death.
Such an effect conjointly puts relationship and minority of the offended party into the nature of a
special qualifying circumstance.

As this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the information or in the complaint against appellant,
he cannot be convicted of qualified rape because he was not properly informed that he is being accused
of qualified rape. The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal
prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. 31 This right finds
amplification and implementation in the different provisions of the Rules of Court.32 Foremost among
these enabling provisions is the office of an information.

Anent the Constitutional right afforded an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of an
accusation against him, as implemented by the relevant provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
Section 9 of Rule 110 provides:

Sec. 9. Cause of accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be
stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute
defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to pronounce a judgment.

Pertinent to this case is the phrase of the current set of adjective rules: "a person of common
understanding," which had its origins in this jurisdiction in the phrase: "a person of ordinary
intelligence." 33

In this light, we hold that the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 3873-95 and 3875-95 do not
sufficiently allege the twin special qualifying circumstances of the victim's age and the relationship
between the culprit and the victim. The informations in these two cases provide, respectively:

[A]nd taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his own daughter who is only thirteen
years old. . .

[T]aking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his thirteen (13) year old daughter. . .
What strikes us about the informations is that, as phrased, they unduly lay stress on the generic
aggravating circumstance of "taking advantage of superior strength." 34 Be it in terms of syntax or
composition, the wording of the informations is unable to sufficiently notify the accused, a person of
common understanding or ordinary intelligence, of the gravity or nature of the crime he had been
charged with, especially considering that generic aggravating circumstace of taking advantage of
superior strength is not even an element of the attendant circumstances treated under number 1 of the
last paragraph of Article 335. The aforequoted clauses in the informations can thus not be read nor
understood as constituting a specific allegation of the special circumstances of relationship of father and
daughter and that the daughter was less than 18 years of age at the time the crime of rape was
committed.

All told, to impose upon GODOFREDO the penalty of death under these circumstances would be to
deprive him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. The
penalty should thus only be for simple rape, in each of the two cases, which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua under the second paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Finally, as regards the civil indemnity. The P50,000.00 compensatory damages awarded by the trial court
shall represent indemnity in one case, but another P50,000.00 must be awarded in the second case.
Moral damages of P50,000.00 in each case, must likewise be awarded, even in the absence of proof of
mental and physical suffering of the victim, these being an inherent and necessary consequences of the
crime of rape. 35

WHEREFORE, the appealed joint decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of IMUS, Cavite, is REVERSED
insofar as Criminal Cases Nos. 3872-95 and 3874-95 are concerned and accused-appellant GODOFREDO
TEVES y LEMEN is ACQUITED therein for lack of evidence, and MODIFIED as to Criminal Cases Nos. 3873-
95 and 3875-95. As modified, said accused-appellant GODOFREDO TEVES y LEMEN is, in each of said
cases, found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of rape and hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay complainant Cherry Rose Q. Teves
indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes and Santiago, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., in the result.

Brief Background

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer,
seven, were brutally slain at their home in Paraaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police
arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a
frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators
remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of
what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the
crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed
the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Tony Boy Lejano, Artemio Dong
Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Pyke Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Ging Rodriguez, and
Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after
the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an
information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.[1]

The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino,
tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.[2] The
prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These
included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong
Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webbs household, police officer Biongs former
girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellitas husband.

For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying they were
elsewhere when it took place. Webbs alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then
across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as
documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show
Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court
found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank
testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by significant
discrepancies between Alfaros April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her explanation that she
at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative, accused Gatchalian;
that no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped her prepare her first
affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she needed once she
disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.

In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and
Gatchalian set up for their defense. They paled, according to the court, compared to Alfaros testimony
that other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after four years
of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged and
imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to
twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.[3]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, modifying the penalty imposed on
Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro
Vizconde.[4] The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial
judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in
executing her mother and sister.

On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special Division of five members
voted three against two to deny the motion,[5] hence, the present appeal.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting
the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver,
which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request
pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence[6] to give the accused and the prosecution access to
scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the
specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the
specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the
governments failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.

Issues Presented

Accused Webbs motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not the Court should acquit him
outright, given the governments failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmelas
cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence.

In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with
Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put
to death her mother and sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are:

1. Whether or not Alfaros testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled
to belief; and

2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaros testimony
that he led the others in committing the crime.

The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the crime after its
commission.
The Right to Acquittal

Due to Loss of DNA Evidence

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,[7] that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of
violation of his right to due process given the States failure to produce on order of the Court either by
negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.

The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this, semen
specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as Carmelas rapist and
killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists a
possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot
possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two persons
have the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins.[8] If, on examination, the DNA of
the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the
Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.

Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at this
late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland[9] that he cites has long be overtaken by the
decision in Arizona v. Youngblood,[10] where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not
require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the
latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a
medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the
same subjected to DNA test.

For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the
country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet
recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even
after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his
co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webbs application for DNA testing, he allowed the
proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused.[11] They
raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court in
rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the
DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the
meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accuseds lack of interest in having such
test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce
the semen specimen at some future time.

Now, to the merit of the case.

Alfaros Story

Based on the prosecutions version, culled from the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer, with
boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to buy shabu
from Artemio Dong Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends: Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
Antonio Tony Boy Lejano, Miguel Ging Rodriguez, Hospicio Pyke Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, and
Joey Filart. Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu house in Paraaque in January 1991, except
Ventura whom she had known earlier in December 1990.

As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a message for him to a girl,
whom she later identified as Carmela Vizconde. Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the group
drove to Carmelas house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Paraaque City. Riding
in her car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a Mazda pick-up and Webb, Lejano,
Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on a Nissan Patrol car.

On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street, alighted, and approached
Carmelas house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a woman came out. Alfaro queried her about Carmela.
Alfaro had met Carmela twice before in January 1991. When Carmela came out, Alfaro gave her Webbs
message that he was just around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not go out yet since she had
just arrived home. She told Alfaro to return after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this to Webb who then
told the group to drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.

The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they drove back but only Alfaro
proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela lived. The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up, with their
passengers, parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their garden. She approached
Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to leave the house for a while. Carmela
requested Alfaro to return before midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that
led to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink her cars headlights
twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so Carmela would know that she had arrived.

Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in her own car. Alfaro trailed
Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped off a man whom Alfaro believed was Carmelas
boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group, found them, and relayed Carmelas instructions to Webb. They
then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro told the group
about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of Carmelas male companion, Webbs mood changed
for the rest of the evening (bad trip).

Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb
decided that it was time for them to leave. He said, Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna.
Lejano said, Ako ang susunod and the others responded Okay, okay. They all left the parking lot in a
convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at
Carmelas house shortly before midnight.

Alfaro parked her car between Vizcondes house and the next. While waiting for the others to alight from
their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a suggestion that they blow up the transformer near the
Vizcondes residence to cause a brownout (Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito). But Alfaro
shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, Malakas lang ang tama mo. When Webb, Lejano, and Ventura
were already before the house, Webb told the others again that they would line up for Carmela but he
would be the first. The others replied, O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami.
Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open. Webb, Lejano, and
Ventura followed her. On entering the garage, Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the Vizcondes
Nissan Sentra and loosened the electric bulb over it (para daw walang ilaw). The small group went
through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the aluminum screen
door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb looked each other in the eyes for a moment and, together,
headed for the dining area.

As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked her where she was going
and she replied that she was going out to smoke. As she eased her way out through the kitchen door,
she saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the garden. After about
twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a womans voice ask, Sino yan? Alfaro immediately walked
out of the garden to her car. She found her other companions milling around it. Estrada who sat in the
car asked her, Okay ba?

After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde house, using the same
route. The interior of the house was dark but some light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro
saw Ventura searching a ladys bag that lay on the dining table. When she asked him what he was looking
for, he said: Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi. She asked him what key he wanted and he replied:
Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse. When she found a bunch of keys in
the bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the lock. She also did not find the car key.

Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was at a spot leading to the
dining area, she heard a static noise (like a television that remained on after the station had signed off).
Out of curiosity, she approached the masters bedroom from where the noise came, opened the door a
little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she walked in, she saw Webb on top
of Carmela while she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at
the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in tears while Webb
raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.

Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She met Ventura at the dining
area. He told her, Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo. Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the
house to the others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk. She entered her car
and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura came out of
the house just then. Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass
frame.

As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he forgot his jacket in the
house. But Ventura told him that they could not get in anymore as the iron grills had already locked.
They all rode in their cars and drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an old
hotel at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down. Someone threw
something out of the car into the cogonal area.

The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence, steel gate, and a long driveway
at BF Executive Village. They entered the compound and gathered at the lawn where the blaming
session took place. It was here that Alfaro and those who remained outside the Vizconde house learned
of what happened. The first to be killed was Carmelas mother, then Jennifer, and finally, Carmella.
Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, Bakit naman pati yung bata? Webb replied that the girl woke up and
on seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders, and pulled his hair. Webb got
mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly stabbed her. Lejano excused himself at
this point to use the telephone in the house. Meanwhile, Webb called up someone on his cellular
phone.

At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered him to go and clean up
the Vizconde house and said to him, Pera lang ang katapat nyan. Biong answered, Okay lang. Webb
spoke to his companions and told them, We dont know each other. We havent seen each otherbaka
maulit yan. Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her fathers house.[12]

1. The quality of the witness

Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four years, bothered by her
conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to come forward and do what was right? No. She was, at
the time she revealed her story, working for the NBI as an asset, a stool pigeon, one who earned her
living by fraternizing with criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers. She had to live a
life of lies to get rewards that would pay for her subsistence and vices.
According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed
Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section, Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or
December 1994 as an asset. She supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and other
criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers like
Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaros tip led to the arrest of the leader of the Martilyo
gang that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her very special treatment and
she became its darling, allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was
piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story
behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to
the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him
that she might as well assume the role of her informant. Sacaguing testified thus:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde murder case? Will you tell
the Honorable Court?

xxxx

A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to her the circumstances, I mean, the
details of the massacre of the Vizconde family. Thats what she told me, Your Honor.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. And what did you say?

xxxx

A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that man and she promised that
in due time, she will bring to me the man, and together with her, we will try to convince him to act as a
state witness and help us in the solution of the case.

xxxx

Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. No, sir.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. Why not?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to bring the man to me. She told
me later that she could not and the man does not like to testify.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. All right, and what happened after that?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. She told me, easy lang kayo, Sir, if I may quote, easy lang Sir, huwag kayong

COURT:

How was that?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang yan.

xxxx

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that papapelan ko na lang yan?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. I said, hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.

(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)

Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguings above testimony.

2. The suspicious details

But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which even tallied with the
physical evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt, yes.

Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying details. Everybody was
talking about what the police found at the crime scene and there were lots of speculations about them.

Secondly, the police had arrested some akyat-bahay group in Paraaque and charged them with the
crime. The police prepared the confessions of the men they apprehended and filled these up with
details that the evidence of the crime scene provided. Alfaros NBI handlers who were doing their own
investigation knew of these details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the NBI offices and practically
lived there, it was not too difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and gain access to the
documents.

Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso akyat bahay gang, condemned by the
Makati RTC as fabricated by the police to pin the crime on them, shows how crime investigators could
make a confession ring true by matching some of its details with the physical evidence at the crime
scene. Consider the following:
a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmelas house by breaking the glass panel of the
front door using a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise. Alfaro could not use this line since the
core of her story was that Webb was Carmelas boyfriend. Webb had no reason to smash her front door
to get to see her.

Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming that, on the way out of the
house, Webb picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled front door of the
Vizconde residence. His action really made no sense. From Alfaros narration, Webb appeared rational in
his decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to get away quickly to avoid
detection. Hurling a stone at that glass door and causing a tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting
the neighbors to come.

b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected confessions of the Barroso
akyat-bahay gang members said that they tried to rob the house. To explain this physical evidence,
Alfaro claimed that at one point Ventura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at another point, going
through a handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the front-door key and the car key.

Again, this portion of Alfaros story appears tortured to accommodate the physical evidence of the
ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura having taken some valuables with him when they left
Carmelas house. And why would Ventura rummage a bag on the table for the front-door key, spilling the
contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story made to fit in with the crime scene
although robbery was supposedly not the reason Webb and his companions entered that house.

c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that the bulb had been
loosened to turn off the light. The confessions of the Barroso gang claimed that one of them climbed the
parked cars hood to reach up and darken that light. This made sense since they were going to rob the
place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front door. Some passersby might
look in and see what they were doing.
Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. So she claimed that
Ventura climbed the cars hood, using a chair, to turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso akyat-bahay
gang, Webb and his friends did not have anything to do in a darkened garage. They supposedly knew in
advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not make sense for Ventura to
risk standing on the cars hood and be seen in such an awkward position instead of going straight into
the house.

And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBIs star witness, their badge of excellent investigative work. After claiming
that they had solved the crime of the decade, the NBI people had a stake in making her sound credible
and, obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed for the job of becoming a fairly good
substitute witness. She was their darling of an asset. And this is not pure speculation. As pointed out
above, Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a cold fact. Why the
trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.

At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong effect on her, given the
circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel Ging Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the Vizconde
killings. But when the NBI found a certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the Bicutan
Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaros Miguel Rodriguez and showed him to Alfaro at the
NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming: How can I forget your face. We just
saw each other in a disco one month ago and you told me then that you will kill me. As it turned out, he
was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case.[13]

Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate to settle some score with
him but it was too late to change the name she already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging the
wrong people for what they did not do.

3. The quality of the testimony

There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent
inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and the common behavior of people will help
expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence in this case.
One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart, who were
supposed to be Webbs co-principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb proposed
twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they (including, if one
believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But when they got to
Carmelas house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.

Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around Alfaros car, which was parked
on the street between Carmelas house and the next. Some of these men sat on top of the cars lid while
others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the street light to anyone who cared to watch them,
particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby house. Obviously, the behavior
of Webbs companions out on the street did not figure in a planned gang-rape of Carmela.

Two. Ventura, Alfaros dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to Webb and his friends
in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she agree to act as Webbs messenger, using her gas, to bring his
message to Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick it out the whole
night with Webb and his friends?

They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it came to a point that Webb
decided with his friends to gang-rape Carmela, clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck it
out with them, as a police asset would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report, only she was
not yet an asset then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to think clearly and just
followed along where the group took her, how could she remember so much details that only a drug-
free mind can?

Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her that she
still had to go out and that Webb and his friends should come back around midnight. Alfaro returned to
her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own car. And she trailed her up to Aguirre Avenue
where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmelas boyfriend. Alfaros trailing
Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since she was on limited errand. But,
as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to freak out and decide to come with his
friends and harm Carmela.
Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmelas house the third time around midnight, she
led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Now, this is
weird. Webb was the gang leader who decided what they were going to do. He decided and his friends
agreed with him to go to Carmelas house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to
Webb before that night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and
the others into her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro wanted to feign being a
witness to something she did not see.

Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty minutes, a woman
exclaimed, Sino yan? On hearing this, Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden and went to her car.
Apparently, she did this because she knew they came on a sly. Someone other than Carmela became
conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked away because, obviously, she
did not want to get involved in a potential confrontation. This was supposedly her frame of mind: fear of
getting involved in what was not her business.

But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what went on in the
house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is
what she next claimed. She went back into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela on the floor of
the masters bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmelas mom and her young sister whose
bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she got scared (another shift to
fear) for she hurriedly got out of the house after Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful look.

Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart who sat
on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak to them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She
entered her car and turned on the engine but she testified that she did not know where to go. This
woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house, knowing that they were
decided to rape and harm Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This emotional
pendulum swing indicates a witness who was confused with her own lies.

4. The supposed corroborations

Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony, the prosecution presented six additional
witnesses:

Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims,
testified on the stab wounds they sustained[14] and the presence of semen in Carmelas genitalia,[15]
indicating that she had been raped.

Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan Subdivision from 7 p.m. of June 29
to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a report on the morning of June 30 that something untoward
happened at the Vizconde residence. He went there and saw the dead bodies in the masters bedroom,
the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating from a television set.[16]

White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom he could identify, go in
and out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also saw them along Vinzons Street. Later, they entered Pitong
Daan Subdivision in a three-car convoy. White could not, however, describe the kind of vehicles they
used or recall the time when he saw the group in those two instances. And he did not notice anything
suspicious about their coming and going.

But Whites testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be inaccurate. He actually saw
Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong Daan Subdivision only once. They were not going in and out.
Furthermore, Alfaro testified that when the convoy of cars went back the second time in the direction of
Carmelas house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed the guardhouse without stopping. Yet,
White who supposedly manned that guardhouse did not notice her.

Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting the subdivision on the early
morning of June 30 when he supposedly cleaned up Vizconde residence on Webbs orders. What is more,
White did not notice Carmela arrive with her mom before Alfaros first visit that night. Carmela
supposedly left with a male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but White did not notice it. He
also did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision. White actually discredited Alfaros testimony about
the movements of the persons involved.
Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart that led the three-vehicle
convoy,[17] White claimed it was the Nissan Patrol with Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he
would not have let the convoy in without ascertaining that Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security
guard White did not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony.

Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision testified that he saw Webb around
the last week of May or the first week of June 1991 to prove his presence in the Philippines when he
claimed to be in the United States. He was manning the guard house at the entrance of the subdivision
of Pitong Daan when he flagged down a car driven by Webb. Webb said that he would see Lilet Sy.
Cabanacan asked him for an ID but he pointed to his United BF Homes sticker and said that he resided
there. Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan had a local sticker.

Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of Congressman Webb. Still,
the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture and the
name on it, Cabanacan returned the same and allowed Webb to pass without being logged in as their
Standard Operating Procedure required.[18]

But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not common for a security guard to
challenge a Congressmans son with such vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the
guardhouse book. Nor did he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the visitors entry into the
subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of seeing Webbs ID but not in
recording the visit.

Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at BF Homes Executive
Village. She testified that she saw Webb at his parents house on the morning of June 30, 1991 when she
got the dirty clothes from the room that he and two brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She saw him
again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt and shorts, passing
through a secret door near the maids quarters on the way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m. of the
same day.[19]

On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished June 30, 1991 from the other
days she was on service at the Webb household as to enable her to distinctly remember, four years
later, what one of the Webb boys did and at what time. She could not remember any of the details that
happened in the household on the other days. She proved to have a selective photographic memory and
this only damaged her testimony.

Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro's testimony by claiming that on June 30, 1991 she noticed
bloodstains on Webb's t-shirt.[20] She did not call the attention of anybody in the household about it
when it would have been a point of concern that Webb may have been hurt, hence the blood.

Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May 1992, and Sgt. Miguel Muoz,
the Webbs' security aide in 1991, testified that Gaviola worked for the Webbs only from January 1991 to
April 1991. Ventoso further testified that it was not Gaviola's duty to collect the clothes from the 2nd
floor bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged with cleaning the rooms.

What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there for only four months to
collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of her employers and their grown up children at four
in the morning while they were asleep.

And it did not make sense, if Alfaros testimony were to be believed that Webb, who was so careful and
clever that he called Biong to go to the Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence against
him and his group, would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the hamper for laundrywoman
Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed habit.

Lolita De Birrer was accused Biongs girlfriend around the time the Vizconde massacre took place. Birrer
testified that she was with Biong playing mahjong from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the early
morning of June 30, when Biong got a call at around 2 a.m. This prompted him, according to De Birrer,
to leave and go to BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him up. When Biong returned at 7
a.m. he washed off what looked like dried blood from his fingernails. And he threw away a foul-smelling
handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum cover from his drawer and hid it in his
steel cabinet.[21]

The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator flashing a badge to get into the
village although Biong supposedly came in at the unholy hour of two in the morning. His departure
before 7 a.m. also remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards. Besides, if he had cleaned up the
crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning there on the following morning
to dispose of some of the evidence in the presence of other police investigators and on-lookers? In fact,
why would he steal valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his return there hours later if he had
the opportunity to do it earlier?

At most, Birrers testimony only established Biongs theft of certain items from the Vizconde residence
and gross neglect for failing to maintain the sanctity of the crime scene by moving around and altering
the effects of the crime. Birrers testimony failed to connect Biong's acts to Webb and the other accused.

Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her wife and two daughters.
Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she called Bagyo, because he was a Paraaque politicians son.
Unfortunately, Lauro did not appear curious enough to insist on finding out who the rejected fellow was.
Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that Carmela and Webb had an on-going
relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be believed, Carmela wanted Webb to come to her house around
midnight. She even left the kitchen door open so he could enter the house.

5. The missing corroboration

There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecutions core theory that Carmela and
Webb had been sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to him, and that it was for this reason that
Webb brought his friends to her house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!

For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressmans son, courted the young Carmela, that would be news
among her circle of friends if not around town. But, here, none of her friends or even those who knew
either of them came forward to affirm this. And if Webb hanged around with her, trying to win her
favors, he would surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be so if they had become
sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to project with her testimony.

But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmelas friends or her friends friends would testify
ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing them together in some popular hangouts in Paraaque or
Makati. Alfaros claim of a five-hour drama is like an alien page, rudely and unconnectedly inserted into
Webb and Carmelas life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle trimmed to fit into the shape on the
board but does not belong because it clashes with the surrounding pieces. It has neither antecedent nor
concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their personal histories. It is quite unreal.

What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house with a male passenger, Mr. X,
whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was also Carmelas lover. This was the all-important reason
Webb supposedly had for wanting to harm her. Again, none of Carmelas relatives, friends, or people
who knew her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life. Nobody has come forward to testify
having ever seen him with Carmela. And despite the gruesome news about her death and how Mr. X had
played a role in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a special friend normally would.
Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the imagination of Alfaro, the woman who made a living
informing on criminals.

Webbs U.S. Alibi

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.

a. The travel preparations

Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife, Elizabeth, sent their son to
the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of independence, hard work, and money.[22] Gloria Webb, his
aunt, accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco via United Airlines. Josefina
Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets.

Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his basketball buddy, Joselito
Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even invited them to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at
Faces Disco along Makati Ave.[23] On March 8,1991, the eve of his departure, he took girlfriend
Milagros Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His basketball buddy Rafael Jose
with Tina Calma, a blind date arranged by Webb, joined them. They afterwards went to Faces Disco for
Webb's despedida party. Among those present were his friends Paulo Santos and Jay Ortega.[24]

b. The two immigration checks

The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California, with his Aunt Gloria on board
United Airlines Flight 808.[25] Before boarding his plane, Webb passed through the Philippine
Immigration booth at the airport to have his passport cleared and stamped. Immigration Officer,
Ferdinand Sampol checked Webbs visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass
through.[26] He was listed on the United Airlines Flights Passenger Manifest.[27]

On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where his entry into that country
was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-immigrant
Information System, confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb presented at the
trial the INS Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,[28] the computer-
generated print-out of the US-INS indicating Webb's entry on March 9, 1991,[29] and the US-INS
Certification dated August 31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs,
correcting an earlier August 10, 1995 Certification.[30]

c. Details of U.S. sojourn

In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latters daughter, Maria Teresa Keame, who
brought them to Glorias house in Daly City, California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb met
Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra, Glorias grandson. In April 1991, Webb, Christopher, and a certain
Daphne Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San Francisco.[31] In the same month, Dorothy
Wheelock and her family invited Webb to Lake Tahoe to return the Webbs hospitality when she was in
the Philippines.[32]

In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to Anaheim Hills,
California.[33] During his stay there, he occupied himself with playing basketball once or twice a week
with Steven Keeler[34] and working at his cousin-in-laws pest control company.[35] Webb presented the
companys logbook showing the tasks he performed,[36] his paycheck,[37] his ID, and other employment
papers. On June 14, 1991 he applied for a driver's license[38] and wrote three letters to his friend
Jennifer Cabrera.[39]

On June 28, 1991, Webbs parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with the Brottmans. On the same
day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon to his son when he came to visit.[40] On the following day,
June 29, Webb, in the company of his father and Aragon went to Riverside, California, to look for a car.
They bought an MR2 Toyota car.[41] Later that day, a visitor at the Brottmans, Louis Whittacker, saw
Webb looking at the plates of his new car.[42] To prove the purchase, Webb presented the Public
Records of California Department of Motor Vehicle[43] and a car plate LEW WEBB.[44] In using the car
in the U.S., Webb even received traffic citations.[45]

On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and Aragon,[46] bought a bicycle at Orange
Cycle Center.[47] The Center issued Webb a receipt dated June 30, 1991.[48] On July 4, 1991,
Independence Day, the Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family had a lakeside picnic.[49]

Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less than a month. On August 4,
1991 he left for Longwood, Florida, to stay with the spouses Jack and Sonja Rodriguez.[50] There, he
met Armando Rodriguez with whom he spent time, playing basketball on weekends, watching movies,
and playing billiards.[51] In November 1991, Webb met performing artist Gary Valenciano, a friend of
Jack Rodriguez, who was invited for a dinner at the Rodriguezs house.[52] He left the Rodriguezs home
in August 1992, returned to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas. He stayed there until he
left for the Philippines on October 26, 1992.

d. The second immigration checks

As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and Philippine immigrations on
his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S. was confirmed by the same certifications that
confirmed his entry.[53] Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department of State with enclosed
letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Office of Records of the US-INS
stated that the Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate statement. And when he
boarded his plane, the Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No. 103,[54] certified by Agnes
Tabuena[55] confirmed his return trip.

When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival
stamp and initial on his passport indicated his return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This was
authenticated by Carmelita Alipio, the immigration officer who processed Webbs reentry.[56] Upon his
return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once again saw Webb
playing basketball at the BF's Phase III basketball court.

e. Alibi versus positive identification

The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webbs alibi. Their reason is
uniform: Webbs alibi cannot stand against Alfaros positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of
Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this, to the
lower courts, Webbs denial and alibi were fabricated.

But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent,
he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has
been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangmans noose in the
face of a witness positively swearing, I saw him do it.? Most judges believe that such assertion
automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is
distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of prevailing
over such a stone-cast tenet?

There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty
conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration
from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the
accuseds claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful
witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, He did it! without blinking
an eye.
Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:

First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible who
can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who
knows her, its weight in gold.

And second, the witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived.
A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering
claims.

Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.

She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been
hanging around that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and
squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the prosecutions worst
possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she volunteered to play the role of a
witness in the Vizconde killings when she could not produce a man she promised to the NBI.

And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators
knew of the case. She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the
clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames even when they were
trying to slip away quietlyjust so she can accommodate this crime scene feature. She also had Ventura
rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front door key that nobody needed just to explain the
physical evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had Ventura climbing the cars hood,
risking being seen in such an awkward position, when they did not need to darken the garage to force
open the front doorjust so to explain the darkened light and foot prints on the car hood.

Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping Carmela is incongruent with their indifference,
exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a street light, visible to neighbors and
passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house, like if it was their turn to rape
Carmela. Alfaros story that she agreed to serve as Webbs messenger to Carmela, using up her gas, and
staying with him till the bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also taxes incredulity.

To provide basis for Webbs outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to the main road to watch
her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And, inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the role of
messenger, she claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gang-rape Carmella, as if
Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on personal knowledge. Her swing from an
emotion of fear when a woman woke up to their presence in the house and of absolute courage when
she nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also quite inexplicable.

Ultimately, Alfaros quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable, testimony
cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial
and an alibi.

f. A documented alibi

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence[57] that (a) he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.[58]

The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in Paraaque when the Vizconde
killings took place; he was not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on
March 9, 1991, he actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed the crime, erased the fact of his
return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine Immigrations, smuggled himself out
of the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal way on October 27, 1992. But this ruling
practically makes the death of Webb and his passage into the next life the only acceptable alibi in the
Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and inhuman paradigm.
If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his fathers
connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his
passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since there
had been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a foreign airlines
passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his name on
them? How could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigrations record system those two dates in its record of his
travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in
the Philippines and then return there? No one has come up with a logical and plausible answer to these
questions.

The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webbs passport since he did not leave the original to be
attached to the record. But, while the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that the
same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court of Appeals
Justice Tagle said in his dissent,[59] the practice when a party does not want to leave an important
document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the
parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are binding on the
parties and on the court.

The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webbs arrival in and departure from
that country were authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State
Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason that Webb
failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. But this was unnecessary.
Webbs passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under international practice,
is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that passport are
presumed true.[60]

The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have been
authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and
departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webbs passport. They have the same evidentiary
value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to testify on them.
Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty,
in the routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of the record.[61]
The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification from the U.S.
Immigration office said that it had no record of Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first
certification was amply explained by the U.S. Government and Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated it in
his dissenting opinion, thus:

While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on August 16, 1995 finding no
evidence of lawful admission of Webb, this was already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less than
the US INS Officials. As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim, Consul and Second Secretary of the
Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said Certification did not pass through proper diplomatic
channels and was obtained in violation of the rules on protocol and standard procedure governing such
request.

The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who directly communicated with
the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, USA, bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which is the
proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of the Records Services Board of US-INS
Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to Philip Antweiler, Philippine Desk Officer, State Department,
declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and erroneous as it was not exhaustive and did not reflect
all available information. Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Office of Information and privacy, US
Department of Justice, in response to the appeal raised by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained
that the INS normally does not maintain records on individuals who are entering the country as visitors
rather than as immigrants: and that a notation concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the
Nonimmigrant Information system. Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere tourist visa,
obviously, the initial search could not have produced the desired result inasmuch as the data base that
was looked into contained entries of the names of IMMIGRANTS and not that of NON-IMMIGRANT
visitors of the U.S..[62]

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel
documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from
airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the
Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and
openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines,
said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of evidence
out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching
evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what they state, are
immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here, however, the
prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webbs passport and the
certifications of the Philippine and U.S. immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back.
The prosecutions rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the lower courts minds.

7. Effect of Webbs alibi to others

Webbs documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also
with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts
the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold
together. Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story. Without it, the evidence against the others
must necessarily fall.

CONCLUSION

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the
innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it
entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an
innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to ones inner being, like a piece of meat lodged
immovable between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset
who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she
could not produce?
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and
Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS
accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez,
Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure
of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately
RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action
he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.