State v. Loomis, 20 S.W. 332 (Mo.
, 1892)
20 S.W. 332
STATE
v.
LOOMIS et al.
Supreme Court of Missouri, Division
No. 2.
October 10, 1892.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — SPECIAL
LEGISLATION — PAYMENT OF WAGES —
ORDER ON STORE — LIMITING RIGHT OF
CONTRACT — EVIDENCE.
1. Rev. St. 1889, § 7058, provides that it
shall not be lawful for any corporation,
person, or firm engaged in manufacturing or
mining to issue for the payment of wages any
order, check, or other token of indebtedness,
payable otherwise than in lawful money,
unless the same is negotiable and redeemable
at its face value, in cash, or in goods, at the
option of the holder, at the store or other
place of business of the corporation or firm.
Held, that this was not such class legislation
as infringed upon the constitutional right of
all to equal protection of the laws, all persons
subject to the legislation being treated alike
under like circumstances and conditions.
2. Such a statute is not an attempt by the
legislature to limit the right of contract, but
simply to prescribe its form in certain
contingencies.
3. Such statute does not violate Bill of
Rights, § 4, declaring "that all constitutional
government is intended to promote the
general welfare of the people; that all persons
have a natural right to life, liberty, and the
enjoyment of the gains of their own industry;
that to give security to these things is the
principal office of government, and that,
when government does not confer this
security, it fails of its chief design."
4. Where the evidence showed that
defendants issued to an employe a coupon
check book for $5 in payment of wages, which
stated that the book was good for
merchandise at defendant's store when
presented by the employe, and it appeared
that the amount of the coupons was deducted
from the employe's wages, and charged to
him, the evidence was sufficient to prove a
violation of the statute.
Appeal from circuit court, Macon county;
ANDREW ELLISON, Judge.
Wesley Loomis, Ezra Snively, and Lewis
J. Loomis were convicted of a violation of a
statute, and appeal. Affirmed.
Dysart & Mitchell, for appellants. The
Attorney General, for the State.
THOMAS, J.
The defendants were tried upon an
information filed by the prosecuting attorney
in the circuit court of Macon county for
issuing a check or evidence of indebtedness in
payment of wages of labor, in violation of the
following sections of the Revised Statutes of
1889: "Sec. 7058. It shall not be lawful for any
corporation, person, or firm engaged in
manufacturing or mining in this state to
issue, pay out, or circulate for payment of the
wages of labor any order, check,
memorandum, token, or evidence of
indebtedness, payable in whole or in part
otherwise than in lawful money of the United
States, unless the same is negotiable and
redeemable at its face value, without
discount, in cash, or in goods, wares, or
merchandise, or supplies, at the option of the
holder, at the store or other place of business
of such firm, person, or corporation, or at the
store of any other person on whom such
paper may be drawn, where goods, wares, or
merchandise are kept for sale, sold, or
exchanged; and the person who, or
corporation, firm, or company which, may
issue any such order, check, memorandum,
token, or other evidence of indebtedness,
shall, upon presentation and demand, within
thirty days from date or delivery thereof,
redeem the same in goods, wares,
 State v. Loomis, 20 S.W. 332 (Mo., 1892)
merchandise, or supplies at the current cash
market price for like goods, wares,
merchandise, or supplies, or in lawful money
of the United States, as may be demanded by
the holder of any such order, memorandum,
token, or other evidence of indebtedness:
provided, that if said corporation, person, or
firm engaged as specified in this section have
a regular pay day once in every thirty days,
then said corporation, person, or firm shall
not be required to redeem such token or
evidence of indebtedness in cash until the
first pay day after the same become payable,
as herein provided, and such token or
evidence of indebtedness shall be presented
for payment in cash only on such pay days."
"Sec. 7060. Any officer or agent of any
corporation, or any person, firm, or company
engaged in the business of manufacturing or
mining in this state, who, by themselves or
agent, shall issue or circulate in payment for
wages of labor any order, check,
memorandum, token, or evidence of
indebtedness, payable in whole or in part
otherwise than in lawful money of the United
States, without being negotiable and payable
at the option of the holder in goods, wares,
merchandise, supplies, or lawful money of the
United States, as required by section 7058 of
this article, or who shall fail to redeem the
same when
[20 S.W. 333]
presented for payment within thirty days
from date or delivery thereof, by said
company or its agents at his or their office or
place of business, in lawful money of the
United States, or who shall compel or attempt
to coerce any employe of any such
corporation, person, firm, or company to
purchase goods, wares, merchandise, or
supplies from any particular person, firm, or
corporation, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be fined not
less than ten nor more than five hundred
dollars for each and every such offense."
Upon trial had before the court without a
jury the evidence tended to show that
defendants, under the firm name of Loomis &
Snively, were engaged in mining coal in
Macon county; that Peter Daniels was
employed to labor for them; that prior to the
month of February, 1891, said Daniels
became indebted to defendants in the sum of
about $38 in their store which they kept in
connection with their mining operations; that
on the 18th day of February, 1891, Daniels
had earned on the current month's wages the
sum of $5.50 in excess of his purchases for
that month; that on that day defendants, at
his request, issued and delivered to him a
coupon check book, using a printed form. On
the first page of the cover of this book is the
following: "Loomis & Snively Credit Coupon
Check Book. No. 807. $5.00. Issued by C. C.
Gorton. Check 2-18-1891. The coupons in this
book are not good if detached, and are
payable in merchandise when presented by P.
Daniels." On the second page of the cover is
the following: "Special Notice. It must be
distinctly understood that these coupons are
redeemable in such articles as are for sale
when presented. Covers must be surrendered
with last coupon. Clerks will return all
canceled coupons and covers to office daily."
The coupons were for 5, 10, and 25 cents,
aggregating $5. The 5-cent coupon was as
follows: "Coupon A. 807. Good for
merchandise at our stores. 5. Loomis &
Snively. Not transferable. Not good, if
detached." The other coupons were in the
same form except that 10 and 25 were
respectively substituted for 5. Daniels
indorsed the book, and delivered it to C. C.
Burge. John R. Hughes obtained it, and he
delivered it to Thomas W. Williams, a
merchant, for goods sold him, and the latter
presented it in April, 1891, to defendants for
payment, which was refused, on the ground
that it was not intended when issued that it
should be paid in cash; and that, when
settlement was made with the laborers, the
coupon books issued to them were deducted
from the amounts due them, respectively, and
the balance was paid in cash. At the
 State v. Loomis, 20 S.W. 332 (Mo., 1892)
conclusion of the evidence the defendants
asked the court by way of instruction to
discharge them, for the reason that the
information failed to charge them with any
crime, and for the reason that the provisions
of the statute on which the information is
founded is unconstitutional and void, which
was refused by the court, and the defendants
at the time duly excepted and saved their
exception. The court found defendants guilty,
and assessed their punishment at a fine of
$10, and entered judgment accordingly.
A constitutional question having been
thus raised, defendants took an appeal to this
court, and for a reversal of the judgment of
the lower court they urge two propositions:
(1) That sections 7058 and 7060, supra, "are
repugnant to the natural rights of the
individual, and are examples of paternalism
and class legislation of the worst sort," and
are in conflict with section 4 of our bill of
rights, which is in these words: "That all
constitutional government is intended to
promote the general welfare of the people;
that all persons have a natural right to life,
liberty, and the enjoyment of the gains of
their own industry; that to give security to
these things is the principal office of
government, and that, when government does
not confer this security, it fails of its chief
design." And (2) that the evidence fails to
show a violation of the statute. We have given
these propositions a most exhaustive
consideration, and our conclusion is that
neither one is tenable, and we will proceed to
give our reasons therefor.
The first proposition involves a
discussion of the functions and limitations of
government, and the rights, duties, and
obligations of the individual as a member of
society; and in its support defendants cite
Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431, 6 Atl.
Rep. 354; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 10
S. E. Rep. 285; State v. Coal & Coke Co., 33
W. Va. 188, 10 S. E. Rep. 288; Com. v. Perry,
(Mass.) 28 N. E. Rep. 1126; Frorer v. People,
(Ill. Sup.) 31 N. E. Rep. 395; Millett v. People,
117 Ill. 294, 7 N. E. Rep. 631; and an article by
D. H. Pingrey, 34 Cent. Law J. 91. In the
Pennsylvania case Wigeman sought to recover
wages earned by him as an employe of
Godcharles & Co., who were manufacturers of
nails at Milton, Pa. During the time of his
employment the plaintiff asked for and
received from defendants orders on different
parties for the purchase of coal and other
articles, which orders were honored by the
parties on whom they were drawn, and
defendants afterwards paid them. The trial
court ruled that these orders, payable in
goods or anything other than money, were
void under the act of assembly of June, 1881,
and could not be used by defendants in the
payment of wages; and on appeal the
supreme court reversed the judgment holding
the act unconstitutional on the ground that it
infringed the right of contract. In the
Goodwill Case the supreme court of West
Virginia held the statute, similar to ours,
unconstitutional on two distinct grounds: (1)
That it was in conflict with the first section of
the fourteenth amendment of the constitution
of the United States, in that the rights of
certain specified employers were abridged,
while others of the same class were left free;
and (2) that it infringed the right of control.
In State v. Coal & Coke Co., the supreme court
of West Virginia held unconstitutional a
statute prohibiting persons and corporations
engaged in mining and manufacturing from
selling merchandise to their employes at a
greater per cent. of profit than they sold to
others, on the grounds
[20 S.W. 334]
that it was class legislation, and an unjust
interference with the right of private contract
and business. In the case of Com. v. Perry,
supra, the supreme judicial court of
Massachusetts held St. Mass. 1891, c. 125, § 1,
which provides that "no employer shall
impose a fine upon or withhold the wages, or
any part of the wages, of an employe engaged
at weaving for imperfections that may arise
during the process of weaving," violates
 State v. Loomis, 20 S.W. 332 (Mo., 1892)
Const. Mass. art. 1, which declares the
inalienable rights "of acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property;" since this includes
the right to make reasonable contracts. The
act construed in the Millett Case was to the
effect that all coal mined should be weighed,
and a correct record thereof kept by the mine
operator, at his expense, and that miners
might employ a check weigher at their own
expense, to see that the coal was properly
weighed, and keep a correct account of the
same; and a penalty was imposed on the
operator failing to comply with these
provisions. Millett was indicted for a violation
of the act, and he set up as a defense that he
had contracts with all the men employed in
the mine to mine coal at so much per box. The
trial court held this defense insufficient, and
this ruling was reversed on appeal to the
supreme court of Illinois on the distinct
ground that the act was unconstitutional, in
that the legislature had no right to single out
owners and operators of coal mines as a
distinct class, and provide that they should
bear burdens not imposed on other owners of
property, or employers of laborers, and
prohibit them from making contracts which it
is competent for other owners of property or
employers of laborers to make. And again, in
Frorer v. People, supra, the supreme court of
Illinois held as late as March 26, 1892, that
the act of May 28, 1891, sections 1, 2, which
declare that "it shall be unlawful for any
person, company, corporation, or association
now engaged or hereafter to be engaged in
any mining or manufacturing business in this
state, to engage in or be interested, directly or
indirectly, in the keeping of a truck store, or
the controlling of any store, shop, or scheme
for the furnishing of supplies, tools, clothing,
provisions, or groceries to his, its, or their
employes while so engaged in mining or
manufacturing," and impose a penalty for so
doing without placing restrictions on
employers engaged in other kinds of business,
is unconstitutional, as depriving persons of
property rights without due process of law. In
Railway Co. v. Wilson, 19 S. W. Rep. 910, the
court of appeals of Texas in June, 1892, held
unconstitutional an act providing that, in the
event of a railroad company refusing to pay
its indebtedness to an employe within 15 days
of demand, "it shall be liable to pay such
employe twenty per cent. on the amount due
him as damages, in addition to the amount
due," on the ground that it was special
legislation, not protecting alike the interest of
employer and employe. The Tennessee
supreme court has held that a statute
prohibiting a barber from keeping bathrooms
open on Sunday, but not prohibiting other
persons from doing so, is unconstitutional as
class legislation. Ragio v. State, 86 Tenn. 272,
6 S. W. Rep. 401.
These are all the cases cited, or which we
have been able to find, that bear directly on
the question here involved, and which
support defendants' contention. Indeed, but
one of these cases is precisely in point here,
and that is the Goodwill Case. The
Pennsylvania case, in the form the question
was presented, cannot be invoked as
authority in the case at bar, though holding a
statute, similar to ours, unconstitutional.
There the laborer attempted to recover in
money what he had already received in
merchandise, and without an offer to return
the merchandise. The state did not complain
in behalf of the public, but an individual
undertook to enforce what was manifestly an
unjust demand. Besides that, the case does
not seem to have received much
consideration at the hands of the court, no
authority whatever being cited. The
Massachusetts, Illinois, Texas, and Tennessee
cases and the Coal & Coke Co. Case of West
Virginia not only differed from the one before
us as to their facts, but they also involved the
construction of statutes essentially different
from ours. Nor do the courts, in the cases
cited, agree upon common ground for the
conclusions reached. The West Virginia and
Texas courts hold the statutes
unconstitutional on two grounds: (1) That
they lay burdens on classes not borne by
others similarly situated, thus denying the
classes affected the equal protection of the
 State v. Loomis, 20 S.W. 332 (Mo., 1892)
law; and (2) that they unreasonably infringe
the right of contract, while the Illinois and
Tennessee courts proceed upon the first
ground alone, and the Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts court upon the last ground
alone, in their decisions. It thus appears that
the cases of four states, West Virginia,
Illinois, Texas, and Tennessee, support the
doctrine that the statutes in question are
unconstitutional because they are class
legislation, denying equal protection of the
law to all similarly situated, and we feel
assured that the great weight of authority is
against them on this proposition. Nearly all
legislation is special "either in the objects
sought to be attained or in its application,"
and the general rule is that legislation in
relation to objects or territory does not
infringe the constitutional right of the equal
protection of the law, where all persons
subject to such legislation shall be treated
alike under like circumstances and
conditions. This proposition, and the reasons
upon which it is based, have been so
exhaustively examined and discussed by the
courts of this country in late years that we
would regard it a profitless task to review it in
the light of the adjudged cases, and we will
therefore content ourselves with a citation of
some of the most important: Budd v. New
York, 143 U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468;
Railway Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 9 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 207; Railway Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S.
205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1161; Walston v. Nevin,
128 U. S. 578, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192; Hayes v.
Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350;
Railway Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 6 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 110; Barbier v. Connolly,
[20 S.W. 335]
113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Soon Hing v.
Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730;
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 8 Sup. Ct Rep.
952, 1257; State v. Addington, 12 Mo. App.
214, and 77 Mo. 110; Ex parte Swann, 96 Mo.
44, 9 S. W. Rep. 10; Perkins v. Railway Co.,
103 Mo. 52, 15 S. W. Rep. 320; State v.
Burgdoerfer, 107 Mo. 1, 17 S. W. Rep. 646;
Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366, 23 N. E. Rep.
253; Davis v. State, 68 Ala. 58; Jamieson v.
Gas & Oil Co., 128 Ind. 555, 28 N. E. Rep. 76;
Com. v. Manufacturing Co., 120 Mass. 383;
Louisville Safety Vault & Trust Co. v.
Louisville & N. Ry. Co., (Ky.) 17 S. W. Rep.
567.
Judge Cooley says: "Laws, public in their
objects, may, unless express constitutional
provision forbids, be either general or local in
their application. They may embrace many
subjects or one, and they may extend to all
citizens, or be confined to particular classes,
as minors, or married women, bankers or
traders, and the like. The authority that
legislates for the state at large must
determine whether particular rules shall
extend to the whole state and all its citizens,
or, on the other hand, to a subdivision of the
state or a class of its citizens only. * * * If the
laws be otherwise unobjectionable, all that
can be required in these cases is that they be
general in their application to the class or
locality to which they apply; and they are then
public in character, and of their propriety and
policy the legislature must judge." Cooley,
Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) 479.
The supreme court of Illinois, in Frorer v.
People, supra, concedes that "it is not
doubted that laws may be enacted properly
and without infringing this section of the
constitution, which, by reason of peculiar
circumstances, may affect some persons or
classes of persons only, who were not before
affected by such restrictions." And speaking
of the legislative power, the court adds: "It is
impossible that under that power what is
lawful if done by A., if done by B. can be a
misdemeanor, the circumstances and
conditions being the same." (The italics are
ours.) With all due deference to that court, we
are constrained to say that, as we view it, the
conclusion reached was a non sequitur from
the premises laid down. The statute in that
case applied to all manufacturers and
operators of mines, and hence it applied to all
 State v. Loomis, 20 S.W. 332 (Mo., 1892)
persons operating under the same
circumstances and conditions; and how the
court could conclude that these two distinct
classes operated under the same
circumstances and conditions that railroad
companies and others engaged in different
employments operated under we are unable
to perceive. The position taken by that court,
as well as by the West Virginia court, that the
classification by the legislature of citizens
based on the business they carry on is
arbitrary, and therefore vicious and void, is
not, in our opinion, sound in principle, nor
supported by authority. Such a classification
has been sustained in many of the cases cited
above, notably in Railway Co. v. Beckwith,
129 U. S. 26, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207, and cases
cited. And in this connection we must not lose
sight of the proposition that corporations are
persons, within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment to the constitution of the United
States and our bill of rights, prohibiting the
deprivation of liberty and property "without
due process of law." Railway Co. v. Beckwith,
supra.
The other ground assumed by some of
the courts that these statutes infringe
unreasonably the right of contract is also we
think, untenable upon reason and authority.
Conceding that the fundamental right of
contract is essential to the enjoyment of
liberty and property, yet the state has
imposed in the past, and does now impose,
without question, limitations upon that right.
Such limitations are found in laws against
usury and gambling, in the statute of frauds
and perjuries, in laws prohibiting contracts
against public policy and contra bonos mores,
in laws regulating rates of charges of railways
and other public carriers, of elevators and
warehouses, whether public or private, and in
many others that might be named. The right
of contract, like all other rights, is held
subject to the necessities of the social state.
In the case at bar defendants appeal, in
support of their contention that the statute in
question is unconstitutional, to the general
principles of free government and to section 4
of our bill of rights, heretofore quoted. Is this,
in any proper sense a limitation upon the
legislative power in Missouri? Speaking of the
clause, "all persons have a natural right to life,
liberty, and the enjoyment of the gains of
their own industry," contained in this section,
Judge THOMPSON, in State v. Addington,
supra, which involved the constitutionality of
the act prohibiting the manufacture and sale
of oleomargarine, uses this language:
"Clearly, it does not mean that all persons
have an absolute right to life, liberty, and the
enjoyment of the gains of their own industry.
On the contrary, each of these enumerated
rights is held in subordination to the rights of
society. A person has a natural right to life,
but yet that life may be taken by law as a
punishment for crime. He has a natural right
to liberty, but yet his liberty may be
restrained either to punish or to prevent
crime; in cases of infants, for purposes of
protection; in cases of persons infected with
contagious diseases, for the benefit of the
public health; and in cases of insane persons,
for the good of the person himself, his
relatives, or the public. A person has a natural
right to the gains of his own industry, and yet
it is well understood and universally conceded
that in a state of civil society there is no such
thing as absolute right of property. On the
contrary, all property is held in subordination
to certain paramount rights of the state and of
the people. State v. Allmond, 2 Houst. 612;
Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479, 487. It may be
taken by the state for its revenue for
governmental purposes; it may be destroyed,
in time of war, to impede the operations of
the public enemy, or even, in time of peace, to
prevent the spread of a conflagration; and in
all these cases the
[20 S.W. 336]
government is not bound to make restitution
or award compensation to the owner. This
being so, it is too plain for discussion that
such a general declaration of right cannot be
strained into a prohibition against the
 State v. Loomis, 20 S.W. 332 (Mo., 1892)
legislature from suppressing the manufacture
and sale of a particular article of food. We
must obviously look further than this for
some constitutional inhibition against the
statute in question." And, after an exhaustive
discussion of the question, the court of
appeals upheld the statute, and on appeal to
this court the judgment was affirmed, and the
opinion filed by Judge THOMPSON was
approved in strong terms. 77 Mo. 110.
In Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678,
8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 992, 1257, which was also an
oleomargarine case, Justice HARLAN,
speaking for the supreme court of the United
States, said: "The power which the legislature
has to promote the general welfare is very
great, and the discretion which that
department of the government has in the
employment of means to that end is very
large. While both its power and its discretion
must be so exercised as not to impair the
fundamental rights of life, liberty, and
property, and while, according to the
principles upon which our institutions rest,
the very idea that one may be compelled to
hold his life or the means of living or any
material right essential to the enjoyment of
life at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom
prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself,
yet in many cases of mere administration the
responsibility is purely political, no appeal
lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the
public judgment, exercised in the presence of
public opinion or by means of the suffrage.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 370, 6 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 1064, * * * If all that can be said of this
legislation is that it is unwise, or
unnecessarily oppressive to those
manufacturing or selling wholesome
oleomargarine as an article of food, their
appeal must be to the legislature or the ballot
box, not to the judiciary. The latter cannot
interfere without usurping powers committed
to another branch of the government." In
scores of cases the courts have held that the
state has the right, and that it is its duty, to
interfere to preserve "not only the public
order, and to prevent offenses against the
state, but also to establish for the intercourse
of citizens with citizens those rules of good
manners and good neighborhood which are
calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and
to insure to each the uninterrupted
enjoyment of his own so far as is reasonably
consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by
others." "Rights of property," says Chief
Justice SHAW in Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53,
"like all other social and conventional rights,
are subject to such reasonable restraints and
regulations established by law as the
legislature, under the governing and
controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and
expedient." Such power as this would be
dangerous in the hands of an hereditary
monarch, but "there is little reason, under our
system of government, for placing a close and
narrow interpretation on the police power, or
restricting its scope so as to hamper the
legislative power in dealing with the varying
necessities of society, and the new
circumstances as they arise calling for
legislative intervention in the public interest;
and no serious invasion of constitutional
guaranties by the legislature can withstand
for a long time the searching influence of
public opinion, which is sure to come, sooner
or later, to the side of law, order, and justice,
however it may be swayed for a time by
passion or prejudice, or whatever aberrations
may mark its course." Budd v. New York, 143
U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468.
Before proceeding further, let us state
here more fully than we have yet done the
precise point now presented for decision. The
statute in question does not deny the right of
the manufacturer or the operator of a mine to
engage in the mercantile business, nor to pay
the wages of labor in merchandise, but it
simply prohibits him from issuing a check or
other evidence of debt in payment of such
wages, without at the same time making it
negotiable and redeemable at its face value,
without discount, in cash or merchandise, at
the option of the holder. In other words, the
 State v. Loomis, 20 S.W. 332 (Mo., 1892)
statute is not prohibitive of any right, but
regulative of it; and there is a wide difference
between regulation and prohibition, between
prescribing the terms upon which a right may
be enjoyed and a denial of that right
altogether. Davis v. State, 68 Ala. supra;
Jamison v. Gas & Oil Co., supra; Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273.
The defendants, in our opinion, are not
deprived of any right or privilege which is not
denied to all others similarly situated. "The
provisions of the statute to which our decision
is directed operates upon all members of the
classes enumerated. It neither confers special
privileges nor makes unjust discrimination.
All who are members of the classes named are
entitled to its benefits or subjected to its
burdens. It is open to every citizen to become
a member of the classes designated, and the
privileges conferred belong on equal terms to
all." Hancock v. Yaden, supra. Our bill of
rights declares that "all constitutional
government is intended to promote the
general welfare," which is but the
embodiment of the principles above
enunciated. But it goes further, and provides
that the principal office of government is to
give security to life, liberty, and the
enjoyment of the gains of industry; and when
it fails to give this security it fails of its chief
design. In the interpretation of this language
we cannot give sanction to the doctrine of the
supreme court of West Virginia in State v.
Coal & Coke Co., that, though one party may
wrong another, the state has no right to
interfere, and the only remedy is with the
injured party. In numberless instances the
injured party cannot protect himself. Nor do
we agree with the Texas court that "employer
and employe must always deal at arm's
length." Suppose the employer's arm is
enormously the longest and strongest, then
what? Courts do extend the strong arm of the
law to
[20 S.W. 337]
men with the shortest and weakest arms in
cases of catching bargains with expectant
heirs, and of contracts between client and
attorney, guardian and ward, doctor and
patient, spiritual adviser and advisee, and
many others where a fiduciary relation exists,
and relieve them of burdens imposed by those
having the longest and strongest arms. There
are relations that give men an undue
advantage over their fellows that justify state
interference in behalf of the weak against the
strong, and no state can abdicate its right to
such interference without failing "of its chief
design." Absolute liberty can exist in an ideal
state only. We do not live in Utopia, but upon
earth, where we find fraud, imposition, and
oppression, and where men and women have
the will and power to make their fellows
mourn; and until we reach that ideal state
where the golden rule will be obeyed in letter
and spirit, we will have to endure the
inconveniences of government, and the state
will have to promote the general welfare of
the people, and give security, as far as it may
be, to life, liberty, and the gains of industry.
How far the government should go in the
defense and aid of the weak, inexperienced, or
foolish cannot be stated dogmatically. We had
occasion in State v. Burgdoerfer, supra, and
State v. Thornton, (Mo. Sup.) 18 S. W. Rep.
841, to dwell upon this question at length,
and we will not repeat here what was said
there.
The case of Hancock v. Yaden, supra, is
precisely in point on every question involved
in the case in hand. The statute of Indiana is
similar to ours, and its constitutionality arose
in a civil action for wages, where the employer
set up as a defense an agreement of the
employe to receive merchandise in payment
of his wages at the option of the employer,
and waiving his right to payment in lawful
money of the United States every two weeks,
as required by statute. The supreme court,
after a review of the authorities, held the
statute constitutional. Mr. Pingrey, in a very
able article published in 34 Cent. Law J. 91,
maintains that reason and the weight of
authority are against the Indiana court. But,
on the other hand, the editors of the
 State v. Loomis, 20 S.W. 332 (Mo., 1892)
American Law Review, in a note in volume
24, p. 328, warmly indorse the opinion of that
court. They say: "These statutes are aimed at
the well-known practice of employers of
forcing their laborers to receive their wages,
or a part of them, in goods at the `Company's
Store.' These schemes have been the subject
of the grossest abuses. Many mining and
manufacturing companies have thus forced
their employes to receive their wages in
goods, and have sold the goods to them at
enormous profits, in many cases at double
their actual cost. * * * We take the view that
these practices, so oppressive to honest labor,
will not be broken up until the criminal
machinery of the state is leveled against them.
* * * But we renew an expression of opinion
that it is the true office of government to
arbitrate between those who have to work for
their daily bread and those who have the
power to oppress them." Applying these
principles to the statute in question, can we
say the legislature exceeded its power in its
enactment? It was first passed in 1881. A
condition, not a theory, confronted the people
of the state at that time. Contemporaneous
history, of which the courts take judicial
notice, teaches us what that condition was,
and to some extent is now. Mr. McCullough,
in his Commercial Dictionary, published in
1842, under the title "Truck System," says:
"`Truck system,' a name given to a practice
that has prevailed, particularly in the mining
and manufacturing districts, of paying the
wages of workmen in goods instead of money.
The plan has been for the masters to establish
warehouses or shops; and the workmen in
their employment have either got their wages
accounted for to them by supplies of goods
from such depots, without receiving any
money, or they have got the money, with a
tacit or express understanding that they were
to resort to the warehouses or shops of their
masters for such articles as they were
furnished with.
"Advantages and disadvantages of the
truck system: A great deal of contradictory
evidence has been given, and very opposite
opinions have been held, as to the practical
operation and real effect of this system on the
workmen. Nor is this to be wondered at,
seeing that everything depends on the mode
in which it is administered, and that it may be
either highly advantageous or highly injurious
to the laborer. If a manufacturer of character
establish a shop, supplied with the principal
articles required for the use of the workmen
in his employment, and give them free liberty
to resort to it or not, as they please, it can, at
all events, do them no harm, and will most
likely render them material service. The
manufacturer, having the command of
capital, may, in general, lay in his goods to a
greater advantage than they can be laid in by
the greater number of retail tradesmen in
moderate sized towns; and, not being
dependent on the profits of his shop for
support, he is, even though he had no
advantage in their purchase, able to sell his
goods at a cheaper rate than they can be
afforded by the majority of shopkeepers.
Sometimes, also, a factory is established in a
district where shops either do not exist at all
or are very deficient; and in such cases the
master consults the interest and convenience
of those dependent on him when he provides
a supply of the principal articles required for
their subsistence. It is easy, therefore, to see
that the keeping of shops by masters for the
use of their workmen may be very beneficial
to the latter. But to insure its being so it is
indispensable that the masters should be
above taking an advantage when it is within
their reach, and that their conduct towards
the workmen should not be in any degree
influenced by the circumstances of the latter
dealing or not dealing with their shops. Such
disinterestedness is, however, a great deal
more than could be rationally expected from
the generality of men; and hence, though
many instances may be specified in which the
truck system was advantageous to the
workmen, those of a contrary description
were, unfortunately, far more numerous. It is
obvious, indeed,
[20 S.W. 338]
 State v. Loomis, 20 S.W. 332 (Mo., 1892)
that a practice of this sort affords very great
facilities for fraudulent dealings. Under the
old law, a manufacturer who had a shop had
means, supposing he were inclined to use
them, not possessed by any ordinary
shopkeeper as respects his customers, for
forcing upon his workmen inferior goods at
an exorbitant price. * * * In many instances,
indeed, the profits made by the shops
exceeded those made by the business to which
they were contingent; and thousands of
workmen, whose wages were nominally 30
shillings a week, did not really receive, owing
to the bad quality and high price of the goods
supplied to them, more than 20 shillings, and
often not so much.
"Abolition of the truck system: A system
of dealing with the laboring classes, so very
susceptible of abuse, and which, in point of
fact, was very extensively abused, was loudly
and justly complained of. A bill was in
consequence introduced for its suppression
by Mr. Littleton, which, after a great deal of
opposition and discussion, was passed into a
law. 1 & 2 Wm. IV. Those who opposed this
act did so on two grounds: First, that it was
improper to interfere at all in a matter of this
sort; and, second, that the interference would
not be effective. The first of these objections
does not appear entitled to any weight. In
suppressing the truck system the legislature
did nothing that could in anywise regulate or
fetter the fair employment of capital. It
interfered merely to put down abuse; to carry,
in fact, the contract of wages into full effect,
by preventing the workman from being
defrauded of a portion of the wages he had
stipulated for. The presumption, no doubt, is,
in questions between workmen and their
employers, that government had better
abstain from all interference, and leave it to
the parties to adjust their disputes on the
principle of mutual interest and compromised
advantage. Still, however, this is merely a
presumption, and must not be viewed as an
absolute rule. Instances have repeatedly
occurred where the interference of legislation
to prevent or suppress abuses, on occasions of
the sort now alluded to, has been imperiously
required, and has been highly advantageous.
Those who claim its interposition are, indeed,
bound to show clearly that it is called for to
obviate some gross abuse, or that it will
materially redound to the public advantage;
and this, we think, was done in the completest
manner by the opponents of the truck system.
Regard for the interest of the more
respectable part of the masters, as well as for
those of the workmen, required its abolition,
for while it continued those who despised
taking an advantage of their dependents were
less favorably situated than those who did. It
is ludicrous, therefore, in a case of this sort, to
set up a cuckoo cry about the `freedom of
industry.' The good incident to the truck
system was, in practice, found to be vastly
overbalanced by the abuses that grew out of
it."
The labor commissioner of Missouri, in
his official report to the governor, January 11,
1881, speaking of the payment of wages said:
"To obtain an intelligent and satisfactory
understanding of the question, the opinions
of the workingmen, employers, and farmers,
as expressed elsewhere in this chapter, must
be studied. These opinions, it may be
observed, come from all parts of the state,
and from the most intelligent and reflecting
portion of its citizens. It may be further
observed that, while the presumption is that
the wages of labor are paid in the currency of
the nation, it will be found on examination
that a large proportion is paid in goods
supplied by stores owned by the proprietors
or corporations, or in `store orders' where the
store is not so owned. The high prices charged
for the goods in these stores, ranging from 10
to 40 per cent. higher than goods of the same
quality sell at neighboring stores, the low
rates of wages, and the rules in force in many
establishments of keeping back wages from
one to four months, have impoverished and
diminished the resources of the laborer to
such a degree that after years of toil, if he
desired to leave, he would have to leave as a
tramp, or, if unable longer to maintain
 State v. Loomis, 20 S.W. 332 (Mo., 1892)
himself, would have to accept life as a charity
from others. Nor is the laborer the only
sufferer by this iniquitous system. It affects,
to an extent known only to those who are so
unfortunate as to be within its influence, the
farming and commercial interests of the
district wherever the system holds sway."
Report 1881, pp. 15, 16. And, having quoted
extensively from the article on the truck
system in McCollough's Commercial
Dictionary, the commissioner continues:
"Here is an exact portraiture of the truck
system as it existed fifty years ago in England,
and as it exists in the state of Missouri to-day,
to an extent that would be incredible in the
absence of proof." To relieve the working
classes of some of the evils attendant upon
the truck system, the statute in question was
enacted. The prohibition did not extend to the
business itself, but to the form only in which
it should be carried on. The "company store"
was not abolished, nor was the right to pay for
wages in merchandise taken away, but the
business was regulated, and the mode of
payment, if in merchandise, prescribed. The
legislature did not undertake to limit the right
of contract, but simply to prescribe its form in
certain contingencies; and that it had the
right to do this we have no doubt. The statute
imposes no additional expense on the mine
owner and manufacturer, as was the case in
Millett v. People, where the law required the
mine owner to buy scales and hire a clerk at
his own expense to weigh coal. Indeed, our
statute relieves the employer of expense. It
relieves him of the expense of printing
"coupon check books," and keeping an
account of them. What burden of any kind
does it lay on the employer? What right does
it deprive him of? None that we can perceive.
Did the act of defendants in this case work a
wrong upon Daniels? Let us see. At the time
the coupon check book was delivered to him
they owed him for wages that month the sum
of $5.50. The amount called for in the book
was to be deducted out of the wages at a
settlement
[20 S.W. 339]
to take place in the future. What was it
defendants owed their employe? Dollars.
What did they give him? A nontransferable
coupon check book, calling for $5, payable in
merchandise at their store. Suppose this
check book gave defendants an opportunity to
charge Daniels from 10 to 40 per cent. more
than the same goods could be bought for at
other stores, (and this the labor
commissioner and Mr. McCollough, in his
Commercial Dictionary, think manufacturers
and mine operators not only have an
opportunity to do, but often do,) if they had
availed themselves of this opportunity, they
would have made on the book for $5 from 50
cents to $2. Was not this 50 cents or $2, as
the case may have been, as much the gains of
Daniels' industry, and as much his property,
as the part of the $5 which he did not lose?
And has the state no power to secure it to
him? Does not the state that fails to confer
such security "fail of its chief design?" But this
is not the whole extent of the wrong inflicted
on the laborer by this system. He is deprived
of using his own as he likes. The book he gets
is not transferable. Daniels had earned five
dollars, and his employer handed him in
payment an order for merchandise, and
enjoined on him not to assign it. What right
has the employer to put this restraint upon
the transfer of this evidence of indebtedness
on his employe? Had he not earned five
dollars? Then why deprive him of the
enjoyment of it in any way agreeable to him?
Suppose defendants had given Daniels five
dollars in cash, and then had exacted a
contract of him that he would not transfer it,
but would spend it for merchandise in the
employers' store, what would all just men
think of that? The use of a nontransferable
coupon check book, calling for merchandise
in payment of wages of labor, also deprives
the laborer of the enjoyment of the gains of
his own industry, to secure which is declared
by our bill of rights to be the principal object
of government. And again, this system gives
the employer the advantage, because he alone
fixes the price of his goods, and thus
determines the measure of value of five
 State v. Loomis, 20 S.W. 332 (Mo., 1892)
dollars in merchandise. "Merchandise" is
indeterminate in kind, quality, quantity, and
value, and the holder does not know, nor can
he estimate, the value of his coupon check
book, and is absolutely at the mercy of the
party issuing it. But the injustice of this
system is not confined to the employes, but
extends to the farmers living in the
neighborhood of the mines and factories. The
mine operator or manufacturer has it in his
power to dominate the purchasing and selling
market of money commodities. The laborers
cannot compete with him for the products of
the farm, because they have nothing to pay
with except nonnegotiable coupons; and
other merchants cannot compete with him for
the same reason. The employer thus enjoys a
complete monopoly of the local market. He is
a bear to the farmer and a bull to the
employe. Has the state no power to interfere
with such an evil?
We can have some conception of the
magnitude of the possible illegitimate profits
of this system, and the possible loss by
employes and the general public, by
considering the great army of men and
women engaged in mines and factories in our
state, and the vast sums they annually earn by
their toil. Has the state no power to interfere
with such an evil, and grant protection? The
protection afforded by a state that would not
interfere with a known evil like that would be
such "protection as vultures give to lambs, —
covering and devouring them." But we are
met by the proposition that by interfering in
behalf of the laborer we degrade his
manhood, and stamp him with imbecility,
and that, if he loses on his wages, he gains the
inestimable boon of free contract. But is he
free, in the true sense? Suppose he is poor,
and depends upon his daily toil for means to
support himself and family. Can he be said to
stand on equal terms with the employer of
hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of
hands, handling in many cases millions of
dollars? Which has the longest arm, and
which will get the advantage if they are left to
deal in all cases with each other at arm's
length? An employer, if he so desired, would
soon find methods to discharge a hand,
without giving any reason for it, that failed to
bear the exactions of the truck system. Such a
laborer, when he submits to unjust
conditions, under such circumstances, cannot
be styled an imbecile; and if his manhood is
degraded it results from the undue
advantages taken of his necessities by the
other party. The history of mankind teaches
that when governments leave the rich and
poor to deal with each other at arm's length,
and afford no remedy except that enforced by
the respective parties themselves, the
inequality of conditions which naturally
appertain to men and women becomes more
marked, and distinctions, based on wealth,
inevitably result, creating an aristocracy in its
most odious form. We hear a great deal about
the conflict between labor and capital, but any
such conflict that actually exists is not
natural, but artificial, arising from an attempt
of the parties by improper means to obtain
unjust advantages. Labor and capital are
interdependent. They must exist together or
wholly disappear. The mining and
manufacturing interests of Missouri are
extensive and important, having invested, as
they have, millions of capital, and giving
employment, as they do, to thousands of
hands. It is the duty of the state to give
security to this capital, and to protect the
laborers in these industries in the enjoyment
of the gains of their own industry. To
accomplish this many laws are to be found
upon our statute books. The legislature
determined that the statute in question was
required to promote the general welfare, and
to secure to the laborer the enjoyment of the
gains of his own industry, and shall the courts
oppose in this instance the judicial judgment
to the legislative judgment? The presumption
is that the act is constitutional, and this
continues till the contrary clearly appears.
The legislature no doubt gave the subject a
most searching examination, and passed the
act making it applicable to operators
[20 S.W. 340]
 State v. Loomis, 20 S.W. 332 (Mo., 1892)

of mines and manufacturers alone. This, it is the offender by information or indictment, as

argued, is an arbitrary and unjust
discrimination against the two classes named.
But how can we say that it is arbitrary and
unjust? The courts are apt to deal with
questions of this character in the abstract,
and legislatures are prone to deal with them
in the concrete. Legislatures see, or think they
see, an evil in its relations to certain persons,
objects, and things, and deal with it in that
relation alone. It seems that the truck system
is peculiar to the operations of mines and
factories. Can we presume that the legislature
found, upon investigation, that other
employers of labor paid their hands in
merchandise to the same extent and as
habitually as miners and manufacturers, and
then arbitrarily omitted them from the
operation of the law? We think not. On the
contrary, we must presume that the remedy
provided was intended to be and is
coextensive with the evil. The English
parliament more than 60 years ago passed a
statute much more stringent than ours, which
applied to manufacturers and mine operators,
and many statutes of the American states are
aimed at these two classes only, all of which
shows that the practice of paying wages of
labor in merchandise or orders for
merchandise prevailed with those classes
specially to a degree injurious to their
employes and the public.
in this case.
The point made by defendants that the
evidence does not show a violation of the
statute cannot be maintained. At the time the
check book was given to Daniels he had
earned $5.50 on his wages for the current
month, and the amount of the book was to be
deducted from his wages when settlement
was made, and he was charged at the time
with it. The fact that he was indebted to
defendants on a prior account cuts no figure
in the case. It certainly cannot be maintained
that the book was to go as a credit on what he
owed the store. If it had been intended that
the five dollars should go in payment of the
old account, it would have been so credited at
the time. Finding no error in the record, the
judgment is affirmed.
MACFARLANE, J., concurs in the result,
but, a federal question being involved, and
the principle being an important one,
GANTT, P. J., expresses no opinion, and the
case is, on our own motion, transferred to the
court in banc.

The legislature had the power also to affix

a penalty to the violation of the statute. See
cases cited above. Without such penalty,
recoverable by the state, such legislation
would be nugatory. The amounts lost by each
employe would be too small to justify
litigation, and the same causes that induce
him to submit to unjust exactions would
operate much more strongly to make him
refrain from appealing to the courts. Before
he could do this, he would unquestionably
have to sever his connection with his
employer. The only way to make such laws
effective is to make their violation criminal,
and to authorize the state to proceed against