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Family Migration Decisions
Jacob Mincer
ColumbiaUniversity
I. Theoretical Concepts
Introduction
Following a more general tradition, past economic studies of migration
did not distinguish between personal and family decisions.' With the
emergence of detailed household panel data and of modern family
economics, such inaccuracy is no longer admissible. This paper joins a few
very recent attempts to analyze migration in the awareness of the family
This research was supported through the National Bureau of Economic Research by a
grant from the National Science Foundation and, in part, by the Employment and Train-
ing Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. It has benefited from collaborative
research with Ann P. Bartel and George J. Borjas at NBER and from comments of many
colleagues and of a referee. This report has not undergone the review accorded official
NBER publications.
1 Perhaps one reason is that the distinction between person and family is viewed as a
sociological rather than an economic issue. Indeed, sociological research on migration
considers the family quite explicitly as a collection of individuals (see long 1972, 1974,
1975). The most recent survey of the economic literature (Greenwood 1975) does not even
mention the family context of migration.
[Journal of Political Economy, 1978, vol. 86, no. 5]
(? 1978 by The University of Chicago. 0022-3808/78/8605-0009$02.07
749
750 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
2 DaVanzo 1972, 1976; Kaluzny 1975; Sandell 1975; Polachek and Horvath 1977.
With the exception of DaVanzo (1974), these papers were not available to me prior to
the first draft in 1975. The current version benefited from the new findings and contains
references to them.
3 A contrary assumption is problematic, to say the least. It suggests that the extended
TABLE 1
P(Crf > 0), NVJIE.NP(Gi > 0) _ 16',0
Moving as a Fanmly
4 A "private" optimum is the maximal potential personal gain in the absence of family
ties, to be distinguished from the actual personal gain or loss, given the family decision.
' This figure appears in table 1 on the assumption that G5 and G2 are uncorrelated
(p = 0) and equal, on average (k = 1).
752 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
of them (7.5 - 2.56 ;5) contain tied movers, awhile92.5 percent stay
with about one quarter of them (92.5 - 70.56 - 22) containing tied
stayers. The major point of this example is the dramatic drop of the
migration rate from 16 percent to 7.5 percent merely by the random
pairing of spouses. As will be shown, the inhibiting effect of marital status
is reduced, but not eliminated, when the special assumptions of this
illustration are relaxed. Except that, at the opposite extreme, if the gains
(or losses) of men always dominated the losses (or gains) of women, or if
the pairs of gains were perfectly positively correlated, the proportion of
men (and therefore of women) migrating would be the same whether they
are married or not.
To consider the matter more generally, drop the assumption of in-
dependence between the signs of G1 and G2, and simply assume a bivariate
distribution of G, and G2, with means6 and variances Pi,, a,; P23 62;
and correlation p 12. Now, the probability of migration of persons, or the
private probability of each spouse, is P(Gi > 0), the area in the distribu-
tion of Gi to the right of Gi = 0. The size of this area is invelsely related
to the standardized value of G = 0, namely, Zio = (0 - i) f/fl = -1/
CVi, where CVi is the coefficient of variation in the distribution.
For simplicity, and perhaps not unrealistically, assume that CV1 = CV2,
so that P2 = k m1and o2 = k o,*.This ensures that the private migration
probabilities are identical for each sex. Yet the probability of family
migration is different, because it is related to CVf and CVf < CVi.
- a(GI + G2) 2I + 2paIC2 + a = + 2pka + k %4
PI + P2 pi + P2 (( + k)1l
o 1 + 2pk+k2 / + 2pk + k2
Ail I + k VI< + 2k + k2
It is clear from equation (1) that CVf = CV1when either p = + 1 or
k = 0. In other words, when the two gains (or losses) are perfectly cor-
related, or when one spouse's gain (or loss) is negligible and is therefore
always dominated by the other, the overall frequency of migration is not
affected by marital status.
It is clear also that CjVf = CV1 is the maximal value of CVf, since the
maximum value of the square root expression is unity. In general, there
is a deterrent effect of marital status which is stronger the lesser (or the
more negative) the correlation of G, and G2: For p < 1, the minimum
value of CVf is reached when k = 1.
We can get some notion of the orders of magnitude in the reduction of
the family migration probabilities as parameter p is decreased and k
6
The means 1i are negative, since most of the population does not move within the
relatively short decision period.
FAMILY MIGRATION DECISIONS 753
increased in a simple but informative simulation procedure. Assume nor-
mal distributions of Gi therefore of Gf-and take a period for which
P(Gi > 0) = 16 percent. Then, since Zi = 1, CVj = - 1, and cumula-
tive probabilities for Zf = - l/CVf can be inspected in a normal prob-
ability table. These are listed in table 1 for values of k for 0 < k < 1
andofp,for -l <p < +1.
It appears from the table that an equalization of work experience of
men and women, and presumably a consequent equalization of the
distribution of gains from migration (that is, an increase of k toward one)
brings about a reduction in family propensities to migrate, provided p,
the correlation among gains from migration of spouses, remains un-
changed. The deterrent effect of a higher k is stronger at lower correlation
levels; for given levels of k, the stronger the correlation the less the
deterrent effect of marriage on migration.
It is also easy to see that the higher the correlation p, the smaller is the
incidence of tied spouses: their "public" (family) decisions are largely
consistent with their "private" gains from migration. At the same time,
k the ratio of women's to men's gains-affects the distribution rather
than the incidence of tied partners among movers and stayers: The
closer women's gains to men's (k -* 1), the fewer the number of tied
movers, but the larger the number of tied stayers (of both sexes), since the
total number of movers is smaller. With low levels of k, there is little
deterrence to migration and most of the migrating families contain tied
women. Note, however, that the seriousness of the conflict between Gf and
Gi increases with k-a matter which potentially affects family stability
when migration opportunities arise. This matter is discussed in "Migration
and Family Stability" below.
Since tied persons in the family are those whose gains from migration
are (in absolute value) dominated by gains (or losses) of the spouse, there
are reasons to believe that wives are more likely than husbands to be the
dominated (tied) partners. The assumption that k < 1 is especially
plausible for the labor market components of Gj: On the return side larger
gains (or losses) are likely to accrue to persons with greater market earning
power, and on the cost side foregone earnings are also higher for such
persons. Moreover, the returns (or losses) from migration are likely to be
smaller for persons whose labor force participation is discontinuous. Thus,
on average, the absolute value of Gi is larger for husbands than for wives.
Indeed, within the family, higher market earning powers of husbands
induce a lesser market participation, lower market earnings, and a
diminished migration payoff for the wife. Since locational amenities and
preferences for them are likely to be shared by spouses, divergences in
market opportunities are a more probable source of discord in locational
choice. Consequently, migration ties arise more often in families of work-
ing couples than in single-earner families. In view of the smaller gains
754 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
SeveralDestinations
Since more than one destination is generally open to potential migrants,
Gi should be defined as the maximum G over all possible destinations.
Then, the relevant personal G"'ax and G"laxmay refer to different desti-
nations say, D1 and D2 -and a conflict arises even when G` ax and G&ax
are both positive. For the family decision, however, Gf = G1 + G2 must
7 On the extreme assumption that k = 0 in families with nonworking wives, migration
rates of marrieds would be reduced by 15 percent compared with others. See table 2 for
empirical data by age groups.
FAMILY MIGRATION DECISIONS 755
be maximized, and this may result in the family not moving, or moving to
D1, D or even D3, where neither of the personal gains is maximized but
25
where Gmax is the potential optimal private gain, while Gi is the individual
opportunity gain (or loss) from optimal family migration. In the special
case of a single destination, GQ= G max and GCmax = 0; hence, T = -G2.
Thus, T is nothing else but a measure of the negative private externality
imposed by family migration.
To the extent that both Gi's are motivated by job opportunities, the
dissimilarity in locational specificities of spouses that gives rise to
Gi < G max might be reduced by a tendency for such families to locate in
large, diversified labor markets. Thus, it may well be that the growing
job motivation of wives will weaken the tendency toward far-flung sub-
urbanization, not only because of the negative effects of wage prospects
on fertility, but also because of a need for greater proximity to large,
diversified labor markets.
Marital Status
If family ties deter migration, as our discussion suggests, then husband-
wife families should migrate less frequently than persons without spouses.
This difference is shown clearly in data on annual migration rates reported
by the U.S. Census Bureau's CurrentPopulation Reportsand averaged over a
6-year period (I1966-71). { ' Table 2 shows that in each age group annual
Stein (1963).
The averaged data are borrowed from Long's (1974) excellent demographic study.
FAMILY MIGRATION DECISIONS 759
TABLE 2
MEN 20-64 YEARS OLD WITH NONFARMOCCUPATIONSGEOGRAPHICALLY
MOBILE DURINGTHE PRECEDING12 MONTHS, 1966-71 (%)
migration rates (cols. 2 and 3) of husband and wife families in which the
husband was 25-64 years old were less than rates of men without wives
(single, widowed, separated, and divorced).
The behavior of the youngest families (husband's age less than 25)
constitutes an exception, which can be explained by the concept of
changes in locational equilibrium. Life-cycle events such as completion of
schooling, entry into the labor force, family formation, or dissolution
create new incentives and opportunities for migration. Conversely, people
also migrate to start a career and to marry. Since the youngest married
couples are, practically by definition, most recently married, their
migration rate is high. The upper panel of table 3 shows the high rates of
migration of young couples married 1 year compared with all young
married couples. 12
12 See also CPR 1970, no. 193, table 5, which shows that migration rates decline steeply
TABLE 3
MIGRArION RArES BY AGE. SEX, AND MARITAL STATUS, 1968-69
MEN WOMEN
Status
JVife's Etmpiployntil
Table 2 shows higher migration rates of families where the wife is not
employed outside the home than in families where the wife is employed.
13 Becker, Landes, and Michael 1976.
I See CPR 1972, no. 235, table 6.
FAMILY MIGRATION DECISIONS 76I
TABLE 4
\NVIFE'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND FAMILY MIGRATION, 1965-70
However, as Long (1974) noted, the evidence confuses cause and effect
when employment status is reported during the survey week and migration,
if any, during the preceding 12 months. Such findings are partly biased
since, of the women who worked at the place of origin and lost their job
through migration, many did not, or not immediately, regain employment
at destination.
The proper comparison is by employment status which precedes
migration. Table 4 (left panel) shows migration rates of families during a
5-year period following 1965, by age of husband and employment status
of wife. With the exception of the youngest couples, migration rates are
lower in families in which the wives were employed than in families with
wives who did not work in 1965. The least propensity to move is shown
by families in which wives' job attachment is strongest, here (col. 3)
identified by the wives' employment both in 1965 and 1970.
As in the top panels of tables 2 and 3, so in table 4 migration rates of
young couples (husband's age up to 29 in 1965) where wives worked in
1965 (but not in 1970) were riot lower than in families where wives did
not work in 1965. The young working wives described in the upper panels
of these tables have not yet settled into longer lasting jobs. A change in
locational equilibrium following the recent marriage and prospective
childbearing accelerate migration of all families during this period.
Significantly, table 4 shows that in families where wives had a strong
attachment to their market work (employed both in 1965 and 1970), the
deterrent effect on migration is visible even in the youngest families
(cf. cols. 2 and 3).
Table 5 (also table 2) shows an interaction of wife's employment
status and distance of migration in their effects on migration rates.
Migration rates diminish with distance, but they decrease more strongly
in families with working wives than in other families. Indeed, for the
nearest relocations, migration rates are higher in two-earner than in one-
earner families. These findings, incidentally, hold for employment status
reported after (table 2) as well as before moving (table 3).
~
z~~~~~~
H - een r-So C) r-
Vt CN
H 0 N c on e o r Z C14
0 '* en eZs C o e4 -
r
0>~~~~~
o > X | cn o e1e1 _ r- o c CO
o~~~~~~~~~~~~L
z c; 06 C,- m+x C14 C6
>HZ1 (0 -~ ~
? O<
(. Co
OH 0-c
o
Cz
Oo~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c
t ?5
> >~C,
.C ,C >, CC4= S C ,C ,c Ln ,c .M
762
FAMILY MIGRATION DECISIONS 763
The interaction with distance can be explained as follows. Costs of
migration (C) increase with distance so that potential net gains (G)
diminish. In families in which there are migration ties, G2 and R2 are
negative in Gf = G1 + G2 = RI + R2 - Cf. Consequently, Gf becomes
negative at a lesser distance from origin than GCdoes, so deterrence to
migration increases with distance. If such couples migrate, their returns,
R1 + R2, have to be greater the greater the distance of migration in order
for (CG + G2) - R1 + R2 - f to remain positive. If earning power is a
proxy for dollar returns from migration, we should find a greater positive
difference between husbands' and wives' earning power among long-
distance than among short-distance movers, prior to migration. We do,
indeed, find both for young and older NLS men that migration distance
(in miles) is positively related to husbands' education and premigration
wage, given the wives' labor force participation and wage, while the
latter have a negative effect. 15
By the same token, short-distance migrants are couples with smaller
intrafamily differences in wages. In our terminology, a higher k deters
long-distance migration of tied husbands. Greater local job mobility, then,
serves as a substitute for search in a wider area, and this may well explain
the greater local residential mobility of two-earner, as compared with
single-earner, families. We find, in fact, in our current NBER studies of
job mobility, that local job change is more frequent among husbands of
working wives. 16
TABLE 6
FAMILY VARIABLES IN MIGRATION
Probability of Migration
noted that the small number of migrants in the sample produces statistics
with low levels of significance. 1 7
TABLE 7
1970 UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY MOBILITY IN 1965-70
Job Mobility
Total Labor Force Quit for Job Rate* of Men,
Separation Withdrawal Family Mobility Age 45-59,t
Rate Rate Reasons Rate NILS Sample
Years of Tenure (1) (2) (3) (1) - (2) (5)
0-2 .46.9........ 46.9 20.6 18.0 26.3 25.1
2-4 ................... 15.8 10.4 7.6 5.4 17.5
4-6 .14.9......... 14.9 7.8 6.7 7.1 11.0
6-8 .18.5......... 18.5 9.9 8.8 8.6 12.4
8-10 .13.4 9.0 6.7 4.4 6.3
10-12 .15.7.......... 15.7 11.8 13.7 3.9 7.0
12-14 .16.4 12.5 12.2 3.9 3.8
14-18 .11.8 9.6 9.3 2.2 4.5
18+. . ....... 12.8 11.2 9.0 1.6 3.8
* Average of periods 1967-69 and 1969-71.
t Age in 1966.
Not only tied movers but also stayers experience a reduction in the
market earnings potential. By definition, tied stayers fail to exploit
potential gains from labor mobility. The confinement of job mobility to
the local labor market, often at short distances, reduces the scope of job
change and the quality of the job match.
The job mobility rate of employed women is, indeed, smaller than the
rate of men at comparable levels of job tenure, as shown in table 8 (cols.
4 and 5), even though their total separation rate (col. 1) exceeds the
separation rate of men (which is only slightly higher than the figures in
col. 5).
The slower rate of job mobility of tied stayers, coupled with shorter
tenure due to labor force withdrawals (col. 2), implies lesser occupational
progress.According to the NLS, 7 percent of women employed throughout
1965 changed occupations, compared with 10 percent of men. These
differences persist within age, education, and tenure groups. The oc-
cupational mobility rates are also smaller on the job as well as in changing
jobs. 23
According to table 8, quits for family reasons (col. 3), which include
migration, are closely related to labor force withdrawals. Of course,
migration need not imply a withdrawal from the labor force, though it
frequently does, as we have seen. We have seen also that such "exogenous"
quits may lead to a period of unemployment as well. In our NBER study
of job mobility, we find that exogenous (family or health related) quits
often result in unemployment of men as well. Consequently, the pre-
valence of tied quits among women, as in migration, explains the census
23 These are detailed occupational categories. Such moves of employed workers are
24
Incidentally, according to Sandell's regressions (1975), earnings gains of husbands
were related to their premigration wages-an assumption we used for G, throughout this
paper. As expected, this was not true of the endogenous (tied) G2.
FAMILY MIGRATION DECISIONS 769
We may conclude that the intrafamily trade-off in gains and losses
from migration involves mutual causality. Gains of husbands induce a
reduction in labor supply and earnings losses of wives, while the potential
losses of wives' migration reduces migration but increases the gains of
husbands in families which move.
Migration,FamilyStability,anidTrenids
The empirical evidence described thus far reflects the internalization of
family ties which, in the context of migration, can be viewed as an ex-
ternality to the family member in his (or her) private capacity. As we
argued in the theoretical discussion, conflicting private locational incen-
tives cannot always be reconciled, and prospective or actual migration
may lead to family dissolution. Conversely, when families disintegrate for
whatever reason, locational equilibrium changes for many of the separated
and divorced persons, and migration follows.
We have seen the stronger migration propensities of divorced and
separated persons compared with others in some of the data cited before.
Evidence on temporal sequences which would reflect migration-caused
family breakup is difficult to come by. We are able to get some inferences
only from one data set: The C-R panel provides chronological data on
labor mobility and on family formation and dissolution over a period
averaging 15 years from completion of high school to the mid-thirties
of a sample of about 1,000 men. In this sample, less than 2 percent of the
marriages dissolved by separation or divorce in an average year. However,
in a 12-month period bracketing a geographic move (interstate) of the
respondent (husband), 5 percent of the families broke up. Conversely,
about 8 percent of the married men moved to another county in a random
year, but 19 percent moved in years bracketing marital breakup.
The comparisons reflect causality running in both directions. They show
the effects of mobility on family integrity, as well as the effects of marital
breakup in creating locational disequilibrium, which underlies the high
mobility rates of separated and divorced persons.
By increasing the incidence of tied spouses, trends toward equalization
of labor market experience of men and women may contribute to a
decrease in migration rates of married couples,2 5 as well as to an increase
in marital instability of migrants as well as of stayers.26 However, in-
creases in marital instability, whatever their source, stimulate migration
25 However, women who lose jobs because of family migration are increasingly defined
as eligible for unemployment insurance. The effect is to reduce obstacles to migration,
as well as to increase the incidence and duration of unemployment among wives of
migrants.
26 The effect of the intrafamily relative earnings on family stability is not restricted to
episodes of migration (see Becker [1974] and Santos [1975] for analysis and documen-
tation) .
770 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
SummaryandConclusions
The subject of this paper was the exploration of the effects of family ties
on migration, of the effects of migration decisions in the presence of such
ties on employment and earnings of family members and on family
stability. Ties are defined only in relation to migration decisions. In the
case of a single (aggregated) destination, ties exist when individual
(private) gains of family members differ in sign. The tied person is one
whose gain (or loss) is smaller in absolute value. In the more general case
of several potential destinations, ties exist so long as the gain of at least one
spouse in the family's optimal location is less than his or her private
maximum. In this case both spouses can be tied, although the discrepancy
from the private optimum is likely to be larger for the spouse with the
smaller gain. Indeed, the discrepancy is a measure of the magnitude of
the tie. It is a measure of the negative externality which the decision to
move (or to stay) imposes on the family members in their individual
capacities.
These externalities are usually, but not always, internalized by the
family. They are absorbed without undermining family integrity so long
as the sum of the ties is less than the gains from marriage. Otherwise,
the family dissolves and at least one person moves. The theorem that
families move whenever family gain is positive and stay when it is negative
must, therefore, be amended. The sign of the family gain is a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for the decisions to move or not to move as a
family.
The presence of family ties deters migration of families, even though it
creates tied movers as well. Since gains or losses from migration are
mainly attributable to job mobility, two-earner families are more likely to
be deterred than single-earner families. Single earners in husband-wife
families are almost always men, so it is families with working wives whose
migration is most likely to be inhibited.
Empirical evidence on the effects of marital status confirms these
FAMILY MIGRATION DECISIONS 77I
propositions: Married persons are less likely to move than singles, and
the mobility of separated and divorced partners (others) is by far the
highest. The mobility of singles is dampened by the fact that many of them
are tied members of households headed by parents or other close relatives.
In contrast, the mobility of others is augmented by their relatively recent
change of marital status, which creates a change of locational equilibrium.
The same effect, of course, holds for newly married couples.
Evidence on lesser migration rates of families with working wives is
extensive. The deterrent effects are stronger when the wife's attachment is
more permanent and, in general, when her permanent earning power is
higher. In contrast, when families are classified by education of husband,
they are more likely to move. Educated husbands' contributions to family
income are larger, and their gains from migration are more likely to out-
weigh their wives' losses.
The deterrent effect of the wife's work status increases with distance,
while the husband's education is positively related to the distance of
migration. At shorter distances (intracounty moves), wives' earnings
actually encourage more intensive search activities of husbands. According
to our analysis, where the female to male earnings ratio is higher, the
incidence of immobilized husbands increases. Consequently, local mobility
increases relative to long-distance migration.
Migration tends to reduce the unemployment of men and to increase
the unemployment of women, since women tend to be tied movers. But to
the extent that men are tied, unemployed men with working wives tend
to search longer at origin than unemployed husbands of nonworking
wives, even if they eventually migrate. Migrating wives experience
increases in unemployment, reductions in employment, and labor force
withdrawals at destination, and these effects increase with distance. Tied
migration results in postponement of job search until after the move,
changes in intrafamily income, and substitution variables due to market
gains of husbands and market losses of wives, and at least temporary
increases in family demand for household activities. Not only tied movers
but also tied stayers experience adverse effects in the labor market. The
restriction ofjob mobility to short distances reduces the scope of job search
and opportunities for advancement and increases the probability of job
mismatch, unemployment, and labor force withdrawal.
We may conclude that the growth of two-earner families increases
unemployment of both sexes but primarily of women. By interrupting the
continuity of women's work, tied migration leads to slower growth of
wages over the life cycle. The adverse effect on wage growth can occur
even without discontinuity of employment, since the mere interruption of
job tenure reduces incentives of workers and employers for job-specific
investments. Tied migration ranks next to child rearing as an important
dampening influence in the life-cycle wage evolution of women.
772 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
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