PT&T vs.

NLRC and Grace de Guzman

G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997

FACTS:

This is a case for illegal dismissal filed by Grace de Guzman against PT&T.

Grace de Guzman is a probationary employee of PT&T. In her job application, she represented that she was
single although she was married. When management found out, she was made to explain. However, her
explanation was found unsatisfactory so she was subsequently dismissed from work.

Grace thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against PT&T with RAB. According to the Labor Arbiter, Grace, who
had already gained the status of regular employee, was illegally dismissed by PT&T. Moreover, he ruled that
Grace was apparently discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of
company rules.

On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was upheld. The Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise rebuffed, hence, this special civil action.

Petitioner argued that the dismissal was not because Grace was married but because of her concealment of
the fact that she was married. Such concealment amounted to dishonesty, which was why she was dismissed
from work.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for employment was discriminatory

Whether or not Grace’s act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss of confidence

Whether or not Grace was illegally dismissed

HELD:

There was discrimination

Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female
employee.

Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our
labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that it dismissed private
respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the
company were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for
employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty

Verily, private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly
characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to
retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same
illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss
of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an
actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employer’s caprices. Furthermore, it should
never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.

However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be sanctioned and
therefore agreed with the NLRC’s decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of Grace from
work.

Grace attained regular status as an employee

Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she was
served her walking papers on Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as
she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected
just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in
order to prevent her from earning security of tenure.

There was illegal dismissal

As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just cause,
she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.

On Stipulation against Marriage

In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&T’s policy against marriage is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals
and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of
the nation.

Petition dismissed.
19. APEX MINING CO., INC. versus NLRC

FACTS:

Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc to perform
laundry services at its staff house.

On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry, she
accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with
her work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication.

De la Rosa offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her
to quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work.

Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.

Private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and Employment, which the
latter rendered its Decision by ordering the Apex Mining Co. to pay Candida the total amount of P55,161.42
for salary differential, emergency living allowance, 13th month pay differential and separation pay.

Petitioner appealed the case before the NLRC, which was subsequently dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondent should be treated as househelper or domestic servant or a regular
employee.

HELD:

Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the term "househelper" as used herein is
synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who
renders services in and about the employer's home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for
the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of
the employer's family.

The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelper or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a

company, like private respondent who attends to the needs of the company's guest and other persons availing
of said facilities.

The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of the
employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its
officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be
considered as a regular employee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of public respondent NLRC
are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs
BARCENAS VS. NLRC

G.R. No. 87210 July 16, 1990

FILOMENA BARCENAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), Rev. SIM DEE the present Head Monk of the Manila
Buddha Temple, MANUEL CHUA, in his capacity as the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Inc., and in his private capacity,respondents.

FACTS: The Buddhist Temple has hired petitioner who speaks the Chinese language as secretary and
interpreter. The head monk, Chua Se Su, had sexual relations with petitioner, which resulted to the latter
giving birth to a child. In May, 1982, of five months before giving birth to the alleged son of Su on October 12,
1982, petitioner was sent home to Bicol. Upon the death of Su in July, 1983, complainant remained and
continued in her job. In 1985, respondent Manuel Chua (Chua, for short) was elected President and Chairman
of the Board of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Inc. and Rev. Sim Dee for short) was
elected Head Buddhist Priest. Thereafter, Chua and Dee discontinued payment of her monthly allowance and
the additional P500.00 allowance effective 1983. Petitioner and her son were evicted forcibly from their
quarters in the temple by six police officers. She was brought first to the Police precinct in Tondo and then
brought to Aloha Hotel where she was compelled to sign a written undertaking not to return to the Buddhist
temple in consideration of the sum of P10,000.00. Petitioner refused and Chua shouted threats against her
and her son. Her personal belongings including assorted jewelries were never returned by respondent Chua.

Chua alleges that she was never an employee of the temple, but only attended to the personal needs of the
former head monk, hence was co-terminus with such.

LA ruled in favour of the petitioner. NLRC reversed.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is an employee of the temple

HELD:

Petitioner is an employee of the temple as secretary and interpreter.

Moreover, the work that petitioner performed in the temple could not be categorized as mere domestic work.
We find that petitioner, being proficient in the Chinese language, attended to the visitors, mostly Chinese,
who came to pray or seek advice before Buddha for personal or business problems; arranged meetings
between these visitors and Su and supervised the preparation of the food for the temple visitors; acted as
tourist guide of foreign visitors; acted as liaison with some goverment offices; and made the payment for the
temple’s Meralco, MWSS and PLDT bills. Indeed, these tasks may not be deemed activities of a household
helper. They were essential and important to the operation and religious functions of the temple.

In spite of this finding, her status as a regular employee ended upon her return to Bicol in May, 1982 to await
the birth of her love-child allegedly by Su. The records do not show that petitioner filed any leave from work
or that a leave was granted her. Neither did she return to work after the birth of her child on October 12,
1982, whom she named Robert Chua alias Chua Sim Tiong. The NLRC found that it was only in July, 1983 after
Su died that she went back to the Manila Buddhist Temple. Petitioner’s pleadings failed to rebut this finding.
Clearly, her return could not be deemed as a resumption of her old position which she had already
abandoned.

Thus, her return to the temple was no longer as an employee but rather as Su’s mistress who is bent on
protecting the proprietary and hereditary rights of her son and nephew. Finally, while petitioner contends that
she continued to work in the temple after Su died, there is, however, no proof that she was re-hired by the
new Head Monk.

REMINGTON CORP. VS. CASTANEDA

November 20, 2006

G.R. Nos. 169295-96

FACTS: Erlinda Castaneda instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of
overtime services, non-payment of SIL pay and non-payment of 13th month pay against Remington Industrial
Sales Corp. before the NLRC-NCR.

Erlinda alleged that she started working in 1983 as company cook for Remington, a corporation engaged in
the trading business and that she continuously worked with Remington until she was unceremoniously
prevented from reporting for work when Remington transferred to a new site.

Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally. It posited that Erlinda was a domestic helper, not a
regular employee; Erlinda worked as a cook and this job had nothing to do with Remington’s business of
trading in construction or hardware materials, steel plates and wire rope products.

In a Decision, the LA dismissed the complaint and ruled that the respondent was a domestic helper under the
personal service of Antonio Tan (the Managing Director), finding that her work as a cook was not usually
necessary and desirable in the ordinary course of trade and business of the petitioner corporation, and that
the latter did not exercise control over her functions. On the issue of illegal dismissal, the labor arbiter found
that it was the respondent who refused to go with the family of Antonio Tan when the corporation transferred
office and that, therefore, respondent could not have been illegally dismissed.

ISSUE: is Castaneda a regular employee or a domestic servant?

HELD: The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decisions of the CA are AFFIRMED

She is a REGULAR EMPLOYEE

In Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court held that a househelper in the staff houses of an industrial
company was a regular employee of the said firm. We ratiocinated that:

Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms “househelper” or “domestic
servant” are defined as follows:

“The term ‘househelper’ as used herein is synonymous to the term ‘domestic servant’ and shall refer to any
person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employer’s home and which services
are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to
the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family.”

The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in the
employer’s home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s
family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys
and similar househelps.

xxx xxx xxx

The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said
employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or
laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their
circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case,
whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural
or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the
employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the business concerned
entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.

Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned to certain aspects of
the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic servant may be considered as such an
employee. The Court finds no merit in making any such distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or
domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in
connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants
the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee
of the employer and NOT as a mere family househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII,
Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.

In the case at bar, the petitioner itself admits in its position paper that respondent worked at the company
premises and her duty was to cook and prepare its employees’ lunch and merienda. Clearly, the situs, as well
as the nature of respondent’s work as a cook, who caters not only to the needs of Mr. Tan and his family but
also to that of the petitioner’s employees, makes her fall squarely within the definition of a regular employee
under the doctrine enunciated in the Apex Mining case. That she works within company premises, and that
she does not cater exclusively to the personal comfort of Mr. Tan and his family, is reflective of the existence
of the petitioner’s right of CONTROL over her functions, which is the PRIMARY indicator of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.

NOTES:

THE OTHER ISSUE:

was there illegal dismissal? NO

Petitioner contends that there was abandonment on respondent’s part when she refused to report for work
when the corporation transferred to a new location in Caloocan City, claiming that her poor eyesight would
make long distance travel a problem. Thus, it cannot be held guilty of illegal dismissal.
On the other hand, the respondent claims that when the petitioner relocated, she was no longer called for
duty and that when she tried to report for work, she was told that her services were no longer needed. She
contends that the petitioner dismissed her without a just or authorized cause and that she was not given prior
notice, hence rendering the dismissal illegal.

We rule for the respondent.

As a regular employee, respondent enjoys the right to security of tenure under Article 279 of the Labor Code
and may only be dismissed for a just or authorized cause, otherwise the dismissal becomes illegal and the
employee becomes entitled to reinstatement and full backwages computed from the time compensation was
withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.

Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is a form
of neglect of duty; hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer under Article 282 of
the Labor Code, which enumerates the just causes for termination by the employer.

For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be present:

(1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and

(2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative
factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employee has no more
intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was
deliberate and unjustified. This, the petitioner failed to do in the case at bar.

Alongside the petitioner’s contention that it was the respondent who quit her employment and refused to
return to work, greater stock may be taken of the respondent’s immediate filing of her complaint with the
NLRC. Indeed, an employee who loses no time in protesting her layoff cannot by any reasoning be said to
have abandoned her work, for it is well-settled that the filing of an employee of a complaint for illegal
dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of her desire to return to work, thus, negating the
employer’s charge of abandonment.

In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and
valid cause; failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. The employer’s case
succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the employee’s defense. If doubt
exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted
in favor of the latter

It is well-settled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to serve the demands of
substantial justice, particularly in labor cases. Labor cases must be decided according to justice and equity and
the substantial merits of the controversy. Rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.