ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES

Vol. 71, No. 2, August, pp. 121–140, 1997

ARTICLE NO. OB972717

Decisions under Time Pressure: How Time

Constraint Affects Risky Decision Making
Lisa Ordóñez
University of Arizona

and

Lehman Benson III

University of Arizona

Subjects rated the attractiveness of and judged maximum buy-

ing prices for gambles which had some probability of winning
a dollar amount, otherwise winning nothing. Change-of-process
theory (Mellers, Chang, Birnbaum, & Ordóñez, 1992; Mellers,
Ordóñez, & Birnbaum, 1992) asserts that decision makers multi-
ply probability and amount information when stating buying
prices but add this information when reporting attractiveness
ratings. When subjects were placed under time constraint, how-
ever, some subjects’ ratings were consistent with a multiplicative
combination process. This result only occurred when these sub-
jects performed the rating task under time constraint and had
performed the buying price task in the previous set of trials.
These subjects were less likely to engage in cognitive tasks, as
measured by the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, &
Kao, 1984). Apparently, the extra cognitive demands of the time
constraint caused these subjects to use the same strategy
employed in the previous task. When the time constraint was
removed, these subjects appeared to switch back to an additive
strategy. These changes in information processing produced pre-
dictable patterns of preference reversals. q 1997 Academic Press

This research was supported by a grant to the first author from the University of Arizona Small
Grants Program. We thank Lee Beach, Terry Connolly, Leamon Crooms, Barbara Mellers, Amnon
Rapoport, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts. In addition, we thank
Anup Kuzmiyil and Vaishali Ghiya for programming assistance.
Address reprint requests to Lisa Ordóñez, Management and Policy, School of Business and
Public Administration, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721. E-mail: lordonez@u.arizona.edu.
121 0749-5978/97 $25.00
Copyright q 1997 by Academic Press
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
122 ORDÓÑEZ AND BENSON

INTRODUCTION

Overview
Researchers have typically studied risky decision making in situations that
allow the decision maker an unlimited amount of time to perform the task.
However, many real world decisions are made under some form of time con-
straint. Air traffic controllers must make quick decisions when directing air
traffic to avoid an accident. Police officers must quickly decide whether situa-
tions warrant the use of force. A driver, upon seeing a yellow light, must decide
whether to speed up through the intersection or hit the brakes to stop before
the red light appears.
Do decision makers use the same strategies when making risky decisions
with and without time constraint? Are there individual differences in responses
to time constraint? How do decision makers react when a deadline has been
met or when a time constraint has been removed? This paper investigates
these issues.
Research suggests that decision makers tend to speed up execution of their
decision strategies or switch to simpler strategies when under time constraint
(Edland & Svenson, 1993; Johnson, Payne, & Bettman, 1993; Svenson & Ben-
son, 1993a, 1993b; Smith, Mitchell & Beach, 1982; Wright, 1974). Furthermore,
when faced with high levels of time constraint, decision makers tend to rely
most heavily upon negative information (Wright, 1974). Moreover, decision
makers under time constraint either filter information that is used or omit
certain information from consideration altogether (Miller, 1960).

Time Constraint
As noted in Benson and Beach (1996), many researchers select time con-
straint levels arbitrarily, with no rationale. In these studies, we first timed
subjects on the task of interest and then selected as our constraint the execution
time that was one standard deviation below the mean. If times are normally
distributed, this forces about 84% of the subjects to perform the task faster
than normal. However, setting a time constraint is not enough to ensure that
subjects feel time pressure (Svenson & Benson, 1993; Benson, 1993). Time
constraint exists whenever there is a time deadline, even if the person is
able to complete the task in less time. Time pressure indicates that the time
constraint induced some feeling of stress and created a need to cope with the
limited time. Thus, it is possible to have time constraint but no time pressure.

Change-of-Process Theory and Preference Reversals

Preference reversals were first demonstrated by Lichtenstein and Slovic
(1971) and Lindman (1971). Subjects were offered pairs of gambles, matched on
expected value. Each pair contained a $ bet (a gamble with a small probability of
winning a moderate amount) and a P bet (a gamble with a high probability of
winning a small amount). They found that changing the task from choice to
 DECISIONS UNDER TIME PRESSURE 123

pricing (buying or selling) resulted in systematic reversals in preference. In

choice, subjects tended to choose the P bet over the $ bet. However, in the
pricing task, the same subject often priced the $ bet higher than the P bet.
The result, clearly, is problematic for researchers interested in measuring pref-
erence.
Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) and Mellers et al. (1992a, 1992b) found prefer-
ence reversals in the buying price and attractiveness rating task combination.
They showed that subjects stated higher buying prices for the $ bet over the
P bet, but rated the P bet as more attractive than the $ bet. Reversals have
also been found due to changes in point of view (Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979)
and due to violations of monotonicity (Birnbaum & Sutton, 1992).
Several theories have been proposed to explain preference reversals
(Goldstein & Einhorn, 1987; Mellers, Chang, Birnbaum, & Ordóñez, 1992;
Mellers, Ordóñez, & Birnbaum, 1992; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). Mellers
et al. (1992a, 1992b) presented results which were consistent with their
“change-of-process” theory but which could not be explained by contingent
weight theory (Tversky et al., 1988) or expression theory (Goldstein & Einhorn,
1987). Change-of-process theory states that preference reversals occur because
decision makers use different strategies for combining information depending
on the task. Attractiveness ratings (“how attractive is this gamble (0–80)?”)
were consistent with an additive combination strategy:

A (x, p; 0) 5 JA[k ? s(p) 1 u(x)], (1)

where A(x, p; 0) is the attractiveness rating for a gamble with probability p

of winning amount x, otherwise nothing, s(p) is the subjective probability of
probability p, u(x) is the utility of amount x, k is a scaling constant that
calibrates subjective probabilities and utilities on the same scale for a given
experiment, and JA is a monotonic judgment function which translates re-
sponses onto the attractiveness rating scale. However, maximum buying prices
were better described by a multiplicative combination process.

PB(x,p; 0) 5 JB[s(p)?u(x)], (2)

where PB(x, p; 0) is the buying price for gamble (x, p; 0) and JB is a monotonic
judgment function for buying prices, placing responses on a dollar scale.
Change-of-process theory assumes scale convergence (Birnbaum, 1974; Birn-
baum & Sutton, 1992): that is, the psychological perceptions of probability and
amount (i.e., subjective probabilities and utilities) remain constant across the
two tasks.
In the Mellers et al. (1992b) study, the decision strategies used by subjects
were investigated by having them judge both buying price and attractiveness
ratings for a set of gambles constructed from a factorial combination of amounts
to win ($3.00 to $56.70) and probability of winning (.05 to .94). Figure 1 presents
mean responses. Under certain assumptions about the judgment functions,
change-of-process theory predicts that the pattern of these plots should differ
124 ORDÓÑEZ AND BENSON

FIG. 1. Mean responses from Mellers et al. (1992a). Panel A presents mean attractiveness
ratings of simple gambles. Ratings plotted as a function of amount to win, with a separate curve
for each probability of winning. Panel B plots mean buying price responses by amount to win,
with a separate curve for probability of winning. Responses were from the “positive skew” context
in Mellers et al. (1992a).

systematically. An additive combination strategy would result in parallel

curves, as shown in Figure 1A. A multiplicative strategy leads to a bilinear
fan, where the curves meet at a common point and fan outward as in Fig. 1B.
Since we cannot be certain that subjects are actually adding and multiplying
in these two tasks, we will use the form of the curves to describe the strategy
that they use: parallel and bilinear.
Note that the inference that subjects are using different information pro-
cessing strategies in the different tasks requires (a) evidence of preference
reversals, (b) monotonic judgment functions, and (c) the scale convergence
assumption. Considering each task separately, subjects could be using a variety
of different combination rules and judgment functions and produce curves that
are either parallel or bilinear. However, Birnbaum (1982) showed that the
assumption of scale convergence between two tasks and monotonic judgment
functions imply that the two tasks cannot produce rank order differences if
subjects are using the same combination process. Thus, given these assump-
tions, preference reversals imply that subjects are using different strategies.

Risky Decision Making under Time Constraint

None of the current models of preference makes explicit predictions about
how preferences will change under time pressure. This paper extends the
change-of-process theory for this purpose, seeking insights into the decision
strategies employed by the subjects under different time constraints. Plots like
Fig. 1 will be used to determine the information processing strategies used in
time-constrained tasks. We will make the same assumptions as Mellers et
al. (1992a, 1992b): scale convergence and monotonic judgment functions. In
Experiment 1, we will apply a time constraint with the same set of gambles
used by Mellers et al. We expect that subjects will accelerate information
processing and possibly switch strategies to cope with the time constraint.
 DECISIONS UNDER TIME PRESSURE 125

This switching of strategies to cope with time constraints may be moderated

by individual differences. There has been a great deal of research investigating
individual differences in a general propensity to engage in cognitive activities,
as measured by the Need for Cognition scale (NFC; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao,
1984). However, only one study has investigated the connection between NFC
and reactions to time pressure (Verplanken, 1993). In this study, Verplanken
found that, under time constraint, subjects scoring low in need for cognition
appear to use more heuristic (i.e., simpler) information search strategies than
do high-NFC subjects. We expect NFC scores to be related to strategies used
in our judgment tasks.

EXPERIMENT 1: TIME CONSTRAINT ON ATTRACTIVENESS RATINGS

AND BUYING PRICES

Method
Stimuli and design. Subjects served in one of two conditions created by a
Time Constraint by Task by Task Order factorial design (2 3 2 3 2). The Task
Order was the only between subjects factor; it indicates whether subjects first
completed the attractiveness rating task or the buying price task.
Gambles were displayed as pie charts on a computer monitor. The circle was
said to represent a hypothetical spinner device in which the outcome depends
on where the spinner lands. The yellow section of the pie represented the
probability of winning, and the blue region indicated the probability of a zero
outcome. Amounts to win were indicated in a legend located near the pie.
Subjects were presented with 25 gambles created from a 5 (Probability) 3
5 (Amount) factorial design. Levels of probabilities were .09, .17, .29, .52, and
.94. Levels of amounts were $5.40, $9.70, $17.50, $31.50, and $56.70. These
levels were chosen to create several gambles with the same expected value,
but differing levels of probabilities and amount; these stimuli were a subset
of those used in Mellers et al. (1992a, 1992b).
Instructions and procedures. All instructions were presented on the com-
puter. The best and worst gambles were presented to indicate the range of
gambles before beginning the tasks. Gambles were presented one at a time
in random order. Before each task, subjects completed five practice trials to
familiarize themselves with the task and procedure. One half of the subjects
first rated the attractiveness of each of the 25 gambles on a scale from 0 to
100 (0 5 neither attractive nor unattractive, and 100 5 extremely attractive).
They then performed the buying price task in which they stated the maximum
amount they would be willing to pay to play each of the 25 gambles. The other
half of the subjects performed the two tasks in the opposite order.
In the first block of trials, all subjects performed rating and pricing tasks
on the 25 gambles, taking as much time per trial as they needed. This allowed
for baseline measures of the subject’s normal time to complete the trials. (Pilot
testing indicated that simply mentioning that there would be a time constraint
in later trials caused subjects to significantly reduce their response times in
126 ORDÓÑEZ AND BENSON

the unconstrained trials. Time constraints were therefore not mentioned in

these initial trials).
After completing both tasks without time constraint, the subjects were told
that they would complete the remaining trails with limited amount of time to
complete each trial. A bar at the upper left of the computer screen indicated
the amount of time remaining: when the bar was filled, the allowed time was
over. Subjects were told that at the end of the time limit on any trial, the
screen would go blank and a loud beep would sound until they made a response.
As an additional discouragement to exceed the time limit, subjects were told
that every time they heard the warning beep (i.e., gone over the limit), they
would have to complete two extra “make-up” trials. In each task they completed
the 25 required trials, then gambles were randomly sampled from the set of
25 to constitute the “make-up” trials. Before beginning the time constraint
trials, subjects completed 5 warm-up trials to familiarize themselves with the
time limit and procedure.
Subjects answered questions about their mood at the beginning of the ques-
tionnaire and after the time constraint trials. At the end of the experiment,
they completed the Need for Cognition (NFC) short form questionnaire and
answered a few additional demographic questions.
Time constraint method. As in Benson and Svenson (1993) constraints were
based on a pilot study. In the rating task, the average response time (RT) was
5.82 s per trial with a standard deviation of 2.74 s. In the pricing task, the
mean was 9.28 s per trial with a standard deviation of 4.5 s. Thus, the time
constraints imposed in the experiment were 3.08 s (5.82–2.74) for ratings and
4.78 s (9.28–4.5) for prices.
Participants. Fifty undergraduate business students at the University of
Arizona received extra credit for their participation. Each student worked alone
in a sound-insulated room at his or her own pace. The experiment took from
25 to 40 min to complete.
Manipulation checks. Several indicators suggested that subjects felt time
pressure when under time constraint. First, subjects under time constraint
significantly reduced the average time they took to complete each trial. For
ratings, the average RT was 6.0 s without time constraint vs 2.9 s with time
constraint (t49 5 8.87, p , .05). For prices, the mean RT without time constraint
was 8.6 s, 3.5s with time constraint (t49 5 8.05, p , .01).
Second, mood-related questions (all reported on a 0 to 100 “thermometer
scale”) indicate that the subjects experienced stress due to the time constraint.
On average, subjects reported feeling more “panicky” (58.0 vs 45.4 on a 0 5
tranquil to 100 5 panicky scale, t49 5 4.65, p , .05), more “vicious” (47.8 vs
38.7 on a 0 5 loving to 100 5 vicious scale, t49 5 4.14, p , .05), and more
“vigorous” (0 5 exhausted to 100 5 vigorous) after the time constraint trials
than before (60.7 vs 54.4, t49 5 2.59, p , .05).
Finally, subjects’ responses indicated that, while they felt time pressure in
the time constraint condition, the pressure was not too extreme. After complet-
ing the time constraint trials, subjects judged that they had a moderate amount
 DECISIONS UNDER TIME PRESSURE 127

of time to think about their responses (4.5 on a scale from 0 5 little time to
10 5 a great deal of time).

Results
Buying prices. Mean buying prices are plotted in Fig. 2. (Individual level
plots showed that all subjects’ responses followed the same pattern as in Fig.
2.) The surprising result is that the pattern of means in the two time constraint
conditions appears virtually identical: both panels displaying bilinear fans
consistent with a multiplicative combination process. In fact, an Order (2) 3
Time Constraint (2) 3 Probability (5) 3 Amount (5) analysis of variance of
buying price responses revealed that there are no significant main effects or
interactions with the Time Constraint factor. That is, buying price judgments
were not affected by the imposed time constraint. Buying prices were also not
affected by the order in which the two tasks were performed: buying prices
followed by attractiveness ratings or the reverse order. As indicated in Fig. 2,
buying prices were affected by Amount (F4,192 5 176.2, p , .05), by Probability
(F4,192 5 130.0, p , .05), and by the Amount by Probability interaction
(F16,768 5 57.6, p , .05). Thus, the hypothesis that subjects would change
decision strategies under time constraint in buying prices is not supported. It
appears that, in the buying price task, subjects were able to accelerate the
processing of information to cope with the time pressure without changing
their decision strategies.

Attractiveness ratings. Individual subject attractiveness ratings showed in-

dividual differences in the pattern of results. The subjects were therefore
grouped according to the form of their curves.
Fifteen subjects showed similar parallel response patterns (suggesting addi-
tive combination rules) in both time constraint conditions. Mean attractiveness
ratings are shown in Fig. 3A. Five subjects showed similar bilinear fan patterns

FIG. 2. Mean buying prices from Experiment 1. Mean buying prices averaging over all 50
subjects were plotted as in Fig. 1B. Panels A and B show responses from the no time constraint
and time constraint conditions, respectively.
128 ORDÓÑEZ AND BENSON

FIG. 3. Mean attractiveness ratings from “same process” subjects in Experiment 1. Mean
attractiveness ratings were plotted as in Fig. 1A. The upper panels show responses from the
parallel subjects, while the lower panels display the responses from the bilinear subject group.
The left and right panels show results for the no time constraint and time constraint condi-
tions, respectively.

(suggesting multiplicative combination rules) in both conditions. Mean ratings

are shown in Fig. 3B. This group is labeled “same process”, indicating that
the subject responses were consistent using the same information processing
strategy with and without time constraint. Twenty-six subjects showed a paral-
lel pattern under no time constraint and a fan pattern under constraint. Mean
ratings for this “different process” group are shown in Fig. 4. The remaining
four subjects showed no classifiable patterns.
We compared “same process” (Figs. 3A and 3B, n 5 20) vs “different process”
(Fig. 4, n 5 26) individuals. The two groups were not significantly different in
average mood (before and after the time constraint trials), average response
time in attractiveness ratings with and without time constraint, amount of
time to think about their responses, gender ratio, and GPA. However, the two
groups showed a marginally significant difference in Need for Cognition (NFC).
The “different process” individuals had lower average NFC scores than the
“same process” individuals (17.1 vs 26.9 on a 272 to 72 scale, p 5 .068). Low
NFC subjects appear to be more ready to shift cognitive strategy to compensate
for the demands of time constraints.
 DECISIONS UNDER TIME PRESSURE 129

FIG. 4. Mean attractiveness ratings from “different process” subjects in Experiment 1. Mean
attractiveness ratings are plotted as in Fig. 1A, separated by time constraint condition.

Discussion

Experiment 1 produced two surprises. First, the bilinear process is robust

when subjects perform the pricing task. Even under extreme time constraint,
subjects continue to use this strategy systematically. Second, attractiveness
ratings seem to be much more malleable than prices under time constraint.
Approximately half of subjects use different strategies with and without
time constraint.
A somewhat different interpretation of this last result is suggested by a close
examination of task order in this experiment. Two counterbalanced task orders
were used: Attractiveness Ratings (AR), then Buying Price (BP), or vice versa,
with the sequence first completed under no time constraint, then repeated
under time constraint. This implied that the time constrained AR task was
always preceded by a BP task—and all 50 subjects displayed bilinear strategies
in both BP tasks. The subjects we labeled as showing different processes be-
tween the time constraint conditions may be simply those who maintained
their bilinear strategies into the AR task. This interpretation would be consis-
tent with the lower NFC score of these apparent strategy changers. It may be
that low-NFC subjects are reluctant to incur the cognitive costs of shifting
decision strategies between task blocks. Experiment 2 was designed to cast
further light on these two alternative interpretations.

EXPERIMENT 2: FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF TIME CONSTRAINT ON

ATTRACTIVENESS RATINGS

One interpretation of the results in Experiment 1, is that when time con-

straint is imposed during an attractiveness rating task, some subjects (primar-
ily those with low NFC) continued to use the bilinear process they were pre-
viously using in a pricing task. Experiment 2 explores this explanation.
130 ORDÓÑEZ AND BENSON

Subjects served in one of two conditions: time-unconstrained and time-con-

strained. In both conditions, subjects rated the attractiveness of the 25 gambles
used in Experiment 1, taking as long as needed to complete each trial, then
stated the buying prices for these 25 gambles without time constraint. The
next block of trials differed across groups. The constrained subjects completed
the attractiveness rating task with a time constraint imposed on each trial,
whereas the unconstrained subjects had no time constraint. At this point,
some of the constrained subjects (i.e., those with low-NFC scores) should use
a bilinear process in the second attractiveness rating block since they were
previously using a bilinear process in the buying price task. However, the
unconstrained subjects are not expected to use a bilinear process for the second
attractiveness rating block since they were not under time constraint and have
the ability to change from the bilinear process in the previous buying price
task to a parallel process in the second rating block. In the final block of trials,
both groups completed the attractiveness rating task without time constraint.
For the constrained subjects who continue using a bilinear process in ratings
under time constraint, the release of time constraint in the final rating block
may allow these subjects to switch back to a parallel process.

Method
Stimuli and design. Subjects served in either the time-unconstrained (no
TC) or the time-constrained (TC) conditions. For the time-unconstrained condi-
tion, the order of the task blocks was AR no TC, BP no TC, AR no TC, and AR
no TC (where AR and BP represent the attractiveness rating and the buying
price tasks, respectively). The time-constrained condition differed only in that
the second rating task block was performed under time constraint: AR no TC,
BP no TC, AR TC, AR no TC. In each task block, subjects evaluated the same
25 gambles used in Experiment 1. Gambles were displayed as pie charts as in
Experiment 1.
Instructions and procedures. All instructions and procedures were the same
as in Experiment 1 except for the order of task blocks. The 25 gambles were
presented in four blocks, and gambles were presented one at a time in random
order within each block on a computer monitor.
Subjects reported their stress level at the beginning of the questionnaire,
after the second block of attractiveness rating trials, and at the end of the
experimental trials. Additionally, subjects responded to questions about the
quality of their responses after the second block of rating trials: how comfortable
they felt with their responses and how satisfied they were with their decisions.
The constrained subjects judged if they had sufficient time to think and if the
exposure time was too short. At the end of the experiment, they completed
the Need for Cognition (NFC) short form questionnaire and a few additional
demographic questions.
Participants. Fifty-one undergraduate business students at the University
of Arizona received course credit for their participation. Twenty-five of these
 DECISIONS UNDER TIME PRESSURE 131

subjects were randomly assigned to the time-unconstrained condition, while the

remaining 26 subjects served in the time-constrained condition. Each student
worked alone in a sound-insulated room at his or her own pace. Two additional
participants who did not follow instructions were excluded from the analyses.
The experiment took from 25 to 40 min to complete.

Manipulation checks. Constrained and unconstrained groups reported ap-

proximately the same level of stress before the beginning of the experimental
trials (3.0 vs 2.2 on a 0 5 no stress to 10 5 a lot of stress scale, p 5 .294).
However, after the second block of attractiveness rating trials, when the time
constraint was imposed, the constrained subjects reported significantly higher
levels of stress than the unconstrained subjects (5.3 vs 2.4, t49 5 3.96, p , .05).
At the end of the experiment, both groups reported comparable stress levels
to those at the beginning of the experiment (3.0 vs 2.3, for the constrained and
unconstrained groups, respectively). Constrained subjects were significantly
less comfortable with their responses than were the unconstrained subjects
(5.3 vs 7.0, t49 5 22.46, p , .05 on a 0 5 not comfortable to 10 5 very comfortable
scale). Constrained subjects felt that the time constraint moderately limited
their time to think (mean 5 4.7 on a 0 5 little time to 10 5 a lot of time scale)
and was moderately too severe (mean 5 5.7 on a 0 5 agree a little to 10 5
agree a lot scale).

Results

Attractiveness ratings. Figure 5 presents the mean responses in all four

trial blocks for the time-unconstrained group. The orders of the Panels A
through D correspond to the order in which the trial blocks were performed:
Panel A presents mean attractiveness ratings from the first block of trials.
Panel B displays the mean buying prices as in Fig. 1. Panels C and D present
mean responses for the last two blocks of rating trials. Individual subject
plots were examined, and three subjects with uncategorizable patterns were
excluded from the means shown in Fig. 5. The general result is that the re-
sponses from the unconstrained subjects are similar to the original findings
by Mellers et al. (1992a, 1992b): parallel curves in ratings and bilinear curves
in prices.
As in Experiment 1, there were individual differences in the pattern of
responses in the time-constrained group. One of the 26 subjects in the con-
strained group, 11 showed a pattern of responses similar to that displayed in
Fig. 5: parallel curves in all rating blocks and bilinear fans in the pricing block.
Thus, these subjects appeared to accelerate their information processing in the
time constraint rating trials (Block 3) and used the same decision strategy for
all rating blocks. We will refer to these subjects as the “same process” group
since they appeared to use the same process in ratings with and without
time constraint.
Another 11 of the constrained group used a bilinear process in the time
constraint rating trials, replicating the result found in Experiment 1. Figure
132 ORDÓÑEZ AND BENSON

FIG. 5. Mean responses from the time-unconstrained condition in Experiment 2. Mean re-
sponses are plotted as in Fig. 1. Panels A to D indicate the task and the order in which the task
was performed. AR denotes the attractiveness rating task and BP is the buying price task. No
time constraint (No TC) was imposed in any of the four blocks of trials.

6 displays the mean responses for these “different process” subjects of Experi-
ment 2. Again, without time constraint, we see parallel curves in ratings and
bilinear fan in prices. However, in the critical Block 3, when the time constraint
was imposed, curves form a bilinear fan similar to the buying prices in Panel
B. It appears that these subjects used a bilinear process under time constraint
instead of the parallel process they used without time constraint. The final
panel (D) suggests that once the time constraint was released, these “different
Process” subjects returned to an additive combination process. (One of these
11 subjects displayed bilinear curves similar to Panel C). The remaining four
subjects in the time-constrained group showed uninterpretable responses and
were placed in the “other” group.
As in Experiment 1, the “same process” and “different process” groups were
similar in many ways: they were not significantly different in GPA, gender,
rated stress levels (before and after time constraint), and judgment of the time
sufficiency, satisfaction, and comfortableness with the time-constrained task.
However, “different process” subjects were significantly lower on average NFC
score than “same process” subjects (6.5 vs 24.1, t20 5 22.56, p , .05).
 DECISIONS UNDER TIME PRESSURE 133

FIG. 6. Mean responses from the “different process” group in the time constrained condition
in Experiment 2. Mean responses are plotted in a similar format as Fig. 6. The only difference is
that Panel C presents mean attractiveness ratings when a time constraint (TC) was imposed in
these trials.

Preference reversals. Figure 7 presents mean preference reversal rates for

the “same process” and “different process” groups in the constrained condition
and for all subjects in the unconstrained condition. Two types of preference
reversals are possible: expected and unexpected. Expected preference reversals
are those that have been frequently found in the literature: the P bet receives
a higher rating than the $ bet, but the $ bet is priced higher than the P bet.
These reversals are located in the upper-right corner in the boxes of Fig. 7.
Unexpected reversals are the opposite ordering and are rare in previous studies:
the $ bet receives a higher rating than the P bet, but the P bet is priced higher
than the $ bet. Unexpected reversals are displayed in the lower-left corner in
the boxes of Fig. 7.
In the unconstrained group, all subjects appeared to use a parallel process
in each rating block and a bilinear process in the buying price task. Change-
of-process theory predicts systematic preference reversals due to these different
strategies. Figure 7A provides evidence for this prediction: the expected prefer-
ence reversal rates are significantly different from the unexpected rates (all
134 ORDÓÑEZ AND BENSON

FIG. 7. Mean individual preference reversals are presented separately for the time-uncon-
strained, “same process”, and “different process” groups (upper, middle, and lower boxes). Three
sets of preference reversals are computed for each group: buying price responses versus the first,
second, and third blocks of attractiveness ratings. In each set, preference reversals for the 30
equal expected value gamble pairs were obtained for each subject. The buying price vs. attrac-
tiveness rating 2 for the “same process” and “different process” groups are the only two boxes in
which time constraint was imposed for ratings (these are indicated by the asterisks). Percentages
of expected and unexpected preference reversals are presented in the upper-right and lower-left
of each box. The remaining two cells represent consistent preferences across tasks and are left
empty for simplicity.

x2 tests have p , .05).1 Since the “same process” subjects showed the same
pattern of strategies in the two tasks as the unconstrained subjects, the change-
of-process predictions are that there should be systematic preference reversals
across all three rating blocks. Figure 7B is consistent with this prediction,
showing a similar pattern to that of the unconstrained group rates (all x2 tests
have p , .05). The interesting change-of-process predictions emerge with the
“different process” group. This group used a bilinear process for the buying
prices and ratings under time constraint (attractiveness rating 2) but a parallel
process for the rating conditions without time constraint (attractiveness ratings
1 and 3). Thus, the prediction is that there should be preference reversals for
prices vs ratings 1 and 3 (when strategies are dissimilar) but not for prices vs

1
Since both reversals are errors in judgment and there is no way of a priori determining the
number of errors that should occur due to chance, previous studies compare the two reversal rates
for systematic differences as evidence that expected reversals exist at a significant rate. Chi-
square tests with 1 df were conducted comparing expected and unexpected reversal rates within
each box, where the expected frequency is the average of the two reversal frequencies.
 DECISIONS UNDER TIME PRESSURE 135

ratings 2 (when strategies are similar). Figure 7C supports this prediction:

there are significant differences between expected and unexpected reversals
for ratings 1 and 3 (x2(1) 5 7.94, p , .05 and x2(1) 5 6.76, p , .05) but not for
ratings 2. Thus, these data support the change-of-process theory predictions
that use of dissimilar (similar) strategies across tasks leads to dissimilar (simi-
lar) preference orderings.
Examination of the mean buying price and attractiveness ratings suggests
that these preference reversals are strong and even occur for gamble pairs
with nonequal expected values. In all panels of Figs. 5 and 6, two gambles are
indicated with asterisks and are labeled 1 or 2. Gamble 1 is a .94 chance of
winning $5.40 (otherwise nothing) and Gamble 2 is a .52 chance of winning
$56.70 (otherwise nothing), with expected values of $5.08 and $29.48, respec-
tively. In the time unconstrained group (Fig. 5) rating panels (A, C, and D),
Gamble 1 is rated more attractive than Gamble 2. However, Gamble 2 is given
a higher buying price than Gamble 1 (Panel B), resulting in three preference
reversals for this buying price task and all rating tasks. However, the “different
process” group in the time constrained condition (Fig. 6) reveals only two
preference reversals. Panels A, B, and D (unconstrained ratings or prices) show
the same pattern as in Fig. 5: Gamble 1 is rated higher than Gamble 2 but
Gamble 2 is priced than Gamble 1, resulting in two preference reversals.
However, the constrained ratings (Panel C) show a different pattern: Gamble
2 is rated higher than Gamble 1, resulting in no preference reversal compared
to the prices.

Discussion

These results replicate and extend those found in Experiment 1. The main
result was that the subjects who used different processes in the rating tasks
did so under specific conditions: they used a bilinear process in ratings only
under time constraint and when they previously used bilinear process in prices.
These “different process” subjects had significantly lower NFC scores. Since
the general propensity to engage less in cognitive activities is related to which
subjects use different processes, we can speculate as to why these subjects use
a different process under time constraint. As suggested before, these subjects
may have been attempting to reduce their cognitive effort by continuing to use
the decision strategy they had been using in the previous task, assuming that
there is a “cognitive cost” to changing strategies. Thus, subjects may not always
switch to easier strategies (as indicated by previous research) if switching itself
takes too much effort. Many of us have had the experience of using a less
efficient method of data analysis (e.g., hand calculation) because we believe
that switching to an easier method requires effort (e.g., learning a new com-
puter program).
An interesting consequence is that the “different process” subjects showed
more consistent preferences under time constraint. Since they used the same
bilinear process in both ratings and prices, their preferences became more
consistent and earlier preference reversals were eliminated. Thus, one way to
136 ORDÓÑEZ AND BENSON

eliminate preference reversals is to use similar information processing strate-

gies in both tasks. However, the effect was short-lived, since almost all subjects
returned to a parallel process once the time constraint was released.

EXPERIMENT 3: INVESTIGATION OF THE “PREVIOUS PROCESS”

HYPOTHESIS

It can be argued that subjects who used a parallel process in time-uncon-

strained ratings and a bilinear process in time-constrained ratings changed
decision strategy purely in response to the time constraint. The “previous
process” hypothesis, in contrast, states that the bilinear process was used
because of both the time constraint and the prior use of the bilinear process.
Experiment 3 provides additional evidence that time constraint alone does not
cause the subjects to change their decision strategy. It uses the same general
design as Experiment 2, except that the time-constrained rating task is pre-
ceded by an unconstrained rating task. The “previous process” hypothesis pre-
dicts that subjects will use the same process under constrained rating as they
did in the preceding unconstrained rating task.

Method

Stimuli and design. The design is similar to that of Experiment 2, except

the order of first two tasks was reversed. In the unconstrained condition, the
order of the task blocks was: BP no TC, AR no TC, AR no TC, AR no TC. The
constrained condition differed only in that the second rating task was performed
under time constraint: BP no TC, AR no TC, AR TC, AR no TC. Thus, the time
constrained rating conidition is preceded by an unconstrained rating task,
unlike Experiment 2. All instructions and procedures were otherwise the same
as in Experiment 2.

Participants. Fifty-six undergraduate business students at the University

of Arizona received course credit for their participation. Twenty-nine of these
subjects were randomly assigned to the time unconstrained condition, while
the remaining 27 subjects served in the time constrained condition. A few
additional participants who did not follow instructions were excluded from the
analyses. The experiment took from 25 to 40 min to complete.

Manipulation check. The time-constrained group reported significantly

higher levels of stress during the time-constrained task (4.1 vs 2.6, t54 5 2.36,
p , .05); however there was no significant difference between the groups at
the beginning (2.8 vs 2.6, p 5 .71, n.s.) or end of the experiment (2.4 vs 2.8,
p 5 .65, n.s.). As in Experiments 1 and 2, the constrained subjects felt time
pressure, but were not overwhelmed by the time constraint: they reported that
they had a moderate amount of time to think (mean 5 4.8) and that the time
was moderately too short (mean 5 5.4).
 DECISIONS UNDER TIME PRESSURE 137

Results

The main question to be addressed in this experiment is whether any subjects

used a parallel process in ratings without time constraint but a bilinear process
with time constraint: the answer is clearly negative. Individual plots similar
to Fig. 5 showed that none of the 27 constrained subjects used different decision
strategies in the three different rating blocks: 81% of these subjects used a
parallel process, while the remaining 19% used a bilinear process in all blocks.
The same approximate percentages were found with the unconstrained condi-
tion: 90% used a parallel process and 10% used a bilinear process. (x2(1) 5 .76,
p 5 .38, n.s.). Thus, Experiment 3 supports the “previous process” hypothesis
of Experiment 2: in order for subjects to use a parallel process in unconstrained
ratings, but a bilinear process in constrained ratings, it is apparently necessary
to have a completed a task using a bilinear process (e.g., pricing) in between
the two rating tasks.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

These experiments examined the effects of time constraint and compared

results to change-of-process theory predictions of preferences for gambles with-
out time constraints. We applied time constraint to both attractiveness ratings
and buying price tasks for a set of gambles. We found no evidence that subjects
switched decision strategies with buying prices to cope with time constraint.
In addition, results suggested that many subjects may have changed the
strategy used in the rating task in response to time constraint. Approximately
half changed from a parallel process to a bilinear process in the rating task.
These “different process” subjects seemed to simply continue using the strategy
they had used in the previous trials. Patterns of preference reversals suggest
that these subjects changed decision strategies in response to time pressure.
Under no time constraint, they used a parallel process for ratings and a bilinear
process for prices, consistent with using an additive and multiplicative decision
strategy. Following the arguments of change-of-process theory (Mellers et al.,
1992a, 1992b), the use of these two different strategies resulted in preference
reversals. However, the bilinear process in time-constrained ratings and prices
led to the elimination of preference reversals, indicating that subjects used the
same decision strategy in these two tasks.
The next important issue to address is why did only half of the subjects use
different strategies in ratings with and without time constraints. Our only clue
lies in the fact that these “different process” subjects tended score low on a
the Need for Cognition personality scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) that
measures people’s general propensity to engage in cognitive activities. We
propose that these subjects were actually attempting to reduce their cognitive
load, but that the load was associated with strategy change, rather than with
the content of either strategy. Prior to the time-constrained rating trials, they
had been using a bilinear process in the pricing task. When the time-con-
strained rating task began, they did not expend the cognitive effort to change
138 ORDÓÑEZ AND BENSON

from bilinear to a parallel process as they had previously done in the time-
unconstrained rating task. Of course this line of reasoning is post hoc since
we could not interrupt the subjects during the time-constrained trials to ask
them why they used their current decision strategy. (Also, they probably could
not have told us had we asked).
Why did the time constraints affect strategies in the rating task but not the
pricing task? Rating responses appear to more malleable than prices. Not only
is this evidenced in the current study by the effects of time constraint, but this
is also suggested by rating responses found in Mellers et al. (1992b). In this
study, subjects produced parallel rating curves to gamble stimuli similar to
the current study. However, when Mellers et al. presented subjects with gambles
that had zero winning payoffs or zero probabilities of winning, most produced
response curves with a bilinear pattern. Mellers et al. suggest that these un-
usual gambles made subjects aware of the problems with using an additive
model: varying one factor (amount to win or probability of winning) while the
other factor is zero would produce varying attractiveness ratings. A multiplica-
tive process leads to the more realistic conclusion that these gambles should
receive a zero rating. Although the current study finds similar results (i.e.,
contextual manipulations resulted in bilinear rating responses), we do not
suggest that our subjects were necessarily aware of the implications of their
decision strategies. Instead, the commonality appears to lie in the fact that
both studies showed the flexibility of rating responses. Note, however, that
Ordóñez, Mellers, Chang, and Roberts (1995) showed the preference orders for
both ratings and prices changed in response to an experimental treatment
which reduced preference reversals.
Finally, why do subjects appear to add subjective probabilities and utilities
in ratings but multiply this information in prices? Mellers, Weber, Ordóñez,
and Cooke (1995) summarize several studies showing the parallel pattern in
ratings and bilinear fan in prices. They suggest that decision makers treat
probability as a modifier in prices (thus, multiply it with amount) but as an
independent variable that contributes to overall attractiveness in ratings (thus,
it is added to amount). However, the inclination to use an additive process in
ratings appears to be quite robust since subjects who used a bilinear process
with time-constrained ratings, revealed ratings consistent with an additive
process as soon as the time restriction was lifted. This result seems to suggest
that an additive process is a more familiar or natural strategy to use with
rating responses.
These current results suggest that more complex models of preference under
time constraint need to be developed. Models that suggest that subjects simply
accelerate processing or switch to “easier” strategies (however defined) appear
to be incomplete. Previous research has indicated that decision makers appear
to tradeoff effort against accuracy when deciding which strategies to employ
(Johnson, Payne, & Bettman, 1993). The present data suggest that we also
tradeoff the immediate effort of switching strategies against using strategies
that are easier or more familiar.
 DECISIONS UNDER TIME PRESSURE 139

REFERENCES

Benson, L. (1993). Studies in human decision making: On the effects of experimental instructions,
framing, and time constraints. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Lund University, Lund Sweden
Benson, L., III, & Svenson, O. (1993). Post-decision consolidation following the debriefing of subjects
about experimental manipulations affecting their prior decisions. Psychological Research Bulle-
tin, 32, 1–13.
Benson, L., III & Beach, L. (1996). The effects of time constraints on the pre-choice screening of
decision options. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 67, 222–228.
Birnbaum, M. H. (1974). The nonadditivity of personality impressions. Journal of Experimental
Psychology Monograph, 102, 543–561.
Birnbaum, M. H. (1982). Controversies in psychological measurement. In B. Wegener (Ed.), Social
attitudes and Psychophysical measurement. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Birnbaum, M. H., & Stegner, S. E. (1979). Source credibility in social judgment: Bias, expertise,
and the judge’s point of view. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 48–74.
Birnbaum, M. H., & Sutton, S. E. (1992). Scale convergence and utility measurement. Organiza-
tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 52, 331–346.
Birnbaum, M. H., & Veit, C. T. (1974). Scale convergence as a criterion for rescaling: Information
integration with difference, ratio, and averaging tasks. Perception & Psychophysics, 15, 7–15.
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Kao, C. F. (1984). The efficient assessment of need for cognition.
Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 306–307.
Edland, A., & Svenson, O. (1993). Judgment and decision making under time pressure: Studies
and findings. In O. Svenson & A. J. Maule (Eds.), Time pressure and stress in human judgment
and decision making. New York: Plenum.
Goldstein, W. M., and Einhorn, H. J. (1987). Expression theory and the preference reversal phenom-
ena, Psychological Review, 94, 236–254.
Johnson, E. J., Payne, J. W., & Bettman, J. R. (1993). Adapting to time constraints. In O. Svenson
and A. J. Maule (Eds.), Time pressure and stress in human judgment and decision making. New
York: Plenum.
Lichtenstein, S. & Slovic, P. (1971). Reversals in preference between bids and choices in gambling
decisions, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89, 46–55.
Lindman, H. R. (1971). Inconsistent preferences among gambles. Journal of Experimental 89, 390–
397.
Mellers, B. A., Chang, S., Birnbaum, M. H., & Ordóñez, L. D. (1992a). Preferences, prices, and
ratings in risky decision making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Processes and
Performance, 18, 347–361.
Mellers, B. A., Ordóñez, L. D., & Birnbaum, M. H. (1992b). A change-of-process theory for contextual
effects and preference reversals in risky decision making. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 52, 319–330.
Mellers, B. A., Weber, E. U., Ordóñez, L. D., & Cooke, A. D. J. (1995). Utility invariance despite
labile preferences. In J. R. Busemeyer, R. Hastie, & D. L. Medin (Eds.), Psychology of learning
and motivation: Vol. 32. Decision making from the perspective of cognitive psychology.
Miller, J. G. (1960). Information input overload and psychopathology. American Journal of Psychia-
try, 116, 695–704.
Ordóñez, L. D., Mellers, B. A., Chang, S, & Roberts, J. (1995). Are preference reversals reduced
when made explicit? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 8, 265–278.
Smith, J. F., Mitchell, T. R. & Beach, L. R. (1982). A cost benefit mechanism for selecting problem-
solving strategies: Some extensions and empirical tests. Organizational Behavior and Human
Performance, 29, 370–396.
Svenson, O. & Benson, L., III (1993a). Framing and time pressure in decision making. In O.
140 ORDÓÑEZ AND BENSON

Svenson & A. J. Maule (Eds.), Time pressure and stress in human judgment and decision making.
New York: Plenum.
Tversky, A., Sattath, S., & Slovic, P. (1988). Contingent weighting in judgment and choice. Psycho-
logical Review, 80, 204–217.
Verplanken, B. (1993). Need for cognition and external information search: Responses to time
pressure during decision-making. Journal of Research in Personality, 27, 238–252.
Wright, P. (1974). The harassed decision maker: Time pressure, distraction and the use of evidence.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 59, 555–561.

Received: December 30, 1996