ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.

Facts: Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA
7675 with title An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized
City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at to its
constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and residents of
Mandaluyong.
With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the
conversion of Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in
effect.

Issues:
WON RA 7675 is in:
1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill
rule".
2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the
Congress to 250 and reappropriating the legislative districts.
Ruling:
Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of
constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a
technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced
justifying the act of the legislature to increase the number of the members of the congress.
Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill
reapportioning the legislative district.
In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

MARIANO, JR. VS. COMELEC

242 SCRA 213, March 7, 1995 (Constitutional Law – Requirements in challenging the
constitutionality of the law)

FACTS: Petitioners suing as tax payers, assail a provision (Sec 51) of RA No. 7859 (An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City
of Makati) on the ground that the same attempts to alter or restart the “3-consecutive
term” limit for local elective officials disregarding the terms previously served by them,
which collides with the Constitution (Sec 8, Art X & Sec 7, Art VI).

ISSUE: Whether or not challenge to the constitutionality of questioned law is with merit.

HELD: No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are
well-delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question
of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must
be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Aquino III vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

Facts: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as
unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First
(1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment.”

Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President Macapagal-
Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned
districts shall form additional district where the new first district shall be composed of
176,383 population count.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the

explicit constitutional standard with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a
legislative district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It was
emphasized as well by the petitioners that if population is less than that provided by the
Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-compliance with the minimum population
requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.

Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first,
error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to question
theconstitutionality of R.A. 9716.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and
void, or whether or not a population of 250,000 is an
indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a
province.

Held: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction between
a city and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the
Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was
mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first
be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled
to two additional districts from the present of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance,
other than population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors
were mentioned during the deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.

BANAT v COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

Facts: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the
NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC
have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and
shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in
allocating party-list seats."

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution
No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC,
to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No.
07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No.
7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the
proceedings of the NBC.

Issue: Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in
these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on
22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one
seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the
party-list elections?

Held: WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of
the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated
9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declareunconstitutional the two percent threshold in
the distribution of additional party-list seats.

Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire
20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we
cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically
prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled.
The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation
of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 isunconstitutional. This Court finds that
the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list
seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution
of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our

allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by
each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each
party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two
steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the
remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats
reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters.
The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats
corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one
party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each
qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22,
any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system
to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either
"a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political
parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in
party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in
patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.)

The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC with
regard to the computation of seat allotments and the participation of major political parties
in the party-list system. I vote for the formula propounded by the majority as it benefits the
party-list system but I regret that my interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the
Constitution with respect to the participation of the major political parties in the election of
party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence

There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional
political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in
2001 where major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The
results confirmed the fear expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional
Commission that major political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of
votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political parties made it to
the top 50. These seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of
votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties
(including those whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average
of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of the major
parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat that would have
entitled them to seat their members as party-list representatives. In contrast, only about
4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of the 155 parties
garnered more than 2%.

In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time
of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list
system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the
Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral
groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the machinery and
chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political parties to
participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice
of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of
the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political
parties into the party-list system.

In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)

However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible 2%
threshold vote required for entitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the House of
Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This minimum vote
requirement ─ fixed at 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party list system ─
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI, of
the Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared constitutional policy,
as well as the legislative objective expressed in the enabling law, to allow the people’s
broadest representation in Congress,the raison d’etre for the adoption of the party-list
system.

Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Court’s decision in Veterans Federation
Party, we see that in the 14th Congress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list representatives,
using the Veterans formula. But that figure (of 55) can never be realized, because the 2%
threshold vote requirement makes it mathematically impossible to have more than 50 seats.
After all, the total number of votes cast for the party-list system can never exceed 100%.

Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold vote
requirement. The need for such a minimum vote requirement was explained in careful and
elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion in Veterans
Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a minimum vote requirement is needed --

1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback
position;

2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are
very low, from participating in the elections;

3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;

4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within
the system;

5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected
representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the
legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the
President of the Philippines;

6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those
who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their
constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor
under the name of the party-list system; and

7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.9

However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list
seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts, and the
foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is no longer viable.
It does not adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in
fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law from ever
being fully operative.

It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section
5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling for
the number of party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941,
enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the constitutional provision,
contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach, totally
impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending condition as an affront to
the fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative
measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional provisions
remain effective at all times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular
legislative enactment that renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs Commission on Elections

Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections
in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified
as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.

Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
the said party-lists.

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC
as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles
established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:

I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked
to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or

lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
“marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors
that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined
political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.

II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the
practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no
constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide
sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).

Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections
will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political
constituencies.”

Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In
the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the
intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is
that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for
the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike
major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can
acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of
elections.

If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system
itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower
house.

As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to

include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic
Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
“marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as
they are ideologically marginalized.

Bantay vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 177271
May 4, 2007

FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to
nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting
party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list
elections on May 14, 2007.

A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were
accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA
7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent
Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations.
Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be
resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the
Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently
unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution
07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential and
in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. Comelec’s reason for
keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is deducible from the
excerpts of the news report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is
that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of
nominees, and that party list elections must not be personality oriented according to
Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec
resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the
forthcoming party-list elections without simultaneously determining whether or not their
respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the
"Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each
seeks to.
In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan
Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3,
2007.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names
of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and
UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be
"declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be
enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections.

ISSUE:

1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-
list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective
nominees do not appear to be qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the
various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents
as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public
the names of said nominees.

HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the
respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose
or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations
accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups,

1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for
cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise
would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the
office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings,
the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the
undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of
want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the
tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a
requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with
the accreditation of an organization. )

2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.

Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

COMELEC’s basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list
groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-list
nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the
Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that
prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the
"Certified List" of the names.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their
representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list
elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who,
in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court frowns
upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of
the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right
where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all
constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of
access to official records are not absolute. The people’s right to know is limited to "matters
of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. But
no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the
nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore,
lies.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy
from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College
now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese
School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she
married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte
and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959,
they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when
Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District
of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest
misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by
adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed
on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in
running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor
of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District
of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following
reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by
operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts
which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile
of origin should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence”
in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late
President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home
and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to
choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte,
the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995
are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte.

Aquino v COMELEC (1995)

Aquino vs. Comelec

Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and
Juanito Icaro, respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age,
able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative
District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident
of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10
months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-
UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on
the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman
which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less
than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his
certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a
resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of
8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the
latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission
resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue:
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to
warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence
(not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.

Held:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile”
not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court
cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is
it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election.
This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was
domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at
times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
…
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical
and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of
domicile.
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain,
i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs
of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for
meeting election lawrequirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to
place through assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for
him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established
a domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior
to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was
a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years
prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his
COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of
origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement
of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in
Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short
length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in
Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in
transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect
a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one
year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the
candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of
Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving
congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved
with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the
elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR
Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its
questioned decision despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to
be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year
against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year
residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which
were only existing for less than a year at the time of the election and barely four months in
the case of petitioner’s district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered
the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine
that a second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser
and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new
political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing
their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these
areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one
year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself
establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.

Co v. HRET

Facts: Petitioner Antonio Co ran for Congressman of the 2nd District of Samar. Private
respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was declared winner. Although Ong's mother is a natural born-
Filipina, his father was only naturalized as a Filipino when the respondent was already nine
years old. Given these facts, petitioner contends that Ong is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen and therefore disqualified from being elected Congressman.
Issue: WON Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Ruling: Affirmative. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit
to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself
that had already elected Philippine citizenship for Ong by declaring him as such. The
petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because
of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. The Court cannot go into the collateral
procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and at this very late
date just so we can go after the son. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship
may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.

Lonzanida vs COMELEC [311 SCRA 602]

(Local Government, Disqualification: Exception to the 3 term limit rule)

Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as
municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May
1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again
proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation
in 1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an election protest. The court rendered a
judgment declaring the results of the said election last May 8, 1995, as null and void on the
ground that there was a failure of election.

In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of
San Antonio and was proclaimed winner. Prior proclamation, His opponent timely filed a
petition to disqualify him from running on the ground that he had served three consecutive
terms in the same post.

The COMELEC found that Lonzanida’s assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in
May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be
counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution
and the Local Government Code. Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition
for disqualification

Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions maintaining that he
was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in
1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term
limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San
Antonio in the May 1995 elections.

The private respondent maintains that the petitioner’s assumption of office in 1995 should
be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for
almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral
elections.

Issue: WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May
1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the
three-term limit for elective local government officials.

Held: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, “the term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three
years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”

Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule, that: “No
local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.”

The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he
was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.

Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a term does not
cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by
law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few
months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance
with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such
involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

Dimaporo v. Mitra
202 SCRA 779 / G.R. No. 96859
October 15, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative
District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990,
petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional
Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the immediately following
elections. Upon being informed of this development by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker
and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus
Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which
he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to

respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions
as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as
congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the
present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present
members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the
House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members
may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof
provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials
first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section
7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a
term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts that under the rule expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these
constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of
office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a
congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a
certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.

ISSUE:
1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION?

2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY

ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS
CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered
resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but
primarily because under our Constitution, we have this …chapter on accountability of public
officers (both in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on
"Accountability of Public Officers" states that:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must
serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern
that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory
provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such officials serve
out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office
and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their
candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the
constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not
trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate
of candidacy for another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the
elective office presently being held, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure,
not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the
certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered.
Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or
appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent
upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the
Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress,
does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI
provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment … All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly
recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the
tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the
constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the
legislature from prescribing other grounds

Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of

legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A
doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform
ministerial functions; It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll
considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the
COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his
certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no
choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously
hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to
question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and
which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from
the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is
created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to
such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any
restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.

NOTES:

- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a
Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The term of
office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature
(22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be
affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter
than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the
term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman

may be shortened:

a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in
the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an
election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.