Jimenez vs Cabangbang (G.R. No. L-15905)
Congress was not in session when the
Freedom of Speech & Debate
Facts: Cabangbang was a member of the
House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. On 14 Nov
1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an
open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said
letter alleged that there have been allegedly
three operational plans under serious study by
some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of
some civilian political strategists. That such
strategists have had collusions with communists
and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus
Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him
as the president. The “planners” allegedly have
Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their
guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be
aware that they are being used as a tool to meet
such an end. The letter was said to have been
published in newspapers of general circulation.
Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang
to collect a sum of damages against
Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s
statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for
the case to be dismissed because he said that
as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit
and that he is covered by the privileged
communication rule and that the said letter is not
even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is
covered by privilege communication endowed to
members of Congress. Whether or not the said
letter is libelous.
HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution
provides “The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases
except treason, felony, and breach of the peace.
Be privileged from arrest during their attendance
at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to
and returning from the same; and for any
speech or debate therein, they shall not be
questioned in any other place.” The publication
of the said letter is not covered by said
expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in session as well
as bills introduced in Congress, whether the
same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress
or outside the premises housing its offices, in
the official discharge of their duties as members
of Congress and of Congressional Committees
duly authorized to perform its functions as such
at the time of the performance of the acts in
question.
letter was published and at the same time he,
himself, caused the publication of the said letter.
It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a member
of Congress or as officer of any Committee
thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by
the lower court the said communication is not
absolutely privileged.
The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is
not sufficient to support Jimenez’ action for
damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs
are under the control of the persons unnamed
therein alluded to as “planners”, and that, having
been handpicked by Vargas, it should be noted
that defendant, likewise, added that “it is of
course possible” that plaintiffs “are unwitting
tools of the plan of which they may have
absolutely no knowledge”. In other words, the
very document upon which plaintiffs’ action is
based explicitly indicates that they might be
absolutely unaware of the alleged operational
plans, and that they may be merely unwitting
tools of the planners. The SC does not think that
this statement is derogatory to Jimenez to the
point of entitling them to recover damages,
considering that they are officers of our Armed
Forces, that as such they are by law, under the
control of the Secretary of National Defense and
the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question
seems to suggest that the group therein
described as “planners” include these two (2)
high ranking officers.Petition is dismissed.
Osmena vs Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144)
FACTS: Congressman Osmena petitioned for
declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction against Congressman
Pendatun and 14 others in their capacity as
member of the Special Committee created by
House Resolution # 59. Specifically, petitioner
asked for the annulment of the resolution on the
ground of infringement of his parliamentary
immunity; and asked the member of the Special
Committee be enjoined from proceeding, as
provided by Resolution # 59, requiring the
petitioner to substantiate his charges against the
President during his privilege speech entitled “A
Message to Garcia” wherein he spoke of
derogatory remarks of the President’s
administration selling pardons. For refusing to
provide evidence as the basis of his allegations,
Osmena was suspended for 15 months for the
serious disorderly behavior.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has complete
parliamentary immunity as provided by the
Constitution.
2. Whether or not petitioner’s words constitute
disorderly conduct.
3. Whether or not the taking up of other
business matters bars the House from
investigating the speech and words of Osmena.
4. Whether or not the House has the power to
suspend its members.
HELD:
1. Petitioner has immunity but it does not protect
him from responsibility before the legislative
body itself as stated in the provision that “xxx
shall not be questioned in any other place”.
2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within
the interpretation of the legislative body and not
the judiciary, because it is a matter that depends
mainly on the factual circumstances of which the
House knows best. Anything to the contrary will
amount to encroachment of power.
3. Resolution # 59 was unanimously approved
by the House and such approval amounted to
the suspension of the House Rules, which
according to the standard parliamentary practice
may be done by unanimous consent.
4. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the
Congress have been, or could be censured,
committed to prison, even expelled by the votes
of their colleagues.
Pobre vs. Santiago
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December
22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre
invites the Courts attention to the following
excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos
speech delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in
the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not
only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in
the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in
the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in
another environment but not in the Supreme
Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a
total disrespect on the part of the speaker
towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
and the other members of the Court and
constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly,
Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or
other disciplinary actions be taken against the
lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25,
2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does
not deny making the aforequoted statements.
She, however, explained that those statements
were covered by the constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech
she delivered in the discharge of her duty as
member of Congress or its committee. The
purpose of her speech, according to her, was to
bring out in the open controversial anomalies in
governance with a view to future remedial
legislation. She averred that she wanted to
expose what she believed to be an unjust act of
the Judicial Bar Council [JBC], which, after
sending out public invitations for nomination to
the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice,
would eventually inform applicants that only
incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would
qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC
should have at least given an advanced advisory
that non-sitting members of the Court, like her,
would not be considered for the position of Chief
Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted
primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section
11 of the Constitution, which provides: A
Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable
by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No member shall be questioned nor
be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof. Explaining the import of the
underscored portion of the provision, the Court,
in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary
immunity which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and
success for it is indispensably necessary that he
should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and
that he should be protected from resentment of
every one, however, powerful, to whom the
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.
As American jurisprudence puts it, this
legislative privilege is founded upon long
experience and arises as a means of
perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of
the legislative department. Without
parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its
equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and
ineffective debating forum. Legislators are
immune from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duties, not for their
private indulgence, but for the public good. The
privilege would be of little value if they could be
subjected to the cost and inconvenience and
distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the
pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against
them based upon a judges speculation as to the
motives.
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact
been in the forefront in upholding the institution
of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free
speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the
importance of the legislative and oversight
functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every
affair of government, investigate and denounce
anomalies, and talk about how the country and
its citizens are being served. Courts do not
interfere with the legislature or its members in
the manner they perform their functions in the
legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any
claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity
and mala fides of the statement uttered by the
member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege. The disciplinary authority of the
assembly and the voters, not the courts, can
properly discourage or correct such abuses
committed in the name of parliamentary
immunity.
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator
Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken.
Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under
the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this
could not be the last word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern
about the language Senator Santiago, a
member of the Bar, used in her speech and its
effect on the administration of justice. To the
Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed
the limits of decency and good professional
conduct. It is at once apparent that her
statements in question were intemperate and
highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she
was quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on
the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and
calling the Court a Supreme Court of idiots.
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente
Sotto.We draw her attention to the ensuing
passage in Sotto that she should have taken to
heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of this Court and believe
that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own
hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would
be the result.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain
the respect due to the courts should be allowed
to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this
case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8,
Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which respectively
provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and to the judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most
lawyers. Her achievements speak for
themselves. She was a former Regional Trial
Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited
authority on constitutional and international law,
an author of numerous law textbooks, and an
elected senator of the land. Needless to stress,
Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and
officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound
to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court
and to maintain the respect due its members.
Lawyers in public service are keepers of public
faith and are burdened with the higher degree of
social responsibility, perhaps higher than their
brethren in private practice.Senator Santiago
should have known, as any perceptive
individual, the impact her statements would
make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the
courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her
privilege speech as a prelude to crafting
remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation
strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the
insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the
passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in
the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not
only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in
the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in
the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in
another environment but not in the Supreme
Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would
readily show that her statements were
expressions of personal anger and frustration at
not being considered for the post of Chief
Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were
outside the pale of her official parliamentary
functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not
be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule,
demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court
and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal
wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that
parliamentary immunity is not an individual
privilege accorded the individual members of the
Parliament or Congress for their personal
benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of
the people and the institution that represents
them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given
vent to her anger without indulging in insulting
rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos
outburst was directly traceable to what she
considered as an unjust act the JBC had taken
in connection with her application for the position
of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions
under the Courts supervision, its individual
members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice
who sits as the JBCs ex-officiochairperson,have
no official duty to nominate candidates for
appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The
Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator
Santiagos
wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the
members of the Court and her choice of critical
and defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech
and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the
Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
x x x x(5) Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of the
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, exercises specific
authority to promulgate rules governing the
Integrated Bar with the end in view that the
integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally
cannot defend itself except within its own forum,
from the assaults that politics and self interest
may level at it, and assist it to maintain its
integrity, impartiality and independence;
x x x x(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty.
Noel S. Sorreda, we reiterated our
pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v.
Ferrer that the duty of attorneys to the courts can
only be maintained by rendering no service
involving any disrespect to the judicial office
which they are bound to uphold. The Court
wrote in Rheem of thePhilippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics
which pronounces that [i]t is the duty of a lawyer
to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance. That
same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly
incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts
against unjust criticism and clamor. And more.
The attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a
conduct that should be with all good fidelity x x x
to the courts.
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding
in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like
the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice. His duty is to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice. Faith in the courts,
a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the
continuity of government and to the attainment
of the liberties of the people. Thus has it been
said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it
is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the
proper administration of justice.
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession
bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code.
Society has entrusted that profession with the
administration of the law and dispensation of
justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a
government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar for misconduct committed
while in the discharge of official duties, unless
said misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his/her oath as a lawyer.
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any
conduct committed in their private capacity, as
long as their misconduct reflects their want of
probity or good demeanor, a good character
being an essential qualification for the admission
to the practice of law and for continuance of
such privilege. When the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of
conduct or misconduct, the reference is not
confined to ones behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of lawyers
professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual
practice of their professionwould show them to
be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which their license and the law invest
in them.
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the
peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of
law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary
authority on lawyers who, for malevolent
purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct
the orderly administration of justice, trifle with
the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse,
malign the men and women who compose them.
We have done it in the case of former Senator
Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel
Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty.
Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang who
repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in
a most insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form
of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty.
Santiago for what otherwise would have
constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part
towards the Court and its members. The factual
and legal circumstances of this case, however,
deter the Court from doing so, even without any
sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional
consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we
let the Senators offensive and disrespectful
language that definitely tended to denigrate the
institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to
re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to
respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal,
and remind her anew that the parliamentary
non-accountability thus granted to members of
Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to
enable them, as the peoples representatives, to
perform the functions of their office without fear
of being made responsible before the courts or
other forums outside the congressional hall. It is
intended to protect members of Congress
against government pressure and intimidation
aimed at influencing the decision-making
prerogatives of Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a
provision on Unparliamentary Acts and
Language that enjoins a Senator from using,
under any circumstance, offensive or improper
language against another Senator or against
any public institution. But as to Senator
Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate
President had not apparently called her to order,
let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics
Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as
the Rules dictates under such
circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated
the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate
that her peers bent backwards and avoided
imposing their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres
motives in filing his complaint, stating that
disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken
solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree
with her more. We cannot overstress that the
senators use of intemperate language to
demean and denigrate the highest court of the
land is a clear violation of the duty of respect
lawyers owe to the courts.
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant
Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made
the statements in question. Suffice it to say in
this regard that, although she has not
categorically denied making such statements,
she has unequivocally said making them as part
of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is
good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J.
Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-
Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of
the Constitution,DISMISSED.
Zandueta v. de la Costa
66 Phil. 615 (1938)
In re: Necessity of deciding Constitutional
Questions
The case is an original quo warranto action with
the Supreme Court instituted by Honorable
Francisco Zandueta against Honorable Sixto de
la Costa to obtain from the Supreme Court a
judgment declaring the respondent to be illegally
occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch
of the CFI of Manila, Fourth Judicial District,
ousting him from the said office and holding that
the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying
the office in question by placing him in
possession thereof.
Facts
Prior to the promulgation of the Commonwealth
Act No. 145, petitioner, the Honorable Francisco
Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of
first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising
solely of the City of Manila and was presiding
over the Fifth Branch of the CFI of the said city,
by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by
the President of the Philippines in his favor on
June 2, 1936, with the corresponding
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly on
September 8th of the same year.
On November 7, 1936, the date on which the
Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known
as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect,
petitioner received from the President of the
Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment
as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth
Judicial District, with authority to preside over
the Courts of First Instance of Manila and
Palawan. The new appointment of the petitioner
was not acted upon by the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly and as it
adjourned on November 20, 1937, the petitioner
was issued with a new ad interim appointment to
the same office, over which the petitioner took
oath on November 22, 1937 and subsequently
discharged the duties of the said office. The
petitioner, acting as executive judge, performed
several executive acts which consist of
designation of several personnel to the Courts
over his jurisdiction.
On May 19, 1938, the Commission on
Appointments disapproved the aforesaid ad
interim appointment of the petitioner, prompting
the President of the Philippines to appoint the
Honorable Sixto de la Costa to the same office,
who took the necessary oath and discharged the
duties of the said office, and was subsequently
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Issues
1. Can the petitioner impugn
the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No.
145?
2. Is the petitioner entitled to continue to
discharge the duties of the office he
occupied prior to his appointment by virtue of
the Commonwealth Act No. 145?
Held
The petitioner cannot impugn the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he
was appointed. The petitioner is estoppedby his
own act proceeding to question the
constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145,
by virtue of which he was appointed, by
accepting said appointment and entering into the
performance of the duties appertaining to the
office conferred therein.
In accepting the new appointment on November
7, 1936 and qualifying for the exercise of the
functions of the office conferred by it, by taking
the necessary oath on November 22, 1937, and
in discharging the same, disposing of both
judicial and administrative cases corresponding
to the CFI of Manila and Palawan, the
petitioner abandoned his appointment of June 2,
1936, and ceased to exercise of the functions of
the office occupied by him by virtue thereof. The
petitioner abandons his old office
and cannot claim to be entitled to repossess it or
question the constitutionality of the law by virtue
of which his new appointment has been issued;
and said new appointment disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly, neither can he claim to continue
occupying the office conferred upon him by said
new appointment, having ipso jure ceased in the
discharge of the functions thereof.
Petition denied and dismissed.
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and
SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. SEN.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN.
MARCELO B. FERNAN, G.R. No. 134577,
November 18, 1998 Case Digest
FACTS: On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the
Philippines convened for the first regular session
of the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day
was the election of officers. Senator Francisco
S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were
nominated for the position of Senate President.
By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was duly
elected President of the Senate.
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the
agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, he was assuming the position of
minority leader. He explained that those who
had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the
majority while those who voted for him,
belonged to the minority. During the discussion,
Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested that the
senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP
-- numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority -- had
chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as
minority leader. No consensus was arrived at
during the following days of session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed
the body that he received a letter from the 7
members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating
that they had elected Senator Guingona as
minority leader. The Senated President then
recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader
of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad
filed before the Supreme Court a petition for quo
warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has
been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising
the position of Senate minorit leader, a position
that, according to them, rightfully belongs to
Senator Tatad.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Supreme Court have
jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the
Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave
abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority
leader?
RULING:
First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction
In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim
that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution
has not been observed in the selection of the
Senate minority leader. They also invoke the
Court’s judicial power “to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on
the part of respondents.
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition
stating that It is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether
indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused
their discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the
Constitution when the Senate President
recognized Senator Guingona as minority
leader.
The Court, however, did not find any violation
since all that the Charter says is that "[e]ach
House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary." The court held that,
the method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method
must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by
this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the
Senate do not provide for the positions of
majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an
open clause providing specifically for such
offices and prescribing the manner of creating
them or of choosing the holders
thereof. However, such offices, by tradition and
long practice, are actually extant. But, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines
or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any
basis upon which to determine the legality of the
acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds
of respect for the basic concept of separation of
powers, courts may not intervene in the internal
affairs of the legislature.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing
must show that he or she has a clear right to the
contested office or to use or exercise the
functions of the office allegedly usurped or
unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case,
petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear
and indubitable franchise to the office of the
Senate minority leader. The specific norms or
standards that may be used in determining who
may lawfully occupy the disputed position has
not been laid down by the Constitution, the
statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power
has been vested. Without any clear-cut
guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality
or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona’s
assumption and exercise of the powers of the
office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore,
no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to
characterize any of his specific acts as minority
leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of
Guingona
Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan
did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate
President in recognizing Respondent Guingona
as the minority leader. The latter belongs to one
of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the
members of this party that he be the minority
leader, he was recognized as such by the
Senate President. Such formal recognition by
Respondent Fernan came only after at least two
Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both
sides were liberally allowed to articulate their
standpoints.
Under these circumstances, the Court believed
that the Senate President cannot be accused of
“capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment”
or of “an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility.” Where no
provision of the Constitution, the laws or even
the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown
to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be
imputed to Senate officials for acts done within
their competence and authority.
The Petition is DISMISSED.
PUYAT, ET. AL. vs. DE GUZMAN JR., ET. AL.
G.R. No. L-51122, 25 March 1982 Case Digest
The suit is for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction poised against the Order
of respondent Associate Commissioner of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
Hon. Sixto T. J. De Guzman, Jr., granting
Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to
intervene in a SEC Case.
FACTS:
On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven
Directors of the International Pipe Industries
(IPI), a private corporation, was held – six of the
elected directors were herein petitioners that
may be called the Puyat Group, while the other
five were herein respondents, the Acero Group.
Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the
Board and of the management of IPI.
On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at
the SEC quo warranto proceedings questioning
the election.
Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and
the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional
grounds the appearance of Justice Estanislao
Fernandez, then a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa, as counsel for the Acero
group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution,
then in force, provided that no Assemblyman
could "appear as counsel before xxx any
administrative body" and SEC was an
administrative body. The prohibition being clear,
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his
appearance.
When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it
turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez had
purchased on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI
stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was
notarized only on 30 May 1979. He then filed on
31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for Intervention
in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares
alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation,
which motion was granted by the SEC
Commissioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in
intervening in the SEC Case, is in effect
appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an
administrative body in contravention of the
Constitutional provision.
RULING:
The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue
of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman
Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as
counsel. His appearance could theoretically be
for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI
shares.
However, certain salient circumstances militate
against the intervention of Assemblyman
Fernandez. He had acquired a mere Php200.00
worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them "after the
fact", that is, on 30 May 1979, after the
contested election of Directors, after the quo
warranto suit had been filed, and one day before
the scheduled hearing of the case before the
SEC. And what is more, before he moved to
intervene, he had signified his intention to
appear as counsel for the Acero group, but
which was objected to by petitioners Puyat
group. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the
objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on
the ground of legal interest in the matter under
litigation.
Under those facts and circumstances, there has
been an indirect appearance as counsel before
an administrative body, which is a circumvention
of the Constitutional prohibition. The
"intervention" was an afterthought to enable him
to appear actively in the proceedings in some
other capacity.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make
the constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence
an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the "interest" of the client and
then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which
the Constitution directly prohibits may not
be done by indirection or by a general
legislative act which is intended to
accomplish the objects specifically or
impliedly prohibited.
Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman
Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the
ambit of the prohibition contained in the 1973
Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order
granting Assemblyman Fernandez leave to
intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set
aside.
Avelino vs Cuenco (G.R. No. L-2821)
FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino,
in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to
declare him the rightful Senate President and
oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a
session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to
deliver a speech in order to formulate charges
against then Senate President Avelino was
approved. With the leadership of the Senate
President followed by his supporters, they
deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada
from delivering his speech. The SP with his
supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried
to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12
Senators were left in the hall. The members of
the senate left continued the session and
Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting
President of the Senate and was recognized the
next day by the President of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the
case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was
validly approved.
HELD:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case
because the subject matter is political in nature
and in doing so, the court will be against the
doctrine of separation of powers. To the first
question, the answer is in the negative, in view
of the separation of powers, the political nature
of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46
Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to
elect its own president, which power should not
be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the
Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the
suspended senators were alleged affected
without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we
should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affect only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any
time to choose their officers, change or reinstate
them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to
be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want
petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the
Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme
Court.
2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12
being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four
justice agree that the Court being confronted
with the practical situation that of the twenty
three senators who may participate in the
Senate deliberations in the days immediately
after this decision, twelve senators will support
Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side
with Senator Avelino, it would be most
injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful
President of the Senate, that office being
essentially one that depends exclusively upon
the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of
the Senate about tenure of the President of that
body being amenable at any time by that
majority. And at any session hereafter held with
thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all
controversy arising from the divergence of
opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of
all concerned,the said twelve senators who
approved the resolutions herein involved could
ratify all their acts and thereby place them
beyond the shadow of a doubt.
Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August
14, 1997
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the
validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code. Petitioners, who are members of
the House of Representatives, charged that
there is violation of the rules of the House
which petitioners claim are constitutionally-
mandated so that their violation is tantamount to
a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of
Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference
committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate
versions of the bill. The bicameral committee
submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption
and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But
after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence
of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded.
After Rep. Arroyo’sinterpellation of the sponsor
of the committee report, Majority
LeaderAlbano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report.
The Chair called out for objections to the motion.
Then the Chairdeclared: “There being none,
approved.” At the same time the Chair was
saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is
that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo
were talking simultaneously. Thus, although
Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the
conference committee report had by then
already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law
by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly
permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act
taken if the requisite number of members has
agreed to a particular measure. But this is
subject to qualification. Where the construction
to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character.
Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are
involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose
to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of
internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not
that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of
quorum had already been defeated, as
the roll call established the existence of a
quorum. The question of quorum cannot be
raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying
the business of the House.
Sergio Osmeña, Jr. vs Salipada Pendatun
109 Phil. 863 – Political Law – The Legislative
Department – Parliamentary Immunity
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr.
delivered a speech entitled “A Message to
Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged then
President Carlos Garcia and hisadministration.
Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was
passed by the lower house in order to
investigate the charges made by Osmeña during
his speech and that if his allegations were found
to be baseless and malicious, he may be
subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower
house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said
resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña
avers that the resolution violates his
parliamentary immunity for speechesdelivered in
Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun
filed an answer where he averred that the
Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the
matter and Congress has the power to discipline
its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has
been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
upon members of the legislature which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every
parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees
the legislator complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside the Hall of Congress.
However, it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body
whenever his words and conduct are considered
disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein.
Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.
Santiago v Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 128055.
April 18, 2001
Facts: "That on or about October 17, 1988, or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being
then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of
her official functions, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization for the stay of the
aliens in violation of Executive Order No.
324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the
legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing
fully well that said aliens are
disqualified thereby giving unwarranted
benefits to said aliens whose stay in the
Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said
accused."
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the
other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-
94555 and No. 91-94897.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a
Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and
to dismiss or quash said information. Pending
the resolution of this incident, the prosecution
filed on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a
motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her
opposition to the motion of the prosecution to
suspend her.
The petition assails the authority of the
Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day
preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of
the Philippines, from any government position,
and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of
the Philippines for the implementation of the
suspension order.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction issuing suspension to petitioner.
Held: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.
Ratio: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to
order the preventive suspension of an
incumbent public official charged with violation
of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has
both legal and jurisprudential support. Section
13 of the statute provides:
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of
benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property whether as a simple or as
a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending
in court, shall be suspended from office.
In view of suspension NOT as a penalty
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty
of the court to issue an order of suspension
upon determination of the validity of the
information filed before it. Once the information
is found to be sufficient in form and substance,
the court is bound to issue an order of
suspension as a matter of course, and there
seems to be "no ifs and buts about it."
Thus, it has been held that the use of the word
"office" would indicate that it applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding,
and not only the particular office under which
he stands accused.
The law does not require that the guilt of the
accused must be established in a pre-
suspension proceeding before trial on the
merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a
proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the
evidence of culpability against him, (2) the
gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or
not his continuance in office could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence
before the court could have a valid basis in
decreeing preventive suspension pending the
trial of the case. All it secures to the accused
is adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity or regularity of the proceedings
against him, such as, that he has not been
afforded the right to due preliminary
investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not
constitute a specific crime warranting his
mandatory suspension from office under Section
13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the
information is subject to quashal on any of the
grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In view of multiple petitions
"Petitioner next claims that the Amended
information did not charge any offense
punishable under Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019
because the official acts complained therein
were authorized under Executive Order No.
324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the
Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of
approving applications for legalization of
spouses and unmarried, minor children of
"qualified aliens" even though they had arrived
in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She
concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not
granting her motion to quash the information
(Rollo, pp. 25-31).
"In a motion to quash, the accused the
accused admits hypothetically the
allegations of fact in the information(People
vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]).
Therefore, petitioner admitted
hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer,
(2) She approved the application for
legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in
the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and
manifest partiality in the execution of her official
functions.'
In view of RA 3019 and Sec 16, Art VI of the
Constitution
The order of suspension prescribed by
Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own
ranks.
Section 16, Article VI of the Constitution —
which deals with the power of each House of
Congress inter alia to'punish its Members for
disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a
Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members subject to the qualification that the
penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days — is unavailing,
as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019,
which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact
that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner
for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives."
In view of the power of the Court
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its
coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in
thus decreeing the assailed preventive
suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal
Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December
1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court,
nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this
decision for future guidance on the significant
issue raised by petitioner.
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR.
V. HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 189506, February 11, 2010Abad,
J.FACTS:In the 2007 elections, Bantay party-list
group received the sufficient voting percentage
entitlingit to a seat in the House of
Representatives in which Petitioner Jovito S.
Palparan, Jr. is the firstnominee of the said
party-list group.Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca,
Jr. , Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes. Jr.
,ErlindaCadapan,Antonia Flores, and
JoselitoUstarez are members of the other party-
list groups filed with theHRET a petition for
quo warranto
against Bantay and its nominee, Palaparan.
They alleged thatPalapran is not eligible to sit in
the House of Representative because he did not
belong to amarginalized and nderreprsented
sectors which then are the victims of communist
rebels,Civilian Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGUs), security guards and former
rebels.Palaparan claimed that he was just
Bantay’s nominee and that HRET had no
jurisdiction over his person since it was actually
the party-list that was elected to assume
membership in the House ofRepresentatives.
Furthermore, he said that such question should
be raised before the party-listgroup, not before
the HRET.On July 23, 2009 HRET issued an
order upholding its jurisdiction over the question
of petitioner
Palparan’s qualifications. Palparan filed a motio
for reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a
resolution dated September 10,
2009.ISSUE:Whether the HRET has the
jurisdiction concerning the eligibilities of the
nominees of the party-list groups that won seats
in the lower house of Congress.held:YES. Under
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, the
members of the Housse of
Representatives are of two kinds: “members
who shall be elected from legislative districts”
and“those who shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations”. Thus, it is the
part-list representatives who are “elected” into
office, not their parties or organizations.
Although it is the party-list organization that is
voted forin the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes member
of the House ofRepresentatives.As
contemplated in Section 17 Article VI of the
1987 Constitution , the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives. Since the party-list
representatives and districts representatives are
treated in like manner, the HRET has jurisdiction
to hear and pass upon their qualifications.Once
the party or organization of the party-list
nominee has been proclaimed and the
nomineehas taken his oath and assumed office
as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his qualifications ends and theHRET’s
own jurisdiction begins.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that the HRET shall be the sole
judge of allcontests relating to, among other
things, the qualifications of the members of the
House ofRepresentatives. Since party-list
nominees are “elected members” of the House
of Representatives no less than the district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to
hearand pass upon their qualifications. By
analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization
of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed
and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRET’s
own jurisdiction begins. Electoral Tribunal, et al.
/Congressman Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. vs.House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), et
al., G.R. No. 189466/G.R. No. 189506,.
February11, 2010.
Pimentel, et al. vs. House of Representives
Electoral Tribunal
Facts:
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act
took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with
the Party-List System Act, national elections
were held which included, for the first time, the
election through popular vote of party-list groups
and organizations whose nominees would
become members of the House. Proclaimed
winners were 14 party-list representatives from
13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe,
Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez,
Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas
from party-list groups Association of Philippine
Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang
Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang
Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network
Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens
Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay
(ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC
was able to send 2 representatives to the
House, while the 12 other party-list groups had
one representative each. Also elected were
district representatives belonging to various
political parties. Subsequently, the House
constituted its HRET and CA contingent by
electing its representatives to these two
constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure
involves the nomination by the political parties of
House members who are to occupy seats in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and the Commission on Appointments
(CA). From available records, it does not appear
that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-
list groups in the House nominated any of their
representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of
the date of filing of the present petitions for
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction, the House contingents to
the HRET and the CA were composed solely of
district representatives belonging to the different
political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters
addressed to then Senate President Blas F.
Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo
(now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The
letters requested Senate President Ople and
Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA
and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list
representatives to conform to Sections 17 and
18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its
meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved
to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer
Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives. On
the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-
Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred
the letter to House of Representatives Secretary
General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February
2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their
Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order) against the
HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against
the CA, its Chairman and Members. They
contend that, under the Constitution and the
Party-List System Act, party-list representatives
should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET,
and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the
HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to act positively on the
letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8
February 2000, the Court en banc directed the
consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489.
On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both
cases a motion to amend their petitions to
implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an
additional respondent, in his capacity as
Speaker of the House and as one of the
members of the CA. The Court granted both
motions and admitted the amended petitions.
Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on
the strength of his oath to protect, defend and
uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as
taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was
joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC,
ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-
NATCCO as co-petitioners.
Issue:
[1] Whether the present composition of the
House Electoral Tribunal violates the
constitutional requirement of proportional
representation because there are no party-list
representatives in the hret.
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA
to reconstitute themselves to include party-list
representatives constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
Held:
[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the
House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from
among its district and party-list representatives
those who may occupy the seats allotted to the
House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18,
Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on
the Senate and on the House the authority to
elect among their members those who would fill
the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for
House members in the Commission on
Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution, each chamber of Congress
exercises the power to choose, within
constitutionally defined limits, who among their
members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of
each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal.
These constitutional provisions are reiterated in
Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
The discretion of the House to choose its
members to the HRET and the CA is not
absolute, being subject to the mandatory
constitutional rule on proportional
representation.[26] However, under the doctrine
of separation of powers, the Court may not
interfere with the exercise by the House of this
constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear
violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of
separation of powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its
duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court
speculate on what action the House may take if
party-list representatives are duly nominated for
membership in the HRET and the CA. The
petitions are bereft of any allegation that
respondents prevented the party-list groups in
the House from participating in the election of
members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does
it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections,
the House barred the party-list representatives
from seeking membership in the HRET or the
CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts
that the party-list groups in the House at that
time simply refrained from participating in the
election process. The party-list representatives
did not designate their nominees even up to the
time they filed the petitions, with the predictable
result that the House did not consider any party-
list representative for election to the HRET or
the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list
representatives lies with the House of
Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the
issues presented by petitioners at this time.
[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack
of action by the HRET and the CA in response
to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under
Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET
and the CA are bereft of any power to
reconstitute themselves.
Reyes vs. COMELEC
Facts:
The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certi
orari with prayer for TemporaryRestraining Orde
r and/or Preliminary Injunction resolution of the
Commission onElection ordering the
cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of
petitioner for the position of the Representative
of the lone district of Marinduque.
On October 31, 2012 Joseph Socorro Tan filed
with the Comelec an Amended Petition to deny
due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Regina Ongsiaco Reyes,the
petitioner, on the ground that it contained
material representations.On March 27, 2013 the
COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy
of the petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8,
2013. On May 14, 2013 COMELEC en banc
denied her MR.
However, on May 18, 2013 she was proclaimed
winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June
5, 2013 COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013
Resolution final and Executory.On the same
day, petitioner took her oath of office before
Feliciano Belmonte, the speaker of the House of
Representatives. She has yet to assume office
at that time, as her term officially starts at noon
of June 30, 2013.According to petitioner, the
COMELEC was ousted of its
jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed
because pursuant to Section 17 Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive
jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and
qualifications”
of the members of the House of Representatives
.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over
the petitioner who is proclaimed as winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the
position of member of theHouse of
Representatives of Marinduque.
HELD:
Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the
jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a member of the House
of Representatives, as stated in Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. For one to be
considered a member of the House
of Representatives, there must
be a concurrence of these requisites 1.
Valid proclamation 2. proper oath, and 3.
assumption of office.
Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a
member of the HR yet as she has not assumed
office yet. Also, the 2nd requirements validly
complied with as a valid oath must be made
before the speaker of the House of
Representatives, and in open session. Here,
although she made the oath before Speaker
Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made
during plenary or in open session and, thus, it
remains unclear whether there required oath of
office was indeed complied.
Petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave
abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to
exist, for an act to be struck down as having
been done with grave abuse of discretion, the
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.
Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No.
127325. March 19, 1997)
FACTS:
Private respondent filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a
“Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative”
(Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time and
dates for signature gathering all over the
country; (2) Causing the necessary publications
of said Order and the attached “Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in
newspapers of general and local circulation; and
(3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in
all Regions of the Philippines, to assist
Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that
R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative
to amend the Constitution and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of
delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A.
No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law because
of its deficiency and inadequacy, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for
such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is
adequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendment to the Constitution, and (3)
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .
HELD:
NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The
conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means
that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No.
6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution are declared
void.
RATIO:
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and
interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide
any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution,
unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle
III. This deliberate omission indicates that the
matter of people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a
petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing
before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC,
sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of
such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the
petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records
and Statistics Office a certificate on the total
number of registered voters in each legislative
district; (3) to assist, through its election
registrars, in the establishment of signature
stations; and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits, and
voters’ identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory
petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or
given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
respondent Commission must have known that
the petition does not fall under any of the actions
or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for
which reason it did not assign to the petition a
docket number. Hence, the said petition was
merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed.
That petition was nothing more than a mere
scrap of paper, which should not have been
dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the
hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order
directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its
time, energy, and resources.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V POEA
FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an
accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint
for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines
with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular
No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated
death benefits and burial for the family of
overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of
the memorandum circular as violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
It contends that no authority had been given the
POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and
even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion
which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed
jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum
Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of
powers.
RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of
powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is
clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the
Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided
shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration
(POEA)."
It is true that legislative discretion as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the
discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative
cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of
legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies
the authority to issue rules to carry out the
general provisions of the statute. This is called
the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may
implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in' the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of
Labor on the new Labor Code. These
regulations have the force and effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine
whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate the only thing he will have to do is
enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be
adequate guidelines or stations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the
shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative.