30. Defensor-Santiago v.

Ramos – 253 SCRA 559 [1996]

TITLE MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, protestant, vs. FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS,

protestee.

GR NUMBER P.E.T. Case No. 001

DATE February 13, 1996

PONENTE Supreme Court acting as Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

NATURE/ ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court acting as Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
KEYWORDS

FACTS Protestant Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Miriam) ran for President in

the 1992 elections and lost against Fidel V. Ramos (Ramos). The presidential
election of 1992 was clouded with much uncertainty as to who is the real winner.
However, Congress sitting as Board of Canvassers proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos as
duly elected President of the Republic. Protestant filed before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) for annulment of proclamation on grounds of massive
fraud and electoral sabotage among others. While the election contest is still
pending, Miriam Defensor-Santiago was elected Senator of the Republic in the
mid-term election in 1995.

ISSUE(S) WON by assuming the position of a Senator, did Defensor-Santiago have

effectively abandoned her Presidential Election protest?

RULING(S) YES. An election contest involves a public office in which the public has an interest.
In the case at bar, when protestant entered into a political contract with the
electorate as Senator, she impliedly waives her vested right to the election contest.
More so, corollary to her position is the discharge of her functions. In assuming the
office of the Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn
the protest, or at very least, abandoned her determination to protect or pursue the
public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the
electorate. Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot and
academic the instant case.

Moreover, the resolution of this protest would serve public interest as it would
dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections.
Petition was DISMISSED.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the Tribunal hereby resolved to

. (1) GRANT the Protestant’s Motion of 16 August 1995 to dispense with the
revision of ballots and other election documents in the remaining precincts
of the pilot areas;
. (2) DISMISS the instant election protest, since it has been rendered moot
and academic by its abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a
consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her
discharge of the duties and functions thereof; and
. (3) DISMISS, as a consequence, the Protestee’s Counter-Protest.

No pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED.

82. Fortun v. Arroyo 668 SCRA 504 [2012]

TITLE PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES,

petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as Commander-in-Chief and
President of the Republic of the Philippines, EDUARDO ERMITA, Executive
Secretary, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), or any of their units, JOHN DOES and
JANE DOES acting under their direction and control, respondents.

GR NUMBER 190293

DATE March 20, 2012.

PONENTE ABAD, J.:

NATURE/ PETITIONS to challenge the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1959.

KEYWORDS

FACTS On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan
family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a
highway in Maguindanao.

In response to this, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential

Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in
Central Mindanao.

Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and
secure it from large groups of persons that have taken up arms against the
constituted authorities in the province, on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo
issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of
the MILF.

Two days later, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in accordance
with sec. 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which required her, within 48 hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report in person or in writing of her action.

In her report, President Arroyo said that she acted based on her finding that
lawless men have taken up arms in Maguindanao and risen against the
government. The President described the scope of the uprising, the nature,
quantity, and quality of the rebels’ weaponry, the movement of their heavily armed
units in strategic positions, the closure of the Maguindanao Provincial Capitol,
Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal Hall, and 14 other municipal halls,
and the use of armored vehicles, tanks, and patrol cars with unauthorized
"PNP/Police" markings.

On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to sec. 18,

Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the President’s action.
But, two days later, before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential
Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Maguindanao.

Petitioners’ contention: Petitioners Fortun and the other petitioners brought the
present actions to challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyo’s
Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao on the following grounds: 1. For gross
insufficiency of the factual basis in proclaiming a state of martial law and
suspending the [writ] in the Province of Maguindanao. 2. It is patently illegal and
unconstitutional for lack of any factual basis. 3. The validity of Proclamation No.
1959, declaring a state of martial law in the province of Maguindanao, except for
the identified areas of the MILF, and suspending the writ in the same area.

Respondents’ contention: The issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting martial

 law and restoring the writ in the province of Maguindanao, rendered the issues
raised in the present petitions moot and academic. Respondents maintain that the
petitions have ceased to present an "actual case or controversy" with the lifting of
martial law and the restoration of the writ, the sufficiency of the factual basis of
which is the subject of these petitions. Proclamation No. 1963 is allegedly a
"supervening event" that rendered of no practical use or value the consolidated
petitions. Respondents’ also questioned the legal standing of the petitioners.

ISSUE(S) WON the issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
writ in the province of Maguindanao, rendered the issues raised in the petitions
moot and academic.

RULING(S) Yes. Petitioners Fortun and the other petitioners brought the present actions to
challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyo’s Proclamation 1959 affecting
Maguindanao But, given the prompt lifting of that proclamation before Congress
could review it and before any serious question affecting the rights and liberties of
Maguindanao’s inhabitants could arise, the Court deems any review of its
constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead horse. Prudence and respect for
the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court should be
cautious in entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the
Executive or the Legislative department.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions on the ground that
the same have become moot and academic. SO ORDERED.
27. SBMA v. COMELEC – 262 SCRA 492 [1996]

TITLE SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, ENRIQUE T. GARCIA and CATALINO A. CALIMBAS, respondents.

GR NUMBER 125416

DATE September 26, 1996

PONENTE PANGANIBAN, J.:

NATURE/ SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
KEYWORDS

FACTS Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992) on March 13, 1992, which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227
likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of converting the
Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military
reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the
implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport,
buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.

On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang

Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence,
as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone
and submitted such to the Office of the President.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan
of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for
Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided
conditions are met.

The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating

Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the
Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.

Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground
that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the
metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval
base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848,
adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules
and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum.

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of
Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a
local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.

ISSUE(S) 1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution

No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or
repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10

2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the
people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a
national law."
RULING(S) 1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but

respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.

In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below,the word
"referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all.
The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was
entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum
returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots
themselves bore the description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word
"initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is
unquestionably an INITIATIVE.

As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws,and to
enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the
other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act
or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases
would without action on the part of electors become a law.

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision

of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-
making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot
control or change the substance or the content of legislation.

2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in
the proposal stage and not yet an approved law.

In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec
Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion.
However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative
since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or
instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself
has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the
pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned
Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a
branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and
acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 2848 is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10l Serye 1993 is
REMANDED to the Commission on Elections for further proceedings consistent
with the foregoing discussion. No costs. IT IS SO ORDERED.
77. Republic v. Garcia – 527 SCRA 495 [2007]

TITLE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MAJ. GEN. CARLOS FLORES
GARCIA, CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, IAN CARL DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA,
JUAN PAULO DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, TIMOTHY DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA and
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), respondents.

GR NUMBER 167741

DATE July 12, 2007

PONENTE CORONA, J.:

NATURE/ SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

KEYWORDS

FACTS This is a Petition for certiorari on two Sandiganbayan resolutions. A petition for
forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties, with a verified urgent ex-parte
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment was filed against
Major General Garcia and his family.

The Republic said that it being a sovereign political entity, it was exempt from filing
the said attachment bond.

Attachment bond is a bond given by a defendant in order to have an attachment

released that ensures payment of a judgment awarded to the plaintiff. It is a bond
required of a plaintiff seeking an attachment, conditioned to pay the costs and
damages which the defendant may sustain in the event the plaintiff loses the suit.

Sandiganbayan issued a resolution ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary

attachment against the properties of the Garcias upon the filing by the Republic of
a P1 million attachment bond; Republic paid the P1 million to avoid delay.

Republic then filed a motion for partial reconsideration, saying again that they were
exempt from filing the attachment bond.

Sandiganbayan denied it twice by reason of a.) there was nothing in the rules of
court that said the Republic was exempt, and b.) a re-examination of Tolentino vs.
Carlos (a case the Republic invoked which was decided over a century ago under
the Old Civil Code)

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE(S) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion when it
rejected the Republic’s claim of exemption from the filing of an attachment bond?

RULING(S) 1. Yes: Under Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 57 of Rules of Court, before a writ of
attachment may issue, a bond must first be filed to answer for all costs which may
be adjudged to the adverse party and for the damages he may sustain by reason of
the attachment. However, this rule does not cover the State. In Tolentino, this
Court declared that the State as represented by the government is exempt from
filing an attachment bond on the theory that it is always solvent meaning, the State
is always able to carry out its obligations.

2. Section 427 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that before the issuance of
a writ of attachment, the applicant therefor or any person in his name, should file a
bond in favor of the defendant for an amount not less than P400 nor more than the
amount of the claim, answerable for damages in case it is shown that the
 attachment was obtained illegally or without sufficient cause; but in the case at bar
the one who applied for and obtained the attachment is the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, as plaintiff, and under the theory that the State is always solvent it was
not bound to post the required bond and the respondent judge did not exceed his
jurisdiction in exempting it from such requirement.

The Sandiganbayan thus erred when it disregarded the foregoing presumption and
instead ruled that the Republic should file an attachment bond. The error was not
simply an error of judgment but grave abuse of discretion.

There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the Constitution,
the law or jurisprudenceHere, the Sandiganbayan’s January 14, 2005 resolution
was clearly contrary to Tolentino.

Worse, the Sandiganbayan transgressed the Constitution and arrogated upon itself
a power that it did not by law possess. All courts must take their bearings from the
decisions and rulings of this Court. Tolentino has not been superseded or reversed.
Thus, it is existing jurisprudence and continues to form an important part of our
legal system. Surprisingly, the Sandiganbayan declared that Tolentino need(ed) to
be carefully reexamined in the light of the changes that the rule on attachment had
undergone through the years.

Art VIII Sec 4(3) “xxx no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the
court sitting en banc.”

CONCLUSION The petition is hereby GRANTED. The January 14, 2005 and March 2, 2005
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Republic
of the Philippines is declared exempt from the payment or filing of an attachment
bond for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment issued in Civil Case No.
0193. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to release the P1,000,000 bond
posted by the Republic of the Philippines to the Office of the Ombudsman. SO
ORDERED.
128 Planters v. Fertiphil – 548 SCRA 485 [2008]

TITLE PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner, vs. FERTIPHIL CORPORATION,

respondent.

GR NUMBER 166006

DATE March 14, 2008

PONENTE REYES, R.T., J.:

NATURE/ PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

KEYWORDS

FACTS Exercising his legislative powers, President Ferdinand Marcos issued LOI No. 1465
which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component
(CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers which resulted in having
Fertiphil paying P 10/bag sold to the Fertilizer and Perticide Authority (FPA).

FPA remits its collection to Far East Bank and Trust Company who applies to the
payment of corporate debts of Planters Products Inc. (PPI). After the Edsa
Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. Upon return of
democracy, Fertiphil demanded a refund but PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a
complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC on the
ground that LOI No. 1465 is unjust, unreaonable oppressive, invalid and unlawful
resulting to denial of due process of law.

FPA answered that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the state in ensuring
the stability of the fertilizing industry in the country and that Fertiphil did NOT
sustain damages since the burden imposed fell on the ultimate consumers.

RTC and CA favored Fertiphil holding that it is an exercise of the power of taxation
ad is as such because it is NOT for public purpose as PPI is a private corporation.

ISSUE(S) 1. WON Fertiphil has locus standi.

2. WON LOI No. 1465 is an invalid exercise of the power of taxation rather the
Police Power.

RULING(S) 1. Yes. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real party in
interest" or party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit. In public suits, there is the right of the ordinary citizen to petition the courts to
be freed from unlawful government intrusion and illegal official action subject to
the direct injury test or where there must be personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result. Being a
mere procedural technicality, it has also been held that locus standi may be waived
in the public interest such as cases of transcendental importance or with far-
reaching implications whether private or public suit, Fertiphil has locus standi.

2. Yes. Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the state
but distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power is the power of the
state to enact the legislation that may interfere with personal liberty on property in
order to promote general welfare. While, the power of taxation is the power to levy
taxes as to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of police power is the
regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The
lawful subjects and lawful means tests are used to determine the validity of a law
enacted under the police power. The power of taxation, on the other hand, is
circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.

In this case, it is for purpose of revenue. But it is a robbery for the State to tax the
 citizen and use the funds generation for a private purpose. Public purpose does
NOT only pertain to those purpose which are traditionally viewed as essentially
governmental function such as building roads and delivery of basic services, but
also includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public
money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and
urban or agrarian reform.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
November 28, 2003 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

179 Jelbert B. Galicto v. H.E. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino, III

TITLE JELBERT B. GALICTO, petitioner, vs.H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C.

AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; ATTY.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management, respondents.

GR NUMBER 193978

DATE February 28, 2012

PONENTE BRION, J.:

NATURE/ SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
KEYWORDS

FACTS Petitioner, claiming to be an employee of PhilHealth, is alleging grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of President
Aquino in his issuance of EO 7 entitled Directing the Rationalization of the
Compensation and Position Classification System in the GOCCs and GFIs, and for
Other Purposes. This issuance was in response to the resolution issued by the
Senate regarding alleged excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of
Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of the Manila Waterworks and
Sewerage System, a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), after
it its conducted inquiry in aid of legislation on the matter. EO 7 primarily imposed
two things: first, a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of
compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all
GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President;
second, a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the
Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010.

Essentially, EO 7 precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of

GOCCs from granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the
board of directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting new or
additional benefits and allowances to their employees. Petitioner in this case claims
to be adversely affected by the same without, however, submitting a Board
resolution or Secretary’s certificate authenticate his position as representative from
PhilHealth. The petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the bar
in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the
Philippine government are legally and validly issued and implemented.

ISSUE(S) Whether or not petitioner in this case—as a member of the bar in good standing as
well as an alleged employee and designated representative of PhilHealth—
possesses legal standing.
RULING(S) No. Petitioner does not possess legal standing for failing to demonstrate a material
and personal interest in the issue in dispute due to his blatant failure to provide a
Board Resolution and a Secretary’s Certificate from PhilHealth to act as its
representative.

The Court’s Precedents on Legal Standing:

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. This requirement of
standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual
cases or controversies.

Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to raise a constitutional question when

(1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury
because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be

affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.”

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate his case because his interest, if any, is
speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future
increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as
contingent events or expectancies. It has been held that as to the element of
injury, such aspect is not something that just anybody with some grievance or pain
may assert. It has to be direct and substantial to make it worth the courts time, as
well as the effort of inquiry into the constitutionality of the acts of another
department of government. If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is
merely superficial and insubstantial, then the courts may end up being importuned
to decide a matter that does not really justify such an excursion into constitutional
adjudication.

As to the petitioner’s assertion that he possesses legal standing by virtue of being

a member of the bar in good standing: this supposed interest has been branded by
the Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon. Zamora, as too general an
interest which is shared by other groups and [by] the whole citizenry. Thus, the
Court ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the
rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it
with standing in that case.

The Court made a similar ruling in Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo and held
that the petitioners therein, who are national officers of the IBP, have no legal
standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP, as an
institution, or its members may suffer. In Velarde v. Social Justice Society, the
Court held that even if it could have exempted the case from the stringent locus
standi requirement, the transcendental issue could not be resolved any way, due to
procedural infirmities and shortcomings, as in the present case.

As the Court has emphasized in its decision in Lozano v. Nograles, while the Court
has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from
the stringent requirements of personal injury to the broader transcendental
importance doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO

ORDERED.
230 People v. Mateo – 433 SCRA 640

TITLE THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EFREN MATEO y GARCIA,
appellant.

GR NUMBER 147678-87

DATE July 7, 2004

PONENTE VITUG, J.:

NATURE/ APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Br. 64.
KEYWORDS

FACTS The MTC Tarlac found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape
and to indemnify the complainant for actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed
to the CA. Solicitor General assailed the factual findings of the TC and
recommends an acquittal of appellant.

ISSUE(S) Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by
virtue of express provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death.

RULING(S) No. The case is remanded and the records are forwarded to teh Court of Appeals
for appropriate action.

Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or
arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for
which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed).
The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution –

Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

“(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:”

“(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.”

It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in

character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favour of the
 accused.

In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has
been a marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of
herein appellant. Some are convinced that the evidence would appear to be
sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from the
Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e.,
the determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which
the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the
Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual
issues.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the instant case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof
ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
disposition, consistent with the discussions hereinabove set forth. No costs. SO
ORDERED.

281. Chavez v. JBC – 676 SCRA 579 [2012]

TITLE FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN.
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., respondents.

GR NUMBER 202242

DATE July 17, 2012

PONENTE MENDOZA, J.:

NATURE/ PETITION to question the composition of the Judicial and Bar Council.
KEYWORDS

FACTS The Judicial Bar Council (JBC) as mandated by the constitution is composed of
only seven-members, however on 1994 it was substantially altered. An eighth
member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began
sitting simultaneously having one-half (1/2) vote each.

The JBC En Banc, on 2001, decided to allow the two representatives be entitled
with one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature.

SECTION 8. (1) A JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL IS HEREBY CREATED UNDER

THE SUPERVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT COMPOSED OF:

The Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,

The Secretary of Justice, and

A representative of the Congress as ex officio Members,

A representative of the Integrated Bar,

A professor of law,

A retired Member of the Supreme Court, an

A representative of the private sector.

It is this issue that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued
 that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is
their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are
permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of
either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the
Constitution.

In simplistic terms, the House of Representatives, without the Senate and vice-
versa, is not Congress. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers,
requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its
mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.

ISSUE(S) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight
(8)members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter
and spirit of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING(S) Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is
used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether
the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either
case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-
member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a
solution should there be a stalemate in voting.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its

primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process.
The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between
the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in
the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists
in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be
composed of seven (7) members only.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the

JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of
operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the
Judicial and Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of
Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section
8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
332. JRB Realty v. CA – 271 SCRA 225 [1997]

TITLE JRB REALTY, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SECURITIES and
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, MAKATI COMMERCIAL ESTATE ASSOCIATION,
INC. and AYALA LAND, INC., respondents.

GR NUMBER 119043

DATE April 14, 1997

PONENTE BELLOSILLO, J.:

NATURE/ PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

KEYWORDS

FACTS MAKATI COMMERCIAL ESTATE ASSOCIATION, INC. (MACEA), respondent, is

an association of owners, lessees and occupants of various lots situated within the
so-called Makati Central Business District (MCBD). JRB REALTY, INC., petitioner,
as owner of two (2) lots in MCBD, is a member of the MACEA. AYALA LAND, INC.
(ALI), in its capacity as successor-in-interest of Ayala Corporation in the ownership
and development of said lots, is also a member of MACEA.

For every Deed of Sale concerning the lots within MCBD a Deed Restrictions was
attached as an essential part of the consideration. The restrictions were then
annotated on the corresponding Certificates of Title as voluntary liens and
encumbrances. One of the restrictions refers to the construction of the buildings
and the architectural designs thereon which states that the building must have a
total gross floor area of not more than five (5) times the lot area and must have a
total height of not more than forty-two (42) meters.

As of the end of 1988 the owners of 80.57% of the lots including petitioner had
already erected buildings thereon in compliance with the height and floor area ratio
(FAR) restrictions.

Sometime in 1989, within the term of the effectivity of the Deed Restrictions,
respondent ALI submitted to respondent MACEA through its Board of Governors a
proposal for the revision of the restrictions relating to the construction and use of
structures to be built on the MCBD lots. The proposal sought the abolition of direct
 height restrictions to be replaced with FAR, in effect allowing lot owners to increase
the total floor areas of their present buildings or to construct buildings with floor
areas greater than those stated in the existing Deed Restrictions.

On 15 May 1989 respondent MACEA distributed to its members Memorandum

Circular No. 89-05 requesting written comments, suggestions and other actions on
the proposed revisions.

Petitioner submitted its written opposition dated 26 May 1989 based on the
grounds that the proposal would have an unfair effect on the members who have
already built structures on their lots in compliance with the Deed Restrictions and
that no less than the consent of all the parties to the Deeds of Sale was needed in
order to carry the revisions into effect.

The Board of Governors of respondent MACEA then decided to endorse the matter
to its members for their direct approval. On 22 March 1990 it sent out notices of an
annual meeting set for 5 April 1990 with the proposal to abolish the direct height
restrictions as one of the items in the agenda. However said meeting was reset to
14 June 1990.

ISSUE(S) (1) Whether respondent court violated Sec. 14, second par., Art. VIII, of the
Constitution when it refused to give due course to the petition for review and
subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration;

(2) Whether respondent MACEA had the power to change/amend/revise the Deed
Restrictions; and

RULING(S) (1) No. the petition has failed to show prima facie that the Securities and Exchange
Commission has committed errors of fact or law that would warrant a reversal or
modification of the assailed decision. In effect, respondent court adopted as its own
the factual findings of SEC as well as the evidence and law which supported the
conclusion. Notably, as contended by respondent ALI, the alleged non-compliance
with the Constitutional provision is merely an afterthought because petitioner did
not raise such issue in seeking reconsideration. Respondent court likewise stated
the legal basis for denying the motion for reconsiderations.

(2) Yes, provided that it will be approved by the parties. Respondent MACEA's
participation in the revision was merely limited to acting as an intermediary
between its members on one hand and respondent ALI on the other. This being the
case, it was not even necessary for public respondents to resolve the matter of
whether respondent MACEA had an implied power of revision.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The resolutions of respondent Court of

Appeals dated 10 January 1995 denying due course to the petition for review, and
14 February 1995 sustaining its denial are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.