G.R. No. L-22979 June 26, 1967 Atty. [Jose S.
Atty. [Jose S.] Armonio, who thought best to focus the attention of this Honorable Court to the
RHEEM OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
ZOILO R. FERRER, ET AL., respondents.
IN RE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ALFONSO PONCE ENRILE, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, MANUEL G.
MONTECILLO, ENRIQUE M. BELO, OSCAR R. ONGSIAKO, and JOSE S. ARMONIO, members of the
Philippine Bar.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for petitioners.
Jose T. Valmonte for respondents.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
Contempt proceedings. The following from the motion to reconsider the decision herein, filed by
counsel for petitioners —
One pitfall into which this Honorable Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the question
as to whether or not a particular subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations is the tendency of this Honorable Court to rely upon its own
pronouncement without due regard to the statutes which delineate the jurisdiction of
the industrial court. Quite often, it is overlooked that no court, not even this Honorable
Court, is empowered to expand or contract through its decision the scope of its
jurisdictional authority as conferred by law. This error is manifested by the decisions of
this Honorable Court citing earlier rulings but without making any reference to and
analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations. This manifestation appears in this Honorable Court's decision in the instant
case. As a result, the errors committed in earlier cases dealing with the jurisdiction of
the industrial court are perpetuated in subsequent cases involving the same issue . . . .
It may also be mentioned in passing that this Honorable Court contravened Rule 2,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court when it applied the so-called "rule against splitting of
jurisdiction" in its Decision in the present case. As applied by this Honorable Court, the
rule means that when an employee files with the Court of Industrial Relations numerous
claims relative to his employment but only one [of] which is cognizable by said court
under the law, while the others pertain to other tribunals, that court has authority to
entertain all the claims to avoid multiplicity, of suits. . . . .
drew from the Court an order directing counsel to show cause why they should not be dealt with
for contempt of court.
In respondent attorneys' verified return, they offered "their most sincere apologies for the
language used" and stated that "[i]t was not and it has never been their intention to be
disrespectful." They manifested that the language "was the result of overenthusiasm on the part of
issue in the case, as not in any way meant to slight or offend this Honorable Court. They also said
that the unfortunate Motion for Reconsideration was prepared and filed by Atty. Armonio who had
been personally handling the case since its inception at the Court of Industrial Relations, and who
had, perhaps, become too emotionally involved in the case."
Respondent members of the law firm, namely, Attys. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion
Reyna, Manuel G. Montecillo, Enrique M. Belo and Oscar R. Ongsiako assumed "full responsibility"
for what appears in the motion for reconsideration. They submitted, not as an excuse, but as fact,
that not one of the partners was able to pass upon the draft or final form of the said motion, and
that Atty. Armonio, an associate, prepared, signed and filed the motion "without clearing it with
any of the partners of the firm." The return winds up with an expression of deep regret about the
incident, coupled with an earnest pledge that it "shall never happen again."
Subsequent to the return, respondent attorneys appeared in court. Attys. Ponce Enrile and
Armonio were orally heard.1äwphï1.ñët
1. As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall
into which this Court has repeatedly fallenwhenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own
pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the
decisions of this Court blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making "any reference
to and analysis of" the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain
import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the
industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of
perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on
jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this
Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements
detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the
capability of the members and — some former members — of this Court to render justice. The
second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm when counsel labelled as "so-called" the "rule
against splitting of jurisdiction." 1
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be
any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: "To observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers." As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces
that "[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to
support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's oath solemnly
binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts." Worth
remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts "can only be maintained by rendering no
service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold." 2
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege.
And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some
such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a
court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the In the end, we admonish Atty. Jose S. Antonio, with the warning that repetition of this incident will
temples of right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are be dealt with accordingly. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to his record.
encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
Attention of Attys. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Manuel G. Montecillo, Enrique
2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and again, this Court has admonished M. Belo and Oscar R. Ongsiako is invited to the necessity of exercising adequete supervision and
and punished, in varying degrees, members of the Bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, control of the pleadings and other documents submitted by their law firm to the courts of justice
acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts. 3 Resort by an attorney — in a motion of this country.
for reconsideration — to words which may drag this Court down into disrepute, is frowned upon as
"neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a So ordered.
special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof,
the many reasons stated in the motion" are "sufficient," and such words "superfluous." 4 It is in this
context that we must say that just because Atty. Armonio "thought best to focus the attention" of Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
this Court "to the issue in the case" does not give him in bridled license in language. To be sure,
lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Court's
attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic
but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
Trust International Paper Corp. v. Pelaez GR No. 164871 August 22, 2006
To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts,
creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or which could have the effect of "harboring FIRST DIVISION
and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the
foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved TRUST INTERNATIONAL PAPER CORPORATION, G.R. No. 164871
turn for protection and relief." 5 Stability of judicial institutions suggests that the Bar stand firm on
Petitioner,
this precept.
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
The language here in question, respondents aver, "was the result of overenthusiasm." It is but to
Chairperson,
repeat an old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
one or the other is no less a virtue, if channelled in the right direction. However, it must be - versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts in
our system of government. 6 CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
We are not unmindful of counsel's statement that the language used "was not in any way meant to
slight or offend" this Court. Want of intention, we feel constrained to say, is no excuse for the MARILOU R. PELAEZ, Promulgated:
language employed. For, counsel cannot escape responsibility "by claiming that his words did not Respondent.
mean what any reader must have understood them as meaning." 7 At best, it extenuates liability. August 22, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
3. We now turn to the partners of the law firm. They explained that not one of them cleared the
motion in which the questionable portion appears. Their reason is that they were not in the office
at the time said motion was filed — which was the last day. They added that "it is the policy of the DECISION
firm known to all its members and associates that only the partners can sign court pleadings except
in rare cases where, for want of time or due to unexpected circumstances, an associate has to sign
the same." We understood Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile to have said in open court that in his long
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
years of practice, he knows that it serves no useful purpose to downgrade the dignity of the Court.
We may overlook the shortcomings of the members of the law firm; except that, as we see it,
partners are duty bound to provide for efficacious control of court pleadings and other court
papers that carry their names or the name of their law firm. Seemingly, such control was absent
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with an Urgent Application
here.
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeks to
set aside the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73356
entitled, Marilou R. Pelaez v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. dated 13 February In a Decision dated 21 September 1999, the Labor Arbiter found petitioner guilty of
2004[1] and 29 July 2004, respectively. The first Resolution denied petitioner Trust International illegal dismissal and awarded to respondent backwages, separation pay and
Paper Corporations (TIPCO) Petition for Relief from Judgment, while the second denied its motion damages.The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
seeking reconsideration thereof.

CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby

Respondent Marilou R. Pelaez started her employment with petitioner as Secretary. She rendered finding complainant to have been illegally retrenched by
earned various promotions, the last of which was her appointment as Corporate Cashier in 1993. respondents. Consequently, they are ordered to pay in solidum complainant
as follows:

After undergoing substantial business losses for the fiscal year 1996-1997, petitioner
a) Backwages as of August 29 August, 1999 Php 484,000.00
implemented cost-cutting and streamlining programs to alleviate its financial predicament. In the
course of carrying out the said programs, several positions were abolished and declared
b) Separation Pay Php 459,800.00
redundant, one of which was the position of Corporate Cashier. Thus, on 24 December 1997,
respondent received a memorandum from Jose Reyes, petitioners Chief Financial Officer, informing c) Moral Damages Php 300,000.00
her that her services were terminated. She accepted her severance from the employ of petitioner
d) Exemplary Damages Php 100,000.00
and turned over her accountabilities to the different departments which absorbed her
responsibilities. Thereafter, she was no longer required to report for work.
e) Vacation and sick leaves Php 55,974.20

f) 5% of the awarded money claims as attorneys fees.

Sometime in January 1998, respondent found out the creation of the position of The sum of Php 539,974.20 should be deducted from the awards
Treasury Clerk in petitioners plantilla which has the same job description and responsibilities as granted to complainant.[2]

that of Corporate Cashier. Feeling deceived, respondent immediately filed on 6 January 1998 a
Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment/underpayment of salaries, separation pay, retirement
On 22 October 1999, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
benefits, service incentive leave and sick leave benefits, and damages against petitioner, Elon Ting,
(NLRC).
the president of TIPCO, Efren TanLapco, the Chief Operating Officer of TIPCO and Jose E. Reyes, the
Chief Financial Officer of TIPCO before the Arbitration Branch of the DOLE-NCR.
In a Decision dated 31 May 2002, the NLRC reversed the findings and rulings of the
Labor Arbiter. It affirmed the validity of petitioners redundancy program, which was the ground for
the termination of respondents employment. The dispositive portion of the Decision provides:
On 12 January 1998, respondent received her separation benefits from petitioner in the
amount of P539,974.20 and correspondingly signed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby VACATED and
SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.
[3]
 On 5 July 2002, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the NLRC denied in
a Resolution dated 31 July 2002.
Unfazed with the setback, respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals arguing that grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the NLRC in setting aside the Labor Arbiters Decision despite having been duly
supported by the facts and the law.
In due time, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of respondent on the
ground that respondents dismissal due to redundancy did not meet the requirements of law;
hence, the same was illegal. The Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The decision of public respondent NLRC in NLRC NCR CA No.
021691-99, as well as its subsequent resolution denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE and the decision of
the labor arbiter a quo REINSTATED.[4]
The Decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory as no appeal or motion
for reconsideration was filed by either party.
Hence, on 25 July 2003, an Entry of Judgment was issued by the Court of Appeals.
On 29 December 2003, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner anchored its petition on the excusable negligence of its
counsel Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiakos (Siguion Reyna) law firm and the gross negligence
of Atty. Elena C. Cardinez (Atty. Cardinez), a newly hired junior associate of the Siguion Reyna law
firm, who allegedly handled the case for petitioner. Petitioner revealed that the instant case was
assigned to Atty. Cardinez in June 2003 and that all notices, orders and legal processes in
connection with the instant case were immediately forwarded to her for appropriate action.
Petitioner contended that the Siguion Reyna law firm was never remiss in its duty to
follow up the status of the case with Atty. Cardinez. In fact, it was the law firm itself, through
Atty. Cardinezs supervising lawyers and co-counsels, Attys. Carla E. Santamaria-Sea, Cheryll Ann
L. Pea and Rean Mayo D. Javier, who had to elicit reports from her.When asked about the
developments of the case, Atty. Cardinez supposedly informed the law firm that everything was in
order regarding petitioners defense, when in fact, it was not. Eventually, Atty. Cardinez never
reported to work and that she was nowhere to be found despite the law firms diligent efforts to
search for her. She did not turn over the case files in her possession, including the Court of Appeals
file folders of the instant case.
Petitioner maintained that the acts of Atty. Cardinez in misrepresenting to the law firm
that everything was in order regarding its defense, when in fact, it was not, and the fact that she
took the files with her constitute gross negligence and should not bind petitioner. Corollarily,
petitioner argues that the Siguion Reyna law firms fault can only be categorized as an excusable
neglect for it was not remiss in making follow-ups about the status of the case with
Atty. Cardinez. It acknowledged that the law firms mistake was that it put faith in the assurances of
Atty. Cardinez, who repeatedly gave her word that nothing was amiss in the defense of petitioners
position in the instant case.
Unconvinced, the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 13 February 2004, denied
petitioners Petition for Relief from Judgment, ratiocinating as follows:
There is no use arguing that the instant case was unloaded by
Attys. Pea and Javier, to a certain Atty. Elena C. Cardinez, as it is the
responsibility of the law firm of Siguion ReynaMontecillo and Ongsiako Law
Office itself, to prepare and submit the appropriate relief or remedy of its
client. The negligence or failure of its partners or associates to perform its
duties and tasks is not excusable negligence that could merit relief under Rule
38 of the Rules of Court.
The doctrinal rule is that the negligence of the counsel binds the
client because, otherwise, there would never be an end to a suit so long as
counsel could allege its own fault or negligence to support the clients case
and obtain remedies and relief already lost by the operation of law. [5]
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 29 July 2004.
Hence, the instant Petition.
In its Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues:
 A.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR
WHEN IT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE GROSS AND PALPABLE NEGLIGENCE,
BORDERING ON FRAUD, COMMITTED BY PETITIONERS FORMER HANDLING
COUNSEL, ATTY. CARDINEZ, WHOSE NEGLIGENCE AND ACTIVE
MISREPRESENTATION PREVENTED PETITIONER FROM EXHAUSTING ALL THE
LEGAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT, PARTICULARLY, THE REMEDY OF APPEAL TO
THE SUPREME COURT.
B.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
STRICTLY APPLIED THE TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE TO THE DETRIMENT
OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.
C.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
FAILED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION PETITIONERS GOOD AND SUBSTANTIAL
DEFENSE, WHICH MUST BE FULLY VENTILATED, CONSIDERING THAT IT STANDS
TO LOSE THE STAGGERING SUM OF MORE THAN TWO MILLION PESOS
(P2,000,000.00)[6]
At the onset, it must be pointed out that the present petition seeking the setting aside of
the Court of Appeals Resolutions dated 13 February 2004 and 29 July 2004, denying petitioners
petition for relief from judgment, is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Section 1(b) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, however, provides:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to beappealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any
similar motion seeking relief from judgment.
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable,
the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Thus, in Azucena v. Foreign Manpower Services,[7] it was held:
Neither may petitioner seek to set aside the Court of Appeals April 26, 2001
Resolution denying his petition for relief from judgment through the same
mode of review (petition for review on certiorari), for under Section 1(b) of
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the denial of a petition for relief from judgment
is subject only to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 . (Emphasis
supplied.)
Based on the foregoing, the denial of a petition for relief from judgment can only be
assailed before this Court via a special civil action under Rule 65 and not through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. In availing of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to
obtain the reversal of the Court of Appeals Resolutions denying its petition for relief from
judgment, petitioner certainly has made use of the wrong remedy.
Even if this Court was to treat the instant petition as a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65, the same would still have to be dismissed.
In Mercury Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, [8] the Court clarified the nature of a
petition for relief from judgment:
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only
in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate
remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be
either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial
court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail
himself of this petition. x x x.
 This Court likewise ruled:
Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his
own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the
right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence. [9]
In the present case, petitioner posits that the Court of Appeals committed grave error
when it failed to recognize the gross and palpable negligence, bordering on fraud, committed by
Atty. Cardinez, whose negligence prevented petitioner from exhausting all the legal remedies
available to it.
It is undisputed that the counsel of record of petitioner is the Siguion Reyna law
firm. The law firm failed to notify petitioner of the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals to
enable it to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal from the said decision. The law firms
failure to inform petitioner of the decision is inexcusable negligence which cannot be a ground for
relief from judgment. This is in line with jurisprudence that notice sent to counsel of record is
binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform his client of an adverse
judgment resulting in the loss of right to appeal will not justify the setting aside of a judgment that
is valid and regular on its face.[10]
The negligence of Atty. Cardinez, the law firms new associate, apparent in her
mishandling of the cause of petitioner likewise constitutes inexcusable negligence.Negligence, to
be excusable, must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could have not guarded against.
It must be pointed out that Atty. Cardinezs name did not appear in any of the pleadings
filed by petitioner before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals. It was only in the
petition for relief filed before the Court of Appeals that the name of Atty. Cardinez appeared for
the first time. In the petition for relief, Atty. Cardinez was blamed by petitioner and its counsel,
the Siguion Reyna law firm, for squandering petitioners opportunity to appeal the Court of Appeals
decision. What appears on the records is that the Comment and Memorandum of petitioner before
the Court of Appeals were signed by Attys. Carla E. Santamaria-Sea, Cheryll Ann
L. Pea and Rean Mayo D. Javier.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the handling lawyers of the law firm were putting
the blame on Atty. Cardinez when they lost the case and forgot to file the appeal.Besides, if the
case was, indeed, unloaded to Atty. Cardinez, the supervising lawyers would have detected the
omission of the former considering that it is a common practice in a law firm that when it hires a
new associate, his or her work is ordinarily reviewed by the more senior associate of the law
firm. If the supervising lawyers of Atty. Cardinez, namely, Attys. Sea, Pea and Javier, were not
remiss in their duty to follow up the status of the case, they would have known that they have not
received or reviewed any pleadings from Atty. Cardinez pertaining to the case under
consideration. Simply, petitioners counsel, the Siguion Reyna law firm itself, was guilty of
inexcusable neglect in handling petitioners case before the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner insists that its case is an exception to the general rule that the negligence of
counsel binds the client. Petitioner invokes this Courts ruling in Peoples Homesiteand Housing
Operation v. Workmens Compensation Commission, [11] Somoso v. Court of Appeals, [12] Apex Mining,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[13] Salazar v. Court of Appeals,[14] Sarraga, Sr. v. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank,[15] and Heirs of Pael v. Court of Appeals,[16] where this Court departed from the
general rule that the client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer considering that, in said cases,
the lawyers were grossly negligent in their duty to maintain their clients cause and such amounted
to a deprivation of their clients property without due process of law. In said cases, the petitions for
relief from judgment were given due course. However, we find that the ruling in said cases do not
apply in the instant case.
In Peoples Homesite, the counsel failed to apprise the petitioners therein of the hearing and the
case was heard in their absence. The counsel also did not inform the petitioners that he had
received a copy of the decision and neither did he file a motion for reconsideration or a petition to
set aside judgment to protect the interests of his clients. When asked to explain, the counsel
merely said that he did not inform the petitioners because the case escaped his attention. On
account of these attendant facts, this Court found that there was something fishy and suspicious
with the actions of counsel. The Court therein, in allowing the petition for relief from judgment and
in remanding the case to the court of origin, had, in mind, the attending probability that
petitioners counsel colluded with the adverse party, which is utterly wanting in the present case.
In the case at bar, petitioners counsel was able to actively defend its case before the
Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. In fact, the Siguion Reyna law firm was able to
obtain a favorable decision for petitioner before the NLRC. The instant case is clearly at variance
with the Peoples Homesite case.
In Somoso, the counsel of spouses Somoso informed them that he was withdrawing his
appearance as counsel of the case. A decision dated 8 March 1985 was issued by the trial court
against the spouses. The counsel received the decision on 15 August 1985, but the spouses came
to know of the decision only on 27 September 1985, the day they received the letter from their
counsel informing them of such decision. On 27 September 1985, the counsel belatedly filed in
court his motion to withdraw as counsel which was dated 10 June 1985. This Court granted
spouses petition for relief from judgment as they were able to prove that they were entitled
thereto considering that their counsel had earlier informed them of his intention to withdraw from
the case, but belatedly filed the formal withdrawal.
In the present case, it has been Attys. Santamaria-Sea, Pea and Javier who participated
in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. They did not notify the Court of Appeals that they
had withdrawn from the case. There was completely no reason for them not to file an appeal,
being the handling counsel of record during the pendency of the case before the Court of Appeals.
The case of Apex Mining, Inc. invoked by petitioner is not on all fours with the instant case. In Apex,
petitioners counsel did not attend the scheduled hearing for the reception of the evidence. The law
firm did not even bother to inform its client of the scheduled hearing, as a result of which both
counsel and petitioners were unable to attend the same.After the trial court issued an order
declaring petitioners in default for having waived their right to present evidence, their counsel did
not take steps to have the same set aside. In addition, the negligent counsel deliberately
misrepresented in the progress report that the case was still pending with Court of Appeals when
the same was dismissed months earlier. These circumstances are absent in the case under
consideration because at no time was petitioner was deprived of its right to submit evidence to
support its argument.
Neither can the case of Salazar be applied in the case under consideration. In the former,
petitioners were deprived of their right to present evidence at the trial through the gross and
palpable mistake of their counsel who agreed to submit the case for decision without fully
substantiating their defense. In the instant case, petitioner was able to ventilate its defense though
various pleadings and documentary evidence before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals.
In Sarraga, the petition for relief from judgment was granted due to the attending circumstance
where the counsel of record was grossly negligent in defending the cause of the client. On the
other hand, in the present case, petitioner is placing the blame on the alleged gross negligence of
an attorney who was not even been shown to have participated in the proceedings of the case.
In Heirs of Antonio Pael, this Court found that there was a showing of badges of fraud displayed by
the counsel of the unsuccessful party when he resorted to two clearly inconsistent remedies,
namely appeal and motion for new trial. In contrast, the instant case merely illustrates a scenario
where a counsel committed a simple and inexcusable negligence to the prejudice of the client.
In sum, this is not a case where the negligence of counsel is one that is so gross,
palpable, pervasive and reckless which deprives the party of his or her day in court. For this reason,
the Court need no longer concern itself with the propriety of the ruling of the Court of Appeals
reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Court is bound by the Court of Appeals ruling
which had become final and executory due to the simple and inexcusable negligence of petitioners
counsel in allowing the reglementary period to lapse without perfecting an appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 13
February 2004 and 29 July 2004 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 73356 denying petitioners petition for relief from judgment, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
RILLORAZA, AFRICA, DE OCAMPO and AFRICA, petitioners, vs. EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PHILS., INC. and PHILIPPINE TELEPHONE LONG DISTANCE COMPANY, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Issue
The basic issue submitted for consideration of the Court is whether or not petitioner is
entitled to recover attorneys fees amounting to Twenty Six Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand
Seven Hundred Seventy Nine Pesos and Ninety One Centavos (P26,350,779.91) for handling the
case for its client Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Makati, though its services were terminated in midstream and the client directly compromised the
case with the adverse party.
The Facts
In giving due course to the petition, we carefully considered the facts attendant to the
case. On August 28, 1987, Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) represented by the
law firm San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin (SAGA), filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Makati, a complaint for recovery of revenue shares against Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT). Atty. Francisco D. Rilloraza, a partner of the firm appeared for ETPI.
After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00). On September 18, 1987, the trial court issued a resolution granting ETPIs
application for preliminary restrictive and mandatory injunctions. During this period, SAGA was
dissolved and four of the junior partners formed the law firm Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa
(RADA), which took over as counsel in the case for ETPI. The latter signed a retainer agreement
with counsel dated October 1, 1987.[1]
Petitioners presented the three aspects of the main case in the trial court. First, the traffic
revenue shares which ETPI sought to recover from PLDT in accordance with the contract between
them. Second, ETPI sought preventive injunctive relief against the PLDTs threats to deny ETPI
access to the Philippines international gateway switch. Third, ETPI called this the foreign
correspondentships aspect where ETPI sought preventive injunctive relief against PLDTs incursions
and inducements directed at ETPIs foreign correspondents in Hongkong, Taiwan and Singapore, to
break their correspondentship contracts with PLDT, using the threat of denying them access to the
international gateway as leverage.
In this connection, ETPI filed with the trial court two urgent motions for restraining order,
one on October 30, 1987 and another on November 4, 1987. As the applications were not acted
upon, ETPI brought the case up to the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari.
On June 28, 1988, petitioner received a letter from ETPI signed by E. M. Villanueva, President
and Chief Executive Officer. In substance, the letter stated that ETPI was terminating the retainer
contract dated October 1, 1987, effective June 30, 1988.
On June 29, 1988, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a notice of attorneys lien,
furnishing copies to the plaintiff ETPI, to the signatory of the termination letter and PLDT. On the
same date, petitioner additionally sent a letter to ETPI attaching its partial billing statement. In its
notice, RADA informed the court that there were negotiations toward a compromise between ETPI
and PLDT.
In April 1990, petitioner confirmed that indeed the parties arrived at an amicable settlement
and that the same was entered as a judgment. On April 26, 1990, petitioner filed a motion for the
enforcement of attorneys lien with the Regional Trial Court of Makati and then appraised the
Supreme Court thereof by manifestation. [2] We noted the manifestation in a resolution dated July
23, 1990.
On May 24, 1990, PLDT filed with the trial court a manifestation that it is not a party to nor
in any manner involved in the attorneys lien being asserted by Atty. Rilloraza for and in behalf of
the law firm,[3] while ETPI filed its opposition thereto on June 11, 1990.
The Lower Courts Ruling
The trial court in its resolution dated September 14, 1990 denied the motion for
enforcement of attorneys lien. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds that the Notice of Attorneys Lien filed by the
law firm of Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa has no basis in fact and in law, and therefore
denies the Motion for Enforcement of Attorneys Lien.
SO ORDERED.
Makati, Metro Manila, September 4, 1990.
(s/t) ZEUS C. ABROGAR
J u d g e[4]
On October 10, 1990, petitioner filed with the trial court a notice of appeal from the above-
mentioned order to the Supreme Court. On November 6, 1990, ETPI filed a Motion to Dismiss
Appeal contending that the case could be brought to the Supreme Court only via a petition for
review on certiorari, not by a mere notice of appeal. In an order dated January 16, 1991, the trial
court dismissed RADAs appeal.
The trial court said:
There is no more regular appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court. Under the
amendment of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act by R.A. 5440, orders and judgments of the Regional
Trial Court may be elevated to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari.
xxx
Wherefore, premises considered, the order dated September 14, 1990 is hereby reconsidered and
set aside. The Notice of Appeal filed by movant RADA is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Given this 16th day of January, 1991, at Makati, Metro Manila.
(s/t) ZEUS C. ABROGAR
Judge[5]
Hence, on February 9, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court,
which we remanded to the Court of Appeals. The latter dismissed the petition in a decision
promulgated on November 14, 1991,[6] ruling that the judge committed no abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners motion for enforcement of attorneys lien. Thus:
We therefore rule that respondent judge committed no abuse of discretion, much less a grave one,
in denying petitioners motion for enforcement of attorneys lien.
Assuming that respondent judge committed an error in denying petitioners motion for
enforcement of attorneys lien, it cannot be corrected by certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are DENIED, and the petition is hereby DISMISSED, with cost
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
(s/t) REGINA G. ORDOEZ-BENITEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(s/t) JOSE A. R. MELO (s/t) EMETERIO C. CUI
Associate Justice Associate Justice[7]
DISCUSSION
A. The Procedural Aspect
There is nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which are liberally construed in order to
promote their objectives and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding. [8] In an analogous case,[9] we ruled that where the
rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice [10], or bar the vindication of a
legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of
the rules.
In A-One Feeds, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we said
Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicality. Dismissal
of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to
be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override,
substantial justice and thereby defeat their very claims. As has been the constant ruling of this
Court, every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. [11]
A basic legal principle is that no one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another.
[12]
This principle is one of the mainstays of every legal system for centuries and which the Civil
Code echoes:
ART. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.[13]
The Code Commission, its report, emphasized that:

It is most needful that this ancient principle be clearly and specifically consecrated in the proposed
Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen by the lawmaker, no one may unjustly benefit
himself to the prejudice of another. The German Civil Code has a similar provision (Art. 812).[14]
With this in mind, one could easily understand why, despite technical deficiencies, we
resolved to give due course to this petition. More importantly, the case on its face appears to be
impressed with merit.
B. The Attorneys Fees
We understand that Atty. Francisco Rilloraza handled the case from its inception until ETPI
terminated the law firms services in 1988. Petitioners claim for attorneys fees hinges on two
grounds: first, the fact that Atty. Rilloraza personally handled the case when he was working for
SAGA; and second, the retainer agreement dated October 1, 1987.
We agree that petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees. We, however, are not convinced
with the petitioners arguments that the services RADA rendered merit the amount they are
claiming.
First, petitioner contends that Atty. Rilloraza initiated the filing of the complaint. When a
client employs the services of a law firm, he does not employ the services of the lawyer who is
assigned to personally handle the case. Rather, he employs the entire law firm. In the event that
the counsel appearing for the client resigns, the firm is bound to provide a replacement. Thus,
RADA could not claim to have initiated the filing of the complaint considering that ETPI hired
SAGA. What is more, on September 17, 1987, ETPI paid SAGA the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,00.00)[15]representing services performed prior to September 17,
1987. SAGA assigned one of its associates, Atty. Francisco Rilloraza, to handle the case for the
firm. Although Atty. Rilloraza handled the case personally, he did so for and in behalf of SAGA.
Second, petitioner claims that under the retainer agreement, which provides:
6.2 B. Court Cases:
Should recourse to judicial action be necessary to effect collection or judicial action be taken by
adverse party, our attorneys fees shall be fifteen percent (15%) of the amounts collected or the
value of the property acquired or liability saved. [16]
the firm is entitled to the fees agreed upon.
However, the retainer agreement has been terminated. True, Attorney Rilloraza played a vital
role during the inception of the case and in the course of the trial. We cannot also ignore the fact
that an attorney-client relationship between petitioner and respondent no longer existed during its
culmination by amicable agreement. To award the attorneys fees amounting to 15% of the sum of
One Hundred Twenty Five Million Six Hundred Seventy One Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Six
Pesos and Four Centavos (P125,671,886.04) plus Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) paid by PLDT
to ETPI would be too unconscionable.
In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable
compensation which lawyers may receive for their professional services. [17] A lawyer has the right
to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client, which compensation must be
reasonable.[18] A lawyer would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services. Otherwise
stated, the amount must be determined on a quantum meruit basis.
Quantum meruit, meaning as much as he deserved is used as a basis for determining the
lawyers professional fees in the absence of a contract but recoverable by him from his client.
[19]
Recovery of attorneys fees on the basis of quantum meruit is authorized when (1) there is no
express contract for payment of attorneys fees agreed upon between the lawyer and the client; (2)
when although there is a formal contract for attorneys fees, the fees stipulated are found
unconscionable or unreasonable by the court; and (3) when the contract for attorneys fees is void
due to purely formal defects of execution; (4)when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able
to finish the case to its conclusion; (5) when lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorneys
fees.[20]
In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis
of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject
matter in controversy, (2) the extent of services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the
lawyer. A determination of these factors would indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown
trial where private respondents can adduce evidence to establish the right to lawful attorneys fees
and for petitioner to oppose or refute the same. [21] The trial court has the principal task of fixing
the amount of attorneys fees [22].Hence, the necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.
C. Charging Lien
Petitioner contends that pursuant to Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is entitled to a
charging lien. The rule provides:
Section 37. Attorneys liens. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of
his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful
fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He
shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgements for the payment of money, and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client,
from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be
entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and
shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and
he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would
have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements. (Emphasis
supplied)
We do not agree. A charging lien to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorneys
fees requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such
judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client [23]. A charging lien
presupposes that the attorney has secured a favorable money judgment for his client. [24] From the
facts of the case it would seem that petitioner had no hand in the settlement that occurred, nor
did it ever obtain a favorable judgment for ETPI.
ETPI entered into a compromise agreement when it ended the services of petitioner and
through the effort of ETPIs new lawyers, the law firm Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and
De los Angeles. Whether there was bad faith in the substitution of the lawyers to avoid compliance
with the retainer agreement could only be determined after a trial of the case on the merits.
This decision, however, should not be interpreted as to impose upon petitioner any
additional burden in collecting its attorneys fees. The petitioner must avail itself of the proper
remedy in order to forestall the possibility of any injustice on or unjust enrichment of any of the
parties.
The Judgment (Fallo)
 ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 24463 and REMANDS the case to the court of origin for the
determination of the amount of attorneys fees to which petitioner is entitled.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Conflict of Interest
Nakpil v. Valdes AC No. 2040 March 4, 1998
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998]
IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the 50s
during their schooldays in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their closeness extended to
their families and respondent became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant of the
Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street,
Baguio City.[1] For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him.
They agreed that respondent would keep the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter
could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank (in
the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which he used to purchase and renovate the property.
Title was then issued in respondents name.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on July 8,
1973, respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow, complainant IMELDA
NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976, respondents law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled the
proceeding for the settlement of Joses estate. Complainant was appointed as administratix of the
estate.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It
appears that respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Joses estate. On
February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the
Caval Realty Corporation.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with damages against
respondent and his corporation. In defense, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the
property and denied that a trust was created over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this administrative
case to disbar the respondent. She charged that respondent violated professional ethics when he:
I. Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property (Pulong Maulap) which
belonged to the estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.
II. Excluded the Moran property from the inventory of real estate properties he
prepared for a client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan
secured to purchase the said excluded property as a liability of the
estate, all for the purpose of transferring the title to the said property to
his family corporation.
III. Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him as
its counsel and auditor.[2]
On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondents offer to serve as
lawyer and auditor to settle her husbands estate. Respondents law firm then filed a petition for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Nakpil but did not include the Moran property in the
estates inventory. Instead, respondent transferred the property to his corporation, Caval Realty
Corporation, and title was issued in its name. Complainant accused respondent of maliciously
appropriating the property in trust knowing that it did not belong to him. She claimed that
respondent has expressly acknowledged that the said property belonged to the late Nakpil in his
correspondences[3] with the Baguio City Treasurer and the complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes and
Co., CPAs) excluded the Moran property from the inventory of her husbands estate, yet included in
the claims against the estate the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which respondent
represented as her husbands loans applied probably for the purchase of a house and lot in Moran
Street, Baguio City.
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondents law firm (Carlos J. Valdes and
Associates) filed the petition for the settlement of her husbands estate in court, while respondents
auditing firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) acted as accountant of both the estate and two of its
creditors. She claimed that respondent represented conflicting interests when his accounting firm
prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against her husbands estate
which was represented by respondents law firm. Complainant averred that there is no distinction
between respondents law and auditing firms as respondent is the senior and controlling partner of
both firms which are housed in the same building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In hisANSWER, [4] respondent
initially asserted that the resolution of the first and second charges against him depended on the
result of the pending action in the CFI for reconveyance which involved the issue of ownership of
the Moran property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the reconveyance case
that he did not hold the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as he is its absolute owner.
Respondent explained that the Nakpils never bought back the Moran property from him, hence,
the property remained to be his and was rightly excluded from the inventory of Nakpils estate.
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against the estate
which included his loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and renovation of the
Moran property. In charging his loans against the estate, he stressed that the list drawn up by his
accounting firm merely stated that the loans in respondents name were applied probably for the
purchase of the house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City. Respondent insisted that this was not
an admission that the Nakpils owned the property as the phrase probably for the purchase did not
imply a consummated transaction but a projected acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter (Exhibit H) of
his accounting firm to the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real estate taxes for the Moran
property on behalf of the Nakpils. He contended that the letter could be a mere error or oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did not own the
Moran property for: (1) complainants February 1979 Statement of Assets and Liabilities did not
include the said property, and; (2) complainant, as administratrix, signed the Balance Sheet of the
Estate where the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and accounting firms
in the settlement of her husbands estate. [5] However, he pointed out that he has resigned from his
law and accounting firms as early as 1974. He alleged that it was Atty. Percival Cendaa (from the
law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates) who filed the inestate proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when his law firm
represented the estate in the inestate proceedings while his accounting firm (C. J. Valdes & Co.,
CPAs) served as accountant of the estate and prepared the claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and
ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He proffered the following reasons for his thesis: First, the two
claimants were closely related to the late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a family corporation of
the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was the President. Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the
late Nakpil who, upon the latters death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These two claimants
had been clients of his law and accounting firms even during the lifetime of Jose Nakpil. Second,
his alleged representation of conflicting interests was with the knowledge and consent of
complainant as administratrix. Third, there was no conflict of interests between the estate and the
claimants for they had forged a modus vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims would be satisfied only
after full payment of the principal bank creditors. Complainant, as administratrix, did not
controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Complainant has started paying off the
claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the banks claims. Complainant did not
assert that their claims caused prejudice to the estate. Fourth, the work of Carlos J. Valdes and Co.
as common auditor redounded to the benefit of the estate for the firm prepared a true and
accurate amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned from his law and accounting firms as
early as August 15, 1974.[6] He rejoined his accounting firm several years later. He submitted as
proof the SECs certification of the filing of his accounting firm of an Amended Articles of
Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaa, from the firm Carlos J. Valdes and
Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand, the claimants were
represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth, respondent alleged that in the
remote possibility that he committed a breach of professional ethics, he committed such
misconduct not as a lawyer but as an accountant who acted as common auditor of the estate and
its creditors. Hence, he should be held accountable in another forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY. [7] She maintained that the
pendency of the reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her disbarment
complaint against respondent for the issue in the latter is not the ownership of the Moran property
but the ethics and morality of respondents conduct as a CPA-lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondents Annexes to his Reply (such as the Statement of Assets
& Liability of the Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which showed that complainant did
not claim ownership of the Moran property were all prepared by C. J. Valdes and Co. as accountant
of the estate of Jose Nakpil and filed with the intestate court by C. J. Valdes and Associates as
counsel for the estate. She averred that these Annexes were not proofs that respondent owned the
Moran property but were part of respondents scheme to remove the property from the estate and
transfer it to his family corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the documents because
of the professional counsel of respondent and his firm that her signature thereon was required.
Complainant charged respondent with greed for coveting the Moran property on the basis of
defects in the documents he himself prepared.
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the list of claims
against the estate and the letter regarding Nakpils payments of realty tax on the Moran property)
which were prepared by his law and accounting firms and invoke other documents prepared by the
same firms which are favorable to him. She averred that respondent must accept responsibility not
just for some, but for all the representations and communications of his firms.
Complainant refuted respondents claim that he resigned from his firms from March 9, 1976
to several years later. She alleged that none of the documents submitted as evidence referred to
his resignation from his law firm. The documents merely substantiated his resignation from his
accounting firm.
In his REJOINDER,[8] respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him liable for
representing the interests of both the estate and the claimants without showing that his action
prejudiced the estate. He urged that it is not per se anomalous for respondents accounting firm to
act as accountant for the estate and its creditors. He reiterated that he is not subject to the
jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as lawyer, but as accountant for both the estate and its
claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the creditors Angel
Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not defended by his accounting or law firm but by Atty.
Enrique Chan. He averred that his law firm did not oppose these claims as they were legitimate and
not because they were prepared by his accounting firm. He emphasized that there was no
allegation that the claims were fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of respondents law firm
to object to these claims damaged the estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution, [9] we deferred further action on the disbarment case
until after resolution of the action for reconveyance between the parties involving the issue of
ownership by the then CFI of Baguio. Complainant moved for reconsideration on the ground that
the issue of ownership pending with the CFI was not prejudicial to her complaint which involved an
entirely different issue, i.e., the unethical acts of respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We granted her
motion and referred the administrative case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[10]
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court ruled that
respondent held the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that complainant waived
her right over it.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court held that
respondent was the absolute owner of the Moran property. The Decision was elevated to this
Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainants appeal to this Court, the OSG
submitted its Report[11] on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied heavily on the decision of the
Court of Appeals then pending review by this Court. The OSG found that respondent was not put
on notice of complainants claim over the property. It opined that there was no trust agreement
created over the property and that respondent was the absolute owner thereof. Thus, it upheld
respondents right to transfer title to his family corporation. It also found no conflict of interests as
the claimants were related to the late Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the dismissal of the
administrative case.
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves the
disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in
connection with the property of his client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction
must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. [12] The measure of good faith which an
attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard than is
required in business dealings where the parties trade at arms length. [13] Business transactions
between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence,
courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his
client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy
position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of
innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor. [14]
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report. These
findings were based mainly on the decision of the Court of Appeals in the action for reconveyance
which was reversed by this Court in 1993.[15]
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in the
aforementioned reconveyance case.[16] It is well-established that respondent offered to the
complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by reason of their close relationship
dating as far back as the 50s. She reposed her complete trust in respondent who was the lawyer,
accountant and business consultant of her late husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil agreed
that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the latter. In violation
of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and refused to
sell the property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the
reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent later transferred it to his corporation.
Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and respected the
trust nature of the Moran property. Respondents bad faith in transferring the property to his family
corporation is well discussed in this Courts Decision,[17] thus:
x x x Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during the lifetime of the
late Jose Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly recognized it. x x x (H)e repudiated the
trust when (he) excluded Pulong Maulap from the list of properties of the late Jose
Nakpil submitted to the intestate court in 1973. x x x
xxx
The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties x x x can be
bolstered by Exh. I-2, an annex to the claim filed against the estate proceedings of the
late Jose Nakpil by his brother, Angel Nakpil, which was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes &
Co., the accounting firm of herein respondent. Exhibit I-2, which is a list of the
application of the proceeds of various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December 1973
by the late Jose Nakpil, x x x contains the two (2) loans contracted in the name of
respondent. If ownership of Pulong Maulap was already transferred or ceded to
Valdes, these loans should not have been included in the list.
Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the arrangement
outlined in Exh. J was that respondent Valdes would x x x take over the total loan
ofP140,000.00 and pay all of the interests due on the notes while the heirs of the late
Jose Nakpil would continue to live in the disputed property for five (5) years without
remuneration save for regular maintenance expenses. This does not mean, however,
that if at the end of the five-year period petitioner (Nakpil) failed to reimburse
Valdes for his advances, x x x Valdes could already automatically assume ownership
of Pulong Maulap. Instead, the remedy of respondents Carlos J. Valdes and Caval
Realty Corporation was to proceed against the estate of the late Jose M. Nakpil
and/or the property itself. (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainants documentary evidence
(Exhibits H, J and L), which she also adduced in this administrative case, should estop respondent
from claiming that he bought the Moran property for himself, and not merely in trust for Jose
Nakpil.[18]
It ought to follow that respondents act of excluding Moran property from the estate which
his law firm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If respondent truly
believed that the said property belonged to him, he should have at least informed complainant of
his adverse claim. If they could not agree on its ownership, respondent should have formally
presented his claim in the intestate proceedings instead of transferring the property to his own
corporation and concealing it from complainant and the judge in the estate proceedings.
Respondents misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly
unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans
of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained by
respondent for the purchase and renovation of the property which he claimed for himself.
Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by disclaiming knowledge or privity in the
preparation of the list of the estates liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion of the loans must
have been a mere error or oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear that the information as to
how these two loans should be treated could have only come from respondent himself as the said
loans were in his name. Hence, the supposed error of the accounting firm in charging respondents
loans against the estate could not have been committed without respondents participation.
Respondent wanted to have his cake and eat it too and subordinated the interest of his client to his
own pecuniary gain. Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his clients cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests. It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot represent
adverse interests. It is highly improper to represent both sides of an issue. [19] The proscription
against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting interests arise
with respect to the same general matter [20] and is applicable however slight such adverse interest
may be. It applies although the attorneys intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good
faith.[21] However, representation of conflicting interests may be allowed where the parties consent
to the representation, after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough for the clients
must give their informed consent to such representation. The lawyer must explain to his clients the
nature and extent of conflict and the possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his
clients.[22]
 In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of it creditors
are adverse to each other. Respondents accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of
the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is
clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two
claimants who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance, respondents law firm questioned
the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the intestate
proceedings. He points out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaa, from his law firm Carlos J. Valdes
& Associates, who filed the intestate case in court. However, the fact that he did not personally file
the case and appear in court is beside the point. As established in the records of this case and in
the reconveyance case, [23] respondent acted as counsel and accountant of complainant after the
death of Jose Nakpil. Respondents defense that he resigned from his law and accounting firms as
early as 1974 (or two years before the filing of the intestate case) is unworthy of merit.
Respondents claim of resignation from his law firm is not supported by any documentary proof.
The documents on record [24] only show respondents resignation from his accounting firm in 1972
and 1974. Even these documents reveal that respondent returned to his accounting firm on July 1,
1976 and as of 1978, the intestate proceedings for the settlement of Joses estate had not yet been
terminated. It does not escape us that when respondent transferred the Moran property to his
corporation on February 13, 1978, the intestate proceedings was still pending in court. Thus, the
succession of events shows that respondent could not have been totally ignorant of the
proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates was
the legal counsel of the estate [25] and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs, was the auditor
of both the estate and the two claimants against it. [26] The fact, however, that complainant, as
administratrix, did not object to the set-up cannot be taken against her as there is nothing in the
records to show that respondent or his law firm explained the legal situation and its consequences
to complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the arrangement does not amount to an acquiescence
based on an informed consent.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the
conflict of interest. When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se adverse to
the estate. As correctly pointed out by complainant, if she had a claim against her husbands estate,
her claim is still adverse and must be filed in the intestate proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position
where his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of respondents
law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but which claims were prepared by
respondents accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not prejudice the estate, the
set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the
representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondents duty to inhibit either of
his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could not
be charged before this Court as his alleged misconduct pertains to his accounting practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions. He
is the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In the case at bar,
complainant is not charging respondent with breach of ethics for being the common accountant of
the estate and the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his accounting firm to represent two
creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the
proceedings where these claims were presented. The act is a breach of professional ethics and
undesirable as it placed respondents and his law firms loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even
granting that respondents misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent this
Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [27] Possession of
good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of
the bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature
and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. [28] In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than
full fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with
his clients. [29]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of
misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from
receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in
the future.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., no part. Previous associate with respondent.
Hornilla v. Salunat AC No. 5804 July 1, 2003
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5804. July 1, 2003]
BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, complainants, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO S.
SALUNAT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On November 21, 1997, Benedicto Hornilla and Federico D. Ricafort filed an administrative
complaint[1] with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, against
respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat for illegal and unethical practice and conflict of interest. They
alleged that respondent is a member of the ASSA Law and Associates, which was the retained
counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA). Respondents brother, Aurelio
S. Salunat, was a member of the PPSTA Board which approved respondents engagement as
retained counsel of PPSTA.
 Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed an intra-corporate case against its
members of the Board of Directors for the terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 before the Securities
and Exchange Commission, which was docketed as SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, and a complaint
before the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB Case No. 0-97-0695, for unlawful spending
and the undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA. Respondent entered his appearance as
counsel for the PPSTA Board members in the said cases.Complainants contend that respondent
was guilty of conflict of interest because he was engaged by the PPSTA, of which complainants
were members, and was being paid out of its corporate funds where complainants have
contributed. Despite being told by PPSTA members of the said conflict of interest, respondent
refused to withdraw his appearance in the said cases.
Moreover, complainants aver that respondent violated Rule 15.06 [2] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he appeared at the meeting of the PPSTA Board and assured its
members that he will win the PPSTA cases.
In his Answer, [3] respondent stressed that he entered his appearance as counsel for the
PPSTA Board Members for and in behalf of the ASSA Law and Associates. As a partner in the said
law firm, he only filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695. [4] On the
other hand, SEC Case No. 05-97-5657 was handled by another partner of the firm, Atty. Agustin V.
Agustin. Respondent claims that it was complainant Atty. Ricafort who instigated, orchestrated and
indiscriminately filed the said cases against members of the PPSTA and its Board.
Respondent pointed out that his relationship to Aurelio S. Salunat was immaterial; and that
when he entered into the retainer contract with the PPSTA Board, he did so, not in his individual
capacity, but in representation of the ASSA Law Firm. He denied that he ensured the victory of the
PPSTA Board in the case he was handling. He merely assured the Board that the truth will come out
and that the case before the Ombudsman will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, considering that
respondents therein are not public officials, but private employees.Anent the SEC case, respondent
alleged that the same was being handled by the law firm of Atty. Eduardo de Mesa, and not ASSA.
By way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent averred that complainant Atty.
Ricafort was himself guilty of gross violation of his oath of office amounting to gross misconduct,
malpractice and unethical conduct for filing trumped-up charges against him and Atty. De
Mesa. Thus, he prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed and, instead, complainant
Ricafort be disciplined or disbarred.
The complainant was docketed as CBD Case No. 97-531 and referred to the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline. After investigation, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Board of Governors
thereafter adopted Resolution No. XV-3003-230 dated June 29, 2002, approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors.
The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for
an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. [5]This rule covers
not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. [6] Also, there is conflict of interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection.[7] Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. [8]
In this jurisdiction, a corporations board of directors is understood to be that body which (1)
exercises all powers provided for under the Corporation Code; (2) conducts all business of the
corporation; and (3) controls and holds all property of the corporation. [9] Its members have been
characterized as trustees or directors clothed with a fiduciary character. [10] It is clearly separate and
distinct from the corporate entity itself.
Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra
vires acts, or negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy the
wrong, a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of
the corporation, to bring about a redress of the wrong done directly to the corporation and
indirectly to the stockholders.[11] This is what is known as a derivative suit, and settled is the
doctrine that in a derivative suit, the corporation is the real party in interest while the stockholder
filing suit for the corporations behalf is only nominal party. The corporation should be included as a
party in the suit.[12]
Having thus laid a suitable foundation of the basic legal principles pertaining to derivative
suits, we come now to the threshold question: can a lawyer engaged by a corporation defend
members of the board of the same corporation in a derivative suit? On this issue, the following
disquisition is enlightening:
The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally recognized. Although early cases found
joint representation permissible where no conflict of interest was obvious, the emerging rule is
against dual representation in all derivative actions. Outside counsel must thus be retained to
represent one of the defendants. The cases and ethics opinions differ on whether there must be
separate representation from the outset or merely from the time the corporation seeks to take an
active role. Furthermore, this restriction on dual representation should not be waivable by consent
in the usual way; the corporation should be presumptively incapable of giving valid consent.
[13]
(underscoring ours)
In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation wherein a lawyer represents both
the corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest. The
interest of the corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by any interest of the
individual corporate officials.[14] The rulings in these cases have persuasive effect upon us.After due
deliberation on the wisdom of this doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced that a lawyer engaged as
counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the same corporations board of directors
in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to representing conflicting
interests, which is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, entitled Philippine Public
School Teachers Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors of the Philippine Public School
Teachers Assn. (PPSTA), et al., was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of
Directors. Respondent admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing Partner, was
the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the respondent Board of
Directors in the said case. Clearly, respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he
represented the parties against whom his other client, the PPSTA, filed suit.
In his Answer, respondent argues that he only represented the Board of Directors in OMB
Case No. 0-97-0695. In the said case, he filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency wherein he
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against his clients, the individual Board Members. By
filing the said pleading, he necessarily entered his appearance therein. [15] Again, this constituted
conflict of interests, considering that the complaint in the Ombudsman, albeit in the name of the
individual members of the PPSTA, was brought in behalf of and to protect the interest of the
corporation.
Therefore, respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Considering however,
that this is his first offense, we find the penalty of suspension, recommended in IBP Resolution No.
XV-2002-230 dated June 29, 2002, to be too harsh. Instead, we resolve to admonish respondent to
observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY of representing conflicting
interests and is ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his
profession. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Yngcoco v. Irreverre AC No. 5480 September 29, 2003
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5480. September 29, 2003]
LEILANI OCAMPO-INGCOCO and BALTAZAR D. OCAMPO, complainants, vs. ATTY. ALEJANDRO G.
YRREVERRE, JR., respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
In a verified Complaint dated July 11, 2001, [1] Leilani Ocampo-Ingcoco and Baltazar D.
Ocampo filed an administrative complaint before the Court charging respondent Atty. Alejandro G.
Yrreverre, Jr. for unethical and unprofessional conduct in violation of his duty as a lawyer, [2] praying
that on the basis of the facts alleged therein, the said respondent be disbarred and/or
administratively sanctioned.
The complainants alleged that on April 17, 2000, the respondent notarized a falsified Deed
of Absolute Sale[3] involving a parcel of land then registered under the name of their parents, Pacita
and Hermilindo Ocampo under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31064. [4] The alleged vendee,
Rosita S. Billones, falsified their fathers signature and caused the notarization of the deed before
the respondent. The complainants alleged that on the date the Deed of Absolute Sale was
purportedly notarized, their mother was in Isabela with her children. As such, it was impossible for
her to appear before the respondent on the said date. Furthermore, their father, Hermilindo, had
been dead for more than a year and could not have appeared before the respondent to attest to
the truth of the matters contained in the deed.
The respondents illegal act of notarizing the said deed without the parties thereto appearing
before him was compounded by the fact that he even placed a Community Tax Certificate (CTC)
Number, which was not issued to Pacita, but to a certain Edelia M. Balingan on March 6, 2000. [5] As
a consequence of the respondents acts, Rosita Billones and her husband were able to transfer the
subject property in their names despite the non-payment of the purchase price. TCT No. T-31064
was thus cancelled, and a new TCT was issued in the name of the Billones Spouses, TCT No. T-
75256.[6]
The complainants later learned that the respondent apparently had a personal interest in
the subject property, as it was later mortgaged to JCY Loans and Mortgage, Inc., a company owned
by the respondent, and for whom the latter also acted as legal counsel. Rosita Billones secured a
loan from JCY Loan and Mortgage, Inc. and used the subject property as collateral. [7]
On November 15, 2000, Pacita filed a civil case for nullification of the deed of sale and
reconveyance of title to real property before the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 275,
docketed as Civil Case No. LP-00-230.[8] In an apparent attempt to protect his interests, the
respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the Billones Spouses. [9] The complainants also
filed a criminal case for estafa through falsification against the Billones Spouses. [10]
The complainants further alleged that the respondent, although acting as counsel for the
Billones Spouses in the said civil case, also acted as counsel for JCY Loans and Mortgage, Inc.,
which had earlier filed a civil case against the same spouses. [11] The respondent also entered his
appearance as counsel for JCY Loans and Mortgage, Inc., which moved to intervene in Civil Case
No. LP-00-0230.[12] According to the complainants, such act of the respondent was unprofessional
and unethical, as he counseled for parties with conflicting interests.Furthermore, based on the
respondents actuations and those of the Billones Spouses, it was most likely that they connived
with one another in defrauding the Ocampo family. [13]
On May 24, 2001, the respondent wrote a letter to the Ocampo family, denying the charges
against him, thus:
1. Before the execution of the Deed of Sale, you together with Debbi Abendano and Mrs. Billones
personally came to the office of our client at Makati City on or before April 2000, and requested to
accommodate the loan application of Mrs. Billones using your house and lot as collateral so that
the loan proceeds thereof, part of which, will be paid to you as additional of her down payment of
PHP=1,000,000.
2. As a matter of fact, you personally submitted to our client through the undersigned lawyer the
following documents: (a) Your receipt of the down payment of PHP=1,000,000 from Sps. Billones,
(b) Contract to Sell between Sps. Billones and yourself; (c) Philamlife and (d) Price Smart IDs and (e)
your Cedula, copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes A, B, C, D and E;
3. Further, you were the one who personally delivered to the undersigned the original copy of TCT
No. 31064 together with other related documents such as tax declarations, vicinity map. In
addition, you even signed in the presence of the undersigned a Special Power of Attorney (copy of
which is hereto appended as Annex F) empowering Mrs. Billones to use your real property as
collateral with our client;
4. Finally, you executed the subject Deed of Sale in front of ATTY. ALEJANDRO G. YRREVERRE, JR.
together with the witnesses in favor of SPS. Billones for the sum of PHP=1,000,000. When asked by
the notary public about the signing of your husband, you requested that he will sign it in your
house because your husband is so sick and old and that he could not come to office for that
purpose. Banking on your representation, the notary public agreed and later the said Deed of Sale
was returned back to the latter.[14]
In a Resolution dated April 3, 2002, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation/decision. [15]
Commissioner Dennis B. Funa of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline thereafter submitted
a Report and Recommendation dated July 4, 2002, with the following findings and
recommendations:
1. On the Charge of Conflict of Interest.
We adopt in toto the arguments of respondent in quoting Canon 6, Canon[s] of Professional Ethics,
which provides for an exception to the rule on conflict of interest, to wit:
except by express consent of all the parties concerned given after a full disclosure of facts.
2. On the charge of Notarizing Deed of Sale Without the Affiants.
Respondent herein had all but admitted this particular charge and, in fact, is willing to face the
appropriate sanction. Respondent furthermore pleads for leniency and consideration.
Accordingly, Respondent is found NOT GUILTY with respect to the charge of Conflict of Interest.
However, Respondent is found GUILTY of notarizing a document supposedly executed by Mr.
Hermilindo P. Ocampo, who was actually deceased at the time of the notarization. Respondent is
also found GUILTY and responsible for the use of a Community Tax Certificate (CTC) that did not
belong to affiant Mrs. Pacita Ocampo, but instead belonged to another person.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that respondent is GUILTY of the offenses charged,
discussed above, and should be given the penalty of ONE (1) MONTH SUSPENSION with a STERN
WARNING that repetition of said acts will warrant a more severe penalty. [16]
On the issue of
representing clients
with conflicting
interests
The respondent cannot be held liable for representing conflicting interests in acting as
defense counsel for the Billiones Spouses in Civil Case No. LP-00-0230 while acting as counsel for
defendant-intervenor JCY Loans and Mortgage, Inc. in the same case. The evidence presented by
the respondent shows that when the Billones Spouses secured his services as counsel, they were
made fully aware of the pertinent facts and circumstances. Their consent and written conformity
was obtained after full disclosure of the facts of the case. [17] They even submitted a verified written
manifestation of conformity to show proof that the respondent was hired with their approval. [18]
One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against a lawyers representation of clients with
conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after the
prospective counsel makes full disclosure of the facts to the parties. [19]
On the issue of notarizing a
deed without requiring the
parties to be present to
attest to the truth of the
matters contained therein
The respondent maintains that Mrs. Pacita Ocampo was present when he notarized the deed
of sale, but admitted that Mr. Hermilindo Ocampo did not appear before him. The respondent
claims that he acted in good faith, and had no knowledge that Mr. Ocampo, the other party to the
document, was already deceased. It was Mrs. Ocampo who led him to believe that her husband
was merely ill
In yielding to Mrs. Ocampos plea, I just acted out of passion, generosity and kindness to her to
facilitate the processing of the loan as she also intimated to me during the meeting that she was
also in dire need of money to be used for her husbands recovery. [20]
The respondent further explained that he took precautionary measures to safeguard the
public interest by making specific instructions to Rosita S. Billones and Deborah Hernandez
Abendano to be present when Mr. Ocampo affixed his signature, and not to use the subject deed
unless and until he got hold of Mr. Ocampos CTC. No damage was caused to any party, since what
facilitated the transfer of the property was a subsequent Deed of Transfer entered into by and
between the same parties. As such, the subject deed was without any legal effect and a mere scrap
of paper.[21]
The respondents arguments are without merit. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 [22] provides:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law
of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is
done. The notary public or the officer taking the instrument or document is known to him and that
he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed.
The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if
not, his certificate shall so state.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that a notary public should not notarize a document unless
the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein.[23]
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with
substantial public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document by law is entitled F E L I C I TA S S . Q U I A M B A O, A d m . C a s e N o . 6 7 0 8
to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost
care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the Complainant, (CBD Case No. 01-874)
public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. [24]

When the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining that the
vendors-signatories thereto were the very same persons who executed it and personally appeared Present:
before him to attest to the truth of what were stated therein, he undermined the confidence of the
public on notarial documents and thereby breached Canon I of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. [25] In acknowledging that the
parties personally came and appeared before him, the respondent also made an untruthful (Chairman),
statement, thus violating Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a
lawyer that he shall do no falsehood. [26] Moreover, he opens himself to prosecution for falsification - versus - QUISUMBING,
of a public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
SANTIAGO,
In Maligsa v. Cabanting,[27] we had the occasion to state:
CARPIO, and
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred
duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with
AZCUNA, JJ.
public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sancrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon
AT T Y. N E S TO R A . B A M BA , Promulgated:
respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his
professional indiscretion. [28]
Respondent.

We take note of the respondents remorseful attitude and his willingness to forego his August 25, 2005
notarial work or accept severe censure, reprimand and admonition from the Court. [29] We agree
that the penalty of disbarment is too excessive and is not commensurate to the faux X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
pas committed by the respondent.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, for breach of the notarial law, the commission of
respondent Atty. Alejandro G. Yrreverre, Jr. as Notary Public, if still existing, is REVOKED. He is R E S O LU T I O N
disqualified from being commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years.

Respondent Atty. Alejandro G. Yrreverre, Jr. is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of Six (6) Months effective immediately for violation of Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to the
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Court to enable us to determine when the revocation of his notarial commission and his
disqualification from being commissioned as Notary Public as well as when his suspension from the
practice of law shall have taken effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated We a re a w a re o f t h e h a p l e s s fa c t t h a t t h e re a re n o t e n o u g h l a w ye rs
Bar of the Philippines. t o s e r v e a n ex p l o d i n g p o p u l a ti o n . T h i s u n fo r t u n a t e s ta t e o f a ff a i rs , h o w e v e r,
w i l l n o t s e i ze t h i s C o u r t f ro m exe rc i s i n g i t s d i s c i p l i n a r y p o w e r o v e r l a w y e rs
SO ORDERED. c u l p a b l e o f s e r i o u s i n d i s c re ti o n s . T h e i n c i d e n c e o f p u b l i c fo rc e m u s t b e
d e p l o ye d t o b e a r u p o n t h e c o m m u n i t y t o e v e n t u a l l y fo rg e a l e ga l p ro fe s s i o n
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ., concur. t h a t p ro v i d e s q u a l i t y, e t h i c a l , a c c e s s i b l e , a n d c o s t- e ff e c ti v e l e ga l s e r v i c e t o
Quiambao v. Bamba AC No. 6708 August 25, 2005 o u r p e o p l e a n d w h o s e m e m b e rs a re w i l l i n g a n d a b l e t o a n s w e r t h e c a l l t o
FIRST DIVISION public service.
 I n t h i s a d m i n i s t ra ti v e c a s e fo r d i s b a r m e n t , c o m p l a i n a n t Fe l i c i ta s S .
Q u i a m b a o c h a rg e s re s p o n d e n t Att y. N e s to r A . B a m b a w i t h v i o l a ti o n o f t h e
C o d e o f P ro fe s s i o n a l Re s p o n s i b i l i t y fo r re p re s e n ti n g c o n fl i c ti n g i n t e re s t s
w h e n t h e l a tt e r fi l e d a c a s e a ga i n s t h e r w h i l e h e w a s a t t h a t ti m e
re p re s e n ti n g h e r i n a n o t h e r c a s e , a n d fo r c o m m i tti n g o t h e r a c t s o f d i s l o ya l t y
and double-dealing.
F ro m J u n e 2 0 0 0 to J a n u a r y 2 0 0 1 , t h e c o m p l a i n a n t wa s t h e p re s i d e n t
a n d m a n a g i n g d i re c to r o f A l l i e d I nv e s ti ga ti o n B u re a u , I n c . ( A I B ) , a fa m i l y-
o w n e d c o r p o ra ti o n e n ga g e d i n p ro v i d i n g s e c u r i t y a n d i nv e s ti ga ti o n s e r v i c e s .
S h e av e rs t h a t s h e p ro c u re d t h e l e ga l s e r v i c e s o f t h e re s p o n d e n t n o t o n l y fo r
t h e c o r p o ra te a ff a i rs o f A I B b u t a l s o fo r h e r p e rs o n a l c a s e . Pa r ti c u l a r l y, t h e
re s p o n d e n t a c te d a s h e r c o u n s e l o f re c o rd i n a n e j e c t m e n t c a s e a ga i n s t
S p o u s e s S a n ti a g o a n d F l o r i ta To r ro b a fi l e d b y h e r o n 2 9 D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 0
b e fo re t h e M e t ro p o l i ta n Tr i a l C o u r t ( M e TC ) o f Pa ra a q u e C i t y, w h i c h wa s
d o c ke te d a s C i v i l C a s e N o . 1 1 9 2 8 . S h e p a i d a tt o r n e y s fe e s fo r re s p o n d e n t s
l e ga l s e r v i c e s i n t h a t c a s e . [ 1 ] A b o u t s i x m o n t h s a ft e r s h e re s i g n e d a s A I B
p re s i d e n t , o r o n 1 4 J u n e 2 0 0 1 , t h e re s p o n d e n t fi l e d o n b e h a l f o f A I B a
c o m p l a i n t fo r re p l e v i n a n d d a m a g e s a ga i n s t h e r b e fo re t h e M e TC o f Q u e zo n
C i t y fo r t h e p u r p o s e o f re c o v e r i n g f ro m h e r t h e c a r o f A I B a s s i g n e d t o h e r a s
a s e r v i c e v e h i c l e . T h i s h e d i d w i t h o u t w i t h d ra w i n g a s c o u n s e l o f re c o rd i n t h e
e j e c t m e n t ca s e , w h i c h w a s t h e n s ti l l p e n d i n g . [ 2 ]
A p a r t f ro m t h e fo re g o i n g l i ti ga ti o n m a tt e r, t h e c o m p l a i n a n t , i n h e r
Po s i ti o n Pa p e r, c h a rg e s t h e re s p o n d e n t w i t h a c t s o f d i s l o ya l t y a n d d o u b l e -
d e a l i n g . S h e av e rs t h a t t h e re s p o n d e n t p ro p o s e d t o h e r t h a t s h e o rga n i ze h e r
o w n s e c u r i t y a g e n c y a n d t h a t h e w o u l d a s s i s t h e r i n i t s o rga n i za ti o n , c a u s i n g
h e r t o re s i g n a s p re s i d e n t o f A I B . T h e re s p o n d e n t i n d e e d a s s i s t e d h e r i n
D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 0 i n t h e fo r m a ti o n o f a n o t h e r s e c u r i t y a g e n c y, Q u i a m b a o R i s k
M a n a g e m e n t S p e c i a l i s t s , I n c . , ( Q R M S I ) , w h i c h wa s l a t e r re g i s t e re d u n d e r
c o m p l a i n a n t s n a m e , w i th t h e re s p o n d e n t a s a s i l e n t p a r t n e r re p re s e n t e d b y
h i s a s s o c i a te Att y. G e ra rd o P. H e r n a n d e z . T h e re s p o n d e n t wa s p a i d a tt o r n e y s
fe e s fo r h i s l e ga l s e r v i c e s i n o rga n i z i n g a n d i n c o r p o ra ti n g Q R M S I . H e a l s o
p l a n n e d to s te a l o r p i ra te s o m e o f t h e m o re i m p o r ta n t c l i e n t s o f A I B . W h i l e
s e r v i n g a s l e ga l c o u n s e l fo r A I B a n d a s i l e n t p a r t n e r o f Q R M S I , h e c o nv i n c e d
c o m p l a i n a n t s b ro t h e r L e o d e ga r i o Q u i a m b a o to o rga n i ze a n o t h e r s e c u r i t y
a g e n c y, S a n E s te b a n S e c u r i t y S e r v i c e s , I n c . ( S E S S I ) w h e re h e ( t h e re s p o n d e n t )
s e r v e d a s i t s i n c o r p o ra to r, d i re c to r, a n d p re s i d e n t . T h e re s p o n d e n t a n d
L e o d e ga r i o t h e n i l l e ga l l y d i v e r te d t h e f u n d s o f A I B t o f u n d t h e i n co r p o ra ti o n
o f S E S S I , a n d l i ke w i s e p l a n n e d to e v e n t u a l l y c l o s e d o w n t h e o p e ra ti o n s o f A I B
a n d t ra n s fe r t h e b u s i n e s s to S E S S I . [ 3 ]
Fo r h i s p a r t , t h e re s p o n d e n t a d m i t s t h a t h e re p re s e n t e d t h e
c o m p l a i n a n t i n t h e a fo re m e n ti o n e d e j e c t m e n t c a s e a n d l a t e r re p re s e n t e d A I B
i n t h e re p l e v i n c a s e a ga i n s t h e r. H e , h o w e v e r, d e n i e s t h a t h e wa s t h e
p e rs o n a l l a w ye r o f t h e c o m p l a i n a n t , a n d av e rs t h a t h e w a s m a d e t o b e l i e v e
t h a t i t w a s p a r t o f h i s f u n c ti o n a s c o u n s e l fo r A I B t o h a n d l e e v e n t h e
p e rs o n a l c a s e s o f i t s o ffi c e rs . Ev e n a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e c o m p l a i n a n t c o n fi d e d
t o h i m p r i v i l e g e d i n fo r m a ti o n a b o u t h e r l e ga l i n t e re s t s , t h e e j e c t m e n t ca s e
a n d t h e re p l e v i n c a s e a re u n re l a t e d c a s e s i nv o l v i n g d i ff e re n t i s s u e s a n d
p a r ti e s a n d , t h e re fo re , t h e p r i v i l e g e d i n fo r m a ti o n w h i c h m i g h t h av e b e e n
ga t h e re d f ro m o n e c a s e w o u l d h av e n o u s e i n t h e o t h e r. At a ny ra t e , i t wa s
t h e c o m p l a i n a n t h e rs e l f w h o i n s i s t e d t h a t h e s tay a s h e r c o u n s e l d e s p i t e t h e
p e rc e i v e d d i ff e re n c e s a m o n g h e r, h e r b ro t h e r, a n d A I B o v e r t h e m o t o r v e h i c l e
s u b j e c t o f t h e re p l e v i n c a s e . T h e c o m p l a i n a n t e v e n a s ke d h i m t o a s s i s t h e r i n
h e r m o n e ta r y c l a i m s a ga i n s t A I B . [ 4 ]
T h e re s p o n d e n t a l s o d e n i e s t h e c h a rg e ra i s e d b y t h e c o m p l a i n a n t i n
h e r p o s i ti o n p a p e r t h a t h e a g re e d t o b e a s i l e n t p a r t n e r o f Q R M S I t h ro u g h
h i s n o m i n e e , Att y. G e ra rd o P. H e r n a n d e z , w h o wa s h i s fo r m e r l aw p a r t n e r. H e
d e c l i n e d c o m p l a i n a n t s o ff e r t o a s s u m e t h a t ro l e a n d s u g g e s t e d Att y.
H e r n a n d e z i n h i s p l a c e ; t h u s , 3 7 5 s h a re s o f s t o c k w e re re g i s t e r e d i n Att y.
H e r n a n d e z s n a m e a s c o n s i d e ra ti o n o f h i s ( Att y. H e r n a n d e z s ) l e ga l s e r v i c e s a s
c o r p o ra t e s e c re ta r y a n d l e ga l c o u n s e l o f Q R M S I . T h e re s p o n d e n t a l s o d e n i e s
t h a t h e c o nv i n c e d c o m p l a i n a n t s b ro t h e r L e o d e ga r i o t o o rga n i ze a n o t h e r
s e c u r i t y a g e n c y a n d t h a t t h e f u n d s o f A I B w e re u n l a w f u l l y d i v e r t e d t o S E S S I .
I t w a s t o c o m p l e m e n t t h e b u s i n e s s o f A I B, w h i c h wa s t h e n i n d a n g e r o f
c o l l a p s e , t h a t S E S S I wa s e s ta b l i s h e d . L e o d e ga r i o s w i fe a n d h e r s o n h av e t h e
e ff e c ti v e c o n t ro l o v e r S E S S I . Re s p o n d e n t s s u b s c r i b e d s h a re h o l d i n g s i n S E S S I
c o m p r i s e o n l y 8 0 0 s h a re s o u t o f 1 2 , 5 0 0 s u b s c r i b e d s h a re s . H e s e r v e s A I B a n d
S E S S I i n d i ff e re n t c a p a c i ti e s : a s l e ga l c o u n s e l o f t h e fo r m e r a n d a s p re s i d e n t
o f t h e l att e r. [ 5 ]
I n h i s Re p o r t a n d Re c o m m e n d a ti o n [ 6 ] d a t e d 3 1 A u g u s t 2 0 0 4 , t h e
i nv e s ti ga ti n g c o m m i s s i o n e r o f t h e I B P fo u n d t h e re s p o n d e n t g u i l t y o f
re p re s e n ti n g c o n fl i c ti n g i n t e re s t s b a s e d o n t h e fo l l o w i n g u n d i s p u t e d fa c t s :
fi rs t , t h e re s p o n d e n t wa s s ti l l c o m p l a i n a n t s c o u n s e l o f re c o rd i n t h e
e j e c t m e n t c a s e w h e n h e fi l e d , a s l e ga l c o u n s e l o f A I B, t h e re p l e v i n ca s e
a ga i n s t h e r ; a n d s e c o n d , t h e re s p o n d e n t w a s s ti l l t h e l e ga l c o u n s e l o f A I B
w h e n h e a d v i s e d t h e c o m p l a i n a n t o n t h e i n c o r p o ra ti o n o f a n o t h e r s e c u r i t y
a g e n c y, Q R M S I , a n d re c o m m e n d e d h i s fo r m e r l a w p a r t n e r, Att y. G e ra rd o
H e r n a n d e z , t o b e i t s c o r p o ra t e s e c re ta r y a n d l e ga l c o u n s e l a n d a l s o w h e n h e
c o n fe r r e d w i t h L e o d e ga r i o t o o rga n i ze a n o t h e r s e c u r i t y a g e n c y, S E S S I , w h e re
t h e re s p o n d e n t b e c a m e a n i n c o r p o ra t o r, s t o c k h o l d e r, a n d p re s i d e n t . T h u s ,
t h e i nv e s ti ga ti n g c o m m i s s i o n e r re c o m m e n d e d t h a t t h e re s p o n d e n t b e
s u s p e n d e d f ro m t h e p ra c ti c e o f l aw fo r o n e ye a r.
 T h e I B P B o a rd o f G o v e r n o rs a d o p te d a n d a p p ro v e d t h e i nv e s ti ga ti n g
c o m m i s s i o n e rs re p o r t a n d re c o m m e n d a ti o n , b u t re d u c e d t h e p e n a l t y f ro m
o n e y e a r to a s te r n re p r i m a n d . [ 7 ]
T h e i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e i s w h e t h e r t h e re s p o n d e n t i s g u i l t y o f
m i s c o n d u c t fo r re p re s e n ti n g c o n fl i c ti n g i n te re s t s i n c o n t rav e n ti o n o f t h e
b a s i c te n e t s o f t h e l e ga l p ro fe s s i o n .
R u l e 1 5 . 0 3 , C a n o n 5 o f t h e C o d e o f P ro fe s s i o n a l Re s p o n s i b i l i t y p ro v i d e s : A
l a w ye r s h a l l n o t re p re s e n t c o n fl i c ti n g i n te re s t s exc e p t b y w r i tt e n c o n s e n t
o f a l l c o n c e r n e d g i v e n a ft e r a f u l l d i s c l o s u re o f t h e fa c t s . T h i s p ro h i b i ti o n i s
fo u n d e d o n p r i n c i p l e s o f p u b l i c p o l i c y a n d g o o d ta s t e . [ 8 ] I n t h e c o u rs e o f a
l a w ye r- c l i e n t re l a ti o n s h i p , t h e l a w ye r l e a r n s a l l t h e fa c t s c o n n e c t e d w i t h
t h e c l i e n t s c a s e , i n c l u d i n g t h e w e a k a n d s t ro n g p o i n t s o f t h e c a s e . T h e
n a t u re o f t h a t re l a ti o n s h i p i s , t h e re fo re , o n e o f t r u s t a n d c o n fi d e n c e o f t h e
h i g h e s t d e g re e . [ 9 ] I t b e h o o v e s l a w ye rs n o t o n l y to ke e p i nv i o l a t e t h e c l i e n t s
c o n fi d e n c e , b u t a l s o to av o i d t h e a p p e a ra n c e o f t re a c h e r y a n d d o u b l e -
d e a l i n g fo r o n l y t h e n c a n l i ti ga n t s b e e n c o u ra g e d t o e n t r u s t t h e i r s e c r e t s t o
t h e i r l a w ye r s , w h i c h i s o f p a ra m o u n t i m p o r ta n c e i n t h e a d m i n i s t ra ti o n o f
j u s ti c e . [ 1 0 ]
I n b ro a d te r m s , l a w ye rs a re d e e m e d to re p re s e n t c o n fl i c ti n g i n t e r e s t s w h e n ,
i n b e h a l f o f o n e c l i e n t , i t i s t h e i r d u t y to c o n te n d fo r t h a t w h i c h d u t y t o
a n o t h e r c l i e n t re q u i re s t h e m to o p p o s e . [ 1 1 ] D e v e l o p m e n t s i n j u r i s p r u d e n c e
h av e p a r ti c u l a r i ze d va r i o u s te s t s to d e te r m i n e w h e t h e r a l a w ye r s c o n d u c t
l i e s w i t h i n t h i s p ro s c r i p ti o n . O n e te s t i s w h e t h e r a l a w ye r i s d u t y- b o u n d t o
fi g h t fo r a n i s s u e o r c l a i m i n b e h a l f o f o n e c l i e n t a n d , a t t h e s a m e ti m e , t o
o p p o s e t h a t c l a i m fo r t h e o t h e r c l i e n t . [ 1 2 ] T h u s , i f a l a w y e rs a rg u m e n t fo r o n e
c l i e n t h a s to b e o p p o s e d b y t h a t s a m e l a w ye r i n a rg u i n g fo r t h e o t h e r c l i e n t ,
t h e re i s a v i o l a ti o n o f t h e r u l e .
A n o t h e r te s t o f i n c o n s i s te n c y o f i n te re s t s i s w h e t h e r t h e a c c e p ta n c e
o f a n e w re l a ti o n w o u l d p re v e n t t h e f u l l d i s c h a rg e o f t h e l a w ye r s d u t y o f
u n d i v i d e d fi d e l i t y a n d l o ya l t y to t h e c l i e n t o r i nv i t e s u s p i c i o n o f
u n fa i t h f u l n e s s o r d o u b l e - d e a l i n g i n t h e p e r fo r m a n c e o f t h a t d u t y. [ 1 3 ] S ti l l
a n o t h e r te s t i s w h e t h e r t h e l a w ye r w o u l d b e c a l l e d u p o n i n t h e n e w re l a ti o n
t o u s e a ga i n s t a fo r m e r c l i e n t a ny c o n fi d e n ti a l i n fo r m a ti o n a c q u i re d t h ro u g h
t h e i r c o n n e c ti o n o r p re v i o u s e m p l o y m e n t . [ 1 4 ]
T h e p ro s c r i p ti o n a ga i n s t re p re s e n t a ti o n o f c o n fl i c ti n g i n t e re s t s
a p p l i e s t o a s i t u a ti o n w h e re t h e o p p o s i n g p a r ti e s a re p re s e n t c l i e n t s i n t h e
s a m e a c ti o n o r i n a n u n re l a t e d a c ti o n . I t i s o f n o m o m e n t t h a t t h e l a w ye r
w o u l d n o t b e c a l l e d u p o n t o c o n t e n d fo r o n e c l i e n t t h a t w h i c h t h e l a w ye r h a s
t o o p p o s e fo r t h e o t h e r c l i e n t , o r t h a t t h e re w o u l d b e n o o c ca s i o n t o u s e t h e
c o n fi d e n ti a l i n fo r m a ti o n a c q u i re d f ro m o n e t o t h e d i s a d va n ta g e o f t h e o t h e r
a s t h e t w o a c ti o n s a re w h o l l y u n re l a t e d . I t i s e n o u g h t h a t t h e o p p o s i n g
p a r ti e s i n o n e c a s e , o n e o f w h o m wo u l d l o s e t h e s u i t , a re p re s e n t c l i e n t s a n d
t h e n a t u re o r c o n d i ti o n s o f t h e l a w y e rs re s p e c ti v e re ta i n e rs w i t h e a c h o f
t h e m w o u l d a ff e c t t h e p e r fo r m a n c e o f t h e d u t y o f u n d i v i d e d fi d e l i t y t o b o t h
clients. [15]
I n t h i s c a s e , i t i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t a t t h e ti m e t h e re s p o n d e n t fi l e d
t h e re p l e v i n c a s e o n b e h a l f o f A I B h e wa s s ti l l t h e c o u n s e l o f re c o rd o f t h e
c o m p l a i n a n t i n t h e p e n d i n g e j e c t m e n t c a s e . We d o n o t s u s ta i n re s p o n d e n t s
t h e o r y t h a t s i n c e t h e e j e c t m e n t c a s e a n d t h e re p l e v i n c a s e a re u n re l a t e d
c a s e s f ra u g h t w i t h d i ff e re n t i s s u e s , p a r ti e s , a n d s u b j e c t m a tt e rs , t h e
p ro h i b i ti o n i s i n a p p l i c a b l e . H i s re p re s e n ta ti o n o f o p p o s i n g c l i e n t s i n b o t h
c a s e s , t h o u g h u n re l a t e d , o b v i o u s l y c o n s ti t u t e s c o n fl i c t o f i n t e r e s t o r, a t t h e
l e a s t , i nv i t e s s u s p i c i o n o f d o u b l e - d e a l i n g . W h i l e t h e re s p o n d e n t m ay a s s e r t
t h a t t h e c o m p l a i n a n t ex p re s s l y c o n s e n t e d t o h i s c o n ti n u e d re p re s e n t a ti o n i n
t h e e j e c t m e n t c a s e , t h e re s p o n d e n t fa i l e d t o s h o w t h a t h e f u l l y d i s c l o s e d t h e
fa c t s t o b o t h h i s c l i e n t s a n d h e fa i l e d t o p re s e n t a ny w r i tt e n c o n s e n t o f t h e
c o m p l a i n a n t a n d A I B a s re q u i re d u n d e r R u l e 1 5 . 0 3 , C a n o n 1 5 o f t h e C o d e o f
P ro fe s s i o n a l Re s p o n s i b i l i t y.
N e i t h e r c a n w e a c c e p t re s p o n d e n t s p l e a t h a t h e w a s d u t y- b o u n d t o h a n d l e a l l
t h e ca s e s re fe r re d t o h i m b y A I B, i n c l u d i n g t h e p e rs o n a l c a s e s o f i t s o ffi c e rs
w h i c h h a d n o c o n n e c ti o n t o i t s c o r p o ra t e a ff a i rs . T h a t t h e re p re s e n t a ti o n o f
c o n fl i c ti n g i n t e re s t i s i n g o o d fa i t h a n d w i t h h o n e s t i n t e n ti o n o n t h e p a r t o f
t h e l a w ye r d o e s n o t m a ke t h e p ro h i b i ti o n i n o p e ra ti v e . [ 1 6 ] M o re o v e r, l a w ye rs
a re n o t o b l i g e d t o a c t e i t h e r a s a n a d v i s e r o r a d v o c a t e fo r e v e r y p e rs o n w h o
m ay w i s h t o b e c o m e t h e i r c l i e n t . T h e y h av e t h e r i g h t t o d e c l i n e s u c h
e m p l o y m e n t , s u b j e c t , h o w e v e r, t o C a n o n 1 4 o f t h e C o d e o f P ro fe s s i o n a l
Re s p o n s i b i l i t y. [ 1 7 ] A l t h o u g h t h e re a re i n s ta n c e s w h e re l a w ye rs c a n n o t d e c l i n e
re p re s e n t a ti o n , [ 1 8 ] t h e y c a n n o t b e m a d e t o l a b o r u n d e r c o n fl i c t o f i n t e r e s t
b e t w e e n a p re s e n t c l i e n t a n d a p ro s p e c ti v e o n e . [ 1 9 ]
A d d i ti o n a l l y, i n h i s p o s i ti o n p a p e r, t h e re s p o n d e n t a l l e g e s t h a t w h e n t h e
c o m p l a i n a n t i nv i t e d t h e re s p o n d e n t t o j o i n Q R M S I , h e v e h e m e n t l y re f u s e d t o
j o i n t h e m d u e t o h i s p e rc e p ti o n o f c o n fl i c ti n g i n te r e s t a s h e w a s t h e n ( a n d
s ti l l i s a t p re s e n t ) t h e L e ga l C o u n s e l o f A I B, w h i c h i s a l s o a s e c u r i t y a g e n c y.
[20]
To b o l s t e r h i s a l l e ga ti o n , h e i nv o ke d t h e a ffi d av i t s o f c o m p l a i n a n t s
w i t n e s s e s w h i c h c o n ta i n e d s ta t e m e n t s o f h i s a p p re h e n s i o n o f c o n fl i c t o f
i n t e re s t s h o u l d h e j o i n Q R M S I . [ 2 1 ]
S u r p r i s i n g l y, d e s p i te h i s a p p re h e n s i o n o r a w a re n e s s o f a p o s s i b l e c o n fl i c t o f
i n t e re s t s h o u l d h e j o i n Q R M S I , t h e re s p o n d e n t l a t e r a l l o w e d h i m s e l f t o
b e c o m e a n i n c o r p o ra to r, s to c k h o l d e r, a n d p re s i d e n t o f S E S S I , w h i c h i s a l s o a
s e c u r i t y a g e n c y. H e j u s ti fi e d h i s a c t b y c l a i m i n g t h a t t h a t w h i l e b o t h A I B a n d
S E S S I a re e n ga g e d i n s e c u r i t y a g e n c y b u s i n e s s , h e i s s e r v i n g i n d i ff e re n t
c a p a c i ti e s . A s t h e i n - h o u s e l e ga l c o u n s e l o f A I B , h e s e r v e s i t s l e ga l i n t e re s t
t h e p a ra m e te r o f w h i c h e v o l v e s a ro u n d l e ga l m a tt e rs s u c h a s p ro t e c ti n g t h e
l e ga l r i g h t s a n d i n te re s t o f t h e c o r p o ra ti o n ; c o n d u c ti n g a n i nv e s ti ga ti o n o r a
h e a r i n g o n v i o l a ti o n s o f c o m p a ny r u l e s a n d re g u l a ti o n s o f t h e i r o ffi c e
e m p l o ye e s a n d s e c u r i t y g u a rd s ; s e n d i n g d e m a n d l e tt e rs i n c o l l e c ti o n c a s e s ;
a n d re p re s e n ti n g t h e c o r p o ra ti o n i n a ny l i ti ga ti o n fo r o r a ga i n s t i t . A n d a s
p re s i d e n t o f S E S S I , h e s e r v e s t h e o p e ra ti o n a l a s p e c t s o f t h e b u s i n e s s s u c h a s
h o w d o e s i t o p e ra te [ ] , h o w m u c h d o t h e y p r i c e t h e i r s e r v i c e s , w h a t k i n d o r
h o w d o t h e y t ra i n [ ] t h e i r s e c u r i t y g u a rd s , h o w t h e y s o l i c i t c l i e n t s . T h u s ,
c o n fl i c t o f i n te re s t i s fa r- fe tc h e d . M o re o v e r, t h e re s p o n d e n t a rg u e s t h a t t h e
c o m p l a i n a n t , n o t b e i n g a s to c k h o l d e r o f A I B a n d S E S S I , h a s n o r i g h t t o
q u e s ti o n h i s a l l e g e d c o n fl i c t o f i n te re s t i n s e r v i n g t h e t w o s e c u r i t y a g e n c i e s .
[22]
W h i l e t h e c o m p l a i n a n t l a c k s p e rs o n a l i t y to q u e s ti o n t h e a l l e g e d c o n fl i c t o f
i n t e re s t s o n t h e p a r t o f t h e re s p o n d e n t i n s e r v i n g b o t h s e c u r i t y a g e n c i e s , w e
c a n n o t j u s t t u r n a b l i n d e ye to re s p o n d e n t s a c t . I t m u s t b e n o t e d t h a t t h e
p ro s c r i p ti o n a ga i n s t re p re s e n ta ti o n o f c o n fl i c ti n g i n t e re s t s fi n d s a p p l i c a ti o n
w h e re t h e c o n fl i c ti n g i n te re s t s a r i s e w i t h re s p e c t t o t h e s a m e g e n e ra l m a tt e r
h o w e v e r s l i g h t t h e a d v e rs e i n te re s t m ay b e . I t a p p l i e s e v e n i f t h e c o n fl i c t
p e r ta i n s to t h e l a w ye rs p r i va te a c ti v i t y o r i n t h e p e r fo r m a n c e o f a f u n c ti o n i n
a n o n - p ro fe s s i o n a l c a p a c i t y. [ 2 3 ] I n t h e p ro c e s s o f d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t h e re
i s a c o n fl i c t o f i n te re s t , a n i m p o r ta n t c r i te r i o n i s p ro b a b i l i t y, n o t c e r ta i n t y,
o f c o n fl i c t .
S i n c e t h e re s p o n d e n t h a s fi n a n c i a l o r p e c u n i a r y i n t e re s t i n S E S S I , w h i c h i s
e n ga g e d i n a b u s i n e s s c o m p e ti n g w i t h h i s c l i e n t s , a n d , m o re i m p o r ta n t l y, h e
o c c u p i e s t h e h i g h e s t p o s i ti o n i n S E S S I , o n e c a n n o t h e l p e n t e r ta i n i n g a d o u b t
o n h i s l o ya l t y to h i s c l i e n t A I B . T h i s k i n d o f s i t u a ti o n p a s s e s t h e s e c o n d t e s t
o f c o n fl i c t o f i n te re s t , w h i c h i s w h e t h e r t h e a c c e p ta n c e o f a n e w re l a ti o n s h i p
w o u l d p re v e n t t h e f u l l d i s c h a rg e o f t h e l a w ye r s d u t y o f u n d i v i d e d fi d e l i t y
a n d l o ya l t y to t h e c l i e n t o r i nv i te s u s p i c i o n o f u n fa i t h f u l n e s s o r d o u b l e -
d e a l i n g i n t h e p e r fo r m a n c e o f t h a t d u t y. T h e c l o s e re l a ti o n s h i p o f t h e
m a j o r i t y s to c k h o l d e rs o f b o t h c o m p a n i e s d o e s n o t n e ga t e t h e c o n fl i c t o f
i n t e re s t . N e i t h e r d o e s h i s p ro te s ta ti o n t h a t h i s s h a re h o l d i n g i n S E S S I i s a
m e re p e b b l e a m o n g t h e s a n d s .
I n v i e w o f a l l o f t h e fo re g o i n g , w e fi n d t h e re s p o n d e n t g u i l t y o f
s e r i o u s m i s c o n d u c t fo r re p re s e n ti n g c o n fl i c ti n g i n t e re s t s .
F u r t h e r m o re , i t m u s t b e n o t e d t h a t Re p u b l i c A c t N o . 5 4 8 7 , o t h e r w i s e
k n o w n a s t h e P r i v a te S e c u r i t y A g e n c y L a w , p ro h i b i t s a p e rs o n f ro m
o rga n i z i n g o r h av i n g a n i n t e re s t i n m o re t h a n o n e s e c u r i t y a g e n c y. F ro m
re s p o n d e n t s p o s i ti o n p a p e r, i t c a n b e c u l l e d t h a t L e o d e ga r i o Q u i a m b a o i s t h e
p re s i d e n t a n d m a n a g i n g d i re c t o r o f A I B, h o l d i n g 6 0 % o f t h e o u t s ta n d i n g
s h a re s ; w h i l e h i s fo u r o t h e r s i b l i n g s w h o a re p e r m a n e n t re s i d e n t s i n t h e
U n i t e d S ta t e s o w n t h e re m a i n i n g 4 0 % . [ 2 4 ] T h i s p ro h i b i ti o n n o t w i t h s ta n d i n g ,
t h e re s p o n d e n t o rga n i ze d S E S S I , w i t h L e o d e ga r i o s w i fe a n d s o n a s m a j o r i t y
s t o c k h o l d e rs h o l d i n g a b o u t 7 0 % o f t h e o u t s ta n d i n g s h a re s a n d w i t h h i m ( t h e
re s p o n d e n t ) , a s w e l l a s t h e re s t o f t h e s t o c k h o l d e rs , h o l d i n g m i n i m a l s h a re s .
[25]
I n d o i n g s o, t h e re s p o n d e n t v i r t u a l l y a l l o w e d L e o d e ga r i o a n d t h e l a tt e rs
w i fe t o v i o l a t e o r c i rc u mv e n t t h e l aw b y h av i n g a n i n t e re s t i n m o re t h a n o n e
s e c u r i t y a g e n c y. I t m u s t b e n o t e d t h a t i n t h e a ffi d av i t [ 2 6 ] o f L e o d e ga r i o s w i fe ,
s h e m e n ti o n e d o f t h e i r c o n j u ga l p ro p e r t y. I n t h e a b s e n c e o f e v i d e n c e t o t h e
c o n t ra r y, t h e p ro p e r t y re l a ti o n o f L e o d e ga r i o a n d h i s w i fe c a n b e p re s u m e d
t o b e t h a t o f c o n j u ga l p a r t n e rs h i p o f ga i n s ; h e n c e , t h e m a j o r i t y s h a re s i n A I B
a n d S E S S I a re t h e c o n j u ga l p ro p e r t y o f L e o d e ga r i o a n d h i s w i fe , t h e re b y
p l a c i n g t h e m s e l v e s i n p o s s e s s i o n o f a n i n t e re s t i n m o re t h a n o n e s e c u r i t y
a g e n c y i n c o n t rav e n ti o n o f R . A . N o . 5 4 8 7 . T h u s , i n o rga n i z i n g S E S S I , t h e
re s p o n d e n t v i o l a t e d R u l e 1 . 0 2 , C a n o n 1 o f t h e C o d e o f P ro fe s s i o n a l
Re s p o n s i b i l i t y, w h i c h m a n d a t e s l a w ye r s t o p ro m o t e re s p e c t fo r t h e l a w a n d
re f ra i n f ro m c o u n s e l i n g o r a b e tti n g a c ti v i ti e s a i m e d a t d e fi a n c e o f t h e l a w.
A s t o t h e re c o m m e n d a ti o n t h a t t h e p e n a l t y b e re d u c e d f ro m a
s u s p e n s i o n o f o n e ye a r t o a s t e r n w a r n i n g , w e fi n d t h e s a m e t o b e w i t h o u t
b a s i s . We a re d i s t u r b e d b y t h e re d u c ti o n m a d e b y t h e I B P B o a rd o f G o v e r n o rs
o f t h e p e n a l t y re c o m m e n d e d b y t h e i nv e s ti ga ti n g c o m m i s s i o n e r w i t h o u t
c l e a r l y a n d d i s ti n c t l y s ta ti n g t h e fa c t s a n d re a s o n s o n w h i c h t h a t re d u c ti o n i s
based.
S e c ti o n 1 2 ( a ) , R u l e 1 3 9 - B o f t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t re a d s i n p a r t
a s fo l l o w s :
S E C . 1 2 . Re v i e w a n d d e c i s i o n b y t h e B o a r d o f G o v e r n o r s .
( a ) Ev e r y c a s e h e a rd b y a n i nv e s ti ga t o r s h a l l b e
re v i e w e d b y t h e I B P B o a rd o f G o v e r n o rs u p o n t h e re c o rd a n d
e v i d e n c e t ra n s m i tt e d t o i t b y t h e I nv e s ti ga t o r w i t h h i s
re p o r t . T h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e B o a rd u p o n s u c h re v i e w s h a l l b e
i n w r i ti n g a n d s h a l l c l e a r l y a n d d i s ti n c t l y s ta t e t h e fa c t s a n d
t h e re a s o n s o n w h i c h i t i s b a s e d .
 YNARES-SANTIAGO,

We m ay c o n s i d e r t h e re s o l u ti o n o f t h e I B P B o a rd o f G o v e r n o rs a s a - versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
m e m o ra n d u m d e c i s i o n a d o p ti n g b y re fe re n c e t h e re p o r t o f t h e i nv e s ti ga ti n g
c o m m i s s i o n e r. H o w e v e r, w e l o o k w i th d i s fav o r t h e c h a n g e i n t h e CALLEJO, and
re c o m m e n d e d p e n a l t y w i th o u t a ny ex p l a n a ti o n t h e re fo r. A ga i n , w e re m i n d
t h e I B P B o a rd o f G o v e r n o rs o f t h e i m p o r ta n c e o f t h e re q u i re m e n t t o CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
a n n o u n c e i n p l a i n te r m s i t s l e ga l re a s o n i n g , s i n c e t h e re q u i re m e n t t h a t i t s
d e c i s i o n i n d i s c i p l i n a r y p ro c e e d i n g s m u s t s ta te t h e fa c t s a n d t h e re a s o n s o n
w h i c h i t s d e c i s i o n i s b a s e d i s a k i n to w h a t i s re q u i re d o f t h e d e c i s i o n s o f
c o u r t s o f re c o rd . [ 2 7 ] T h e re a s o n s fo r h a n d i n g d o w n a p e n a l t y o c c u p y n o l e s s e r Promulgated:
s ta ti o n t h a n a ny o t h e r p o r ti o n o f t h e r a ti o .
ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA,

Respondent. January 23, 2006

I n s i m i l a r c a s e s w h e re t h e re s p o n d e n t w a s fo u n d g u i l t y o f
re p re s e n ti n g c o n fl i c ti n g i n te re s t s a p e n a l t y ra n g i n g f ro m o n e t o t h re e ye a rs
s u s p e n s i o n wa s i m p o s e d . [ 2 8 ] I n t h i s c a s e , w e fi n d t h a t a s u s p e n s i o n f ro m t h e
p ra c ti c e o f l a w fo r o n e ye a r i s w a r ra n te d . x-----------------------------------------------------------x

W H E R E F O R E , re s p o n d e n t Att y. N e s to r A . B a m b a i s h e re b y
h e l d G U I LT Y o f v i o l a ti o n o f R u l e 1 5 . 0 3 o f C a n o n 1 5 a n d R u l e 1 . 0 2 o f C a n o n 1 RESOLUTION
o f t h e C o d e o f P ro fe s s i o n a l Re s p o n s i b i l i t y. H e i s S U S P E N D E D f ro m t h e
p ra c ti c e o f l a w fo r a p e r i o d o f O N E ( 1 ) Y EA R e ff e c ti v e f ro m re c e i p t o f t h i s
Re s o l u ti o n , w i t h a wa r n i n g t h a t a s i m i l a r i n f ra c ti o n i n t h e f u t u re s h a l l b e
d e a l t w i t h m o re s e v e re l y.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

L e t c o p i e s o f t h i s Re s o l u ti o n b e f u r n i s h e d t o t h e O ffi c e o f t h e B a r
C o n fi d a n t a n d t h e I n te g ra te d B a r o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s .

SO ORDERED.
Before this Court is a complaint filed by Leticia Gonzales (Gonzales) praying that Atty. Marcelino
Gonzales v. Cabucana AC No. 6836 January 23, 2006
Cabucana, (respondent) be disbarred for representing conflicting interests.
FIRST DIVISION
On January 8, 2004, Gonzales filed a petition before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
alleging that: she was the complainant in a case for sum of money and damages filed before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Santiago City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1-567 where she
was represented by the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW
LETICIA GONZALES, A.C. No. 6836
OFFICE, with Atty. Edmar Cabucana handling the case and herein respondent as an
associate/partner; on February 26, 2001, a decision was rendered in the civil case ordering the
Complainant,
losing party to pay Gonzales the amount of P17,310.00 with interest and P6,000.00 as attorneys
fees; Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully implement the writ of execution issued in connection
Present:
with the judgment which prompted Gonzales to file a complaint against the said sheriff with this
Court; in September 2003, Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to the house of Gonzales; they
harassed Gonzales and asked her to execute an affidavit of desistance regarding her complaint
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairman, before this Court; Gonzales thereafter filed against the Gatchecos criminal cases for trespass, grave
threats, grave oral defamation, simple coercion and unjust vexation; notwithstanding the pendency
of Civil Case No. 1-567, where respondents law firm was still representing Gonzales, herein
respondent represented the Gatchecos in the cases filed by Gonzales against the said spouses;
respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law since respondents acceptance of the
cases of the Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client relationship between complainant and
respondents law firm and renders respondent liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) particularly Rules 10.01,[1] 13.01,[2] 15.02,[3] 15.03,[4] 21.01[5] and 21.02.[6]
On January 9, 2004, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline ordered Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. to
submit his Answer to the complaint.[7]
In his Answer, respondent averred: He never appeared and represented complainant in Civil Case
No. 1-567 since it was his brother, Atty. Edmar Cabucana who appeared and represented Gonzales
in said case. He admitted that he is representing Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife in the cases filed
against them but claimed that his appearance is pro bonoand that the spouses pleaded with him as
no other counsel was willing to take their case. He entered his appearance in good faith and opted
to represent the spouses rather than leave them defenseless. When the Gatchecos asked for his
assistance, the spouses said that the cases filed against them by Gonzales were merely instigated
by a high ranking official who wanted to get even with them for their refusal to testify in favor of
the said official in another case. At first, respondent declined to serve as counsel of the spouses as
he too did not want to incur the ire of the high-ranking official, but after realizing that he would be
abdicating a sworn duty to delay no man for money or malice, respondent entered his appearance
as defense counsel of the spouses free of any charge. Not long after, the present complaint was
crafted against respondent which shows that respondent is now the subject of a demolition job.
The civil case filed by Gonzales where respondents brother served as counsel is different and
distinct from the criminal cases filed by complainant against the Gatcheco spouses, thus, he did not
violate any canon on legal ethics. [8]
Gonzales filed a Reply contending that the civil case handled by respondents brother is closely
connected with the cases of the Gatchecos which the respondent is handling; that the claim of
respondent that he is handling the cases of the spouses pro bono is not true since he has his own
agenda in offering his services to the spouses; and that the allegation that she is filing the cases
against the spouses because she is being used by a powerful person is not true since she filed the
said cases out of her own free will.[9]
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP sent to the parties a Notice of Mandatory Conference
dated March 1, 2004.[10] On the scheduled conference, only a representative of complainant
appeared.[11] Commissioner Demaree Raval of the IBP-CBD then directed both parties to file their
respective verified position papers.[12]
Complainant filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions and added that respondent
prepared and notarized counter-affidavits of the Gatcheco spouses; that the high-ranking official
referred to by respondent is Judge Ruben Plata and the accusations of respondent against the said
judge is an attack against a brother in the profession which is a violation of the CPR; and that
respondent continues to use the name of De Guzman in their law firm despite the fact that said
partner has already been appointed as Assistant Prosecutor of Santiago City, again in violation of
the CPR.[13]
Respondent filed his Position Paper restating his allegations in his Answer. [14]
On August 23, 2004, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes issued an Order notifying both parties to
appear before his office on October 28, 2004 for a clarificatory question regarding said case. [15] On
the said date, only respondent appeared [16] presenting a sworn affidavit executed by Gonzales
withdrawing her complaint against respondent. It reads:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
TUNGKOL SA PAG-UURONG NG DEMANDA
Ako, si LETICIA GONZALES, nasa tamang edad, Pilipino, may asawa, at
nakatira sa Barangay Dubinan East, Santiago City, makaraang manumpa ayon
sa batas ay nagsasabing:
Ako ang nagdedemanda o petitioner sa CBD Case No. 04-1186 na may
pamagat na Leticia Gonzales versus Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. na
kasalukuyang nahaharap sa Commission on Bar Discipline ng Integrated Bar
of the Philippines
Ang pagkakahain ng naturang demanda ay nag-ugat sa di-pagkakaintindihan
na namamagitan sa akin at nina Mr. and Mrs. Romeo and Anita Gatcheco.
Dahil sa aking galit sa naturang mag-asawa, idinawit ko si Atty. Marcelino C.
Cabucana, Jr. sa sigalot na namamagitan sa akin at sa mag-
asawang Gatcheco, gayong nalalaman ko na si Atty. Marcelino C.
Cabucana ay walang nalalaman sa naturang di pagkakaintindihan.
Makaraang pag-isipang mabuti ang paghain ko ng demanda kontra kay Atty.
Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr., nakumbinsi ako na ang pagdedemanda ko
kay Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. ay isang malaking pagkakamali dahil siya
ay walang kinalalaman (sic) sa di pagkakaintindihan naming(sic) ng mag-
asawang Gatcheco.
 Si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. ay di ko rin naging abogado sa Civil Case
No. 1-567 (MTCC Br. I Santiago City) na inihain ko kontra kay Eduardo
Mangano.
Nais kong ituwid ang lahat kung kayat aking iniuurong ang
naturang kasong inihain ko kontra kay Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. at dahil
dito ay hindi na ako interesado pang ituloy and naturang kaso, at aking
hinihiling sa kinauukulan na dismisin na ang naturang kaso.
Ginawa ko ang sinumpaang salaysay na ito upang patotohanan sa lahat ng
nakasaad dito.[17]
Commissioner Reyes issued an Order dated October 28, 2004 requiring Gonzales to appear before
him on November 25, 2004, to affirm her statements and to be subject to clarificatory questioning.
[18]
However, none of the parties appeared.[19] On February 17, 2005, only respondent was present.
Commissioner Reyes then considered the case as submitted for resolution. [20]
On February 24, 2005, Commissioner Reyes submitted his Report and Recommendation, portions
of which are quoted hereunder:
The Undersigned Commissioner believes that the respondent made a mistake
in the acceptance of the administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, however,
the Commission (sic) believes that there was no malice and bad faith in the
said acceptance and this can be shown by the move of the complainant to
unilaterally withdraw the case which she filed against Atty. Marcelino C.
Cabucana, Jr. However, Atty. Cabucana is reminded to be more careful in the
acceptance of cases as conflict of interests might arise.
It is respectfully recommended that Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. (be)
sternly warned and reprimanded andadvised to be more circumspect and
careful in accepting cases which might result in conflict of interests. [21]
On June 25, 2005, a Resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2005-153
CBD CASE NO. 03-1186
Leticia Gonzales vs.
Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent made (a)
mistake in the acceptance of the administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, Atty.
Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is hereby WARNED and REPRIMANDED and advised
to be more circumspect and careful in accepting cases which might result in
conflict of interests.[22]
Before going to the merits, let it be clarified that contrary to the report of Commissioner Reyes,
respondent did not only represent the Gatcheco spouses in the administrative case filed
by Gonzales against them. As respondent himself narrated in his Position Paper, he
likewise acted as their counsel in the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against them. [23]
With that settled, we find respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. [24] Such prohibition is
founded on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. [25] Lawyers are expected not only to keep
inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing
for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice. [26]
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that
duty.[27]
As we expounded in the recent case of Quiambao vs. Bamba,[28]
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests
applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the
same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer
would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has
to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the
confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other
as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing
parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and
 the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of them
would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.
[29]
The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the civil case handled
by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal cases filed by
Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are not related, has no merit. The representation
of opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at
the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow. [30]
We shall consider however as mitigating circumstances the fact that he is representing the
Gatcheco spouses pro bono and that it was his firm and not respondent personally,
which handled the civil case of Gonzales. As recounted by complainant herself, Atty.
Edmar Cabucana signed the civil case of complainant by stating first the name of the law
firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, under which,
his name and signature appear; while herein respondent signed the pleadings for the
Gatcheco spouses only with his name,[39] without any mention of the law firm. We also
note the observation of the IBP Commissioner Reyes that there was no malice and bad
faith in respondents acceptance of the Gatchecos cases as shown by the move of
complainant to withdraw the case.

Respondent further argued that it was his brother who represented Gonzales in the civil case and
not him, thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We do not agree. As respondent Thus, for violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and taking
admitted, it was their law firm which represented Gonzales in the civil case. Such being into consideration the aforementioned mitigating circumstances, we impose the penalty of fine
the case, the rule against representing conflicting interests applies. of P2,000.00.

As we explained in the case of Hilado vs. David:[31]

[W]e can not sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of
the party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVI-2005-153 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach is APPROVED with MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.
the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without condemning the isFINED the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a
respondents conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that commission of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
upon the admitted facts it is highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring
the profession, of which he is a distinguished member, into public disrepute
and suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice. [32] SO ORDERED.
Perez v. De la Torre AC No. 6160 March 30, 2006
The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest intention will also
not exculpate him as such claim does not render the prohibition inoperative. [33]
In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no other lawyer is EN BANC
willing to take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that while there may be instances
where lawyers cannot decline representation they cannot be made to labor under
conflict of interest between a present client and a prospective one. [34] Granting also that NESTOR PEREZ , A.C. No. 6160
there really was no other lawyer who could handle the spouses case other than him, still Complainant,
he should have observed the requirements laid down by the rules by conferring with the Present:
prospective client to ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve
a conflict with another client then seek the written consent of all concerned after a full Panganiban, C.J.,
disclosure of the facts.[35] These respondent failed to do thus exposing himself to the Puno,
charge of double-dealing. Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
We note the affidavit of desistance filed by Gonzales. However, we are not bound by such Sandoval-Gutierrez,
desistance as the present case involves public interest. [36] Indeed, the Courts exercise of - versus - Carpio,
its power to take cognizance of administrative cases against lawyers is not for the Austria-Martinez,
purpose of enforcing civil remedies between parties, but to protect the court and the Corona,
public against an attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his profession. [37] Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests a Tinga,
penalty ranging from one to three years suspension was imposed. [38] Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ.
ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE,
Respondent. Promulgated:
March 30, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a letter-complaint[1] dated July 30, 2003 addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., complainant Nestor Perez charged respondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre with misconduct
or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for representing conflicting interests.
Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur;
that in December 2001, several suspects for murder and kidnapping for ransom, among them
Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were apprehended and jailed by the police authorities; that
respondent went to the municipal building of Calabanga where Ilo and Avila were being detained
and made representations that he could secure their freedom if they sign the prepared
extrajudicial confessions; that unknown to the two accused, respondent was representing the heirs
of the murder victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed against
them, including herein complainant who was implicated in the extrajudicial confessions as the
mastermind in the criminal activities for which they were being charged.
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that while being detained
at the Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in drafting an extrajudicial
confession regarding his involvement in the crimes of kidnapping for ransom, murder and robbery.
He advised Avila to inform his parents about his decision to make an extrajudicial confession,
apprised him of his constitutional rights and of the possibility that he might be utilized as a state-
witness.
Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his extrajudicial
confession, he conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and only after he was convinced
that Ilo was not under undue compulsion did he assist the accused in executing the extrajudicial
confession.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. [2] On August 16, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner
submitted his report with the following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Danilo de la
Torre be suspended for one (1) year from the practice of the legal profession
for violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
The Board of Governors of the IBP modified the recommendation by increasing the
period of suspension to two years.
In finding the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests, the Investigating
Commissioner opined that:
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint. The
complainant was able to prove by substantial evidence his charge against Atty.
de la Tor[r]e. The respondent admitted that his services as a lawyer were
retained by both Avila and Ilo. Perez was able to show that at the time that
Atty. de la Torre was representing the said two accused, he was also
representing the interest of the victims family. This was declared by the
victims daughter, Vicky de Chavez, who testified before Branch 63 of the
Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur that her family retained the services of
Atty. Danilo de la Torre to prosecute the case against her fathers killers. She
even admitted that she was present when Atty. de la Torre met with and
advised Avila and Ilo on one occasion. This is proof that the respondent
consciously offered his services to Avila and Ilo despite the fact that he was
already representing the family of the two accuseds victim. It may not even be
improbable that respondent purposely offered to help the accused in order to
further his other clients interest. The respondent failed to deny these facts or
offer competent evidence to refute the said facts despite the ample
opportunity given him.
Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
 concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Respondent is therefore
duty bound to refrain from representing two parties having conflicting
interests in a controversy. By doing precisely the foregoing, and without any
proof that he secured the written consent of both parties after explaining to
them the existing conflict of interest, respondent should be sanctioned.
As found by the IBP, at the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the
accused in the murder of the victim Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing the family of the
murder victim. Clearly, his representation of opposing clients in the murder case invites suspicion
of double-dealing and infidelity to his clients.

We agree with the findings of the IBP except for the recommended penalty.
There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. This rule
covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. [3]
What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the execution by the two accused of
their confessions whereby they admitted their participation in various serious criminal offenses
knowing fully well that he was retained previously by the heirs of one of the
victims. Respondent, who presumably knows the intricacies of the law, should have exercised his
better judgment before conceding to accuseds choice of counsel. It did not cross his mind to inhibit
himself from acting as their counsel and instead, he even assisted them in executing the
extrajudicial confession.

Considering that this is respondents first infraction, disbarment as sought by the

complaint is deemed to be too severe. Under the present circumstances, we find that a suspension
There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer from the practice of law for three years is warranted.
will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against
his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. [4]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo de la Torre is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. He
is SUSPENDED for THREE YEARS from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
public policy and good taste. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the severely.
facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature
of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. It behooves
lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
impropriety and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP,
their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. [5] as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and
guidance.

To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offer his legal services to
accused Avila and Ilo but it was the two accused who sought his assistance in executing their SO ORDERED.
extrajudicial confessions. Nonetheless, he acceded to their request to act as counsel after apprising Lim-Santiago v. Sagucio AC No. 6705 En Banc March 31, 2006
them of their constitutional rights and after being convinced that the accused were under no EN BANC
compulsion to give their confession.

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, A.C. No. 6705

Complainant,
The excuse proferred by the respondent does not exonerate him from the clear violation
of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from representing Present:
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
 PUNO,
QUISUMBING, Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary
YNARES-SANTIAGO, investigation.[9] He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, Informations[10] for violation of Article 288[11] in relation to Article 116[12] of the Labor Code of
CARPIO, the Philippines.[13]
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA, Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR., 1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
AZCUNA,
TINGA, Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of
GARCIA, JJ. Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and
deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. [14] Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Promulgated: instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede
Respondent. March 31, 2006 and sign an affidavit to support the complaint. [15]
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice
of law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that
respondent received P10,000 as retainers fee for the months of January and February 1995,
[16]
DECISION another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995,[17] andP5,000 for the month of April
1996.[18]
CARPIO, J.:
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
The Case Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of working as government prosecutor.
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor. Respondent refutes complainants allegations and counters that complainant was merely
aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her
The Facts expectation.[19]

Ruthie Lim-Santiago (complainant) is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate.[1] Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat
Industries, Inc.[2]
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio (respondent) was the former Personnel Manager and Retained
Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc.[3] until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.[4]
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned
from Taggat for more than five years. [20] Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided
loyalty to Taggat.[21] Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary
preliminary investigation.[22] Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of
impartiality when he performed his duty. [23] Respondent points out that complainant did not file a
motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint [24] but instead complainant
voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. [25]

Taggat Industries, Inc. (Taggat) is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of

timber concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government
sequestered it sometime in 1986,[5] and its operations ceased in 1997.[6]
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat (Taggat employees) filed a criminal
complaint entitled Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago, docketed as I.S. No. 97-240
(criminal complaint).[7] Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the
management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries
and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.[8]
Respondent states that complainants reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her
impression that respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from
complainants statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:
xxx
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didnt think he would do it, Madam
Witness?
 A. Because he is supposed to be my fathers friend and he was working with
my Dad and he was supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to
me and told me he gonna help me. x x x.[26]
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not
representing Taggat employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his
official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. [27] Respondent argues that complainant failed to
establish that respondents act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. [28]
Respondent denies complainants allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases,
threatened and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of
proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present them for
cross-examination.[29]
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government
prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant but claims that it
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. [30] Respondent contends that the fees were
paid for his consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent
submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that rendering
consultancy services is not prohibited. [31] Respondent, in his Reply-
Memorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid
voluntarily by Taggat without the respondents asking, intended as token
consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These
payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of conflict of interest.
Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the
above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees. [32]
Respondent insists that complainants evidence failed to prove that when the criminal
complaint was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still
the retained counsel or legal consultant.[33]
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent
to file 651 Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State
Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. [34] Hence, the criminal complaint
was dismissed.[35]
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M.
Alejandro-Abbas (IBP Commissioner Abbas) heard the case [36] and allowed the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.[37] Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas resignation, the case was
reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa (IBP Commissioner Funa). [38]
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of
Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 (IBP Resolution) dated 4 November 2004 adopting
with modification[39] IBP Commissioner Funas Report and Recommendation (Report) finding
respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former clients interest, and violating
the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP
Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the
practice of law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of
Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S.
No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of whether the
matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel
Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for Violation of Labor Code (see Resolution
of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex B of Complaint). Herein
Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having
the management and control of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros.
Office, supra).
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of
Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor
concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedlydealt with and related with the
employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and
related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No.
97-240, are very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid
salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in
that case are very much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent
owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to maintain inviolate the clients
confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him
in any matter in which he previously represented him (Natam v. Capule, 91
Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does
not represent any client or any interest except justice. It should not be
forgotten, however, that a lawyer has animmutable duty to a former
client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former
client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor
relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel
of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for Violation of the Labor Code. Here lies the
conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been
labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager
concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and
Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
xxxx
 While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the
unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and
1997, the employees and management involved are the very personalities he
dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent
dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he
was an employee of the corporation and part of its management.
xxxx
As to the propriety of receiving Retainer Fees or consultancy fees
from herein Complainant while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and
for rendering legal consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are
prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial
Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal consultant is a
practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that
are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers
any activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law, legal
principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of
Taggat and instigating the filing of criminal complaints, we find the evidence
insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of
interest, failure to safeguard a former clients interest, and violating the
prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government
prosecutor.[40]
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[41] of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). However, the Court finds respondent liable for
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful
conduct.[42] Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No.
6713 (RA 6713).
Canon 6 provides that the Code shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official duties. [43] A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition not [to]
represent conflicting interests.[44] However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition
to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written
consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client
relationship exists.[45] Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty. [46]
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in unlawful
x x x conduct. Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a
government employee to engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized
by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with [his] official functions.[47]
Complainants evidence failed to substantiate the claim
that respondent represented conflicting interests
In Quiambao v. Bamba,[48] the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict
of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use
against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment.[49] In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain
inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect
him in any matter in which he previously represented him.[50]
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal
complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.
Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned
sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to
prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired
through his previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect
to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On
that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information
from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to
charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyers immutable duty to a former
client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the
client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests
only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose
after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her
allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
Respondent engaged in the private practice of law
while working as a government prosecutor
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as
 x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is
to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.[51]
Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. [52]
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently
and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is
without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer
agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with
the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term practice of law.
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts.[55]
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized
private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year. [56] We find this
penalty appropriate for respondents violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, weSUSPEND respondent Atty.
Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department
of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to SO ORDERED.

complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated
that the payments by Taggat were for Retainers fee. [53] Thus, as correctly pointed out by Lim v. Villarosa AC No. 5303 June 15, 2006
complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.

However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the
Code of Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to
investigate violations of RA 6713 the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public SECOND DIVISION
Officials and Employees unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Here, respondents violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR., A.C. No. 5303
Canon 1, which mandates that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or in behalf of PENTA RESORTS
deceitful conduct. Respondents admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services CORPORATION/Attorney-in-
while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a Fact of LUMOT A. JALANDONI,
violation of Rule 1.01. Complainant, Present:

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct PUNO, J., Chairperson,
when respondent stated in his Demurrer to Evidence: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be AZCUNA and
permanently and indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law GARCIA, JJ.
profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following
grounds: ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA,
Respondent. Promulgated:
xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of June 15, 2006
his oath of office and in his dealings with the public.[54]
x----------------------------------------x

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.
Humberto C. Lim Jr.[1] filed a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Nicanor V.
Villarosa on July 7, 2000.[2] On February 19, 2002, respondent moved for the consolidation of the
said complaint with the following substantially interrelated cases earlier filed with the First Division
of this Court:
1. Administrative Case No. 5463: Sandra F. Vaflor v. Atty. Adoniram P.
Pamplona and Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa;
2. Administrative Case No. 5502: Daniel A. Jalandoni v. Atty. Nicanor V.
Villarosa.
In a resolution dated February 24, 2003, this Court considered Administrative Case No. 5463 closed
and terminated.[3] On February 4, 2004, considering the pleadings filed in Administrative Case No.
5502, the Court resolved:
(a) to NOTE the notice of the resolution dated September 27, 2003 of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the case against
respondent for lack of merit; and
(b) to DENY, for lack of merit, the petition filed by complainant praying
that the resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
dismissing the instant case be reviewed and that proper sanctions
be imposed upon respondent.[4]
No motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial in Administrative Case No. 5502
appears in the records. The Court is now called upon to determine the merits of this remaining
case (A.C. No. 5303) against respondent.
The complaint read:
AS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
xxx xxx xxx
- II -
That respondent is a practicing lawyer and a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental Chapter. That sometime on
September 19, 1997, Lumot A. Jalandoni, Chairman/President of PRC was
sued before RTC, Branch 52 in Civil Case No. 97-9865, RE: Cabiles et al. vs.
Lumot Jalandoni, et al. The latter engaged the legal services of herein
respondent who formally entered his appearance on October 2, 1997 as
counsel for the defendants Lumot A. Jalandoni/Totti Anlap Gargoles.
Respondent as a consequence of said Attorney-Client relationship represented
Lumot A. Jalandoni et al in the entire proceedings of said case. Utmost trust
and confidence was reposed on said counsel, hence delicate and confidential
matters involving all the personal circumstances of his client were entrusted
to the respondent. The latter was provided with all the necessary information
relative to the property in question and likewise on legal matters affecting the
corporation (PRC) particularly [involving] problems [which affect] Hotel
Alhambra. Said counsel was privy to all transactions and affairs of the
corporation/hotel.
- III -
That it was respondent who exclusively handled the entire proceedings of
afore-cited Civil Case No. 97-9865 [and] presented Lumot A. Jalandoni as his
witness prior to formally resting his case. However, on April 27,
1999 respondent, without due notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly
filed a Motion to withdraw as counsel, one day before its scheduled hearing
on April 28, 1999. A careful perusal of said Motion to Withdraw as Counsel
will conclusively show that no copy thereof was furnished to Lumot A.
Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformity. No doubt, such notorious act of
respondent resulted to (sic) irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A.
Jalandoni, et al since the decision of the court RTC, Branch 52 proved adverse
to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. The far reaching effects of the untimely and
unauthorized withdrawal by respondent caused irreparable damage and
injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al; a highly meritorious case in favor of his
client suddenly [suffered] unexpected defeat.
- IV -
That the grounds alleged by respondent for his withdrawal as counsel of
Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was that he is [a] retained counsel of Dennis G.
Jalbuena and the Fernando F. Gonzaga, Inc. It was Dennis G. Jalbuena who
recommended him to be the counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. It is worthy
to note that from the outset, respondent already knew that Dennis G.
Jalbuena is the son-in-law of Lumot A. Jalandoni being married to her eldest
daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena. The other directors/officers of PRC were
comprised of the eldest sibling of the remaining children of Lumot A.
Jalandoni made in accordance with her wishes, with the exception of Carmen
J. Jalbuena, the only daughter registered as one of the incorporators of PRC,
obviously, being the author of the registration itself [sic]. Respondent further
stated that he cannot refuse to represent Dennis G. Jalbuena in the case filed
against the latter before the City Prosecutors Office by PRC/Lumot A.
Jalandoni due to an alleged retainership agreement with said Dennis G.
Jalbuena. [He] likewise represented Carmen J. Jalbuena and one Vicente
Delfin when PRC filed the criminal complaint against them. On April 06, 1999,
twenty-one (21) days prior to respondents filing of his Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al., respondent entered his appearance with
Bacolod City Prosecutor OIC-Vicente C. Acupan, through a letter expressly
stating that effective said date he was appearing as counsel for both Dennis
G. Jalbuena and Carmen J. Jalbuena and Vicente Delfin in the Estafa case filed
by the corporation (PRC) against them. Simply stated, as early as April 6,
1999 respondent already appeared for and in behalf of the Sps. Carmen and
Dennis Jalbuena/Vicente Delfin while concurrently representing Lumot A.
Jalandoni, et al. in Civil Case No. 97-9865. However, despite being fully aware
that the interest of his client Lumot A. Jalandoni [holding an equivalent of
Eighty-two (82%) percent of PRCs shares of stocks] and the interest of PRC are
one and the same, notwithstanding the fact that Lumot A. Jalandoni was still
his client in Civil Case No. 97-9862, respondent opted to represent opposing
clients at the same time. The corporations complaint for estafa
(P3,183,5525.00) was filed against the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena
together with UCPB bank manager Vicente Delfin. Succeeding events will
show that respondent instead of desisting from further violation of his
[lawyers] oath regarding fidelity to his client, with extreme arrogance,
blatantly ignored our laws on Legal Ethics, by palpably and despicably
defending the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in all the cases filed against
them by PRC through its duly authorized representatives, before the Public
Prosecutors Office, Bacolod City (PP vs. Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena
for False Testimony/Perjury, viol. of Art. 183 RPC under BC I.S. No. 2000-2304;
viol. of Art. 363, 364, 181 and 183 RPC under BC I.S. 2000-2343, PP vs.
Carmen J. Jalbuena for viol. of Art. 315 under BC I.S. 2000-2125 and various
other related criminal cases against the Sps. Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena).
AS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
xxx xxx xxx
-I-
xxx xxx xxx
There is no dispute that respondent was able to acquire vast resources of
confidential and delicate information on the facts and circumstances of [Civil
Case No. 97-9865] when Lumot A. Jalandoni was his client which knowledge
and information was acquired by virtue of lawyer-client relationship between
respondent and his clients. Using the said classified information which should
have been closely guarded respondent did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously conspired and confabulated with the Sps. Dennis and
Carmen J. Jalbuena in concocting the despicable and fabricated charges
against his former clients denominated as PP vs. Lumot A. Jalandoni, Pamela J.
Yulo, Cristina J. Lim and Leica J. Lim for viol. of Art. 172 of Revised Penal Code
due to a board resolution executed by the corporation which the Sps.
Jalbuena, with the assistance of herein respondent, claimed to have been
made without an actual board meeting due to an alleged lack of quorum,
[among other things]. Were it not for said fiduciary relation between client
and lawyer, respondent will not be in a position to furnish his conspirator
spouses with confidential information on Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, operator of
Alhambra Hotel.
- II -
Adding insult to injury, respondent opted to deliberately withhold the entire
case file including the marked exhibits of the Cabiles case for more than three
(3) months after his untimely unilateral withdrawal therefrom, despite
repeated demands from [his] client. On July 26, 1999, capitalizing on his
knowledge of the indispensability of said documents particularly the marked
exhibits, which deadline to file the formal offer of exhibits was continually
impressed upon the new counsel by the court, respondent suddenly
interposed an amount of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as consideration
prior to or simultaneous to the turnover of said documents. [On] July 29,
1999, left with no other alternative owing to the urgency of the situation, PRC
issued Check No. 2077686 for P5,000.00 in payment thereof. This was duly
received by respondents office on the same date. Such dilatory tactics
employed by respondent immensely weakened the case of Lumot A.
Jalandoni eventually resulting to (sic) an adverse decision against [her].
Further demonstrating before this Honorable Court the notoriety of
respondent in representing conflicting interest which extended even beyond
the family controversy was his improper appearance in court in Civil Case No.
99-10660, RE: Amy Albert Que vs. Penta Resorts Corp., this time favoring the
party opponent of defendant who is even outside the family circle. During the
pre-trial hearing conducted on May 5, 1999, while still [holding] exclusive
possession of the entire case file of his client in Civil Case No. 97-9865,
respondent brazenly positioned himself beside Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona,
counsel of plaintiff [in] a suit against his client Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC,
coaching said counsel on matters [he was privy to] as counsel of said
client. Facts mentioned by said counsel of the plaintiff starting from the last
par. of page 25 until and including the entire first par. of page 26 were the
exact words dictated by respondent. The entire incident was personally
witnessed by herein complainant [who was] only an arms length away from
them during the hearing. However, the particular portion showing the said
irregular acts of respondent was deliberately excluded by the court
stenographer from the transcript, despite her detailed recollection and
affirmation thereof to herein complainant. This prompted the new counsel of
Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC to complain to the court why Atty. Nicanor Villarosa
was coaching Atty. Pamplona in such proceedings. Said corrections were only
effected after repeated demands to reflect the actual events which
[transpired] on said pre-trial.[5] (emphasis ours)
In an addendum to the July 4, 2000 complaint, Lim also pointed to certain acts of respondent
which allegedly violated the Rules of Court ― perpetration of falsehood and abuse of his influence
as former public prosecutor. These supposedly affected the status of the cases that Lim filed
against the clients of respondent.[6]
In a motion to dismiss dated October 30, 2000, respondent claimed that the complainant violated
Circular No. 48-2000 because, in his verification, Lim stated:
 3. That [he] prepared this instant complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Nicanor V. Villarosa, read its contents, the same are all true and correct to
[his] own personal knowledge and belief.[7] (emphasis ours)
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that:
SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
(5a)
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains verification based on
information and belief or upon knowledge, information and belief, or lacks a
proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (As amended,
A.M. 00-2-10, May 1, 2000.) (emphasis ours)
While the Rules provide that an unsigned pleading produces no legal effect, [8] the court
may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it appears that the same was due to
mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. [9] We find that Lim was not shown to have
deliberately filed the pleading in violation of the Rules.
In his comment dated December 1, 2000, respondent, reiterating his ground for the dismissal of
the complaint, added:
[that] complainant Humberto C. Lim, Jr. has not only violated the Rule on Civil
Procedure but he was/is NOT duly authorize[d] by the Penta Resorts Corp.
(PRC) nor [by] Lumot A. Jalandoni to file this complaint against [him]. Neither
[was Lim] a proper party to file this complaint. This fact is an additional
ground to have his case dismissed because Humberto C. Lim Jr. exceeded
whatever authority was granted to him as embodied in a resolution and the
Special Power of Attorney allegedly granted to him by the complainants. [10]
To bolster his assertion that the complaint against him was unfounded, respondent presented the
following version in his defense:
FACTS OF THE CASE
xxx xxx xxx
That Mrs. Jalandoni has two sons-in-law, namely Dennis G. Jalbuena married
to her daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena, and Humberto C. Lim Jr., the herein
complainant married to her daughter, Cristina J. Lim.
That Mrs. Lumot Jalandoni organized a corporation namely the Penta Resorts
Corporation (PRC) where she owned almost ninety seven percent (97%). In
other words, in reality, Penta Resorts Corporation is a single proprietorship
belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni. That the only property of the corporation is as
above-stated, the Alhambra Hotel, constructed solely through the effort of
the spouses Jalbuena on that parcel of land now claimed by the Cabiles family.
That sometime on the year 1997 the case above-cited (Civil Case No. 97-9865)
was filed before the court against the sisters.
That [he], being RETAINED counsel of the spouses Dennis and
Carmen J. Jalbuena was RECOMMENDED by the spouses to the sisters to
answer the complaint filed against them.
II.
That as counsel to the sisters, [he] filed a Motion for Extension Of Time To File
Answer and ultimately, [he] filed an Answer With Counter-Claim And Prayer
For Issuance Of Writ Of Preliminary Injunction.
That reading the Answer it is clear that the defense of the sisters totally rest
on public documents (the various titles issued to the land in question because
of the series [of changes] in ownership) and the sisters and their parents
actual occupation and possession thereof. xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Lim[s] accusation against [him] in the light of the above-facts is the best
evidence of Humberto C. Lim, Jr.s penchant for exaggeration and distortion of
the truth. Since the defense of the sisters to retain ownership of the land in
question is based on PUBLIC documents, what delicate and confidential
matters involving personal circumstances of the sisters allegedly entrusted to
[him], is Mr. Humberto C. Lim, Jr. talking about in paragraphs I and II of his
Complaint? What [privity] to all transactions and affairs of the
corporation/hotel is he referring to? Whatever transactions the corporation
may have been involved in or [may be getting involved into], is totally
immaterial and irrelevant to the defense of the sisters.
There was nothing personal [about the] circumstances of the sisters nor
transactions of the corporation [which were] discussed. The documents being
offered as evidence, [he] reiterate[s] for emphasis, are public; the
presumption is that the whole world knows about them.
That [he] [also] vehemently den[ies] another distorted allegation of Mr. Lim
that [he] represented Mrs. Jalandoni [in] the entire proceedings of [the]
case. [Lim] himself attested that [he] [filed] [his] Motion to Withdraw As
Counsel, dated April 26, 1999 , before the trial court, sometime on April 27,
 1999. How then could [he] have represented Mrs. Jalandoni for
[the] entire proceedings of the case?
Further, Mr. Lim intentionally hid from this Honorable Court the important
fact that [his] Motion to Withdraw was APPROVED by the trial court because
of the possibility of a conflict of interest. xxx xxx xxx. [11]
Respondent discredited Lims claim that he deliberately withheld the records of the cited
civil case. He insisted that it took him just a few days, not three months, to turn over the records of
the case to Lim.[12] While he admitted an oversight in addressing the notice of the motion to
withdraw as counsel to Mrs. Totti Anlap Gargoles instead of Mrs. Jalandoni at Hotel Alhambra, he
maintained that it was the height of hypocrisy to allege that Mrs. Jalandoni was not aware of his
motion to withdraw[13] since Mrs. Gargoles is Mrs. Jalandonis sister and Hotel Alhambra is owned
by PRC which, in turn, actually belongs to Mrs. Jalandoni. Respondent also argued that no
prejudice was suffered by Mrs. Jalandoni because she was already represented by Atty. Lorenzo S.
Alminaza from the first hearing date. [14] In fact, respondent contended, it was he who was not
notified of the substitution of counsels.[15]
As to the bill of P 5,000, respondent stated:
That Mr. Lim begrudge[s] [him] for billing Mrs. Jalandoni Five
Thousand (Php5,000.00) Pesos. Mr. Humberto C. Lim Jr.
conveniently forgets that the net worth of the property together with its
improvements, under litigation in that Cabiles, et al. vs. Gargoles et al. case, is
a minimum of THIRTY MILLION (Php30,000,000.00) PESOS then, and more so
now. [He] cannot find any law which prohibits a counsel from billing a client
for services in proportion to the services he rendered. [16]
In view of these developments, respondent was adamant that:
the only real question to be answered in this complaint is why Mr. Lim so
consistently [determined] to immerse the Jalandoni family [in] a series of
criminal and civil suits and to block all attempts to reconcile the family by
prolonging litigations, complaints and filing of new ones in spite of the
RESOLUTION of the corporation and the UNDERTAKING of the members. [17]
On June 18, 2001, the Court resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro made the following report and
recommendation:
xxx xxx xxx
After going over the [pieces of evidence] submitted by the parties[,] the
undersigned noted that from the onset, PRC had a case wherein respondent
was its counsel. Later on, complainant had a case against spouses Jalbuena
where the parties were related to each other and the latter spouses were
represented by the respondent as their retained counsel; after respondent
had allegedly withdrawn as counsel for the complainant in Civil Case No. 97-
9865.
Being the husband of one of the complainants which respondent himself
averred in his answer, it is incumbent upon Humberto Lim Jr. to represent his
wife as one of the representatives of PRC and Alhambra Hotel in the
administrative complaint to protect not only her interest but that of the
[familys].
From the facts obtaining, it is evident that complainant had a lawyer-client
relationship with the respondent before the latter [was] retained as counsel
by the Spouses Jalbuena when the latter were sued by complainants
representative.
We cannot disregard the fact that on this situation for some reason or another
there existed some confidentiality and trust between complainants and
respondent to ensure the successful defense of their cases.
Respondent for having appeared as counsel for the Spouses Jalbuena when
charged by respondents former client Jalandoni of PRC and Alhambra Hotel,
represented conflicting interests in violation of the Canon of Professional
Responsibility.
As such therefore, the Undersigned has no alternative but to respectfully
recommend the suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months from receipt hereof.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Pasig City, June 20, 2002.[18]
The IBP Board of Governors (Board), however, reversed the recommendation of the investigating
commissioner and resolved to dismiss the case on August 3, 2002. [19] Lumot A. Jalandoni filed a
motion for reconsideration (MR) on October 18, 2002 but the Board denied the MR since it no
longer had jurisdiction to consider and resolve a matter already endorsed
to this Court.[20]
Before delving into the core issues of this case, we need to address some preliminary matters.
Respondent argues that the alleged resolution of PRC and the special power of attorney given by
Lumot A. Jalandoni to Humberto did not contemplate the filing of an administrative complaint.
[21]
Citing the Rules of Court, respondent said that:
 [s]uch complaints are personal in nature and therefore, the filing of the same,
cannot be delegated by the alleged aggrieved party to any third person unless
expressly authorized by law.
We must note, however, the following:
SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any
person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained
of and shall be supported by affidavits or persons having personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents a may
substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon referral by the
Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any
person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against any erring attorneys.
[22]
(emphasis ours)
Complaints against members of the Bar are pursued to preserve the integrity of the legal
profession, not for private vendetta. Thus, whoever has such personal knowledge of facts
constituting a cause of action against erring lawyers may file a verified complaint with the Court or
the IBP.[23] Corollary to the public interest in these proceedings is the following rule:
SEC. 11. Defects. No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the
proceeding or the Investigators Report shall be considered as substantial
unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds that
such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which
event the Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may
warrant, including invalidation of the entire proceedings. [24] (emphasis ours)
Respondent failed to substantiate his allegation that Lims complaint was defective in
form and substance, and that entertaining it would result in a miscarriage of justice. For the same
reason, we will no longer put in issue the filing at the onset of a motion to dismiss by respondent
instead of an answer or comment.[25]
The core issues before us now are:
1. whether there existed a conflict of interest in the cases represented
and handled by respondent, and
2. whether respondent properly withdrew his services as counsel of
record in Civil Case No. 97-9865.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing conflicting interests, breach of attorney-
client confidentiality and deliberate withholding of records were committed by respondent. To
effectively unravel the alleged conflict of interest, we must look into the cases involved.
In Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent represented Lumot A. Jalandoni and Totti Anlap
Gargoles. This was a case for the recovery of possession of property involving Hotel Alhambra, a
hotel owned by PRC.
In BC I.S. No. 99-2192, Lim v. Vicente Delfin, Spouses Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena,
respondent was counsel for Delfin and the spouses Jalbuena. In this case, plaintiff Cristina Lim sued
the spouses Jalbuena and Delfin on the basis of two checks issued by PRC for the construction of
Hotel Alhambra.[26] The corporate records allegedly reflected that the contractor, AAQ Sales and
Construction (AAQSC), was already paid in full yet Amy Albert Que of AAQSC still filed a collection
case against PRC for an unpaid balance.[27] In her complaint-affidavit, Cristina averred:
11. That it was respondent Carmen J. Jalbuena, who took advantage of [her]
signatures in blank in DBP Check Nos. 0865590 and 0865591, and who filled
up the spaces of the payee, date and amount without the knowledge and
consent of any officer of the corporation and [herself], after which she caused
the delivery of the same checks to her husband Dennis Jalbuena, who
encashed without [their] knowledge and consent, and received the proceeds
of the same checks (as evidenced by his signature in receipt of payment on
the dorsal side of the said checks) with the indispensable participation and
cooperation of respondent Vicente B. Delfin, the Asst. Vice President and
Branch Head of UCPB.[28]
Notably, in his comment, respondent stated:
There was a possibility of conflict of interest because by this time, or one
month before [he] filed [his] Motion to Withdraw, Mrs. Jalandoni /Penta
Resorts Corporation, Mr. Lim, through his wife, Cristina J. Lim, by another
counsel, Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza, filed a criminal complaint against the
spouses Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena on March 26, 1999 under BC-I.S. Case
No. 99-2192.[29]
Similarly, in BC I.S. Nos. 00-1370, 2000-2304, 2000-2343, 00-2125, 00-2230, 00-880,
respondent positioned himself against PRCs interests.
 And, in Civil Case No. 99-10660, a collection case against PRC, Atty. Alminaza of PRC was
alarmed by the appearance of respondent at the table in court for AAQSCs counsel. [30]
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) highlights the need for candor, fairness
and loyalty in all the dealings of lawyers with their clients. Rule 15.03 of the CPR aptly provides:
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full disclosure of facts that a
lawyer may appear against his client; otherwise, his representation of conflicting interests is
reprehensible.[31] Conflict of interest may be determined in this manner:
There is representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect
his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection.[32] (emphasis ours)
The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which confidential communications have
been confided but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. [33]
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
or double-dealing in the performance thereof, and also whether he will be
called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquire in the previous employment. The first part of the rule refers to cases
in which the opposing parties are present clients either in the same action or
in a totally unrelated case; the second part pertains to those in which the
adverse party against whom the attorney appears is his former client in a
matter which is related, directly or indirectly, to the present controversy.
[34]
(emphasis ours)
The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally
unrelated cases. The cases here directly or indirectly involved the parties connection to PRC, even
if neither PRC nor Lumot A. Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant in some of the cases
mentioned.
An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance. After being retained and
receiving the confidences of the client, he cannot, without the free and
intelligent consent of his client, act both for his client and for one whose
interest is adverse to, or conflicting with that of his client in the same general
matter. The prohibition stands even if the adverse interest is very slight;
neither is it material that the intention and motive of the attorney may have
been honest.[35] (emphasis ours)
The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the written consent of all
parties concerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional misconduct which
subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action.[36]
Even respondents alleged effort to settle the existing controversy among the family
members[37] was improper because the written consent of all concerned was still required. [38] A
lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it. [39]
WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97-9865
The next bone of contention was the propriety of respondents withdrawal as counsel for
Lumot A. Jalandoni in Civil Case No. 97-9865 to fulfill an alleged retainership agreement with the
spouses Jalbuena in a suit by PRC, through Cristina Lim, against the Jalbuenas and Delfin (BC I.S.
No. 99-2192). In his December 1, 2000 comment, respondent stated that it was he who was not
notified of the hiring of Atty. Alminaza as the new counsel in that case and that he withdrew from
the case with the knowledge of Lumot A. Jalandoni and with leave of court.
The rule on termination of attorney-client relations may be summarized as follows:
The relation of attorney and client may be terminated by the client, by the
lawyer or by the court, or by reason of circumstances beyond the control of
 the client or the lawyer.The termination of the attorney-client relationship
entails certain duties on the part of the client and his lawyer. [40]
Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the
relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted. Canon 22 of the CPR reads:
Canon 22 A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon
notice appropriate in the circumstances.
An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of
the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name
of the new lawyer is recorded in the case. [41] A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without
the written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court. [42] He must serve a
copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three days before the date set for
hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a mere scrap of paper.[43]Respondent
made no such move. He admitted that he withdrew as counsel on April 26, 1999, which withdrawal
was supposedly approved by the court on April 28, 1999. The conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was
only presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of the appearance of Atty. Alminaza in court, supposedly
in his place.
[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause and
thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. Thus,
it has been held that a client is free to change his counsel in a pending case
and thereafter retain another lawyer to represent him. That manner of
changing a lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed.
Nor does it require approval of the court. [44]
The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent but
to act as additional counsel.[45] Mrs. Jalandonis conformity to having an additional lawyer did not
necessarily mean conformity to respondents desire to withdraw as counsel. Respondents
speculations on the professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support
in the records of this case.
Respondent should not have presumed that his motion to withdraw as counsel [46] would
be granted by the court. Yet, he stopped appearing as Mrs. Jalandonis counsel beginning April 28,
1999, the first hearing date. No order from the court was shown to have actually granted his
motion for withdrawal. Only an order dated June 4, 1999 had a semblance of granting his motion:
When this case was called for hearing Atty. Lorenzo Alminaza appeared for the
defendants considering that Atty. Nicanor Villarosa has already withdrawn
his appearance in this case which the Court considered it to be approved as
it bears the conformity of the defendants. [47] (emphasis ours)
That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty. Alminazas professional engagement on her behalf despite
respondents withdrawal did not absolve the latter of the consequences of his unprofessional
conduct, specially in view of the conflicting interests already discussed. Respondent himself stated
that his withdrawal from Civil Case No. 97-9865 was due to the possibility of a conflict of interest.
[48]
Be that as it may, the records do not support the claim that respondent improperly
collected P5,000 from petitioner. Undoubtedly, respondent provided professional services to
Lumot A. Jalandoni. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the documents belonging to Mrs.
Jalandoni were deliberately withheld. The right of an attorney to retain possession of a clients
documents, money or other property which may have lawfully come into his possession in his
professional capacity, until his lawful fees and disbursements have been fully paid, is well-
established.[49]
Finally, we express our utter dismay with Lims apparent use of his wifes community tax
certificate number in his complaint for disbarment against respondent. [50] This is not, however, the
forum to discuss this lapse.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby
found GUILTY of violating Canon 15 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective upon receipt of this decision, with
aSTERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be entered into the records of respondent and furnished to the Office
of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all
courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
 (1) a special power of attorney dated 1 July 1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his brother,
Raleigh Falame, appointing the latter to be his attorney-in-fact; and (2) the affidavit of Raleigh
WE CONCUR: Falame dated 23 July 1988, executed before respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned
the property subject of the first civil case. [4]

Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City had ruled in favor of
REYNATO S. PUNO the defendants in the first civil case, Lydio retained the services of respondent as his legal adviser
Associate Justice and counsel for his businesses until Lydios death on 8 September 1996.[5]
Chairperson
However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame,
respondent filed a case against complainants allegedly involving the property subject of the first
civil case, entitled Spouses Rally F. Falame and Noemi F. Falame v. Melba A. Falame, Leo A. Falame,
Falame v. Baguio AC No. 6876 March 7, 2008 Jerry A. Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporations, their representatives,
HEIRS OF LYDIO JERRY ADM. CASE NO. 6876 agents and persons acting in their behalf and docketed as Civil Case No. 5568 (the second civil
FALAME, namely: MELBA case) before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6. The complaint sought the
FALAME, LEO FALAME and Present: declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, Transfer Certificate
JERRY FALAME, of Title No. 20241 issued as a consequence of the registration of the deed of sale, and the real
Complainants, CARPIO, J., estate mortgage on the said property. Alternatively, it prayed for specific performance and
Acting Chairperson, reconveyance or legal redemption and damages with preliminary injunction and restraining order. [6]
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,*
- versus - TINGA, and Firstly, complainants maintained that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second
VELASCO, JR., JJ. civil case wherein they were impleaded as defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and
ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, duty as an attorney. Plainly, they contended that the spouses Falames interests are adverse to
Respondent. Promulgated: those of his former client, Lydio.[7]
March 7, 2008
Secondly, complainants claimed that respondent knowingly made false statements of fact in the
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x complaint in the second civil case to mislead the trial court. In so doing, respondent violated
paragraph (d), Section 20[8] of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,[9] complainants asserted further.

RESOLUTION Lastly, complainants alleged that the second civil case is a

baseless and fabricated suit which respondent filed as counsel for complainants uncle
TINGA, J.: against the heirs of respondentsdeceased client. Specifically,
they averred that respondent filed the case for the sole purpose of
retaining, maintaining and/or withholding the
On Petition for Review [1] is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Lydio Jerry Falame possession of the subject property from complainants who are its true owners. Complainants
(complainants) against Atty. Edgar J. Baguio (respondent), docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1191. concluded that respondent violated paragraph (g), Section 20 [10] of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
[11]

In their Complaint[2] against respondent, complainants alleged that on 15 July 1991, their father,
the late Lydio Jerry Falame (Lydio), engaged the services of respondent to represent him in an
action for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. A-2694 (the first civil case) and entitled Heirs of
Emilio T. Sy, represented by Anastacia Velayo Vda. De Sy and Belen V. Sy vs. Lydio Jerry
Falame, Raleigh Falame and Four (4) John Does, in which Lydio was one of the defendants.[3]
Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the answer to the
complaint in the first civil case. Subsequently, when the parties to the first civil case were required
to file their respective position papers, respondent used and submitted in evidence the following:
In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, [12] respondent controverted complainants allegations. He
emphasizes that it was only Raleigh Falame who personally engaged his legal services for him and
on Lydios behalf and that, in fact, it was Raleigh who paid him the attorneys fees. He also stated
that he signed the jurat in Raleighs affidavit, which was submitted as evidence in the first civil case,
believing to the best of his knowledge that there is good ground to support it. Insisting that he did
not betray the confidence reposed in him by Lydio as the latters counsel in the first civil
case, respondent maintained that he did not reveal or use any fact he acquired knowledge of
during the existence of the attorney-client relation in the first civil case as he had never even
conferred with nor talked to Lydio in the first place. Respondent likewise contended that he did not
knowingly make any misleading or untruthful statement of fact in the complaint in the second civil
case and neither did he employ any means inconsistent with truth and honor in the hearing of the
case.[13]
Respondent vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as counsel in any case or
transaction. Stressing the long interval of twelve years separating the termination of the first civil
case and his acceptance of the second civil case, respondent pointed out that the first civil case
was not between Lydio and Raleigh but rather between the heirs of Emilio T. Sy on one hand
and Lydio and Raleigh on the other where physical possession of property was at stake.
Respondent further averred that in contrast the second civil case is one involving the spouses
Raleigh and Noemi Falame as plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr., all surnamed Falame,
and Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporation, as defendantsa case which arose from
the wrongful acts committed by Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr. after Lydios death. [14]
Respondent maintained that since the second civil case was still pending before the trial court, the
IBP had no jurisdiction over the instant administrative case. He added that complainants filed this
administrative case when Raleigh could no longer testify in his own favor as he had died a year
earlier.[15]
In their Position Paper [16] dated 7 September 2004, in addition to their previous charges against
respondent, complainants claimed that respondent violated Rule 15.03 [17] of the Code
of Professional Responsibility when he represented the cause of the spouses Falame against that of
his former client, Lydio.[18]
On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-167 adopting and
approving Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuans report and recommendation for the
dismissal of this administrative case, thus:[19]
x x x The charge lacks specification as to what part of the lawyers oath was
violated by the respondent and what confidence was disclosed. The
complainants may have in mind the prohibition against disclosure of secret
information learned in confidence, but there is no specification in the
complaint what secret or information learned in confidence under Civil Case
No. A-2694 was disclosed or will be disclosed by respondent in Civil Case No.
5568. In administrative complaints for disbarment or suspension against
lawyers, the complainant must specify in the affidavit-complaint the alleged
secrets or confidential information disclosed or will be disclosed in the
professional employment (Uy v. Gonzalez, 426 SCRA 422; 431). In the absence
of such specification, the complaint must fail.
In the complaint, there is no specific charge against respondent for violation
of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility about the
prohibition against representation of conflicting interest. So, the allegation in
paragraph 1, page 8 and 9 of complainants position paper stating: With all
due respect, it is submitted that respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot be countenanced. The reason
being that it is an elementary principle of due process to which the
respondent is entitled that only those charged in the complaint can be proved
by the complainants. A charge not specified in the complaint cannot be
proved (Uy v. Gonzales, id.)
x x x But still this charge will not proper for lack of sufficient bases.
xxx
Civil Case No. 5568, which was commenced on 03 October 2000, or three
years since the complainants became owners of Lydio Falames properties, is a
suit against the complainants, not as representatives of Lydio Falame, but as
owners of their respective aliquot interests in the property in question (Gayon
v. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104; 107-108). The complainants are sued not on the basis
of the acts, rights, obligations and interest of Lydio Falame on the material
possession of the improvements found on Lot 345 litigated in Civil Case No. A-
2694 nor even on such land itself, but rather on the facts alleged in the
second amended and supplemental complaint which give rise to their cause
of action against them.
While the complainants could not specify under what circumstances the
respondent committed [the] alleged breach of confidence, breach of secrecy
or revelation of secret or confidential information[,] the respondent has
shown that he did not commit any violation of such duties or obligations of an
attorney.
It is clear that only Raleigh Falame engaged the legal services of the
respondent for his and Lydio Falames defense in Civil Case No. A-2694.
xxx
The other allegations of the complainants that the respondent violated
paragraph (d), Section 20 of Rule 139, Rules of Court, and his lawyers oath
when he allegedly betrayed the trust and confidence of his former client by
denying knowledge of the fact that the land was owned by Lydio Falame and
when he did not disclose to the Court that at one time his present clients
categorically declared and unconditionally recognized the full ownership of
the late Lydio Falame and complainant Melba Falame over subject matter of
both cases equally lacks evidentiary basis.
xxx
It is beyond the competence of the complainants to conclude and is outside
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Commission to rule as to whether or nor
(sic) the complaint in Civil Case No.5568 is baseless or fabricated. It is only the
Honorable Court which has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the same
and cannot be the subject of an administrative complaint against the
respondent.
xxx
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended
that this complaint be dismissed on grounds of prescription, the same having
been filed four (4) years after the alleged misconduct took place and for lack
of merit.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[20]
Dissatisfied, complainants filed the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
reiterating their allegations in the complaint and their position paper. [21] They likewise assert that
the IBP erred in holding that the instant administrative complaint had been filed out of time since
it was filed on 16 January 2004, or three (3) years, four (4) months and sixteen (16) days after the
second civil case was filed on 23 October 2000. [22] In addition, in their Consolidated Comment
(should be Consolidated Reply), [23]complainants invoke the Courts ruling in Frias v. Bautista-
Lozada[24] to support their contention that administrative complaints against members of the bar
do not prescribe.[25]
In his Comment, [26] respondent principally maintains that the charges imputed to him have never
been proven by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence which is the quantum of proof required
in administrative cases against lawyers, and that complainants have the burden to prove their
accusations as he enjoys the presumption of innocence. [27] Respondent likewise asserts that in
accusing him of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility only in their
position paper and in the instant petition, complainants infringed his right to due process and to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. [28]
There is merit in the petition.
At the outset, the Court holds that the instant administrative action is not barred by prescription.
As early as 1947, the Court held in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo,[29] to wit:
The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment
proceedings, nor does the circumstance that the facts set up as a ground for
disbarment constitute a crime, prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding
is barred by limitation, affect the disbarment proceeding x x x (5 AM. JUR.
434)[30]
This doctrine was reaffirmed in the relatively recent case of Frias v. Bautista-Lozada[31] where the
Court held that Rule VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP, which provides for a
prescriptive period for the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers, should be struck
down as void and of no legal effect for being ultra vires.[32]
Prescinding from the unavailability of the defense of prescription, the Court concurs with the
Investigating Commissioners opinion that some of the charges raised by complainants in their
complaint are unsubstantiated.
There is, however, sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. While this charge was not raised in the initiatory pleading, it
was put forward in complainants position paper filed with the IBP and in the petition filed with the
Court. In fact, respondent proffered his defenses to the charge in his position paper before the IBP
and likewise in his comment before the Court. In his very first pleading before the IBP, the answer
with motion to dismiss, he denied having Lydio as his client. Such absence of attorney-client
relationship is the essential element of his defense to the charge of conflict of interest, as
articulated in his subsequent submissions.
The Court, therefore, rules and so holds that respondent has been adequately apprised
of and heard on the issue. In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not
connote full adversarial proceedings. Actual adversarial proceedings only become necessary for
clarification when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague
testimonies. Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments. [33]
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. [34] The test is whether, on behalf
of one client, it is the lawyers duty to contest for that which his duty to another client requires him
to oppose or when the possibility of such situation will develop. [35] The rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used.[36] In addition, the rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or
merely probable or the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent
conflicting interests.[37]
The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that
representation will be directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a
lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related
matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after
consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. [38] In the course of a lawyer-
client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the
weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. [39]
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The clients confidence once reposed
should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment. Even after the severance of
the relation, a lawyer should not do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any
matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the clients
confidences acquired in the previous relation. [40]
In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
His highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to
himself.[41] The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination
of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining
another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
[42]

In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants
in the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent was
established despite the fact that it was only Raleigh who paid him. The case of Hilado v.
David[43] tells us that it is immaterial whether such employment was paid, promised or charged for.
[44]
As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the stance
that Lydio solely owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the
same property, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent
position that Raleigh owned the same property in common with Lydio, with complainants, who
inherited the property, committing acts which debase respondents rights as a co-owner.
The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydios death or through the
completion of the specific task for which respondent was employed is not reason for respondent to
advocate a position opposed to that of Lydio.[45] Precedents tell us that even after the termination
of his employment, an attorney may not act as counsel against his client in the same general
matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could
operate to his clients disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment. [46] And while
complainants have never been respondents clients, they derive their rights to the property
from Lydios ownership of it which respondent maintained in the first civil case.
For representing Raleighs cause which is adverse to that of his former clientRaleighs supposed co-
ownership of the subject property respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Having
previously undertaken joint representation of Lydio and Raleigh, respondent should have diligently
studied and anticipated the
potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, disciplinary action is warranted. [47] Heretofore,
respondent is enjoined to look at any representation situation from the point of view that there are
possible conflicts; and further, to think in terms of impaired loyalty that is to evaluate if his
representation in any way will impair loyalty to a client. [48]Considering, however, that this is
respondents first offense, the Court resolves to reprimand respondent, with admonition to observe
a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. [49]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests
and meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND. He is further admonished to observe a higher degree of
fidelity in the practice of his profession and to bear in mind that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez AC No. 8243 En Banc July 24, 2009
ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR., A.C. No. 8243
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,*
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
Promulgated:
ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ, July 24, 2009
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case stems from an administrative complaint [1] filed by Rolando Pacana, Jr. against
Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez charging the latter with flagrant violation of the provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. [2] Complainant alleges that respondent committed acts constituting
conflict of interest, dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure to render an accounting of all the
money and properties received by her from complainant.
On January 2, 2002, complainant was the Operations Director for Multitel
Communications Corporation (MCC). MCC is an affiliate company of Multitel International Holdings
Corporation (Multitel). Sometime in July 2002, MCC changed its name to Precedent
Communications Corporation (Precedent).[3]
According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by demand letters from
its members and investors because of the failure of its investment schemes. He alleges that he
earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock
of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos
(P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank.
Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also happened to be a
member of the Couples for Christ, a religious organization where complainant and his wife were
also active members. From then on, complainant and respondent constantly communicated, with
the former disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedents relation with
Multitel. Respondent gave legal advice to complainant and even helped him prepare standard
quitclaims for creditors. In sum, complainant avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established
between him and respondent although no formal document was executed by them at that time. A
Retainer Agreement[4] dated January 15, 2003 was proposed by respondent. Complainant,
however, did not sign the said agreement because respondent verbally asked for One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as acceptance fee and a 15% contingency fee upon collection of the
overpayment made by Multitel to Benefon, [5] a telecommunications company based
inFinland. Complainant found the proposed fees to be prohibitive and not within his means.
[6]
Hence, the retainer agreement remained unsigned.[7]

After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter from
respondent[8] asking for the return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by respondents
clients in Multitel. When complainant confronted respondent about the demand letter, the latter
explained that she had to send it so that her clients defrauded investors of Multitel would know
that she was doing something for them and assured complainant that there was nothing to worry
about.[9]
Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the
persistent demands made by Multitel investors against complainant. On these occasions,
respondent impressed upon complainant that she can closely work with officials of the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), the Bureau of Immigration and Deportations (BID), [10] and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)[11] to resolve complainants problems. Respondent also convinced complainant
that in order to be absolved from any liability with respect to the investment scam, he must be
able to show to the DOJ that he was willing to divest any and all of his interests in Precedent
including the funds assigned to him by Multitel. [12]
Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for safekeeping to be used
only for his case whenever necessary. Complainant agreed and gave her an initial amount
of P900,000.00 which was received by respondent herself. [13] Sometime thereafter, complainant
again gave respondent P1,000,000.00.[14] Said amounts were all part of Precedents collections and
sales proceeds which complainant held as assignee of the companys properties. [15]
When complainant went to the United States (US), he received several messages from
respondent sent through electronic mail (e-mail) and short messaging system (SMS, or text
messages) warning him not to return to the Philippines because Rosario Baladjay, president of
Multitel, was arrested and that complainant may later on be implicated in Multitels failed
investment system. Respondent even said that ten (10) arrest warrants and a hold departure order
had been issued against him. Complainant, thereafter, received several e-mail messages from
respondent updating him of the status of the case against Multitel and promised that she will settle
the matter discreetly with government officials she can closely work with in order to clear
complainants name.[16] In two separate e-mail messages, [17] respondent again asked money from
complainant, P200,000 of which was handed by complainants wife while respondent was confined
in Saint Lukes Hospital after giving birth,[18] and another P700,000 allegedly to be given to the NBI.
[19]
Through respondents persistent promises to settle all complainants legal problems,
respondent was able to convince complainant who was still in the US to execute a deed of
assignment in favor of respondent allowing the latter to retrieve 178 boxes containing cellular
phones and accessories stored in complainants house and inside a warehouse. [20] He also signed a
blank deed of sale authorizing respondent to sell his 2002 Isuzu Trooper. [21]
Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to handle his legal
problems, complainant was advised by his family to hire another lawyer. When respondent knew
about this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows:
Dear Butchie,
Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as
your friend and lawyer. The charges are all non-bailable but all the same as
the SEC report I told you before. The findings are the same, i.e. your company
was the front for the fraud of Multitel and that funds were provided you.
I anticipated this, that is why I really pushed for a quitclaim. Rolly is willing to
return the Crosswind, laptap (sic) and [P]alm [P]ilot. Manny Cancio really
helped. Anthony na lang. Then, I will need the accounting of all the funds you
received from the sale of the phones, every employees and directors[]
quitclaim (including yours), the funds transmitted to the clients through me,
the funds you utilized, and whatelse (sic) is still unremitted, every centavo
must be accounted for as DOJ and NBI can have the account opened.
I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit with Real [B]ank and the trust
given [to] you. So we can inform them [that] it was not touched by you.
I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco
Pimentel. I know him very well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no
problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. In this
cases (sic), you cannot be highprofile (sic) because it is the clients who will be
sacrificed at the expense of the fame of the lawyer. I have to work quietly and
discreetly. No funfare. Just like what I did for your guys in the SEC. I have to
work with people I am comfortable with. Efren Santos will sign as your
lawyer although I will do all the work. He can help with all his connections.
Vals friend in the NBI is the one is (sic) charge of organized crime who is the
entity (sic) who has your warrant. My law partner was the state prosecutor for
financial fraud. Basically we have it covered in all aspects and all departments.
I am just trying to liquidate the phones I have allotted for you s ana (sic) for
your trooper kasiwhether we like it or not, we have to give this
agencies (sic) to make our work easier according to Val. The funds with Mickey
are already accounted in the quit claims (sic) as attorneys (sic)fees. I hope he
will be able to send it so we have funds to work with.
As for your kids, legally they can stay here but recently, it is the children
who (sic) the irate clients and government officials harass and kidnap to make
the individuals they want to come out from hiding (sic). I do not want that to
happen. Things will be really easier on my side.
Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you
hire Coco, I will give him the free hand to work with your case. Please trust
me. I have never let you down, have I? I told you this will happen but we are
ready and prepared. The clients who received the phones will stand by you
and make you the hero in this scandal. I will stand by you always. This is my
expertise. TRUST me! That is all. You have an angel on your side. Always pray
though to the best legal mind up there. You will be ok!
Candy[22]
On July 4, 2003, contrary to respondents advice, complainant returned to the country.
On the eve of his departure from the United States, respondent called up complainant and
conveniently informed him that he has been cleared by the NBI and the BID. [23]
 About a month thereafter, respondent personally met with complainant and his wife and
told them that she has already accumulated P12,500,000.00 as attorneys fees and was willing to
give P2,000,000.00 to complainant in appreciation for his help. Respondent allegedly told
complainant that without his help, she would not have earned such amount. Overwhelmed and
relieved, complainant accepted respondents offer but respondent, later on, changed her mind and
told complainant that she would instead invest theP2,000,000.00 on his behalf in a business
venture. Complainant declined and explained to respondent that he and his family needed the
money instead to cover their daily expenses as he was no longer employed. Respondent allegedly
agreed, but she failed to fulfill her promise.[24]
Respondent even publicly announced in their religious organization that she was able to
help settle the ten (10) warrants of arrest and hold departure order issued against complainant and
narrated how she was able to defend complainant in the said cases. [25]
By April 2004, however, complainant noticed that respondent was evading him.
Respondent would either refuse to return complainants call or would abruptly terminate their
telephone conversation, citing several reasons. This went on for several months. [26] In one instance,
when complainant asked respondent for an update on the collection of Benefons obligation to
Precedent which respondent had previously taken charge of, respondent arrogantly answered that
she was very busy and that she would read Benefons letter only when she found time to do so.
On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with respondents arrogance and
evasiveness, complainant wrote respondent a letter formally asking for a full accounting of all the
money, documents and properties given to the latter. [27] Respondent rendered an accounting
through a letter dated December 20, 2004.[28] When complainant found respondents explanation to
be inadequate, he wrote a latter expressing his confusion about the accounting. [29] Complainant
repeated his request for an audited financial report of all the properties turned over to her;
otherwise, he will be constrained to file the appropriate case against respondent. [30] Respondent
replied,[31] explaining that all the properties and cash turned over to her by complainant had been
returned to her clients who had money claims against Multitel. In exchange for this, she said that
she was able to secure quitclaim documents clearing complainant from any liability. [32] Still
unsatisfied, complainant decided to file an affidavit-complaint [33] against respondent before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment
of respondent.
In her Answer-Affidavit, [34] respondent vehemently denied being the lawyer for
Precedent. She maintained that no formal engagement was executed between her and
complainant. She claimed that she merely helped complainant by providing him with legal advice
and assistance because she personally knew him, since they both belonged to the same religious
organization.[35]
Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel and that she
merely mediated in the settlement of the claims her clients had against the complainant. She also
averred that the results of the settlement between both parties were fully documented and
accounted for.[36] Respondent believes that her act in helping complainant resolve his legal problem
did not violate any ethical standard and was, in fact, in accord with Rule 2.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[37]
To bolster her claim that the complaint was without basis, respondent noted that a
complaint for estafa was also filed against her by complainant before the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Quezon City citing the same grounds. The complaint was, however, dismissed by
Assistant City Prosecutor Josephus Joannes H. Asis for insufficiency of evidence. [38] Respondent
argued that on this basis alone, the administrative case must also be dismissed.
In her Position Paper,[39] respondent also questioned the admissibility of the electronic
evidence submitted by complainant to the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent
maintained that the e-mail and the text messages allegedly sent by respondent to complainant
were of doubtful authenticity and should be excluded as evidence for failure to conform to the
Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).
After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a Report and
Recommendation[40] finding that a lawyer-client relationship was established between respondent
and complainant despite the absence of a written contract. The Investigating Commissioner also
declared that respondent violated her duty to be candid, fair and loyal to her client when she
allowed herself to represent conflicting interests and failed to render a full accounting of all the
cash and properties entrusted to her. Based on these grounds, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended her disbarment.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,[41] but the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Recommendation[42] denying the motion and adopting the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner.
The case now comes before this Court for final action.
We affirm the findings of the IBP.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste [43] and, more
importantly, upon necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the
facts connected with the clients case, including its weak and strong points. Such knowledge must
be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given to him to take
advantage of his client; for if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss
thereof.[44] It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double ─ dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. [45] It is for
these reasons that we have described the attorney-client relationship as one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.[46]
Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating
with complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel,
eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot shield
herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she
rendered to complainant was only in the form of friendly accommodations, [47] precisely because at
the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the
opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC. [48]
 Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no
written contract for the engagement of her services was ever forged between her and
complainant.[49] This argument all the more reveals respondents patent ignorance of fundamental
laws on contracts and of basic ethical standards expected from an advocate of justice. The IBP was
correct when it said:
The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that
there was a professional relationship between the parties. Documentary
formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the
contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient
that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any
matter pertinent to his profession.[50] (Emphasis supplied.)
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have
done was either to advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was
already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel
investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that
would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,[51] we explained the concept of conflict of interest, thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of
two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be
called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.[52]
Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainants hapless situation, initially, by
giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter,
respondent impressed upon complainant that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him
divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But
simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants
against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel.
Respondent herself admitted to complainant that without the latters help, she would not have
been able to earn as much and that, as a token of her appreciation, she was willing to share some
of her earnings with complainant.[53] Clearly, respondents act is shocking, as it not only violated
Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [54] but also toyed with decency and
good taste.
Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client had ever complained
of respondents unethical behavior. [55] This remark indubitably displays respondents gross ignorance
of disciplinary procedure in the Bar. As a member of the Bar, she is expected to know that
proceedings for disciplinary actions against any lawyer may be initiated and prosecuted by the IBP
Board of Governors, motu proprio or upon referral by this Court or by the Board of Officers of an
IBP Chapter[56] even if no private individual files any administrative complaint.
Upon review, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of
the IBP Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, on the admissibility
of the electronic evidence submitted by complainant. We, accordingly, adopt the same in toto.
Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to
disbar her on the grounds of deceit, malpractice and other gross misconduct, aside from violation
of the Lawyers Oath, has been rendered moot and academic by voluntary termination of her IBP
membership, allegedly after she had been placed under the Department of Justices Witness
Protection Program.[57] Convenient as it may be for respondent to sever her membership in the
integrated bar, this Court cannot allow her to do so without resolving first this administrative case
against her.
The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is necessary in order
to determine the degree of her culpability and liability to complainant. The case may not be
dismissed or rendered moot and academic by respondents act of voluntarily terminating her
membership in the Bar regardless of the reason for doing so. This is because membership in the
Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. [58] The conduct of a lawyer may make him or her civilly,
if not criminally, liable to his client or to third parties, and such liability may be conveniently
avoided if this Court were to allow voluntary termination of membership. Hence, to terminate ones
membership in the Bar voluntarily, it is imperative that the lawyer first prove that the voluntary
withdrawal of membership is not a ploy to further prejudice the public or to evade liability. No
such proof exists in the present case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby DISBARRED for
representing conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in
violation of her Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar,
and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Palm v. Iledan AC No. 8242 October 2, 2009
REBECCA J. PALM, A.C. No. 8242
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, JR., Promulgated:
Respondent. October 2, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The case before the Court is a disbarment proceeding filed by Rebecca J. Palm (complainant)
against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. (respondent) for revealing information obtained in the course of an
attorney-client relationship and for representing an interest which conflicted with that of his
former client, Comtech Worldwide Solutions Philippines, Inc. (Comtech).
The Antecedent Facts
Complainant is the President of Comtech, a corporation engaged in the business of computer
software development. From February 2003 to November 2003, respondent served as Comtechs
retained corporate counsel for the amount of P6,000 per month as retainer fee. From September
to October 2003, complainant personally met with respondent to review corporate matters,
including potential amendments to the corporate by-laws. In a meeting held on 1 October 2003,
respondent suggested that Comtech amend its corporate by-laws to allow participation during
board meetings, through teleconference, of members of the Board of Directors who were outside
the Philippines.
Prior to the completion of the amendments of the corporate by-laws, complainant became
uncomfortable with the close relationship between respondent and Elda Soledad (Soledad), a
former officer and director of Comtech, who resigned and who was suspected of releasing
unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds. Thus, Comtech decided to terminate its retainer
agreement with respondent effective November 2003.
In a stockholders meeting held on 10 January 2004, respondent attended as proxy for Gary
Harrison (Harrison). Steven C. Palm (Steven) and Deanna L. Palm, members of the Board of
Directors, were present through teleconference. When the meeting was called to order,
respondent objected to the meeting for lack of quorum. Respondent asserted that Steven and
Deanna Palm could not participate in the meeting because the corporate by-laws had not yet been
amended to allow teleconferencing.
On 24 March 2004, Comtechs new counsel sent a demand letter to Soledad to return or account
for the amount of P90,466.10 representing her unauthorized disbursements when she was the
Corporate Treasurer of Comtech. On 22 April 2004, Comtech received Soledads reply, signed by
respondent. In July 2004, due to Soledads failure to comply with Comtech's written demands,
Comtech filed a complaint for Estafa against Soledad before the Makati Prosecutors Office. In the
proceedings before the City Prosecution Office of Makati, respondent appeared as Soledads
counsel.
On 26 January 2005, complainant filed a Complaint[1] for disbarment against respondent before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
In his Answer,[2] respondent alleged that in January 2002, Soledad consulted him on process and
procedure in acquiring property. In April 2002, Soledad again consulted him about the legal
requirements of putting up a domestic corporation. In February 2003, Soledad engaged his services
as consultant for Comtech. Respondent alleged that from February to October 2003, neither
Soledad nor Palm consulted him on confidential or privileged matter concerning the operations of
the corporation. Respondent further alleged that he had no access to any record of Comtech.
Respondent admitted that during the months of September and October 2003, complainant met
with him regarding the procedure in amending the corporate by-laws to allow board members
outside the Philippines to participate in board meetings.
Respondent further alleged that Harrison, then Comtech President, appointed him as proxy during
the 10 January 2004 meeting. Respondent alleged that Harrison instructed him to observe the
conduct of the meeting. Respondent admitted that he objected to the participation of Steven and
Deanna Palm because the corporate by-laws had not yet been properly amended to allow the
participation of board members by teleconferencing.
Respondent alleged that there was no conflict of interest when he represented Soledad in the case
for Estafa filed by Comtech. He alleged that Soledad was already a client before he became a
consultant for Comtech. He alleged that the criminal case was not related to or connected with the
limited procedural queries he handled with Comtech.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation dated 28 March 2006, [3] the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and of representing interest in conflict with that of Comtech as his former client.
The IBP-CBD ruled that there was no doubt that respondent was Comtechs retained counsel from
February 2003 to November 2003. The IBP-CBD found that in the course of the meetings for the
intended amendments of Comtechs corporate by-laws, respondent obtained knowledge about the
intended amendment to allow members of the Board of Directors who were outside the
Philippines to participate in board meetings through teleconferencing. The IBP-CBD noted that
respondent knew that the corporate by-laws have not yet been amended to allow the
teleconferencing. Hence, when respondent, as representative of Harrison, objected to the
participation of Steven and Deanna Palm through teleconferencing on the ground that the
corporate by-laws did not allow the participation, he made use of a privileged information he
obtained while he was Comtechs retained counsel.
The IBP-CBD likewise found that in representing Soledad in a case filed by Comtech, respondent
represented an interest in conflict with that of a former client. The IBP-CBD ruled that the fact that
respondent represented Soledad after the termination of his professional relationship with
Comtech was not an excuse.
The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year,
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that
herein respondent be found guilty of the charges preferred against him and be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. [4]
In Resolution No. XVII-2006-583[5] passed on 15 December 2006, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification
by suspending respondent from the practice of law for two years.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. [6]
In an undated Recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors First Division found that respondents
motion for reconsideration did not raise any new issue and was just a rehash of his previous
arguments. However, the IBP Board of Governors First Division recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for only one year.
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-703 passed on 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors First Division. The IBP
Board of Governors denied respondents motion for reconsideration but reduced his suspension
from two years to one year.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the present case to this Court as provided under Section
12(b), Rule 139-B[7] of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of this Court
We cannot sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Violation of the Confidentiality
of Lawyer-Client Relationship
Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 21. A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client
even after the attorney-client relationship is terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the IBP that in the course of complainants consultations, respondent obtained the
information about the need to amend the corporate by-laws to allow board members outside the
Philippines to participate in board meetings through teleconferencing. Respondent himself
admitted this in his Answer.
However, what transpired on 10 January 2004 was not a board meeting but a stockholders
meeting. Respondent attended the meeting as proxy for Harrison. The physical presence of a
stockholder is not necessary in a stockholders meeting because a member may vote by proxy
unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or by-laws. [8] Hence, there was no need
for Steven and Deanna Palm to participate through teleconferencing as they could just have sent
their proxies to the meeting.
In addition, although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate by-laws may
have been given to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential information. The
amendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws may be effected by the board of directors or
trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and the owners of at least a majority of the outstanding
capital stock, or at least a majority of members of a non-stock corporation. [9] It means the
stockholders are aware of the proposed amendments to the by-laws. While the power may be
delegated to the board of directors or trustees, there is nothing in the records to show that a
delegation was made in the present case. Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new
by-laws is made, copies of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articles of incorporation and by-laws.
[10]
The documents are public records and could not be considered confidential.
It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality.[11] The client must intend the communication to be confidential. [12]Since the
proposed amendments must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and copies
of the amended by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not have been
intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders
meeting could not be considered a violation of his clients secrets and confidence within the
contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Representing Interest in Conflict
With the Interest of a Former Client
The IBP found respondent guilty of representing an interest in conflict with that of a former client,
in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
We do not agree with the IBP.
In Quiambao v. Bamba,[13] the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests.
One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former
client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.
[14]
The Court has ruled that what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the clients
confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in
which he previously represented him.[15]
We find no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed by
Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech
against its former officer. There was nothing in the records that would show that respondent
used against Comtech any confidential information acquired while he was still Comtechs
retained counsel. Further, respondent made the representation after the termination of his
retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. [16] The intent of the
law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated.[17] On 10 July 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. [4]
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. for lack of merit.
On 27 July 2003, she received a copy of a Motion for Consolidation [5] filed by respondent for and on
SO ORDERED. behalf of Ms. Koa, the accused in the criminal cases, and the latters daughter Karen Torralba (Ms.
Torralba). Further, on 8 August 2003, respondent appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa before the
Castro-Justo v. Galing AC No. 6174 November 11, 2011 prosecutor of Manila.
SECOND DIVISION
Complainant submits that by representing conflicting interests, respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO, A.C. No. 6174
In his Comment,[6] respondent denied the allegations against him. He admitted that he drafted a
Complainant, Present:
demand letter for complainant but argued that it was made only in deference to their long
standing friendship and not by reason of a professional engagement as professed by
CARPIO,
complainant. He denied receiving any professional fee for the services he rendered.It was allegedly
Chairperson,
their understanding that complainant would have to retain the services of another lawyer. He
- versus - BRION,
alleged that complainant, based on that agreement, engaged the services of Atty. Manuel A. Ao.
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
To bolster this claim, respondent pointed out that the complaint filed by complainant against Ms.
Promulgated:
Koa for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was based not on the demand letter he drafted but on
ATTY. RODOLFO T. GALING,
the demand letter prepared by Atty. Manuel A. Ao.
Respondent. November 16, 2011
Respondent contended that he is a close friend of the opposing parties in the criminal cases. He
further contended that complainant Justo and Ms. Koa are likewise long time friends, as in fact,
they are comares for more than 30 years since complainant is the godmother of Ms. Torralba.
[7]
Respondent claimed that it is in this light that he accommodated Ms. Koa and her daughters
request that they be represented by him in the cases filed against them by complainant and
complainants daughter. He maintained that the filing of the Motion for Consolidation which is a
non-adversarial pleading does not evidence the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x him and Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba. Likewise, his appearance in the joint proceedings should only
be construed as an effort on his part to assume the role of a moderator or arbiter of the parties.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:
Before us for consideration is Resolution No. XVIII-2007-196 [1] of the Board of Governors,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint [2] for disbarment filed by Lydia
Castro-Justo against Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing.
Complainant Justo alleged that sometime in April 2003, she engaged the services of respondent
Atty. Galing in connection with dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Arlene W. Koa
(Ms. Koa). After she paid his professional fees, the respondent drafted and sent a letter to Ms. Koa
demanding payment of the checks. [3] Respondent advised complainant to wait for the lapse of the
period indicated in the demand letter before filing her complaint.
He insisted that his actions were merely motivated by an intention to help the parties achieve an
out of court settlement and possible reconciliation. He reported that his efforts proved fruitful
insofar as he had caused Ms. Koa to pay complainant the amount of P50,000.00 in settlement of
one of the two checks subject of I.S. No. 03G-19484-86.
Respondent averred that the failure of Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba to make good the other checks
caused a lot of consternation on the part of complainant. This allegedly led her to vent her ire on
respondent and file the instant administrative case for conflict of interest.
In a resolution dated 19 October 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved
with modification the findings of its Investigating Commissioner. They found respondent guilty of
violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by representing
conflicting interests and for his daring audacity and for the pronounced malignancy of his act. It
was recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. [8]
We agree with the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, [9] as adopted
by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
It was established that in April 2003, respondent was approached by complainant regarding the
dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Koa.
It was also established that on 25 July 2003, a Motion for Consolidation was filed by respondent in
I.S. No. 03G-19484-86 entitled Lydia Justo vs. Arlene Koa and I.S. No. 03G-19582-84 entitled Lani C.
Justo vs. Karen Torralba. Respondent stated that the movants in these cases are mother and
daughter while complainants are likewise mother and daughter and that these cases arose out
from the same transaction. Thus, movants and complainants will be adducing the same sets of
evidence and witnesses.
Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant
because there was no professional fee paid for the services he rendered. Moreover, he argued that
he drafted the demand letter only as a personal favor to complainant who is a close friend.
We are not persuaded. A lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding the close friendship
between complainant and respondent. The relationship was established the moment complainant
sought legal advice from respondent regarding the dishonored checks. By drafting the demand
letter respondent further affirmed such relationship. The fact that the demand letter was not
utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that respondent was not eventually engaged by
complainant to represent her in the criminal cases is of no moment. As observed by the
Investigating Commissioner, by referring to complainant Justo as my client in the demand letter
sent to the defaulting debtor[10], respondent admitted the existence of the lawyer-client
relationship. Such admission effectively estopped him from claiming otherwise.
Likewise, the non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate respondent from liability. Absence
of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from complying with the prohibition against
pursuing cases with conflicting interests. The prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-
client relationship is established and extends beyond the duration of the professional relationship.
[11]
We held in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta [12] that it is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised
or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for
which his service had been sought.[13]
Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [a] lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. Respondent was therefore bound to refrain from representing parties with
conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing so, without showing any proof that he had obtained
the written consent of the conflicting parties, respondent should be sanctioned.
The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy
and good taste.[14] In the course of the lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns of the facts
connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of
the relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. [15]
It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. [16]
The case of Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat[17] is instructive on this concept, thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of
two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. [18] This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used.[19] Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be
called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection.[20] Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.[21]
The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty. Ao who was eventually engaged
by complainant will not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The take- over of a clients cause of action by another lawyer does not
give the former lawyer the right to represent the opposing party. It is not only malpractice but also
constitutes a violation of the confidence resulting from the attorney-client relationship.
Considering that this is respondents first infraction, the disbarment sought in the complaint is
deemed to be too severe. As recommended by the Board of Governors of the IBP, the suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year is warranted.
Accordingly, the Court resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing from the practice of law for one
(1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more
severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is directed to append a copy of this Decision to respondents record as member of the
Bar.
SO ORDERED.
BRION, J.:
We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. who is charged of: (1)
violating the lawyers duty to preserve confidential information received from his client; [1] and (2)
violating the prohibition on representing conflicting interests. [2]
In her complaint, Josefina M. Anion (complainant) related that she previously engaged
the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale
over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana
allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Caete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The
complainant accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential information he obtained from her in
filing the civil case.
Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and execution of the
Deed of Sale. However, he denied having received any confidential information. Atty. Sabitsana
asserted that the present disbarment complaint was instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr.,
the notary of the disbarment complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana) and had
instigated the complaint for this reason.
The Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

In our Resolution dated November 22, 1999, we referred the disbarment complaint to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
Aniñon v. Sabitsana AC No. 5098 April 11, 2012 and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation dated November 28, 2003, IBP
Republic of the Philippines Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo Jr. found Atty. Sabitsana administratively liable for representing
Supreme Court conflicting interests. The IBP Commissioner opined:
Baguio City
In Bautista vs. Barrios, it was held that a lawyer may not handle a case to
SECOND DIVISION nullify a contract which he prepared and thereby take up inconsistent
positions. Granting that Zenaida L. Caete, respondents present client in Civil
A.C. No. 5098 Case No. B-1060 did not initially learn about the sale executed by Bontes in
JOSEFINA M. ANION, favor of complainant thru the confidences and information divulged by
Complainant, Present: complainant to respondent in the course of the preparation of the said deed
of sale, respondent nonetheless has a duty to decline his current employment
BRION, J., as counsel of Zenaida Caete in view of the rule prohibiting representation of
Acting Chairperson, conflicting interests.
PERALTA,*
PEREZ, In re De la Rosa clearly suggests that a lawyer may not represent
SERENO, and conflicting interests in the absence of the written consent of all parties
- versus - REYES, JJ. concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. In the present case, no
such written consent was secured by respondent before accepting
Promulgated: employment as Mrs. Caetes counsel-of-record. x x x

xxx
April 11, 2012
Complainant and respondents present client, being contending claimants to
ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR., the same property, the conflict of interest is obviously present. There is said to
Respondent. be inconsistency of interest when on behalf of one client, it is the attorneys
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x duty to contend for that which his duty to another client requires him to
oppose. In brief, if he argues for one client this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client. Such is the case with which we are
DECISION
 now confronted, respondent being asked by one client to nullify what he had
formerly notarized as a true and valid sale between Bontes and the
complainant. (footnotes omitted)[3]
The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year. [4]
The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve
the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully supported by
the evidence on record, the applicable laws and rules. [5] The IBP Board of Governors agreed with
the IBP Commissioners recommended penalty.
Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of Governors denied
his motion in a resolution dated July 30, 2004.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests.
The Courts Ruling
After a careful study of the records, we agree with the findings and recommendations of the IBP
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the
highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to
promote a full disclosure of the clients most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an
unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust
confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost
secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. [6] Part of the lawyers duty in this regard is to
avoid representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility quoted below:
Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation
where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. [7] The
prohibition also applies even if the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that
which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the
confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are
wholly unrelated.[8] To be held accountable under this rule, it is enough that the opposing parties in
one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the
lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of
undivided fidelity to both clients.[9]
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above
rule is present in a given case.
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or
claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for
the other client. Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be opposed
by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the
rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still
another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation
to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through
their connection or previous employment. [10] [emphasis ours]
On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial evidence to support
Atty. Sabitsanas violation of the above rule, as established by the following circumstances on
record:
One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her interest
over a certain property. The records show that upon the legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed of
Sale over the property was prepared and executed in the complainants favor.
Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Caete to discuss the latters legal interest over the
property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty. Sabitsana already had knowledge that
Zenaida Caetes interest clashed with the complainants interests.
Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty.
Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida Caete.
Four, Atty. Sabitsanas actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two
clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed a case against the complainant in behalf
of Zenaida Caete; second, he impleaded the complainant as the defendant in the case; and third,
the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and
executed for the complainant.
By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another
client in the same action; he also accepted a new engagement that entailed him to contend and
oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his legal services had been previously
retained.
To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides an exception
to the above prohibition. However, we find no reason to apply the exception due to Atty.
Sabitsanas failure to comply with the requirements set forth under the rule. Atty. Sabitsana did not
make a full disclosure of facts to the complainant and to Zenaida Caete before he accepted the
new engagement with Zenaida Caete. The records likewise show that although Atty. Sabitsana
wrote a letter to the complainant informing her of Zenaida Caetes adverse claim to the property
covered by the Deed of Sale and, urging her to settle the adverse claim; Atty. Sabitsana however
did not disclose to the complainant that he was also being engaged as counsel by Zenaida Caete.
[11]
Moreover, the records show that Atty. Sabitsana failed to obtain the written consent of his two
clients, as required by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we find as the IBP Board of Governors did Atty. Sabitsana guilty of
misconduct for representing conflicting interests. We likewise agree with the penalty of suspension
for one (1) year from the practice of law recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. This penalty
is consistent with existing jurisprudence on the administrative offense of representing conflicting
interests.[12]
We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP recommendation on the ground
that the charge in the complaint was only for his alleged disclosure of confidential information, not
for representation of conflicting interests. To Atty. Sabitsana, finding him liable for the latter
offense is a violation of his due process rights since he only answered the designated charge.
We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsanas due process rights. Although there was indeed a
specific charge in the complaint, we are not unmindful that the complaint itself contained
allegations of acts sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on the prohibition against
representing conflicting interests. As stated in paragraph 8 of the complaint:
Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. accepted the commission as a Lawyer of ZENAIDA CANEJA,
now Zenaida Caete, to recover lands from Complainant, including this land
where lawyer Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. has advised his client [complainant] to
execute the second sale[.]
Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in his answer. [13] He also
averred in his Answer that:
6b. Because the defendant-to-be in the complaint (Civil Case No. B-
1060) that he would file on behalf of Zenaida Caneja-Caete was his former
client (herein complainant), respondent asked [the] permission of Mrs. Caete
(which she granted) that he would first write a letter (Annex 4) to the
complainant proposing to settle the case amicably between them but
complainant ignored it. Neither did she object to respondents handling the
case in behalf of Mrs. Caete on the ground she is now invoking in her instant
complaint. So respondent felt free to file the complaint against her.[14]
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
be informed of the charge against oneself and to be heard or, as applied toadministrative
proceedings, the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. [15] These opportunities were all afforded to Atty. Sabitsana, as
shown by the above circumstances.
All told, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.[16] In the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations
as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession. We
likewise aim to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. [17] This is all that we did in this case. Significantly,
we did this to a degree very much lesser than what the powers of this Court allows it to do in terms
of the imposable penalty. In this sense, we have already been lenient towards respondent lawyer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines.
Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
Atty. Sabitsana is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that
we can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.
SO ORDERED.
Seares v. Gonzales-Alzate AC No. 9058 November 14, 2012
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/9058.pdf
Lee v. Simando AC No. 9537 June 10, 2013
A.C. No. 9537 June 10, 2013
(Formerly CBD Case No. 09-2489)
DR. TERESITA LEE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. AMADOR L. SIMANDO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated July 21, 2009 filed by Dr. Teresita Lee (Dr. Lee) against
respondent Atty. Amador L. Simando (Atty. Simando) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2489, now A.C. No. 9537,
for violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics of Lawyers.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Atty. Simando was the retained counsel of complainant Dr. Lee from November 2004 until January
8, 2008, with a monthly retainer fee of Three Thousand Pesos (Php3,000.00). 2
Sometime during the above-mentioned period, Atty. Simando went to see Dr. Lee and asked if the
latter could help a certain Felicito M. Mejorado (Mejorado) for his needed funds. He claimed that
Mejorado was then awaiting the release of his claim for informer's reward from the Bureau of
Customs. Because Dr. Lee did not know Mejorado personally and she claimed to be not in the
business of lending money, the former initially refused to lend money. But Atty. Simando allegedly
persisted and assured her that Mejorado will pay his obligation and will issue postdated checks and
sign promissory notes. He allegedly even offered to be the co-maker of Mejorado and assured her
that Mejorado's obligation will be paid when due. Atty. Simando was quoted saying: "Ipapahamak
ba kita, kliyente kita"; "Sigurado ito, kung gusto mo, gagarantiyahan ko pa ito, at pipirma din ako";
"Isang buwan lang, at hindi hihigit sa dalawang buwan ito, bayad ka na." 3
Due to Atty. Simando's persistence, his daily calls and frequent visits to convince Dr. Lee, the latter
gave in to her lawyer's demands, and finally agreed to give Mejorado sizeable amounts of money.
Respondent acted as co-maker with Mejorado in various cash loans, to wit: 4
Date: Amount
November 11, 2006 Php 400,000.00
November 24, 2006 200,000.00
November 27, 2006 400,000.00
December 7, 2006 200,000.00
December 13, 2006 200,000.00
Total: Php1,400,000.00
When the said obligation became due, despite Dr. Lee's repeated demands, Mejorado failed and
refused to comply with his obligation. Since Atty. Simando was still her lawyer then, Dr. Lee
instructed him to initiate legal action against Mejorado. Atty. Simando said he would get in touch
with Mejorado and ask him to pay his obligation without having to resort to legal action. However,
even after several months, Mejorado still failed to pay Dr. Lee, so she again asked Atty. Simando
why no payment has been made yet. Dr. Lee then reminded Atty. Simando that he was supposed to
be the co-maker of the obligation of Mejorado, to which he replied: "Di kasuhan din ninyo ako!" 5
Despite complainant's repeated requests, respondent ignored her and failed to bring legal actions
against Mejorado. Thus, in January 2008, complainant was forced to terminate her contract with
Atty. Simando.
Subsequently, complainant's new lawyer, Atty. Gilbert Morandarte, sent a demand letter dated
June 13, 2008 to Atty. Simando in his capacity as the co-maker of some of the loans of Mejorado.
In his Letter dated June 30, 2008, respondent denied his liability as a co-maker and claimed that
novation had occurred because complainant had allegedly given additional loans to Mejorado
without his knowledge.6
Dr. Lee then accused Atty. Simando of violating the trust and confidence which she gave upon him
as her lawyer, and even took advantage of their professional relationship in order to get a loan for
his client. Worse, when the said obligation became due, respondent was unwilling to help her to
favor Mejorado. Thus, the instant petition for disbarment against Atty. Simando.
On August 12, 2009, the IBP-CBD ordered respondent to submit his Answer on the complaint
against him.7
In his Answer8 dated September 17, 2009, Atty. Simando claimed that complainant, who is engaged
in lending money at a high interest rate, was the one who initiated the financial transaction
between her and Mejorado. He narrated that complainant asked him if it is true that Mejorado is
his client as she found out that Mejorado has a pending claim for informer's reward with the
Bureau of Customs. When he affirmed that Mejorado is his client, complainant signified that she is
willing to give money for Mejorado's financial needs while awaiting for the release of the
informer's reward. Eventually, parties agreed that Mejorado will pay double the amount and that
payment shall be made upon receipt by Mejorado of the payment of his claim for informer's
reward.9
Meanwhile, Atty. Simando stressed that Dr. Lee gave Mejorado a total of Php700,000.00 as an
investment but he signed as co-maker in all the receipts showing double the amount or
Php1,400,000.00.10
Respondent claimed that complainant is a money-lender exacting high interest rates from
borrowers.11 He narrated several instances and civil cases where complainant was engaged in
money-lending where he divulged that even after defendants had already paid their loan,
complainant still persists in collecting from them. 12 Respondent asserted that he knew of these
transactions, because he was among the four lawyers who handled complainant's case. 13
Respondent averred that from the time that Mejorado and Dr. Lee had become close to each other,
the latter had given Mejorado additional investments and one (1) Silverado Pick-up at the price
of P500,000.00 and fifty (50) sacks of old clothings. He claimed that the additional investments
made by Dr. Lee to Mejorado were given without his knowledge.
Atty. Simando further alleged that with Dr. Lee's investment of around P2 Million which included
the Silverado Pick-up and the fifty (50) sacks of old clothings, the latter required Mejorado to issue
five (5) checks with a total value ofP7,033,500.00, an amount more than the actual value which
Mejorado received.14
Atty. Simando added that while Dr. Lee and Mejorado agreed that the issued checks shall be
presented to the bank only upon payment of his informer's reward, Dr. Lee presented the checks to
the bank despite being aware that Mejorado's account had no funds for said checks. Atty. Simando
further denied that he refused to take legal action against Mejorado. He claimed that complainant
never instructed him to file legal action, since the latter knew that Mejorado is obligated to pay
only upon receipt of his informer's reward.
Finally, Atty. Simando insisted that he did not violate their lawyerclient relationship, since Dr. Lee
voluntarily made the financial investment with Mejorado and that he merely introduced
complainant to Mejorado. He further claimed that there is no conflict of interest because he is
Mejorado's lawyer relative to the latter's claim for informer's reward, and not Mejorado's lawyer
against Dr. Lee. He reiterated that there is no conflicting interest as there was no case between
Mejorado and Dr. Lee that he is handling for both of them. 15
In her Reply dated October 30, 2009, Dr. Lee denied that what she entered into was a mere
investment. She insisted that she lent the money to Mejorado and respondent, in his capacity as
co-maker and the transaction was actually a loan. 16 To prove her claim, Dr. Lee submitted the
written loan agreements/receipts which categorically stated that the money received was a loan
with due dates, signed by Mejorado and respondent as co-maker. 17She further claimed that she did
not know Mejorado and it was respondent who brought him to her and requested her to assist
Mejorado by lending him money as, in fact, respondent even vouched for Mejorado and agreed to
sign as co-maker.
Complainant further emphasized that what she was collecting is the payment only of the loan
amounting to One Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php1,400,000.00) which respondent had
signed as co-maker. Thus, respondent's claim that his obligation was already extinguished by
novation holds no water, since what was being collected is merely his obligation pertaining to the
loan amounting to Php1,400,000.00 only, and nothing more.
Finally, complainant lamented that respondent, in his comments, even divulged confidential
informations he had acquired while he was still her lawyer and even used it against her in the
present case, thus, committing another unethical conduct. She, therefore, maintained that
respondent is guilty of violating the lawyer-client confidentiality rule.
Both parties failed to appear during the mandatory conference on January 15, 2010. Both parties
requested for resetting of the mandatory conference, however, both failed to agree on a certain
date. Hence, the IBP, so as not to delay the disposition of the complaint, terminated the mandatory
conference and instead required the parties to submit their respective position papers. 18
On March 18, 2010, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Simando guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months.
On December 29, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD to suspend Atty. Simando from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months.
Respondent moved for reconsideration.
On March 10, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors granted respondent's motion for reconsideration
for lack of sufficient evidence to warrant the penalty of suspension. The Resolution dated
December 29, 2010 was reversed and the case against respondent was dismissed.
RULING
We reverse the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors.
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a lawyer is guilty of representing
conflicting interest:
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and,
at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one
client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of
the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another
test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client
any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 19
In the instant case, we find substantial evidence to support respondent's violation of the above
parameters, as established by the following circumstances on record:
First, it is undisputed that there was a lawyer-client relationship between complainant and Atty.
Simando as evidenced by the retainer fees received by respondent and the latter's representation
in certain legal matters pertaining to complainant's business;
Second, Atty. Simando admitted that Mejorado is another client of him albeit in a case claiming
rewards against the Bureau of Customs;
Third, Atty. Simando admitted that he was the one who introduced complainant and Mejorado to
each other for the purpose of entering into a financial transaction while having knowledge that
complainant's interests could possibly run in conflict with Mejorado's interests which ironically
such client's interests, he is duty-bound to protect;
Fourth, despite the knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients, respondent
consented in the parties' agreement and even signed as co-maker to the loan agreement;
Fifth, respondent's knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients was
demonstrated further by his own actions, when he:
(a) failed to act on Mejorado's failure to pay his obligation to complainant despite the
latter's instruction to do so;
(b) denied liability despite signing as co-maker in the receipts/promissory notes arising
from the loan agreement between his two clients;
(c) rebutted complainant's allegations against Mejorado and him, and even divulged
informations he acquired while he was still complainant's lawyer.
Clearly, it is improper for respondent to appear as counsel for one party (complainant as creditor)
against the adverse party (Mejorado as debtor) who is also his client, since a lawyer is prohibited
from representing conflicting interests. He may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflict with that of his present or former
client.
Respondent's assertion that there is no conflict of interest because complainant and respondent
are his clients in unrelated cases fails to convince. His representation of opposing clients in both
cases, though unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least, invites suspicion
of double-dealing.20 Moreover, with the subject loan agreement entered into by the complainant
and Mejorado, who are both his clients, readily shows an apparent conflict of interest, moreso
when he signed as co-maker.
Likewise, respondent's argument that the money received was an investment and not a loan is
difficult to accept, considering that he signed as co-maker. Respondent is a lawyer and it is
objectionable that he would sign as co-maker if he knew all along that the intention of the parties
was to engage in a mere investment. Also, as a lawyer, signing as a co-maker, it can be presupposed
that he is aware of the nature of suretyship and the consequences of signing as co-maker.
Therefore, he cannot escape liability without exposing himself from administrative liability, if not
civil liability. Moreover, we noted that while complainant was able to show proof of receipts of
various amounts of money loaned and received by Mejorado, and signed by the respondent as co-
maker, the latter, however, other than his bare denials, failed to show proof that the money given
was an investment and not a loan.
It must be stressed that the proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds
application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter however
slight the adverse interest may be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the lawyer’s private
activity or in the performance of a function in a non-professional capacity. In the process of
determining whether there is a conflict of interest, an important criterion is probability, not
certainty, of conflict.21
We likewise note that respondent offered several excuses in order to avoid payment of his
liability.1âwphi1 First, in his Answer to complainant's demand letter, he claimed there was
novation which extinguished his liability; Secondly, he claimed that the amount received by
Mejorado for which he signed as co-maker was merely an investment and not a loan. Finally, he
alleged that it was agreed that the investment with profits will be paid only after Mejorado
receives the payment for his claim for reward which complainant violated when she presented the
checks for payment prematurely. These actuations of Atty. Simando do not speak well of his
reputation as a lawyer.22
Finally, we likewise find respondent guilty of violating Rule 21.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.23 In his last-ditch effort to impeach the credibility of complainant, he divulged
informations24 which he acquired in confidence during the existence of their lawyer-client
relationship.
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez25 that the termination of the relation of attorney and client
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of
the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client’s confidence once reposed cannot be
divested by the expiration of the professional employment. Consequently, a lawyer should not,
even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect his
former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use
any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.
Accordingly, we reiterate that lawyers are enjoined to look at any representation situation from
"the point of view that there are possible conflicts," and further, "to think in terms of impaired
loyalty" that is to evaluate if his representation in any way will impair loyalty to a client. 26
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and recommendation
of the IBP in Resolution No. XIX-20 10-733 suspending respondent Atty. Amador L. Simando for six (
6) months from the practice of law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's record as member of the
Bar.
Atty. Simando is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that we
can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Samson v. Era AC No. 6664 En Banc July 16, 2013
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6664 July 16, 2013
FERDINAND A. SAMSON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An attorney who wittingly represents and serves conflicting interests may be suspended from the
practice of law, or even disbarred when circumstances so warrant.
Antecedents
Ferdinand A. Samson has brought this complaint for disbarment charging respondent Atty. Edgardo
O. Era with violation of his trust and confidence of a client by representing the interest of Emilia C.
Sison, his present client, in a manner that blatantly conflicted with his interest.
Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the pyramiding scam
perpetrated by ICS Exports, Inc. Exporter, Importer, and Multi-Level Marketing Business (ICS
Corporation), a corporation whose corporate officers were led by Sison. The other officers were
Ireneo C. Sison, William C. Sison, Mimosa H. Zamudio, Mirasol H. Aguilar and Jhun Sison.
Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his relatives in the criminal prosecution
of Sison and her group. Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era prepared the demand letter dated
July 19, 2002 demanding the return or refund of the money subject of their complaints. He also
prepared the complaint-affidavit that Samson signed and swore to on July 26, 2002. Subsequently,
the complaint-affidavit charging Sison and the other corporate officials of ICS Corporation with
several counts of estafa 1was presented to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
(OCPQC). After the preliminary investigation, the OCPQC formally charged Sison and the others
with several counts of estafa in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96 (RTC), in Quezon City. 2
In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his relatives to discuss the possibility of
an amicable settlement with Sison and her cohorts. He told Samson and the others that
undergoing a trial of the cases would just be a waste of time, money and effort for them, and that
they could settle the cases with Sison and her group, with him guaranteeing the turnover to them
of a certain property located in Antipolo City belonging to ICS Corporation in exchange for their
desistance. They acceded and executed the affidavit of desistance he prepared, and in turn they
received a deed of assignment covering land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. R-
4475 executed by Sison in behalf of ICS Corporation.3
Samson and his relatives later demanded from Atty. Era that they be given instead a deed of
absolute sale to enable them to liquidate the property among themselves. It took some period of
negotiations between them and Atty. Era before the latter delivered to them on November 27,
2003 five copies of a deed of absolute sale involving the property. However, Atty. Era told them
that whether or not the title of the property had been encumbered or free from lien or defect
would no longer be his responsibility. He further told them that as far as he was concerned he had
already accomplished his professional responsibility towards them upon the amicable settlement
of the cases between them and ICS Corporation.4
When Samson and his co-complainants verified the title of the property at the Registry of Deeds
and the Assessor’s Office of Antipolo City, they were dismayed to learn that they could not
liquidate the property because it was no longer registered under the name of ICS Corporation but
was already under the name of Bank Wise Inc.5 Upon their urging, Atty. Era negotiated as their
counsel with ICS Corporation.
Due to the silence of Atty. Era for sometime thereafter, Samson and his group wrote to him on
September 8, 2004 to remind him about his guarantee and the promise to settle the issues with
Sison and her cohorts. But they did not hear from Atty. Era at all. 6
During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and his group. This
forced them to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to find out later on, however, that Atty.
Era had already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her other criminal cases in
the other branches of the RTC in Quezon City involving the same pyramiding scam that she and her
ICS Corporation had perpetrated.7 In this regard, they established Atty. Era’s legal representation of
Sison by submitting several certified copies of the minutes of the proceedings in the criminal cases
involving Sison and her group issued by Branch 102 and Branch 220 of the RTC in Quezon City
showing that Atty. Era had appeared as the counsel of Sison in the cases for estafa pending and
being tried in said courts.8 They also submitted a certification issued on November 3, 2004
indicating that Atty. Era had visited Sison, an inmate in the Female Dormitory in Camp Karingal,
Sikatuna Village, Quezon City as borne out by the blotter logbook of that unit. 9
On January 20, 2005, Samson executed an affidavit alleging the foregoing antecedents, and praying
for Atty. Era’s disbarment on the ground of his violation of the trust, confidence and respect
reposed in him as their counsel.10
Upon being required by the Court to comment on the complaint against him within 10 days from
notice, Atty. Era several times sought the extension of his period to file the comment to supposedly
enable him to collate documents relevant to his comment.11 The Court granted his request and
allowed him an extension totaling 40 days. But despite the lapse of the extended period, he did not
file his comment.
On September 27, 2005, Samson reiterated his complaint for disbarment against Atty. Era. 12
By its resolution dated March 1, 2006,13 the Court required Atty. Era to show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure to submit his comment.
In the comment that he subsequently filed on April 11, 2006 in the Office of the Bar
Confidant,14 Atty. Era alleged that the conclusion on April 23, 2002 of the compromise settlement
between Samson and his group, on one hand, and Sison and her ICS Corporation, on the other, had
terminated the lawyer-client relationship between him and Samson and his group; and that on
September 1, 2003, he had been appointed as counsel de officio for Sison by Branch 102 of the RTC
in Quezon City only for purposes of her arraignment.
On July 17, 2006, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.15
In his report and recommendation dated October 1, 2007, 16 the Investigating Commissioner of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD) found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests, for failing to serve his clients with competence and diligence, and for failing to
champion his clients’ cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.
The Investigating Commissioner observed that the evidence did not sustain Atty. Era’s claim that his
legal services as counsel for Samson and his group had terminated on April 23, 2003 upon the
execution of the compromise settlement of the criminal cases; that he even admitted during the
mandatory conference that there was no formal termination of his legal services; 17 that his
professional obligation towards Samson and his group as his clients did not end upon execution of
the settlement agreement, because he remained duty-bound to see to it that the settlement was
duly implemented; that he also had the obligation to appear in the criminal cases until their
termination; and that his acceptance of the engagement to appear in behalf of Sison invited
suspicion of his double-dealing and unfaithfulness.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Era be suspended from the practice of
law for six months, viz:
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests, failing to serve his client, complainant herein, with competence and diligence and
champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. It is respectfully
recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act would merit a more severe
penalty.18
In Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195 passed on October 19, 2007,19 the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
IBP-CBD, with the modification that Atty. Era be suspended from the practice of law for two years.
On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-180, 20 denying Atty.
Era’s motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195.
The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court.21
On October 17, 2012, Atty. Era filed a Manifestation and Motion (With Leave of Court). 22 However,
on November 26, 2012, the Court merely noted the manifestation, and denied the motion for its
lack of merit.23
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP.
In his petition for disbarment, Samson charged Atty. Era with violating Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests by accepting the responsibility of
representing Sison in the cases similar to those in which he had undertaken to represent Samson
and his group, notwithstanding that Sison was the very same person whom Samson and his group
had accused with Atty. Era’s legal assistance. He had drafted the demand letters and the complaint-
affidavit that became the bases for the filing of the estafa charges against Sison and the others in
the RTC in Quezon City.
Atty. Era’s contention that the lawyer-client relationship ended when Samson and his group
entered into the compromise settlement with Sison on April 23, 2002 was unwarranted. The
lawyer-client relationship did not terminate as of then, for the fact remained that he still needed to
oversee the implementation of the settlement as well as to proceed with the criminal cases until
they were dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial court. It is also relevant to indicate that
the execution of a compromise settlement in the criminal cases did not ipso facto cause the
termination of the cases not only because the approval of the compromise by the trial court was
still required, but also because the compromise would have applied only to the civil aspect, and
excluded the criminal aspect pursuant to Article 2034 of the Civil Code. 24
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: "A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts." Atty. Era thus owed to Samson and his group entire devotion to their
genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights. 25 He was expected
to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve the clients’ cause, for the unwavering loyalty
displayed to his clients likewise served the ends of justice. 26
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,27 the Court discussed the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers
not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. 28
The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on five rationales, rendered as follows:
x x x. First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with undivided
loyalty. A client is entitled to be represented by a lawyer whom the client can trust. Instilling such
confidence is an objective important in itself. x x x.
Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the effectiveness of legal
representation. To the extent that a conflict of interest undermines the independence of the
lawyer’s professional judgment or inhibits a lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in the
client’s behalf, the client’s expectation of effective representation x x x could be compromised.
Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard the client’s confidential information
xxx.1âwphi1 Preventing use of confidential client information against the interests of the client,
either to benefit the lawyer’s personal interest, in aid of some other client, or to foster an assumed
public purpose is facilitated through conflicts rules that reduce the opportunity for such abuse.
Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as by inducing a client
to make a gift to the lawyer xxx.
Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in obtaining adequate
presentations to tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for example, a lawyer might appear on
both sides of the litigation, complicating the process of taking proof and compromise adversary
argumentation x x x.29
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would Orola v. Ramos AC No. 9860 September 11, 2013
be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/september2013/9860.pdf
the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a Jimenez v. Jimenez AC No. 6712 February 6, 2006
substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client Daging v. Davis AC No. 9395 November 12, 2014
consents to it after consultation.30 The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of Alcantara v. de Vera AC No. 5859 En Banc November 23, 2010
loyalty.31 Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts Mabini Colleges Inc. v. Pajarillo AC No. 10687 July 22, 2015
connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and Gimeno v. Zaide AC No. 10303 April 22, 2015
information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with Anglo v. Valencia, et al. AC No. 10567 February 25, 2015
care.1âwphi1 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to Jimenez v. Francisco AC No. 10548 December 10, 2014
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to Gamilla v. Mariño AC No. 4763 March 20, 2003
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. 32 The
nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. 33 Conviction of a crime as a ground for disciplinary action
In Re Marcelino Lontok En Banc April 7, 1922
Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group, the Re: SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 in GR No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court AC
termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest No. 7940, In Re Pactolin En Banc April 24, 2012
adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the client’s In the Matter of Di sbarment Proceedings vs. Narciso Jaranillo AC No. 229 En Banc April 30, 1957
confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional 101 Phil. 323
employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will In Re: Dalmacio delos Angeles AC No. 350 En Banc August 7, 1959 106 Phil. 1
injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the Soriano v. Dizon AC No. 6792 En Banc January 25, 2006
client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s confidences acquired in the Catalan v. Silvosa AC No. 7360 En Banc July 24, 2012
previous relation.34 In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly Barrios v. Martinez AC No. 4585 En Banc November 12, 2004
declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust People v. Tuanda AM No. 3360 En Banc January 30, 1990
and confidence reposed in him." In re Carlos S. Basa 41 Phil. 275 En Banc, December 7, 1920
Garcia v. Sesbreño AC Nos. 7973 and 10457 En Banc February 3, 2015
Enriquez v. de Vera AC No. 8330 March 16, 2015
The lawyer’s highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs
even to himself.35The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the Falsified / altered evidence
termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the client’s ceasing to employ the attorney and Valencia v. Antiniw AC Nos. 1302, 1391, 1543 En Banc April 26, 1991; June 30, 2008
retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of Adez Realty Inc. v. Court of Appeals GR 100643 Benjamin M. Dacanay August 14, 1992; October
the client.36 30, 1992; December 12, 1995
Sambajon v. Suing AC No. 7062 September 26, 2006
In the absence of the express consent from Samson and his group after full disclosure to them of Balaoing v. Calderon AM No. RTJ-90-580; Balaoing v. Maliwanag AM No. RTJ-676 En Banc April 27,
the conflict of interest, therefore, the most ethical thing for Atty. Era to have done was either to 1993
outrightly decline representing and entering his appearance as counsel for Sison, or to advice Sison Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel GR No. L-27072 En Banc January 9, 1970
to engage another lawyer for herself. Unfortunately, he did neither, and should now suffer the Villaflor v. Sarita AC No. CBD No. 471 En Banc June 10, 1999
proper sanction. Maligaya v. Doronilla AC No. 6198 September 15, 2006
RE: THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S. TORRES AS A MEMBER
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of violating Rule OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR AC No. 5161 En Banc August 25, 2015
15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him Guarin v. Limpin AC No. 10576 January 14, 2015
from the practice of law for two years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning Alilano v. Examen AC No. 10132 En Banc March 24, 2015
that his commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Falsifying court decisions / Issues in the Judiciary
Pe v. Embido AC No. 6732 En Banc October 22, 2013
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. EDGARDO 0. ERA and entered Re: Fake Decision Allegedly in GR No 75242 No. 02-8-23-0 En Banc September 24, 2002; February
m his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant. 16, 2005
Re: Interview with Atty. Lorna Kapunan on Corruption in the Judiciary AM No. 11-09-SC
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court En Banc August 12, 2014
Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance. In Re: Derogatory news Items Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria
with Interference on Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen: Court of Appeals Associate Justice
SO ORDERED.
Demetrio G. Demetria, respondent. AM No. 00-7-09-CA En Banc March 21, 2001; December 19, Soliman v. Lerios-Amboy AC No. 10568 En Banc January 13, 2015
2001 Concepcion v. de la Rosa AC No. 10681 En Banc February 13, 2015
Re: Complaint Against Justice Elvi John S. Asincion of the Court of Appeals AM No. 06-6-8-CA, AM Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo AC No. 10537 En Banc February 3, 2015
No. 06-44-CA-J En Banc March 20, 2007 Umaguing v. de Vera AC No. 10451 February 4, 2015
Olazo v. Tinga AM No. 10-5-7-SC En Banc December 7, 2010 Ruby v. Espejo and Bayot AC No. 10588 February 23, 2015
Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing held on Maglente v. Agcaoili AC No. 10672 March 18, 2015
September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan AM No. SB-14-21-J Sosa v. Mendoza AC No. 8776 March 23, 2015
En Banc September 23, 2014 Olayta-Camba v. Bongon AC No. 8826 March 25, 2015
In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. against Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo Santiago v. Fojas AC No. 4103 September 7, 1995
AM No. 10-7-17-SC En Banc October 12, 2010; February 8, 2011
Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the Influence Peddling
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in Rafols v. Ricardo G. Barrios Jr. AC No. 4973 En Banc March 15, 2010
the Supreme Court.” AM No. 10-10-4-SC En Banc October 19, 2010; March 8, 2011; June 11, 2011
In re: Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, Intemperate language
GR No. 179120 AM No. 09-2-19-SC February 24, 2009; En Banc August 11, 2009; April 16, 2013 Rodriguez-Manahan v. Flores AC No. 8954 November 13, 2013
Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing held on Noble v. Ailes AC No. 10628 July 1, 2015
September 26, 2013 Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan AM No. SB-14-21-J Gimeno v. Zaide AC No. 10303 April 22, 2015
En Banc September 23, 2014 Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago AC No. 7399 August 25, 2009

Inexcusable negligence / Dereliction of duty / infidelity to client’s cause/funds Lawyers in Government Service
Quiachon v. Ramos AC No. 9317 June 4, 2014 Effect of Disbarment on Civil Service Eligibility, CSC Resolution No. 02-0520
Viray v. Sanicas AC No. 7337 September 29, 2014 Dionisio C. Antiniw (http://excell.csc.gov.ph/mread02/res-020520.html)
Yutuc v. Penuela AC No. 7904 September 22, 2008 Lingan v. Calubaquib AC No. 5377 June 30, 2014
Yupangco-Nakpil v. Uy AC No. 9115 September 17, 2014 Abella v. Cruzabra AC No. 5688 June 4, 2009 588 SCRA 218
Licuanan v. Melo AM No. 2361 En Banc February 9, 1989 Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, former Clerk of Court – Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon –
Pariñas v. Paguinto AC No. 6297 July 13, 2004 on the Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law AM No. 08-6-352-RTC En Banc
Overgaard v. Valdez AC No. 7902 En Banc September 30, 2008; March 31, 2009 August 19, 2009
Navarro v. Meneses AC No. 313 En Banc January 30, 1998 Cawaling v. Menese, et al. AC No. 9698 November 13, 2013
Hernandez v. Go AC No. 1526 En Banc January 31, 2005 Francia v. Abdon AC No. 10031 July 23, 1014
Busiños v. Ricafort AC No. 4349 En Banc December 22, 1997 Marcoleta v. Borra and Brawner AC No. 7732 Division March 30, 2009
Brennisen v. Contawi AC No. 7481 En Banc April 24, 2012
Daroy v. Legaspi AC No. 936 En Banc July 25, 1975 Love, marriage, sex
Basilio v. Castro AC No. 6910 July 11, 2012 Figueroa v. Barranco SBC Case No. 519 En Banc July 31, 1997
Mattus v. Villaseca AC No. 7922 En Banc October 1, 2013 Arciga v. Maniwang GR No. 1608 August 14, 1981
Pitcher v. Gagate AC No. 9532 En Banc October 8, 2013 Guevarra v. Eala AC No. 7136 En Banc August 1, 2007
Tria-Samonte v. Obias AC No. 4945 En Banc October 8, 2013 Ui v. Bonifacio AC No. 3319 June 8, 2000
Cristobal v. Renta AC No. 9925 September 17, 2014 Cojuangco v. Palma AC No. 2474 En Banc September 15, 2004
Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin AC No. 7965 November 13, 2013 Ventura v. Samson AC 9608 En Banc November 27, 2012
Yu v. Tajanlangit AC No. 5691 March 13, 2009 Macarrubo v. Macarrubo AC No. 6148 En Banc February 27, 2004; January 22, 2013
Abella v. Ricardo G. Barrios Jr. AC No. 7332 En Banc June 18, 2013 Villatuya v. Tabalingcos AC No. 6622 En Banc July 10, 2012; August 19, 2014
Foster v. Agtang AC No. 10579 En Banc December 10, 2014 De Leon v. Pedreña AC No. 9401 En Banc October 22, 2013
Mendoza v. Mendoza and Navarro AC No. 6056 September 9, 2015 Vitug v. Rongcal AC No. 6313 September 7, 2006
Spouses Saunders v. Pagano-Calde AC No. 8708 August 12, 2015 Dantes v. Dantes AC No. 6488 September 22, 2004
Luna v. Galarrita AC No. 10662 En Banc July 7, 2015 Garrido v. Attys. Garrido and Valencia AC No. 6593 En Banc February 4, 2010
Andrada v. Cera AC No. 10187 July 2, 2015 Tiong v. Florendo AC No. 4428 December 12, 2011
Enriquez v. Lavadia AC No. 5686 En Banc June 16, 2015 In re Carlos S. Basa 41 Phil. 275 En Banc, December 7, 1920
Nonato v. Fudolin AC No. 10138 En Banc June 16, 2015 Ecraela v. Pangalangan AC No. 10676 En Banc, September 8, 2015
Olvida v. Gonzales AC No. 5732 En Banc June 16, 2015 Perez v. Catindig and Bravo AC No. 5816 En Banc, March 10, 2015
Llunar v. Ricafort AC No. 6484 En Banc June 16, 2015
Dalupan v. Gacott AC No. 5067 June 29, 2015 Non-compliance with MCLE Requirements
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Noble v. Ailes AC No. 10628 July 1, 2015 Linsangan v. Tolentino AC No. 6672 September 4, 2009
Ulep v. The Legal Clinic BM No. 553 En Banc June 17, 1993
Notarial Law/Notarial Rules Villatuya v. Tabalingcos AC No. 6622 En Banc July 10, 2012
Sappayani v. Gasmen AC No. 7073 En Banc September 1, 2015 Camacho v. Pangulayan AC No. 4807 March 22, 2000
Gimeno v. Zaide AC No. 10303 April 22, 2015 Binay-an v. Addog AC No. 10449 July 28, 2014
Flores v. Chua AC No. 4500 En Banc April 30, 1999 (306 SCRA 465); March 6, 2012; September 9, Pagdanganan v. Sarmiento GR No. 206555 September 17, 2014
2014
Anudon v. Cefra AC No. 5482 En Banc February 10, 2015 Miniano Dela Cruz
Pitogo v. Suello (AC No. 10695 March 18, 2015 Atty. Miniano Dela Cruz v. Zabala AC No. 6294 November 17, 2004
Atty. Miniano Dela Cruz v. Diesmos AC No. 6850 July 27, 2006

Pattern of misconduct / abuse of legal processes

Flores v. Chua AC No. 4500 En Banc April 30, 1999 (306 SCRA 465); En Banc March 6, 2012; En Banc Teaching Manual on Legal Ethics
September 9, 2014 (http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/roli/philippines/philippines_legal_ethi
Natalia Realty Inc. v. Rivera GR No. 164914 October 5, 2005 cs_manual.authcheckdam.pdf)
Urban Bank v. Peña AC No. 4863 September 7, 2001
RE: Supreme Court Resolution dated April 28, 2003 in G.R. No. 145817 and G.R. No. 145822 (Atty.
Magdaleno M. Peña, Respondent) AC No. 6332 En Banc April 17, 2012; June 26, 2012
Re: Letter-Complaint Against Hon. Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes PA Sereno dated
September 16, 2011 filed by Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña AM No. 12-6-11-SC En Banc June 13, 2012
Madrid v. Dealca AC No. 7474 En Banc September 9, 2014
Larucom v. Jacoba AC No. 5921 March 10, 2006
Tacardon v. Ang GR No. 159286 En Banc April 5, 2005
Re: Letter dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda AM No. 05-3-04-SC En Banc July 22,
2005
Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior State Prosecutor AC No. 7006 En Banc
October 9, 2007
Re: AC No. 44 of the RTC Branch IV Tagbilaran City against Atty. Samuel C. Occeña AC No. 2841 En
Banc July 3, 2002
Yu v. Palaña AC No. 7747 En Banc July 14, 2008
Williams v. Enriquez AC No. 8329 September 16, 2015
Coronel v. Cunanan AC No. 6738 August 12, 2015
Salabao v. Villaruel AC No. 8084 August 24, 2015
Flores v. Mayor AC No. 7314 En Banc August 25, 2015
De los Santos II v. Barbosa AC No. 6681 June 17, 2015
Davao Import Distributors v. Landero AC No. 5116 April 13, 2015
Villamor v. Santos and Maranan AC No. 9868 April 22, 2015
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO
LAURETA GR No. L-68635 En Banc March 12, 1987; May 14, 1987
Chu v. Guico AC No. 10573 En Banc January 13, 2015
Villahermosa v. Caracol AC No. 7325 January 21, 2015
Caspe v. Mejia AC No. 10679 En Banc March 10, 2015

Practicing despite suspension

Ibana-Andrade v. Paita-Moya AC No. 8313 En Banc July 14, 2015
Feliciano v. Bautista-Lozada AC No. 7593 March 11, 2015
Lingan v. Calubaquib AC No. 5377 June 30, 2014

Solicitation of Business / Withdrawal of appearance /