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CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, prevented from engaging in his customary occupation for The first issue raised by the

pation for The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is
vs. twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about P50.00 governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. during his incapacity to work. Because of the incident, he was City of Manila) reading:
subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates
City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for petitioner. and friends. During the period of his treatment, plaintiff was The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to
Sevilla, Daza and Associates for respondents. under constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of his minor persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the
children since he was their only support. Due to the filing of Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the
this case, plaintiff has obligated himself to pay his counsel the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
sum of P2,000.00. from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other
officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and provisions.
documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain Section, Office of
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of the uncovered or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, condition of a catchbasin at the corner of P. Burgos and Old provides:
Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same was
jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five covered on the same day (Exhibit 4); that again the iron cover
minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages
of the same catch basin was reported missing on January 30,
stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason
1958, but the said cover was replaced the next day (Exhibit 5);
and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public
that the Office of the City Engineer never received any report
catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, buildings, and other public works under their control or
to the effect that the catchbasin in question was not covered
his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and supervision.
between January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has always been a
causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood policy of the said office, which is charged with the duty of
flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to installation, repair and care of storm drains in the City of Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over
his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them Manila, that whenever a report is received from whatever the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended
brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the matter is exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a
injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. In immediately attended to, either by immediately replacing the general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico missing cover or covering the catchbasin with steel matting
suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing, The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we
right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant; that the Office think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial
infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruption of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law
caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the theft of said iron covers; that in order to prevent such thefts, and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the
hospital, required further medical treatment by a private the city government has changed the position and layout of subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of
practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00. catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the
sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, side of the gutter; and that these changes had been undertaken or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce
with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint — which by the city from time to time whenever funds were available. the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or
was, subsequently, amended — for damages against the City of from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other
Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision of the Manila rendered the aforementioned decision sustaining the provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code
trial court, and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals, theory of the defendants and dismissing the amended constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities
complaint, without costs. and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of
accountant, a businessman and a professor at the University of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the
the East. He held responsible positions in various business firms buildings, and other-public works under their control or
Court of Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is
like the Philippine Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valencia and Co., supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability
concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the
the Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the Sincere arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object
aggregate sum of P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the City of
Packing Corporation. He was also associated with several civic thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to
Manila.
organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club, the Chamber "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is
of Commerce of the Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila and the based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said
Knights of Rizal. As a result of the incident, plaintiff was Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the
Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving him places; . . . to provide for the inspection of, fix the license fees findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review.
took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of for and regulate the openings in the same for the laying of gas,
Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith. water, sewer and other pipes, the building and repair of WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is
tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and under the hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila. It is so
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an same and the erecting of poles and the stringing of wires ordered.1äwphï1.ñët
allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City. Moreover, therein; to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and
Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended gutters therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the
complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition streets and other public places; to provide for the abatement of
of a street which is "under the supervision and control" of the nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners
City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, thereof; to provide for the construction and maintenance, and
alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit
constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop rolling, and other
the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the amusements which may annoy persons using the streets and
defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been public places, or frighten horses or other animals; to regulate
ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective the speed of horses and other animals, motor and other
functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the limits of the city;
City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and
is under its control and supervision. locomotives; . . . to provide for and change the location, grade,
and crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad to raise
or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes;
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a
and to require railroad companies to fence their property, or
national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for
any part thereof, to provide suitable protection against injury to
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such
persons or property, and to construct and repair ditches, drains,
assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not
sewers, and culverts along and under their tracks, so that the
been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for
natural drainage of the streets and adjacent property shall not
the first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the
be obstructed.
decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the
reconsideration thereof.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by
Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2,
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not
1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the
necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the
disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the
defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities in
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said
the construction of roads and streets within their respective
article requires is that the province, city or municipality have
boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements
either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if
the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, concerning the
P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this
disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover,
circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or
it provides that "the construction, maintenance and
supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In
improvement of national primary, national secondary and
fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
national aid provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by
the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways
the following legislative powers: and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be
authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or
xxx xxx xxx special appropriation Acts."

(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos
the laying out, construction and improvement, and to regulate Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila
the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection
parks, cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for with the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the
REYNALDO PASCO, assisted by his father PEDRO c. Since this is a civil case, a demand should have been made by
PASCO, petitioner, the plaintiff, hence, it would be premature to bring an action
vs. for damages against defendant University. (Rollo, p. 96)
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH V, STA.
MARIA and ARANETA UNIVERSITY, respondents. On May 12, 1980, respondent court issued an Order * granting
said Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner moved to reconsider the
The sole question of law raised by petitioner in this case is Order of Dismissal but the motion was likewise denied on the
whether the provision of the penultimate paragraph of Article ground that there is no sufficient justification to disturb its
2180 of the Civil Code which states: ruling. Hence, this instant Petition for certiorari under Republic
Act No. 5440, praying that judgment be rendered setting aside
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades the questioned order of May 12, 1980 dismissing the complaint
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students as against respondent school and the order of July 17, 1980
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of
dismissal, with costs against respondent school.
is equally applicable to academic institutions.
We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of the
Article to educational institutions (which are not schools of arts
The facts of this case are as follows:
and trades) for the issue in this petition is actually whether or
not, under the article, the school or the university itself (as
On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, distinguished from the teachers or heads) is liable. We find the
petitioner, together with two companions, while walking inside answer in the negative, for surely the provision concerned
the campus of the private respondent Araneta University, after speaks only of "teachers or heads."
attending classes in said university, was accosted and mauled
by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karim Madidis alias
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
"Teng." Said Muslim group were also students of the Araneta
University. Petitioner was subsequently stabbed by Abdul and
as a consequence he was hospitalized at the Manila Central SO ORDERED.
University (MCU) Hospital where he underwent surgery to save
his life.

On October 5, 1979, petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro


Pasco, filed a complaint for damages against Abdul Karim
Madidis and herein private respondent Gregorio Araneta
University which was docketed as Civil Case No. SM-1027. Said
school was impleaded as a party defendant based on the
aforementioned provision of the Civil Code.

On October 26, 1979, respondent school filed a Motion to


Dismiss on the following grounds:

a. The penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the New Civil


Code under which it was sued applies only to vocational
schools and not to academic institutions;

b. That every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly


liable under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the
civil liability in this case arises from a criminal action which the
defendant university has not committed;
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants, Record on Appeal.) decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses 1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal
Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees. Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil
assignment of errors: liability, was not reversed?
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY 2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code
Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT - he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed
dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his
I
the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant father, was already legally married?
Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,
for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A
VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a
Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said
REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE reiteration and further clarification of the dual character,
accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE; criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction
mistake."
in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
II
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds: Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA; citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works
section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own,
of Court; III that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under
the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF holds:
and or in res-adjudicata; THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant IV machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code.
Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the other In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and
defendant through emancipation by marriage. fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject
DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.]) GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.) was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could
the above grounds that the following order was issued: plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence
prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of
defendants on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal
examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or
the same to be meritorious and well-founded. the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is
when appellants filed their complaint against appellees aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above
Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
entitled case.
death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a
above-referred to. criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could
SO ORDERED.
have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was
617, 73 Phil.) 2 the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text
given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code,
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses
specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear
although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether
made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by
Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3 nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book,
on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should
believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by
ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as
such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood,
fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their
to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
foundations.
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that omission of the defendant.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that for the better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor,
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision
an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or
that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal
directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to
in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of
secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
- would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what
reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by
sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We
that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear,
are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring
therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish
about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that
the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the
that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil
literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless
in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but
a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said
development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code)
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, Commission, p. 162.)
Spanish Civil Code.
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts
or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to
intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift-
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the
emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or
negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than
but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of
the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not
cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and
use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render
civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in
almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito,
wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.) arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and
3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article
"more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The
felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether minor children who live in their company." In the instant case,
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore,
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a
is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both situation which is not unusual.
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing
by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless,
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that
accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into
that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation.
which may be punishable by law.4 (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing
someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the
criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give
hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
him. encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their
minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399;
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's Manresa, supra.)
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty.
Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to
conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
responsibility cannot be upheld. Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is
now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or opinion. Costs against appellees.
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or
alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant, plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability
vs. these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has
darkness is readily to be credited. suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its
the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate,
Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage condition, and it appeared that the injuries which he had differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive
of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by
Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad to a certain hospital in the city of Manila where an examination article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof
company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office was made and his arm was amputated. The result of this of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision.
in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied operation was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations
by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the to another hospital where a second operation was performed arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations
company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question, and the member was again amputated higher up near the — or to use the technical form of expression, that article
January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit through the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for
door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the other expenses in connection with the process of his curation. Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103
upright guardrail with his right hand for support. and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out this distinction,
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359).
Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to rise of the defendant company, founding his action upon the In commenting upon article 1093 Manresa clearly points out
with a moderate gradient some distance away from the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent,
company's office and extends along in front of said office for a placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between
distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger persons not formerly connected by any legal tie"
the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio Zuñiga, alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the Court and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an
also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts obligation already existing . . . ."
alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his
from the level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to
little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 of the Civil
or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute
with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself the breach of a contract.
violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and
platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right was therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was Upon this point the Court said:
arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and
plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly the plaintiff appealed.
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil
six meters before it came to a full stop.
Code] are applicable are understood to be those not growing
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether
and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light platform in the manner above stated; that their presence springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of
located some distance away, objects on the platform where the caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and those duties are subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the
accident occurred were difficult to discern especially to a that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep.,
person emerging from a lighted car. injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the 359 at 365.)
defendant company is liable for the damage thereby
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which,
platform where the plaintiff alighted is found in the fact that it contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is
under the Spanish law, is, in certain cases imposed upon
was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the
employers with respect to damages occasioned by the
large lot had been brought to the station for the shipment to primary responsibility of the defendant company and the
negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not
the market. They were contained in numerous sacks which has contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately
bound by contract, is not based, as in the English Common Law,
been piled on the platform in a row one upon another. The examined.
upon the principle of respondeat superior — if it were, the
testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed of melons master would be liable in every case and unconditionally — but
and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the fall of the
upon the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code, acting within the scope of his employment. The Court, after to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The
which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said: legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure
negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character,
the damage caused. One who places a powerful automobile in From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other
the hands of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee members of society. The breach of these general duties
method of managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if
negligence which makes him liable for all the consequences of negligence on the part of the master or employer either in productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the
his imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over injured party. The fundamental distinction between obligations
arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption of this character and those which arise from contract, rests
acting within the scope of his employment causes the injury. is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is
The liability of the master is personal and direct. But, if the be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates
master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations
selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the
acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the
employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does liability. contractual relation.
not amount to a breach of the contract between the master
and the person injured. With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on
his own negligence and not on that of his servant. This is the negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for the
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected —
selection and control of the servant relieves the master from course, in striking contrast to the American doctrine that, in whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or, on
liability for the latter's acts — on the contrary, that proof shows relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant in the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability,
that the responsibility has never existed. As Manresa says (vol. conclusively the negligence of the master. without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include
8, p. 68) the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is responsibility for the negligence of those person who acts or
always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in
willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them.
case of extra-contractual culpa based upon negligence, it is
caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to
necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to
care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined
the defendant personally, and that the last paragraph of article
the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be directly
1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in
duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility
complete accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa,
them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third may consist in having failed to exercise due care in the
who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article
persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the
1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent
incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his control of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a
in the special relations of authority or superiority existing
servants, even within the scope of their employment, such position of dependency with respect to the person made liable
between the person called upon to repair the damage and the
third person suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of for their conduct.
one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.
the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he has been
negligent in the selection or direction of his servant, but the The position of a natural or juridical person who has
presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for
undertaken by contract to render service to another, is wholly
diligence in this respect. the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents,
different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the
when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to
sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action
the breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere presumption
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof
of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and
provisions, as found in the Porto Rico Code, has held that these rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence — if he does not his
proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard
articles are applicable to cases of action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual
does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his
extra-contractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is
contract.
Porto Rico Reports, 215.) alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the
contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to willful
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its
contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his
decision in the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil.
breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its
rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the theory of the
society imposes upon it members, or which arise from these nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the
relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society
damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach
culpa, a suing creditor should assume the burden of proof of its obligation, by fault or negligence, such as those to which article Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is true that the court
existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages caused by the rested its conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon
on the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the defendant's failure to carry out the undertakings imposed by article 1903, although the facts disclosed that the injury
existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that the contracts . . . . complaint of by plaintiff constituted a breach of the duty to him
it exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him arising out of the contract of transportation. The express
to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]). A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the ground of the decision in this case was that article 1903, in
liability of employers for damage done by the negligent acts of dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach their servants will show that in no case has the court ever servants "makes the distinction between private individuals
of a contract to show that the breach was due to the negligent decided that the negligence of the defendant's servants has and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates a
conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in been held to constitute a defense to an action for damages for rebuttable presumption of negligence in the selection or
fact the actual cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on breach of contract. direction of servants; and that in the particular case the
the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his presumption of negligence had not been overcome.
servants or agents caused the breach of the contract would not In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court
constitute a defense to the action. If the negligence of servants held that the owner of a carriage was not liable for the It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the
or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In that case the court treated plaintiff's action as though founded in tort rather
liability arising from contract, the anomalous result would be court commented on the fact that no evidence had been than as based upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and
that person acting through the medium of agents or servants in adduced in the trial court that the defendant had been an examination of the pleadings and of the briefs shows that
the performance of their contracts, would be in a better negligent in the employment of the driver, or that he had any the questions of law were in fact discussed upon this theory.
position than those acting in person. If one delivers a valuable knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness. Viewed from the standpoint of the defendant the practical
watch to watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the bailee, result must have been the same in any event. The proof
by a personal negligent act causes its destruction, he is disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania
unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him from his grossly negligent and that his negligence was the proximate
Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the plaintiff sued the defendant
liability for the breach of his contract, which involves the duty cause of plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared that
for damages caused by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff
to exercise due care in the preservation of the watch, if he defendant had been guilty of negligence in its failure to
which was allowed to get adrift by the negligence of
shows that it was his servant whose negligence caused the exercise proper discretion in the direction of the servant.
defendant's servants in the course of the performance of a
injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury suffered by
contract of towage. The court held, citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp.
would enjoy practically complete immunity from damages plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded
29, 69) that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a
arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent as constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. As
contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we do not think
acts as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether negligence
that the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to
agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a
the case."
instances that reasonable care had been taken in selection and contractual undertaking or its itself the source of an
direction of such servants. If one delivers securities to a extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential
banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason of In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission
the negligence of some clerk employed by the bank, would it plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages for the productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the
be just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself of personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendant's part of the defendant. Consequently, when the court holds that
liability for the breach of its contract to return the collateral chauffeur while driving defendant's automobile in which a defendant is liable in damages for having failed to exercise
upon the payment of the debt by proving that due care had defendant was riding at the time. The court found that the due care, either directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in
been exercised in the selection and direction of the clerk? damages were caused by the negligence of the driver of the the selection and direction of his servants, the practical result is
automobile, but held that the master was not liable, although identical in either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be
he was present at the time, saying: inferred, because the court held in the Yamada case that
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an
obligation, and culpa contractual as a mere incident to the defendant was liable for the damages negligently caused by its
performance of a contract has frequently been recognized by . . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a servants to a person to whom it was bound by contract, and
the supreme court of Spain. (Sentencias of June 27, 1894; length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to made reference to the fact that the defendant was negligent in
November 20, 1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the decisions observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom. . . . the selection and control of its servants, that in such a case the
of November 20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff's action The act complained of must be continued in the presence of court would have held that it would have been a good defense
arose ex contractu, but that defendant sought to avail himself the owner for such length of time that the owner by his to the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of the
of the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own. breach of the contract, for defendant to have proved that it did
The Spanish Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention, in fact exercise care in the selection and control of the servant.
saying:
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the
the attention to the relative spheres of contractual and plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as part of the plaintiff in this case the following circumstances are
extra-contractual obligations. The field of non- contractual he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a
obligation is much more broader than that of contractual perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place. level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding
obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot
human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the
concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk
to another by contract does not relieve him from (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows: incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform,
extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight.
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has
under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility
been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving
source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to
railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be
existed between the parties. get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would
considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age,
have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the
sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, question of contributory negligence in performing such act —
passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the
by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or
evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which
safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article recklessly — the age, sex, and physical condition of the
may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the
1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of
care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar
and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been
circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on
the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants. observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of
Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of
their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to
even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may say that the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train
placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his
contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was
and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the which would have admonished a person of average prudence required to take or the character of the platform where he was
injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence that to get off the train under the conditions then existing was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in
in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way
before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he
announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was negligence.1awph!l.net was not guilty of contributory negligence.
caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed
upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the
contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned.
which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that plaintiff was accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and that
It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact
guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him
guilty of negligence.
without being able to discern clearly the condition of the from continuing that employment. Defendant has not shown
platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had considering the situation thus presented, it should not be expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is
come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a
suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant contends, fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his
and cites many authorities in support of the contention, that it melons piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant was permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also
is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25
train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff for medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental
absolute form. We are of the opinion that this proposition is had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.
too badly stated and is at variance with the experience of warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The
every-day life. In this particular instance, that the train was place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted,
barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby
and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant
the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of
in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it
where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from both instances. So ordered.
were by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these
trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of them
no injury where the company has kept its platform free from adequately so that their presence would be revealed.

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