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Sources of Criminal Law

De Joya vs warden Batangas City GR No. 159418-19, Dec 10, 2003
Facts: Petitioner Norma De Joya was charged separately with violations of BP 22.
When arraigned in both cases, petitioner pleaded not guilty. While trial was going on,
petitioner jumped bail. No evidence was thereby adduced in her defense in any of the
two cases. The Court found the her guilty. Petitioner remained at large and no appeal
was filed from any of the said decisions. After five years, petitioner was finally arrested
while she was applying for an NBI clearance. She was forthwith detained at the
Batangas City Jail. Subsequently, she filed an urgent motion with the MTC of Batangas
City asking the court to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively pursuant to
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code and to order her release from detention. In an
Order dated August 15, 2003, the trial court denied the motion on three grounds: (a) its
decision convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had long become final and
executory; hence, could no longer be amended to change the penalty imposed therein;
(b) the SC Circular should be applied prospectively; and (c) the SC Circular did not
amend B.P. Blg. 22, a substantive law, but merely encourages trial court judges to have
a uniform imposition of fine. Petitioner thus filed a petition for habeas corpus before the
Supreme Court praying for her release from the Batangas City Jail on the claim that her
detention was illegal.

Issue: Is petitioner entitled to a writ habeas corpus?

Held: No. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that the writ
of habeas corpus is not allowed if the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record:

Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment; or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of
a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

In this case, the petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to the final judgment of
the MTC of Batangas City, convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Irrefragably then,
the petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioners reliance of our ruling in Ordonez v. Vinarao that a convicted person is

entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law, citing People
v. Simon, is misplaced. Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No.
13-2001 should benefit her has no basis.

First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending
as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.

Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin.

Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the
penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the
legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the
courts to take into account not only the purpose of the law but also the circumstances of
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the accused whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence and such other circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court
believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed.

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22. The pursuit of this purpose
clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg.
22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law. (De Joya vs. Jail Warden
of Batangas City, G.R. Nos. 159418-19. December 10, 2003)

Theories of Criminal Law

People Vs. Santiago
FACTS: Petitioner Gregorio Santiago caused the death of a 7year old boy by striking
himwith an automobile that he was driving. Santiago was prosecuted for the crime
of homicide by reckless negligence, Santiago does not agree with the courts
sentence,questioning the constitutionality of act no. 2886 amending order no. 58 stating
thatall prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the U.S... Act
no. 2886stating that all prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of
thePhilippine islands.
ISSUE:Whether the procedure in criminal matters is incorporated in the constitution of
thestate?

HELD: NO, procedure in criminal matter is not incorporated in the constitution of

thestates, but it is left in the hand of the legislature, so that it falls within the realm
of public statutory law.It is limited to criminal procedure and its intention is to give to its
provision theeffect of law in criminal matters.In pursuance of the constitution of the
US each state has the authority, under itspolice power rule to define and punish crimes
and to lay down the rules of criminalprocedure. The delegation to our government
needs no demo, the crimes committed w in ourterritory even before sec 2 of general
orders no.58 was amended, were prosecutedand punish jurisdiction .Act no. 2886 (feb
24 1920) criminal complainant was filed may 10 1920. The silenceof congress regarding
those laws amendatory of the said general orders must beconsidered as an act of the approval

Application and Chrateristics of Phil Criminal Law

Generality

EUGENE GONZALES, ET AL. vs. NARCISO ABAYA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006.

FACTS: In relation to the celebrated Oakwood mutiny where a total of 321 soldiers
including petitioners herein declared their withdrawal of support to the Commander-in-
chief, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declared a state of rebellion and ordered the
arrest of the said soldiers. In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent
negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. After several hours of negotiation, the
government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the
explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they
returned to their barracks.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended
that the military personnel involved be charged with coup d'etat defined and penalized
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The Chief State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the
corresponding Information against them.
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Meanwhile, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso

Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved
in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate
investigation.

On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an
Information for coup d'etat against those soldiers, Subsequently, this case was
consolidated involving the other accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC,
Makati City.

On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal
Case No. 03-2784.

On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a
Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military
tribunal charges for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 (otherwise known as
"The Articles of War"), as amended, against the same military personnel.

Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including
petitioners herein) filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the
said trial court assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal.
They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055.

Subsequently, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial

Investigation Report to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of
absorption," those charged with coup d'etat before the RTC should not be charged
before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.

For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order stating that "all charges
before the court martial against the accused . . . are hereby declared not service-
connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat."
The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners' applications for bail.

Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the
findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers
involved in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general
court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman)
of the Articles of War. The same was approved by the AFP.

The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to
the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for
Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with
violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident.

Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of
February 11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not
service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d'etat, the military tribunal
cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

1.Whether the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been
criminally charged of coup d’état before the regular courts.

2. Whether the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable.

HELD:
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1. Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided

in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge
against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to
defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly
caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a
bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative
of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same
— dismissal from the service — imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is
purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of
misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.

Hence, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged
before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the
same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-
connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat,"
hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically
amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over
"service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should
not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court,
tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so.
And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act
can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as
they find it, not as they like it to be. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore,
void.

2. No. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the
charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in
furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of
crimes' is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same
statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies
only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055
deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96
of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this
case.

Prospectivity
Case Title: US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code
Facts:

On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals named

Stanford commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was
found that said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674 heads of cattle without
providing appropriate shelter and proper suitable means for securing the animals which
resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and others to have died while in transit.

This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the
Philippine Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be filed because
neither was it said that the court sitting where the animals were disembarked would take
jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships not licensed under Philippine laws, like the ships
involved.

Issue:
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Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign
ship while inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which embrace the
entrance of Manila Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters and thus, the laws of the
Philippines shall apply. A crime committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel
sailing to the Philippines is within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines if the
illegal conditions existed during the time the ship was within the territorial waters -
regardless of the fact that the same conditions existed when the ship settled from the
foreign port and while it was on the high seas,

In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a
fine of two hundred and fifty pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.

Case Title: People vs Wong Cheng, 46 Phil 729

Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code
Facts:

The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General, filed an appeal that urges the
revocation of a demurrer sustained by the Court of First Instance of Manila presented by
the defendant. The defendant, accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the
merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while the said vessel was anchored in
Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the shores of the city. In the said demurrer, the
defendant contended the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court of the said crime, which
resulted to the dismissal of the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard
merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters.

Held:

Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters thus the
Philippine courts have a right of jurisdiction over the said offense. The Court said that
having the opium smoked within our territorial waters even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship is a breach of the public order because it causes such drugs to produce
pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore, the demurrer is revoked and the Court
ordered further proceedings.

THE UNITED STATES VS. LOOK CHAW

GR No. L-5887
December 16, 1910

FACTS: Defendant Chaw was found in possession of two sacks of opium on board the
steamship Errol of English Nationality departed in Hongkong bound for Mexico, via the
call ports of Manila and Cebu. He stated, freely and voluntarily that the contraband
belonged to him but prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds that the court
has no jurisdiction to try the same and facts therein did not constitute a crime. The court
of First Instance of Cebu ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction in as much as the crime
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had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu. Hence, the defendant
appealed to Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts of the Philippineshave jurisdiction to try unlawful
possession of opium on a foreign vessel and unlawful sale of opium on Philippine soil.

RULING: The court ruled that on the account of foreign vessel being an extension of its own
nationality, mere possession of thing of prohibited use in Philippine Islands does not
constitute a crime and therefore not triable by the courts in the Philippines. However, in
the case at bar, the can of opium landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil is an open
violation of the laws of the land, and therefore as it is a violation of the penal law in force
at the place of commission of the crime, only the court established in the said place had
competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
Therefore, imprisonment and fine were reduced from 5 years to six months and 10,000
to 1,000 respectively. Other aspects were affirmed in toto with the cost of this instance
against the appellant.

Case Title: US vs Ah Sing, 36 Phil 978

Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign vessel which arrived in the
port of Cebu from Saigon. He bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board
and had them in his possession during the said trip. The 8 cans of opium were found in
the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine by authorities who made a search
upon anchoring on the port of Cebu. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of
the opium and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He dis not confess, however, as to
his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the
prohibited drug.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands is
criminally liable in the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person who unlawfully
imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited
drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a
foreign country and is within the jurisdiction limits of the Philippines, is guilty of the crime
of illegal importation of opium, unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense
proves otherwise.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO ENACT PENAL

LAWS

1. Equal Protection (Sec 1, Article 111, 1987 Constitution)

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Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

2. Due Process
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.cralaw

Non-
3. Non-Imposition of cruel and Unusual Punishment or excessive Fines

Republic Act No. 9346 June 24, 2006

AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE

PHILIPPINESBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited.

Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven
(R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal
Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred
Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all
other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death
penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed.

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of
the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or

whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act,
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

SEC. 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall cause the publication at least
one a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation of
the names of persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment by reason of this Act who are being considered or recommend
for commutation or pardon; Provided, however, That nothing herein shall limit the
power of the President to grant executive clemency under Section 19, Article VII
of the Constitutions.

SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect immediately after its publication in two national
newspapers of general circulation.

4. Bill of Attainder- No bill of attainder shallbe enacted (Art 3, Sec 22). It is a

legislative act, which inflicts punishment without trial.Its essence substitution of a
legislative for judicial determination of guilt.
5. Ex post Facto Law (Art 3 Sec 22)
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Basic Maxims

1. Doctrine of Pro Reo- When in doubt, rule for the accused.Whenever a penal
law is to be construed or applied and the law admits of two interpretations –
one lenient to the offender and one strict to the offender – that interpretation
which is lenient or favorable to the offender will be adopted.
2. Nullum crimen, nullum poena sine lege-there is no crime where there is no
law punishing it. There can be no crime committed, and no punishment meted
out, without a violation of penal law as it existed at the time.
3. Mens rea- . Latin for a guilty mind, or criminal intent in committing the act.
4. Equipoise doctrine = is the rule which states that when the evidence of the
prosecution and the defense are so evenly balanced the appreciation of such
evidence calls for tilting of the scales in favor ofthe accused. Thus, the
evidence for the prosecution must be heavier to overcome the presumption of
innocence of the accused.

FELONIES

CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES

People v. Gonzales / G.R. No. 80762 / March 19, 1990

FACTS:Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales Sr., Custodio
Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida were all found guilty of murder for
killing Lloyd Peñacerrada. All of them except for Custodio Sr. withdrew their appeal.The
decision of the trial court was based on the testimony of witness Jose Huntoria.
Huntoria said that appellant was also one of the attackers of the deceased. Appellant
maintained that he was asleep at the moment.The trial court and the Court of Appeals
rejected appellants defense of alibi.

ISSUE: Whether appellant was guilty.

RULING:The Supreme Court found Huntoria to be an unreliable witness. Huntoria

admittedduring cross-examination that he cannot determine the group of people
stabbing the deceased. He failed to point definitely that appellant also did the crime.As
stated in Arts. 3 and 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for one to be criminally liable, an act
should be committed. The SC found no sufficient proof that appellant has acted.Lastly,
the SC found Huntoria was an interested witness as he was also the tenant of the
deceased. His testimony was sought to ingratiate himself with the deceaseds family.The
SC found appellants guilt not proven by reasonable doubt thus acquitting him.

Longer versionof People v. Gonzales

At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the physician who conducted
the autopsyon the body, Paja, the patrolmen and constabulary members who joined in
the investigation, the widow,and Huntoria.Dr. Rojas testified that he performed
the autopsy at around 11:20 a.m. on Feb. 1981 after thedeceased was taken to the
municipal hall. He found 4 puncture wounds, 7 stab wounds, 4 incisions, and1
laceration; five of these were fatal wounds. Rojas admitted one of two possibilities:Only
one weapon might have caused all the wounds. Multiple instruments were used due to
the number and different characteristics The brunt of the prosecution’s case rested on
Huntoria’s alleged eyewitness account of the
incident, which was as follows:
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Testified on July 27, 1982; at 5 pm on Feb. 21, 1981, he left his work at Brgy. Central,
andwalked home, taking a short-cut.While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses’ home
at around 8:00 pm, he heard cries for help. Curiosity prompted him to approach the place
where the shouts were from.15-20 m away from the scene, he hid himself behind a
clump of banana trees, and saw allthe accused ganging upon the deceased near
a threshing platform. He said he clearlyrecognized all the accused as the place was
awash in moonlight.After stabbing and hacking the victim, the accused lifted his body
and carried it to the house.Huntoria then left home. Upon reaching his house, he related
what he saw to his wife andmother before going to sleep.Eight months after the
incident, bothered by his conscience and the fact that his father wasa tenant of the
deceased, he thought of helping the widow. Out of his own volition, he
travelled to the widow’s houise, and related to her what he saw. Except Fausta who admitted
killing the deceased as he was trying to rape her, the rest denied participation in the
crime. The appellant claimed that he was asleep in his house which was one kilometre
away from the scene of the crime, and he knew of the crime only when his
grandchildren went to his house that night.
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the prosecution’s
version.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellant contended that the trial court erred in
convicting him on the basis of the testimony of the lone witness, and in not appreciating
his defense of alibi. The Court found no merit in the errors, and rejected defense of alibi.
Worsening this is that the appellate court found the sentence erroneous, and upgraded
the penalty to that of murder
—reclusion temporal/death.The case is now brought upon certification by the Court of
Appeals, hence the appeal.
Issue(s):
Whether or not the client, under the evidence presented, has committed the felony of
murder.
Held: No, he has not.
Ratio:Court’s analysis of the evidence:

Investigation conducted left much to be desired. Centeno gave the date of commission
asMarch 21, 1981. The sketch made was troubling, as it did not effectively indicate the
extentof the blood stains in the scenes of crime. This would have added a lot of weight
to any oneof the versions of the incident.

Sazon, who claimed that Gonzales surrendered to him, failed to state clearly the reason
forthe surrender. It may even be possible that Augusto surrendered just so he could be
safe
from the victim’s kin. Sazon also admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of
other persons in the killing.-

Rojas’ statement showed two possibilities for the killing. Fausta’s admission that she was
the only killer is plausible. Furthermore, there were only five fatal wounds, which will
bediscussed later.-

Huntoria’s testimony, of which the prosecution’s argument solely rests, needs to beexamined further.
Huntoria’s claims in his testimony did not exact
ly match with those fromhis cross-examination. He first claimed that he recognized the
people involved. However, inthe cross-
examination, he “only saw flashes.”
This implies that he may not have recognizedanyone at all.
As such, Huntoria’s testimony co
uld not place a definite act committed or contributed by theappellant in the killing of the
deceased.On the criminal liability of the appellant:-
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There is nothing in the findings or the evidence that establishes the criminal liability of
theappellant as a principal for direct participation under Art. 17, para. 1 of the Revised
PenalCode.-

Furthermore, there is nothing in the findings or evidence that inculpates him by

inducement,under paragraph 2 of the same article. Based on the definition of felonies in
Art. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, the prosecution’s evidence could not establish intent nor fault. Recall
that the elements of felonies include:An act or omission
Act or omission must be punishable
Act is performed or omission incurred by deceit or fault-The lone witness could not
properly establish any acts or omissions done by the appellant.He stated that he does
not know who hacked or stabbed the victim, thus implying that hedoes not know what
the appellant did. With this, the essential elements of felonies may noteven be present.-
Furthermore, the fact that there were five stab wounds and six accused would imply
thatone of them may not have caused a grave wound (especially given the statement of
thephysician). This may have been the appellant, and given that there is no evidence
that the
appellant caused any of the wounds, coupled with the prosecution’s failure to prove the
presence of conspiracy (that is, how many people actually took part in the killing), it
weakens the arguments against the appellant.On the lone witness:-Huntoria’s credibility as
a witness is tarnished by two points: He came out eight months after the killing. He claims
that he feared for his life, butthere was no proof that he was being threatened, nor was
the length of timereasonable given the circumstances.He is not exactly a
disinterested/neutral witness. He admitted to being a tenant of the deceased, and stated
that one of the reasons why he testified was because thevictim was his landlord.-

Under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the source of his livelihood from his
landlord. As such, they would do everything to get the landlords to their favour. Posing
as a witness would have been a convenient way to do this, especially as he ceased to
be employed as early as May 1981.Finally, based on Philippine customs and traditions,
it is unlikely for the appellant to be in the scene of the crime, as under our family culture,
aging parents are usually sheltered and insulated from possible harm. It is improbable
for the accused to bring their aging father when they were clearly in better shape than
he was, and it was unlikely for the appellant to offer his services as they were more or
less enough to handle what could have been a perceived enemy.Although alibi is a
weak defense, in cases like this where the participation of the appellant is not clear, it
may be considered. In light of the evidence on record, it may be sufficient for an
acquittal.Decision of the CA is reversed and set aside. Appellant acquitted. Costs de
officio

People v. Silvestre / December 14, 1931 / G.R. No. L-35748

FACTS:Romana Silvestre was found guilty by the trial as accomplice to arson with
Martin Atienza as the principal.Silvestre and Atienza were illicit partners and they were
charged of adultery by Domingo Joaquin, Silvestre second husband. After pleading to
Joaquin, he dropped the charges and Atienza lived in another barangay.Silvestre still
secretly met with Atienza with the pretense of meeting her son from his first husband
Nicolas de la Cruz. On the day of the incident, Atienza burned the de la Cruz house with
Silvestre silently watching.

ISSUE: Whether Silvestre was an accomplice.

RULING:An accomplice means doing nothing on the crime itself but cooperated
by executing acts before or after the crime.The Supreme Court found mere presence
and silence do not constitute cooperation. She did not encouraged Atienza to do the
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act.The SC reversed the decision on Silvestre while they affirmed the decision
on Atienza.

Longer vesion People v. Silvestre:

 Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage

 Romana cohabited with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in
Masocol, Paombong, Bulacan
 On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong,
Bulacan a sworn complaint for adultery
 After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the
municipal president of Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge him to withdraw
the complaint
 The two accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised
not to live again in Masocol (Atienza signed the promise)
 On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his
complaint and the justice of the peace dismissed the adultery case
 The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Niño, in Paombong
 About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas
de la Cruz, in Santo Niño and followed him home to Masocol (under the pretext of
asking him for some nipa leaves)
 Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her and lived in
the home of Nicolas
 On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the
appellants were gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and Antonia to take their
furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to it
 He said that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people
of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and Romana
 Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him
 Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late
 The fire destroyed about 48 houses
 Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire
 The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson
 Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8
months, and 1 day of cadena temporal)
 Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio
mayor)
 The court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the affirmance
of the CFI decision with regard to Martin, but assigns errors with reference to Romana:
 The lower court erred in convicting Romana as acoomplice
 The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of insufficient
evidence, or at least, of reasonable doubt
Issue:Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice
Holding:No.
Ratio:
 Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be
one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or
induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of
the act by previous or simultaneous actions.
 In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and
none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence
 12

while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear
that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for
her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as
an accomplice.
 Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure
to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the
cooperation required by Art. 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of
the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent
Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to
Romana Silvestre, who is acquitted.

Dolo vs Culpa

US vs. Ah Chong
G.R. No. L-5272. March 19, 1910
Plaintiff-appelle: The United States
Defendant-appellant: Ah Chong
Ponente: J. Carson
FACTS:
The accused, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in Fort Mckinley and was sharing the
house with the deceased, Pascual Gualberto, who was employed as a house boy. The
door of the room they were occupying was not furnished with a permanent lock, and as
a measure of security, they fasten the door by propping a chair against it. One evening,
Ah Chong was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the door of their
room. The deceased and the accused had an understanding that when either returned
late at night, he should knock at the door and acquaint his companion with his identity.
Ah Chong sat up in bed and called out twice, “Who is there?” but heard no answer. The
room was quite dark, and as there had been recent robberies in Fort McKinley, fearing
that the intruder was a robber or a thief, he leaped to his feet and called out. “If you
enter the room, I will kill you.” Suddenly, he was struck by the edge of the chair which
had been placed against the door. Believing that he was being attacked, he seized a
common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow and wildly struck and fatally
wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate, Pascual.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was criminally liable.
HELD:
No. The rule is that one is not criminally liable if he acted without malice (criminal
intent), negligence, and imprudence. In the present case, the accused acted in good
faith, without malice or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than
exercising his legitimate right of self-defense. Had the facts been as he believed them to
be, he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act.
Moreover, the accused cannot be said to have been negligent or reckless as the facts
as he saw them threatens his person and his property. Under such circumstances, there
is no criminal liability, as the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or
bad faith.

People vs. Oanis

July 27, 1943 (74 Phil 257)
FACTS:
Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a notorious criminal and
escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. They
went to the suspected house then proceeded to the room where they saw the
supposedly Balagtas sleeping with his back towards the door. Oanis and Galanta
 13

simultaneously or successively fired at him which resulted to the victim’s death. The
supposedly Balagtas turned out to be Serepio Tecson, an innocent man.
ISSUE:
1. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent mistake of fact in the
honest performance of their official duties.
2. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the performance of their duty.
HELD:
1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar. “Ignorance facti
excusat” applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. The
fact that the supposedly suspect was sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could have checked
whether it is the real Balagtas.
2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs no criminal liability when
he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are
2 requisites to justify this: (1) the offender acted in teh perfomance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office, (2) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of
such right or office. In this case, only the first requisite is present.

Diego V. Castillo 2004

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673 August 11, 2004

FACTS:
· January 9, 1965: Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr.,
both Filipinos, solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City
· February 15, 1978: Jorge filed a Decree of Divorce in Texas
· June 4, 1987: Crescencia Escoto using the name Lucena Escoto married Manuel P.
Diego before the Rev. Fr. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City
· The sister of Manuel P. Diego filed a criminal case of bigamy against Escoto
· RTC: Acquittal since state failed to prove guilt beyond whisper of a doubt and gave
credence to the defense of the accused that she acted without any malicious intent for
believing in good faith that her marriage was already annulled by a foreign judgment
· An administrative case is filed against Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for Knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code

ISSUE: W/N Castillo should be liable against Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code

HELD: NO. Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is FINED P10,000 with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely
· The law requires that
o (a) the offender is a judge;
o (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision;
o (c) the judgment is unjust;
o (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust
· even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, he still cannot be
administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose
· As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
· Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.
· error committed by respondent Judge being gross and patent, the same constitutes
ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action
 14

ERRORINPERSONAE/ABERRATIO ICTUS/PRAETER INTENTIONEM

POP vs. BINDOY (CASE BRIEF)
G.R. No. L-34665 AUGUST 28, 1931
POP vs. BINDOY (CASE BRIEF)
1FACTS:
On May 6, 1930, Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Tibay, Faustino Pacas' wife.
She refused andBindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. Pacas stepped in
to defend his wife andattempted to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. The
disturbance attracted the attention ofEmigdio Omamdam. In the course of the struggle,
Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself fromPacas, wrenching the bolo from the
latter's hand, with such violence that the point of the boloreached Omamdam's chest,
who was then behind Bindoy. The trial court held that Bindoy wasguilty of the crime
of homicide. Bindoy appealed, alleging that the death of Omamdam was
causedaccidentally and without malicious intent.
ISSUE:WON the crime of which Bindoy was found guilty of can be mitigated on the
ground of accident.
HELD:Yes. Decision is reversed. Bindoy is acquitted according to Article 8, No. 8 of the
Revised PenalCode
RATIO:
1.There is no evidence to show that Bindoy deliberately and intentionally killed
Omamdam.
No evidence that Omamdam took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas.
No evidence that Bindoy was aware of Omamdam's presence.
No evidence that there was disagreement or ill feelings between Bindoy & Omamdam.
Onthe contrary, they were nephew & uncle, & were on good terms with each other.
2.The witness for the defense corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and
Bindoy wereactually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter
let go, the former hadpulled so violently that it flew towards Omamdam, who was
therefore hit in the chest, withoutBindoy's seeing him, because Omamdam had passed
behind him. The testimony of this witnesswas not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence
adduced by the fiscal.
3.If, in the struggle, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of
doing so,had wounded Omamdam, he would be liable for his act, since whoever willfully
commits a felony ora misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act
done is different from that whichhe intended.This is not the case here. Bindoy did not try
to wound Pacas. He was only trying to defend hispossession of the bolo, which Pacas
was trying to wrench away from him. His conduct was perfectly lawful.

People vs Cagoco
FACTS: On July 24, 1932, Manila, the accused willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, without any just
causetherefor and with intent to kill and treachery, assaulted and attacked Yu Lon by suddenly giving
hima fist blow on the back part of the head, treacherously,under conditions which intended
directlyand especially to insure, the accomplishment of his purpose without risk to himself
arisingfrom any defense the victim Yu Lon might make, thus causing him to fall on the ground as
aconsequence of which he suffered a lacerated wound in the scalp and a fissured fracture on
the leftoccipital region, which were necessarily mortal and which caused the immediate death of the
said Yu Lon. Defendant was found guilty of murder in the CFI, for which the defendant made an
appeal. Counsel enumerated the following assignment of error:
(1) that the trial court erred in finding thetrue assailant of Yu Lon, (2) assuming that the
appellant is such person, the trial court erredin finding that the appellant struck his supposed
victim, (3) assuming that the appellant issuch person, and that the appellant did indeed strike
Yu Lon, the trial court erred in that theblow was struck in the rear, (4) the trial court erred in
finding that the identity of the appellantwas fully established,
(5) the trial court erred in convicting the appellant of murder (Art 248) rather than maltreatment (Art
266).
 15

ISSUE: W/N a naturally resulting injury from a direct consequence of an unlawful act would make the
aggressor criminally liable

DECISION: Regarding the contention of the appellant that striking Yu Lon at the back of the
headwould not possibly cause him to fall forward on his face to the pavement, the Court declared
that theexpert testimony shows that the victim had undergone a natural phenomenon of falling
backwardson the pavement in an attempt to regain balance. Another consideration was the slope of
thesidewalk, which could have made Yu Lon fall the opposite direction from which he was struck, as
hetried to straighten up. The Court referred to paragraph 1, Article 4 of the RPC which provides
thatcriminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongfulact done be different from what he intended; but in order that a person be criminally liable,
thefollowing requisites must be present: (1) that a felony was committed, and (2) that the wrong done
tothe aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the offender. There is
nodoubt as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon, which occurred as the direct consequence of the
blowdealt by the appellant, and the fact that the defendant did not intend to cause so great an injury
doesnot relieve him from the consequence of his unlawful act but is merely a mitigating
circumstance(US vs Rodriguez, 23 Phil 22).

Notes:
Appellate court mentioned the US vs Brobst case, where it was held that death may result
from a blow over or near the heart or in the abdominal region, notwithstanding the fact that
the blow leaves no outward mark of violence; that where death results as the direct
consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened
condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor
of criminal responsibility.

PP v Rodriguez page 73
PP vs Reyes page 73
US vs Marasigan page 73 and 74

US VS. MOLDES, GR NO. 42122

FACTS: There was a dance in a private house, and the deceased was the master of
ceremonies at that dance. The appellant insisted on dancing out of turn and
was reproved by the deceased. Appellant then went to the porch of the house and with
his bolo began cutting down the decorations. He descended into the yard of the house
and challenged everyone to a fight. Not attracting sufficient attention, he began
chopping at the bamboo trees and repeated his challenged for a fight. The
deceased, unarmed, started down the stairs, speaking to him in a friendly manner, and
as deceased had about reached the ground, appellant struck at him with his
bolo, inflicting a wound on his left arm. As deceased fell to the ground, appellant
inflicted a slight wound in the back and ran
away from the scene of action. The wound was seen and treated the next
morning by the sanitary inspector of Abuyog, but the deceased remained
in the care of a local “curandero.” This treatment failed to stop the
hemorrhage, and the deceased died.
HELD: The attorney de oficio urges that appellant did not intend to
commit as serious a wound as was inflicted but struck only in the dark
and in self-defense. It is clear that there is no element of self-defense in
the case and that appellant was the aggressor. When one resorts to the
use of a lethal weapon and strikes another with the force that must have
 16

been used in this case, it must be presumed that he realizes the natural
consequences of his act. It is also contended by the attorney for the
appellant that if the deceased had secured proper surgical treatment, the
wound would not have been fatal. In the outlying barrio in which this
assault took place, proper modern surgical service is not available.
The general rule is “… that he who inflicts the injury is not relieved of
responsibility if the wound inflicted is dangerous, that is, calculated to
destroy or endanger life, even though the immediate cause of the death
was erroneous or unskillful medical or surgical treatment.
Impossible Crimes
PP VS. DOMASIAN, GR NO. 95322
FACTS: In the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking with
a classmate, he was approached by a man who requested his assistance
in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to
help and rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan, where he waited
outside while the man went into a building to get the certificate. Enrico
became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to
the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding
him firmly all the while. The man told him to stop crying or he would not
be returned to his father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took
another tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building from where
they walked to the market. Here the man talked to a jeepney driver and
handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father.
The two then boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente, with the man still
firmly holding Enrico, who continued crying. This aroused the suspicion of
the driver, Alexander Grate, who asked the man about his relationship
with the boy. The man said he and the boy were brothers, making Grate
doubly suspicious because of the physical differences between the two
and the wide gap between their ages. Grate immediately reported the
matter to two barangay tanods when his passengers alighted from the
tricycle. Grate and the tanods went after the two and saw the man
dragging the boy. Noticing that they were being pursued, the man told
Enrico to run fast as their pursuers might behead them. Somehow, the
man managed to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way
home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in
the hospital ambulance and already looking for him. 2
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra
 17

received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1

million for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would
be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After
comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the note to the
police, which referred it to the NBI for examination. The test showed that it had been
written by Dr. Samson Tan. 4 On the

other hand, Enrico was shown a folder of pictures in the police station so
he could identify the man who had detained him, and he pointed to the
picture of Pablito Domasian.
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of the
ransom note was an impossible crime which he says is not punishable.
His reason is that the second paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person
performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means." As the
crime alleged is not against persons or property but against liberty, he
argues that it is not covered by the said provision.
HELD: Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraph of the same article,
which clearly applies to him, thus: Criminal liability shall be incurred: By
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be
considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent
improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or
ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the
victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty. The sending
of the ransom note would have had the effect only of increasing the
penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article 267 although this too
would not have been possible under the new Constitution.

INTOD VS. PP, GR NO. 103119

FACTS: Petitioner together with other men, all armed with firearms,
arrived at Palangpangan's house. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian,
Tubio and Daligdig fired at bedroom of Palangpangan. It turned out,
 18

however, that Palangpangan was in another city and her home was then
occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when
the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's decision. This
petition questions the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of
attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the
judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime,
HELD: Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation of the Revised Penal Code.
This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where: it was
necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the
person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed,
employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a
reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been
physically possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law
and the courts did not hold him criminally liable.
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an
offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. That the offense
cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by
its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1)
legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the
intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal
impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would
not amount to a crime. Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to those
circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform
an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical
act, (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the
consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category. On
the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts
 19

his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the
latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. The case at bar belongs to this
category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would
be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus,
the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
In the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is
factuallyor physically impossible of accomplishment, the offender cannot
escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the
substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears,
therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an
attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is
legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for
any crime — neither for an attempt nor for an impossible crime. The only
reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an
impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to
a crime charge — that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes
are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is
not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the
phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised
Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility
and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar presents physical impossibility
which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And
under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient
to make the act an impossible crime.

PP VS. ENOJA, GR NO. 102596

SYNOPSIS: The five appellants here, all farmers and residents of
Barangay Caraudan, Janiuay, Iloilo, are related to each other. The victim,
Siegfred G. Insular, was a suspected commander of the "New People's
Army" (NPA). The provincial fiscal filed an nformation for murder against
herein appellants and their three companions who remained at-large.
They were arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty. The trial court
rendered a decision finding appellants herein guilty as charged. The trial
court did not give credence to the claim of self-defense and found
 20

conspiracy in committing the crime. The appellants filed this appeal

before the Supreme Court. DIET
In this case, circumstances indubitably showed that appellants acted
concertedly to kill Siegfred. Here, the Supreme Court found that the trial
court did not err in finding that conspiracy was present in this case. Both
the victim and the assailant knew each other and the victim gave no
provocation in the attack. Clearly the qualifying circumstance was present
in this case. The defense of alibi did not prosper when the appellants
failed to prove the physical impossibility of their presence at the crime
scene at the time of its commission. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court was affirmed with modification that the award of actual damages
was deleted.
As an alternative defense, appellants present the theory that even
assuming they participated in the killing of Siegfred, they should only be
held liable for the commission of an impossible crime under Article 4, Par.
2 of the Revised Penal Code, penalized under Article 59
thereof. Appellants theorize that the shots fired by Armada already
resulted in the death of the victim, and hence, their subsequent shooting
of the victim merely constitutes the impossible crime of killing an already
dead person. The proposition not only completely contradicts their
defense of alibi and denial, it is also speculative as to cause of death. The
defense of impossible crime is irreconcilable with alibi.

Doctrine of Proximate Cause

VDA BATACLAN VS. MEDINA, 102 Phil 181
FACTS: There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and
conductor. While the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus,
Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it
fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle.
Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they
could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while four passengers could
not get out of the overturned bus. After half an hour, came about ten men,
one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one
end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach
the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning
and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped
inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to
 21

leak, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground
under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men
who answered the call for help set it on fire.
HELD: There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant
carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial court was of
the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan and the
other trapped passengers was not the overturning of the bus, but rather,
the fire that burned the bus. We disagree. Proximate Cause has been
defined as 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.' It may be that
ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger,
merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected
and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if
some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the
passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate
cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But
in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do
not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the
bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side
but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was
not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted
torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the
rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a
rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what
was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In
other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and
was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of
some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the
burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the
carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the
driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They,
or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in
which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from
 22

the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside
from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can
be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor
the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the
rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

URBANO VS. PP, GR NO. 182750

FACTS: The victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the
compound of the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD) having just arrived
from a picnic in the nearby town of Bugallon, Pangasinan, where, they
drunk beer in a restaurant with some other co-workers While inside the
compound, the two had a heated altercation in the course of which
Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at petitioner. The exchange of words
led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking up the
fight, but only for a brief moment as the protagonists refused to be
pacified and continued throwing fist blows at each other. Then petitioner
delivered a "lucky punch," as described by eyewitness Orje Salazar, on
Tomelden’s face, which made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden was on
the verge of hitting his head on the ground had their companions not
caught him and prevented the fall. The blow, however, caused
Tomelden’s nose to bleed and rendered him unconscious. The deceased
told his wife of the mauling incident. Thereafter, the deceased was still
able to go to work however, his complaints to his wife of severe pain in
the head, prompted him to be admitted at the community hospital. Finally,
Tomelden died on October 10, 1993 due, per Dr. Arellano, to "cardio-
respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant
cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident."
The defense presented petitioner who denied having any intention to kill,
asserting that hypertension, for which Tomelden was receiving treatment,
was the cause of the latter’s death.Moreover, the Tomelden only died 12
days later after the incident and was still able to report to work engenders
doubt on the proximate cause of victim’s death. Petitioner, thus, contends
that he could only be adjudged guilty of physical injuries.
HELD: The prosecution witness, Salazar, testified about petitioner’s lucky
punch hitting Tomelden right smack on the face. And even if Tomelden’s
head did not hit the ground as his co-workers averted that actuality, that
punch gave him a bleeding nose and rendered him unconscious right
 23

after the September 28, 1993 fight. From then on, Tomelden was in and
out of the hospital complaining of headache, among other pains, until his
demise 12 days after the blow was made. Significantly, Dr. Arellano
opined that the fist blow which landed on Tomelden’s head could have
shaken his brain which caused the cerebral concussion; and that the
cause of the victim’s death was "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to
cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling
incident." The combined effects of the testimonies of Salazar and Dr.
Arellano, buttressed by that of Rosario who related about her husband’s
post September 28, 1993 severe head pain, clearly establish beyond
cavil the cause of Tomelden’s death and who was liable for it. It was
through the direct accounts of the prosecution witnesses of the events
that transpired during the fisticuff incident more specifically the landing of
the "lucky punch" on the face of [Tomelden], taken together with the
result of the medical examinations and autopsy report which described
the death of the victim as "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral
concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident"
that we are convinced that the "lucky punch" was the proximate cause of
[Tomelden’s] death. The prosecution had satisfactorily proven that it was
only after the incident that transpired on September 28, 1993 that the
victim was hospitalized on several occasions until he expired, twelve days
later. It is moreover of no consequence whether the victim was able to
report for work during the intervening days.

SEGURITAN VS. PP, G.R. NO. 172896

FACTS: Petitioner was having a drinking session with his uncles Lucrecio
Seguritan (Lucrecio), Melchor Panis and Baltazar Panis in the house of
Manuel dela Cruz in Barangay Paradise, Gonzaga, Cagayan. Petitioner,
who was seated beside Lucrecio, claimed that Lucrecio’s carabao
entered his farm and destroyed his crops. A heated discussion thereafter
ensued, during which petitioner punched Lucrecio twice as the latter was
about to stand up. Petitioner’s punches landed on Lucrecio’s right and left
temple, causing him to fall face-up to the ground and hit a hollow block
which was being used as an improvised stove.
Lucrecio lost consciousness but was revived with the assistance of
Baltazar. Thereafter, Lucrecio rode a tricycle and proceeded to his house.
Upon his arrival, his wife noticed blood on his forehead. Lucrecio
 24

explained that he was stoned, then went directly to his room and slept.
At around 9 o’clock in the evening, Lucrecio’s wife and daughter noticed
that his complexion has darkened and foamy substance was coming out
of his mouth. Attempts were made to revive Lucrecio but to no avail. He
died that same night.
NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Antonio Vertido exhumed Lucrecio’s body
and performed the autopsy. Dr. Vertido concluded that Lucrecio’s cause
of death was traumatic head injury.

HELD: Petitioner disputes the conclusion that the fracture on the right
middle fossa of the skull, beneath the area where a hematoma developed
was due to the blow he delivered because according to the testimony of
Dr. Vertido, the fracture may also be caused by one falling from a height.
Petitioner also maintains that the punches he threw at Lucrecio had
nothing to do with the fatal head injuries the latter suffered. According to
him, Lucrecio sustained the head injuries when he accidentally hit the
hollow block that was used as an improvised stove, after falling from the
opposite end of the bench. Petitioner insists that Lucrecio died due to a
fatal heart attack.
We are not persuaded. It is on record that Lucrecio suffered two external
injuries and one internal injury in his head. The autopsy report showed
that Lucrecio died of internal hemorrhage caused by head injuries.
Melchor’s eyewitness account of the fist blows delivered by petitioner to
Lucrecio and the manner by which the latter fell from the bench and hit
his head on the improvised stove is consistent with the autopsy findings
prepared and testified to by Dr. Vertido. The testimony of Dr. Vertido also
ruled out petitioner’s contention that Lucrecio died of a heart attack.
Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code states that Criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended. Petitioner committed
an unlawful act by punching Lucrecio, his uncle who was much older than
him, and even if he did not intend to cause the death of Lucrecio, he must
be held guilty beyond reasonable doubt for killing him pursuant to the
above-quoted provision. He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of
the evil caused.

PP VS. RAFAEL MARCO, DEFENDANT APPELLANT, GR NOS. L-

 25

28324-5
FACTS: Simeon Marco, son of appellant Rafael, approached Constancio
Sabelbero and after asking him if he were the one who boxed his
(Simeon's) brother the year before, brandished a hunting knife, which
caused Constancio to run away. While thus running, he passed by
appellant who hit him with a cane causing him slight physical injuries.
When Simeon was about to pursue Constancio, the latter's father,
Vicente, who was in the crowd, grabbed Simeon's hand that was holding
the knife. When Vicente, however, saw that appellant, who was holding a
round cane and a hunting knife, was approaching them, he shouted to
Constancio and to his other son Bienvenido who appeared in the scene
to run away, which they did, as he himself released Simeon and ran
away. Appellant followed Bienvenido and stabbed him, but the latter
parried the blow which caused injuries to his left hand. Bienvenido tried to
run farther but his feet got entangled with some vines and he fell down.
Whereupon, Beltran, who came from nowhere, stabbed him near the
anus, followed by Simeon who stabbed him on the left side of the breast.
Thereafter, Bienvenido died. On the theory that there was obvious
conspiracy among appellants Rafael, Simoen, and Beltran, the trial court
convicted them of murder. Only Rafael appealed.
The Supreme Court ruled that the act of appellant stabbing the victim
which caused injuries to the latter's left hand is separate from the fatal
stabs inflicted by his two co-accused, because the existence of bad blood
between the families of the deceased and the accused which could have
established commonality of intent on the part of the three accused was
denied by both parties. Moreover, there was no clear evidence
connecting the act of appellant in trying to stab the victim which caused
the latter injuries on the left hand, with the fatal stabs inflicted by his two
other co-accused.
HELD: Appellant cannot be held liable for the death of decedent under
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code. "Article 4, paragraph 1, of the
Revised Penal Code provides that, 'criminal liability shall be incurred by
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.' Under this provision, one who
commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences
which may naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or
intended or not. It cannot be denied that the stabbing of the decedent by the appellant
 26

which caused a slight wound on the former's hand was intentionally

made; hence, felony. However, the ensuing death of the decedent was
not the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wound inflicted by
the appellant. There was an active intervening cause, which was no other
than the sudden and unexpected appearance and participation of Simeon
Marco and Dulcisimo Beltran. And there is authority that if the
consequences produced have resulted from a distinct act or fact
absolutely foreign from the criminal act, the offender is not responsible for
such consequence.

PP VS. VILLACORTA, GR NO. 186412

FACTS: Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending
her sari-sari store located at C-4 Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both
Cruz and Villacorta were regular customers at Mendeja’s store. At
around two o’clock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering bread at
Mendeja’s store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering a
word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruz’s body using a sharpened
bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz’s
body. Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja
gave chase but failed to catch Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her
store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the broken bamboo stick from
Cruz’s body. Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical
Center.
Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro
Hospital. When Cruz sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he
was taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where he was treated as an out-
patient. Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on February
14, 2002, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. While
admitting that he did not personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to
determine, using Cruz’s medical chart and diagnosis, that Cruz died of
tetanus infection secondary to stab wound
HELD: There is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the
event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held
liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon
Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection, and
not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as “that cause, which, in natural and
 27

continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,

produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.”
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early
morning of January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-
patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On February 14, 2002, Cruz was
admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus
infection, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The
prosecution did not present evidence of the emergency medical treatment
Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by Cruz to
Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up medical treatment
of his stab wound, or Cruz’s activities between January 23 to February 14,
2002.
There are doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the
conviction of Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval of 22 days
between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to
San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If
Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the
symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the
Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation
period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two to three
days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%)
mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was
merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might
have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s
stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is
guilty of slight physical for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz.

ATTEMPTED STAGE
PP VS. LAMAHANG, GR NO. L-43530
FACTS: At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing,
who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and CR Fuentes streets of the
City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of making an opening with an
iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named
street. At the time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside
with another Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking
 28

one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman
showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.
HELD: There is no doubt in the case at bar it was the intention of the
accused to enter Tan Yu’s store by means of violence, passing through
the opening which he has started to make in the wall, in order to commit
an offense which, due to the arrival of policeman Tomambing did not
develop beyond the first steps of execution. But it is not sufficient, for the
purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed
constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its
unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause
and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop
into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is
necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated
by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator,
will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in the
case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force
or violence another person’s dwelling may be considered an attempt to
commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to
take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property
belonging to another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record
from which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. The
fact under consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but
attempted trespass to dwelling.

PEOPLE VS LIZADA GR NO 143468-71, JANUARY 24, 2003

Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged with four (4) counts of qualified
rape under four separate Information for raping his stepdaughter.

Issue:Will Lizada be charged with attempted rape or act of lasciviousness

Principles Applied:
In light of the evidence of the prosecution, there was no
introduction of the penis of accused-appellant into the aperture or within
the pudendum of the vagina of private complainant. Hence, accused-
appellant is not criminally liable for consummated rape
 29

The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not accused-

appellant is guilty of consummated acts of lasciviousness defined in
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code or attempted rape under Article
335 of the said Code, as amended in relation to the last paragraph of
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. In light of the evidence on record,
we believe that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape and not of
acts of lasciviousness.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
“Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness.—Any person who shall commit any act
of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished
by prision correccional.”
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
“There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.”
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
“1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by
overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony;
3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due
to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.”
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements,
namely:
“(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to
be committed.”
Ruling:
In Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant is hereby found
guilty of attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended in relation to Article 6 of the said Code and is hereby meted an
indeterminate penalty of from six years of prision correccional in its
maximum period, as minimum to ten years of prision mayor in its medium
period, as maximum.
 30

PP VS. RIVERA et. al. GR No. 16632

FACTS: The accused, all surnamed Rivera, attacked and assaulted one
Ruben Rudil, hitting him with a piece of hollow block while the latter went
to a nearby store to buy food together with his daughter. People who saw
the incident called for them to stop. Policemen arrived in the scene
prompting the three accused to fled to their house. Ruben was rushed to
the hospital where the attending physician declared that the wounds
sustained by Ruben were slight and superficial and would heal in about 7
days. The RTC and the CA convicted the accused of attempted murder.
Accused, now petitioners, aver that the prosecution had failed to prove
that they had intention to kill Ruben. They aver that based on the
testimony of the attending physician, the victim did not sustained a fatal
wound.
HELD: As stated by the attending physician, appellants could have killed
the victim had the hollow block hit his head and had the police not
promptly intervened. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but
intent to kill is evident, the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown by
the fact that the three brothers helped each other maul the defenceless
victim, and even if he had already fallen to the ground; that one of them
proceeded to hit the victim with a hollow block had not the police arrived.
The accused commenced of the felony directly by overt acts, but failed to
perform all acts of execution which would produce the crime of murder by
reason of some causes other than their own spontaneous desistance,
that is, Ruben Rodil was able to run away and the timely response of the
policemen. Furthermore, petitioners also draw attention to the fact that
the injury sustained by victim was superficial and thus not life threatening.
However, the nature of the injury does not negate the intent to kill. An
essential element of murder and homicide, whether, consummated,
frustrated or attempted, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim
immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injury. Intent to
kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or
circumstantial evidence while general criminal intent is presumed from
the commission of a felony by dolo.

ARANETA VS CA JULY 30, 1990

Facts:
 31

In an Information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila,

6th Judicial District on May 14, 1973, Eliseo Araneta, Jr. y Macute,
herein petitioner, Benjamin Bautista y Mendoza, also a petitioner,
Eden Ng y Dumantay and Joselito "Boy" Santiago were charged
with murder for the death of one Manuel Esteban, Jr. due to multiple
gun shot wounds on March 23, 1972.

Issue:
Should an accused who admittedly shot the victim but is shown to have
inflicted only a slight wound be held accountable for the death of the
victim due to a fatal wound caused by his co-accused?

Principles Applied:
The gunshot wound inflicted by petitioner Araneta, Jr. was a slight wound
which did not cause the death of the victim nor materially contributed to it
in order that he may be held liable for homicide.
His liability should therefore be limited to the slight injury he caused. However, the fact
that
petitioner Araneta Jr. inflicted a gunshot wound on the victim shows the
intent to kill. The use of a gun fired at another certainly leads to no other
conclusion than that there is intent to kill. He is therefore liable for the
crime of attempted homicide and not merely for slight physical injury Considering the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without

any other attendant circumstances, petitioner Araneta, Jr. is imposed the

penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) months of prision correccional.
Although, he is still guilty of attempted homicide.

PP VS. BALEROS, JR. GR NO. 138033

SYNOPSIS: About 1:50 in the morning of December 13, 1991 in Manila,
the accused Renato Baleros Jr., forcefully covered the face of Martina
Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying
effects, and commenced the commission of rape by lying on top of her
with the intention to have carnal knowledge with he but was unable to
perform all acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against
her will and consent to her damage and prehudice. The petitioner argues,
however, that the above mentioned information, does not allege the
 32

complained act of covering the face of the victim with a piece of cloth
soaked in chemical caused her annoyance, irritation, torment, distress
and disturbance.
HELD: Malice, compulsion, or restraint need not be alleged in an
information for unjust vexation. The paramount question (in a prosecution
for unjust vexation) is whether the offender’s act causes annoyance,
irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to
whom it is directed. That the victim, after the incident, cried while relating
to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact
that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond reasonable doubt
that she was disturbed, if not, distressed, by the acts of the petitioner.
Frustrated Stage
PP vs Sy Pio- page 106
US VS. EDUAVE, GR NO L-12155
FACTS: The accused rushed upon the girl, suddenly an struck her from
behind, in part at least, with a sharp bolo. A deadly weapon was used.
The motive of the crime was that the accused was incensed at the girl for
the reason that she had theretofore charged him criminally before the
local officials with having raped her and causing her pregnancy.
HELD: The crime was frustrated, not attempted murder. A felony is
frustrated when the offender performs all acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause between the
beginning of the commission of the act and the moment when all the acts
have been performed which would result in the consummate crime. In
other words, the subjective phase had been passed. In the case at bar,
the blow was directed toward a vital part of the body. The aggressor
stated his purpose to kill, thought he had killed and threw the body into
the bushes. When he gave himself up, he declared that he had killed the
complainant. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the
offender while he was passing through the subjective phase. The crime,
however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes
independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to
commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due
to something beyond his control. In this case, he thought he already killed
the victim.
 33

PP VS. DAGMAN, et al GR NO. L-23133

FACTS: On the 2nd of May, 1924, Elias Magbual, was attacked by a
crowed of persons and was nearly killed. The motive of the crime was
that the persons who harbored enmity against Magbual had previously
been dispossessed of portions of the land by judicial order. Magbual
managed to escape death from his tormentors by the use of feigning
death.
HELD: The murder should be regarded as frustrated because the
offenders performed all acts of execution which should precede the felony
as consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrators; in this instance, the
playing possum by Magbual. There was an intent upon the part of the
assailants to take the life of the person attacked, which intent may be
gathered from the circumstances surrounding the attack; in this instance,
the nature of the wounds, the cry of the accused and their fingering of the
nose of Magbual to see if respiration continued. Deadly weapons were
used, blows were directed at the vital parts of the body, the aggressors
stated their purpose to kill and thought they had killed. The subjective
phase of the crime was entirely passed, and subjectively speaking, the
crime was complete. The particular parts of the body of the person struck
during the assault, the deadly character of the weapons used, the picked up
two pieces of firewood along the way with which he hit Chu.

Appellant Jaime Lopez in the meantime surfaced from the back of the
tailoring shop and also joined the chase. Soon appellant Aragon also
surfaced from the back of the tailoring shop and joined the chase. The
three caught up with Chu. Aragon boxed Chu, causing the latter to fall.
He then kicked the victim. Lopez stabbed Chu several times as Regalado
looked on. When Chu was no longer moving, the three appellants left.
HELD: Appellants’ disclaimer of the presence of conspiracy fails. The
evidence shows that they cooperated in a common design to kill Chu.
Regalado initiated the killing when he stabbed Chu on the chest, and the
two other appellants joined Regalado in chasing Chu, with Regalado
hitting Chu with firewood along the way. Then, when the three of them
had cornered Chu, Aragon boxed and kicked Chu enabling Lopez to stab
him several times. These indicates a conspiracy.
 34

Colinares vs PP GR no. 182748 dec 13, 2011

The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) with
frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in
Criminal Case T-2213.[1]

Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25,
2000, he and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way,
Jesus took a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked
behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 inches in
diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.

Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the
roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the right temple,
knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him.

Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be
smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought Rufino to
the hospital.

Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate[2] showing that Rufino suffered two
lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these
injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.

The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-
defense. He testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus,
and Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of
Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then
boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked
up a stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he
charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and
hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sisters house. On September 4,
2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.

Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on the
night of the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw the
three engaged in heated argument with Arnel.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six
years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.

Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively,
seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of
the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award
for lost income in the absence of evidence to support it.[3] Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this
Court on petition for review.

In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the Solicitor
General to submit their respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel committed only
the lesser crime of attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four
 35

months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as
maximum, he could still apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.

Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for
probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense
probationable. The language and spirit of the probation law warrants such a stand. The Solicitor
General, on the other hand, argues that under the Probation Law no application for probation
can be entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.

The Issues Presented

The case essentially presents three issues:

1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head with a
stone;

2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of frustrated
homicide; and

3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced
probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to
the trial court.

The Courts Rulings

One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely
acted in self-defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.

When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he was
legally justified in killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must establish the
elements of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. When successful, the otherwise
felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the
accused.[4]

In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1)

that the person whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the
offender employed means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (3) that the person defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation.[5]

If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has
nothing to prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for
being appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack
or an imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not
enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a weapon.[6]

Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful
aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino
and Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated Arnels testimony that it was Rufino who
started it. Arnels only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those involved
having a heated argument in the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical
certificate to prove his point that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his
companions.[7]

In contrast, the three witnessesJesus, Paciano, and Ananiastestified that Arnel was the
aggressor. Although their versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract from
 36

their core story. The witnesses were one in what Arnel did and when and how he did
it. Compared to Arnels testimony, the prosecutions version is more believable and consistent
with reality, hence deserving credence.[8]

Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be liable for
frustrated homicide when the wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could
not have resulted in death as in fact it did not?

The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accuseds intent to take his
victims life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible
doubt regarding homicidal intent.[9] And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other
things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted
on his victim.[10]

Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it
knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the
location of the wounds that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he intended
to kill him.

The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated,
homicide. In Palaganas v. People,[11] we ruled that when the accused intended to kill his victim,
as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die
because of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If
the victims wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.

Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and
severity of the victims wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that head injuries are always very
serious,[12] he could not categorically say that Rufinos wounds in this case were fatal. Thus:

Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?

A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.

Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds actually
are not fatal on that very day?
A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming
fatal. But on that case the patient preferred to go home at that time.

Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to the
length of the wound not the depth of the wound?
A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of scalp.

Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?

A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up the
label of the frontal lo[b]e, we always call it lacerated wound, but in
that kind of wound, we did not measure the depth.[13]

Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his
skull incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head. The
wounds were not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal in seven
or eight days. Dr. Belleza further testified:

Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery?
A: Yes, Madam.

Q: The injuries are slight?

 37

A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give antibiotics

and antit[e]tanus the problem the contusion that occurred in the
brain.

xxxx

Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?

A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the wounds.

Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?

A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of them
would rather go home and then come back.

Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?

A: No, Your Honor.

Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?

A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up.[14]

Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the
prosecutions claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical intervention. Thus, the
Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender.

Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed
from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.

But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds
that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as
maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation
upon remand of the case to the RTC.

Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by
the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides:
That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction.[15] Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated
homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation.

But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel
has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for
that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4
months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still
up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into
account the full circumstances of his case.

Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals from the judgment of
conviction is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens,
two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated
homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide
by the Supreme Court.
 38

If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will apply the
probation law on Arnel based on the trial courts annulled judgment against him. He will not be
entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More,
the Supreme Courts judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also
have to bend over to the trial courts judgmenteven if this has been found in error. And, worse,
Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of
his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the
horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?

The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for
probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals[16] that the
probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can
avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between Francisco and this case.

In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of
grave oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to one year
and eight months of prision correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation was his to
ask! Still, he chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for
probation. When the acquittal did not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of
course let him.It served him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly
could not have both appeal and probation.

The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation.This requirement outlaws the
element of speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the result of his appealthat when
his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the
service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an escape hatch thus
rendering nugatory the appellate courts affirmance of his conviction.[17]

Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to
apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a
position to say, By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation. The stiff penalty that
the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to
now seek probation under this Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling
in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they
have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.

Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty
imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for
attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way,
therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law
would allow him to apply for probation.

In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but
only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a
probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty
of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months
maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no
fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the
accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory
provisions.[18] As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law
 39

must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly
appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases
that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law
but to achieve its beneficent purpose.[19]

One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for
probation after he appealed from the trial courts judgment of conviction would not be consistent
with the provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to provide an
opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender. An accused like Arnel who appeals from a
judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.

This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of
conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that
carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a
crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide
with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.

Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced
penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to
instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation
law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on
Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right
to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the
right had the RTC done right by him.The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely
since the penalty he got was not probationable.

The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to
apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one
erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision
dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel
Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years
and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the amount
of P20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner applying for probation within 15
days from notice that the record of the case has been remanded for execution to the Regional
Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.

Roque vs PP Gr 193169

Petitioner Rogelio Roque (petitioner) was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in an
Information that reads as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of November, 2001, in the municipality of Pandi, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill[,] attack,
assault and shoot with a gun complain[an]t Reynaldo Marquez, hitting the latter on his right ear
and nape, and kick[ing] him on the face and back, causing serious physical injuries which
 40

ordinarily would have caused the death of the said Reynaldo Marquez, thus, performing all the
acts of execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is[,] by the
timely and able medical attendance rendered to said Reynaldo Marquez which prevented his
death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

When arraigned on March 23, 2003, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." During the pre-trial
conference, the defense admitted the identity of petitioner; that he is a Kagawad of Barangay
Masagana, Pandi, Bulacan; and that the day of the incident, November 22, 2001 was the
Thanksgiving Day of the said barangay. Trial thereafter ensued where the parties presented
their respective versions of the incident.

The prosecution averred that on November 22, 2001, while brothers Reynaldo Marquez
(Reynaldo) and Rodolfo Marquez (Rodolfo) were in the house of Bella Salvador-Santos (Bella)
in Pandi, Bulacan, Rodolfo spotted Rogelio dela Cruz (dela Cruz) and shouted to him to join
them. At that instant, petitioner and his wife were passing-by on board a tricycle. Believing that
Rodolfo's shout was directed at him, petitioner stopped the vehicle and cursed the former.
Reynaldo apologized for the misunderstanding but petitioner was unyielding. Before leaving, he
warned the Marquez brothers that something bad would happen to them if they continue to
perturb him.

Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo Tayao (Tayao) to ask for
assistance in settling the misunderstanding. Because of this, Reynaldo, who had already gone
home, was fetched by dela Cruz and brought to the house of Tayao. But since Tayao was then
no longer around, Reynaldo just proceeded to petitioner's house to follow Tayao and Rodolfo
who had already gone ahead. Upon arriving at petitioner's residence, Reynaldo again
apologized to petitioner but the latter did not reply. Instead, petitioner entered the house and
when he came out, he was already holding a gun which he suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was
hit in his right ear. Petitioner then shot Reynaldo who fell to the ground after being hit in the
nape. Unsatisfied, petitioner kicked Reynaldo on the face and back. Reynaldo pleaded Tayao
for help but to no avail since petitioner warned those around not to get involved. Fortunately,
Reynaldo's parents arrived and took him to a local hospital for emergency medical treatment.
He was later transferred to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital in Manila where he was operated on
and confined for three weeks. Dr. Renato Raymundo attended to him and issued a medical
certificate stating that a bullet entered the base of Reynaldo's skull and exited at the back of his
right ear. Presenting a totally different version, the defense claimed that on November 22, 2001,
petitioner went to the house of Bella on board a tricycle to fetch his child. While driving, he was
cursed by brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo who were visibly intoxicated. Petitioner ignored the
two and just went home. Later, however, the brothers appeared in front of his house still
shouting invectives against him. Petitioner's brother tried to pacify Rodolfo and Reynaldo who
agreed to leave but not without threatening that they would return to kill him. Petitioner thus
asked someone to call Tayao. Not long after, the brothers came back, entered petitioner's yard,
and challenged him to a gun duel. Petitioner requested Tayao to stop and pacify them but
Reynaldo refused to calm down and instead fired his gun. Hence, as an act of self-defense,
petitioner fired back twice.

On March 12, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 84, rendered
its Decision2 finding petitioner guilty as charged, viz:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in
the information, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six ( 6) years
[of] prision correccional, as minimum[;] to ten (10) years of prision mayor in its medium [period],
as maximum.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order4 dated August 16,
2007.
 41

Undaunted, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its Decision5 dated February
27, 2009, the CA affirmed in full the RTC's Decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in its entirety.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration7 thereto was likewise denied in a Resolution8 dated July
30, 2010.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari9 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where
petitioner imputes upon the CA the following errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPRECIATED THE

FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT THE ELEMENT OF
UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION WAS NOT SATISFACTORILY PROVEN SINCE 1HE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY SHOWN THAT THE
VICTIM/PRIV A TE COMPLAINANT WAS INDEED ARMED WITH AGUN.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPRECIATED THE

FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT GRANTING FOR THE
BENEFIT OF ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS INDEED UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION,
PETITIONER WAS NO LONGER JUSTIFIED IN FIRING AT THE VICTIM/PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT FOR THE SECOND TIME.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOSUL Y APPRECIATED THE

FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT INTENT TO KILL ON
THE PART OF PETITIONER WAS PRESENT CONSIDERING: (A) THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED TWO GUNSHOT WOUNDS, AND (B) THE
PETITIONER PREVENTED BARANGA Y OFFICIALS FROM INTERVENING AND
HELPING OUT THE WOUNDED PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.10

Our Ruling

The Petition must be denied.

The errors petitioner imputes upon the CA all pertain to "appreciation of evidence" or factual
errors which are not within the province of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The
Court had already explained in Batistis v. People11 that:

Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the review on
appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein the CA imposes a penalty other than death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is by petition for review on certiorari.

A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court,
explicitly so provides, viz:

Section I. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same
provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during
its pendency.

Petitioner's assigned errors, requiring as they do a re-appreciation and reexamination of the

evidence, are evidentiary and factual in nature.12 The Petition must therefore be denied on this
basis because "one, the petition for review thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only
legal questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings
 42

of the CA, unless they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse
of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin,"13 which was not shown
to be the case here.

Besides, findings of facts of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonial evidence, its assessment
of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on the said findings, are
accorded high respect if not conclusive effect when affirmed by the CA,14 as in this case. After
all, the RTC "had the opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were
telling the truth."15 "To [thus] accord with the established doctrine of finality and bindingness of
the trial court's findings of fact, [the Court shall] not disturb [the] findings of fact of the RTC,
particularly after their affirmance by the CA"16 as petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish
any extraordinary circumstance which merits a departure from the said doctrine.17

In any event, the Court observes that the CA correctly affirmed the RTC 's ruling that petitioner
is guilty of frustrated homicide and not merely of less serious physical injuries as the latter
insists. As aptly stated by the CA:

In attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill the
victim.1âwphi1 If there is no intent to kill on the part of the offender, he is liable for physical
injuries only. Vice-versa, regardless of whether the victim only suffered injuries that would have
healed in nine to thirty days, if intent to kill is sufficiently borne out, the crime committed is
frustrated homicide (Arts. 263-266).

Usually, the intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the offender and the parts of
the victim's body at which the weapon was aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. Hence,
when a deadly weapon, like a bolo, is used to stab the victim in the latter's abdomen, the intent
to kill can be presumed (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 13TH ED., P. 431).

It is worth highlighting that the victim received two gunshot wounds in the head. Indeed the
location of the wounds plus the nature of the weapon used are ready indications that the
accused-appellant's objective is not merely to warn or incapacitate a supposed aggressor.
Verily, had the accused-appellant been slightly better with his aim, any of the two bullets surely
would have killed him outright. Also, the intent to kill is further exhibited by the fact that the
accused-appellant even prevented barangay officials from intervening and helping x x x the
bleeding victim. Indeed, the fact that Reynaldo Marquez was miraculously able to live through
the ordeal and sustain only modicum injuries does not mean that the crime ought to be
downgraded from frustrated homicide to less serious physical injuries. After all, as was
mentioned above, what should be determinative of the crime is not the gravity of the resulting
injury but the criminal intent that animated the hand that pulled the trigger.18

The Court, however, notes that while the penalty imposed upon appellant is also proper, there is
a need to modify the assailed CA Decision in that awards of damages must be made in favor of
the victim Reynaldo.

The RTC and the CA correctly held that actual damages cannot be awarded to Reynaldo due to
the absence of receipts to prove the medical expenses he incurred from the incident.
"Nonetheless, absent competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a party still has the
option of claiming temperate damages, which may be allowed in cases where, from the nature
of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced although the court is convinced
that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss."19 Since it was undisputed that Reynaldo
was hospitalized due to the gunshot wounds inflicted by petitioner, albeit as observed by the
RTC there was no evidence offered as to the expenses he incurred by reason thereof, Reynaldo
is entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Aside from this, he is also
entitled to moral damages of P25,000.00. These awards of damages are in accordance with
settled jurisprudence.20 An interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum must also be imposed on
the awarded damages to commence from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid. 21

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 27, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31084 affirming in its entirety the March 12, 2007 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 84 in Criminal Case No. 3486-M-2002
convicting petitioner Rogelio Roque of the crime of :frustrated homicide, is AFFIRMED with the
 43

MODIFICATION that the petitioner is ordered to pay the victim Reynaldo Marquez moral
damages and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000,00 each, with interest at the legal
rate 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUMATED
Valenzuela vs. People
G.R. No. 160188. June 21, 2007

FACTS:
While a security guard was manning his post at the open parking area of a supermarket,
he saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of
detergent and unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting.
Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons
of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the cartons inside.
As the taxi was about to leave, the security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of
the merchandize. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were subsequently
apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and Calderon of
the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals,
arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to
freely dispose of the articles stolen. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of theft has a frustrated stage.
HELD:
No. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a felony is consummated when all
the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime
of theft, the following elements should be present: (1) that there be taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with
intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that
the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things. The Court held that theft is produced when there is
deprivation of personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the
offender is able or unable to freely dispose the property stolen since he has already
committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the owner has already
ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be
attempted or consummated.

Conspiracy and Proposal

Aleta vs People gr no. 179708 apr 16, 2009

Facts:Marcelo and his sons-co-appellants Ferdinand, Rogelio, Marlo andJovito, all

surnamed Aleta killed Celestino Duldulao and Fernando Acobthrough clubbing them
with wood.Based on testimonies of witnesses and report on investigation, the
victims suffered deep and large amount of clubbing which couldn’t be
performed by a single person. Also the victims fell on the gound due to theimpact of the
wood but they were continuously clubbed and hit with wooduntil they died.The court
found all of them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. It also rules out
the accused claim on self-defense and defense of relative. With that all the accused
petitioned

.Issue:WON the accused can interpose self-defense and defense of relative.

WON there was conspiracy.
 44

Held: No. Alibi, self-defense or defense of relatives are inherently weak defenses which,
as experience has shown, can easily be fabricated. For theaccused to be entitled to
exoneration based on self-defense or defense of relatives, complete or incomplete, it is
essential that there be unlawfulaggression on the part of the victim, for if there is
no unlawful aggression,there would be nothing to prevent or repel. For unlawful
aggression to beappreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack
or imminent danger thereof,. On the case, lawful aggression on the part of thevictims is
not present. The moment the victims fell on the groundextinguished any imminent
danger they pose. With that the accused shouldhave stopped but intead they continued
clubbing the victims until dead.
Yes.Conspiracy was present during the attack. When two or more persons aim their
acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that
their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative
indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment,
conspiracy may be inferred. And where there is conspiracy, the act of one is deemed
the act of all.

people v. Lopez, et. al. G.R. No. 177302 April 16, 2009
FACTS:
According to the prosecution:On April 25, 1996, appellant Rogelio Regalado
stabbed Edencito Chu (Chu) after interposing a challenge for Chu to come out so that
they “measure his courage.” Chu was able to run away but Regalado chased him and hit
him with two pieces of firewood which he picked along the way. Appellant Jaime Lopez
came out from a nearby house armed with a hunting knife and joined the chase. They
were soon joined by appellant Romeo Aragon who came from the back of the tailoring
shop where the stabbing first took place. The three were able to catch up with Chu.
Aragon boxed Chu until the latter fell and then kicked him. Lopez then stabbed Chu
several times as Regalado looked on. They only left when Chu was no longer moving.
Chu died before reaching the hospital.
Regalado, in his defense, denied taking part in the stabbing and claimed that Chu
choked him, causing him to run away from Chu after extricating himself from him.
Appellant Lopez interposed “defense of relative” and “self-defense” claiming that he
intercepted Chu as he was chasing, Regalado, Lopez’ father-in-law but Chu boxed him sohe
stabbed him several times and thereafter surrendered to the police. Appellant Aragon invoked
an alibi that he was at the wharf, which is 40 meters away from the scene of stabbing at the
time of the incident.The RTC found the three appellants to have killed Chu, qualified by
treachery which absorbed "abuse of superior strength". The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision instant case. Nowhere in the records is it shown that when Chu allegedly
chased Regalado, the former was wielding a weapon. Thus, the intention of Lopez to get a knife
for his protection and that of his father-in-law was unwarranted.

ISSUE: W/N there exist conspiracy

RULING:Yes. The evidence shows that they cooperated in a common design to kill Chu.
Regalado initiated the killing when he stabbed Chu on the chest, and the two other appellants
joined Regalado in chasing Chu, with Regalado hitting Chu with firewood along the way.Then,
when the three of them had cornered Chu, Aragon boxed and kicked Chu, enabling Lopez to
stab him several times. These indicate a conspiracy.
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