Maritime Security in The South China Sea PDF

Maritime Security in the
South China Sea

Regional Implications and International
Cooperation
Edited by
Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou
Maritime Security in the South China Sea
Corbett Centre for Maritime
Policy Studies Series
Series editors:
Professor Greg Kennedy, Dr Tim Benbow and Dr Jon Robb-Webb,
Defence Studies Department, Joint Services Command and Staff College, UK
The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies Series is the publishing platform
of the Corbett Centre. Drawing on the expertise and wider networks of the Defence
Studies Department of King’s College London, and based at the Joint Services
Command and Staff College in the UK Defence Academy, the Corbett Centre is
already a leading centre for academic expertise and education in maritime and
naval studies. It enjoys close links with several other institutions, both academic
and governmental, that have an interest in maritime matters, including the
Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), the Naval Staff of the
Ministry of Defence and the Naval Historical Branch.
The centre and its publishing output aims to promote the understanding and
analysis of maritime history and policy and to provide a forum for the interaction
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the Corbett Centre series reflect these aims and provide an opportunity to stimulate
research and debate into a broad range of maritime related themes. The core subject
matter for the series is maritime strategy and policy, conceived broadly to include
theory, history and practice, military and civil, historical and contemporary, British
and international aspects.
As a result this series offers a unique opportunity to examine key issues such
as maritime security, the future of naval power, and the commercial uses of the
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Truly interdisciplinary in its approach, the series welcomes books from across
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visibility of maritime affairs, and provide a forum for policy debate and analysis.
Maritime Security in the
South China Sea
Regional Implications and International Cooperation
Edited by
Wu Shicun
National Institute for the South China Sea Studies, China
and
Zou Keyuan
University of Central Lancashire, UK
© Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou 2009
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.
Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editors of this work.
Published by
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Maritime security in the South China Sea : regional
implications and international cooperation. -- (Corbett
Centre for Maritime Policy Studies series)
1. Piracy--South China Sea--Prevention--International
cooperation. 2. Maritime terrorism--South China Sea--
Prevention--International cooperation. 3. International
relations and terrorism--South China Sea. 4. South Asian
cooperation.
I. Series II. Wu, Shicun. III. Zou, Keyuan.
327’.0916472-dc22
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Wu, Shicun.
Maritime security in the South China Sea : regional implications and international
cooperation / by Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou.
p. cm. -- (Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy studies series)
Includes index.
ISBN 978-0-7546-7727-7 (hardback) -- ISBN 978-0-7546-9443-4
(ebook) 1. South China Sea--Navigation--Safety measures--International cooperation. 2.
Maritime terrorism--South China Sea--Prevention--International cooperation. 3. National
security--South China Sea--International cooperation. I. Zou, Keyuan. II. Title.
VK113.S66W8 2010
359’.030916472--dc22
2009018255
ISBN: 978-0-7546-7727-7 (hbk)

ISBN.V)
Contents
List of Editors and Contributors vii
Part I: Introduction
1 Maritime Security in the South China Sea:

Cooperation and Implications 3
WU Shicun and ZOU Keyuan
Part II: Securing Navigation in the South China Sea
2 Good Order at Sea in the South China Sea 15

Sam BATEMAN
3 Maritime Trade Development in Asia: A Need for Regional Maritime

Security Cooperation in the South China Sea 35
HONG Nong
4 Maritime Security Cooperation in the South China Sea Region 51

Andrew S. ERICKSON
5 Myth and Reality:

The Rise and Fall of Contemporary Maritime Piracy
in the South China Sea 81
XU Ke
6 Commentary:
A Regional Perspective on South China Sea Passage Security 99
WU Shicun
Part III: Regional Cooperation Combating Maritime

Terrorism and Piracy
7 Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) and

Enhancing Security in the Straits of Malacca:
Littoral States’ and Regional Responses 109
Yann-huei SONG
vi Maritime Security in the South China Sea
8 Crackdown on Piracy in Southeast Asian Seas:

Need a More Effective Legal Regime? 135
ZOU Keyuan
9 Southeast Asian SLOC Security 157

Joshua H. HO
10 The United States Response to Maritime Terrorism 177

Kristen G. JURAS
11 Commentary:
Enhancing Sino–U.S. Maritime Cooperation for Regional Security 195
BAO Hongjun and ZHU Huayou
Part IV: Environmental Security and Maritime Rescue
12 The Development of Oil Spill Preparedness and Response in China 205

XU Shiming
13 Regional Cooperation for Marine Pollution Contingency

Response in the South China Sea 217
ZHANG Xiangjun
14 International Submarine Rescue: A Constructive Role for China 237

Lyle J. Goldstein and William S. Murray
15 Commentary:
Search and Rescue in South China Sea and Regional Cooperation 255
ZHANG Jie
Index 263
List of Editors and Contributors
Editors
WU Shicun is currently President of the National Institute for the South China
Sea Studies located in Hainan, China; visiting scholar to the School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS) of John Hopkins University in 1998, and to the
Seminar on the Dynamics of U.S. Foreign Policy—Regional Security sponsored
by US Government in 1999; and visiting senior research fellow at the Asia-Pacific
Center for Security Studies in 2001. His research focuses on history and geography
on the South China Sea, ocean boundary delimitation, international relations and
regional security strategy. His main publications include Origin and Development
of Spratly Disputes, Collection of Literatures on the South China Sea Issues, A
Bibliography of Research on the South China Sea, The Issue of the South China
Sea Islands in the Time of the Republic of China (1911–1949), Contest on the South
China Sea and Zheng He’s Voyages to the Indian Ocean, Historical background
on the 1943 Sino-British New Treaty, On Relativity of Cognition of the History,
The Foundation of Sino-ASEAN Free Trade Zone and Across-Strait Commercial
Relations, Imperative Task – the Exploitation of South China Sea Resources and
A Study on the South China Sea Dispute.
ZOU Keyuan is currently Harris Professor of International Law at the Lancashire

Law School of the University of Central Lancashire in the United Kingdom. His
specialties are international law and Chinese law. Before joining the Lancashire
Law School in 2007, he taught and conducted researches at Dalhousie University
(Canada), Peking University (China), University of Hannover (Germany) and the
National University of Singapore. His main publications include Law of the Sea in
East Asia (London/New York: Routledge, 2005), China’s Marine Legal System and
the Law of the Sea (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), China’s Legal Reform:
Towards the Rule of Law (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), and over 50
articles in international refereed journals. He is member of the editorial boards
of the International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Ocean Development and
International Law, Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy, and Chinese
Journal of International Law. He has been appointed as Academic Advisor to the
China National Institute for the South China Sea Studies since 2000.
viii Maritime Security in the South China Sea
Contributors (in alphabetical order)
BAO Hongjun is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Nanjing University, China. His

research areas include international politics and economy and China’s social
development. He has published over ten articles in influential Chinese journals of
related research areas.
Sam BATEMAN is a senior fellow and Advisor to the Maritime Security Program at
the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological
University in Singapore. He retired from full-time service in the Royal Australian
Navy with the rank of commodore (one-star) in 1993 and became the Director of
the Centre for Maritime Policy at the University of Wollongong in New South
Wales where he remains a professorial research fellow. He has written extensively
on defense and maritime issues in Australia, the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean,
and was awarded his Ph.D. from the University of New South Wales in 2001.
Andrew S. ERICKSON is an assistant professor of strategic studies within the

Strategic Research Department of the US Naval War College. He earned his
Ph.D. in 2006 at Princeton University where he wrote his dissertation on Chinese
aerospace development. He has worked for Science Applications International
Corporation (as a Chinese translator), as well as at the U.S. embassy in Beijing
and the American consulate in Hong Kong. His publications include contributions
to Comparative Strategy, to the Naval War College Review and the U.S. Naval
War College’s Newport Papers.
Lyle J. GOLDSTEIN is an Associate Professor in the Strategic Research Department

of the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI. He teaches and writes about issues
in East Asian security, focusing on energy, naval, nuclear issues. Recent research
has been published in such journals as China Quarterly, Jane’s Intelligence Review,
Joint Force Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary China, Journal of Strategic Studies,
International Security, and Political Science Quarterly. His first book, which draws
heavily on China’s nuclear history to examine proliferation crises in historical
perspective, has been published by Stanford University Press in 2006. He speaks
both Chinese and Russian and has a Ph.D. in political science from Princeton
University and an M.A. from Johns Hopkins SAIS.
Joshua H. HO is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International

Studies, Singapore, and a Fellow of the Cambridge Commonwealth Society. He
is a serving naval officer with 18 years of service and currently holds the rank of
lieutenant colonel. He was trained as a Principal Warfare Officer and has served
in various shipboard and staff appointments including the Command of a missile
gun boat and stints in the Naval Operations, Plans, and Personnel Departments. He
also holds concurrent appointments of Honorary Aide de Camp to the President,
Secretary to the Naval Staff Meeting, and Secretary to the Policy and Strategy
List of Editors and Contributors ix
Meeting, MINDEF. Joshua Ho’s research interests include military transformation

and maritime security. He is a co-editor for a volume on Maritime Security in the
Asia-Pacific and has written commentaries on military transformation and maritime
security. He has published in well-known local and overseas journals like Defence
Studies, Asian Survey, etc. He has also lectured at the Singapore Command and
Staff Course as well as the Home Team Command and Staff Course.
Kristen Gustafson JURAS is currently an Assistant Professor at the University of

Montana School of Law located in Missoula, Montana, where she teaches courses
in property and business law. Professor Juras is the coach of the Law School’s
Jessup International Moot Court Team, and has taught classes on the law of the
sea at Xiamen University’s Center for Oceans Policy and Law. Prior to teaching,
Professor Juras practiced for more than twenty years in the areas of business
transactions, international law, and tax planning, including the representation of
clients in international tribunal proceedings. She has co-authored the Law of the
Sea in a Nutshell (West Publishing 1984), and was preparing a second edition for
publication in 2008. Professor Juras received her J.D. degree magna cum laude
in 1982 from the University of Georgia School of Law, and her B.A. degree in
French and German from the University of Montana.
HONG Nong is an Assistant Research Fellow at the National Institute for

the South China Sea Studies. She got her B.A on international journalism at
Shanghai International Studies University (China) and her Master’s degree in
public management from Potsdam University funded by InWEnt—Capacity
Building International, Germany. She participated in the training program “Ocean
Governance: Policy, Law and Management” jointly conducted by the International
Ocean Institute (IOI) and Dalhousie University of Canada in 2005, funded by the
OPEC Fund for International Development. Her academic interests include the
law of the sea and international relations.
William S. MURRAY is an associate research professor at the U.S. Naval War

College. He joined the U.S. Navy in 1983 immediately after graduating cum
laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo with a B.S. in Electrical
Engineering. Professor Murray served as a junior officer and plank owner on the
USS Pittsburgh (SSN-720), and as the navigator on the USS Houston (SSN-713).
He conducted overseas deployments in those vessels in both the Atlantic and
Pacific oceans. He is a 1990 recipient of the David Lloyd Award for excellence,
and qualified to command nuclear-powered submarines. In 1994 he received a
Master of Arts degree from the Naval War College. Prof. Murray has served as a
fire control instructor at the U.S. Submarine School, and on the operations staff at
the U.S. Strategic Command. He retired from the Navy with the rank of lieutenant
commander in 2003. He has published articles in International Security, the U.S.
Army War College Parameters, the journal Comparative Strategy, the United States
Naval Institute’s Proceedings, Jane’s Intelligence Review, and Undersea Warfare.
Yann-huei SONG received his undergraduate degree from National Chengchi

University, Taipei, Taiwan; a Master’s degree in Political Science from Indiana
State University, Indiana; an LL.M. degree from the University of California
School of Law (Boalt Hall), Berkeley, California; a doctoral degree in international
relations from Kent State University, Kent, Ohio; and a JSD degree from the
University of California School of Law. Following graduation from Kent State
University, Dr. Song taught at Department of Political Science, Indiana State
University, as assistant professor in 1988. He then returned home and taught
as an associate professor at the Institute of Maritime Law, National Taiwan
Ocean University, Keelung, Taiwan in 1990. Currently, Dr. Song is a research
fellow and Deputy Director at the Institute of European and American Studies,
Academia Sinica, Nankang, Taipei, and Distinguished Professor, the Graduate
Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taichung,
Taiwan. Dr. Song’s research interests are in the fields of international law of the
sea, international fisheries law, international environmental law, national ocean
policy study, naval arms control and maritime security. He has published articles
in journals such as Political Geography Quarterly, Asian Survey, Marine Policy,
and Ocean Development and International Law.
XU Ke is a research fellow at the Centre for Maritime Studies, National University

of Singapore (NUS). Xu Ke obtained his Ph.D. degree from the Southeast Asian
Studies Programme, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, NUS. His Ph.D.
dissertation reveals the logic behind the rise and fall of contemporary piracy in
Southeast Asia. Xu Ke was a researcher in the Research School of Southeast Asian
Studies in Xiamen University, China, where he received the Master’s degree in
economics. Xu Ke has published several articles on maritime piracy in Southeast
Asia. His research interests include maritime security in Southeast Asia, and
maritime cooperation between the ASEAN countries and China.
XU Shiming started his career in Hebei Maritime Safety Administration (MSA)

since 1989 mainly in charge of Pollution Prevention from Ships, Dangerous Cargo
Transportation Supervision and Port State Control as a senior engineer and Deputy
Director. Between 2000 and 2001, he studied in the World Maritime University
and obtained his Master’s degree in maritime administration. He has now assumed
management responsibility for national pollution prevention from ships in the
China MSA.
ZHANG Jie is Deputy-Director of Hainan Maritime Safety Administration

of People’s Republic of China. After graduated from Shandong University of
Technology in 1982 Zhang Jie went to Wuhan University pursuing his Master’s
degree studies in water transportation and engineering, specializing in ship’s
power. After then he worked for the university as a lecturer up to 1989 when he
moved to the Hainan Maritime Safety Administration, as a PSC officer and also
carrying out investigation and settlement of waterborne traffic accidents. His most
List of Editors and Contributors xi
important job is being a search and rescue coordinator for life saving at sea and
he has organized and coordinated many search and rescue operations in the South
China Sea.
ZHANG Xiangjun is currently a lecturer in Fuzhou University Law School, PR

China. Her specialty is in international law, particularly in the law of the sea. She
obtained her Ph.D. degree in international law from Xiamen University School of
Law and has published a number of papers on the law of the sea and international
law.
ZHU Huayou is Vice-President of the National Institute for the South China Sea
Studies. He obtained his Ph.D. from Nanjing University, China. His previous
positions include Research Fellow at the China Institute for Reform and
Development (CIRD) and Division Director at the Hainan Provincial Foreign
and Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. His current research focuses on economic
reform and social development, South China Sea resources and exploitation,
international relations, etc. His main publications include Theory and Practice of
Chinese Market Economy, The Increasing Energy-Development of Chinese Non-
governmental Business, Burgeoning Market, The South China Sea and China’s
Energy Sources’ Security, An Analysis of the Petroleum Diplomacy around the
South China Sea, and Going Towards the Blue-Hainan’s Economic Development
Strategy.
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Part I
Introduction
Chapter 1
Maritime Security in the South China Sea:
Cooperation and Implications
WU Shicun and ZOU Keyuan
Introduction
Maritime security is a hot issue, attracting the attention of the whole world
community. In the modern era, maritime security mainly concerns the safety of
navigation, the cracking down on transnational crimes including sea piracy and
maritime terrorism, and conflict prevention and resolution. In the context of non-
traditional security, issues such as maritime environmental security and search and
rescue at sea are included. Maritime security is of vital importance to the South
China Sea, which is located in Southeast Asia and is a critical sea route for the
maritime transport of East Asian countries including China. While the concept of
maritime security can apply to any seas around the world, the South China Sea has
its own uniqueness.
The South China Sea is commonly described as one of three flashpoints
(together with the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits) in East Asia for the
potential conflict of national interests and threat to peace and security. Security
issues around it therefore always remain a focus of international concern. As a
semi-enclosed sea, the South China Sea hosts numerous islets and reefs as well as
abundant living and non-living marine resources. It also provides key sea routes
for maritime shipping and naval mobility. Because of its important strategic
location and abundant resources, it becomes a target of contention between/among
bordering countries. The picture of the Spratly Islands is even more complicated.
Five countries and six parties (Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Chinese
Taipei, and Vietnam) made claims, in whole or in part, to this group of islets and
display their physical presence (except Brunei) on their respectively occupied
islets. In 2002, China and ten member states of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea which is designed to consolidate and develop the friendship
and cooperation existing between China and ASEAN, to promote a peaceful,
friendly and harmonious environment in the South China Sea, and to enhance
the principles and objectives of the 1997 Joint Statement of the Meeting of the
Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and President of
Text is available at http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm (accessed March 4, 2009).

the People’s Republic of China. However, unilateral actions of the claimants

attempting to consolidate their territorial and maritime claims have never ceased
since. The latest move was carried out by the Philippines, which passed a law
of archipelagic baselines to embrace some disputed islets of the Spratly Islands
into its maritime territory in February 2009 and it invited protests from other
claimants including China.
Against this background, people may wonder how to handle effectively
the security issues and enhance security cooperation in the South China Sea.
Considering two additional factors which affect the discourse of the security
paradigm in the South China Sea—one is the intensified fight against terrorism at
the global level after the 9/11 terrorist attack and the other is the rapid economic
growth and emerging regional integration in East Asia—the task will be very
challenging. This book attempts to address maritime security issues in various
perspectives and approaches. Maritime security, though covering both traditional
security issues such as military activities and non-traditional security issues such
as piracy and maritime terrorism, this book places more emphasis on the latter.
It is acknowledged that there are so many maritime security issues concerning
the South China Sea. With limited space and resources, this book is only able to
identify and address some of the most pressing issues of maritime security.
The general legal framework which governs maritime security is centered on the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), which
is commonly known as the constitution of oceans and has incorporated almost all
previously existing conventional and customary rules and norms concerning the
oceans. Pursuant to the provisions of the LOS Convention, a coastal state has
the right to establish maritime zones under its jurisdiction: internal waters inside
the baselines which are used to measure the extent of the territorial sea and other
jurisdictional waters, the territorial sea of 12 nautical miles (nm), the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nm, and the continental shelf of 200 nm (or up to 350
nm in some cases), outward from the baselines.
Different maritime zones have different legal status. Internal waters and
territorial sea are treated as part of the coastal state’s territory and that state enjoys
full sovereignty there except innocent passage for foreign vessels in its territorial
sea. The sovereignty of the coastal state over the territorial sea extends to the
airspace above the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. For some
jurisdictional purposes, such as prevention and punishment of infringement of
its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations, a coastal state
has the right to establish the contiguous zone which may not extend 24 nm from
“Bicam OKs Baseline Bill”, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/

nation/view/20090216-189576/Bicam-OKs-baseline-bill (accessed March 5, 2009).
21 ILM (1982) 1261. The Convention was open for signature on December 10,
1982 and came into effect on November 16, 1994. As of February 2009, there were 157
Contracting Parties to it, including one international organization.
Art. 2 (2) of the LOS Convention.
Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Cooperation and Implications
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. However,
it should be noted that in comparison with the territorial sea or the EEZ, the
contiguous zone is not a complete maritime zone; rather it is subsidiary to the
territorial sea for the coastal state to control certain matters of territorial nature
while it is part of the EEZ in other sense. As to the EEZ and continental shelf,
the coastal state, according to the LOS Convention, only enjoys sovereign rights
and certain kinds of jurisdiction. The coastal state enjoys sovereign rights to the
living and non-living resources in the EEZ and continental shelf, and exercises
its jurisdiction over the matters relating to the establishment and use of artificial
islands, installations and structures, marine scientific research, and the protection
and preservation of the marine environment. The coastal state has the exclusive
right to authorize and regulate drilling on the continental shelf. The EEZ and the
continental shelf are identical in terms of sovereign rights and jurisdiction of a
coastal state. For that reason, the EEZ and the continental shelf are not part of the
high seas, or part of the territorial sea. The EEZ is a maritime zone sui generis.
Since the entry into force of the LOS Convention in 1994, the legal situation
of maritime zones in the South China Sea has become more complicated. All of
its adjacent countries become parties to the LOS Convention, and have enacted
their corresponding domestic laws governing the maritime zones entitled under
the LOS Convention. However, the South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea with
multiple coastal states, thus maritime boundary delimitation becomes another
maritime security issue. Although China and Vietnam have resolved the maritime
boundary issue in the Gulf of Tonkin, they have disputes over the maritime
boundary delimitation beyond the Gulf of Tonkin and in the South China Sea. The
maritime boundary delimitation, if involving territorial disputes over islands, will
be more difficult to be undertaken. This is the exact case in the South China Sea
regarding the Spratly Islands claimed by five countries/six parties.
Securing Navigation in the South China Sea
The role of international law in the resolution of security issues and promotion
of security cooperation is indispensable. As China and ASEAN countries have
reiterated on many occasions, they pledge to resolve the disputes over the South
China Sea in a peaceful manner and in accordance with contemporary international
law, including the 1982 LOS Convention. As Sam Bateman rightly comments, all
regimes for good order at sea are based on the framework provided by the LOS
Convention. In addition, he lists a series of legal instruments that applicable to
Art. 56 (1)(b) and Art.77 (1) of the LOS Convention.

Art. 81 of the LOS Convention.
For details, see Zou Keyuan, “Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on the Maritime
Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin”, Ocean Development and International Law,
36 (2005), 13 –24.
the South China Sea and its security. It is well perceived that all the maritime
security issues should be handled through appropriate cooperative mechanisms in
accordance with international law.
The most salient of the security issues in the South China Sea in the non-
traditional security context is the safety of navigation. The number of vessels
sailing through the South China Sea has increased to about 50,000 per annum,
and the Malacca Straits, which is directly linked to the South China Sea, is
overcrowded with vessels on its narrow waterways, thus making littoral states
more difficult to ensure navigation safety. The first part of the book contributes
to this crucial topic. The international maritime treaties including the 1974 Safety
of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention; the 1979 Convention on Maritime Search
and Rescue (SAR Convention); the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ship, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto
(MARPOL 73/78); the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Navigation (SUA Convention); and the 1988 Protocol for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf, as mentioned in Bateman’s chapter in this book, are all
applicable to the safeguard of the safety of navigation in the South China Sea. While
the LOS Convention guarantees all states to exercise the freedom of navigation on
the high seas, the safety of navigation largely depends on the implementation of
relevant international treaties by coastal states.
Hong Nong’s chapter links maritime security and the safety of navigation to the
global economy with special reference to the countries adjacent to the South China
Sea. As she comments, world trade is largely dependent on maritime transport
and Asian countries are major players in world maritime transport, with sizeable
shares in shipping industry. However, maritime transport is threatened by surging
maritime violence in Southeast Asia as well as natural disasters and manmade
hazards. Thus regional maritime security cooperation is called for—the theme of
Chapter 4, contributed by Erickson, who perceives such negative forces as piracy,
smuggling, maritime accidents, and even potentially maritime terrorism to be
challenges which directly impinge upon the national interests in Southeast Asia.
The author outlines a broad array of cooperative initiatives and places particular
emphasis on the interests of the U.S. and China in the South China Sea region and
their respective roles in contributing to both regional security as well as their own
strategic coexistence, which, Erickson argues, is a prerequisite for the regional
stability that all states should seek.
There are two more chapters in Part II of this book. One is addressing the piracy
issue in the South China Sea by looking into the factors contributing to the
rise and fall of maritime piracy in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea
from 1991 to 2007. The other is concerning the passage security in the South China
Sea. As Xu Ke observes in his chapter, “the myth of piracy and terrorism nexus
has made anti-piracy cooperation in the Straits of Malacca and the South China
See Chapter 2 of this book.

Sea integrated into the global anti-terrorism framework. The myth has also driven
the littoral states to shift their paradigms on anti-piracy policies, thus changed
the reality of this region tremendously.” Wu’s chapter examines a different but
related issue in the context of maritime security, i.e., the passage security for all
ships through the South China Sea. Free navigation in that sea area is guaranteed
by the LOS Convention, and the coastal states have the responsibility to maintain
the safety of navigation. However, while there is freedom of navigation on the
high seas and in the EEZs, the passage through the territorial sea of a coastal state
is qualified by the conditions set forth by the LOS Convention in the stipulations
on innocent passage, which is different from free passage.10 According to Wu,
China shares the responsibility with other countries in the region for safeguarding
passage security in the South China Sea and regional cooperation is necessary.
Regional Cooperation Combating Maritime Terrorism and Piracy
Part III of this book concerns the fight against piracy and maritime terrorism,
which is a key issue in the whole picture of maritime security. Moreover, maritime
security in the South China Sea is indispensably linked to maritime security in the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore, as the latter is a chokepoint to the passage to
the South China Sea. Song’s lengthy chapter depicts recent developments relating
to the responses of the littoral states of the Straits of Malacca to the Regional
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) proposed by the United States in 2004,
attempting to apply it to the Straits in the name of maintaining the maritime order
there by the presence of American military personnel. This was obviously opposed
by the two key littoral states—Indonesia and Malaysia. Though the initiative
was finally aborted without the support of the key littoral states, it has political
and legal implications for future developments concerning the maintenance of
maritime security. In considering the vitality of the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) and the recent multinational naval presence in Somali waters to crack down
on piracy under the authorization of the United Nations Security Council, its
implications are even greater. Zou’s chapter is more focused on the suppression
of maritime piracy. By examining the legal definition of piracy provided for in the
LOS Convention and state practices in the crackdown of piracy, he calls for a more
effective mechanism both at the regional and global levels for the prevention and
suppression of piracy and maritime terrorism.
Closely related to this is the security of the sea lanes in the South China
Sea and the Malacca Straits. Ho’s chapter specifically addressing this issue and
give us a comprehensive picture of how and to what extent the littoral states as
well as user states have made efforts individually, jointly, regionally or through
international mechanisms in maintaining the sea lane security. He concludes by
See Chapter 5 of this book.

10 For details on these provisions, see Articles 17-26 of the LOS Convention.
citing the remarks made by Singapore’s Defense Minister Teo Chee Hean to the
effect that littoral states have the primary role in addressing maritime security
issues, other stakeholders have important roles to play, and consultation should be
pursued and the rule of international law observed in the implementation of any
new initiatives.11 Juras’s chapter offers us an American perspective regarding the
maritime security issue in the South China Sea. She discusses various national
responses of the United States to maritime security including legislative response
represented by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, agency
response represented by the C-TPAT and the Container Security Initiative, and the
executive response represented by the PSI. By additionally examining the 2005
National Strategy for Maritime Security and the Reducing Crime and Terrorism
at America’s Seaports Act of 2005, she concludes that “the United States cannot
act in isolation to protect its maritime transportation system. Protection can only
be achieved through the collective efforts of the international community”.12 The
commentary chapter of this part is contributed by Bao and Zhu, who call for the
enhancement of Sino-American cooperation for regional maritime security in the
South China Sea.
Environmental Security and Maritime Rescue
The final part of this book touches upon one important aspect of maritime security
relating to the environment and human life. With rapid economic growth, China is
eager to get sufficient energy including oil and gas to support its dynamic national
development. According to a recent report, China’s demand for oil reached a new
record of 5.62 million barrels per day (mb/d) in August 2003.13 China replaced
Japan to become a second largest oil-consuming country in the world, just after the
United States. This developmental trend inevitably triggers China’s enthusiasm to
quicken its pace of exporting oil from overseas and much of such oil import has to
go through the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea. Maritime transport could
pose a threat to the marine environment by vessel-source pollution.
China enacted the Marine Environmental Protection Law in 1982 and amended
it in 1999. 14 The law is designed to protect the marine environment and resources,
prevent pollution damage, maintain ecological balance, protect people’s health
and promote marine understandings. It covers five sources of pollution in general:
11 See Chapter 9 of this book.

12 See Chapter 10 of this book.
13 See International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report: A Monthly Oil Market and
Stocks Assessment, 10 October 2003, p.12.
14 English version may be found in Office of Laws and Regulations, Department of
Ocean Management and Monitoring, State Oceanic Administration (ed.), Collection of the
Sea Laws and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing: Ocean Press, 1991),
69-93.
pollution by coastal construction projects, pollution from offshore oil exploration

and exploitation, pollution by land-based pollutants, pollution by vessels, and
pollution by dumping of wastes. For the prevention of marine pollution from vessel
source, China passed the Regulations Concerning the Prevention of Pollution
in Sea Areas by Vessels of 1983.15 They are applicable to Chinese and foreign
vessels within the sea areas and sea ports under China’s jurisdiction, as well as to
shipowners and other individuals. The Chinese authority in charge is the China
Maritime Bureau.
Against the above background, the first two chapters of Part IV address the
issues concerning oil spill preparedness and contingency response from the Chinese
perspective and relating to China’s practice. Xu Shiming presents some major marine
oil pollution incidents in China and a series of measures taken by China to deal with
marine oil pollution. As for the South China Sea, the author observes that China will
continue to promote regional cooperation by sticking to the action plans in order to
get prepared against serious pollution incident involving ships. Different from the
perspective of a practitioner such as Xu, the chapter by Zhang Xiangjun is more like
a desktop exercise, but more focused on contingency plans for the South China Sea.
As she observes, the South China Sea has been exposed to serious environmental
threats including those caused by oil spill accidents. In the legal arrangements for
regional seas sponsored by the United Nations Environment Program, cooperation
in combating pollution in case of emergency has become an important component.
By referring to the existing treaties in other regional seas, the author suggests the
establishment of a similar legal regime for the South China Sea so as to protect the
marine environment from oil spill pollution.
Of the remaining two chapters, one is from an American perspective and the other
from a Chinese one, are concerning search and rescue, also an important element in
the paradigm of maritime security. Goldsten and Murray’s joint chapter touches a new
area of submarine rescue, which is important as reports about submarine collisions
and submarine incidents appear in the media from time to time. Their paper explores
how increased cooperation in submarine rescue is one potential avenue for expanded
maritime cooperation between the established and emerging naval powers in the
Asia-Pacific region and suggests the formulation of some kind of mechanism to
avoid potential conflict and facilitate trust and transparency. The chapter contributed
by Zhang Jie describes the efforts made by the China Maritime Search and Rescue
Center in the search and rescue life at sea, and introduces how the search and rescue
system has been constructed and developed in recent years in China.
The Way Forward
In recent years, non-traditional security issues to a large extent affect the maintenance
of maritime security in the South China Sea. If such issues cannot be resolved in a
15 See Office of Laws and Regulations, ibid., 115-147.

10 Maritime Security in the South China Sea
timely manner, they will cause serious damages to regional economies, and even
disrupt the global trade order. Meanwhile, it is acknowledged that traditional political
and military factors continue to exert a strong influence over the security in the South
China Sea, as reflected in the development of disputes over the Spratly Islands and
the increasing intervention of external powers in the region. Despite the adoption
of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea between
ASEAN nations and China, attempts to consolidate territorial claims by individual
claimants have been intensified, as seen in recent moves by Malaysia, whose prime
minister visited a disputed islet in the Spratly Islands in March 2009, and the
Philippines, which adopted a new law (Republic Act 9522) to embrace the disputed
Kalayaan Group, part of the Spratly Islands, a month earlier. The row between China
and the United States in March 2009 regarding an American naval vessel conducting
intelligence-gathering and military surveying in the EEZ of China in the South
China Sea indicates that big maritime powers retain their strong interest in the South
China Sea. Therefore, traditional security factors have been playing a leading role
in shaping the political landscape of the region. However, the importance of non-
traditional security factors is significantly rising, particularly with the resurgence of
sea piracy in the South China Sea and the Malacca Straits. A closer examination of
the security situation in the South China Sea reveals that cooperation and conflict
coexist there. The key point is how to convince the countries concerned to realize
the necessity of engaging each other to cooperate and avoid potential conflicts so as
to pave the way for lasting peace and security in the region.
As the chapters of this book demonstrate, there is a solid basis to reach the
goal of cooperation in the resolution of the security issues concerning the South
China Sea. Besides a series of international treaties which bind the signatory
states, China and ASEAN countries have also reached a number of agreements
relating to maritime security. By signing the Joint Declaration of ASEAN and
China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues (November
2002) and the Memorandum of Understanding between ASEAN and China on
Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues (January 2004),16 China
and ASEAN have established their partnership in safeguarding maritime security
in the South China Sea. In September 2004, experts in combating terrorism from
China and ASEAN members met in China to work out concrete steps to be jointly
taken against terrorism. Specifically applicable to the South China Sea is the 2002
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea which requests states
concerned to cooperate in the fields of non-traditional security including the fight
against sea piracy and maritime terrorism.
On the other hand, it is to be noted that the 2002 Declaration is a political
document without legal binding force, thus affecting its effectiveness in practice.
Moreover, there is a lack of an effective notification and information sharing
mechanism. A multilateral maritime security cooperation framework has not yet
16 Texts of these documents are available at http://www.aseansec.org/4979.htm

(accessed 11 March 2009).
Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Cooperation and Implications 11
been established in the South China Sea region. In this regard, the 24-hour hotline
between the naval forces of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia for joint policing
of the Malacca Straits may serve as a valuable example. Furthermore, the scope
and modes of cooperation in maritime security have not been clearly defined. For
instance, questions arise as to whether cooperative operations should extend to
disputed maritime areas and how law enforcement should be conducted in such
sea areas. It is also necessary to explore whether and how external powers should
be invited to the multilateral maritime security cooperation framework and what
respective roles the governments, business sectors and non-state actors should
play in the maintenance of maritime security in the South China Sea.
A crucial aspect of maritime security cooperation in the South China Sea is to
realize regional cooperation in the disputed maritime areas. Due to the overlapping
claims of sovereignty over South China Sea islands and the ensuing disputes
over maritime jurisdiction, countries concerned will take a cautious approach
in developing security cooperation in order to avoid negative consequences. If
security cooperation is likely to let one of the parties involved gradually control
the disputed maritime areas, the other parties will naturally resist such cooperation.
Moreover, ordinary people of the countries concerned have the deeply rooted
conviction that the disputed sea areas are the territory of their own countries. In
order not to flare up nationalist sentiments, the governments have to be cautious
in negotiations on security cooperation. There are some suggestions which may
be helpful to facilitate the establishment of a multilateral maritime security
cooperation framework in future.
First, to realize security cooperation, the governments concerned should
demonstrate their political wisdom by moving a step further from the commitment
to “setting aside disputes for joint development of resources” to “setting aside
disputes for joint maintenance of maritime security.” Besides, to remove worries
about the impact on sovereignty claims, the governments concerned should
pledge not to seek unilateral benefits from security cooperation. Such cooperation
should produce a win–win result. In addition, littoral countries may strengthen
cooperation through international organizations operating in the region to promote
mutual understanding and trust.
Secondly, information sharing is particularly important for security cooperation
in the disputed sea areas. This can be achieved by establishing a shared database
on maritime security in the South China Sea and an information exchange system.
The experiences gathered from the Information Sharing Center established under
the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)17 in November 2006 can be borrowed. The
potential of existing channels of exchanges between different countries, including
those between China and ASEAN, should be further exploited. As the cooperation
between littoral countries in the South China Sea region covers various aspects
17 Text is available at http://www.recaap.org/about/pdf/ReCAAP%20Agreement.pdf

(accessed 11 March 2009).
of social life, a more effective use of the existing cooperation mechanisms will
no doubt contribute to cooperation in safeguarding maritime security. However,
these cooperation mechanisms are only confined to inter-governmental exchanges.
Therefore, it is necessary to establish mechanisms for promoting exchanges
between industries, think tanks, and academics. The role of non-governmental
organizations should be emphasized in particular.
Thirdly, it is necessary to promote economic and social developments to
tackle threats to maritime security at the root. Piracy, terrorism and other cross-
border crimes are serious crimes. Although poverty does not necessarily lead to
crimes, the rampant piracy and terrorist activities can be attributed at least partly
to unbalanced economic development and social turbulence in Southeast Asia.
Therefore, countries in the region should work together to deepen economic and
social development, improve living standards, promote social justice, protect the
environment and realize sustainable development.
Fourthly, modern advanced technology can facilitate the safeguard of maritime
security. As piratical attacks and terrorist activities are generally unpredictable, it is
necessary to use modern technology as a counter-measure. In this regard, external
maritime powers, particularly those with advanced technology, can provide
support. For instance, the United Kingdom Hydrographical Office (UKHO) has
published the South China Sea electronic nautical charts (ENC) which can be used
to improve navigation routing and safety in the South China Sea. In addition, a
more advanced anti-hijack alarm and ship-tracking system can help to track down
to a hijacked ship.
With regard to the complex and changing traditional and non-traditional security
issues, it is expected that the countries concerned can place security cooperation
in the South China Sea at the top of their agenda so as to build up consensus for
the establishment of a multilateral maritime security cooperation framework in the
foreseeable future.
As a final note, this book is a result of a joint project between the China National
Institute for the South China Sea Studies and the Lancashire Law School of the
University of Central Lancashire. The National Institute for the South China Sea
Studies is the key think tank in China at the national level specializing in South
China Sea studies. Regarding maritime security, the institute has held several
international conferences, and some of the chapters in this book are selected from
the papers presented to these conferences. The Lancashire Law School has recently
created a research program on law and security and maritime security is a main
focus in that program. We do hope that this edited book can contribute itself to the
continuing studies on maritime security as well as on the South China Sea.
Part II
Securing Navigation in the South
China Sea
Chapter 2
Good Order at Sea in the South China Sea
Sam BATEMAN
The Geopolitics of the South China Sea
The South China Sea can be rated geopolitically, economically and strategically,
as one of the most important seas in the world. It attracts considerable attention
in contemporary thinking in international relations and strategic studies, and
continues to be seen as a “hot spot” that could be a source of tension or even
conflict in East Asia. The need for good order at sea in the South China Sea is a
strong common interest of the countries bordering the sea, the United States and
the emerging maritime powers of Asia—China, India, Japan and South Korea.
The South China Sea is identified in The Times Atlas and Encyclopedia of the
Sea as the largest sea in the world if the size of a sea is assessed as its area within
defined physical boundaries. It covers an area of 3.5 million square kilometers,
and has rich biodiversity and abundant natural resources. One hundred and
twenty-five major rivers drain into the South China Sea and over 30 per cent of the
world’s coral reefs border it, especially around the archipelagos of Indonesia and
the Philippines. Substantial oil and gas reserves have been found in littoral areas
of the sea off Borneo and Vietnam but so far there has been no exploration in the
disputed island groups, and estimates vary as to their potential.
The South China Sea is the geo-strategic focus of Southeast Asia. It is
crisscrossed by major shipping routes and divides Southeast Asia into a maritime
sphere (i.e. the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore) and a
continental one (i.e. Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam). The
countries bordering the South China Sea display a variety of political systems
from the communism and socialism of China and Vietnam to the democracies of
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines to the absolute monarchy of
Alastair Couper, ed., The Times Atlas and Encyclopedia of the Sea, London: Guild
Publishing, 1989, p. 26.
Lu Ning, Flashpoint Spratlys! Singapore: Dolphin Books, 1995, p.1
David Rosenberg, “Fisheries Management in the South China Sea” in Sam Bateman
and Ralf Emmers, eds, Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards
a Cooperative Management Regime, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, p.62.
U.S. Government, “South China Sea——Oil and Natural Gas”, Energy Information
Administration, Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government, http://www.eia.doe.
gov/emeu/cabs/South_China_Sea/OilNaturalGas.html (accessed June 23, 2009)
Brunei Darussalam. The shipping routes through the South China Sea have great
strategic and economic significance to major non-littoral countries, particularly
Japan and the United States, as well as to the bordering countries themselves.
Most of the countries bordering the South China Sea, but notably Indonesia
with its concept of wawasan nusantara (the “archipelagic outlook”), have a strong
cultural affinity with the sea. The South China Sea divides Malaysia into its two
constituent parts—East and West Malaysia. Certain areas in and around the sea, but
particularly in its southwestern part around the Riau Archipelago and the Anambas
and Natuna islands, and off Borneo and around the Sulu Sea, have a long history of
piracy and sea raiding. This remains the situation today as these areas continue to
figure prominently as “high risk” areas for piracy and armed robbery attacks.
The South China Sea is classified as a semi-enclosed sea that comes within the
regime for enclosed and semi-enclosed seas in Part IX of the 1982 UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS Article 123 in that part states that:
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with

each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties
under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour, directly or through an
appropriate regional organization:
(a) to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation
of the living resources of the sea;
(b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to
the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) to coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where
appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area;
(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international organizations
to cooperate with them in the furtherance of the provisions of this article.
While resource management, the protection of the marine environment and

marine scientific research are mentioned specifically as areas for cooperation,
the opening sentence of UNCLOS Article 123 sets a more general obligation to
cooperate. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) in
its Memorandum No. 13 suggests that this responsibility might also be interpreted
broadly as including security and safety, including the maintenance of law and
Stefan Eklof, Pirates in Paradise——A Modern History of Southeast Asia’s

Maritime Marauders, Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2006.
CSCAP was established in 1992–3 as the premier second-track organization in the
Asia Pacific that addresses regional security, including prospective measures for confidence
building and preventive diplomacy. For a critical review of the first eight years of CSCAP’s
achievements, see Desmond Ball, “The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific——Its Record and Its Prospects”, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.
139, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University,
October 2000.
Good Order at Sea in the South China Sea 17
order at sea. It suggests that any failure to achieve an effective level of cooperation
is “due largely to the existence of sovereignty disputes and overlapping boundary
claims that inhibit the process of cooperation and a perception that cooperation
involves some giving up of sovereignty.” As I argue in this chapter, this is certainly
the case in the South China Sea.
There are seven countries bordering the South China Sea. Five of these, as
well as Taiwan, lay claim to some or all of the offshore islands and reefs lying in
midstream between the mainland of East Asia and the Indonesian and Philippine
archipelagos. All these countries are parties to UNCLOS and thus have a clear
obligation to cooperate with regard to the management of the South China
Sea, including the maintenance of good order at sea. Unfortunately and despite
numerous efforts to do so, particularly in recent years, it has proven extremely
difficult to establish effective management regimes for the sea. At present good
order at sea is lacking in the region. As Rosenberg and Chung have suggested
recently, “the number and intensity of regional maritime security problems in the
South China Sea are increasing.”10
Good Order at Sea
Through its several working groups and study groups, CSCAP has undertaken
extensive work over the years to promote maritime security cooperation in the
Asia Pacific, including the notion of good order at sea. CSCAP Memorandum
No. 5 specifically discussed agreed best practices and the scope for cooperation to
maintain law and order at sea in the region. It provides the following description of
what is meant by good order at sea and the prerequisites for its achievement:
Good order at sea permits the free flow of seaborne trade and ensures that nations
can pursue their maritime interests and develop their marine resources in an
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, “Guidelines for Maritime
Cooperation in Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas and Similar Sea Areas of the Asia
Pacific”, CSCAP Memorandum No. 13, July 2008, p. 2 (CSCAP memos are available on
the website at: http://www.cscap.org/index.php?page=cscap-memoranda) (accessed June
23, 2009)
Ibid., p. 1.
The most persistent efforts in this regard have been through the Workshops on
Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea hosted by Indonesia. For a description
of the activities and achievements of this process, see Hasjim Djalal, “The South China
Sea: The Long Road Towards Peace and Cooperation” in Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers,
eds, Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative
Management Regime, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, pp. 175–88.
10 David Rosenberg and Christopher Chung, “Maritime Security in the South China
Sea: Coordinating Coastal and User State Priorities”, Ocean Development and International
Law, 39:1 (2008), p. 61.
ecologically sustainable and peaceful manner in accordance with international

law. It provides for the preservation and protection of the marine environment,
including the conservation of species, and ensures that all nations and peoples,
including future generations, benefit equitably from the marine environment and
the exploitation of its resources.
A breakdown in good order at sea is evident with unregulated pollution of

the marine environment, unregulated or illegal fishing (including the use of
explosives or chemicals to catch fish), or if other illegal activity occurs at sea.
Illegal activity might include piracy; maritime terrorism; maritime theft and
fraud; human smuggling; and the shipment of drugs, arms, protected animal
and plant species, certain toxic materials and nuclear wastes, as well as the
dumping of environmentally harmful and hazardous substances banned under
international agreements.11
This description suggests several requirements for good order at sea that provide
a useful framework for the discussion in this chapter of the extent to which good
order at sea exists at present in the South China Sea. These requirements are:
• adherence to agreed principles of international law;

• processes to provide for the safe and secure flow of seaborne trade;
• the absence of illegal activity at sea, such as piracy, smuggling, and illegal
fishing;
• agreed limits to maritime jurisdiction through established systems of
maritime boundaries;
• arrangements for the ecological sustainable and peaceful development of
marine resources; and
• arrangements for the preservation and protection of the marine
environment.
International Law
Good order at sea requires that nations are able to pursue their legitimate maritime
interests in accordance with agreed principles of international law. Relevant
international law is derived from UNCLOS, other international instruments, soft
law and customary international law. While UNCLOS provides the bulk of the
conventional law of the sea, there is much relevant law that is not contained in
international conventions and is guided by the practice or custom of nations. Recent
decades have also seen a proliferation of both binding international conventions
and “soft law” instruments relevant to good order at sea.
11 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, “Cooperation for Law and
Order at Sea”, CSCAP Memorandum No. 5 (February 2001), pp. 2–3.
All regimes for good order at sea are based on the framework provided by
UNCLOS. However, UNCLOS has some significant limitations in this regard,
including its numerous “built-in” ambiguities, which allow states scope to adopt
flexible interpretations of their rights and duties under the convention.12 UNCLOS
prescribes the regime of maritime zones that establishes the nature of state
sovereignty and sovereign rights over ocean space and resources, and as has been
noted, sets out obligations for countries bordering an enclosed and semi-enclosed
sea. However, it does not assist with resolution of the sovereignty disputes over
offshore features in the South China Sea; it is only after sovereignty has been
agreed that UNCLOS will come into play by guiding claims to maritime zones and
the establishment of maritime jurisdiction.13
International Instruments
Using the framework provided by UNCLOS, other important international

conventions provide principles for good order at sea. These include the:
• 1974 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention;14

• 1979 Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention);15
• International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ship, 1973,
as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78);
• Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Navigation 1988 (SUA Convention);
• Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf 1988; and
• Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Navigation 2005.16
12 Sam Bateman, “UNCLOS and Its Limitations as the Foundation for a Regional
Maritime Security Regime”, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 19:3 (Fall 2007), pp.
27–56.
13 Robert C. Beckman, “Legal Regimes for Cooperation in the South China Sea”
in Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers, eds, Security and International Politics in the South
China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, pp.
222–3.
14 Amendments to SOLAS Chapter V include the mandatory fitting of ship-borne
Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) for all ships of 500 gross tonnage and above on
international voyages.
15 Other IMO Conventions also bear on maritime safety, particularly the 1978
International Convention on Standards for Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers (STCW Convention), but they are less dependent on cooperation and are not
discussed in this paper.
16 Articles 1–16 of the 1988 SUA Convention, as revised by the 2005 SUA Protocol,
together with Articles 17–24 of the 2005 Protocol and its annex, are to constitute and be
called the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Navigation
SOLAS Convention The SOLAS Convention is the most important of

international treaties dealing with the safety and security of merchant ships.
The main objective of the Convention is to specify minimum standards for the
construction, equipment, and operation of ships, compatible with their safety and
security. Additional protocols and amendments relate to tanker safety and pollution
prevention; surveys and certification; passenger ships (especially ferries and ro-ro
vessels); high speed craft; and the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
(GMDSS).
While the focus of the Convention was originally ship safety, it now covers
security requirements as well through its incorporation of the International Ship
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which entered into force on July 1, 2004.17
However, this Code applies only to the so-called “SOLAS ships” i.e. the ships over
500 gross tonnage that are employed on international voyages. Unless extended
by national legislation,18 it does not apply to fishing vessels, ships under 500 gross
tonnage, or to merchant ships employed only in the domestic trade. The number
of vessels to which the ISPS code does not apply is particularly large around the
South China Sea where there are large fishing fleets, many smaller trading vessels,
and big domestic commercial fleets, particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia and the
Philippines. Non-SOLAS ships are common in and around the South China Sea.
MARPOL Convention MARPOL 73/78 is a combination of two treaties adopted

in 1973 and 1978 respectively. It provides the details of what flag states need to
do to fulfill their obligations under UNCLOS, particularly Articles 211 and 217,
2005. Robert C. Beckman, “The 1988 SUA Convention and 2005 Protocol: Tools to
Combat Piracy, Armed Robbery, and Maritime Terrorism”, in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam
Bateman and Peter Lehr, eds, Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security, Boca Raton,
F.L.: Auerbach Publications, 2008, p. 192.
17 This Code includes a mandatory section (Part A) and a recommendatory section
(Part B). Part A requires ships to have security assessments and plans, ship security officers
and certain onboard equipment, as well as permanent ship identity markings and a Continuous
Synopsis Record recording ship ownership. Ships will have to carry an International Ship
Security Certificate (ISSC) indicating that they comply with the requirements of SOLAS
and the ISPS Code. The ISSC will be subject to port state inspections. Similarly, ports are
required to have security assessments, security plans and security officers, and to monitor
and control access. Ships may also be subject to control measures if the port state is
concerned that they have visited a non-compliant port in the recent past. For a critical review
of the ISPS Code and other contemporary maritime security requirements, see Steven M.
Jones “Implications and Effects of Maritime Security on the Operation and Management
of Merchant Vessels” in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr, eds, Lloyd’s
MIU Handbook of Maritime Security, Boca Raton, F.L.: Auerbach Publications, 2008, pp.
87–116.
18 The Maritime Transport Security Act (Cwlth) 2003 in Australia, for example,
extends ISPS provisions to all ships employed on interstate voyages but not to ones
employed on intrastate voyages.
with the objective of preventing the pollution of the marine environment by ships
through the discharge of harmful substances or effluents. It is split into six detailed
annexes covering topics such as oil, noxious liquid substances in bulk (chemicals),
harmful substances carried in packaged form or in containers, sewage, garbage,
and air pollution from ships. Annexes I (oil discharges) and II (carriage of bulk
chemicals) are mandatory for parties to the Convention while the remaining
annexes are optional.
MARPOL emphasizes enforcement and requires that violations of the
requirements of the Convention be prohibited and sanctions established under
the law of the flag state of the ship concerned regardless of where the violation
occurs. Parties are also enjoined to cooperate in the detection of violations and in
enforcement. It is a complex instrument but generally it has been well accepted,
contributing significantly to the prevention of marine pollution by ships.19
However, the prosecution by a flag state of offenses under MARPOL committed
at sea requires coastal states to have an effective monitoring and surveillance
regime to be in place that provides for the detection of pollution incidents and the
collection of evidence to facilitate prosecutions by the flag state. In an area such
as the South China Sea, this requires cooperation between coastal states and this
is currently lacking.
SAR Convention The 1979 SAR Convention encourages cooperation between

States Parties and search and rescue (SAR) organizations around the world with
regard to search and rescue operations at sea. Search and rescue regions are
established by the concerned parties. It obliges state parties to provide adequate
SAR services for persons in distress around their coasts. The original SAR
Convention imposed considerable obligations on parties such as the need to set
up arrangements onshore to manage their SAR responsibilities. As a result, the
Convention was not widely ratified and a revised Convention was approved
at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1997. This clarifies the
responsibilities of governments and puts greater emphasis on regional cooperation.
Parties are encouraged to enter into SAR agreements with neighboring states
involving the establishment of SAR regions, the pooling of facilities, establishment
of common procedures, training and liaison visits.
However, the Convention has still failed to attract additional ratifications in
Southeast Asia, and major bordering States to the South China Sea are not party
to it. A possible explanation of this low level of support is the obligation in the
Convention to allow entry into the territorial sea or territory of a state by rescue
units from another state for the purpose of SAR. The Convention states that parties
should take measures to expedite entry into its territorial waters of rescue units
from other parties.
19 Edgar Gold, Gard Handbook on Protection of the Marine Environment, 3rd ed.,
Arendal: Gard AS, 2006, pp. 238–9.
SUA Convention There are about a dozen international conventions dealing

with the threat of terrorism but only the SUA Convention and its Protocol relate
to terrorism at sea. The SUA Convention extends coastal state enforcement
jurisdiction against acts of violence at sea beyond territorial limits, and in
particular circumstances, allows exercise of such jurisdiction in an adjacent state’s
territorial sea. The Protocol on Fixed Platforms is important for good order in
the South China Sea because of the number of offshore oil and gas platforms in
the area. However, some Southeast Asian countries have failed to ratify the SUA
Convention and its Protocol (see Table 2.1), and this is probably due to some
sensitivity to the extra-territorial aspects of the Convention.
An IMO Diplomatic Conference in October 2005 adopted new Protocols
to the SUA Convention and its protocol on Fixed Platforms. These provide an
international treaty framework for combating and prosecuting individuals who
use a ship as a weapon or means of committing a terrorist attack, or transport
by ship terrorists or cargo intended for use in connection with weapons of mass
destruction programs.20 A mechanism is also provided to facilitate the boarding
in international waters of vessels suspected of engaging in these activities.
These expanded provisions of the SUA Convention through the introduction of
this Protocol are unlikely to make the Convention any more attractive to those
countries, which so far have chosen not to ratify it.
Status of Conventions
Table 2.1 shows the current state of ratification by South China Sea littoral
countries of the key conventions related to good order at sea. All the littoral
countries are parties to UNCLOS but, as can be seen, there are still major gaps in
the level of ratification of the other important conventions. Only China, Singapore
and Vietnam are parties to the SAR Convention. The 1988 SUA Convention and
its Protocol have not been ratified by Indonesia and Malaysia, and as Singapore
does not have any fixed offshore oil or gas platforms, it has not ratified the 1988
Protocol. No littoral country has yet ratified SUA 2005. Only the SOLAS and
MARPOL Conventions have been ratified by all regional countries although some
of their key protocols and annexes have not been.
To ensure good order at sea in the South China Sea, there is a need for greater
attention to these conventions in the littoral countries, enhanced legal education
and better domestic legislation. There needs to be greater awareness of the
benefits of the conventions and acceptance of the principal that the sum of mutual
benefits outweighs any perceived individual costs. In the field of maritime security
and safety, the articulation and enactment of sound and effective legislation is
20 U.S. Department of State, “Protocols to the United Nations Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA)”, Fact
Sheet, October 21, 2005.
Table 2.1 Status of Conventions and Agreements—South China Sea

Countries
SOLAS MARPOL SAR SUA 88 SUA 88 SUA

Protocol 2005
Brunei X X(a) X X
China X X X X X
Indonesia X X(a)
Malaysia X(a) X(a)
Philippines X(a) X X X
Singapore X X X X
Vietnam X X(a) X X X
Note: X signifies that the Convention has been ratified and X(a) denotes that not all
protocols and annexes to the Convention have been ratified
Source: International Maritime Organization
extremely important. These conventions are not self-executing and require

domestic legislation to put them into force.
Soft Law
Soft law instruments are a relatively recent phenomenon in respect of the growing
body of international agreements between states.21 They are generally regarded
as non-binding instruments that do not create legal obligations, but instead reflect
agreement between states concerning the need to cooperate in identified issue
areas. While the law of the sea is mainly set out in hard law conventions, soft
law instruments are also significant, including the various “codes” promulgated
by U.N. bodies such as the IMO and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO). Examples relevant to the provision of good order at sea in the South China
Sea include the Global Program of Action (GPA) on the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-Based Activities established through the Washington
Declaration,22 the FAO’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and the
International Plan of Action against Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU)
Fishing.
21 Dinah Shelton, ed., Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding
Norms in the International Legal System, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.
22 The 1995 Declaration on Protecting the Marine Environment from Land-Based
Activities, done in Washington, November 1, 1995, reproduced in Environmental Policy
and Law, 26 (1996), p. 37.
The 2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) is
a significant soft law instrument for good order at sea in the South China Sea.23
It potentially provides a basis for cooperation in the South China Sea.24 While an
important demonstration of good intent between China and the ASEAN counties,
it is not a binding code of conduct. It is a political gesture rather than a major step
towards conflict management and resolution, and Nguyen Hong Thao believes
that it would be naïve to believe that because of the DOC, the parties have ceased
activities that could complicate the situation.25 A code of conduct that provides
a binding obligation to avoid conflict still remains desirable if good order is to
prevail in the South China Sea.
Shipping and Seaborne Trade
Seaborne trade has largely driven economic growth in Southeast Asia, and much
of this trade crosses the South China Sea. International trade in the region has been
growing much faster than the economies of the regional countries themselves,
and most of this is carried by sea. The importance of seaborne trade is explained
by both geo-strategic and economic factors. As well as inter-island shipping in
the Philippine and Indonesian archipelagos, ports on continental Southeast Asia
are mainly linked by water rather than by developed road and rail systems.26 The
size of the domestic shipping fleets in Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Indonesia demonstrates the importance of local shipping in Southeast Asia. The
situation is further evident in the “hub and spokes” nature of the contemporary
container trade whereby major container ports, such as Singapore and Hong Kong,
are the “hubs” where containers are offloaded from large, main line container ships
for transshipment, usually by smaller vessels to other ports.
Economically, Southeast Asia is trading much more with itself, as well as with
Northeast Asia and elsewhere in the world as the process of globalization continues.
This is particularly evident with petroleum products, liquid petroleum gas (LPG)
and various chemicals. Singapore is now one of the major oil refining centers of
the world and largely supplies the region with refined petroleum products. Again
much of this traffic in and out of Singapore crosses the South China Sea.
23 The text of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(DOC) is available at: www.aseansec.org/13163.htm
24 Beckman, “Legal Regimes for Cooperation in the South China Sea”, p. 227.
25 For a critical discussion of the DOC, see Nguyen Hong Thao, “The Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea——A Vietnamese Perspective” in Sam
Bateman and Ralf Emmers, eds, Security and International Politics in the South China Sea:
Towards a Cooperative Management Regime, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, pp. 207–21.
26 The exception is the Malay Peninsula where an excellent highway links ports and
main centers in Malaysia with Singapore.
Most of the distribution and redistribution of fuels (petrol, diesel, kerosene,

etc.) in Southeast Asia occurs by sea. This explains the large number of product
tankers of all shapes and sizes to be seen at sea in the region, and often at anchor
off regional ports waiting for their next cargo. Not surprisingly these ships,
particularly the smaller ones, figure prominently in the incidence of piracy and
armed robbery at sea, including some cases of entire vessels being hijacked. The
cargoes of these ships can be readily disposed of on the black market.
Safety and Security
The requirements for safety and security include the availability of effective SAR
services, good hydrographic surveys, reliable meteorological forecasts, and the
provision of the necessary navigational aids. A ship security alert system (SSAS)
was introduced with the ISPS Code to provide a ship-to-shore security alert in the
event of an emergency, such as a pirate or terrorist attack, but a recent investigation
found this system to be largely ineffective due to long delays in an alert reaching
a response authority and a large incidence of false alerts.27 No process exists at
present to make the system effective in the South China Sea.
There must be concern about how a major maritime incident, such as an
accident involving a cruise liner or a terrorist attack, or even the crash of an
airliner at sea, 28 would be handled in the South China Sea. ASEAN and China
have talked about SAR cooperation but so far this has been limited to “table top”
exercises. With current search and rescue regions (SRR), Singapore has accepted
SAR responsibility for a large part of the South China Sea.29 It must be noted,
however, that SRR boundaries do not accord with national maritime boundaries,
and this along with the current low level of ratification of the SAR Convention by
littoral countries, suggests that there could be problems with mounting a large-
scale maritime SAR operation in the South China Sea.
27 Thomas Timlen, “The use of SOLAS Ship Security Alert Systems”, RSIS Working
Paper No. 154, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, March 5, 2008.
28 The loss of the Adam Air B737 aircraft in January 2007 is an example. Although
the incident involved an aircraft, it occurred over the sea off the west coast of Sulawesi.
The initial SAR operation appears to have been less than effective. “Fate of Adam Air Plane
carrying 102 Remains Mystery”, Indanesia.com, January 5, 2007. (http://news.indahnesia.
com/item/200701053/fate_of_adam_air_plane_carrying_102_remains_mystery.php)
(accessed June 23, 2009)
29 See map in Sam Bateman, Catherine Zara Raymond and Joshua Ho, Safety and
Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits——An Agenda for Action. Singapore:
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, May 2006, Fig. 11, p. 28.
Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT)
Largely at the behest of the United States, the IMO introduced a system in 2006 for
the long range identification and tracking (LRIT) of ships.30 This is part of general
arrangements for enhancing maritime domain awareness to detect and monitor
illegal activity at sea. Several countries, including Australia and the United States,
have already introduced extended offshore identification arrangements requiring
ships approaching their shores to identify themselves well before they enter
national waters. However, there is still no complete consensus on the political,
legal or financial implications of LRIT.
The new regulations on LRIT are included in SOLAS Chapter V on Safety of
Navigation, through which LRIT will be introduced as a mandatory requirement for
ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards. These establish a multilateral agreement
for sharing LRIT information for security and search and rescue purposes, amongst
SOLAS contracting governments, in order to meet their maritime security needs
and other concerns. They maintain the right of flag states to protect information
about the ships entitled to fly their flag, where appropriate, while allowing coastal
states access to information about ships navigating off their coasts.
The LRIT information that ships will be required to transmit include the ship’s
identity, location and date and time of the position. There is no interface between
LRIT and the Automatic Identification System (AIS) required by the SOLAS
Convention.31 One of the more important distinctions between LRIT and AIS,
apart from that of range, is that, whereas AIS is a broadcast system, data derived
through LRIT will be available only to the recipients who are entitled to receive
such information, and safeguards concerning the confidentiality of those data
have been built into the regulatory provisions. SOLAS contracting governments
are entitled to receive information about ships navigating within a distance not
exceeding 1000 nautical miles off their coast.
While an operational system of LRIT would have high utility in providing
good order in the South China Sea, it is not clear how the system would be
implemented in the area. Many problems are likely. No coastal state in the region
has expressed interest in receiving LRIT data and virtue of the geography of the
area, some form of coordination and information sharing would be appropriate.
However, operational implementation of LRIT is likely to be frustrated by the lack
30 For a comprehensive discussion of LRIT, see Martin Tsamenyi and Mary Ann
Palma, “Long-Range Identification and Tracking Systems for Vessels: Legal and Technical
Issues” in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr, eds, Lloyd’s MIU Handbook
of Maritime Security, Boca Raton, F.L.: Auerbach Publications, 2008, pp. 215–32.
31 See discussion in Martin N. Murphy, “Lifeline or Pipedream? Origins, Purposes,
and Benefits of Automatic Identification System, Long-Range Identification and Tracking,
and Maritime Domain Awareness” in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter
Lehr, eds, Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security, Boca Raton, F.L.: Auerbach
Publications, 2008, pp. 13-28.
of agreed maritime boundaries in the South China Sea and the conflicting claims to
sovereignty over offshore islands and reefs. These factors mean that there are no
accepted limits to maritime jurisdiction on which to base LRIT, or arrangements
for good order at sea more generally. And even with LRIT, some ships will want
to hide for their own protection from potential corruption among those who have
access to LRIT data, which might have criminal or terrorist intent.
Illegal Activity
Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea
The situation with piracy and armed robbery against ships in Southeast Asia has
improved significantly in recent years. The number of actual and attempted attacks
in the region has trended steadily downwards from 170 in 2004 to 78 in 2007, and
54 in 2008.32 The number of attacks in the South China Sea reflected this trend
with eight in 2004, two in 2007, and none in 2008. However, these figures give
a misleading picture of the situation in the South China Sea as attacks that occur
near Pulau Tioman off the east coast of Malaysia and near Anambas and Natuna
islands are listed as having occurred in Malaysia and Indonesia respectively. As
shown in Table 2.2, there have been a significant number of attacks in these areas
during 2008. As the areas are not much more than 100 nautical miles apart, it
is not inconceivable that they involve the same group of attackers. Most of the
attacks involved robbers armed with knives and machetes boarding the vessels and
stealing personal valuables, cash and ship’s property. However, the tug Whale 7
and its barge were hijacked and their crews put ashore, and the vessels so far have
not been located.
Statistics from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) need some
interpretation. On the one hand, there could be some under-reporting of attacks.
Both the IMB and the IMO have noted the reluctance by some shipmasters and
shipowners to report incidents due to concerns that any investigation might disrupt
the ship’s schedule, and insurance premiums might increase. Under-reporting may
also occur because attacks on local craft, such as fishing boats, barges and small
barter vessels, may not be reported to the IMB.33 However, there is also the risk
of over-reporting. The widespread use of the Internet means that it is all too easy
to report an attack by email and many attacks, particularly ones of a minor nature,
that may not have been reported in earlier years are now reported. This is borne
32 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships—
Annual Report for Period 1 January
33 J.N. Mak, “Pirates, Renegades, and Fishermen: Reassessing the Dynamics of
Maritime Piracy in the Malacca Straits”, paper presented at the Royal Australian Navy Sea
Power Conference 2008, Sydney, January 29–31, 2008, p. 4.
Table 2.2 Actual Attacks on Vessels underway in Southern Area of South

China Sea, 2008
Date Ship name Vessel type Location

24.03 Ocean Seal Lift barge Off Anambas Islands
13.04 Monalisa Product tanker Off Mangkai Islands
13.04 Spar Cetus Bulk Carrier Off Mangkai Islands
25.04 Pataravin 2 Product tanker NE of Singapore Str.
30.04 PU2008 Tug Off Pulau Tioman
PU3306 Barge
03.06 Medbothian Container ship Off Anambas Islands
04.06 Red Wing Chemical tanker Off Anambas Islands
29.06 Wecoy 6 Tug Off Pulau Tioman
07.09 Whale 7 Tug Off Pulau Tioman
Sinobest2503 Barge
30.09 J.K.M. Muhieddine Bulk carrier Off Anambas Islands
02.10 Sun Geranium Chemical tanker NE of Pulau Tioman
03.10 Diamond Coral LPG tanker Off Mangkai Islands
01.12 Entebe Star 21 Tug (with barge) Off Pulau Tioman
Sources: IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – Annual Report for Period 1
January – 31 December 2008
out to some extent by the relative increase in the number of minor attacks and
attempted attacks shown in the IMB statistics over the last ten years.
The vast majority of attacks in the region continue to be on vessels at anchor,
in port or entering or leaving a harbor. For example, of the 78 actual and attempted
attacks in Southeast Asia in 2007, 52 were on vessels that were not at sea. These
attacks are usually of a minor nature and are best countered by more effective
policing by port authorities, including active patrolling of ports and anchorages.
The successful attacks that do occur at sea in Southeast Asia on vessels underway
are mostly on small vessels, and on vessels that have slowed down for some reason.
Larger vessels gain considerable protection from their size and speed. Most large,
modern merchant ships engaged in international trade travel at speeds in excess
of 14 knots, and it is both difficult and dangerous for small craft to attempt to
approach them at this speed.
Smuggling
Smuggling at sea occurs both across the South China Sea and along its bordering
coasts. Most criminal groups, including so-called pirates, engage in several
different types of criminal activity. There is no strict demarcation between people
involved in piracy and those involved in other forms of maritime crime, particularly
smuggling. Many are non-professional criminals, such as fishermen and traditional
barter traders, engaged in opportunistic subsistence-level crime, making money by

avoiding excise tax on, for example, cigarettes from Indonesia to Malaysia where
the tax is very high, or fuels from Malaysia to the Philippines.
The sea is a preferred medium for smuggling in Southeast Asia due to the
archipelagic nature of the region and the fact that sea borders may be more easily
crossed covertly than land borders. Larger quantities of contraband may also be
carried by sea. Drug smuggling may occur across the South China Sea with opiates
(mainly heroin) moving out of the “Golden Triangle,” overlapping Myanmar, Laos
and Vietnam, through Thailand and Cambodia. The manufacture and trafficking
of methamphetamines (“ice”) and other amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) is
also a problem in the region with precursor chemicals probably moving by sea.
Illegal people movement is another feature of the South China Sea with recorded
incidents of people moving illegally from the Philippines, Vietnam and Fujian
province in southern China.
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a major security problem
in Southeast Asia. Small arms trafficking, much of which occurs by sea, is an
integral part of broader transnational crime that includes terrorism, drug trafficking,
money laundering, piracy, and human trafficking. Due largely to its proximity and
role in the Cambodian conflict, Thailand is a key point of origin and transit in the
trafficking of small arms and light weapons. The Philippines with its large legal
and illegal arms industries, and major internal conflicts, also figures prominently
in arms smuggling.
Maritime Boundaries
Good order at sea depends heavily on countries having agreed limits to their
maritime jurisdiction based on established systems of maritime boundaries.
However, maritime boundary making in the South China Sea is extremely
problematic. The main reason for this lies in the geography of the region, with
its concave areas of coast, numerous islands and longstanding historic claims to
sovereignty. Many boundaries (or at least their end points or “turning points”) will
require the agreement of three, or even more, countries. Furthermore, maritime
boundaries cannot be agreed until sovereignty over islands and other features has
been established.
Prior to UNCLOS, countries could only claim a 3 nautical mile (nm) territorial
sea. Maritime boundaries were not required unless countries were adjacent to each
other or had territory lying within 6 nm of each other. Boundary differences then
had little effect on the relative size of jurisdiction that a country could claim and
maritime boundary negotiations between neighboring countries were comparatively
straightforward. All this has changed. Countries now require maritime boundaries
if they have territory within 400 nm of each other (700 nm in certain circumstances
where there are extended continental shelves), and the location of a boundary can
have a large effect on the size of a country’s maritime jurisdiction.
Table 2.3 shows the current situation with maritime boundaries in the South
China Sea. It is not a good picture. Very few of the maritime boundaries required
have so far been fully agreed, and little progress is being made with delimiting
outstanding ones. Indonesia is the one regional country that has assiduously
pursued agreements on maritime boundaries with its neighbors. In contrast, the
Philippines has no agreed maritime boundaries with any of its neighbors. The lack
of EEZ boundaries means that enforcement against illegal fishing in the region is
very difficult.
When a full set of maritime boundaries is agreed in the South China Sea, this
will mean that most, if not all, of the sea is part of the EEZ or territorial sea of one
country or another. However, this outcome is most unlikely. It would depend first
on the settlement of the sovereignty disputes, and then with the complex geography
of the South China Sea, there would be the great difficulties of reaching agreement
on boundaries between three or more countries in some parts of the sea. A full set
of conventional straight-line maritime boundaries for the South China Sea seems
an unachievable objective. Thus some alternative approach to boundary making is
required if there is to be good order at sea in the South China Sea.
Table 2.3 Maritime Boundaries in the South China Sea
Country Territorial EEZ Continental Remarks

sea shelf
Brunei–Malaysia No No No
Indonesia–Malaysia Yes No Yes
Indonesia–Vietnam NR Yes Yes Agreement not yet
public
Indonesia–China NR No No
Malaysia–Philippines No No No
Malaysia–Vietnam NR No No Joint zone
China–Vietnam Yes Yes Yes In Tonkin Gulf.
(part only) (part only)
Philippines–China NR No No
Notes: NR = Boundaries are not required because either the countries are too far apart
to have the relevant boundary (i.e., over 24 nm in the case of a territorial sea boundary),
or so close together that a territorial sea boundary only is required (e.g., as is the case with
both Malaysia and Singapore and Indonesia and Singapore).
Marine Resources
Living Resources
Illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing is a serious problem in the

South China Sea. The flat and shallow seabeds of the area are among the world’s
most productive fishing grounds,34 but the fisheries have been over-exploited and
catches have declined over the years. In a large part, this is due to the lack of
agreed limits to maritime jurisdiction. This has contributed to over fishing through
a “beggar thy neighbor” approach, the lack of effective fisheries management
arrangements, and the absence of effective enforcement against IUU fishing.
Clashes between different groups of fishers and alleged illegal fishermen and
maritime law enforcement forces also occur regularly in the area.
While over-fishing is the major problem, this problem has been exacerbated by
the serious degradation of coastal habitats. Fish stocks are affected by ecologically
harmful practices such as the clearing of mangroves, the exploitation of coral
reefs, and the destruction of sea grass beds. Other problems include sedimentation
of estuaries, land-based pollution, saw-milling, dynamiting, the use of very fine
mesh nets, and other forms of illegal fishing. Aquaculture was initially seen as a
solution to the problem of depleted fish stocks but many aquaculture programs
have been disappointing and have caused problems of pollution and natural habitat
destruction.
The Convention on the Conservation of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean, 2000 was developed to ensure the compatibility
of the conservation and management measures for straddling and highly migratory
fish stocks between areas under coastal states jurisdiction and on the high seas.
However, the area of application of the Convention does not include important
spawning and catching areas for tuna stocks of concern in the Indonesian and
Philippine archipelagos and the South China Sea. Unfortunately, the benefits that
may have been gained in terms of fisheries management and conservation did not
outweigh the difficulties in bringing into the negotiation the countries claiming
sovereignty in the South China Sea.35
Non-living Resources
As levels of energy self-sufficiency fall and countries become more concerned

about their energy security, increasing attention is being given to the potential of
34 David Rosenberg, “Fisheries Management in the South China Sea” in Sam

Bateman and Ralf Emmers, eds, Security and International Politics in the South China
Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, p.62.
35 Laurence Cordonnery, “A Note on the 2000 Convention for the Conservation
and Management of Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean”, Ocean Development
and International Law, 33 (2002), p. 10.
offshore areas to produce oil and gas. The South China Sea is a focus of much
interest in this regard because it is underlain by sedimentary basins that either
produce oil and gas or are known to contain hydrocarbon deposits. There is a range
of views regarding the potential of the area with the Chinese estimates being the
most optimistic.36 However, accurate assessments have not been possible while
limits to maritime jurisdiction have not been established.
In the absence of agreed jurisdiction, joint development of resources would
appear to be the only feasible approach.37 However, major problems are involved
with developing a suitable model for joint development and agreeing on the area to
be incorporated within a joint arrangement. There are also the risks of two countries
agreeing joint development in an area which is affected by the claim of another
party. Finally, oil companies are unlikely to make the heavy investment in the
exploration and exploitation of offshore hydrocarbon deposits if sovereign rights
in the prospective area are in doubt. There were reports during 2008 that China
had taken this concern one step further by warning major foreign oil companies
against entering into arrangements with Vietnam to exploit oil and gas resources
in the South China Sea.38
Marine Environmental Protection
Under the provisions of UNCLOS, marine environmental protection is primarily

the responsibility of the coastal state in exercising its rights and fulfilling its
obligations in its EEZ. However, in areas such as the South China Sea where
maritime boundaries have not been agreed and there are overlapping EEZ claims,
management becomes problematic. As noted earlier, marine environmental
protection is also a specific and joint responsibility of countries adjacent to an
enclosed or semi-enclosed sea under the regime for those seas in UNCLOS Part
IX. Specific tasks required for marine environmental management include the
monitoring and prevention of ship-sourced marine pollution; the mitigation of
the effects of a major spill of oil, or other hazardous or noxious substance; the
reversal of the degradation of marine habitats, the control of illegal, unreported or
36 An incomplete figure from China shows that the eight sedimentary basins
within China’s unilateral U-shaped line contain 34.97 billion tons of petroleum reserves,
including 1,182 billion tons of oil so far discovered and 8,000 billion cubic meters of gas.
Zou Keyuan, “Cooperative Development of Oil and Gas Resources in the South China Sea”
in Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers, eds, Security and International Politics in the South
China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, p.
80.
37 Ibid., p. 85
38 Greg Torode, “Tussle for Oil in the South China Sea”, South China Morning
Post, July 20, 2008.
unregulated (IUU) fishing; and the establishment as required of marine protected

areas and marine parks.
Several international and multilateral programs have been established to
protect the marine and coastal environment of the South China Sea. These have
all been steps in the right direction but their way ahead has not been easy. The
South China Sea comes within the scope of the Action Plan of the Coordinating
Body of the Seas of East (COBSEA), which is part of the UNEP’s Regional Seas
Program, but COBSEA is not always successful due to the lack of political will
and a lack of awareness by the wider community of the consequences of marine
and coastal degradation.39 The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP)
and Global Environmental Facility (GEF) project on Reversing Environmental
Degradation in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand is a major multilateral
conservation effort, but it only covers areas under accepted national jurisdiction.
Perhaps the most widespread policy response adopted by the countries around
the South China Sea to achieve marine environmental protection and sustainable
fisheries management has been the establishment of Marine Protected Areas
(MPAs). According to the MPA Global Database, 554 MPAs have been declared
in countries around the South China Sea.40
Conclusion
Despite the strategic, economic and political importance of the South China
Sea, current arrangements for providing good order at sea in the South China
Sea fall well short of what is desirable. There are few maritime boundaries and
key international regimes for providing maritime safety and security appear not
well supported by bordering countries. Resolution of the sovereignty claims and
agreement on maritime boundaries seem quite unlikely in the foreseeable future.
While the risks of conflict between claimant countries may have fallen, there is still
no effective regime in the area for providing key elements of good order at sea: the
safety and security of shipping; the preservation, protection, and conservation of
the marine environment; agreed arrangements for the exploration and exploitation
of marine resources; and the prevention of illegal activity at sea. This will
only be achieved by a much higher level of cooperation than exists at present,
including a possible web of provisional arrangements covering cooperation for
each requirement of good order at sea, and perhaps even with different areas of
geographical application for each requirement.
However, changed mindsets are necessary before this can happen. The littoral
countries must first accept that the benefits of cooperation in terms of “win–win”
outcomes outweigh the costs that might result from any perceived diminution of
39 Hugh Kirkman, “The East Asian Seas UNEP Regional Seas Programme”,
International Environmental Agreements, Vol. 6, 2006, pp. 305–16.
40 Rosenberg, “Fisheries Management in the South China Sea”.
sovereignty. It should be accepted that cooperative management regimes need

not be prejudicial to the sovereignty claims of individual countries.41 They would
involve a functional approach to cooperation and joint development. Benefits
would result for both the littoral countries and the other countries with an interest
in good order in the South China Sea. To achieve this outcome, a much greater
effort is required to promote the notion of functional cooperation and to get away
from the idea that “fences in the sea” are required in the same way as we have
border fences on land. The effort required is not to be underestimated. It requires
identifying particular functions for cooperation; defining the area for cooperation;
finding a formula to share costs and resources; and where required, establishing a
management body.42 This seems the only way ahead for good order at sea in the
South China Sea .
41 The guidelines provided in CSCAP Memorandum No. 13 should be of assistance

here (see note 7 above).
42 Djalal, “The South China Sea: The Long Road Towards Peace and Cooperation”,
pp. 185—6.
Chapter 3
Maritime Trade Development in Asia:
A Need for Regional Maritime Security
Cooperation in the South China Sea
HONG Nong
Review of Maritime Trade in Asia
Economic Background in Asia
In spite of the Iraq war, the sharply increasing price of oil and the SARS outbreak
in 2003, the gross domestic product (GDP) of Asian countries grew by 6.3 percent,
higher than the 5.8 percent growth in 2002, becoming the driver for the world
economic development. The average GDP of 20 developing countries increased
from 4.6 percent in 2002 to 5.2 percent in 2003. Trade growth in 2003 was positive
for the large majority of the 40 Asian economies.
The majority of Asian countries is increasing importing and exporting with
other Asian countries. This growth of trade is at the same time the cause and effect
of the general progress of regional integration in Asia. As regards Southeast Asia,
in January 2003, countries belonging to the ASEAN free trade area renewed their
commitment to promote regional trade by signing the Protocol to Amend the
Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme, whereby
import duties would be eliminated. With regard to neighboring countries, in October
2003, both India and China signed a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, ensuring
their mutual cooperation towards developing and sustaining the prosperity and
security of the region. On the same day, the commitment for economic cooperation
between ASEAN states and China, Japan, and India was also affirmed in the form
of framework agreements and partnerships. The agreement cover various aspects
of trade, including matters classified under trade facilitation such as customs
cooperation, non-tariff measures, mutual recognition arrangements, conformity
assessment, accreditation procedures, and standards and technical regulations.
The data in this part are based on United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2004, New York and Geneva.
Ibid.
Seaborne Trade
World seaborne trade increased strongly in 2003, reaching 6.17 billion tons of
loaded goods. The breakdown of world seaborne loaded goods by continent was
as follows: Africa’s share of world exports was 8.9 percent, while America’s was
20.7 percent. Asia was by far the continent with the largest share of the world
tonnage of seaborne loaded goods—37.2 percent. Europe’s share was the second
largest at 25.1 percent, while Oceania’s share was the smallest, only 8.0 percent
of world seaborne loaded goods. Total maritime activities measured in ton-miles
increased to 24,589 billion ton-miles, compared with 23,217 billion ton-miles in
2002.
Asian countries were major players in world maritime transport, with sizeable
shares in several activities. They accounted for 35.8 percent of containership
ownership, 45.7 percent of containership operation, 60.4 percent of seamen, 62.3
percent of container port throughput, 64.7 percent of container port operators,
83.2 percent of containership shipbuilding and 99 percent of ship demolition.
In addition to being one of the focuses of the main east–west shipping routes
articulated around world port leaders such as Hong Kong (China) and Singapore,
they are also the focus of an intensive and significant intra-Asian shipping trade.
Seaborne trade covers trade in tankers, dry cargo shipments, liner shipments of
containerized cargoes. In 2003 the total world shipment of tanker cargoes reached
2.20 billion tons, after rebounding by 3.4 percent during the year. About 76.5
percent of this tanker trade was in crude oil, with the remainder as petroleum
products. Crude oil seaborne shipments were increased by 3.5 percent to 1.66
billion tons in 2003. Developing countries in South and East Asia took 301.2
million tons during 2002. LNG shipments increased by 4.9 percent during 2002
to reach 150 BCM (billion cubic metres) of natural gas. This is about 5.9 percent
of world production. The largest importing area is located in the Far East, where
major importers continued to be Japan, with 72.7 BCM, and the Republic of Korea,
with 24.1 BCM. Supplies came from Indonesia, with 34.3 BCM; Malaysia, with
20.5 BCM; Qatar, with 18.6 BCM; and Australia, with 10 BCM.
Maritime Trade and Demand for Maritime Transport Services in Asia
Containerized Trade
Twelve major South and East Asian exporters together accounted for 49.3 per
cent of the world’s containerized exports in 2003. China is by far the world’s
largest exporter of containerized cargo, with 14.4 million TEUs (twenty-foot
equivalent unit) in 2003. China’s export volume of containerized cargo amounted
Ibid.
Ibid.
Maritime Trade Development in Asia 37
to 21.54 million TEU in 2005, 24.62 million TEU in 2006 and 27.65 million TEU
in 2007. China will then account for 24 percent of the world’s containerized
trade exports. In fact, globally, the largest bilateral containerized trade flow is
that of Chinese exports to the United States. The second largest Asian exporter is
Japan, whose containerized exports are expected to reach 442,000 TEUs in 2005.
India’s containerized exports are expected to grow annually by a relatively low 3.8
percent, which will leave the country in eighth position among the leading South
and East Asian exports.
The most important intra-Asian containerized trade flow in 2003 were Chinese
exports to Japan (1,041,961 TEUs), followed by Chinese exports to Hong Kong,
China (720,734 TEUs), Taiwan Province of China exports to China (688,334
TEUs), Republic of Korea exports to China (504,081 TEUs), and Japanese exports
to China (502,895 TEUs). Chinese imports and exports from other Asian countries
were also those with the highest growth rates.
Ports and Liner Shipping Services
Sixty-two percent of global container port throughput takes place in Asia. In 2003,
20 of the world’s top 30 container ports were located in Asia. Shenzhen is the port
that in 2003 registered the highest absolute growth of all ports in the world, with
an annual increase of 3 million TEUs. Salalah (Oman), ranked 34th in the world,
registered the highest annual growth rate among the world’s top 70 ports, with
an increase of over 65 percent between 2002 and 2003. Hong Kong (China) and
Singapore continue to be by far the largest container ports in the world. Most
intercontinental liner shipping routes that link Asia with Europe or North America
will call at both of them. Nevertheless, there are also an increasing number of
additional hub ports and secondary direct calling ports, and most liner shipping
alliances tend to offer alternative routes.
In order to be competitive in the transshipment business, Malaysia has effectively
lifted cabotage restrictions for the main liner shipping routes. International liner
shipping companies are allowed to pick up cargo in Malaysian secondary ports
and transship, for example, in Port Klang or Tanjung-Pelepas. Further to the north,
Gwang Yang (Republic of Korea) expects to benefit from cabotage restrictions
in neighboring countries. In particular, it has ambitions to serve as a major
transshipment center for the trade of Japanese and Northern Chinese ports.
Nazer Y Khalid, “Container Shipping Within The Middle East And Asian Countries
– Dynamics And Trends”, at http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/pdf/nazery/
Dubai%20paper%20_7Nov_.pdf (accessed June 23, 2009).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Supply of Maritime Business in Asia
Asian countries have a significant presence in most maritime sectors, including

liner shipping companies, ownership of containerships, nationally flagged vessels,
containership building, classification societies, protection and indemnity clubs,
container manufacturing, ship-to-shore crane manufacturing, container port
operators, ship scrapping, and crewing. Sixteen of the world’s top 25 liner shipping
companies and 28 of the top 50 are based in Asia. The largest Asian ship-owning
companies at the beginning of 2004 were evergreen (Chinese Taiwan), COSCO
(China), APL (Singapore), NYK (Japan) and K-Line (Japan). Nine of the top 10
containership builders are from Asia. Ten of the 25 largest classification societies
are based in Asia. Together, they are responsible for 26 percent of the world’s
classifications of commercial vessels. Most of the major protection and indemnity
clubs are based in the United Kingdom. The largest Asian club is based in Japan.
Approximately 90 percent of all containers are being built in China. Almost all
global ship scrapping takes place in Asia. India, Bangladesh, China, and Pakistan
together accounted for 97 percent of the world’s ship scrapping activity between
1994 and 2002. Sixty percent of the world’s ratings are from Asia, the largest
providers being the Philippines, followed by Indonesia, Turkey, China, and India.
Maritime Country Profile
Different maritime businesses are concentrating their activities in selected Asian

countries. This development leads to a situation where some Asian countries
are specializing in certain sectors, and other countries in other sectors. China is
the country with by far the most container port throughput in Asia. Singapore
and Hong Kong (China) have their largest maritime participation through their
respective international port operating companies—Port of Singapore Authority
and Hutchison Port Holdings, which not only operate in their traditional home port,
but have also expanded and invested in concessions and port privatizations abroad.
Japan has its highest market share with its classification society Nippon Kaiji
Kyokai. The Republic of Korea has by far its highest market share in containership
building. Except for Singapore, most Asian countries have a large proportion of
their fleet registered under a foreign flag. Chinese Taiwan, mostly through the
Evergreen group, has its highest market share in containership operation. Just
like other major operators from China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, these
liner shipping companies tend to operate fleets that are only partly owned by them
and a large proportion of the vessels are chartered in. Singapore and Hong Kong
(China), on the other hand, have a higher market share in container ship owning
than in container ship operation.
Clarkson Research Studies, March 2004.

China is among the few Asian countries that participate in almost all maritime
sub-sectors. Chinese shipping companies are among the fastest growing regarding
to supply side, and the country is host to the most important container and crane
manufacturers. On the demand side, Chinese containerized exports are going at
almost 18 percent annually and today make up almost one quarter of the world’s
total. As a result of these developments, Chinese ports too are among the fastest
growing in the world, with annual increases of port throughput of between
approximately 18 and 153 percent in major ports. In terms of volume, 70.5 percent
of Chinese port throughput is cabotage traffic, and 37.7 percent takes place in
inland ports. In 2003, port throughput of foreign trade grew by 23.7 percent and
cabotage port throughput by 25.5 percent. China also has a remarkable market
share in ship scrapping, which has grown further in recent months due to the
country’s demand for steel. Concerning containership registration, ownership and
operation, China has a relatively typical industry structure for a country that hosts
important liner shipping companies.
Threat to Maritime Trade in Asia
World trade is largely dependent on maritime transport. Thus at present maritime

trade is developing at high speed in Asia, given the region’s significant role in
international commerce. But there is potential threat to maritime transport resulting
from the explosion of maritime violence in Southeast Asia. Roughly 45 percent
of the world’s commercial shipping moves through the region’s waters, and the
frequent attacks on commercial vessels passing through the region can hamper
international trade and lead to severe economic loss. Indeed, maritime attacks in
the region have caused an estimated $16 billion in economic loss over the past
five years.10
Piracy
Piracy has existed for nearly as long as people have sailed the ocean. The reality
of piracy, has posed a threat to all states’ maritime interest for centuries. Piracy
remains a serious threat to international commerce and safety in modern time,
especially in the Southeast Asian archipelago where it has been a nagging problem
for centuries. Commercial ships in this region have always been particularly
Review of Maritime Transport 2004, supra note 1.

10 John J. Brandon, Piracy as Terrorism, J. Com. (June 3, 2003), at http://www.
bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/meta-elements/journals/bciclr/28_1/03_FTN.htm (last
visited November 20, 2004).
vulnerable to piracy due to the narrow waterways and countless small islands that
define the region’s geography.11
The situation gets even worse now in the Malacca Straits and Singapore
Straits due to its location as a busy and significant sea lane. The Malacca Straits
lies between Malaya and Sumatra, linking the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean.
In virtue of its strategic geographic location, it is one of the oldest and busiest
shipping lanes in the world and the most significant sea lane in Asia. The Malacca
Straits serves as a primary conduit for the movement of cargo and human traffics
between the Indo-European region and the rest of Asia and Australia. It is a shorter
east–west sea route than Indonesia’s Macassar and Lombok Straits. Every year
about RM3.8 trillion worth of goods and services pass through the region formed
by the Straits of Malacca and other associated shipping routes.12 It is reported
that about 80,000 ships passing through it annually (with a daily rate of 220),
accounting for about one third of global trade, and half the world’s oil. By using
the Malacca Straits, the Japanese petroleum industry saves up to RM1.3 billion
annually.
There was a sharp increase in maritime piracy in the late 1990s following the
massive unemployment and political instability caused by the Asian economic
crisis.13 When the International Maritime Organization of the United Nations started
to collect information about acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels since
1984, close to 4,000 such acts were reported to them. Nearly two-thirds of the
attacks in 1999 occurred in Asia, with 113 of the 285 reported cases taking place in
Indonesia’s waters and ports.14 The risk of attack is increasing, with 90 percent of
the world’s trade moving via ship and 45 percent of all shipping moving through
the pirate-infested waters of Asia. Clearly, piracy is becoming an increasing threat
to global trade. The problem, moreover, has grown worse in the new century. Over
half of the 330 cases worldwide in 2004, 169 cases occurred in Southeast Asia,
and a map of the region included in the IMO’s annual Report on Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships indicates that most of the attacks took place in or around
Indonesian waters.15 The country has earned a reputation as a haven for pirates,
11 See Ger Teitler, “Piracy in Southeast Asia: A Historical Comparison”, Mast 1:1, 72
(2002), available at http://www.marecentre.nl/mast/documents/GerTeitler.pdf (last visited
November 20, 2004).
12 Malacca Straits Research and Development Centre, Introduction to the Straits of
Malacca http://www.fsas.upm.edu.my/~masdec/web/straits.html (last visited December 5,
2005).
13 Erik Barrios, Casting a Wider Net: Addressing the Maritime Piracy Problem
in Southeast Asia http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/meta-elements/journals/
bciclr/28_1/03_TXT.htm (last visited December 5, 2005)).
14 www.nvu.bg/stanag/PracticTest/ Files/Reading/Reading7/R.%20Test%207%20T.
htm (last visited December 5, 2005).
15 http://www.icc-ccs.org/prc/piracy_maps_2004.php (last visited December 5,
2005).
and a couple of years ago a well-known correspondent and author on organized

crime in Asia even dubbed the country the “pirate republic”.16
Most of the personnel employed in Southeast Asia‘s maritime security forces
are grossly underpaid. As a share of GDP, for example, Indonesia’s defense budget
is the lowest in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, as a result of the Asian financial
crisis, the value of its defense budget declined by 65 percent from 1997 to 1998,
aggravating the already tight fiscal problems that prevent it from allocating more to
its maritime security force. Moreover, in many of Southeast Asia’s armed forces, a
culture of corruption has evolved under years of authoritarian governments, often
abetted by the military. With limited budgets, the military often cannot afford to
provide sufficient pay to officers and lower ranking members, who then resort
to “off budget” sources of income. In countries with high tariff barriers, which
include many Asian countries, smuggling is a lucrative business and works well
for fencing pirated goods.17
Maritime Terrorism
The interweaving of maritime piracy and terrorism has tended to threaten regional
security in Asia. Piracy in the high sea has gradually been used as the tool for
terrorist groups. The interrelation between piracy and terrorism poses great threat
to the energy market since oil and natural gas transportation are mostly through
the areas where piracy happened most frequently. Pirates and Islamic terrorists
have been acting jointly in the Arabian Sea, the South China Sea, and the West
Africa coastal area. Since the international community has worked hard to freeze
the capital of terrorist groups, they tend to acquire funds through the activities
of pirates. Maritime attacks in recent years have shown that terrorism has been
expanded to the sea. Security experts warn that the terrorists may create a hazard
by crashing a vessel containing dynamite or even weapons of mass destruction in a
port or a harbor. Such attacks would halt international commerce and lead to the loss
of billions of US dollars. It is well known that the most efficient way for terrorists
to intervene in the global economy is to attack the oil supply. It is relatively easy
to protect the potential targets for attack on land; however, the oil supply through
maritime transport is mostly vulnerable to maritime terrorists. Sixty percent of the
world’s oil supply is through about 4,000 oil tankers which are old and slow. They
become the targets for maritime terrorists. After 9.11, al-Qaedais has moved some
of their bases onto the sea and set up a “terrorism fleet” composed of 20 vessels,
scattering at the Arab Sea and Indian Ocean. At a maritime security meeting in
Singapore on November 29, 2005, an expert on terrorism claimed that al-Qaeda
had been developing underwater attack technology.
16 Lintner, Bertil, Blood Brothers: The Criminal Underworld of Asia, New York and
Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2003.
17 Dana Robert Dillon, Piracy in Asia: A Growing Barrier to Maritime Trade http://
new.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/BG1379.cfm (last visited December 5 2005).
Natural Disasters and Man-made Hazards
An example of natural disaster attacking the region, and its effects, is the earthquake
and the tsunami in December 2004, the epicenter of which was off the west coast
of Northern Sumatra. It was the worst tsunami disaster on record and one of the top
10 earthquake disasters ever recorded. It resulted in more than 225,000 confirmed
deaths (as at February 1, 2005).18 Hazards caused by human beings contribute
to the deterioration of the oceanic environment in this region. Since 1992, when
the Liberian-registered tanker Nagasaki Spirit collided with container Ocean
Blessing in the Malacca Straits spilling some 12,000 tonnes of crude, there have
been reports on oil spills in this area every year. In December 2002, a potentially
disastrous crude oil spill in Singapore waters, when a small general cargo vessel
collided with a heavily laden single-hulled tanker in the middle of the Singapore
Straits, was contained to just 350 tonnes. In June 2003, the MV APL Emerald, a
40.077-tonne container ship, spilt about 150 tonnes of fuel oil when it ran aground
near Horsburgh Lighthouse, in the eastern approaches of the Singapore Straits. In
October 2004, an oil spill swamped a chain of tourist islands off the coast of the
Indonesian capital, polluting a marine park, and affecting businesses in the area.19
Regional Maritime Security Cooperation in the South China Sea
The increasing importance of maritime trade and the threat to it makes addressing
issues of maritime security in the South China Sea urgent. The South China Sea
stretches roughly from Singapore and the Strait of Malacca in the southwest, to the
Straits of Taiwan (between Chinese Taiwan and China Mainland) in the northeast.
The South China Sea region is the world’s second busiest international sea lane.
More than half of the world’s supertanker traffic passes through the region’s
waters. In addition, the South China Sea region abounds in oil and gas resources
strategically located near large energy-consuming countries. Asia’s economic
growth rates have been among the highest in the world and this economic growth
will be accompanied by an increasing demand for energy. Much of this additional
demand will need to be imported from the Middle East and Africa. Excluding
cargoes bound for South Asia, most of this volume would need to pass through
the strategic Straits of Malacca into the South China Sea.20 Countries in the Asia-
Pacific region depend on seaborne trade to fuel their economic growth, and this
has led to the sea’s transformation into one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes.
Over half of the world’s merchant fleet (by tonnage) sails through the South China
18 http://www.gesource.ac.uk/hazards/tsunami2004_full.html (last visited December

5, 2005).
19 http://www.marinergroup.com/oil-spill-history.htm (last visited December 5, 2005).
20 http://www.hceis.com/ChinaBasic/SeasAndDeserts/Deserts_seas.htm (last visited
5 December 2005).
Sea every year.21 The economic potential and geopolitical importance of the South
China Sea region has resulted in contention between the surrounding nations to
claim this sea and its resources for themselves.
The latest development of the South China Sea (SCS) dispute is at present
the most intricate maritime dispute in the world involving many countries and
regions. The states around and their people may encounter maritime terrorism,
marine pollution, and even potential conflicts arising from overlapping sovereign
rights and jurisdiction claims in this area. A need for regional maritime security
cooperation is being called for to address the issues. Beside the existing international
instrument such as UN and IMO, efforts from international community and
respective country are being made.
RMSI
Washington’s concerns over the potential terrorist threat in the Malacca Straits were
clear in late 2001 and early 2002 when the U.S. and Indian navies collaborated to
protect U.S. merchant shipping at the northern end of the Malacca Straits, which
it has long viewed as the key maritime chokepoint in Asia. In early 2004, the
United States began taking a more overt interest. Admiral Thomas B. Fargo,
then commander-in-chief of U.S. Pacific Command, highlighted the issue during
testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives in March 2004, and with a speech
in Vancouver in May,22 by suggesting a Regional Maritime Security Initiative
(RMSI) to combat piracy, maritime terrorism, and sea-trafficking in people and
narcotics. According to Fargo, RMSI would involve not only closer intelligence-
sharing with Southeast Asian states, but also the deployment of U.S. Marines and
special forces on high-speed vessels to deal with maritime threats, particularly
from terrorists.
Fargo secured support for RMSI from Singapore, which was negotiating a
“strategic framework agreement” on security with Washington and had already
supported other key U.S. maritime security-related measures, notably the
Proliferation Security Initiative and Container Security Initiative. However, RMSI
was not well received by Indonesia or Malaysia. Both stated that security there was
the responsibility of the coastal states, that they possessed the capacity to ensure
security without any deployment of extra-regional forces, and that the introduction
of such foreign forces might even be counterproductive by provoking terrorist
incidents. Fargo attempted unsuccessfully to assuage these regional concerns,
emphasizing that RMSI was still embryonic and that it was mainly concerned with
sharing information rather than the deployment of U.S. forces in the region.
21 See above.

22 Dire Straits, Piracy and Maritime Terror in Southeast Asia, http://www.
southchinasea.org/docs/Piracy%20and%20Maritime%20Terror%20in%20Southeast%20A
sia,%20IISS.pdf (last visited December 5, 2005).
Shangri-La Facilitation
The issue of RMSI continued to be discussed at the IISS “Shangri-La Dialogue,”

a meeting of defense ministers and the wider national security establishment
of the Asia-Pacific region in Singapore in early June 2005 (the third IISS Asia
Security Conference). The meeting facilitated significant convergence between
the positions of the various interested parties regarding RMSI23 and resulted
in a degree of consensus, facilitating practical multilateral collaboration. U.S.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld explained that Admiral Fargo’s comments
on military intervention in the region had been “misreported.” While Malaysian
Defense Minister Najib Tun Razak emphasized the danger that deployment of
foreign forces would pose to the “ideological battle against extremism and
militancy,” he accepted that Southeast Asian states “should definitely expand our
cooperation with the United States” in the acquisition and sharing of intelligence,
and in “surveillance technology.”24 At the conference, Indonesian representatives
recognized the legitimate interests of extra-regional states in the security of the
Straits and expressed willingness to engage them in a multilateral framework that
respected littoral states’ sovereignty.
There were some significant developments in the aftermath of the Shangri-
La Dialogue. Within days, the ministerial meeting of the Five Power Defense
Arrangements (FPDA; involving Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore,
and the United Kingdom) agreed that the scope of the grouping’s military
exercises, which already had a maritime focus, should be widened to include
non-conventional security threats, including maritime terrorism. The first FPDA
exercise involving a counter-terrorism dimension, which Indonesia attended as
an observer, was held in September 2005. Soon afterwards, Indonesia proposed
trilateral coordinated maritime patrols in the Malacca Straits, involving its own
forces and those of Malaysia and Singapore. The first Malacca Straits Coordinated
Patrol (MALSINDO), during which each state’s vessels patrolled its own
territorial waters, commenced in late July and involved 17 ships.25 Moreover, as
part of a Southeast Asian tour in late June, Admiral Fargo visited Malaysia, and the
two sides were reported to have “mended fences,” with the U.S. emphasizing its
respect for littoral states’ sovereignty while offering to share intelligence and boost
their “technical competency” to deal with piracy and potential maritime terrorism.
For its part, Malaysia accepted that the U.S. role posed no threat to its sovereignty,
and welcomed Washington’s offer of practical assistance. Littoral states also
made efforts to enhance their maritime security capacities: the Indonesian navy’s
Western Fleet announced that it was stepping up anti-piracy operations in the
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
Malacca Straits, while Malaysia announced that it would establish a coast guard,
to be known as the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency.26
Meetings on Malacca Security
Since late 2003, the security of shipping in Southeast Asian ports and waters,
particularly in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, has emerged as a key concern
for countries in and outside the region. Thus a series of relevant meetings were
conducted aiming to address the issues. The “Conference on the Straits of
Malacca—Building a Comprehensive Security Environment” was held in October
2004 in Kuala Lumpur. Maritime security has been included in the agenda of
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)27 Security Policy Conference (ASPC) in Beijing
November 2004. Defense and security officials from ARF’s 24 members attended
the event. Tripartite Technical Expert Group (TTEG) on Maritime Security was
held in December 2004. The Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the Littoral States
on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore was convened in August 2005 in Batam,
Indonesia, to discuss matters pertaining to the safety of navigation, environmental
protection, and maritime security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The
“Jakarta Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore—Enhancing Safety,
Security and Environmental Protection” was held in Jakarta in September 2005
in dealing with issues of environmental protection in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore. Officials from the Ministry of Communications and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of China attended this meeting. China agreed that the littoral states
of the Strait of Malacca and Singapore should play the leading role in maintaining
the security of the Straits. China also expressed the willingness to contribute to the
cooperation in this region.
Regional Efforts
Regional cooperation to combat maritime terrorism has been enhanced since

2003. The 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in June 2004 in Jakarta agreed that
the ASEAN Security Community would strengthen their capacity to deal with
security challenges, both traditional and non-traditional security issues. The
ASEAN Security Community would strengthen ASEAN relations with Dialogue
Partners and its other friends and would enhance ASEAN’s role as the ARF’s
primary driving force.28 A similar statement was made in the Joint Communiqué
26 Dire Straits, Piracy and Maritime Terror in Southeast Asia, http://www.
southchinasea.org/docs/Piracy%20and%20Maritime%20Terror%20in%20Southeast%20A
sia,%20IISS.pdf (last visited December 5, 2005).
27 ARF is composed of ASEAN members, ASEAN dialogue partners, Papua New
Guinea, Mongolia, the Democratic People’’s Republic of Korea and Pakistan.
28 Joint Communique of the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Jakarta, June 29–30,
2004, http://www.aseansec.org/16192.htm (last visited December 5, 2005).
of the 4th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crimes (AMMTC)

and the Joint Communiqué of the 1st AMMTC+3 in January 2004 in Bangkok.
The Convening of the Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter Terrorism
(BRMM-CT) in Bali in February 2004 means to translate strong political
commitments of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region in combating terrorism
into practical collaborative actions. The Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement
Cooperation (JCLEC) was formally opened in Semarang in July 2004, to build
regional operational law enforcement capacity needed to fight transnational
crimes, with a key focus on terrorism. The Second ARF Intersessional Meeting
on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM CT-TC) was held in March
2004 in Manila, the Philippines. The ARF Statement on Strengthening Transport
Security Against International Terrorism expanded cooperation and enhanced
participation in international fora and international organizations, in particular, by
adherence to the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO’s) International Ship
and Port Security (ISPS) Code and relevant standards of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO).
In addition to cooperating between themselves, Southeast Asian countries have
also set up a sound communication mechanism through various means, especially
through their consensus with the United States, China, and the European Union on
security issues. The signing of Memorandum of Understanding between ASEAN
and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues at the
1st AMMTC+3 provides concrete and operational measures on cooperation in
the field of non-traditional security issues between ASEAN and China. Southeast
Asian countries have been very positive on cooperating with the United States to
combat terrorism including maritime terrorism. Besides, joint military exercises
both amongst the ASEAN and with countries outside the region have increased
sharply in 2004. ASEAN states are also taking steps to enhance its military forces,
with emphasis on the construction of air forces and navy to ensure the regional
security.
Extra-regional stakeholders in the security of the Straits have been particularly
concerned about rising maritime crime and the potential for maritime terrorism
there. Since the late 1990s, Japanese security policymakers have favored the
creation of a multinational maritime security and safety regime that would include
a capacity for counter-piracy. Tokyo’s more ambitious proposals—such as late
Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi’s call in 1999 for a regional coast guard body—have
made little headway. Nevertheless, Japan has succeeded in promoting bilateral
anti-piracy exercises involving its own coast guard and regional states’ security
forces. Japan has also started negotiations to establish a Regional Cooperation
Agreement on Anti-Piracy in Asia (ReCAAP), primarily involving intelligence
exchange between members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN): Japan, China, South Korea, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The
Philippine, Indonesian, and Malaysian militaries agreed in November 2005 to set
up two defensive areas between Sulu Sea and Sulawesi Sea to monitor and inspect
suspected vessels in order to prevent maritime terrorism and piracy.
Legal Framework for International Transport
Given that world trade is largely dependent on maritime transport, much of the
focus has been directed to enhancing maritime transport security and addressing
the particular challenges posed by containerized transport. The United States
initiated the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), the Container
Security Initiative (CSI), and the 24-Hour Advance Manifest Rule (or the 24-Hour
Rule). Many important international developments have been made at the IMO
(International Maritime Organization), ILO (International Labour Organization),
World Customs Organization (WCO) ,and OECD (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development).29 Recent amendments are made to the 1974 Safety
of Life at Sea Convention (SOALAS), including the new International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).30 This new security regime entered into
force in July 2004 and its timely implementation was mandatory for all SOLAS
member states, without any distinction as to their level of development.
There are a number of international conventions affecting the commercial and
technical activities of maritime transport, such as the United Nations Convention
on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences,1974; United Nations Convention on
the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978; International Convention on Maritime Liens
and Mortgages, 1993; United Nations Convention on International Multimodal
Transport of Goods, 1980; United Nations Convention on Conditions for
Registration of Ships, 1986; International Convention on Arrest of Ships, 1999.
Challenges and Opportunities
These efforts on maritime security cooperation are accompanied with risks when
the national interest encounters challenges. Some countries may have suspicions
concerning the capabilities and intentions of their neighbors. Regional navies
acquire their ships, submarines, and aircraft from a wide range of sources.31 The
problems become even more acute with the increase of the technological levels
of navies. Navies are at different stages of technological development. Technical
deficiencies in some navies may significantly inhibit cooperation when less
advanced navies are reluctant to engage in operational cooperation for fear that
their deficiencies will be too apparent.
Another problem is that cooperative activities may be used to gain intelligence
on the capabilities of another country. It is well known that even innocuous naval
port visits provide an opportunity to gather intelligence—both for the host nations
29 Review of Maritime Transport 2004, supra note 1.

30 See O. Ozcayir, “The ISPS Code”, Journal of International Maritime Law, 9
(2003), p. 578.
31 Sam Bateman, Regional and International Frameworks for Maritime Security
Cooperation, http://www.iips.org/Bateman_paper.pdf (last visited December 5, 2005).
collecting information about visiting ships and for visiting ships finding out about
the host nations. Normally it is standard practice for a host nation to close down
sensitive transmissions while a “potential intelligence collector” (PIC) is in port.
Expert intelligence collectors can obtain much vital information on another navy,
particularly data on weapons, sensors, and communications systems, during
operations with ships and aircraft of another country.32
International cooperation has been undertaken to combat pirates in Southeast
Asia. However, due to reasons relating to the jurisdiction and the power of the
relevant international organizations, unresolved conflicts between international
and domestic laws concerning any coastal state’s obligation and jurisdiction
to combat pirates (who are highly mobile across any national border), and the
financial implications for certain international organizations that enforce any
effective control against pirates, international cooperation on combating piracy
in Southeast Asia has had only limited success. An innovative approach to piracy
control or an innovative model of international cooperation must be developed if
an effective system or mechanism of international control is to be achieved.
The conflict of national interests between different countries can be seen in
several aspects. First, the territorial claims of neighboring countries may create
difficulties for any country chasing and catching pirates across the maritime
boundary of another country. In order to enforce a territorial claim, a country
would be reluctant to allow the navy or military force of another country to enter
its territorial waters. The situation in the South China Sea gets even more complex
due to the overlapping sovereignty and jurisdiction claims. Although arguably
the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS may allow the warship of one country
to chase pirates from the high seas into the territorial waters of another country,
the exercise of such a “right” may be very difficult because of the difficulties in
identifying a pirate ship or a ship hijacked by pirates and also due to any conflict
with the sovereign claims of the relevant coastal state. Second, due to national
security consideration, a country is always suspicious of the presence of another
country’s navy near the former’s claimed territorial waters. Similarly, a country is
often suspicious of the deployment of another country’s military force.
Given the complex situation in the South China Sea, to achieve maritime
security cooperation in this region requires that the relevant states work hard
to reach consensus and build up mutual confidence, and eliminate the concern
that maritime cooperation will affect the claim of sovereign right. In addition,
the claimant states of the South China Sea should enhance cooperation through
the international organizations in this region, such as IMO, ASEAN, to deepen
the mutual understanding and confidence, eventually pave the way for maritime
security cooperation.
Information exchanging and sharing is very important in terms of security
cooperation under the circumstance of overlapping claims of sovereign right and
jurisdiction in the South China Sea. Information sharing includes setting up a
32 Ibid.
database on maritime security in the South China Sea for all the relevant states
to access, and building up a mechanism of intelligence information exchange.
Information exchange and sharing should depend not only upon the government,
but also on the private sectors and research agencies.
Piracy and maritime terrorism to some extend attribute to delays in economic
and social development in Southeast Asia. The claimant countries of the South
China Sea should adopt effective measures to promote economic and social
development, with the aim of eliminating threats to security. In addition, modern
technology should be used to enhance maritime cooperation considering the
unpredictability of piracy and terrorism.
In conclusion, the increasing development of maritime trade in Asia requires
a stable maritime security in this region. However, maritime security in the
South China Sea is a complex and difficult topic for the international community,
taking into consideration of the intricate situation in this area. Regional maritime
security cooperation can only be achieved when it addresses these issues through a
diversified trajectory combined with first-track political dialogue and second-track
efforts, eventually contribute to the prosperous development of maritime trade in
Asia.
Chapter 4
Maritime Security Cooperation in the South
China Sea Region
Andrew S. ERICKSON
Maritime Security Challenges in Southeast Asia
It is well known that the greater South China Sea region confronts significant
maritime security challenges, many partially linked to the region’s continued
economic growth. Recent trends in non-state threats including terrorism, piracy,
smuggling, and the targeting of critical infrastructure have led some experts to argue
that sub-state threats have truly combined to form a new challenge to international
maritime commerce and security. While there are a variety of views on these
critical issues both within and outside the region, and economic development
and political consolidation and reform (with the attendant issues of “territorial
sovereignty, illegal seaborne population movements, arms trafficking to and by
separatist rebels… and environmental pollution”) remain clear priorities for many
states in the region, there is clearly an urgent need to fight rising terrorism and
other security threats. Maintaining maritime security, and giving clear evidence
of this security to the various entities and market forces that regulate the global
The views expressed in this study are solely those of the author as a private
individual. This study is based only on publicly available sources and does not represent
the official position or analysis of the U.S. Navy or any other organization of the U.S.
Government.
For a useful background, see Brian Nichiporuk, Clifford Grammich, Angel Rabasa,
and Julie DaVanzo, “Demographics and Security in Maritime Southeast Asia”, Georgetown
Journal of International Affairs, Winter/Spring (2006).
For U.S. understanding concerning the importance of this issue, see Admiral William
J. Fallon, United States Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Remarks at 4th Annual
Shangri La Dialogue, “Enhancing Maritime Security Cooperation”, June 5, 2005, http://
www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2005/050606-emsi-shangrila.shtml (accessed July 1, 2009).
Evelyn Goh, “Southeast Asian Reactions to America’s New Strategic Imperatives”,
in Jonathan D. Pollack, ed., Asia Eyes America: Regional Perspectives on U.S. Asia-Pacific
Strategy in the Twenty-First Century, Newport, R.I., Naval War College Press, 2007, p.
206.
economy, is important for the wellbeing of the region’s people, 60 percent of

whom live in or rely economically on maritime zones.
Maritime security is also important because of Southeast Asia’s vital role as
both a source of and a conduit for international trade and energy supply. Roughly
one third of world trade transits the Strait of Malacca annually. This includes
more than 50,000 vessels, twice the number that pass through the Suez Canal
by some estimates and many times that which pass through the Panama Canal.
It includes 11.7 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of oil. Eighty percent of Chinese
crude oil imports, for instance, including virtually all of China’s imports from
the Middle East and Africa, flow through the Strait of Malacca. According to
the U.S. Energy Information Agency, if an oil spill, piracy, or terrorism closed
the 1.5 mile wide Strait, “nearly half of the world’s fleet would be required
to sail further, generating a substantial increase in the requirement for vessel
capacity. … Closure of the Strait of Malacca would immediately raise freight
rates worldwide.”10
Roughly three-quarters of annual world oil and natural gas trade transits the
South China Sea, which, at 3.5 million square kilometers, is the world’s sixth
largest body of water.11 The South China Sea handles an annual oil flow three
times that of the Suez Canal and 15 times that of the Panama Canal. By 2020,
increasing regional energy demand is expected to double its oil flow figures.12
The South China Sea is a vital transport corridor for liquefied natural gas (LNG),
carrying two-thirds of the world’s current LNG trade.13 While Japan and South
John Bradford, “Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast

Asia,” Naval War College Review (Summer 2005), p. 63.
“World Oil Transit Chokepoints: Malacca”, U.S. Energy Information Administration,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Malacca.html (accessed
July 1, 2009).
Sudha Ramachandran, “Divisions Over Terror Threat in Malacca Straits”, Asia
Times (June 16, 2004), www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FF16Ae01.html (accessed
July 1, 2009).
“World Oil Transit Chokepoints: Malacca.”
Zhang Yuncheng, “Energy Security and Sea Lanes”, in Yang Mingjie ,ed., Sea
Lane Security and International Cooperation, (Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2005), p.
118.
10 “World Oil Transit Chokepoints: Malacca.”
11 John Garofano, “China, the South China Sea, and U.S. Strategy”, in Gabriel
Collins, Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and William Murray, China’s Energy Strategy:
Implications for Beijing’s Maritime Policies (Annapolis, M.D.: Naval Institute Press,
2008).
12 Ibid.
13 Zhang Yuncheng, “Energy Security and Sea Lanes”, p. 107.
Maritime Security Cooperation in the South China Sea Region 53
Korea are East Asia’s primary LNG users,14 LNG transport security is also of
great interest to China, which commenced maritime imports in May 2006. The
South China Sea represents a critical source of seaborne energy for China, which
receives nearly 90 percent of overseas-sourced oil (as compared to roughly 75
percent for Japan) and many trading goods through this major body of water.15
One half of the world’s merchant fleet navigates the Sea Lines of Communication
(SLOCs) of the South China Sea and waters around Indonesia.16
Of central significance to the economic interests of the U.S., its (South)east
Asian trading partners, and indeed the world, is the security of mega-hubs. Five
of these deep-water ports (Singapore, Hong Kong, Ningbo/Shanghai, Kaosiung,
Guangzhou, and Yokohama), which can accommodate the 60-foot drafts of the
largest container ships, are located in East and Southeast Asia. The world’s 20
mega-hub container ports17 send nearly 68 percent of the 5.7 million containers
entering the U.S. by sea annually.18 This is part of a larger pattern in which
seaborne trade, which accounts for 80 percent of all international trade,19 has
increased an estimated 4.1 percent (in 2004), and 3.6 percent (in 2005 and
2006).20
For all these reasons, a variety of Asia-Pacific maritime powers, including the
United States and China, are making important contributions to regional security.
This chapter will review the two nations’ regional roles, existing cooperation
initiatives both indigenous and applicable to the region, and the vital importance
of both bilateral and multilateral efforts to ensuring future progress.
14 Japan imported 58.6 million tons of LNG in 2005, and South Korea 23.1 million
tons in 2004, as compared to a smaller amount in Mainland China and Taiwan’s 5.5
million tons in that same year. See http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Japan/pdf.pdf (accessed
July 1, 2009); http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/South_Korea/NaturalGas.html (accessed July
1, 2009); http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/taiwan.html (accessed July 1, 2009).
15 Garofano, “China, the South China Sea, and U.S. Strategy.”
16 Ibid.
17 As of 2005, the world’s top 20 ports were, in descending order of annual tons
of container traffic: Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Busan, Kaohsiung,
Rotterdam, Hamburg, Dubai, Los Angeles, Long Beach, Antwerp, Qingdao, Port Klang,
Ningbo, Tianjin, New York/New Jersey, Guangzhou, Tanjung Pelepas, and Laem Chalang.
Data from the American Association of Port Authorities, http://www.aapa-ports.org/
(accessed July 1, 2009).
18 “China Joins the U.S. in Container Security Initiative”, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, October 25, 2002, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/
archives/legacy/2002/102002/china_joins_csi_1025.xml (accessed July 1, 2009).
19 “Hong Kong Trails Singapore in 2005 Container Volume”, Bloomberg.com,
January 16, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com (accessed July 1, 2009).
20 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2006, p. x.
The U.S. and Maritime Southeast Asia
As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Eric G. John has testified,
We want to see a Southeast Asia that is a partner in the promotion of democracy

and human rights and an engine of economic growth; a group of nations whose
varied ethnic and religious groups live together and flourish in peace; countries
that cooperate fully with us in battling the evils of terrorism, proliferation, and
infectious diseases; and a region in which the United States plays a positive role,
in harmony with other powers.21
Former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, in his May 2005 tour of
Southeast Asia, “very effectively conveyed that Washington would not ignore the
maintenance and extension of economic ties with the Southeast Asian nations.”22
Indeed, the region is presently “America’s fifth-largest export market, with two-way
trade of over $136 billion in 2004 and U.S. direct investment of over $90 billion in
2003. The United States, along with Japan, is Southeast Asia’s top trading partner
and investor.”23 After the EU 15, the U.S. contributed the second largest amount
of ASEAN24’s foreign direct investment in 2004 (23.7 percent, over $5 billion
dollars).25 Through the U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington
“is the largest source of bilateral official development assistance in the ASEAN
region.”26 Initiated in 2002, with a goal to involving states across the region,
21 Deputy Assistant Secretary Eric G. John, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
“The United States and Southeast Asia: Developments, Trends, and Policy Choices”,
Statement Before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific, September 2005, p. 1; Goh, “Southeast Asian Reactions to America’s New
Strategic Imperatives.” See also “Remarks by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Evans Revere to the Baltimore Council of Foreign
Relations”, May 3, 2005.
22 Goh, “Southeast Asian Reactions to America’s New Strategic Imperatives”, p.
215.
23 Ibid., p. 206.
24 For an overview of U.S.–ASEAN relations, see “The United States and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Thirty Years of Dialogue and Cooperation”, U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, July 27, 2007, www.state.gov (accessed
June 30, 2009).
25 Donald E. Weatherbee, “Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in
Southeast Asia”, in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds, Strategic Asia 2006-07: Trade,
Interdependence, and Security, Washington, D.C., National Bureau of Asian Research,
2006, p. 279.
26 Ibid., p. 278.
Washington’s Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI)27 “has been highly valued.”28
During a November 2005 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting,
President Bush and seven ASEAN leaders issued a Joint Vision Statement for an
ASEAN–U.S. Enhanced Partnership.29 The Enhanced Partnership is envisioned to
be “comprehensive, action-oriented and forward looking, and comprising political
and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and social and development
cooperation.”30 In this regard, it is worth noting that nations across Southeast Asia,
with the unfortunate exception of Burma, “all wish to maximize economic and
technological gains from relations with the United States.”31 For a demonstration
of the importance of foreign trade, and the relevance of the U.S. economy, to
Southeast Asia, see Table 4.1:
Table 4.1 Trade Intensity and Share of Trade with the U.S. for Selected
Southeast Asian States and Administrative Regions in 200432
Economy Trade as share of GDP Share of trade with U.S.

(%) (%)
Hong Kong 376.2 11.0
Macau 161.8 24.0
Malaysia 221.1 37.1
Cambodia 140.5 24.6
Vietnam 140.0 11.0
Thailand 136.4 21.3
Philippines 102.4 33.8
27 EAI offers guidelines for converting consultative bilateral trade and investment
framework agreements (TIFA) into more robust and rewarding binding bilateral free trade
agreements (FTAs). FTAs also allow for dispute resolution mechanisms. See Weatherbee,
“Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia”, p. 282.
215.
29 Weatherbee, “Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast
Asia”, p. 284.
30 See “Joint Vision Statement for an ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership”, http://
www.state.gov/p/eap/ris/ot/57078.htm (accessed August 12, 2008).
216.
32 Data from Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds, Strategic Asia 2006-07: Trade,
Interdependence, and Security, Washington, D.C., National Bureau of Asian Research,
2006, pp. 398–9. Economies selected based on data available from this source.
Meanwhile, “none of the [regional] states with current military strategic ties
with the United States wish to diminish or downgrade these ties, while those
states that do not have such ties wish to develop them to some degree.”33 Indeed,
“Though the U.S. war in Iraq is generally unpopular in Southeast Asia … the
impetus of congruent U.S. and Southeast Asian counter-terrorism interests has in
fact strengthened and deepened U.S. defense links with its ASEAN friends and
allies.”34
Washington’s “commitment to regional security35 is expressed in a robust
program of bilateral and multilateral exercises and exchanges between U.S.
forces in the Pacific Command and friendly and allied Southeast Asian forces.”
Relevant exercises include Cobra Gold, CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness
and Training), and SEACAT (Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism).
SEACAT specifically “promotes information sharing and multinational cooperation
in maritime interception scenarios.”36 On May 23–24 2006, for instance, the navies
of the U.S. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand
trained to search for illicit drugs and weapons aboard ships in the South China
Sea.37 “Regional cooperation is already in place, and when it comes to piracy in
this area, we need everybody’s help,” stated Singaporean Navy Captain Tan Yong.
“SEACAT is a good opportunity for us all to exercise together.”38
As two U.S. Navy officers from PACOM elaborate,

216.
Asia”, p. 294.
35 For an overview of relevant U.S. cooperative mechanisms, see “Maritime Security
in the East Asia and Pacific Region”, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,
April 21, 2006, www.state.gov (accessed August 3, 2008).
36 Major Victor Huang, Republic of Singapore Navy, “Building Maritime Security
in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?” Naval War College Review, Winter 2008,
Vol. 61, No. 1. For more information, see the 2006 SEACAT website, www.clwp.navy.
mil/seacat2006 (accessed July 1, 2009).
37 Melinda Larson, “Communication Key to SEACAT Boarding Exercises”, May
26, 2006, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=23830 (accessed July 1, 2009);
Commander Task Force 73 Public Affairs, “Navies Partner for Southeast Asia Maritime
Security Exercise”, May 19, 2006, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_
id=23727 (accessed July 1, 2009); Melinda Larson, “SEACAT Strengthens Maritime
Bonds in Southeast Asia”, May 29, 2006, http://www.clwp.navy.mil/seacat2006/news/
SEACAT%20closing.htm (accessed November 18, 2008). For details on the previous
year’s exercise, see U.S. Seventh Fleet Public Affairs, “SEACAT 2005 Training Catalyst
for U.S., SE Asia Navies”, May 30, 2005, http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2005/may/35.htm
(accessed October 11, 2008).
38 Melinda Larson, “SEACAT Fosters Exchange Between Future Naval Leaders”,
www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=23773 (accessed July 1, 2009).
USPACOM engagement strategies include Service-to-Service activities, joint

and combined multilateral exercises, subject matter expert exchanges, and other
training venues. Bilateral exercises are historically among the most successful
exchange opportunities. Among the many that USPACOM is involved in
are Exercise Balikatan in the Philippines, Pacific Fleet’s Cooperation Afloat
Readiness and Training, Marine Force Pacific’s Incremental Training Exercises,
and U.S. Army Pacific’s Garuda Shield with Indonesia and Keris Strike with
Malaysia. USPACOM is increasingly encouraging multilateral ventures by
inviting partner nations to participate in traditionally U.S.-only exercises.
Cope Tiger, Red Flag, and Cobra Gold are among the most visible military-to-
military exercises, but they represent only a fraction of the actual participation of
Southeast Asian nations’ militaries in U.S. or regional exercises.39
Among Washington’s many military exchanges involving Southeast Asia,

which include the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, “The U.S. International
Military Education and Training (IMET) program has graduated tens of thousands
of Southeast Asian students including [Indonesian] President Yudhoyono.” Finally,
Washington “is also the major extra-regional defense supplier to the key ASEAN
countries.”40
The U.S. is thus poised to remain a welcome influence in Southeast Asia,
according to Evelyn Goh, particularly if it continually strives to address the
diverse needs of nations across the region. Because Washington’s “nonimperial
history suggests a more benign exercise of power …41 many Southeast Asian
policymakers favor a continuation of the preponderance of perceived benign U.S.
power.”42
China’s Growing Interests in the Maritime Realm and Southeast Asia
As it becomes an increasingly capable, influential, and cooperative maritime power

in all dimensions, China is acquiring a large, comprehensive stake in the security of
the oceans. Maritime commerce, in particular, supports China’s national program
of “peaceful development.” With its over four million square km of claimed
sea area, 1,400 harbors, and a tremendous number of cargo ships, the world’s
largest developing nation generated 10 percent of its GDP (US$270 billion) from
39 John D. Wheeler and Herschel Weinstock, “The Enduring Value of Military-to-
Military Cooperation in Southeast Asia”, Joint Forces Quarterly, 47: 4th quarter (2007),
p. 67.
Asia”, p. 294.
202.
42 Ibid., p. 209.
maritime industries in 2006, up 14 percent from 2005.43 Estimates have projected

that China’s maritime GDP will reach one trillion by 2020.44 With 1,700 ships,
China’s merchant marine is second only to Panama’s in size.45 A recent article by
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Senior Captain Xu Qi further underscores
China’s growing global maritime interests, stating that today “[China’s] open ocean
transport routes pass through every continent and every ocean [and] through each
important international strait to over six hundred ports in over 150 nations and
[administrative] regions.”46 The insightful, popular government-inspired study 大
国崛起 (The Rise of Great Powers) suggests that economic development, fueled
by foreign trade and safeguarded by a sustainable and non-provocative degree of
naval power, drives national development. There appears to be a vigorous domestic
debate today concerning China’s maritime history, orientation, and ideology as the
nation increasingly relies on the seas even while working to preserve elements of
its longstanding maritime cultural heritage.47
The need to import key natural resources such oil, natural gas, and iron ore gives
China a major stake in maritime security. China imports tremendous amounts of
raw inputs to fuel its dynamic industrially intensive economy. The bulk of China’s
natural resource imports come by sea from places as far afield as Brazil and Saudi
Arabia, making sea lane security a major policy concern in China.
China’s strategic thinkers apparently perceive maritime energy security to be
increasingly vital. Their nation, already the world’s second largest oil consumer,
is on track to become the world’s second largest net oil importer by 2015. Since
1993, when Beijing became a net crude oil importer, demand has skyrocketed.
In 2005–06, for example, year on year import demand growth was 14.5 percent.
Despite extensive exploration of offshore reserves to replace dwindling onshore
reservoirs, and a new oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang province, China
imports 45 percent of its oil and receives 85 percent of it by sea. China’s rising
motor vehicle ownership, its reported plans to double the size of its road network,
and its domestic firms’ huge fixed investments in steel, petrochemicals, and other
43 “10% Of GDP Now Comes From Sea, Says Report”, Chinadaily.com.cn, April
10, 2007.
44 Xu Qi, “Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the
Early Twenty-first Century”, China Military Science, 17: 4 (2004), pp. 75–81, in Chinese;
trans. Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein, Naval War College Review 59: 4 (Autumn
2006).
45 See www.nationmaster.com (accessed July 1, 2009). Lyle J. Goldstein, “China: A
New Maritime Partner?”, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 2007, p. 27.
46 Xu, “Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early
Twenty-first Century”.
47 For more information on efforts to protect China’s maritime cultural heritage, see
Ren Huaifeng and Zhu Huayou, National Institute for South China Sea Studies, “Protection
of Underwater Cultural Heritage in the South China Sea and Regional Cooperation”, paper
presented at Conference on New Development of the Law of the Sea and China, Xiamen,
March 9–12, 2005.
energy-intensive industries could drive oil imports to as much as 60 percent of total

oil demand by 2016–20. If import demand grows at 6 percent per year, China’s
oil import needs could increase from roughly 3.2 million bbl/day at present to 5.3
million bbl/day in this timeframe.
Envisioned future pipelines, of varying logistical and economic viability, seem
unlikely to substantially reduce this dependence on sea lane security. Indeed,
according to Senior Captain Xu, “By 2020… It may be[come] necessary to import
three-quarters of [China’s] oil from overseas.”48
LNG use promises to ameliorate China’s serious air pollution problems, which
some researchers believe are already causing as much as US$200 billion annually
in economic damage. In the economically vibrant southeast coastal region, which
is emerging as China’s main LNG demand center, seaborne imports of liquefied
natural gas (LNG) are already proving economically viable and are likely to grow
rapidly in coming years. Given energy policy reform and Russia’s construction of
promised gas pipelines to China, Chinese LNG demand could reach 20 million
tons/year by 2016. By 2020, China may be importing more than 30 million tons
per year,49 much of it by sea.
Shipbuilding is emerging as a “strategic industry” in need of “special oversight
and support.”50 China launched over 13 million tons of new ships in 2006 and
(assuming continuation of recent trends) 51 will produce 20 million tons annually
by 2010.52 Beijing reportedly aims to become the world’s largest shipbuilder by
2015, with 24 million tons of production capacity (35 percent of global capacity).
However uneven in its pace and nature of development, China’s large shipbuilding
sector will support broad-based maritime and naval development.
For all these reasons, Beijing seems poised to assume an even greater stake
in the security of the global maritime commons. Encouragingly, awareness of the
48 Xu, “Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early
Twenty-first Century”.
49 Scott C. Roberts, “China’s LNG Program Turns a Corner”, Cambridge Energy
Research Associates, http://www.cera.com/aspx/cda/client/report/reportpreview.
aspx?CID=7328&KID= (accessed July 1, 2009).
50 “China to Limit Foreign Investment in Shipyards”, Shanghai Daily, September 19,
2006, http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/?id=292385&type=business (accessed August
24, 2008).
51 The recent drop-off in global ship construction and transport demand may render
some of the more optimistic projections cited in this chapter unrealistic, but the overall
development of China’s ship building and shipping industries will continue and they remain
poised to assume increasing prominence internationally.
52 Derived from new construction and order book statistics in Lloyd’s Register—
Fairplay, Ltd., Register of Ships, Sea—web database, http://www.sea-web.com (accessed
July 1, 2009); Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, “China’s Maritime Evolution:
Military and Commercial Factors”, Pacific Focus (Fall 2007).
importance of maritime anti-terrorism appears to be increasing in China.53 Chinese

attention to non-traditional security threats appears to have prompted a variety of
unprecedented maritime safety exercises.54
Emerging Maritime Cooperation in Southeast Asia
As explained above, many regional “stakeholders,” as well as the U.S. and China,
have a strong interest in the continued security of Southeast Asia and its sea lanes.
Each nation will have its own interests and priorities, but it will be important to
reach a common understanding concerning the need to ensure the collective good
of maritime security more broadly. One issue on which all parties can already
agree is that the multiple, complex security challenges that confront the region
call for cooperative security measures that are no less sophisticated and diverse
than the threats that they are designed to address. An appropriate philosophy for
building on this consensus might be termed, “mutual interests, mutual respect,
mutual consultation, and mutual responsibility.”
The importance of maritime security in Southeast Asia, therefore, is clear. The
question then becomes how to achieve this pressing, multifaceted objective. Such
non-traditional security threats as piracy, former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Michael Mullen has emphasized, “… can no longer be viewed as someone
else’s problem. [Piracy] is a global threat to security because of its deepening ties
to international criminal networks, smuggling of hazardous cargoes, and disruption
of vital commerce.”55 As Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff has stated from the U.S. perspective, “we fear the intrusion of terrorist
weapons from a nation not our own [but] it is only in building strong alliances
with foreign countries that we can prevent such an attack from occurring.”56
53 See, for example, Zhang Lina, “Maritime Anti-Terrorism and Recent Developments
in the International Marine Transportation Security System”, China Water Transport, 1
(2007) [in Chinese], http://scholar.ilib.cn/A-zgsy-xsb200701111.html (accessed July
1, 2009); Wang Fei, “The Policies of U.S. ‘Port Security’ in the Age of Anti-Terrorism
and Information Revolution Safety Measures”, Informatization Construction, 4 (2006)
[in Chinese], http://scholar.ilib.cn/A-xxhjs200406018.html (accessed July 1, 2009); Yu
Chengguo and Li Daze, “Thoughts on Strengthening Maritime Security Counter-Terrorism
Measures”, China Navigation, 2 (2003) [in Chinese].
54 See, for example, Yuan Xuan, “China’s First Anti-terrorism Drill Involving an Oil
Tanker with a Loading Capacity of 300,000 Tons—Launched Jointly by the China Maritime
Safety Administration and COSCO”, Maritime China, 7 (2004) [in Chinese], http://scholar.
ilib.cn/A-zgyyhwgg200407005.html (accessed July 1, 2009).
55 Admiral Michael Mullen, “Remarks as Delivered for the 17th International
Seapower Symposium”, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., September 21, 2005, http://
www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/mullen050921.txt (accessed July 1, 2009).
56 Dannielle Blumenthal, “CBP Kicks Off Secure Freight Initiative”, U.S. Customs &
Border Protection Today, April/May (2007), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2007/
Encouragingly, a variety of agreements have already been formed to safeguard

various aspects of maritime security in the region—thereby suggesting widespread
recognition of the need for action.
The Malacca Straits Patrol Network
The Malacca Strait littoral states are critically dependent on maritime security.
Eighty percent of Malaysia’s trade transits the Strait.57 Malaysia’s foremost law
enforcement official emphasized in June 2007 that maritime terrorism is a “‘real
and possible threat’ that could ‘devastate Southeast Asia’s economic environment
and severely disrupt trade.’”58 Najib Razak, Malaysia’s deputy prime minister,
“has called for greater vigilance and intelligence sharing to combat piracy and
prevent terrorism along the Malacca Strait.”59 Singapore’s economy is even more
dependent on the “free flow of shipping through the region” than Malaysia or
Indonesia.60
The Malacca Straits Patrol Network encompasses two initiatives among
the littoral states of the Malacca Straits, MALSINDO and “Eyes in the Sky”
(EiS).61 In July 2004, the MALSINDO (Malaysia/Singapore/Indonesia) Trilateral
Coordinated Patrols were initiated in the Strait of Malacca based on cooperation
between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.62 The goal is to better utilize the
littoral states’ respective resources in order to combat piracy,63 terrorism, and other
criminal actions. According to Major Victor Huang of the Republic of Singapore
Navy,
A conceptually linked but officially unrelated boost to the initiative’s effectiveness

was Project SURPIC, a technical system that allows information sharing between
Singapore and Indonesian command and control (C2) centers in order to achieve
apr_may/secure.xml (accessed July 1, 2009).

57 Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not
Welcome?”
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 For a Chinese perspective on Malacca Strait security issues, see Yu Kun, “Who
Will Manage the Security of the Malacca Strait?” The Contemporary World, 5 (2006) [in
Chinese].
62 “Launch of Trilateral Coordinated Patrols—MALSINDO Malacca Straits
Coordinated Patrol”, Singapore Ministry of National Defense, July 20, 2004, http://www.
mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2004/jul/20jul04_nr.html (accessed July 1,
2009).
63 For an argument that the threats of maritime terrorism and piracy have been
exaggerated, see Joshua H. Ho, “The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia”, Asian
Survey, 46: 4, July/August (2006), pp. 558–74.
a common operating picture in the Singapore Strait, facilitating communication

and enforcement.64
As Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh has

emphasized, MALSINDO involves “coordinated,” not “joint” patrols, meaning
that nations do not normally subordinate their forces to a supra-national command
on the basis of a defense agreement or introduce them into each other’s territorial
waters.65 Accordingly, “MALSINDO … excludes other countries such as the
United States …”66 Moreover, even among the participating littoral states, “Due
to the sensitivity of the littorals over the issue of ‘sovereignty’, MALSINDO does
not provide for ‘hot pursuit.’”67
A new initiative for the original MALSINDO states, this time in partnership
with Thailand, emerged following a proposal by Malaysia’s deputy prime
minister and defense minister, Najib Tun Razak, at the Shangri La Dialogue in
June 2005.68 The four parties began EiS maritime air patrols in September 2005
out of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. While these have met with considerable media
attention,69however, researchers have differed concerning the extent to which EiS
has produced tangible results.70
In an effort to address ongoing security concerns while upholding national
sovereignty, the Indonesian Navy’s chief of staff of has declared, “Other countries
that would like to help in making Malacca Strait safe, would be highly appreciated if
they are willing to share by providing intelligence information, weapon equipment,

Welcome?”
65 Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, Chief of Staff Indonesian Navy, “National
Sovereignty and Security in the Strait of Malacca”, paper presented to the Conference held
by Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, October 12, 2004,
p. 11, www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/conferences/som04/papers/sondakh.pdf (accessed
May 17, 2008).
66 Zhang Xuegang, “Southeast Asia and Energy: Gateway to Stability”, China
Security, 3: 2, Spring (2007), http://www.wsichina.org/cs6_2.pdf (accessed July 1, 2009).
67 Gurpreet S. Khurana, “Cooperation Among Maritime Security Forces: Imperatives
for India and Southeast Asia”, Strategic Analysis, 29: 2, April–June (2005), p. 298.
68 Graham Gerard Ong and Joshua Ho, “Maritime Air Patrols: The New Weapon
Against Piracy in the Malacca Straits”, IDSS Commentary, 13 October 2005, www.idss.
edu.sg/publications/Perspective/IDSS702005.pdf (accessed July 1, 2009).
69 “M’sia, Thailand to Adopt Malsindo Module—Mohd Anwar”, Malaysia National
News Agency, August 25, 2005, http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/news.php?id=152155
(accessed July 1, 2009); Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Monthly Report (September
2005), p. 1.
70 Carolin Liss, “The Privatisation of Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Between
a Rock and a Hard Place?”, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Working Paper
No. 141, February 2007, http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/wp/wp141.pdf (accessed July 1,
2009).
navigational buoys/sea traffic sign, training, etc.”71 Indeed, in July 2005 the three
littoral states “request[ed] equipment, training, and intelligence assistance from
other countries, including the United States, Japan, and Australia.”72
Here, Japan’s substantial role in providing such assistance merits special
recognition. Following policy adjustments to account for local sensitivities, Tokyo
has undertaken a variety of measures in support of the efforts of states surrounding
the Malacca Strait to increase security there,73 including the installation of
navigational aids in the Strait.74 Japan’s Coast Guard, for instance, has engaged
in joint training exercises with six nations Southeast Asia. All coastal states have
received Japanese training and equipment.75 Tokyo has funded an anti-piracy
center in Singapore.76 According to Sam Bateman, Japan has also:
hosted Port Security Seminars in Southeast Asian countries to assist

implementation of the ISPS Code. In June 2006, Japan donated three patrol
boats to Indonesia to help fight terrorism and piracy, after earlier donating a
training vessel to the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA). At a
higher political level, Japan has held recent talks with ASEAN on cooperation
against terrorism. These talks were expected to focus on how Japan can help
ASEAN to exchange information on terrorism, tighten immigration controls,
strengthen maritime patrols and improve investigation technology.77
71 Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, Chief of Staff, Indonesian Navy, “National

Sovereignty and Security in the Strait of Malacca”, paper presented to the Conference
held by Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, October 12,
2004, pp. 11–12, www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/conferences/som04/papers/sondakh.pdf
(accessed May 17, 2008).
206.
73 For a Chinese perspective on Japan’s role in maritime security affairs in Southeast
Asia, see Gong Yingchun, “Japan and the Construction of Multilateral Marine Security
Mechanism”, Contemporary East Asia, 7 (2006) [in Chinese].
Welcome?”
75 John F. Bradford, “Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy
Formulation and the Coastal State Responses”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26 (2004).
76 Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Monthly Report, p. 3.
77 Sam Bateman, “International Cooperation in Piracy Prevention”, in Werner
Vom Busch and Tobias Rettig, eds, Covering Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia, Media
Programme Asia, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Singapore, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung,
2006, p. 67.
U.S. Military and Economic Contributions to Southeast Asia
The U.S., for its part, has worked to increase regional security while respecting
the views and interests of states in the region. Washington has sought to develop
robust economic and military partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
and other important regional nations.
Indonesia The tragic December 26, 2004 tsunami gave the U.S. an historic
opportunity to restore good relations with Indonesia, a regional power of critical
importance with over 17,000 islands and the world’s fourth largest population.78
Jakarta has requested U.S. “military assistance in the form of training and support
in order to build its enforcement capacity.”79
In February 2005, the U.S. and Indonesia resumed International Military
Education and Training (IMET). This was cemented with a visit by U.S. Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in June. In November of that year, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice “waived all remaining legislative restrictions on U.S. military
assistance to Indonesia,”80 thereby lifting a five-year ban on arms sales to Jakarta,
and permitting defense exports and Foreign Military Financing (FMF).81 In March
2006, during a visit to Jakarta, Secretary Rice highlighted “‘the growing strategic
partnership and strategic relationship of the United States and Indonesia.’”82
That month, U.S. State Department “posted formal notice permitting the sale
of lethal military equipment to Indonesia on a case-by-case basis.”83 Following
these measures, then Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command William J. Fallon
78 Bruce A. Elleman, Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in
Northern Indonesia, Newport, R.I., Naval War College Press, February 2007; Sumathy
Permal, “U.S.–Indonesia Military Ties: An Observation”, http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/
htmls/papers/pdf/sumathy/sumathy-us_indon_military_ties.pdf (accessed October 1,
2008); Admiral Gary Roughead, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, “Deployment of Hospital
Ship ‘Mercy’ and Current Pacific Command Operations”, Foreign Press Center Briefing,
Washington, D.C., May 10, 2006, http://2002-2009-fpc.state.gov/66063.htm (accessed July
1, 2009).
Welcome?”
80 U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman, “Indonesia-Military
Assistance”, January 4, 2006, http://www.state.gov?r/pa/prs/2006/58686.htm (accessed
March 30, 2008); Weatherbee, “Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in
Southeast Asia”, p. 296.
81 Michael Vatikiotis, “Washington’s Turnaround on Indonesia”, International
Herald Tribune, January 1, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/06/opinion/edvatik.
php?page=1 (accessed July 1, 2009).
Asia”, p. 297.
83 Federal Register 71: 60 (13 March 2006), 15797; Weatherbee, “Strategic
Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia”, p. 296.
recommended a “‘rapid, concerted infusion’” of U.S. military aid to Indonesia,84

a call that was echoed in the U.S. administration’s FY 2007 foreign operations
budget request.85 In 2006, the U.S. Pacific Command invited the Indonesian Army
Special Forces (KOPASSUS) to participate in its annual Pacific Area Special
Operations Conference (PASOC).86 Indonesia has also participated in the annual
CARAT exercises. 87
“From a military point of view,” according to Donald Weatherbee,
the restoration of normal relations allows the United States to again contribute
to Indonesia’s military modernization and capacity building, aid that will
better allow Indonesia to support common strategic interests in counter-
terrorism and maritime security. These changes will also enhance Indonesia’s
ability to work with Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand in their joint security
presence in the Strait of Malacca. With access to U.S. assistance and equipment
reopened, the Indonesian military’s capacity for interoperability with other U.S.
friends and allies in the ASEAN region will be increased. The reintegration of
Indonesia into the PACOM-centered security nexus in Southeast Asia also is
expected to give further incentives to the Indonesian military for reform and
professionalization.88
In a larger sense,
The United States views Indonesia’s position in Southeast Asia as strategically

unique—given that Indonesia contains nearly half of Southeast Asia’s population,
has the largest Muslim population in the world, is located on critical Asian sea
lane choke points, is a key ally in the war on terrorism, and is a re-emerging
leader of ASEAN.89 … As important as normalization is for the military, the
greatest significance is the new political quality that normalization lends to the
84 Admiral William J. Fallon, “Statement to the U.S. Senate Armed Services

Committee on Pacific Command Posture”, March 7, 2006, http://www.armed-services.
senate.gov/statement.2006/March/Fallon%2003-07-06.pdf (accessed February 2, 2008);
Weatherbee, “Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia”, p.
296.
85 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations,
Fiscal Year 2007, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60643.pdf (accessed July
1, 2009); Weatherbee, “Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast
Asia”, p. 296.
Asia”, p. 297.
Welcome?”
Asia”, p. 297.
89 Ibid., p. 296.
bilateral relationship. … Given Indonesia’s critical role in ASEAN, the U.S.-

Indonesia “strategic partnership” is a necessary key ingredient to the ASEAN-
U.S. Enhanced Partnership.90
Malaysia The U.S. and Malaysia enjoy robust trade relations. Kuala Lumpur,
which already has Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) status,
initiated further negotiations with Washington in the beginning of 2006. As for
maritime security, between 2004 and 2006 Malaysia reorganized its five maritime
agencies into the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA).91 The
MMEA “will buy new vessels, refurbish many of its seventy-plus existing craft,
and acquire six helicopters for surveillance, enforcement, and search-and-rescue
duties.”92 Washington stands willing and ready to provide assistance should Kuala
Lumpur deem it to be helpful. Following a meeting with his Malaysian counterpart
in July 2006, then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Mullen stated, “As
we are developing future capabilities, certainly we are willing to share those with
the Malaysian navy …”93
Singapore In May 2003, Singapore became the first Southeast Asian nation
to conclude an FTA with the U.S. This robust “‘WTO plus’” agreement, which
entered force on January 1, 2004, has been credited with increasing bilateral trade
by 10 percent in 2004 and 2005.94 As a Major Security Cooperation Partner of
Washington, the dynamic city state has concurrently strengthened military relations
with Washington by constructing a naval base capable of accepting U.S. aircraft
carriers and hosting a naval logistics command center. Of its own initiative, in
2003 Singapore formed a Maritime and Port Security Working Group, involving
its maritime and port authority, police coast guard, and navy, to implement port
and shipping security regulations.95 Singapore’s vessel traffic information system
employs sophisticated coastal radars to track as many as 5,000 vessels and
allows both real time and historical analysis.96 In addition to hosting ReCAAP’s
90 Ibid., p. 297.
91 Hon Dato’ Sri Najib Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy Prime Minister, Malaysia, “The
Security of the Straits of Malacca and its Implications to the South East Asia Regional
Security”, Korea National Defense University, March 13, 2007, http://www.kln.gov.my/
?m_id=25&vid=432 (accessed July 1, 2009).
92 Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?”
93 “U.S. Committed To Security in Malacca Strait Says Top Navy Official”, Agence
France-Presse, July 17, 2006.
Asia”, p. 285.
95 For an overview of Singapore’s complex maritime security environment, see
Catherine Zara Raymond, “Maritime Security: The Singaporean Experience”, Institute of
Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore, draft paper, December 2005.
96 Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?”
Information Sharing Center, Singapore announced on March 27, 2007:
that it would construct a command and control center to “house the Singapore
Maritime Security Centre (SMSC), an Information Fusion Centre (IFC), and a
Multinational Operations and Exercise Centre (MOEC).” The IFC will facilitate
information fusion and sharing between “participating militaries and agencies,”
and the MOEC will provide the infrastructure for multinational exercises,
maritime security operations, and humanitarian operations and disaster relief
should the need arise. In essence, Singapore is offering a readymade capability
that can be leveraged for regional cooperation at any time. This will allow a rapid
operationalization of cooperation initiatives should the political environment be
conducive.97
Singapore also holds the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, a useful meeting of

defense ministers.98
Other Southeast Asian Partners The U.S. and the Philippines have long had close
military and economic ties. On the bilateral trade front, Manila enjoys TIFA status.
Washington accorded the Philippines major non-NATO ally status in 2003. As part
of their formal defense alliance relationship, Manila and Washington have also
concluded a Mutual Defense Agreement and a Visiting Forces Agreement. During
the two previous years, U.S. troops helped Manila fight Mindanao-based Abu
Sayyaf separatists in the joint Balikatan exercises. As part of its formal defense
alliance relationship with the U.S., Thailand was recognized by the U.S. as a major
non-NATO ally in 2003.99 The two nations’ longtime security discussions, initiated
in 1993, culminated in a bilateral “‘strategic dialogue’” in November 2005.100
Vietnam has also bolstered its security ties with the U.S., sending representatives
to IMET for the first time in 2006.101
97 Ibid. See also “New Maritime Command and Control Centre at Changi”, Ministry
of Defense, Singapore, March 27, 2007, www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/.../2007/.../27mar07_
nr.html (accessed July 1, 2009); “Speech by Mr. Yeo Cheow Tong, Minister for Transport,
at the ReCAAP IFN Signing Ceremony, April 20, 2006, Garden Suite, Oriental Hotel,”
http://app.mot.gov.sg/data/s_06_04_20.htm (accessed).
98 For additional information concerning Singapore’s maritime security efforts, see
the “Opening Address by Mr. Yeo Cheow Tong, Minister for Transport, at the International
Maritime and Port Security Conference, January 21, 2003, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore,”
http://app.mot.gov.sg/data/s_03_01_21.html.
99 For more information concerning Thailand’s contribution to regional maritime
security, see Chusak Chupaitoon, “Thailand’s Contribution to Regional Security.”
Asia”, p. 294.
101 Ibid., pp. 295–6.
Regional Cooperation Against Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP)
In November 2004, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

plus Japan (which originally introduced the initiative), China, South Korea,
Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka concluded a Regional Cooperation Agreement
on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).102
This “indigenous pan-Asian initiative,” which entered into force on September 4,
2006, is “the first regional government-to-government agreement to promote and
enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery at sea in Asia.”103 Now 16-
members-strong,104 ReCAAP has resulted in the establishment of an Information
Sharing Center (ISC) in Singapore to “maintain databases, conduct analysis, and
act as an information clearinghouse.”105 Moreover, the “agreement does not ‘oblige
members to take any specific action other than sharing information that they deem
pertinent to imminent pirate attacks,’”106 although they “agree to cooperate in
capacity building, legal assistance, and extradition.”107
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
Another constructive measure, which has recently been applied to East Asia, is
the multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). PSI is motivated solely by
concerns about proliferation and does not represent an effort to compromise the
national interests of peaceful states that abide by the norms of the international
system. Rather, supported by over 60 countries, PSI is “a set of partnerships that
establishes the basis for cooperation on specific activities, when the need arises. …
PSI interdiction training exercises and other operational efforts help states work
together in a more cooperative, coordinated, and effective manner to stop, search,
and seize [proliferation-related] shipments.”108
102 Bradford, Naval War College Review, p. 69. See also Singapore Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, “Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)”, press release, September 4, 2006, http://app.
mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View,5230,(accessed July 1, 2009)
103 Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ReCAAP”; Huang, “Building Maritime
Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?”.
104 “About ReCAAP ISC,” official website, http://www.recaap.org/about/about1_
2.html (accessed June 30, 2009).
Welcome?”
106 Liss, “The Privatisation of Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Between a Rock
and a Hard Place?”
Welcome?”
108 “The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)”, U.S. State Department Bureau
of Nonproliferation, Washington, D.C., May 26, 2005, http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/
other/46858.htm (accessed January 17, 2008).
PSI “is intended to operate in a manner ‘consistent with national legal

authorities and relevant international law and frameworks.’”109 PSI supports the
January 1992 United Nations (UN) Security Council Presidential Statement that
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threatens international peace
and security, and underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent
proliferation. As Major Victor Huang of the Republic of Singapore Navy notes,
“the spirit of PSI was emphatically affirmed by the passage on 28 April 2004
of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, requiring all states to take
measures to prevent proliferation.”110 According to Admiral Michael Mullen,
“Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan applauded the work of all
countries active in PSI and has pointed to this initiative as an example of the type
of cooperation necessary to counter today’s threats [with] nations acting in their
own interest, but also for the common good.”111 PSI is also consistent with recent
G-8 and EU statements calling for more coherent and concerted efforts to prevent
the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials.
Singapore hosted East Asia’s first PSI exercise, Deep Sabre, in August 2005.
Conducted in the South China Sea, Deep Sabre advanced PSI participating
nations’ operational capabilities by integrating an at-sea boarding (conducted by a
combination of military and law enforcement forces) with a port search operation
(conducted primarily by law enforcement). From August 5–19, 2,000 personnel
from military, coastguard, customs and other agencies of 13 PSI countries
participated.112 Other regional nations were invited to observe. Singapore’s
Ministry of Defense assessed that Deep Sabre “served to validate the multinational
and inter-agency systems and procedures that have been put in place to detect
and interdict illegal shipments of WMD-related materials.”113 As Deep Sabre
demonstrated, specifically targeted exercises can provide an excellent opportunity
for positive and productive cooperation for the promotion of mutual interests.
109 Office of the Press Secretary, White House, “Proliferation Security Initiative:
Statement of Interdiction Principles”, www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/23764.htm (accessed
April 4, 2008); Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not
Welcome?”
Welcome?”
111 Mullen, “Remarks as Delivered for the 17th International Seapower
Symposium.”,
112 Participating nations included Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, Singapore, the U.K., and the U.S. “Singapore
Hosts Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise”, Singapore Ministry of National Defense,
August 15, 2005, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2005/aug/
15aug05_nr2.html (accessed July 1, 2009).
113 “Exercise Deep Sabre Successfully Conducted”, Singapore Ministry of National
Defense, August 18, 2005, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2005/
aug/18aug05_nr.html (accessed July 1, 2009).
The Container Security Initiative (CSI)
Another important security measure with particular significance for Asia, which
boasts 13 of the world’s top 20 container shipping ports,114 is the Container
Security Initiative (CSI), introduced by the U.S. in January 2002. Containerized
cargo security’s importance for global economic development and stability is
readily apparent. One hundred and eight million cargo containers transport early
90 percent of global trade annually. Ships carrying as many as 8,000 containers
transport nearly half of incoming trade (by value), 40 percent overall, to the U.S.’s
360 commercial ports; this percentage is even higher in Japan, Singapore, and
the U.K. U.S. ports received 26,000 containers per day, for a total of 9.6 million,
in fiscal year 2004;115 seaborne containers also transported one-quarter of U.S.
imports ($423 billion) and one-sixth of U.S. exports ($139 billion).116 In 2005, 16
million shipping containers arrived in U.S. ports.117 That fiscal year, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection processed 20 million sea, truck, and rail containers entering
the U.S. and 29 million of its trade entries.118
Seaborne container transport is also the lifeblood of China’s economy.
China had US$974 billion in exports in 2006, 21 percent (US$250 billion) of
which went to the U.S. and 9.5 percent of which went to Japan. China imported
US$777.9 billion worth of goods in 2006.119 In all cases, logistical and commercial
imperatives meant that the vast majority of goods by volume, and a substantial
majority by value, traveled by sea. Thus China, like the U.S., has a major stake in
seaborne container security.
The Secure Freight Initiative
Three East Asian ports—Singapore’s Brani Terminal, South Korea’s Gamman

terminal (in Busan), and Hong Kong—are participating in the Secure Freight
Initiative. Hong Kong’s recent participation is an extremely welcome development,
114 The Economic Costs of Disruptions in Container Shipments, Washington, D.C.,

Congressional Budget Office, March 29, 2006, p. 1.
115 “Container Security Initiative Fact Sheet”, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
30 September 2006, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/international_
activities/csi/csi_fact_sheet.ctt/csi_fact_sheet.doc (accessed).
116 The Economic Costs of Disruptions in Container Shipments, p. 1.
117 Ibid.
118 “Container Security Initiative 2006–2011 Strategic Plan”, U.S. Customs and
Border Patrol, Office of Policy and Planning and Office of International Affairs, Container
Security Initiative Division, August 2006, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_
security/international_activities/csi/csi_strategic_plan.ctt/csi_strategic_plan.pdf, p. 5
(accessed December 30, 2007).
119 14.6 percent of China’s 2006 imports were from Japan, 11.3 percent from South
Korea, and 7.5 percent from the U.S. “China”, CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (accessed September 20, 2009).
as the Special Administrative Region currently ranks first in terms of the volume
of both shipments and containers exported to the U.S.120 In 2004, the U.S. received
US$43.4 billion containerized imports from Hong Kong.121 In fiscal year 2006,
Hong Kong sent 13 percent (1.3 million) of its containers to the U.S. Moreover, 90
percent of Hong Kong’s shipments are themselves transshipments, making their
safety all the more important to verify.122
Initiated officially on December 7, 2006, the Secure Freight Initiative
supplements CSI by screening a greater portion of containers, even those not
predetermined to be of high risk, with the goal of identifying radiological hazards.
It therefore integrates sophisticated scanning technology (e.g., nuclear detection
devices) into selected operations at selected ports and sub-port terminals.123 In
fiscal year 2006, the six ports under evaluation handled over 10 percent (nearly 1.2
million) of U.S.-bound shipments.124
Participating (South)east Asian Nations
Under CSI, officials collaborate closely with their host nation counterparts. U.S.
Customs and Border Protection officers are stationed in many overseas locations,
where they engage in reciprocal information exchange. Because these personnel
are essentially law enforcement officials, and not military officials, they can more
easily share relevant information, which is related to law enforcement activities as
opposed to potential military activities. Cooperation in law enforcement is usually
much easier for nations to achieve than is military cooperation, especially against
mutual threats. CSI partner nations may also send officers to U.S. ports to monitor
containers destined for their own nation’s ports, as Japan and Canada have already
done. For a list of currently operational ports in East and Southeast Asia, please
see Table 4.2.
120 “Hong Kong to Scan U.S.-Bound Goods for Radiation as Part of Secure Freight
Initiative”, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, July 27, 2007, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/
cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/2007_news_releases/072007/07272007_2.xml
121 This represented 10 percent of overall containerized imports, and 3 percent of
total imports. The Economic Costs of Disruptions in Container Shipments (Washington,
DC: Congressional Budget Office, 29 March 2006), p. 1.
122 The Economic Costs of Disruptions in Container Shipments, p. 1.
123 “Secure Freight Initiative”, Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.
gov/xprevprot/programs/gc_1166037389664.shtm#content (accessed July 1, 2009).
124 Dannielle Blumenthal, “CBP Kicks Off Secure Freight Initiative”, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection Today, April/May (2007), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/
CustomsToday/2007/apr_may/secure.xml (accessed July 1, 2009).
Table 4.2 CSI Ports in (South)east Asia125
Hong Kong*
South Korea
Singapore*
Mainland
Thailand
Malaysia
Taiwan
China
Japan
Shenzhen Kaohsiung Yokohama Busan* Port Laem
Klang Chabang
Shanghai Chi-Lung Tokyo Tanjung
Pelepas
Nagoya
Kobe
* Also a participant in Secure Freight Initiative
All the aforementioned nations and entities have played a critical role in
furthering CSI’s coverage, and deserve great recognition for their many efforts in
this regard. For the purposes of this chapter, however, it will be necessary here to
focus on the implementation of CSI in two East Asian member nations, Singapore
and China.
Singapore
Singapore became the first Asian nation to participate in CSI in March 2003.
With the world’s busiest port in terms of container traffic (23,192,000 twenty-
foot equivalent units (TEUs) in 2005)126 and 80 percent of its large volume of
containers representing transshipments, Singapore is uniquely positioned to detect
and interdict dangerous containers. U.S. Customs and Border Protection has
deployed five officers in Singapore, where they observe cargo being screened by
Singaporean authorities.127 This is in complete accordance with utmost respect
for Singapore’s national sovereignty, as it is with all host countries. Unarmed and
lacking arrest powers, foreign officers stationed in host country ports conduct
125 “Ports in CSI”, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, September 21, 2007,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/ports_in_csi.xml
(accessed November 15, 2008).
126 Data from the American Association of Port Authorities, http://www.aapa-ports.
org/ (accessed July 1, 2009).
127 Information for this paragraph derived from “Singapore, the World’s Busiest
Seaport, Implements the Container Security Initiative and Begins to Target and Pre-
Screen Cargo Destined for U.S.”, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, March 17, 2003,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/cbp_press_releases/
032003/03172003.xml (accessed July 1, 2009).
themselves strictly in accordance with CSI guidelines, with local law being the
deciding factor.
China
With its rapid manufacturing-based economic growth, China has already had a
major impact on global container trade, Beijing’s active participation is essential
to the success of CSI. With seven of the world’s top 20 container ports,128 China
processes a tremendous volume of containerized exports. In 2004, Chinese ports
handled roughly one-quarter of global container traffic that year and (when
including that of the Hong Kong S.A.R.) nearly 40 percent of world container
volume. China’s rapid port development and economic growth will probably only
increase its portion of global container trade.129
China’s formal accession to CSI in July 2003 was therefore a very welcome
development. The announcement in April 2005 that the port of Shanghai would
become operational in CSI was another milestone. Already third in volume after
Singapore and Hong Kong (with 18,084,000130 container unit throughput in 2005,
a 24 percent increase from the previous year), the port may become the world’s
largest by 2010.131 Shenzhen’s announced entry in June 2005 was similarly
positive. In 2005, the port ranked fourth globally in container unit throughput, just
behind Shanghai at 16,197,000.132 It is to be hoped that more Chinese ports will
enter CSI in the near future.
Building Maritime Partnerships in Southeast Asia and Beyond
While a variety of regional and international initiatives are beginning to

enhance security in maritime Southeast Asia, what are the prospects for a more
comprehensive approach to maritime security in the region and beyond? In
a landmark speech at the 17th International Seapower Symposium, held at the
U.S. Naval War College in September 2005, then-U.S. Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Michael Mullen called for a series of global maritime partnerships. In
CNO Mullen’s vision, a “Thousand Ship Navy” would bring the maritime forces
128 Choe Sang-Hun, “Asian Ports Struggle to Keep Up with Shanghai”, December
20, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/20/business/transcol21.php?page=1 (accessed
July 1, 2009).
129 See Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, “China’s Maritime Evolution:
Military and Commercial Factors”, Pacific Focus, Fall 2007.
130 Data from the American Association of Port Authorities.
131 Choe Sang-Hun, “Asian Ports Struggle to Keep Up with Shanghai.”
132 Data from the American Association of Port Authorities.
of friendly nations together based on their abilities, needs, and interests to provide
collective security against a variety of threats in the maritime commons.133
Under the leadership of Admiral Mullen (now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff) and his successor Admiral Gary Roughead, the U.S. government has for
the first time brought all three of its maritime forces (the Navy, Marine Corps, and
Coast Guard) together to produce a unified strategy. Unveiled at the U.S. Naval
War College in Newport, Rhode Island, in October 2007, with 97 heads of foreign
maritime forces in the audience and participating in related discussion panels,
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is based on the premise that
“preventing wars is as important as winning wars.”134
As the U.S. Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter has cautioned, the U.S.
is “not walking away from, diminishing, or retreating in any way from those
elements of hard power that win wars—or deter them from ever breaking out in
the first place.” But this first major U.S. maritime strategy in 25 years does place
renewed emphasis on cooperating to protect the global commons on which the
security and prosperity of nations around the world depends. In this new vision,
U.S. “maritime forces will be employed to build confidence and trust among
nations through collective security efforts that focus on common threats and mutual
interests in an open, multi-polar world.”135 Moreover: “Expanded cooperative
relationships with other nations will contribute to the security and stability of the
maritime domain for the benefit of all” because “trust and cooperation cannot
be surged” but must rather “be built over time so that the strategic interests of
the participants are continuously considered while mutual understanding and
respect are promoted.”136 More specifically, this new U.S. maritime strategy states,
“Building and reinvigorating these relationships … requires an increased focus
on capacity-building, humanitarian assistance, regional frameworks for improving
maritime governance, and cooperation in enforcing the rule of law in the maritime
domain … by countering piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking,
and other illicit activities.”137 Moreover, “When natural or manmade disasters
strike, our maritime forces can provide humanitarian assistance and relief, joining
with interagency and non-governmental partners. By participating routinely and
133 See, for example, Admiral Michael Mullen, “The Thousand Ship Fleet”, Pentagon
Brief, October 1, 2005; “‘Global Maritime Partnership’ Gaining Steam at Home and with
International Navies”, Defense Daily International, 7: 42 (October 27, 2006).
134 “A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower”, U.S. Chief of Naval
Operations and the Commandants of the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard, October
17, 2007, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf (accessed July 1, 2009), p.
4.
135 Ibid., p. 5.
136 Ibid., p. 11.
137 Ibid., p. 11.
predictably in cooperative activities, maritime forces will be postured to support

other joint or combined forces to mitigate and localize disruptions.”138
Despite ongoing strategic concerns, there appears to be growing recognition
that the most substantive threats at present to seaborne trade and energy supplies
in such regions as Southeast Asia are not from other navies, but rather from non-
state actors such as pirates and terrorists, as well as adverse weather and physical
overcrowding of the Malacca Strait and other key shipping lanes. These issues
are all best dealt with via “capacity building” measures aimed at improving the
ability of coastal nation governments to solve these problems from the grassroots
level up. Future progress in this area might include providing additional training
to regional police forces and coastguards, building an improved regional vessel
tracking network, and promoting economic development to give erstwhile pirates
and terrorists better alternatives. Additionally, a wide spectrum of Chinese analysts
appear to be attuned to the complicated reality of China’s energy challenge, and
express a clear readiness to engage in cooperation with other oil-consuming great
powers, including the U.S., in order to secure oil and gas supply stability.
These enlightened perspectives may offer a basis for substantive cooperation,
including in maritime Southeast Asia. Already, according to scholar Donald
Weatherbee, the U.S. and China
have similar interests in maintaining the security of sea lanes throughout Southeast
Asia and the critical straits choke points. Both Beijing and Washington have
committed their support to ASEAN in a variety of multilateral non-traditional
security areas: counter-narcotics, counter-piracy, and counter-trafficking in
persons. 139 … The commonality of Chinese, ASEAN, and U.S. views of the
terrorist threat has been expressed in bilateral terms, ASEAN formulations, and
the multilateral deliberations of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).140 … The
United States and China have been proactive with ASEAN on other transnational
issues, such as combating the spread of pandemic disease (including HIV/AIDS,
SARS, and avian influenza. From ASEAN’s vantage, both China and the United
States are playing positive roles.141
There are certainly frictions that will doubtless be associated with China’s
rise as an energy consumer and major player throughout the maritime arena and
policymakers throughout the Asia-Pacific region must recognize this. But it is
important now for the U.S. and China to engage each other on these important
issues, as both sea powers are in the process of making decisions that will shape
138 Ibid., p. 12.
Asia”, p. 293.
140 Ibid., p. 294.
141 Ibid., p. 293.
their force structures for years to come. In that spirit, the next section will outline
some of the modest but useful interaction that has occurred thus far.
Sino-American Maritime Cooperation
Over the past few years, a larger vision has been emerging concerning the utility
of cooperation between China and the U.S.142 Former Deputy Secretary of State
Robert Zoellick has stated that it is in China’s interest to become a “responsible
stakeholder” and that Beijing “has a responsibility to strengthen the international
system that has enabled its success.” Beijing and Washington, Zoellick suggests,
possess a “shared interest in sustaining political, economic, and security systems
that provide common benefits.”143 While expressing significant concerns, China’s
2006 Defense White Paper acknowledges that “[N]ever before has China been so
closely bound up with the rest of the world as it is today.” China, in this analysis,
is “[C]ommitted to peace, development, and cooperation” as it seeks to construct
“together with other countries, a harmonious world of enduring peace and common
prosperity.”144 The 2008 edition adds, “The Asia-Pacific security situation is stable
on the whole. The regional economy is brimming with vigor, mechanisms for
regional and sub-regional economic and security cooperation maintain their
development momentum, and it has become the policy orientation of all countries
to settle differences and hotspot issues peacefully through dialogue.”145
The potential for Sino-American maritime cooperation has been highlighted
by recent events. The U.S. Coast Guard has established excellent relations
with its Chinese counterparts. These include the Ministry of Public Security
(with its Border Control Department and Maritime Police Division), Ministry
of Communications (with its Maritime Safety Administration and Rescue and
142 For a positive but realistic exploration of this topic, see Andrew Erickson and
Lyle Goldstein, “Hoping for the Best, Preparing for the Worst: China’s Response to U.S.
Hegemony”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 29: 6 (December 2006), pp. 955–86. This section
draws heavily on Andrew S. Erickson, “Combating a Collective Threat: Prospects for Sino-
American Cooperation Against Avian Influenza”, Journal of Global Health Governance,
I: 1 (January 2007), http://diplomacy.shu.edu/academics/global_health/journal/ (accessed
July 1, 2009).
143 Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?”
Remarks to the National Committee on U.S.–China Relations, New York, September 21,
2005; James J. Przystup and Phillip C. Saunders, “Visions of Order: Japan and China in
U.S. Strategy”, Strategic Forum, 220 (June 2006), Washington, D.C., National Defense
University, Institute for National Strategic Studies.
144 The Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China,
“China’s National Defense in 2006”, December 29, 2006, www.china.org.cn/english/
features/book/194421.htm (accessed June 30, 2009), pp. 1, 3.
“China’s National Defense in 2008”, January 20, 2009, www.gov.cn/english/official/.../
content_1210227.htm (accessed June 30, 2009).
Salvage Agency), Ministry of Agriculture (with its Bureau of Fisheries), and State
Oceanic Administration. In May 2006, buoy tender USCGC Sequoia (WLB-215)
became the first U.S. cutter to visit China. In June 2006, USCGC Rush (WHEC-
723) called in Qingdao. In August 2007, USCGC Boutwell continued these
exchanges with a visit to Shanghai during the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum,
East Asia’s only maritime security organization, in which China and the U.S. play
substantive roles.146 U.S. Coast Guard officers have provided training and lectures
in China, and Chinese officers have studied at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy
(New London, C.T.) and the fisheries enforcement school (Kodiak, A.K.). Chinese
fisheries enforcement officers have served temporarily on U.S. cutters (i.e., to halt
illegal Chinese fishing), and their patrol boats join U.S., Japanese, and Russian
counterparts annually to prevent illegal driftnet fishing in the North Pacific. It is
to be hoped that the apparently planned creation of a unified Chinese coastguard
organization will further opportunities to build on this substantive and useful
progress. Already, the posting of a U.S. Coast Guard liaison officer, with the rank
of captain, at the U.S. embassy in Beijing appears to indicate prioritization of
developing the relationship on the U.S. side.147
Despite its greater sensitivity, cooperation between the U.S. and Chinese navies
is expanding as well, as part of larger bilateral military cooperation and exchanges.
In July 2006, PRC Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Guo
Boxiong became the highest-ranking Chinese military officer to visit the U.S.
since 2001. Qian Lihua, deputy director of the Foreign Affairs Office of China’s
Defense Ministry, described Guo’s visit as “the most important Chinese military
exchange with another country this year” and bilateral military relations as being
“at their best since 2001.”148 Former Commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific
Admiral William Fallon visited China in May and August 2006. He extended to
the PLA an unprecedented invitation to observe the U.S. Guam-based military
exercise Valiant Shield in June, which was readily accepted. A Chinese defense
ministry official stated that, “The invitation to observe the U.S. military exercises
is a very important component of exchanges between the militaries of China
and the United States.” That same month, the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet flagship
Blue Ridge called on Shanghai for the fourth time, which China’s official media
described as “highlighting warming exchanges between the two navies.” Assistant
Defense Secretary Peter Rodman led a U.S. delegation to Beijing for the eighth
round of annual defense consultations between the two countries. “The defense
146 “Shanghai Hosts U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Boutwell during North Pacific Coast
Guard Forum 2007”, U.S. Coast Guard Visual Information Gallery, August 16, 2007, http://
cgvi.uscg.mil/media/main.php?g2_itemId=159644 (accessed July 1, 2009).
147 Unless otherwise specified, data for this paragraph are derived from Lyle J.
Goldstein, “China: A New Maritime Partner?” p. 29.
148 All quotations in the paragraph are taken from “China, U.S. Enjoy Active Military
Exchanges in 2006”, People’s Daily, December 28, 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.
cn/200612/28/eng20061228_336342.html (accessed July 1, 2009).
departments of the two countries restored a series of consultation mechanisms

on maritime security, humanitarian disaster relief and military environmental
protection,” stated People’s Daily. “A mechanism for officer exchanges between
the two armed forces was also set up and military institutions have regular
exchange programs.” Visits to China were also made in September and December
2006 by Ryan Henry, Deputy Under Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense,
and Gary Roughead, then Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Building on the foundation of this growing series of exchanges, the U.S. and
China have held a series of unprecedented bilateral exercises. A search and rescue
exercise (SAREX) was held by off San Diego on September 20, 2006. Though a
series of port visits had previously occurred, and are scheduled to continue,149 this
was the first bilateral military exercise ever conducted between the two nations.150
The two navies stationed observers on each other’s ships as they practiced
transmitting and receiving international communications signals. Led by North
Sea Fleet deputy commander Rear Admiral Wang Fushan, China’s guided missile
destroyer Qingdao and refueling vessel Hongze Hu joined the new U.S. Arleigh
Burke-class Aegis-guided missile destroyer USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93).151 The
2006 SAREX is envisioned to be “the first in a series of bilateral exercises.”152
149 “Chinese Fleet Visits San Diego”, People’s Liberation Army Daily, September
18, 2006, http://english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2006-09/19/content_591087.
htm (accessed July 1, 2009); “Chinese Fleet Visits San Diego”, People’s Daily, September
19, 2006, http://english.people.com.cn/200609/19/eng20060919_304115.html (accessed
July 1, 2009); Steve Liewer, “‘A Touching Moment’: Hundreds Greet 2 Chinese Navy
Ships; Last Visit Was More Than 9 Years Ago”, San Diego Union-Tribune, September 19,
2006, “Chinese, U.S. Warships Train Off San Diego Coast”, Mercury News, September
20, 2006, http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060919/news_1m19chinese.html
150 Vessels from the U.S. and Chinese navies have previously participated in search
and rescue exercises in Hong Kong (e.g., in 2003), but did not directly interact in the
exercise. “U.S., Chinese Navies Complete SAREX Together”, Navy Newsstand, September
21, 2006, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=25702 (accessed July 1, 2009);
Bonnie Glaser, “U.S.–China Relations: Promoting Cooperation, Managing Friction”,
Comparative Connections, A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, se1.
isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=865DDC28-B012-
(accessed February 10, 2009).
151 Specifically selected to convey a positive connection, USS Chung-Hoon is the
first U.S. Navy ship named for a Chinese-American. Rear Admiral Gordon Pai’ea Chung-
Hoon (1910–79) served as commanding officer of USS Sigsbee (DD 502) from May 1944
to October 1945 and received the Navy Cross and Silver Star for “conspicuous gallantry and
extraordinary heroism.” See “Rear Admiral Chung-Hoon”, from the official Navy website
of USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93), http://navysite.de/dd/ddg93.htm (accessed July 1, 2009).
152 “U.S., Chinese Navies Complete SAREX Together”; “Chinese, U.S. Sailors
Meet, Make Friends”, Navy Newsstand, September 20, 2006, http://www.navy.mil/search/
display.asp?story_id=25664 (accessed July 1, 2009).
A second phase of the exercise was held in the South China Sea in November
2006.153 China provided guided missile destroyer Zhanjiang, fuel tanker Dongting
Lake, and a Yun-7 transport aircraft. The U.S. contributed missile destroyer USS
Fitzgerald, landing platform dock (LPD) USS Juneau, and a P-3C patrol plane.
These ships and aircraft worked together to “locate and salvage a ship in danger.” In
the assessment of PLAN South China Sea Fleet Commander Gu Wengen, “the two
navies demonstrated very good military skills and strong cooperative spirits.”154
“The exercise symbolizes more substantial cooperation between the armed forces
of China and the United States, which is very important to the future development
of military relations,”155 Qian Lihua elaborated. “The current search-and-rescue
exercise is an important and substantial exchange activity between the two
armed forces. It has been of vital importance to expanding the Sino-U.S. military
cooperation despite its limited scale in terms of troops and vessels.”156 “The visit
of the USS Juneau is indicative of improved military relations and transparency
between the People’s Liberation Army navy and the U.S. navy,” then-U.S. Pacific
Fleet Commander Admiral Gary Roughead concluded.157
China has also been invited to cooperate more broadly with the U.S. Navy under
the framework of global maritime partnerships. While visiting China in November
2006, then-U.S. Pacific Fleet commander (and now Chief of Naval Operations)
Admiral Roughead stated to Chinese officials that “[E]nhancing our navy-to-
navy relationships is especially important so we can cooperate in our many areas
of mutual interests … [T]hrough routine dialogue and exercises, our navies can
improve the ability to coordinate naval operations in missions such as maritime
security, search and rescue, and humanitarian relief.”158 In April 2007, during PLA
Navy commander Vice Admiral Wu Shengli’s visit to the U.S., Admiral Mullen
asked Admiral Wu to consider “China’s potential participation in global maritime
partnership initiatives.”159 According to Admiral Mullen’s spokesman Commander
“China’s National Defense in 2006”, December 29, 2006, www.china.org.cn/english/
features/book/194421.htm (accessed June 30, 2009), pp. 31–33.
154 “China, U.S. Hold Search-and-Rescue Exercise”, Xinhua, November 19, 2006,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/19/content_5349057.htm (accessed July 1,
2009).
155 “China, U.S. Enjoy Active Military Exchanges in 2006”, People’s Daily,
December 28, 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200612/28/eng20061228_336342.
html (accessed July 1, 2009).
156 “China, U.S. Hold Search-and-Rescue Exercise.”,
157 “Sino-U.S. Search-and-Rescue Exercise Held on South China Sea”, Xinhua
News Agency, November 20, 2006, http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/189469.
htm (accessed July 1, 2009).
158 “U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Visits China”, Navy Newsstand, November 13,
2006, www.news.navy.mil (accessed March 13, 2008).
159 P. Parameswaran, “U.S. Asks China to Help Maintain Global Maritime Security”,
Agence France Presse, April 5, 2007.
John Kirby, Admiral Wu “expressed interest” in the proposal and “asked for more
information … so that he would better acquaint himself about it.”160 Already, the
U.S. and Chinese navies have made new strides in communication during the
historical and widely welcomed deployment of destroyers from China’s South Sea
Fleet to protect merchant vessels from piracy in the Gulf of Aden.161 Combating
avian influenza is another area in which the two militaries might cooperate
productively.162
Conclusion
The greater South China Sea region boasts increasing maritime commerce but
faces growing unconventional security threats. A wide variety of bilateral and
multilateral maritime security cooperation initiatives that recognize both the
gravity of extant threats and the interests of those responsible nations involved are
helping provide a set of frameworks for collective security. There are other positive
indications that analysts in nations throughout the Asia-Pacific increasingly seek
cooperative solutions to maritime security concerns. A major collaborative Chinese
study on sea lane security, for instance, calls for emphasizing cooperation in
international organizations and conventions, laws and regulations concerning oil
transport.163 Establishing specific security measures offers prospects for increasing
trust, fostering good will, and enhancing maritime security in Southeast Asia. As
the world’s largest developed and developing nations respectively, as well as
two major Pacific powers, the U.S. and China have a critical role to play in this
process. Effective bilateral communication in this regard will maximize prospects
for positive results.
160 P. Parameswaran, “Plea by Pentagon to Top Naval Visitor”, The Weekly Standard,
April 6, 2007, http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?we_cat=3&art_id=41726&
sid=13026608&con_type=1&d_str=20070406 (accessed July 1, 2009).
161 For details, see Erickson and Justin Mikolay, “Welcome China to the Fight
Against Pirates,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 2009, pp. 34-41.
162 For further details, see Erickson, “Combating a Collective Threat: Prospects for
Sino-American Cooperation Against Avian Influenza”; Erickson, “Combating a Collective
Threat: Protecting U.S. Forces and the Asia-Pacific from Pandemic Flu”, in Michael Birt
and Claire Topal, eds, An Avian Flu Pandemic: What Would it Mean, and What Can We Do?
Seattle, W.A., National Bureau of Asian Research, June 2006, pp. 11–20.
163 Zhang Yuncheng, “Energy Security and Sea Lanes”, p. 124.
Chapter 5
Myth and Reality:
The Rise and Fall of Contemporary
Maritime Piracy in the South China Sea
XU Ke
Introduction
Maritime piracy has plagued the South China Sea since early 1990s. After the
terrorist attacks on New York on September 11, 2001 (9/11), piracy evoked further
concern, and the myth of a piracy and terrorism nexus was expressed by the mass
media and government statements. Intriguingly, three years later, piracy incidents
had declined significantly, especially in the Straits of Malacca, and this trend has
continued up to the present.
This chapter looks into the factors contributing to the rise and fall of
maritime piracy in the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea from 1991 to 2007.
The chapter has three sections: the following section introduces the definition of
maritime piracy and data about it; the second section reveals factors contributing
to the rise and fall of contemporary piracy in the South China Sea; and the final
section discusses the myth and reality of anti-piracy cooperation after 9/11.
Definition and Data
Piracy has many definitions in the contemporary era. Currently, three definitions are
well known. The first one is the definition in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS); the second, the International Maritime Bureau
Piracy Reporting Center (IMB-PRC) of International Chamber of Commerce;
the third, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).
Adam. J. Young and Mark. J Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in

Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility,“ Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25: 2 (2003), pp.
269–83.
IMB-PRC, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report, 1 January
– 31 December 2007, London, ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2008, p. 5.
Piracy is defined in the UNCLOS, Article 101. This definition applies only to
any of the described illegal acts committed either on the high seas or outside the
jurisdiction of any state. Thus, technically, any violent and illegal acts against ships
or property and people on board ships taking place in ports or inside territorial
waters can not be referred as piracy.
The second definition of piracy is that of the IMB-PRC (1992). The IMB-PRC
defines piracy as “an act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or
any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance
of that act.” This definition “covers actual or attempted attacks whether the ship
is berthed, at anchor or at sea,” which is much wider than the UNCLOS Article
101.
The third definition is in the ReCAAP agreement (2004), Article 1, which uses
two legal terms: “piracy” and “armed robbery against ships,” covering all the
unlawful acts outside and within a state’s jurisdiction. The definition of piracy is
pursuant to the UNCLOS Article 101, and the definition of “armed robbery against
ships” adopts the definition of United Nations International Maritime Organization
(IMO):
“Armed robbery against ships” means any unlawful act of violence or detention or
any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of “piracy,” directed
against a ship or against persons or property on board the ship, within a State’s
jurisdiction over such offenses.
For the purpose of easy communication, the chapter adopts the IMB definition
as a working definition; that is that “piracy” refers to both “piracy” as defined
under Article 101 of the UNCLOS and “armed robbery against ships” as defined
by the IMO.
Data used in this study consist of two parts: primary sources on piracy cases
and time-series piracy reports. The piracy cases provide an in-depth knowledge of
piracy, while the time-series piracy reports reveal the overview picture of piracy.
Piracy cases were collected from trial records, witness testimonials, interviews,
government gazettes, shipping columns, newspapers, magazines, photographs, and
video reports. The time-series piracy reports acquired from three organizations:
International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Center (IMB-PRC); International
International Seabed Authority, The Law of the Sea: Compendium of Basic

Documents, Kingston, International Seabed Authority, Caribbean Law Publishing, 2001,
p. 39.
IMB-PRC, Piracy Report 1992, London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 1993,
p. 2.
Ibid.
IMO, “Draft Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships (MSC/Cir.984)”, Article 2.2. http://www.imo.org (accessed July 8,
2007).
Myth and Reality 83
Maritime Organization (IMO), and Information Sharing Center of Regional

Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ISC-
ReCAAP).
The IMB-PRC, a non-government organization sponsored by shipping
industry in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, has published the IMB Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships Reports since 1992. The IMB-PRC also provides weekly
updates on pirate activities via the Internet. The IMB-PRC reports provide detailed
information on locations of actual and attempted attacks, status of ships during
actual attacks, the types of arms used, the type of violence, types of ships attacked,
the nationalities of ships attacked, as well as the trend of piracy attacks. Thus, the
IMB reports are widely used by researchers.
The United Nations International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime
Safety Committee has published Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Reports
since 1995. The reports, compiling from piracy reports from shipping industry, are
similar to IMB-PRC reports, but less detailed.
The most recent new type of piracy reports are published by Information
Sharing Center (ISC) of ReCAAP, which was set up in Singapore in November
2006. The ISC data are collected directly from focal points of member states;
however, the data in ISC reports only cover piracy and armed robbery against
ships incidents in Asian waters.
The Rise and Fall of Contemporary Piracy
The Surge of Piracy Incidents
According to the IMB-PRC piracy reports, there were 102 piracy incidents in
Southeast Asia in 1991, and the figures increased until 2000, when the figure
peaked at 262 incidents. The number declined significantly after 2004. The most
piracy-prone areas were in Indonesian waters, the Straits of Malacca and the South
China Sea. From 1991 to 2007, Indonesian waters experienced 1,148 actual and
attempted piracy attacks; the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea hosted
963 incidents.
What factors caused the surge of piracy in these areas? The first factor is due to
their unique geographic position; the second, the rapid development of the global
shipping industry; the third, the political economy situation in the littoral states;
and the fourth, the obstacles to anti-piracy operations among these countries.
IMB-PRC, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report (1991–2004),
London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 1992–2008.
See http://www.recaap.org (accessed March 6, 2007).
IMB-PRC, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report (1991–2007),
London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 1992–2008.
Chokepoints and Seaborne Trade Routes The Straits of Malacca and the South
China Sea are located in the major sea lines of communication (SLOC) connecting
the West and East Asian countries. These SLOCs cross the waters of several
countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, with Singapore’s port
facilities serving as a major node for refueling and transshipment. More than half
of the world‘s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through the Straits of Malacca,
Sunda, and Lombok.10 Cargo flowing into Asia includes containerized goods, dry
bulk goods such as grain, coal, and iron ore from North America and Australia, and
oil from the Middle East. Crude oil is the biggest single cargo in terms of volume
through Southeast Asia to East Asia, while finished consumer goods are the
principal cargo being transported back via Southeast Asia to India, the Middle
East, and Europe.
The Straits of Malacca have been the main seaborne trade gateway since the
early history of Southeast Asia. The Straits of Malacca remain the shortest sea
route from the ports of India and the Persian Gulf to ports on mainland East Asia.
Nowadays, tanker traffic through the Straits of Malacca is more than three times
that of Suez Canal traffic, and well over five times that of the Panama Canal.
The Straits have become more and more congested every year; according to the
Statistics of Marine Department Peninsular Malaysia, the ships passing through
the Straits of Malacca amounted to 63,636 in 2004, and the number continues to
increase each year. 11
The maximum tonnage of ships allowed to pass through the Straits of Malacca,
according to the Traffic Separation Schemes, was limited to 230,000 dead weight
tonnage (dwt) with an Under Keel Clearance (UKC) of at least 3.5 meters at all
times. Ships larger than 230,000 dwt must use the Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar
Straits.12 The Sunda and Lombok–Makassar routes are superior in terms of
depth and width to the Straits of Malacca, but lack good navigational aids and
infrastructure. Furthermore, ships using these straits have to navigate a longer
distance (around 1,000 nautical miles) and more time (two or three days) than
passing through the Straits of Malacca, and the freight rate would also increase
nearly 20–30 percent.13 In terms of freight costs, these straits are not the ideal
choice for shipping companies.
Shipping Industry and Piracy Since 1990s, the robust economic situation in East
Asia has given a fresh impetus to seaborne trade and shipping industry. A huge
10 Michael Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-Related Terrorism
in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2004, p. 38.
11 A.R. Hussin, “The Management of Straits of Malacca: Burden Sharing as the Basis
for Co-opeation”, LIMA International Maritime Conference 2005, Awana Porto Malai,
Langkawi, Malaysia, 2005.
12 Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade, pp. 36–41.
13 Ibid, p. 41.
Myth and Reality 85
volume of cargo flowing through the Straits of Malacca provides ready prey for
pirates. The global shipping industry is the direct prey of piracy. The prey includes
ships, cargoes and crew. Among all the victims’ ships, bulk carriers were on the
top of victim ships list, with 916 incidents, nearly 21 percent of total attacks from
1991 to 2007. Bulk carriers travel at a limited speed and their freeboards are low,
which makes it easier for pirates to board them when they are underway.14
The other vulnerable types of vessels were general cargo ships, container ships,
and oil tankers. From 1991 to 2007, there were 736 attacks against general cargo
ships, nearly 18 percent of total attacks; 609 attacks against crude oil tankers,
nearly 15 percent of total attacks; and 363 attacks against chemicals tankers, nearly
9 percent of total attacks. In the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, these vessels are
most likely to be attacked, because they have to slow down when passing through
the Straits.
Fishing boats and trawlers are also vulnerable due to their slow speed and their
lucrative seafood cargoes which are easy to be dispose of in open markets. From
1991 to 2007, there were 214 attacks against fishing boats and trawlers.15
Some inherent weaknesses in the ship industry make ships vulnerable to
piratical attacks. Thanks to modern technology, the number of crew members
now needed on board has been greatly reduced; this makes it easier for pirates to
seize the control of such ships. For example, bulk carriers have only an average of
20–25 crew members on board; container ships, 21; tankers, 12–25; and fishing
boats, fewer than 10.16 Furthermore, crews have been discouraged from fighting
back for fear of escalating the situation.17 This has encouraged pirates to be more
daring in their attacks.
Flag of Convenience To make the matter worse, many ship owners register their
ships under flags of convenience (FOC). An FOC is: “the flag of any country
allowing the registration of foreign-owned and foreign-controlled vessels under
conditions which, for whatever the reasons, are convenient and opportune for the
persons who are registering the vessels.”18 Pirates have taken advantage of the
14 Freeboard: the distance between the water line and the uppermost full deck of a
ship.
15 ICC-IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report (1991–
2007).
16 ISC-ReCAAP, “Analysis of Type of Ships involved in Incidents of Piracy and
Armed Robbery in Asia (2003–2007)”, Singapore: ISC-ReCAAP, 2008.
17 IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Guidance to Shipowners and
Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships, May 29, 2002 http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.
asp/data_id%3D5378/623r3.pdf (accessed November 1, 2005).
18 Richard M. F. Coles and Nigel P. Ready, Ship Registration, London: Lloyd’s
Shipping Law Library, 2002, p. 15.
loophole of FOC to re-register their stolen ships; this will be elaborated on later.
The use of flags of convenience can be traced back to the use of the Spanish
flag by English merchants in order to avoid Spanish monopoly restrictions on
trade with the West Indies in the seventeenth century. The widespread use of flags
of convenience began in the 1920s.19 Since World War II, the number of flags of
convenience has increased tremendously. The leading open registry countries are
Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, Malta, and Cyprus. For example, at the end of 2005,
the number of ships flying Panamanian and Liberian flags reached 8,494, totaling
201,421,949 gross tonnage (GT), more than a quarter of global tonnage.20
The reasons why ship owners register their ships under FOC flags, or “flag out,”
is based principally on economic considerations. FOCs are easy to register, for
example, a ship may be registered at a consul’s office abroad, and a transfer from
one registry to another is not restricted. Taxes on a ship’s income are low or may
not even be levied. A registry fee and an annual fee, based on tonnage, are normally
the only charges made. For example, under Panamanian registration, a ship of
15,000 dwt need only pay US$3,000 for initial registration, and subsequently pays
only US$1,500 annually in tonnage tax (10 cents per ton) and an annual survey
tax fee of US$1,000.21 From the shipowners’ point of view, their ultimate aims
are to maximize profit and minimize operation costs. Flags of convenience (FOC)
meet this demand. Under the registration of FOC, shipowners can avoid taxes and
benefit from lower crewing costs. For example, annual crewing costs for a United
Kingdom-registered tanker with a British crew are estimated at US$908,000. In
the case of a Hong Kong-registered ship (FOC) with a Hong Kong crew, that
figure could be reduced to US$396,000.22
Furthermore, under FOC, ship owners enjoy anonymity. Owners can change
their identities to avoid being identified, especially when their ships have been
blacklisted by an insurance company. 23 There are always conflicts of interest
between ship owners and insurance companies, which will be discussed later.
However, the FOC lacks a “genuine link” with flag states. FOC countries are
typically small states that have neither the power nor the administrative machinery
to impose effective governmental or international regulations on ships under their
registration. FOC countries’ principal aim is to earn money from registration, and
they have no intention or power to protect ships under their registration.24 Thus,
those ships under FOCs are vulnerable to piratical attacks. From 1991 to 2007,
the ships flying Panamanian, Liberian, Cypriot, and Bahaman FOC flags were
19 Ibid.
20 Lloyd’s Register, World Fleet Statistics 2006, London: Lloyd’s Register, p. 10.
21 Richard M.F. Coles, and Nigel P. Ready, Ship Registration, London: LLP, 2002,
pp. 245–7.
22 Coles and Ready, Ship Registration, 46.
23 Ibid., p. 20.
24 B.N. Metaxas, Flags of Convenience: A Study of Internationalisation, Aldershot,
Hampshire: Gower Pub. Co., 1985, pp. 14–15.
Myth and Reality 87
at the top of the victim ship list. Panamanian ships were involved in 603 piracy
incidents; Liberian, 228; Cypriot, 235; and Bahaman, 166.25
The loophole of FOC has long been used by pirates for re-registering stolen
ships. The modus operandi is quite simple. The criminal groups use their network
to find a suitable ship to be hijacked at sea. The cargo on board is downloaded,
and disposed of through their smuggling network on the black market. The crew
are either killed or abandoned. The ship becomes a “phantom ship.” A typical
illustration of this kind of attack is the “Cheung Son case.” The Cheung Son case
is one of China’s most brutal cases of piracy in the South China Sea, involving the
murder of 23 Chinese seamen on board the MV Cheung Son, whose bodies were
dumped overboard, and ended with 13 pirates (one Indonesian and 12 Chinese
nationals) being sentenced to death. The ship, the Cheung Son, was repainted and
turned into “phantom ship” before the pirates were caught. The ship has never
recovered, she might be somewhere in the world, using another name.26
The phantom identity enables the owners of “phantom ships” to commit
maritime fraud. Firstly, the phantom ship owner offers competitive freight rates to
shippers who are not aware of the conspiracy. After the cargo has been loaded, the
ship is diverted to another destination, and the cargo is off-loaded and sold to pre-
arranged buyers. The ship is then re-registered with yet another phantom identity,
and the crime is committed all over again. It is difficult to trace these ships because
none of their registration details are accurate.27 According to IMB reports, 136
ships have been hijacked and have then disappeared. Many of these ships were
probably turned into “phantom ships.”28
Piracy and Insurance To avoid losses from pirate attacks, one solution for ship
owners is to buy an insurance policy with piracy coverage. In global insurance
markets, piracy is usually covered under hull and machinery risks. However, an
insurance policy always has a “deductible amount” term. The insured has no right
to claim for any reimbursement when the loss incurred is less than the deductible
amount.29
Most pirate attacks in Southeast Asian waters are made with the intent of
robbing the crew of cash and property. The economic losses made in these attacks
are usually insufficient to exhaust the deductibles on most marine insurance
25 ICC-IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report (1991–
2007).
26 Guangdong Higher Court, “Court Judgement Of ‘The Case of Wei Siliang and
Soni Wee and Others, Total 38 Suspects’,” in Renmen Fayuan Caipan Wenshu Xuan [The
Selected Court Judgments], Beijing: Falu Chubianshe, 2001.
27 Ibid., p. 33.
28 ICC-IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report (1 January
– 31 December 2005), London, ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2006.
29 Jonathan Ignarski, “Piracy, Law and Marine Insurance”, in Piracy at Sea, ed. Eric
Ellen, Paris: ICC Publishing SA, 1989, p. 182.
policies. This means that ship owners have to cover the entire loss without getting
any reimbursement from their insurance company, or get a fixed maximum
reimbursement, for example, US$20,000, as in the Hellenic Club’s 1988 rules.30
If ship owners report that their ships are being attacked by pirates, they might lose
time and money in waiting for the insurance company to investigate the case, and
even after all that, they might not succeed in obtaining sufficient reimbursement.
Furthermore, the ship owner might acquire the bad reputation of being vulnerable,
and their insurance company might require a possible increase in premium. These
are the main reasons for at least 55 percent of pirate attacks not being reported.31
The brutal nature of contemporary maritime piracy creates an atmosphere of
terror in which it is much more difficult for ship owners to crew their vessels,
particularly those ships plying Southeast Asian waters. As a consequence, ship
owners are forced to offer better pay and increased benefits to their sailors in
compensation for the greater physical risk, and this of course results in an increase
in ship owners’ operating costs. To remain in business, such ship owners will
need to cut prices and reduce margins to compensate merchants for their own
added risk of delay or loss. In order to avoid having to reduce profit margins and
to stay in business, ship owners are compelled to employ anti-piracy measures.
Implementing more effective measures often costs more than ship owners are
currently willing to spend.32
One example involves the problems and costs of hiring a group of private armed
escorts. There is a private security company, “Malacca Straits Maritime Security,”
which provides security escorts through the Straits of Malacca. The service costs
between US$10,000 and US$100,000 a day. The US$10,000 service consists of
a group of four to six armed Gurkhas on a small escort vessel. The full service
includes an armed Gurkha squad on board, fast craft and helicopter scouts, and
an additional patrol craft escort. However, the necessary maritime legislation and
multilateral coordination have not yet been worked out to facilitate the operations
of such private armed escorts. Furthermore, a regional licensing regime must be
established in order to distinguish between reputable private security companies
and those with a more mercenary inclination.33
As previously mentioned, insurers are responsible only for losses sustained
that exceed the amount of the deductible. A lower deductible amount means a
higher premium, to compensate for the insurer’s added liability. In most pirate
attacks in Southeast Asian waters, the losses from piracy are less than the policy
deductible, so insurers indemnify such losses only on rare occasions.
30 Ibid.
31 Noel Choong, (Regional Director of the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre), in
discussion with the author, Kuala Lumpur, March 13, 2004.
32 Captain Chua Yoe Han (manager of a Singaporean shipping company) in discussion
with the author, Singapore, May 18, 2004.
33 Tracy Sua, “For Hire: Guardians of the Sea—Several Firms Now Offer Armed
Escort Vessels and Mercenaries,” The Straits Times, April 15, 2005.
Myth and Reality 89
Insurers are keen to collect data on losses caused by pirate attacks. Based on
these data, insurers have begun to charge increased premiums because of the piracy
risk in some regions; for example, it is more difficult to obtain hull insurance in
Indonesia than anywhere else in the region.34
Although piracy incidents have declined significantly since 2004, on June 20,
2005, the Straits of Malacca and adjacent ports, including other Indonesian ports
(Ambon, Balikpapan, Jakarta, and Poso), were listed as war-risk areas by the Joint
War Committee of the London Insurance Market, without any announcement to
the shipping industry beforehand.35 According to international practice, when a
vessel sails into a so-called war-risk area, its insurance coverage can be cancelled
by the insurers. If a vessel intends to travel into this war-risk area, the ship owner
will have to pay an extra premium to reinstate the ship’s insurance cover. War-
risk premiums are calculated as a percentage of the total value of an individual
ship’s hull and machinery. For example, after the Tamil Tiger terrorist attack on
Colombo’s airport, war-risk premiums for ships calling at Colombo’s port climbed
as high as 0.7 percent of a ship’s value, i.e. US$500,000 per single port call for
the largest container ships.36 This means that ship owners whose vessels transit
the Straits of Malacca or call at Indonesian ports may have to pay for additional
insurance coverage. This greatly increases costs for the shipping industry. In
August 2006, considering the significant decline of piracy incidents and the strong
protect from littoral states and shipping industry, the JWC removed the Straits of
Malacca from the War Risk Listing.37
Pirates and the Littoral States Piracy in contemporary Southeast Asia was
fostered by interrelated political and economic factors. The poor economic
situation in Southeast Asia has played an important role in the surge of piracy. The
massive amount of sea traffic passing through the Straits of Malacca and the South
China Sea not only led to navigational congestion in the Straits, but also imposed
a negative impact on the local maritime environment, such as the degradation of
34 Jack Gottschalk and Brian Flanagan, Jolly Roger with an Uzi: The Rise and Threat
of Modern Piracy, Annapolis, M.D., Naval Institute Press, 2000.
35 The Joint War Committee (JWC) represents the interests of the London marine
insurance community and comprises members of the Lloyd’s Market Association (LMA)
and the International Underwriting Association (IUA). Chairman of JWC is Rupert Atkin,
Director of Underwriting at Talbot Underwriting. See SSA, Joint War Committee War
Risk Listed Area, Singapore Shipping Association 2005 , http://www.ssa.org.sg (accessed
November 1, 2005).
36 Donald Urquhart, “Malacca Strait Risk Premiums Set to Skyrocket,” The Business
Times, July 5, 2005.
37 David Rosenberg and Christopher Chung, “Maritime Security in the South China
Sea: Coordinating Coastal and User State Priorities”. Ocean Development and International
Law, 39 (2008), pp. 51–65.
fish habitats, and a slump in profits from fishing.38 Consequently, this aggravated
the economic crisis of coastal and especially Indonesian fishermen. Several
decades ago, for example, a traditional Belawan fisherman caught about 200kg of
fish per week, earning about 3,300,000 rupiah (US$330), excluding operational
costs, which were about 700,000 rupiah (US$70) per week. Nowadays, the size
of catches has dropped considerably to 70kg per week, equivalent to earnings
of 500,000 rupiah (US$50) per week. To make matters worse, operational costs
have soared to 1,200,000 rupiah (US$120) per week. This means that even though
fishermen can sell their fish, they still make a loss.39 Poverty has provided strong
incentives for coastal people to turn to piracy as an alternative source of income.
The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–1998 further exacerbated the Indonesian
economic situation, and led to a dramatic increase in piratical incidents in 2000.
Apart from the poor, small-time pirates in the Straits of Malacca, criminal
syndicates have also been much involved in piracy. These syndicates had networks
dealing with all kinds of criminal activities, such as piracy, smuggling, human
trafficking, etc. To support their operation, the criminal syndicates were often
in collusion with local law enforcement officers.40 They were equipped with
advanced weaponry, and had well-developed international networks through
which to dispose of stolen goods. These syndicates were capable of dealing in
“big stuff”—the hijacking of ships, disposal of stolen cargoes, and re-registration
of ships as “phantom ships.”
Obstacles in Anti-Piracy Cooperation Incentives Piracy in Southeast Asia is

generally a transnational crime involving parties or processes in more than one
country. The suppression of piracy requires related states to cooperate. Since the
early 1990s, the littoral countries have been cooperating in anti-piracy operations.
However, divergences in national interests in the littoral states have resulted in
different incentives regarding anti-piracy operations. For example, in the eyes of
Indonesian officials, piracy in Southeast Asia is petty theft, which does not have
a great impact on its national interest. In fact, they have a point: the majority
of victims’ ships are foreign ships, not Indonesian ones. From 1991–2007, only
53 Indonesian ships were attacked, out of total 4,200 victim ships.41 Thus, the
Indonesian Government is reluctant to spend money on protecting foreign users
38 Tom McCawley, “Sea of Trouble,” Far Eastern Economic Review 167: 21 (2004),
pp. 50–3.
39 Anucha Charoenpo, Illegal Thai Fishing Robbed Indonesia Off Billions of Catches
and Cash, Southeast Asian Press alliance, 2006, http://www.seapabkk.org/fellowships/2002/
anucha.html (accessed May 18, 2006).
40 Peter Chalk, Grey-Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: Piracy, Drug Trafficking
and Political Terrorism, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Research School
of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997.
41 IMB-PRC, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report (1991–
2007).
Myth and Reality 91
of their shipping lanes who do not contribute to the cost of maintenance of

navigational facilities and maritime security in the Straits of Malacca.
The Malaysian Government is also unwilling to spend money on these foreign
“free riders.” However, the main Malaysian ports, such as Port Klang and Tanjung
Pelepas Port, are situated along the Straits of Malacca, and maritime safety and
security in the Straits of Malacca are important for the Malaysian economy. The
Malaysian Government cannot ignore the interests of shipping industry nor their
appeal for protection. Facing similar budget constraints and insufficient maritime
capability to Indonesia, the Malaysian Government has been appealing for a
“Burden-Sharing Scheme,” urging other users of the Straits of Malacca, together
with Japan, to share the cost of maintaining and enhancing maritime safety and
security in the Straits of Malacca.
Singapore, as a city-state, is greatly dependent on its ports, and considers
piracy as a serious threat to its national security. Although Singapore has the
highest incentive to combat piracy, however, only the southern tip of the Straits of
Malacca is under Singapore’s jurisdiction, and thus Singapore cannot be of much
help.
In terms of incentives for combating piracy, Indonesia has the lowest incentive
to join in anti-piracy operations and Singapore the highest, while Malaysia falls in
between these two countries. In short, incentives regarding anti-piracy operations
differ in the littoral countries. Piracy was rampant in the countries where the
government had little incentive to combat it, and this is most true of Indonesian
waters.
Capabilities Maritime capacities have long been a problem in Southeast Asia:

the constraints in defense budgets have hampered their capabilities; the lack
of funding for anti-piracy operations constitutes a bottleneck for some poor
countries like Indonesia in implementing anti-piracy operations. For example, the
Indonesian Navy chief said of the Indonesian Navy: “Old ships cannot sail, new
ships cannot shoot.”42 With their current material capabilities, the law enforcement
agencies of Indonesia cannot successfully implement anti-piracy operations. In
terms of maritime capability, Indonesia is the lowest, Singapore is the highest, and
Malaysia comes somewhere in between.
Furthermore, sovereignty becomes a main concern in law implementation
of anti-piracy patrols involving Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. All the
multilateral patrols in the Straits of Malacca at present are coordinated, not joint
patrols, showing that trust and confidence among the littoral countries have yet to
be established.43
42 Bernard Kent Sondakh, “National Sovereignty and Security in the Straits of
Malacca,” paper presented at the “Straits of Malacca: Building a Comprehensive Security
Environment”, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, October 11–13, 2004.
43 Coordinated patrol: the law enforcement agencies coordinate while patrolling
within their own territorial waters, but they cannot cross national sea borders. Each law
The Decline of Piracy Incidents
This turning point of anti-piracy cooperation was the terrorist attacks on the
United States on 9/11. In the aftermath of 9/11, the allegation of an existence of a
piracy and terrorism nexus provides the United States with an excuse to intervene
in Southeast Asia in the name of anti-terrorism. Furthermore, China’s economic
boom in the last decade has made it necessary for the United States to “re-energize”
its relationship with Southeast Asia.44
The United States has led the global anti-terrorism campaign, and integrated
anti-piracy policies as a part of its maritime security project. The United States
launched three international maritime security initiatives: the Container Security
Initiative (CSI) in 2002, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2003, and the
Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in 2004.
The aim of CSI is to identify high-risk containers before they are delivered
to the United States, using screening technology in the originating ports. The
purpose of PSI is “to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors
of proliferation concern.”45 The CSI and PSI apply to the global scope, while the
RMSI deals particularly with maritime security in the Strait of Malacca.46
In March 2004, Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, then the U.S. Pacific Command
commander, unveiled the US Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in
the course of his annual U.S. PACOM testimony to the United States House of
Representatives. The goal of RMSI was “to partner the region’s nations, of all manner
of differing capabilities, to create a relationship to observe, monitor and intercept
any transnational threats in their waters, with the use of existing international and
domestic legislation.”47 Singapore welcomes American involvement in maritime
security in the straits of Malacca, but Indonesia and Malaysia rebuffed U.S. offers
to provide intelligence, conduct joint patrols, and send U.S. Marines into their
territorial waters.48
enforcement agency has its own commander. Joint patrol: all law enforcement agencies
of the participating countries constitute one taskforce and patrol together, under one
commander; this taskforce is empowered to cross national sea borders.
44 Bhagyashree Garekar, “China’s Rise Prompts Us to ‘Re-Energise’ S-E Asia Ties,”
The Straits Times, June 3, 2006.
45 Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, “Fact Sheet: What Is the
Proliferation Security Initiative?” http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/105217.htm (accessed
March 3, 2007)
46 Rosenberg and Chung, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Coordinating
Coastal and User State Priorities”.
47 Global Security, “Regional Maritime Security Initiative” ,http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/ops/rmsi.htm (accessed July 7, 2006).
48 AP, “Malaysia, U.S. To Discuss Port Security”, USA Today, June 6, 2004 http://
www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/press-coverage/press-coverage-2004,/
usa-today---discuss-port-security (accessed June 2, 2006).
Myth and Reality 93
After 9/11, piracy was high on the agenda of many international government-
level forums and meetings, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN
meetings and Asian Security Summits.
In May 2002, the Asian Security Summit or “Shangri-La Dialogue”, organized by
the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, was held in the Shangri-
la Hotel in Singapore. Participants included defense ministers and security officials
from India, Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, South
Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, together with US Deputy Defense Secretary
Paul Wolfowitz, British Defense Minister Geoff Hoon and the Director-General of
China’s Foreign Affairs Bureau, Major-General Zhan Maohai.
Since the inaugural meeting in 2002, the Shangri-la Dialogue has become a key
event in Asian defense diplomacy.49 At the third Shangri-la dialogue in June 2004,
the United States expressed its intention not only to retain its “forward presence” in
the Asia-Pacific region, but also to seek to update its military-strategic doctrines.
China Under the challenge of the United States, China changed its low profile
policy, and began to take an active role in maritime security in the South China
Sea. In 2002, China and ASEAN reached consensus on the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which not only reaffirmed both sides’
commitment to maintain peace and stability in the region, but also their willingness
to enhance cooperation on maritime environment protection, maritime transport
and navigational safety, and fight against transnational crimes at sea.
In accordance with the Joint Declaration of China and ASEAN on Cooperation
in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues, released at the 2002 China-ASEAN
Summit, China and ASEAN signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
on Cooperation on Non-traditional Security Issues in 2004. The objective of the
MOU is:
To develop practical strategies in accordance with their national laws

and regulations to enhance the capacity of each individual country and
the region as a whole in dealing with such non-traditional security issues
as trafficking in illegal drugs, people smuggling, including trafficking
in women and children, sea piracy, terrorism, arms smuggling, money
laundering, international economic crime and cyber crime.50
49 IISS, The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, International Institute for Strategic Studies,
2006 (cited June 3, 2006); available from http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-
dialogue (accessed).
50 ASEAN Secretariat, “Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments
of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-
Traditional Security Issues,” 2004 http://www.aseansec.org/15647.htm (accessed November
4, 2004).
In 2003, China ratified the UN Treaty against Organized Crimes. In 2004,

the China-ASEAN Prosecutors-General Conference was held in China, and both
sides agreed to work together in the fight against crimes, including transnational
maritime crimes.51
IMO Responses after 9/11 In the wake of 9/11, in November 2001, the IMO
Assembly called for a review of the existing international legal and technical
measures to prevent and suppress terrorist acts against ships at sea and in port.52
After the IMO Assembly, a Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security was
held at the London headquarters of the IMO on December 9–13, 2002, which
was attended by 109 governments contracted to the 1974 International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention).53 The Conference adopted a
number of amendments to SOLAS and implemented the new International Ship
and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).54
In 2002, the IMO adopted several regulations of the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS). A new amendment of the Regulation
5, requires that every ship must be issued with a Continuous Synopsis Record
(CSR), which is “intended to provide an on-board record of the history of the ship
with respect to the information recorded therein … The CSR shall be issued by the
Administrations of flag states.”55 These requirements facilitate law enforcement
agencies and port authorities to identify stolen ships, and also prevent pirates from
getting a complete set of shipping documents without any form of evidence.
In addition, the IMO adopted a modification to SOLAS Regulation XI/3
regarding the Ship Identification Number Scheme (SINS), introduced in 1987. The
new regulation required a “ship’s identification number (SIN) to be permanently
marked in a visible place either on the ship’s hull or superstructure. Passenger
ships should carry the marking on a horizontal surface visible from the air. Ships
should also be marked with their ID numbers internally.”56 This regulation deters
pirates from re-registering a hijacked ship.
Furthermore, the IMO also requires all vessels of more than 500 GT to be
equipped with a Ship Security Alert System (SSAS), which can send an alert from
ship to shore in case of a piracy or terrorist attack on board a vessel.
51 Zhao Jianhua, “Straits Malacca and Challenges Ahead: Perspectives from
Littoral and User States,” in The Straits of Malacca: Building a Comprehensive Security
Environment (Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2004).
52 IMO, “IMO Assembly Resolution A.924 (22),” London: International Maritime
Organization, November 2001.
53 IMO, “Consideration and Adoption of the International Ship and Port Facility
Security (ISPS) Code, Consideration and Adoption of the Resolutions and Recommendations
and Related Matters (Solas/Conf.5/34),” London: International Maritime Bureau, 2002.
54 Ibid.
55 IMO website, http://www.imo.org/Facilitation /mainframe.asp?topic_id=388
56 Ibid.
Myth and Reality 95
Apart from all IMO measures, the IMB-PRC promotes a simple transmitter
called ShipLoc, which can continually transmit a ship’s position. These devices are
installed by ship owners, and even the captain and crew do not know where they
are located. These tracking devices can report a vessel’s position up to 15 times
a day, and costs about US$60 to US$70 a month per vessel, depending on the
number of units fitted.57 Ship owners can also log on to a specific website to locate
their ship. Many ships now have ShipLoc installed on board.
The implementation of these IMO regulations and installment of new tracking
devices on ships has helped ship owners and law enforcement agencies to track
down hijacked ships. These measures strongly deter pirates from hijacking re-
registering ships, and turning them into “phantom ships.” These measures have
brought about the decline of “phantom ships.”
ISPS Code The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS
Code) is “a comprehensive set of measures to enhance the security of ships and
port facilities developed in response to the perceived threats to ships and port
facilities.”58 The aim of the ISPS Code is to “provide a standardised, consistent
framework for evaluating risk, enabling governments to offset changes in threat
with changes in vulnerability for ships and port facilities through determination of
appropriate security levels and corresponding security measures.”59
The ISPS Code contains detailed security-related requirements for governments,
port authorities and shipping companies in a mandatory section (Part A), together
with a series of guidelines about how to meet these requirements in a second,
non-mandatory section (Part B). The ISPS Code applies to ships engaged on
international voyages and port facilities serving these ships.60 All the ships and
port facilities belonging to this category were required to comply with the ISPS
Code before July 1, 2004.
In 2004, Southeast Asia witnessed the implementation of the ISPS Code. The
implementation of the ISPS code not only significantly increased security awareness
in the shipping industry, but also effectively deterred the source that threatens
the security of ships and port facilities. For this reason, amongst others, piratical
attacks in ships, ports, and anchorages declined significantly after 2004.61
Capability Building In 2002, the Malaysian and Philippine navies conducted

a six-day joint military anti-piracy exercise. Furthermore, in 2002, Indonesia,
57 Straits Times “Secret Trackers Helped Vessel Recovery,” The Strait Times,
February 7, 2005.
58 IMO, “What is ISPS Code?” http://www.imo.org/Safty/mainframe.asp?topic_
id=897 (accessed June 3, 2007).
59 Ibid.
60 IMO, ISPS Code, Part A, 3 Application.
61 K. Matthews, “Trade and Shipping: A Common Interest of the Asia-Pacific”,
Australian Maritime Affairs, 10 (2003), p. 54.
Malaysia, and the Philippines signed a trilateral security pact to enhance

cooperation on transnational crime issues. In February 2003, Indonesia and the
Philippines conducted anti-piracy drills with Japan, similar to those held between
Malaysia and the Philippines.62
On July 20, 2004, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia launched new
coordinated patrols, the Trilateral Coordinated Patrols, or Malsindo, in the Straits
of Malacca; these new coordinated patrols involved year-round patrols using ships
from the littoral states.63
On May 27, 2005, the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) and the Indonesian
Navy officially launched Project SURPIC (Surface Picture) in Batam. SURPIC is
a sea surveillance system, which allows the RSN and Indonesian navies to share a
common real-time sea situation picture of the Singapore Strait.64
On September 13, the three littoral states, together with Thailand, began
coordinated air patrols over the Straits of Malacca to “attain maritime domain
awareness over the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.”65 The three states each
donated two planes for the patrols, which were known as the “Eyes in the Sky” (EiS)
patrols. The aerial patrols provided a valuable supplement to Malsindo, carried out
by the navies of the littoral states. 66
ReCAAP Shortly after 9/11, in November 2001, Japanese Prime Minister

Junichiro Koizumi proposed the establishment of a government-level working
group to study the formulation of a regional anti-piracy cooperation agreement
at the ASEAN+3 Summit in Brunei. Negotiations on the agreement continued
for three years. Eventually, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was concluded in
Tokyo on November 11, 2004 among 16 Asian countries, including the People’s
Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the
People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, the Republic of Indonesia,
Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia,
the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore,
62 France-Presse Agence, “Malaysia, Philippines Begin Maritime Exercises,” Jakarta

Post, May 13, 2002.
63 AFP, “Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore Agree to Joint Malacca Strait Patrols,”
Jakarta Post, June 30, 2004.
64 Graham Gerard Ong, “Charting a Unified Course for Safer Seas,” The Straits
Times, June 25, 2005.
65 MINDEF, “Launch of Eyes in the Sky (EiS) Initiative”, MINDEF News. http://
www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2005/sep/13sep05_nr.html (accessed
April 3, 2006).
66 ABC News, Indonesian Navy Plans Fleet Expansion to Boost Maritime Security,
ABC News Online, February 12, 2005, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200502/
s1301509.htm (accessed October 16, 2005).
Myth and Reality 97
the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.67
The ReCAAP agreement came into force on September 4, 2006; however, the
two key littoral states of the Straits of Malacca, Malaysia and Indonesia, are yet
to ratify the agreement. The ReCAAP has three aims, or three pillars: information
sharing, capacity building, and cooperative arrangements. The key pillar of the
ReCAAP was the establishment of the Information Sharing Center (ISC). The
ISC is a government-level international organization that aims to facilitate
communication and information exchanges between member countries, and
improve the quality of statistics and reports on piracy and armed robbery against
ships in the region.68 The ISC, located in Singapore, is run by a Japanese Executive
Director, Yoshiaki Ito, with a number of staff from member countries.
Conclusion
Although piracy and terrorism have some similarities, so far there has been no
evidence to prove piracy and terrorism share a nexus.69 Intriguingly, after 9/11,
the myth of piracy and terrorism nexus has integrated anti-piracy cooperation
in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea into the global anti-terrorism
framework. The myth has also driven the littoral states to shift their paradigms on
anti-piracy policies, thus changing the reality of this region tremendously.
Incentives in and capabilities of anti-piracy cooperation in the littoral countries
have been enhanced. Malaysia and Indonesia enhanced their maritime capabilities
in order to show that they were capable of safeguarding their own waters, and to
prevent foreign navies from intervening in the name of protecting the Straits of
Malacca. From 2002 onwards, the littoral states enhanced bilateral and multilateral
patrols, with such initiatives as Malsindo patrols and the EiS patrol, which were
sufficient to reduce piracy on the open sea.70
Against this backdrop, the first government-level organization amongst 16
Asian countries, the ReCAAP, was concluded in 2004. The Information Sharing
Center of ReCAAP was set up in Singapore. Although Indonesia and Malaysia
67 MFA, Singapore, “The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy

and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (RECAAP),” Singapore: the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, April 28, 2005.
68 Ibid.
69 Mark J. Valencia, “‘Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Similarities,
Differences, and Their Implications”, in Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and
Responses, eds Derek Johnson and Mark Valencia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2005, pp. 77–102.
70 AFP, “Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore Agree to Joint Malacca Strait Patrols,”
Jakarta Post, June 30, 2004.
have yet to ratify the ReCAAP agreement, they are cooperating with the ISC at
the operational level.
In addition, the implementation of the IMO International Ship and Port
Facility Security Code (ISPS code), which provide a standardized and consistent
maritime security framework for ships and port facilities, has significantly reduced
the opportunities for crimes to be committed at ports and anchorages. The ISPS
Code was implemented in port facilities in Southeast Asia in 2004, leading to the
significant decline in piracy incidents.71
As a result of these initiatives, over three years, from 2002 to 2004, pirates lost
their crime scenes at ports, anchorages, and on the open sea. Eventually, piracy
declined significantly in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea after 2004
and this decline continues.
71 IMO, “What is the ISPS Code?”, http://www.imo.org (accessed March 1, 2007).

Chapter 6
Commentary: A Regional Perspective on
South China Sea Passage Security
WU Shicun
Overview of Passage Security in the South China Sea
Passage through the South China Sea plays an important geopolitical and geo-
economic role, as it shapes the security pattern in the region. From a global point
of view, its strategic location makes it a hot spot for divergent interests. As an
increasingly strong force in the area, China has to pay attention to and safeguard
travel in the South China Sea for the sake of its own security and development.
China should cooperate with other countries to ensure safe passage through the
waters for the benefit of all parties.
As an important component in regional security, passage security in the South
China Sea involves both traditional and non-traditional factors. China, as an
emerging force in the region, emphasizes security and development and is keenly
aware of the challenges ahead.
Traditional Security Factors
Southeast Asian countries are situated in geographically strategic positions. Due

to political instability and terrorist threats in recent years, some ASEAN members
face grim situations in terms of internal and external security. To respond to such
challenges, ASEAN members are motivated to strengthen their military power.
This highlights the leading role of traditional security strategies in spite of the fact
that the Cold War has ended and ASEAN countries are no longer a strategic hot
spot between Communist and Western camps.
Due to the relatively weak position of ASEAN members in terms of their
overall political, economic, and military power, as well as the vested strategic
interests of external forces in the region, it is only natural for ASEAN members
to develop multilateral check-and-balance mechanisms by cooperating with other
countries. Consequently, the United States has staged a high-profile comeback into
Wu Shicun, “Security in South China Sea”, Cross-Strait Conference on South China

Sea, Taipei, November 2007.
See “Landmark Pact on Spratly up for Signing”, The Manila Times, November 4,
2002.
the region by signing agreements with several ASEAN members on combating

terrorism and conducting joint military exercises. The U.S.-led regional anti-
terrorism center in Malaysia is already in operation and the United States Navy
and Air Force bases in the area are functioning well. In addition, the U.S. has taken
concrete steps towards renting Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay.
As the most important provider of investment and development aid to Southeast
Asia, Japan attributes 16 percent of its total foreign trade to the region. It is also
the largest trading partner for some Southeast Asian countries. In addition, 10
percent of the crude oil and 80 percent of the natural gas consumed in Japan are
supplied by ASEAN members and 53 percent of Japan’s imports are transported
through the South China Sea. Out of its own interests and in response to requests
for intervention from ASEAN members, Japan has remained highly alert regarding
the security situation in the South China Sea. Through the adoption of the Special
Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, the
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Military Emergency Law, Japan
has legalized the deployment of its troops overseas. This is a clear indication of
Japanese motives towards becoming a strong military power.
India has also begun to intervene in the important water channel. After
its nuclear testing, India reformulated its national security strategy to claim
strategic interests stretching from the Arab Sea to the South China Sea. In spite of
significantly improved bilateral relations and reduced tension on land, the rivalry
between China and India at sea has intensified. India’s marine operations have
revealed the country’s ambition of becoming a new force in shaping the security
situation, which will inevitably have a bearing on the activities of coastal states
in the South China Sea, adding a new level of complexity in regards to regional
security. With the further development of its navy, India will be able to play a more
influential role in the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea.
Yao Jianguo, “US military comeback to Southeast Asia in the name of combating
terrorism”, Contemporary World 8 (2002) (in Chinese).
Yu Hongyuan, “Geo-political Considerations of the US in Combating Terrorism in
Southeast Asia”, Contemporary Asia-Pacific, 7 (2007) (in Chinese).
Zhang Yuan, “Complex Situation in South China Sea from Reinforced US, Japanese
and Indian Military Presence”, Eastern Outlook Weekly 1 (2004) (in Chinese).
The National Diet of Japan passed the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law (with a
valid duration of two years) in October 2001 in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack, which
provides the legal basis for sending troops overseas. The Law extends the scope of activities
by Japan’s Self-Defense Force to all international high seas and foreign territories upon the
consent of the country concerned.
Jia Yu and Zhang Haiwen. “Maritime situation around China”, China Ocean News,
April 20, 2005 (in Chinese).
Commentary: A Regional Perspective on South China Sea Passage Security 101
Non-traditional Security Factors
According to International Maritime Bureau reports over recent years, the area
around Somalia is the most dangerous and sea territories around Indonesia,
Bangladesh, and India are vulnerable to pirate attacks. It is emphasized in those
reports that attacking oil tankers and merchandise ships with dynamite-loaded
boats represents a new trend in marine terrorism and piracy by illegal armed forces
which are very difficult to control once initiated. The International Maritime
Bureau calls for heightened security efforts by national governments to reduce
such assaults. This emphasizes the serious threat posed by pirate attacks, which
becomes even more complex when mixed with terrorism.
Since the 1990s, especially after the Asian financial crisis, piracy has become
quite rampant through the waterway. The water territories in Southeast Asia,
particularly in the Malacca Straits, have become the most pirate-infested waters in
the world. However, due to measures taken by national governments in the region,
pirate attacks have decreased. According to the annual report of the International
Maritime Bureau, altogether there were 239 reported pirate attacks in 2006. This
number includes 88 attacks in the South China Sea, 50 attacks in the Indonesian
water territories (down from 79 in 2005), 11 attacks in the Malacca Straits, and
10 in Malaysian water territories. Other illegal activities at sea include armed
smuggling, drug trafficking, and cross-border crimes.
The safety of transportation and the proliferation of insensitive and sensitive
materials constitute other important issues of concern because sea routes are
also used to transport materials for weapons manufacturing. This may involve
the movement of nuclear materials and/or hazardous chemical materials for
the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. In transit, these materials
are vulnerable to safety problems and are at risk of robbery or attack by pirates
and terrorists. With the development of the global economy, the sea route plays
an increasingly important role as a chief channel for the transportation and
proliferation of classified and sensitive materials. The negative effects generated
have undermined the benefits of marine transportation, posing a serious challenge
to regional security and even world peace. For instance, as nuclear energy is used
on the mainland China, Taiwan, Japan, and North Korea, the transportation of
raw nuclear material and waste by sea is causing an increasingly serious threat to
water lanes. As such, with the advent of terrorism on a global scale and a building
consensus regarding the prevention of nuclear proliferation, waterways will
undoubtedly become an important arena for checking nuclear proliferation.10
Source: Yearly Report of International Maritime Bureau 2006.

Ma Yingjie and Jiang Lili, “Anti-proliferation Safety Proposal and the Right of Visit
at Sea”, Ocean Information (in Chinese), Issue 3, 2005 (in Chinese).
10 Li Xiaojun, “Legitimacy and Risks of US Security Initiative against Nuclear
Proliferation”, Academic Exploration, 1 (2007).
Under the excuse of limited domestic resources, Japan has long been
processing nuclear waste in order to make full use of nuclear sources of energy.
To extract plutonium from nuclear waste, Japan has signed contracts with state-
owned nuclear waste treatment plants in France and the UK. For the past three
decades or so, several hundred tons of nuclear wastes have been shipped from
Japan to Europe for post-treatment; the extracted plutonium and leftover solid
residue have been returned to Japan via the sea.11 Although Japan has already
moved all of its nuclear waste to the UK for post-treatment, over 3,000 tanks of
highly radioactive solid residue are still waiting to be shipped from the UK and
France back to Japan,12 requiring 15–30 shipments over the next 15 years.13 As
shipments through the South China Sea are increasingly threatened by pirate and
terrorist attacks, the safety hazards of nuclear waste transportation are evident. If
leaked, long-lasting and extensive radiation will result; disastrous for humans, not
to mention other biological organisms. For this reason, countries along these sea
routes have protested strongly against the transportation of such materials.
Each day, a total of 10.3 million barrels of crude oil are transported through the
Malacca Straits. 87 percent of the oil going to Japan and Korea and over 89 percent
of the oil being delivered to Taiwan travel through the important waterway. Given
the sheer amount of oil being transported, it is not surprising that oil spills occur
from time to time. Due to the lack of effective cooperative mechanisms among the
different countries concerned, such accidents are often not dealt with in a timely
and efficient manner, thus seriously jeopardizing passage security and the marine
ecosystem.
These non-traditional security problems directly endanger passage security in
the South China Sea and pose serious threats to China’s security and development
as well as the economic and social development in Southeast Asia as a whole.
Difficulties in Security Cooperation in the South China Sea
The Asia-Pacific region is enjoying the momentum of developmental growth with

China functioning as a locomotive driving Asia’s economy. Given the strategic
importance of passage security in the South China Sea and the mounting risks of
assault on key sea lanes, countries in the region have stepped up their efforts in
bilateral and multilateral cooperation in order to prevent terrorist attacks and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the complex situation gives rise to
both opportunities and challenges in regional security cooperation, breakthroughs
11 http://www.nci.org under “Pu Sea Shipments”, December 23, 2002 (accessed
November 16, 2007).
12 Ibid.
13 Paul Leventhal and Steven Dolley, Understanding Japan’s Nuclear Transports:
The Plutonium Context, available at http://www.nci.org under “Pu Sea Shipments”,
December 23, 2002 (accessed November 16, 2007).
should be achieved in passage security collaboration by leveraging on various

positive factors.
The “China Threat” Argument
The rising political, economic, and military power of China has indeed increased
geopolitical pressure on other entities in the region. Consequently, the “China
Threat” theory was once widely popular in Southeast Asia. This shows that the
Cold War mentality is still deeply entrenched, which has led some countries to
view China as an ambitious rival for dominance over the South China Sea.
Nevertheless, as an emerging power with a strong sense of responsibility,
China represents a constructive force for regional security. Chinese leaders have
explicitly expressed on multiple occasions that China has no intention to fill the
so-called “strategic vacuum.” With the support of the country’s booming economic
development and overall social stability, China has adopted diplomatic initiatives
to promote a new security outlook in order to improve the general security situation
in the South China Sea region.14 Chinese leaders have visited ASEAN members,
signed political protocols, and maintained a political stance to conduct dialogues
and cooperation with all parties concerned. China has also sought to establish
confidence-building mechanisms through the ASEAN Regional Forum. Guided
by the good neighbor and friendship policy put forth by President Hu Jintao, China
follows a pragmatic foreign policy to facilitate higher levels of economic, security,
and political cooperation in Asia.15
Therefore, China represents opportunities, rather than threats, to Southeast
Asia. Countries concerned should work jointly with China to effectively strengthen
security in the region.
Clash of Interests
The co-existence of traditional and non-traditional security factors and entangled

strategic interests have resulted in a lack of trust and conflicting political and
economic interests among different countries in the region. The Spratly Islands
are a highly contested group of lands that have garnered dispute and aggression
among seven parties who claim sovereignty over the area. Due to a lack of strong
organization for regional security, as well as an absence of commonly accepted
guidelines for dispute settlement and/or cooperative memoranda for avoiding
marine accidents, the occurrence of conflicts is not surprising. The fight for
influence or even permanent dominance over the sea lanes in and out of the region
14 Li Dongyan, “China’s new security outlook”, Journal of Chinese Academy of

Social Sciences, February (2007) (in Chinese).
15 Zhu Yunlong and Miao Suoqun, “Fruitful Results of China’s Good Neighbor and
Friendship Policy”, Xinhua Net, April 19, 2005.
has resulted in heavier military spending and reinforced naval power.16 Such
conflicting interests have rendered passage security in the South China Sea subject
to the influence of a host of interwoven variables. It seems that in the foreseeable
future, this clash of interests will not fundamentally change.
Freedom of Navigation and Innocent Passage
Since the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted in 1982, freedom of
navigation and innocent passage have become important issues related to passage
security. However, the United States, as the world’s sole superpower, has not
yet ratified the Convention. Consequently, the United States, and several other
countries, still use the traditional three nautical mile mark as the extent of a state’s
jurisdiction and believe that military or commercial vessels have the right to pass
through foreign territorial waters without prior notification. This will result in
possible clashes, thus directly undermining the principle of establishing a new
marine order based on the Convention.17
China and Regional Cooperation
With the development of regional integration and the global economy, particularly
the development of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area, passage security in the
South China Sea has taken on new significance for China, as it plays an extremely
important role in China’s “going global” strategy. To ASEAN members and extra-
regional forces, ensuring passage security is a strategic and pragmatic choice. Since
the 1990s, particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attack, the security situation in the
region has substantially changed. Based on the consensus of jointly contributing
to regional security and development, China shares the responsibility with other
countries in the region for safeguarding passage security in the South China Sea.
Political and Economic Basis for Regional Cooperation
China and ASEAN have enjoyed strengthened ties, growing mutual trust, and
continued cooperation. In November 2002, China and ASEAN signed the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the Joint
Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional
Security Issues. In October 2003, China acceded to the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia. These diplomatic moves provide the basis for joint
16 Cao Yunhua, “Changing Sino-US relationship: Southeast Asia in Dilemma”,

Lianhe Zaobao, October 5, 2001 (in Chinese).
17 Gao Zhiguo, “Reasons and Results of US Refusal to Ratify the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea”, China Ocean News, 1012 (in Chinese).
efforts between China and ASEAN in cracking down on illegal activities at sea.18
Moreover, with heightened awareness of security, ASEAN members have begun
cooperating amongst themselves to combat terrorism.
The Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s swept through ASEAN member
countries and plunged most of them into economic recession. In such a situation,
China’s refusal to devaluate its currency showed its sense of responsibility and
served as a crucial factor in helping ASEAN members restore their economies.19
In addition, the development of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area represents
both a historic opportunity and a huge challenge. The economic and industrial
restructuring, that would inevitably ensue, calls for sound political ties and
economic cooperation between ASEAN and China. Therefore, ASEAN members
have not only improved its investment climate by combating terrorism, but also
developed a favorable international environment by readjusting its political
relations with relevant countries. As a regional organization, ASEAN must make
efforts to both understand and be understood by other countries, thereby inviting
cooperation. Although ASEAN and China are competing for foreign investment
in several industries, a stable international environment and a potential market are
beneficial to both sides.20 The above analysis shows the political and economic
basis for bilateral cooperation. Based on mutual trust, security cooperation in the
South China Sea would mark a step forward in the development of China–ASEAN
ties.
Legal Basis
Regional cooperation in the South China Sea must be based on the UN Charter, the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and other related UN legal documents on
combating piracy and terrorism. These international laws not only spell out rights
and obligations for parties concerned, but also support marine rules and procedures
to ensure security maintenance. Although military forces are mainly responsible
for cracking down on piracy and terrorism, their activities are drastically different
from those in war times, for their purpose is to ensure marine passage security by
controlling potentially threatening factors.
The political documents signed between China and ASEAN reflect respect
for the law and a spirit of cooperation. For instance, in the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, the parties concerned reiterate the
basic principles of handling relations between different countries based on the UN
18 Wu Shicun and Ren Huaifeng, “More than a Declaration: A Commentary on the
Background and the Significance of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the
South China Sea”, Chinese Journal of International Law, 2003.
19 Chen Daofu, “China’s Financial Reform from the Perspective of Southeast Asian
Financial Crisis”, China Development Watch, September (2007) (in Chinese).
20 Wang Lanfen and Lin Lin, “Analysis of Competition and Cooperation between
China and ASEAN”, Contemporary Finance and Economics, 12 (2004) (in Chinese).
Charter, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
and other universally recognized norms of international law.21 Moreover, in the
Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues,
China and ASEAN “confirm that cooperation should be conducted on the basis
of observing the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and other universally
recognized norms of international law, which are embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and
respect the legal systems of all countries.” These political documents outlining
regional cooperation are legally binding, based on which follow-up activities
can be carried out to consolidate a peaceful and secure regional environment and
promote mutual trust and economic development.
Conclusion
Concerning the cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues, China and
ASEAN have made concrete achievements. This can be seen in the two regions’
cooperative efforts, which include the ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations
in Response to Dangerous Drugs in 2000 and in 2001, the ministerial meeting
on controlling drug abuse held between China, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand, at
which the Beijing Declaration was adopted. With the Statement of the ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) in 1997, the 2001 ASEAN
Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism adopted by ASEAN leaders,
the Joint Communiqué of the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism
in 2002, and the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of
Communication Procedures between Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippines, cooperation in various forms through bilateral mechanisms has been
greatly enhanced.22 It can be concluded that mutual support between China and
ASEAN in the field of non-traditional security issues is making headway, paving a
tangible path for the establishment of regional security mechanisms in the future.
21 See the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
22 Ding Yanping and Zhang Jing, “Cooperation between China and ASEAN Members
in Non-traditional Security Areas from a New Perspective”, Journal of Yinchuan Party
School, 6 (2006) (in Chinese).
Part III
Regional Cooperation Combating
Maritime Terrorism and Piracy
Chapter 7
Regional Maritime Security Initiative
(RMSI) and Enhancing Security in the
Straits of Malacca: Littoral States’ and
Regional Responses
Yann-huei SONG
Introduction
The Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), proposed in 2004 by

Admiral Thomas Fargo, former Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, is one
of the American maritime security programs and initiatives to promote regional
cooperation to improve maritime security in the East Asia and Pacific region,
especially in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The main goal of RMSI is to
develop a partnership of willing nations, working together, under international and
domestic law, to identify, monitor, and intercept transnational maritime threats, in
particular, piracy, armed robbery, and terrorist attacks at sea.
Other maritime security programs and initiatives include Advance Electronic Cargo
Information (24-House Rule), Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Magaports Initiative,
Transshipment Country Export Control Initiative (TECI), Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI), Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and the International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) Code, International Port Security Program, Customs—Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), U.S. Coast Guard International Training Programs,
Smart Box Initiative, 96-House Advance Notice of Arrival, Advance Passenger Information
System Rule (APIS), the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, the Global
Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan, the Maritime Operation Threat Response Plan, the
International Outreach and Coordination Strategy, the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery
Plan, Maritime Transportation System Security Recommendations, the Maritime Commerce
Security Plan, and the Domestic Outreach Plan. See United States Department of State,
International Outreach and Coordination Strategy for the National Strategy for Maritime
Security, November 2005, available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/57280.htm
(accessed 1 June 2006).
For main threats to U.S. maritime security, see The White House, The National
Strategy for Maritime Security, September 2005, Section II, pp. 3–6, available at: http://
www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/ maritime-security.html (accessed 1 June 2006).
The Straits of Malacca, 600 miles long and only 1.5 miles wide at its narrowest
point, is a narrow stretch of water between peninsular Malaysia and the Indonesian
island of Sumatra. From an economic and strategic perspective it is one of the most
important shipping lanes in the world, the equivalent of the Suez Canal or Panama
Canal. The Straits of Malacca form the seaway connecting the Indian Ocean with
the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, linking three of the world’s most
populous nations: India, Indonesia, and China. Annually, approximately 50,000
large vessels, and daily an average 45 oil tankers pass through these Straits.
Between one-fifth and one-quarter of the world’s sea trade, half of global oil
shipments carried by sea, and over 80 percent of the oil and gas imports of China,
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea come through the Straits of Malacca.
In recent years, the Straits of Malacca has become a target for piracy and
armed robbery against vessels because of high volume of transiting traffic, its
geographical nature, significant political and economic instability in the area, and
the lack of resources and weak maritime law enforcement capacity of the strait
littoral states. Since the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States,
increasing attention has been given to the threat of maritime terrorism, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the security of the maritime transport
sector in general. As a result of this changed strategic environment in the Straits
of Malacca area there has also been a growing concern among the littoral states
over the need to establish a burden-sharing arrangement, based on Article 43 of
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); this
is intended to help cover the gradually increasing cost of providing essential
maritime infrastructure in the Straits of Malacca, and over the years, to keep the
waters clear of pollution, safe for navigation, and free from threat of pirate and
terrorist attacks.
The user states, especially China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, which are
dependent on the Straits for the smooth and efficient transit of cargo, in particular,
energy supplies, also raised their concerns about the safety and security of their
vessels passing through the Straits and accordingly demanded more security
measures taken by the states that border the Straits of Malacca. Other user states
that are the major maritime powers, such as the United States, also raised their
maritime security concerns regarding the potential threat of transnational crimes,
maritime terrorism, and armed attacks against their naval and commercial vessels
traversing through the Straits. As a result, user states possessing maritime powers
C.S. Kuppuswamy, “Straits of Malacca: Security Implications,” Paper no. 1033,

South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG), June 18, 2004.
The Convention opened for signature on December 10, 1982, and entered into
force on November 16, 1994. For the text see UN Doc. A/Conf.62/122, October 7, 1982,
reprinted in International Legal Materials 21(November 1982): 1261–354. As of April 28,
2006, it had 149 contracting parties.
Thomas Orszag-Land, “UN Launches Global Initiative to Defend Malacca Straits,”
Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor, January 19, 2005.
RMSI and Enhancing Security in the Straits of Malacca 111
began to explore the possible means of becoming involved more directly in the
management of security matters in the Straits of Malacca. These efforts, however,
were regarded by the littoral states as an attempt to “internationalize” the safety
and security of the Straits of Malacca. In response, the littoral states reiterated their
positions that enhancing safety and security, and managing environmental issues
in the Straits are primarily their responsibility.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the development of the U.S.-
proposed RMSI and its relations with, and influence on the national and regional
efforts undertaken to help enhance security in the Malacca Straits by focusing, in
particular, on the littoral States’ responses to the American security initiative.
Littoral States’ Perception of the RMSI
The three littoral states’ perception of and initial reactions to the U.S.-proposed
RMSI are examined below.
Indonesia
Shortly after the media’s disclosure of the U.S. plan to deploy troops in the Straits
of Malacca, Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on the
official position of the country in its opposition to the plan, arguing that Indonesia
and Malaysia, in accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS, were solely responsible for
guarding the Straits of Malacca. Nugroho Wisnumurti, former Director General
for Political Affairs of Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pointed out that
“[f]ighting terrorism through regional cooperation in Southeast Asia, or any part
of the globe for that matter, is something to be applauded. However, fighting
terrorism in the Malacca and Singapore Straits by allowing the use of military force
by any country other than the coastal states (Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore) is
another matter.” Indonesian Navy Chief Adm. Bernard Kent Sondakh joined the
opposition, calling the idea of sending special operations troops to the Straits of
Malacca under the RMSI “baseless.” During the Second Indonesia-United States
Security Dialogue, held in Washington, D.C., April 22–23, 2004, the Indonesian
delegation sought clarification regarding the U.S. policy towards the Straits of
Malacca. In response, the U.S. delegation clarified the concept of RMSI and gave
assurances that the United States would respect Indonesia’s sovereignty over its
Tiarma Siboro, “RI Opposes U.S. Deployment in Malacca Straits,” Jakarta Post,
April 7, 2004.
Nughoho Wisnumurti, “Upholding Security in the Malacca Straits,” The Jakarta
Post, April 12, 2004.
“U.S. Initiative in Malacca Strait ‘Baseless’: RI Navy,” The Jakarta Post, April 12,
2004.
waters. The U.S. delegation further agreed to continue to consult with Indonesia
and other regional countries.
In June 2004, when attending the 3rd Asian Security Conference (known
as the “Shangri-La Dialogue) in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H.
Rumsfeld told a group of Asian reporters that the RMSI was an idea in its early
stage and it would not threaten sovereignty. The Secretary clarified that “[a]ny
implications that it would impinge in any way on the sovereign territorial waters
of some countries would be inaccurate.”10 Navy Adm. Walter F. Doran, the Pacific
Fleet commander, who accompanied Secretary Rumsfeld at the Conference, also
told the reporters that Admiral Fargo’s testimony did not imply that establishing
new U.S. bases and units or stationing elite forces in the region were part of the
RMSI. Admiral Doran pointed out that the main idea of the initiative was to build
on normal navy-to-navy contacts and discussions to raise maritime situational
awareness in the Asia-Pacific region.11
Despite the clarification made by the high-ranking officials of the U.S.
Government, including Admiral Fargo and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld,
Indonesia’s concerns over the possible intervention by foreign maritime powers,
in particular, the United States, in the management of the Straits of Malacca
remained. As reported, Indonesia was displeased with joint naval patrols conducted
by the navies of India and the United States for several months in 2003.12 The
reason behind was Indonesia’s worries about the U.S. involvement in a broader
strategy that favored a permanent Indian presence in Southeast Asia with the
endorsement from Singapore.13 According to another analysis, while the U.S.
Government kept clarifying that RMSI was still in its early stage and the initiative
was mainly concerned with sharing information rather than deploying U.S. troops
in the Straits of Malacca, Indonesia continued to raise its objection to the U.S.
proposal, mainly because of its long-standing policy of seeking regional solutions
to regional security problems, and its government’s need to appease a large,
anti-American nationalist and Islamist domestic political audience. In addition,
Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., Press Release, Joint

Statement, Indonesia–U.S. Security Dialogue, April 23, 2004.
10 John D. Banusiewicz, “Officials Clarify Maritime Initiative Amid Controversy,”
American Forces Information Service (afis) News Article, US Department of Defense, June
4, 2004, available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/n06042004_200406048.
html (accessed 1 June 2006)
11 Ibid.
12 See Vivian L. Forbes and Encik Mokhzani Zubir, “Ensuring Security in the
Malacca Strait: Solutions Offered and Suggested Implementation,” paper presented at
LIMA International Maritime Conference on “Enhancing Security in the Straits of Malacca:
Amalgamation of Solutions to Keep the Straits Open to All,” Awana Porto Malai, Langkawi,
Malaysia, December 4–5, 2005, p. 4.
13 Ibid.
Indonesia perceived that the U.S. proposal represented a challenge to regional

self-management of security issues.14
Malaysia
The government of Malaysia, taking the same position as Indonesia’s, objected

strongly to the U.S. idea of sending troops to help patrol in the Straits of Malacca
under the proposed RMSI. Yab Dato Seri Najib Tun Razak, Malaysia’s deputy
prime minister and defense minister, stated in early April 2004 that “[i]n principle,
ensuring the security of the Straits of Malacca is the responsibility of Malaysia
and Indonesia and for the present we do not propose to invite the United States
to join the security operations we have mounted there.”15 The minister continued
to say that “[e]ven if they [the Americans] wished to act, they should get our
permission, as this touches on the question of our national sovereignty.”16 Najib
Razak denied that Malaysia and Indonesia needed help from non-littoral states
to police the Malacca Straits which, despite periodic raids by pirates on smaller
cargo vessels, were generally safe for shipping. Moreover, he pointed out that
while Malaysia maintained good relations with the United States, including joint
military training, and that the U.S. vessels, including warships, were free to use
the Straits, but to launch military operations the United States should first obtain
permission from the governments of Malaysia and Indonesia.17 Mohamed Nazri
Abdul Aziz, a minister in Malaysia’s Prime Minister’s Department, warned that
if the littoral states did not safeguard properly security in the Straits of Malacca,
foreign powers might intervene in managing the security matters in the Straits,
which would pose a threat to Malaysia’s sovereignty.18
In June 2004, while continuing to reject the U.S. idea of sending troops to the
Straits of Malacca, Malaysia agreed to discuss the issue of protecting the Straits
from piracy and potential terrorist attacks with the United States.19 In the same
month at the 3rd Shangri-La Dialogue, Malaysia again stressed its opposition to
U.S. military presence in defending the Straits of Malacca and Southeast Asia
from terrorist attacks but also agreed to the principles of sharing intelligence and
14 “Piracy and Maritime Terror in Southeast Asia: Dire Straits,” IISS Strategic
Comments, 10: 6, July 2004.
15 Mark Baker, “Malaysia Rebuffs US Sea Force Plan,” The Age, Global Policy
Forum, April 6, 2004, available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/intervention/2004/
0406usmalacca.htm (accessed); “Malaysia Rejects US Help to Guard Malacca Straits
against Terrorists,” AFX-Asia, April 4, 2004; V. Ramanan, “US cannot Deploy Forces in
Straits,” New Straits Times (Malaysia), April 5, 2004.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Donald Urquhart, “Asian Coast Guard Meeting to Focus on Terrorism Threat;
Malaysia Announces Creation of Coast Guard,” The Business Times, June 17, 2004.
19 “Malaysia Rejects U.S. Troops for Malacca Straits, but Agrees to Discuss Safety
of the Crucial Waterways with Washington,” Associated Press, June 6, 2004.
blocking terrorists’ financial and logistical networks. Najib Tun Razak reminded
the participating defense ministers of Malaysia’s concerns over the negative
impact of foreign military presence on security and political stability in the region,
because it would “set us back in our ideological battle against extremism and
militancy.”20
The government of Malaysia was aware of Singapore’s strong support for
the U.S.-proposed RMSI and therefore accused Singapore of calling on foreign
powers to intervene in the security matters in the Straits of Malacca. Malaysia
also disagreed with Singapore’s security assessment with regard to the link
between pirate attacks and maritime terrorism. Malaysia did not believe that
the problem of piracy in the Straits of Malacca was critical; what occurred were
only minor robberies, as pointed out by Rahim Husin, Malaysia’s Director of the
Maritime Security Policy Directorate. In addition, Malaysia claimed that its law
enforcement agencies were more than capable to ensure security in the Straits
without intervention from anyone.21
Singapore
Since the September 11 attacks, Singapore has been working closely with the
United States to deal with the potential threats posed by terrorism and WMD
proliferation. Similar to the actions taken by Japan, Singapore participates actively
in the U.S.-led security initiative, such as the CSI and PSI. In August 2005,
Singapore hosted the multinational PSI interdiction training exercise, Deep Sabre,
in the South China Sea. Singapore also signed a new framework agreement with the
United States for a strategic cooperation partnership in defense and security. The
agreement expands the scope of bilateral cooperation between the two countries
in such areas as anti-terrorism, anti-proliferation of WMD, joint military exercises
and training, policy dialogues, and defense technology.22 Bearing in mind the close
security relations between Singapore and the United States, it is no surprise to see
Singapore giving its strong support for the U.S.-proposed RMSI. As stated earlier,
shortly before the announcement of the RMSI, Admiral Fargo had talks with the
government of Singapore and obtained its support for the initiative.23
20 See Shangri-La Dialogue 2004—A Special Press Summary, Executive Summary,
June 10, 2004, available at: http://www.vic-info.org (accessed 1 June 2006).
21 Shahrullizan Rusli and Noor Soraya Mohd Jamal, “American Intervention on
Piracy in Straits of Malaka Not Needed,” Bernama The Malaysian National News Agency,
April 28, 2004.
22 For the Strategic Framework Agreement Between the United States and the
Republic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, signed
on July 12, 2005; visit: http://www.us-asean.org/DefSec/SFA.doc (accessed).
23 “Singapore confirms Talks with US over Troops in Malacca Straits,” AFX.COM,
April 5, 2004.
In the area of managing security in the Straits of Malacca, Singapore complained

frequently about the lack of political will and weak law enforcement capacities of
the other states that border the Malacca Straits to take effective actions to counter
the threat posed by transnational crimes, such as piracy and armed robberies a
sea. To enhance the safety and security in the Straits, Singapore has been calling
regional states and interested extra-regional powers to put pressure on the littoral
states, in particular Indonesia. Singapore’s perception of maritime security threat
has been greatly reinforced by the attacks on U.S.S. Cole in 2000, MV Limburg in
2002, and Dewi Madrim in 2003. It has become Singapore’s big worry that pirate
attacks might be linked to terrorist organizations and launch terrorist attacks in the
Malacca Straits area.
Singapore’s reactions to the U.S.-proposed RMSI were first reflected in the
statement made by its Defense Minister Teo Chee Hean in April 2004, saying
that “the task of safeguarding the regional waters against maritime terrorism was
complex and no single State had the resources to deal effectively with this threat.”24
In response to this statement, Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Syed
Hamid pointed out that if Singapore had concerns about security in the Straits of
Malacca, it should discuss first with the littoral states of Malaysia and Indonesia.25
In May 2004, Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for Security and
Defense, Dr. Tony Tan Keng Yam, further elaborated Singapore’s concerns over
the threat of maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia and the lack of security in the
Straits of Malacca. Tony Tan stated that “[t]he possible nexus between piracy and
maritime terrorism is probably the greatest concern to maritime security.”26 To
counter the threat posed by piracy and maritime terrorism, Singapore advocates
a comprehensive approach that covers three overlapping domains, namely
domestic, regional and international. Domestically, each country can tighten up
its port security by putting in place additional or enhanced measures. Regionally,
the responsibility of the littoral states for maritime security in the region must be
recognized. At the same time, the littoral states should take unified and concerted
action to enhance the security of strategic waterways. Internationally, key players
such as the UN, International Maritime Organization (IMO) and other countries
that have a stake in the safety and security of international waterways must be
involved to protect the important sea lines of communications against pirate
attacks and maritime terrorism.27
24 P. Vijian, “M’sia Continues to Bolster Maritime Security,” Financial Times, April
27, 2004.
25 Ibid.
26 See the speech made by Singapore Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating
Minister for Security and Defense, Dr. Tony Tan Keng Yam, at the 2004 IDSS Maritime
Security Conference held in Singapore. The full text of the speech can be found in Defense
& Foreign Affairs Daily, May 21, 2004.
27 Ibid.
At the 3rd Shangri-La Dialogue held in June 2004, Tony Tan reiterated
Singapore’s concern over the potential maritime attacks, pointing out that a ship
sunk in the right spot in the Straits of Malacca would cripple world trade. He also
raised the possibility of hijacked ships being turned into “floating bombs” and
crashed into critical infrastructure such as oil refineries or ports.28 It was later
reported that Singapore proposed the idea of U.S Marines helping to patrol the
Straits of Malacca, which further reinforced the belief of Malaysia and Indonesia
that Singapore was using the terrorist threat as a tool to justify the U.S presence
in the region.29
Littoral States’ Responses to the RMSI: From June 2004 to June 2006
In response to the U.S.-proposed anti-terrorism patrols in the Straits of Malacca

under the RMSI, and perceiving a foreign intervention in the management
of security matters in the Straits and military presence in the region a threat to
their sovereignty, Malaysia and Indonesia began to take domestic measures and
cooperate with Singapore to enhance security in the Straits. In addition, they also
started to seek U.S. and other user states’ involvement in their efforts to enhance
security in the Malacca Straits, mainly by providing training, logistic supports,
patrolling vessels, or technological and financial aids. International organizations,
such as the IMO of the United Nations, and regional cooperative mechanisms
such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) were also called upon to provide help. The littoral states’
political willingness to take more effective action to improve security in the Straits
was further motivated by a decision made by the Joint War Committee (JWC) of
Lloyd’s Market Association in June 2005, which declared the Straits of Malacca
a “high-risk zone” and added it to its list of areas which are at risk to war, strikes,
terrorism and related perils.30 The littoral states were concerned very much over
the JWC decision, mainly because it could result in higher insurance premiums
for the ships that transit the Straits or call at littoral states’ ports, which thus would
hurt their economy. While repeatedly claiming that the JWC decision was not
justified, the littoral states also realized that unless they took more effective actions
to improve safety and security in the Straits of Malacca, the Straits would not be
removed from the JWC “high-risk zone” list. In the next section, the national
28 “Going for the Jugular; Shipping in South-East Asia,” The Economist (U.S.
edition), June 12, 2004.
29 C.S. Kuppuswamy, “Straits of Malacca: Security Implications,” South Asia
Analysis Group, Paper No. 1033, June 18, 2004.
30 Marcus Hand and James Brewer, “Malacca Strait Declared a High Risk Zone by
Joint War Committee: Decision could Increase Premiums in Affected Area,” Lloyd’s List,
July 1, 2005.
responses of the three littoral states of the Malacca Straits to the U.S.-proposed
RMSI since July 2004 until June 2006 are examined.
Domestic Actions Taken by Littoral States to Combat Maritime Crimes
Indonesia To improve its capacity to handle the security problems in the Straits
of Malacca, Indonesia formed the Navy Control Command Centers (Puskodal)
in Batam and Belawan31 and set up six regencies at the immediate borders of the
Straits of Malacca and Straits of Singapore, namely, Rokan, Hilir, Bengkalis, Siak,
Palawan, Indragiri Ilir, and Karimun, which are believed the most vulnerable and
dangerous areas for pirate attacks.32 The main purpose of setting up these regencies
was to increase the people’s welfare, alleviate poverty, and thus dissuade the local
people from attempting to engage in pirate activities. Tens of regencies along the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore and around the three choke points will be set up
in the future.33 In July 2005, an Indonesian maritime policy unit was established to
help fight pirates and maintain Malacca security.34
In September 2005, Indonesia decided to install radars at nine locations
along the Straits of Malacca to strengthen security in the area and announced
that the Integrated Maritime Security System (IMSS) in the Straits will soon be
introduced.35 Given that most of the cases involving maritime crimes in Indonesia’s
conventional courts often produce problematic verdicts, which do not have the
required deterrent effect, the government of Indonesia considered establishing
maritime courts to try criminals operating in Indonesian waters.36 Anti-piracy and
anti-terror exercises were also be held to enhance security in the Straits of Malacca.
For instance, in July 2005, the Indonesian Navy launched a three-month operation,
31 Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, “National Sovereignty and Security in the

Strait of Malacca,” paper presented at conference on “The Straits of Malacca: Building
a Comprehensive Security Environment”, Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur,
October 11–13, 2004, pp. 8–10.
32 Robert Magindaan, “Maritime Terrorism Threat: An Indonesian Perspective,”
paper presented at Observer Research Foundation Workshop on Maritime Counter
Terrorism, November 29–30, 2004, p. 4.
33 Ibid.
34 “Indonesian Maritime Policy Contributes to Security in Malacca Straits,” Thai
Press Report, July 20, 2005.
35 “RI Navy to Install Radar Along Malacca Strait,” Antara (Indonesia), September
3, 2005; “Indonesian Defence Minister attends Border Committee Meeting in Malaysia,”
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, December 16, 2005; “Integrated Maritime Security System to
Debut in Malacca Strait,” Asia Pulse, September 9, 2005.
36 Tony Hotland, “Admiralty Courts in the Making,” The Jakarta Post, June 23,
2005.
named Gurita (Octopus) in a bid to fight rampant pirate attacks in the Straits37 and
in March 2006, an anti-terrorism drill was held in the Straits of Malacca.38
Malaysia The government of Malaysia has also adopted a number of domestic

measures to deal with the maritime threats posed by piracy and armed robberies
in the Straits of Malacca. In fact, some of these measures had been implemented
before the RMSI was announced in May 2004. For instance, in 2003, Malaysia built
a string of radar tacking stations along the Straits of Malacca to monitor traffic and
acquired new patrol boats to combat piracy.39 In 2004, the Royal Malaysian Navy
intensified its training activities and patrols in the northern reaches of the Straits
of Malacca beyond the area of one fathom bank in an effort to combat piracy and
maritime terrorism.40 In April 2005, it was reported that the Malaysian Maritime
Enforcement Agency (MMEA) will be formed to be responsible for patrols in the
Straits of Malacca.41 This new agency began patrolling the Straits in December
2005.42 The Malaysian maritime policy was also asked to increase its anti-piracy
operations and help ensure safety and security of the Straits of Malacca. 43 In
February 2006, Malaysia announced its plan to step up anti-piracy patrols in the
Straits of Malacca by adding up to 15 new high-speed police boats and conducting
joint maritime exercises with Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore.44
Singapore When undertaking efforts to fight piracy and maritime terrorism,

the government of Singapore encounters a dilemma of conflicting interests
between protecting its shipping industries and stressing that maritime threats in
the Straits of Malacca are real and therefore asking the littoral states to adopt
37 “Navy Launches Operation to Secure Malacca Strait,” The Jakarta Post, July 13,
2005.
38 Irwan Firdaus, “Indonesian Navy Holds Anti-terror Drill in the Malacca Strait,”
Associated Press, March 8, 2006; “Indonesian Navy Holds Anti-terror Drill in Malacca
Strait,” Thai Press Reports, March 10, 2006.
39 Nick Brown, “Malaysia asks for Help to Fight Piracy,” Jane’s Navy International,
November 1, 2003; Iskander Sazlan, “Counter Maritime Terrorism: Malaysia’s Perspective,”
paper presented at Observer Research Foundation Workshop on Maritime Counter
Terrorism, November 29–30, 2004, p. 13.
40 Admiral Dato Sri Mohd Anwar bin HJ Mohd Nor, Chief of Navy, Royal Malaysian
Navy, “Malaysia’s Approach”, presentation at ARF Regional Cooperation in Maritime
Security Conference, March 2–4, 2005.
41 “Report: Malaysia Forms New Maritime Agency to Patrol Malacca Straits from
June,” The Associated Press, April 27, 2005.
42 “Malaysia to Increase Patrol in Malacca Strait,” Thai Press Report, December 6,
2005.
43 “Malaysia’s Maritime Police Increase Anti-piracy Operations,” BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, June 1, 2005.
44 “Malaysia to Step up Anti-piracy Patrols in Malacca Strait,” AFX International
Focus, February 9, 2006.
more cooperative law enforcement measures to protect against pirate and maritime
terrorist attacks. The basis for the JWC to declare the Straits a high-risk zone was
the security assessment done by its consultant Aegis Defence Services. In August
2005, the JWC stated that the Straits of Malacca would remain on the list of high-
risk zones “until it was clear that the measures planned by government and other
agencies in the area had been implemented and were effective.”45 While taking
note of shipping industries’ concern over rising insurance costs, the government
of Singapore has consistently emphasized the potential maritime security threat
in the Straits of Malacca and asked cooperation from the other two littoral states
to enhance security in the Straits. A number of unilateral anti-piracy and anti-
terrorism measures have also been taken by Singapore, such as deploying a fleet of
remote-controlled vessels,46 providing two Fokker planes for joint Malacca Straits
patrols,47 deploying armed security teams onboard selected merchant vessels
entering and leaving its territorial waters,48 and laying high-tech sonar arrays on
the seabed across the Malacca Straits.49 More importantly, Singapore has been
very active in pressing Malaysia and Singapore to agree to a tripartite coordinated
patrolling program in the Straits and the involvement of other ARF members and
user states in the management of security matters in the Malacca Straits.
In addition to the selected domestic anti-piracy and anti-terrorism measures as
mentioned above, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have also cooperated closely
with the IMO by implementing amendments to the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea, in particular, Chapter XI-2 of the Convention,
the International Ships and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, the Automatic
Identification System, and held a special meeting in Jakarta in September 2005 to
enhance security in the Straits of Malacca. Both Singapore and Malaysia joined
the U.S. CSI in March 2003, and March 2004 respectively.
Bilateral Cooperative Programs in the Straits of Malacca
Between Littoral States Long before the announcement of the idea of RMSI by
the U.S. Pacific Command, Indonesia and Singapore agreed to establish a bilateral
program to patrol the Straits of Singapore in 1992, which involved the setting up
of direct communication links between the navies and the relevant agencies of
45 James Brewer, “Joint War Committee Stands by Strait Ruling,” Lloyd’s List,
August 17, 2005.
46 “Singapore Navy Unveils Fleet of Remote-control Vessels,” AFX—Asia, May 17,
2005.
47 “Singapore to Contribute 2 Fokker Planes for Joint Malacca Strait Patrols,”
Channel News Asia, September 8, 2005.
48 “Singapore—Navy will Escort Commercial Ships,” Reuters, March 2, 2005;
“Armed Teams to Guard Merchant Ships entering Singapore Port,” Lloyd’s List, March 1,
2005, p. 1.
49 “Singapore Newspaper Highlights,” Asia Pulse, March 30, 2005.
the two littoral States. Coordinated patrols under the program were carried out
three months in the Straits.50 In May 2005, Indonesia’s and Singapore’s navies
launched Project SURPIC, which is a sea surveillance system. Under the system,
the two countries’ navies can share a common real-time sea situation picture of the
Singapore Straits.51
Similarly, bilateral cooperative efforts had also been made by Indonesia and
Malaysia to help improve safety and security in the Straits of Malacca. In 1992,
a Maritime Operation Planning team was established by the two countries to
coordinate their joint patrols in the Straits, which are conducted four times a year
and involve maritime institutions such as customs, search and rescue, and police.52
Indonesia and Malaysia also carry out join patrols in the Straits of Malacca
under the agreed Malindo program. In November 2005, Malaysia and Singapore
conducted a joint exercise, code name Ex Malapura, in the Malacca Straits to
secure security in the area, which is the 17th joint exercise between the navies of
the two countries.53 In April 2006, Malaysia and Indonesia held another joint aerial
exercise, code-named Elang Malindo XXII.54
Between Littoral States and User States Bilateral cooperative programs or

agreements have also been concluded between the littoral states and user states of the
Malacca Straits, in particular, the United States. In July 2005, as mentioned earlier,
a strategic framework agreement for a closer cooperation partnership in defense
and security was signed between Singapore and the United States, in which the two
countries agreed to work toward enhanced cooperation in the areas of anti-WMD,
anti-terrorism, search and rescue (SAR) and disaster management, intelligence
exchange, and defense technology.55 While both Malaysia and Indonesia raised
their concerns over the singed U.S.-Singapore Strategic Framework Agreement,
in particular the worries about a strong U.S. military presence in the region and
50 Robert Go, “Singapore Strait Patrols Keep Pirates at Bay,” The Straits Times
Interactive, May 16, 2002.
51 “Singapore and Indonesian Navies Launch Sea Surveillance System,” MINDEF
News Release, May 27, 2005, available at: http://app.sprinter.gov.sg/data/pr/20050527997.
htm (accessed 1 June 2006).
52 Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, “National Sovereignty and Security in the
Strait of Malacca,” paper presented at conference on “The Straits of Malacca: Building
a Comprehensive Security Environment”, Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur,
October 11–13, 2004, p. 11.
53 “Malaysia, Singapore Conduct Joint Exercise in Malacca Strait,” Thai Press
Reports, November 29, 2005.
54 “Joint Exercise Expected to Enhance RI, KL Diplomatic Ties,” Antara (Indonesia),
April 24, 2006.
55 Strategic Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the
Republic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, see
Joint Statement Between President Bush and Prime Minister Lee of Singapore, FDCH
Federal, Department and Agency Documents, July 12, 2005.
a potential threat to their sovereignty,56 they are willing to improve their military
relations with the United States. In 2004 and 2005, Indonesia and the United States
held the 2nd and 3rd security dialogue respectively, in which the two countries
exchanged views on a wide range of security and defense issues, including
security in the Straits of Malacca.57 In May 2005, joint anti-terrorism exercises
between the United States and Indonesia were held in the sea off Jakarta.58 At the
end of 2005, the United States decided to help Indonesia to modernize its armed
forces and offered technical assistance to support joint security operations in the
Straits of Malacca by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.59 In January 2006, it
was reported that Indonesia and the United States will re-evaluate their security
cooperation following the lifting of the U.S. arms embargo in November 2005,
especially in dealing with terrorism and security in the Straits of Malacca and in
Southeast Asia.60 In the same month, the government of Indonesia submitted its
request to the United States for technical support in the form of radar, sensors,
and improved patrol boat capability to secure the Straits of Malacca.61 Indonesia’s
cooperation with the United States to fight terrorism and enhance security in
the Malacca Straits was also discussed during the visit of U.S. State Secretary
Condoleezza Rice to Jakarta in mid-March 2006.62 In March 2006, Indonesia and
the United States conducted a joint exercise on Small Craft Counter Terrorism
Maritime Interdiction Techniques.63 During her visit to Indonesia in March 2006,
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that maritime security was a top priority
in Southeast Asia, and that the United States was working with Indonesia and
others to close the Straits to drug smugglers and human traffickers, pirates and
56 “Singapore: Country Outlooks,” EIU Views Wire, August 9, 2005.

57 See Joint Statement, Indonesia–United States Security Dialogue III, Jakarta, August
2–3, 2005, available in Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia Tokyo Official Website at:
http://www.indonesian-embassy.or.jp/menue/information/state/index.htm (accessed); Joint
Statement Indonesia–U.S. Security Dialogue II, press release, Embassy of the Republic of
Indonesia, Washington, D.C., April 23, 2004, available at: http://www.embassyofindonesia.
org (accessed 1 June 2006).
58 “U.S., Indonesian Navies Hold Joint Anti-terror Exercise off Jakarta,” The
Associated Press, May 10, 2005.
59 P.S. Suryanarayana, “A Strategic Move,” Frontline, 23: 1 (January 2006), pp.
14–27; “ＵS Offers Technical Aid for Malacca Strait Security,” ANT-LKBN ANTARA
(Indonesia), December 2, 2005; and “U.S. to Donate Old Ships to Indonesia to Help Secure
Malacca Strait, Official Says,” The Associated Press, December 7, 2005.
60 “RI, US to Re-formulate Security Cooperation,” Antara (Indoensia), January 13,
2006.
61 “Indonesia Requests US Technical Assistance for Malacca Strait Security,” BBC
Worldwide Monitoring, January 23, 2006.
62 “Rice Visit to Strengthen RI-US Ties in Fighting Terrorism: Legislator,” Antara
(Indonesia), March 2, 2006.
63 “Indonesian and US Navies Conduct Counter-Terrorism Exercise,” Antara
(Indonesia) March 14, 2006.
weapons proliferators.64 US$1 million in aid was allocated to Indonesia to help the
country improve security in the Straits of Malacca, according to Admiral William
Fallon.65 In April 2006, it was reported that the United States would soon provide
Indonesia with an early warning system to support security maintenance in the
Straits of Malacca, which will be installed at several points along Indonesia’s
territory on the waterway and on maritime patrol aircraft. In addition, the United
States also promised to exchange intelligence information with the three littoral
states on various matters relating to the situation and condition of the Malacca
Straits.66 Indonesia also planned to discuss with the United States at the fourth
Indonesia–United States Security Dialogue, held in Washington on April 23–30,
2006, on issues relating to the security of the Straits of Malacca, anti-terrorism,
bio-terrorism and cyber-terrorism efforts, as well as the security of Southeast
Asia.67
While differences over the question of securing the Straits of Malacca and the
concern about the idea of U.S. military presence in the Straits still exist, Malaysia
also moved to consider accepting help from the United States to enhance security
in the Straits through improving military relations between the two countries. In
May 2005, for instance, Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister
Najib Razak discussed security in the Malacca Straits with visiting U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick. During the visit, the Acquisition and Cross-
Servicing Agreement (ACSA) was signed, which provides a framework for
cooperation in military logistic matters between the two countries.68 During his
visit, Deputy Secretary Zoellick stated that the United States respects the role of
the littoral states as the player with the responsibility for maritime security in the
Straits, but at the same time is exploring ways to help Malaysia and Indonesia
develop their capacities to deal with piracy and other crimes in the Straits.69 In
February 2006, Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak and Chief of the U.S. Pacific
Command Admiral William Fallon held talks in Kuala Lumpur to discuss piracy
and potential terrorist threats in the Straits of Malacca and the waters of Sabah.70
64 “Piracy Remains Threat in Southeast Asia,” Associated Press Online, March 20,
2006.
65 “Rumsfeld Calls for New Indonesian Ties,” Financial Times, March 10, 2006.
66 “U.S. offers Early Warning System to Secure Malacca Strait,” Xinhua General
News Service, April 22, 2006.
67 “RI to seek US Affirmation on Proposed Strategic Partnership,” Antara (Indonesia),
April 19, 2006.
68 “Malaysia, U.S. Ink Military Pact, Seek Malacca Strait Security,” Asia Political
News, May 9, 2005; “Malaysia and US Renew Defence Pact, Discuss Malacca Strait
Security,” AFX International Focus, May 9, 2005; and “US Looks at Malacca Piracy Fight
Options,” Lloyd’s List, May 10, 2005.
69 “Deputy Secretary Zoellick Comments on Outcome of Meetings with Malaysian
Prime Minister, Finance Minister,” US Fed. News, May 9, 2005.
70 “Malaysia, US Discuss Counter-Terrorism Cooperation in Malacca Straits,” Thai
Press Reports, March 3, 2006.
In early June 2006, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld urged increased ties between the
militaries of the United States and Indonesia during his visit in Jakarta. He also
discussed with Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono on cooperation
between the two countries in the fight against terrorism and the threat of piracy
in the Straits of Malacca. They also discussed how the United States could give
military equipment to Indonesia to enhance Indonesian military capability to
eradicate piracy in the Malacca Strait.71
In addition to the bilateral cooperation between the littoral states and the
United States, there has also been seen cooperation developed between the littoral
states and other main user states of the Malacca Straits, such as Japan. In March
2005, in response to a pirate attack against a Japanese-owned tugboat in the Straits
of Malacca, Japan told the littoral states of the Straits that it was ready to send
patrol vessels and aircraft to combat piracy. This offer was objected to by Malaysia
and Indonesia.72 In May 2005, Indonesia’s Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Slamet
Soebijanto said that Indonesia welcomed any assistance from foreign countries in
securing the Straits of Malacca, including from Japan, as long as it was not in the
form of military force. In relation to this, Japan sent a team to Indonesia tasked
with studying what type of patrol ships Indonesia needed to deal with maritime
crime in the Straits.73 In June 2005, during the bilateral trade talks, Japan and
Indonesia agreed to strengthen their cooperation to enhance safety of navigation
in the Straits of Malacca.74 In July the same year, Indonesia announced that four
patrol boats provided by Japan would carry out patrolling missions in the Malacca
Straits. In addition, Japan donated US$50 million to Jakarta to help safeguard the
waterways.75 It was also reported in December 2005 that Japan and the three littoral
states jointly drew up electronic sea charts of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
to help accident or piracy in the areas.76 In February 2006, the government of
Japan pledged again to grant technical aid consisting of detectors and patrol boats
to protect the Malacca Straits from possible terrorist attacks. Japan’s Nippon
Foundation also announced its decision to donate a patrol training vessel to
Malaysia as part of efforts to reduce piracy and improve maritime security in the
71 “US Wanted Military Cooperation Boosted,” The Jakarta Post, June 7, 2006; “US,
Polish Defense Ministers visit RI to Boost Military Ties,” The Jakarta Post, June 6, 2006.
72 “Koizumi seeks Anti-piracy Cooperation with Asian Nations,” Asia Political
News, March 28, 2005.
73 “Japan to Provide Vessels to Assist Indonesia with Malacca Strait Security,” BBC
Monitoring International Reports, May 23, 2005.
74 “Japanese, Indonesian Leaders Agree to Launch Trade Talks, Cooperation on UN
Reform,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, June 2, 2005.
75 “Indonesia May Deploy Four Japanese Ships to Tackle Piracy in Malacca Straits,”
BBC Monitoring International Reports, July 20, 2005 and “Japan, Indonesia to Discuss
Security Aid for Malacca Straits,” Asia Pulse, September 29, 2005.
76 “Japan, 3 Nations Draw up Electronic Sea Charts of Malacca Strait,” Japan
Economic Newswire, December 19, 2005.
Straits of Malacca.77 In June 2006, the Japanese Government decided to donate

three patrol boats to Indonesia to help fight terrorism and piracy.78 In April 2006,
Malaysian and Australian navies held a five-day exercise code-named Mastex in
the Malacca Straits.79 In May 2006, Japan and Indonesia held intensive talks on
security in the Malacca Straits.80
Tripartite Cooperative Patrolling Programs of the Littoral States
It seems safe to point out that the most important development in terms of enhancing
security in the Straits of Malacca is the establishment of routine sea and air patrols
by the maritime security organizations of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. As
stated earlier, the main motivations for reaching the tripartite cooperative patrolling
agreements among the three littoral states were the increasing demand from the
user states and the international community for more effective law enforcement
measures to deal with the problem of piracy and possible maritime terrorist
attacks, the increasing concern of the littoral states over possible intervention of
foreign powers by sending their troops to the areas, and the decision of Lloyd’s
Joint War Committee that declared the Straits of Malacca a war-risk area. In July
2004, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore launched coordinated patrol program,
known as the Malsindo Coordinated Patrol (MCP). Under the program, seven
warships from Indonesia, five from Malaysia, and another five from Singapore
are deployed to maintain security in the Straits of Malacca. However, it should be
noted that the warships of the participating countries are prohibited from carrying
out the patrolling activities in another participating country’s territorial waters.81
In securing the Malacca Straits under Malsindo Coordinated Patrol, control points
have been set up in Belawan and Batam (Indonesia), Lumut (Malaysia) and in
Changi (Singapore). Another control point, Phuket, will be set up in Thailand after
its joining the “Eyes in the Sky” program.82
In addition to the tripartite coordinated sea patrol program, the three littoral
states also reached agreement to begin air patrol over the Malacca Straits to curb
piracy and increase security in the strategic waterway under the program known
77 “Japan to Provide Technical Aid to Safeguard Malacca Strait,” Antara (Indonesia),
February 7, 2006; and “News In Brief,” Lloyd’s List, March 24, 2006.
78 “Japan to give patrol boats to Indonesia, to Relax Arms Export Ban,” BBC
Monitoring International Report, June 8, 2006.
79 “Malaysia, Australia Conduct Naval Exercise in Malacca Strait,” BBC Monitoring
Asia Pacific—Political, April 21, 2006.
80 “RI, Japan Intensifying Talks on Malacca Strait Security,” Antara (Indonesia),
May 24, 2006.
81 K.C. Vijavan, “3-nation Patrols of Strait Launched; Year-round Patrols of Malacca
Straits by Navies of Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia aimed at Deterring Piracy and
Terrorism,” The Straits Times Interactive, July 21, 2004.
82 “Thailand to Join Malacca Strait Security System,” Thai Press Reports, April 25,
2006.
as “Eyes in the Sky”. The initiative for multinational maritime air patrols was
proposed by Malaysia’s Deputy Minister and Defense Minister Najib Razak at the
Shangri-la Dialogue held in June 2005.83 Under the “Eyes in the Sky” program,
each littoral state of the Malacca Straits will provide two maritime aircraft per
week to patrol the Straits, which will only patrol the waterway and will not be
allowed to cross over to the land. While the maritime patrol aircraft would be
allowed to fly above another participating country’s waters in the Straits, they
must fly no less than three nautical miles from that country’s land. It was also
agreed that each patrol aircraft will have a Combined Maritime Patrol Team
(CMPT) on board, consisting of a military officer from each of the participating
countries. The CMPT will establish a comprehensive surface picture over the
patrol area. During the initiative stage for the implementation of the maritime
air patrol program, only the three littoral states and Thailand can participate. But
the implementation of the second phase of the “Eyes in the Sky” program could
involve participation by the extra-regional countries, such as the United States,
subject to the principle that sovereignty of the littoral states must be respected.84
Although the “Eyes in the Sky” program was launched in September 2005, it was
in April 2006 that the three littoral states signed an agreement on the formation of
a joint coordinating committee on the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) and Standard
Operational Procedures on Coordinated Patrols.85 Under the agreement, cross-
border hot pursuit cannot be carried out without prior arrangements between the
littoral states. While Singapore and Indonesia, as well as Malaysia and Indonesia,
have a bilateral agreement allowing for cross-border hot pursuit, Singapore and
Malaysia have no such agreement and must seek permission before entering each
other’s territorial waters. It was pointed out that the tripartite patrol agreement
is an “open arrangement with opportunities for the international community to
participate”, but only with the consent of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.86 In
June 2006, at the 5th Shangri-La Dialogue, held in Singapore, both India expressed
their willingness to help the littoral States to patrol the Straits of Malacca.87
83 “Interactions among world powers can be source of strength: Minister Teo,”
Channel News Asia, August 4, 2005.
84 Graham Gerard Ong and Joshua Ho, “Maritime Air Patrols: The New Weapons
Against Piracy in the Malacca Straits,” IDSS Commentary, 70/2005, October 13, 2005,
available at: http://www.idss.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/IDSS702005.pdf (accessed).
85 “Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore agree Malacca Strait Security Procedures,” BBC
Monitoring Asia Pacific—Political, April 22, 2006.
86 Donald Urquhart, “Malacca Strait Air and Sea Patrols under One Umbrella,” The
Business Times Singapore, April 22, 2006.
87 “Marcus Hand, “Asia-Pacific Nations Pledge Joint Action on Malacca Strait
Protection: Terrorism Threat adds to Concern over Piracy,” Lloyd’s List, June 6, 2006;
“India Willing to Help Littoral States Patrol Malacca Straits,” Channel News Asia, June
3, 2006.
Regional Responses and Efforts in Helping Improve Security in the Malacca

Straits
Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the Littoral States on the Malacca and

Singapore Straits
In August 2005, ministers of foreign affairs of the three littoral States met in Batam,
Indonesia to discuss matters in relation to safety of navigation, maritime security,
and environmental protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.88 A Joint
Statement was issued after the meeting, in which the three countries reaffirmed their
sovereignty and sovereign rights over the Malacca and Singapore Straits, which
are defined under the 1982 UNCLOS as straits used for international navigation.
The ministers stressed that the main responsibility over the safety, security, and
environmental protection in the Straits lies with the littoral states. The ministers
emphasized that whatever measures undertaken in the Straits in the future should
be in accordance with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS. It is based
on this understanding the three littoral states acknowledged the interest of user
states and relevant international agencies and the role they could play in respect
of the Straits. Moreover, in recognition of the importance of engaging the states
bordering the funnels leading to the Malacca and Singapore Straits and the major
users of the Straits, the three littoral states supported continuing discussion on
the overall subject of maritime security in the Southeast Asian region within the
framework of ASEAN and ARF. They also acknowledged the good work carried
out by the Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG) on Safety of Navigation
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and recognized the efforts of Revolving
Fund Committee (RFC) in dealing with issues of environmental protection in the
Straits.89
The Ministers recognized the importance of the Tripartite Ministerial Meeting
on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in providing the overall framework for
cooperation among them and supported the convening of the Chief of Defense
Forces of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand Informal Meeting in Kuala
Lumpur on August 1–2, 2005. More importantly, the ministers agreed to address
the issue of maritime security comprehensively which includes trans-boundary
crimes such as piracy, armed robbery and terrorism. They also perceived the need
to address the issue of trafficking in persons, and smuggling of people, weapons
and other trans-boundary crimes through appropriate mechanisms. In recognition
of user states’ interest in maintaining the safety of navigation, maritime security,
and environmental protection in the Straits, the ministers welcomed the assistance
88 This is the 4th Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the Littoral States on the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore, which was held on August 1–2, 2005.
89 See The Batam Joint Statement of the 4th Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the
Littoral States on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Batam, Indonesia, August 1–2,
2005.
of the user states, relevant international agencies, and the shipping community in
the areas of capacity building, training and technology transfer, and other forms of
assistance, provided that the main responsibility of littoral states in managing the
Straits was respected, and that the assistance was offered in accordance with the
1982 UNCLOS. The ministers expressed their displeasure about the JWC decision
that declared the Straits of Malacca and Singapore a high-risk zone for piracy and
terrorism without consulting with the littoral states and failing to take into account
the existing anti-piracy and anti-terrorism measures undertaken by the littoral
states. Finally, the ministers welcomed a special meeting on enhancing safety,
security, and environmental protection in the Malacca and Singapore Straits to be
held in Jakarta in September 2005.90
IMO Jakarta Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing

Safety, Security and Environmental Protection
Due to a genuine concern over possible terrorist attacks in the Straits of Malacca,
the Council of IMO decided in November 2004 to convene a high-level conference
to consider ways and means of enhancing safety, security and environmental
protection in the Straits.91 Accordingly, the “IMO Jakarta Meeting on the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection”
was held in September 2005. At the conference, Mr. Efthimios Mitropoulos,
Secretary-General of the IMO, pointed out in his opening remarks that
[w]ith regard to the question of security versus sovereignty (or vice versa), while
I can understand and fully respect the sensitivity of any State over the issue, I
also believe that, whilst States have the right of non-interference in their internal
affairs, they also have concurrent responsibilities towards their own people, the
international community and their international engagements. Whatever the
answer to this, there can be no excuse for inactivity, whether the danger is clear
and present or perceived as a future possibility.92
Accordingly, the Secretary-General called on the three littoral states bordering

the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, user states of the Straits, industry and all
other stakeholders to work together to produce an outcome conductive to building
confidence in any efforts undertaken jointly to enhance safety, security and
environmental protection in the Straits. The Secretary-General also made it clear
that any action undertaken in the future should be based on the consent, support
and cooperation of the littoral States concerned, which should be invited to play
90 Ibid.
91 “IMO to take Straits initiative,” Council, 93rd session, November 15–19, 2004,
available at: http://www.imo.org (accessed 1 June 2006).
92 For the opening remarks, visit the website of the IMO at http://www.imo.org
a principle role in all developments. In addition, any action undertaken must be

consistent with international law, including the relevant provisions of the 1982
UNCLOS.93 The meeting produced the Jakarta Statement which emphasizes the
need to balance the interest of the littoral states and the user states while respecting
the littoral states’ sovereignty, and to establish a mechanism to facilitate cooperation
between them to discuss issues relating to the safety, security and environmental
protection of the Strait of Malacca and Singapore, including exploring possible
options for burden sharing.94 For the purpose of enhancing the safety, security and
environmental protection of the Malacca and Singapore Straits, the 34 participating
countries in the meeting agreed that the work of Tripartite Technical Experts
Group (TTEG) on Safety of Navigation in enhancing the safety of navigation and
in protecting the marine environment in the Straits, including the efforts of the
TTEG in relation to the implementation of article 43 of UNCLOS in the Straits
should continue to be supported and encouraged.95
The IMO has also been invited to consider, in consultation with the littoral
states, convening a series of follow-on meetings for the littoral states to identify
and prioritize their needs, and for user states to identify possible assistance to
respond to those needs, which may include information exchange, capacity
building, training, and technical support, with a view to promote and coordinate
cooperative measures.96 A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by and among
the governments of the three littoral states and IMO for the implementation of a
regional Marine Electronic Highway (MEH) demonstration project in the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore (MEH MOU), and a Memorandum on Arrangements by
and among the three littoral states, IMO, International Hydrographic Organization
(IHO), INTERTANKO and ICS to implement specific activities or article 4 of the
MEH MOU, were signed.97 Also at the meeting, China, South Korea and Norway
were encouraged to join Japan to make financial contributions to the Malacca
Straits Council. Over the previous 35 years or so, the Nippon Foundation of Japan
had contributed more than US$100 million to the Council.98
93 Ibid.
94 See the identical letters dated October 28, 2005 from the Permanent Representatives
of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General and the President of the General Assembly, Sixtieth Session, Agenda item 75,
Ocean and the Law of the Sea, A/60/529, November 1, 2005, Appendix II, pp. 5–10.
95 Para. 22, ibid.
96 Para. 23, ibid.
97 Para. 24, ibid.
98 “IMO Malacca Straits Meeting on Safety and Security in Jakarta,” UK P&I Club,
available at: http://www.ukpandi.com/ukpandi/infopool.nsf/HTML/ClubEvents20050907
(accessed). See also “High-powered Jakarta Meeting Agrees that Vessels should Chip
In,” The Star Online, September 12, 2005, available at: http://thestar.com.my/maritime/
Tokyo Ministerial Conference on International Transport Security
In January 2006, the Ministerial Conference on International Transport

Security was held in Tokyo, Japan, attended by the transport ministers of the
G-8 members and six Asian countries, namely, China, South Korea, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia. The purpose of this conference was to discuss
international transport security issues, including security in maritime transport
sector. A ministerial declaration and three ministerial statements on security in
the international maritime transport sector, aviation security, and land transport
security were adopted by the conference. The Ministerial Statement on Security
in the International Maritime Transport Sector stressed the importance of ensuring
continued compliance with the provisions of Chapter XI-2 of the 1974 SOLAS
convention and the ISPS Code, which were adopted in December 2002 and
entered into force in July 2004.99 The participants in the conference welcomed
the adoption of the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Convention, and the 2005
Protocol to the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Fixed platform Located on the Continental Shelf. Among the unlawful
acts covered by the 1988 SUA Convention in Article 3 are the seizure of ships by
force; acts of violence against persons on board ships; and the placing of devices
on board a ship which are likely to destroy or damage it.100
In May 2006, the IMO announced that parties to the SOLAS Convention had
given initial acceptance to new security measures, which require ships be tracked
by satellite to fight terrorism and to prevent the introduction of WMD to the supply
chain. Under the new Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) regulation,
which is expected to become effective in January 2008, merchant ships will be
required to transmit information about their identity, location, and date and time of
their position through satellite-based technology.101 The new regulation on LRIT
is included in the 1974 SOLAS Convention’s Chapter V on Safety of Navigation,
through which LRIT is introduced as a mandatory requirement for passenger
ships, including high-speed craft and cargo ships, including high-speed craft, of
300 gross tonnage and upwards, and mobile offshore drilling units on international
voyages.
The Plan to Establish the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center
To help enhance safety and security in the Straits of Malacca, Japan launched an
initiative in 2001, aiming to set up a anti-piracy cooperative framework among
99 The Ministerial Declaration and Ministerial Statements adopted at the Ministerial

Conference on International Transport Security, Tokyo, Japan, January 12–13, 2006; for the
documents, visit http://www.mlit.go.jp/sogoseisaku/kokusai_e/minister_e.html (accessed 1
June 2006).
100 See Article 3bis of the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention.
101 “Shipping Nations Agree Satellite Tracking Rule,” Reuters, May 19, 2006.
ASEAN countries, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
As a result, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was concluded in Tokyo in
November 2004.102 The Agreement has been opened for signature by Bangladesh,
Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam and will enter into
force 90 days after the date on which the tenth instrument of notification by a
state mentioned above, indicating the completion of its domestic requirements,
is submitted to the government of Singapore, the depositary of the Agreement.103
As of June 2006, 12 countries104 had signed the agreement; all of these countries
except Brunei had ratified the ReCAAP agreement, which entered into force on
September 4, 2006.105
A key pillar of the ReCAAP is the Information Sharing Center (ISC), which
will be established in accordance with Part II of the Agreement. The ISC, located
in Singapore, is an international organization with major functions of facilitating
communication and information exchanges between the member countries and
improving the quality of statistics and reports on piracy and armed robbery against
ships in the region. It was reported that one of the major reasons for Malaysia’s and
Indonesia’s failure to sign the Agreement so far was the two countries’ displeasure
of the decision to set up the ISC in Singapore. However, it should be noted that it
was mentioned in the Batam Agreement that Malaysia and Indonesia “take note
of” the ISC, and agreed to cooperate with the Center.106
Positive Results from the Responses of the Littoral States
Within such a short period of time, about two years from May 2004, security in
the Straits of Malacca improved significantly, mainly because of the cooperative
efforts undertaken by the littoral states in response to the U.S.-proposed RMSI
and the likelihood of American unilateral actions sending its troops to help patrol
the Straits, and also in response to the decision by the British-based Joint War
Committee of the Lloyd’s Market Association to put the Straits on its list of
102 Regional Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in

Asia, Introductory Note by Moritaka Hayashi and Text of Agreement, International Legal
Materials, 44 (July 2005), pp. 826–35.
103 See Article 18 of the Agreement.
104 They are: Brunei, Cambodia, India, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Myanmar, the
Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Thailand.
105 See speech by Mr. Yeo Cheow Tong, Minister for Transport, at Regional
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in
Asia (ReCAAP) Information Network System (IFN) Signing Ceremony, April 20, 2006,
Singapore Government, media release.
106 See para. 10 of the Batam Joint Statement of the 4th Tripartite Ministerial Meeting
of the Littoral States on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
war-risk areas in June 2005. According to the figures released by the IMB in its
2005 Annual Report on Piracy Against Ships, the number of pirate attacks in the
Malacca Straits dropped from 38 in 2004 to only 12 attacks in 2005.107 There were
no reported pirate attacks in the Straits of Malacca in the period of time between
January 1 and March 31, 2006, compared with eight in the same period in 2004
and four in 2005.108 “Action by law enforcement agencies, notably in Indonesia
and the Malacca Strait, has continued to be effective” and “Indonesia in particular,
has increased its efforts to defeat piracy by way of a show of force in known
(pirate) hotspots”, said the IMB in April 2006.109
In addition to the Malsindo joints sea patrols and the “Eyes in the Sky” joint
air patrols, launched by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in July 2004 and in
September 2005, respectively, a number of domestic anti-piracy and anti-terrorism
measure and bilateral cooperative programs have also been developed to safeguard
the Straits of Malacca. New national organizations or units such as Malaysia’s
Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and Singapore’s Accompanying Sea
Security Team (ASSet) were established to be responsible for maritime security
matters. The ReCAAP Information Network System was launched in April 2006
and the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center is to be established after the entrance
into force of the ReCAAP Agreement. Moreover, bilateral cooperation between the
littoral states and user states, in particular, the United States, Japan, and India, has
been strengthened to help improve maritime security in the Straits of Malacca and
in Southeast Asia. The littoral states, especially Indonesia, have received the offer
by user states of technical aids, patrol training, and equipments. It is expected that
the littoral states will receive more financial and technical assistance from the user
states, including China and South Korea in the future. At the same time, it has been
reiterated that the sovereignty of the littoral states will be respected. The regional
and international concerns over safety and security in the Straits of Malacca will
continue serving as an important external policy factor in the process of enhancing
security in the Straits and the region. As such, it is also expected to see more
discussions on the issue of enhancing maritime security in the Straits of Malacca
under the IMO framework and in the existing regional security organizations, such
as the ASEAN, ARF, Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP),
APEC, Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA), Western Pacific Naval
Symposium (WPNS), and the Shangri-La Dialogue. While there has been positive
development in the management of security in the Straits of Malacca since 2004,
107 Frank Kennedy, “Piracy Declines Sharply in Malacca Straits,” Gulf News, Gulf
News, February 6, 2006.
108 Based on the IMB’s Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for January
1 to March 31 2006 in April 2006. See Katy Glassborow, “IMB Report Charts Piracy’s
Shifting Trends,” Jane’s Navy International, June 1, 2006.
109 “Pirate Attacks Drop to Zero in Malacca Strait but Global Attacks Rise, says
Watchdog,” Associated Press Worldstream, May 3, 2006.
a number of challenges remain to be dealt with by both the littoral and user states
in the future.
Challenges Ahead
While a number of positive developments in relation to the management of

security in the Straits of Malacca have been seen since June 2004, still there are
challenges lying ahead and needing to be deal with by both the littoral and user
states. The shipping industries of the three littoral states of the Straits have been
asking the committee to change its risk assessment, but without avail. Unless the
littoral states are able to prove the effectiveness of their coordinated patrolling
programs, it is likely that the Straits would remain on the list.
The effectiveness of the tripartite coordinated air and sea patrolling programs
agreed to by the three littoral states has also been questioned. A Singaporean
maritime security analyst listed three limitations to the effectiveness of the
cooperative programs: (1) the countries view independence and sovereignty very
strongly and therefore generally are reluctant to agree participate more actively
in cooperative activities; (2) there is a gap between the countries with regard to
law enforcement capacities; and (3) there exists political suspicion among the
countries, in addition to the lack of political frameworks that could help facilitate
more cooperative maritime security efforts. It is challenging to see the littoral states
iron out their differences over the seriousness of the maritime security threats and
the possible association between piracy and maritime terrorism in the Straits of
Malacca and in Southeast Asia.
It has been pointed out that law enforcement capacity of Malaysia and Singapore
are good, but Indonesia’s difficult resource problems need to be resolved if the
problem of piracy and possible maritime terrorist attacks are effectively dealt with.
It remains to be seen concerning the question to what extent and how soon these
problems can be resolved either by significant investment provided by the littoral
states themselves or by the financial and technical aids from the user states such as
United States, Japan and India now, as well as Australia, China and South Korea in
the future. The development of closer strategic and military cooperation between
the littoral states and foreign powers, in particular, the United States, could be
helpful for countries such as Japan or international governmental organizations
such as IMO to justify the decision to offer more assistance to help the littoral
states enhance their maritime security capabilities. The United States and
Indonesia have resumed military ties, but progress toward greater accountability
and complete military reform in Indonesia remain to be seen. The governments
of Indonesia and Malaysia could reconsider their position on the PSI, such as
participating in the PSI activities partially or selectively. A positive development
in this regard is the announcement made by the U.S. Government that it “stand[s]
ready to help Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand to secure the Straits
of Malacca.”110 In addition, the signing of the Strategic Framework Agreement
between the United States and Singapore in July 2005 could be welcomed by the
other two littoral States as a positive development helpful to the enhancement of
maritime security in the Straits of Malacca in particular and in Southeast Asia in
general.
Another challenge to the effective management of security in the Straits
of Malacca is how to find an acceptable approach that would compromise the
littoral states’ sovereign concerns with the user states’ demand for a more direct
involvement in the security matters in the Straits. This requires both sides
reach agreement on establishing a burden-sharing mechanism or a multilateral/
international security cooperative mechanism in the Straits of Malacca area. To
help establish a burden-sharing mechanism, there is a need to amend Article 43
of the 1982 UNCLOS for the purpose of expanding the scope of burden sharing
to include those costs associated with the management of security in the Straits of
Malacca. The early establishment of a regional marine training center or a piracy/
terrorism information sharing center would also be seen another important test
of political will of the littoral states and the concerned countries in the region to
enhance security in the Straits of Malacca and in Southeast Asia.
Finally, it would be important for the littoral states to become contracting
parties to the IMO’s 1988 SUA Convention, the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA
Convention, and the 2004 ReCAAP agreement. At present, of the littoral states
of the Malacca Straits, only Singapore had ratified the 1988 SUA Convention
and the ReCAAP Agreement. It remains a big challenge to have both Indonesia
and Malaysia ratify the aforementioned maritime security-related international
treaties.
Conclusion
Under the pressure spreading outwards from the United States, in particular
through the proposal of RMSI and the consideration of sending its troops to deal
with the potential maritime security threats in the Straits of Malacca and Southeast
Asia, the three littoral states—Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore—were forced
to adopt more domestic anti-piracy and anti-terrorism measures, and to develop
the tripartite coordinated sea and air patrol programs to improve security in the
Straits. New governmental agencies or units, such as the Malaysian Maritime
Enforcement Agency, the Singaporean Accompanying Sea Security Team, and the
Indonesian maritime policy unit, have been formed to be responsible for managing
security in the Straits. More patrol boats have been acquired and new monitoring
110 See Paul X. Rutz, “Rice: U.S. , Indonesia Must Continue Work on ‘True
Partnership’,” American Forces Information Service News Articles, March 16, 2006.
systems been set up to help strengthen the littoral states’ control over the traffic in
the Straits. Bilateral cooperative programs have also been developed between the
littoral states themselves and between the littoral states and user states, such as the
United States, Japan and India, and perhaps in the future with China, South Korea,
and other countries, to keep the region’s important waterways safe.
A number of important political statements such as the Batam Agreement and
the Jakarta Agreement of 2005, and the first ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Statement
of May 2006, have been adopted or issued, in which both the littoral and user
states are urged to take more cooperative actions to help enhance security in the
Malacca Straits. It seems that a more effective, collaborative approach to deal
with the maritime security matters in the Malacca Straits and in Southeast Asia
has been developed since the first half of the year 2004. It is believed that this
development is to benefit the international maritime community and, in particular,
the shipping industries that rely heavily on the safe navigation of the Straits of
Malacca. However, piracy and maritime terrorism, and other transnational crimes
in the Straits and in Southeast Asia are likely to remain a major maritime security
concern for the governments and the shipping industries for some years to come.
To deal effectively with the maritime security threats in the Straits of Malacca,
a number of challenges need to be overcome, which include the effectiveness of
the implementation of the agreed tripartite coordinated sea and air patrols program,
the littoral States’ ratification of the maritime security-related international
Conventions, in particular, the 2004 ReCAAP Agreement and the 1998 SUA
Convention, and the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Convention. There is also a
need to establish a burden-sharing agreement that is acceptable to both the littoral
and user states.
Chapter 8
Crackdown on Piracy in Southeast Asian Seas:
Need a More Effective Legal Regime?
ZOU Keyuan
Modern Piracy and Maritime Terrorism
In the early European state system piracy was a legitimate practice. Pirates
brought revenue to the sovereign, weakened enemies by attacking their vessels
and settlements, and supplied European markets with scarce goods at affordable
prices. The most successful of the British pirates were even knighted. Madagascar
was once a pirate republic for 35 years named Libertalia.
However, with the time, this legitimate enterprise gradually became a statutory
crime. The domestic law of piracy can be traced back in the seventeenth century. The
English law on piracy in 1698 (then 1721, 1837, and 1850) was the first domestic
law specifically addressing the issue of piracy. Subsequently, the United States,
Germany and France enacted similar laws of piracy. At the international level, the
first law was the 1856 Treaty of Paris which ended privateering by commissioned
pirate ships. The 1889 Montevideo Convention accepted the principle that
suppression of piracy was the responsibility of mankind. The Nyon Agreement of
1937 defined the unidentified attacks in the Mediterranean as “acts of piracy.” The
1958 Geneva Convention codified the anti-piracy provisions generally formulated
from the customary international law. Thus piracy became illegal and punishable
wherever encountered.
Piracy continues to exist in modern times. According to the report prepared by
the Piracy Reporting Center of the ICC International Maritime Bureau, between
January 1 and June 30 1999, there were 115 piracy incidents around the world.
Pirate attacks jumped 28 percent in the first quarter of 2002. The total number
of piratical incidents from 1984 to the end of March 2002 was 2,626. According
to a report issued by International Maritime Bureau (IMB), pirate attacks have
See Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and

Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1994, 107–108.
“Pirate Attacks Jumped 28% in First Quarter”, The Shipping Times (Singapore),
May 10, 2002.
International Maritime Organization, “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships”, Annual Report—2001, MSC.4/Circ.16, March 31, 2002, at 1.
tripled in the last decade. The number of attacks in the first quarter of 2003 had
already equaled the total number of recorded pirate attacks for the whole of 1993.
For that reason, the United Nations General Assembly, for the first time in 1998,
called all states, in particular coastal states in affected regions, to take all necessary
and appropriate measures to prevent and combat incidents of piracy and armed
robbery at sea. After the September 11 disaster, piracy has been firmly connected to
maritime terrorism, though there is no universally accepted definition on terrorism.
The Bush Administration wanted to convince the world that terrorism was just as
immoral as piracy, slave trading, and genocide. Piracy and maritime terrorism
have been since mentioned together in mass media and government statements.
Thus piracy constitutes a modern threat to world peace and security.
Piracy in the Southeast Asia is not new. It is recorded that as early as the
fourteenth century piracy existed in its waters. In the late twentieth century
Southeast Asia was categorized as one of the most active piracy zones in the
world with seven key “pirate-prone areas.” Recently, piracy incidents increased
considerably in Southeast Asia. In the 2000 figure, piracy in the region accounted
for 65 percent of the total worldwide number. In 2002, Indonesia remains the
world’s most pirate-infested, with 22 of 87 attacks reported worldwide (32 in the
Southeast Asian seas) from January to March.
The security of navigation through sea lanes in Southeast Asia is of vital interest
for the East Asian countries. More than half of the world’s merchant fleet capacity
sails through the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok and the South China Sea.10
More than 10,000 vessels of greater than 10,000 deadweight tonnage (dwt) move
“Pirate attacks have tripled in a decade, IMB report finds”, in http://www.iccwbo.

org/home/news_archives/2003/stories/piracy-quarter-1.asp (accessed July 19, 2003).
“Pentagon Policy Chief: Terrorism as Immoral as Genocide”, Dow Jones
International News, May 8, 2002.
See Adam Young and Mark Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in
Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Reality”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25: 2 (2003), p.
269.
For historical background on piracy in Southeast Asia, see Robert C. Beckman, Carl
Grundy-Warr and Vivian L. Forbes, “Acts of Piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits”,
IBRU Maritime Briefing, 1: 4 (1994), pp. 1–4.
They are (1) the Strait of Malacca; (2) the northern tip of Sumatra, near the Benaaten
Strait; (3) the Phillip Channel and waters near to the Riau Islands of Indonesia; (4) the
South China Sea, near to the Anambas Islands; (5) the South China Sea, east of Pulau
Tioman, near to Mangkai; (6) the South China Sea, near to Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh;
and (7) the Bangka Strait. SNSA, press release, May 1992; cited in Beckman et al., supra
note 5, at 13.
“Pirate Attacks Jumped 28% in First Quarter.”
10 See Stanley B. Weeks, “Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) Security and
Access”, in Michael Stankiewicz, ed., Maritime Shipping in Northeast Asia: Law of the
Sea, Sea Lanes, and Security, IGCC Policy Paper No. 33, Institute on Global Conflict and
Co-operation, University of California, February 1998, at 55.
Crackdown on Piracy in Southeast Asian Seas 137
southward through the South China Sea annually, with well over 8,000 proceeding
in the opposite direction.11 In addition, with the fast growth of economy in East
Asia, the recent trend to greater intra-Asian trade (relative to trade with Europe and
North America) results in more shipping in the littoral waters of Southeast Asia
and the South China Sea.12 Thus the sea routes in the region are usually regarded
as economic lifelines for the East Asian countries, particularly for Japan. For such
reason, it is obvious that acts of piracy in Southeast Asia constitute a great threat to
the security of navigation as well as to the safety of vessels and crews.
Piracy is traditionally regarded as hostis humani generis, the enemy of the
human race. Pirates commit acts of murder, robbery, plunder, rape or other
villainous deeds at sea, cruelly against humanity. Therefore it is punishable
wherever encountered.13 The law of piracy is designed to eliminate and suppress
all acts of piracy in the world. Since piracy is sui generis, the law is to some
extent very special in comparison with other laws and embodies two parts, i.e., the
international and the domestic.
Legal Dilemmas
Dilemma 1: Definition
The term “piracy” usually refers to a broad range of violent acts at sea. The 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the LOS Convention) defines
it thus:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or
detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew
or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed to: (i) on
the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on
board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a
place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation
in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a
11 Hal Olson, “Marine Traffic in the South China Sea”, Ocean Yearbook, 12 (1996),
at 137.
12 See Stephen J. Meyrick, “Development in Asian Maritime Trade”, in Stankiewicz,
ed., supra note 10, at 21.
13 As is said, “a pirate, under the law of nations, is an enemy of the human race; being
the enemy of all, he is liable to be punished by all”. Appendix to United States v. Smith, 5
Wheat. (U.S.) 153 (1820), 7–8; quoted in the Harvard Draft Convention, American Journal
of International Law, Supplement, 26: 4 (1932), at 763.
pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).14
It consists of five elements: (1) the acts complained against must be crimes of
violence such as robbery, murder, assault or rape; (2) committed on the high seas
beyond the land territory or territorial sea, or other territorial jurisdiction, of any
State; (3) by a private ship, or a public ship which through mutiny or otherwise
is no longer under the discipline and effective control of the State which owns
it; (4) for private ends; and (5) from one ship to another so that two ships at least
are involved.15
However, the definition provided in the LOS Convention has limitations in

respect to the phenomenon of piracy. First, it defines “piracy” as only for “private
ends,” though it is argued that such wordings could be given a wider interpretation.
It is therefore that the terrorist acts at sea for political ends are generally excluded.
That is why after the Achille Lauro incident in 1988,16 the world community
needed the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation. Second, according to the above definition, piracy juris
gentium presupposes that a criminal act be exercised by passengers or the crew
of a ship against another ship or persons or property on its board. The two-vessel
requirement is an ingredient of the crime of piracy, unless a criminal act occurs in
terra nullius.17 Thus “internal seizure” within the ship is hardly regarded as “act
of piracy” under the definition of the LOS Convention.18 Because of the above
14 Article 101, the LOS Convention. United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Index and Final Act of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, New York: United Nations, 1983, at 34.
15 L.F.E. Goldie, “Terrorism, Piracy and the Nyon Agreement”, in Yoram Dinstein,
ed., International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne,
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988, at 227.
16 On October 3, 1985, a group of Palestinian guerrillas hijacked the Italian cruise
ship Achille Lauro while it was in Egyptian territorial waters. The hijackers demanded
the release of 50 Palestinians held in Israel in return for the release of the passengers.
They ordered the ship to sail to Syria, which refused them port entry. The hijackers then
on October 8 killed an American passenger. Several days later the four hijackers gave
themselves up to the Egyptian authorities. On October 11 an Egyptian civilian aircraft was
intercepted by United States military aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea and instructed
to land at an air base in Sicily. Four Palestinians on board were detained by the Italian
authorities and subsequently indicted and convicted in Genoa for offenses related to the
hijacking of the ship and the death of the American passenger.
17 Natalino Ronzitti, “The Law of the Sea and the Use of Force Against Terrorist
Activities”, in N. Ronzitti, ed., Maritime Terrorism and International Law, Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1990, at 1.
18 A different view holds that internal seizures could be piracy. See Samuel P. Menefee,
“Piracy, Terrorism, and the Insurgent Passenger: A Historical and Legal Perspective”, in
limitations and other alleged deficiencies in the definition, some scholars have
suggested revising this definition.19 It is recalled that in 1970 before the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), the International
Law Association suggested a definition on piracy as “unlawful seizure or taking
control of a vessel through violence, threats of violence, surprise, fraud or other
means,”20 but it was not taken account in UNCLOS III. In addition, since the
above definition is only applicable to acts of piracy on the high seas or places
outside the jurisdiction of states,21 it has a geographic limitation and can not cover
the whole piratical situation in Southeast Asia.
The Piracy Reporting Center of the International Maritime Bureau of the
International Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter referred to as IMB-PRC)
suggested a definition of piracy “as an act of boarding any vessel with the intent
to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in
the furtherance of that act,”22 which seems to be accepted by the shipping industry
but has not been recognized both in international law and in domestic law. The
International Maritime Organization (IMO) has taken the position to divide acts
of piracy into two categories by geographical and legal division of maritime
zones: piracy in the high seas is defined as “piracy” in accordance with the LOS
Convention, while acts of piracy in ports or national waters (internal waters and
territorial sea) are defined as “armed robbery against ships.”23 However, we may
note that the shortcomings of such a division are obvious: piracy is not equivalent
to armed robbery and it may also include other violent acts such as murder, assault
and rape.
The problem concerning different definitions also affects the number of
incidents relating to piratical attacks. As some scholars point out, the definition
of the piracy under the LOS Convention may lead to the conclusion that the low
Ronzitti, ed., ibid., at 60. In addition, it is acknowledged that even the internal seizure was
not a piracy in international law, it is still a piracy under municipal law of the flag State.
19 See Alfred P. Rubin, “Is Piracy Illegal?” American Journal of International Law,
70 (1976), at 95; see also Clyde H. Crockett, “Toward a Revision of the International Law
of Piracy”, De Paul Law Review, 26 (1976), 78–99.
20 International Law Association, “Piracy: Sea and Air”, Report of the Fifty-fourth
Conference, August 23–29, 1970, at 708.
21 The reason is that the acts of piracy committed within the sea areas of national
jurisdiction are subject to the municipal laws of the State concerned, who is competent to
suppress and punish acts of piracy. However, the problem remains whether such competence
can produce effective suppression.
22 IMB Piracy Reporting Center, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Report
for the Period of 1 January – 30 June 1998, Kuala Lumpur, July 1998, at 1.
23 See Birgit S. Olsen, “Piracy and the Law”, paper presented to the IMO Seminar
and Workshop on Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Singapore, February 3–5,
1999, at 2 (on file with the author).
incidence of such acts implies that there is no significant problem of piracy today.24
On the other hand, the reported 115 incidents by IMB Piracy Reporting Center in
1999 were simply based upon its own definition. This means that there was no
difference between incidents in the high seas and those happened in the territorial
seas of coastal States. Otherwise, the number would have been much smaller.
However, as the Piracy Reporting Center acknowledged that the number they
tallied was the lowest possible figure and true figures could be much higher due
primarily to the under-reporting of incidents related to its definition.
Finally, the definition problem also exists in the comparison of the international
one with the domestic one. The United States law defines “piracy” as “[a]ny act of
piracy as defined by international law if the perpetrators are found in the United
States; any act of murder, robbery, or hostility against the United States or against
a United States citizen on the high seas, by a citizen of the United States; and acts
by aliens against the United States or its citizens that are defined as piracy in the
treaty between the nation that the individual is a citizen of and the United States.”25
Though making a reference to the definition in international law, it is not clear that
the above definition includes both “private ends” as defined in the LOS Convention
and “political ends” as defined in the Rome Convention. For most of the countries
in the Southeast Asian region, piracy may be subject to punishment in the name
of robbery, murder, larceny, or kidnapping according to their criminal law. In this
context, the international definition does not carry a significant meaning when
piratical activities are found in the waters within national jurisdiction and subject
to the punishment under the domestic criminal law of a coastal state.
Dilemma 2: Inadequate Legal Regime International law has established an

obligation on states to cooperate in suppression of piracy and grants States certain
rights to seize pirate ships and criminals. The LOS Convention is a major anti-
piracy treaty in contemporary era with the following relevant provisions:
• Obligation to cooperate: Article 100 of the LOS Convention provides that

“All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression
of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of
any State.”
• Right to seize pirate ships and criminals: Article 105 provides that “on
the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State,
every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by
24 Jason Abbot and Neil Renwick, “Pirates? Maritime Piracy and Societal Security in
Southeast Asia”, Pacifica Review, 11: 1 (1999), at 11.
25 United States Code, Title 18, 1651–3; cited in Jack A. Gottschalk, Brian Flanagan,
Lawrence Kahn and Dennis Larochelle, Jolly Roger with an Uzi: The Rise and Treat of
Modern Piracy, Annapolis, M.D., Naval Institute Press, 2000, at 34.
piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the
property on board.”
• Only warships or military aircraft or similar governmentally authorized
ships or aircraft have the power to seize a pirate ship or aircraft.
The above piracy provisions are also applicable to the exclusive economic
zone (EEZ).
In addition, there are supplementary anti-piracy treaties including: (1) the 1988
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (the SUA Convention) and the Protocol.
• It covers the unlawful acts no matter whether they are for political ends or
for private ends.
• It aims to punish any person who commits an offense by unlawfully and
intentionally seizing or exercising control over a ship by force or threat
thereof; or performing an act of violence against a person on board a ship if
that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or destroying a
ship or causing damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger
the safe navigation of that ship.
• Each contracting party should take necessary measures to establish
its jurisdiction over the above offenses or extradite the offender or the
alleged offender to the other contracting party who has the corresponding
jurisdiction.
• The Convention applies to the offenses committed in the ship which is
navigating or is scheduled to navigate into, through or from the waters
beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a coastal state or applies when
the offender or the alleged offender is found in the territory of a contracting
party other than the previous case.
• The 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (the SUA Protocol)
contains similar provisions.
The above two conventions can be regarded as complimentary as anti-piracy

legal measures. However, the scope of the territorial application between the LOS
Convention and the SUA Convention is different: while the former applies only
to the high seas and the EEZ, the latter applies not only the waters beyond, but
also waters within national jurisdiction as the SUA Convention clearly states that
“[t]his Convention applies if the ship is navigating or is scheduled to navigate into,
through, or from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single
State, or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States.” Different scope
of application may cause problems in implementation of the above conventions.
The expansion of jurisdictional waters by coastal states under the LOS
Convention also causes problems in implementing the above international
treaties. The EEZ is a major problem. The EEZ, originally being part of the high
seas, has perplexed the issue of piracy. Since the articles relating to piracy in the
LOS Convention are fully and unchangeably copied from the 1958 Convention,
it may query whether these articles are still applicable to the EEZ, as residual
rights and/or obligations in question, despite the changed legal status of the latter.
The provisions are ambiguous and controversial, particularly in the context of
Article 86 (regarding the non-application of the high seas provisions) of the same
convention.26 In spite of such ambiguity, it is meaningful to note that similar
residual rights and/or obligations have been retained in the LOS Convention
formerly belonging to the freedom of high seas, such as the freedom of navigation
in the EEZ. Article 58 of the LOS Convention expressly provides that the piracy
provisions are applicable to the EEZs in so far as they are not incompatible with
the provisions on EEZs of that convention and in compliance with the laws and
regulations adopted by the coastal state. Since piracy is closely related to the safety
of navigation, states could assume a corresponding duty or right to suppress piracy
in the EEZ of other states provided that anti-piracy measures taken by such states
are inadequate. The problem is more exacerbated when a certain coastal state is
unable to handle effectively acts of piracy occurring within its EEZ. For such
reason, it is argued that the piracy provisions in the LOS Convention should apply
to the EEZ in so far as they are not incompatible with the rights of coastal States
set forth in the LOS Convention. “Since enforcement against a pirate, in normal
circumstances, could not be viewed as impinging upon any rights reserved to the
coastal State, the law of piracy in the EEZ must be viewed as identical to that
applying beyond.”27
The above issue is important to Southeast Asia since most, if not all, of the
sea areas will be within the national jurisdiction after the necessary maritime
boundary delimitation between/among the interested riparian countries. The piracy
provisions in the LOS Convention, once they become the basis for the regional
cooperation combating the piracy at sea, are applicable to the EEZs in the region.
Second, it is recognized that suppression of piracy within national jurisdiction
is a duty and obligation of a coastal state on behalf of the interest of the entire
international community as well as for its own interest. Since the EEZ is now
within the national jurisdiction of the coastal state, the degree and scope of the
applicability of the piracy provisions in the LOS Convention may differ from their
application to the high seas. The key question lies on the jurisdictional aspect. The
view expressed by Lauterpacht may be insightful. He once said that “if a pirate
is chased on the open sea and flees into the territorial maritime belt, the pursuers
may follow, attack and arrest the pirate there; but they must give him up to the
26 See Bjorn Aune, “Piracy and Its Repression under the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention”, Ocean Yearbook, 8 (1989), at 29 and 36–7.
27 Thomas A. Clingan Jr, “The Law of Piracy”, in Eric Ellen, ed., Piracy at Sea,
Paris: ICC Publishing SA, 1989,, at 170.
authorities of the littoral state.”28 Accordingly, foreign warships have the right of
hot pursuit within the EEZ of a coastal state and the right to arrest the piratical
vessel there, but the coastal state may have the right to request the state which has
exercised the rights in respect of suppression of piracy to hand over the pirates for
trial in the coastal state, if that state intends to do try them.
It is to be noted that while most of the East Asian countries acceded to the
LOS Convention, not so many such countries have acceded to the other important
international convention on the prevention and suppression of piracy and maritime
terrorism, i.e., the SUA Convention (see Table 8.1). It is regrettable that two key
Straits states Indonesia and Malaysia are still left outside the SUA legal framework
despite the fact that these two countries participated in the Correspondence Group
under the leadership of the United States regarding the revision of the SUA
Convention, which is going on within the IMO.29 The discussion on the Protocol
to the SUA Convention is mainly focused on the possible incorporation of the
shipboarding regime proposed by the United States (as reflected in the bilateral
agreements signed between the United States and relevant flag-state countries)
into the SUA Convention. The diplomatic conference on the SUA Convention
was held in October 2005 to consider the adoption of two Protocols incorporating
substantial amendments aimed at strengthening the SUA Convention in order
to provide an appropriate response to the increasing risks posed to maritime
navigation by piracy as well as maritime terrorism.30
The 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention expands the coverage of the unlawful
acts under Article 3 of the SUA Convention by adding a new provision to cover:
uses against or on a ship or discharging from a ship any explosive, radioactive

material or BCN (biological, chemical, nuclear) weapon in a manner that
causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage; discharges, from
a ship, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other hazardous or noxious substance, in
such quantity or concentration that causes or is likely to cause death or serious
injury or damage; uses a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury
or damage; transports on board a ship any explosive or radioactive material,
knowing that it is intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, death
or serious injury or damage for the purpose of intimidating a population, or
compelling a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain
28 See Burdick H. Brittin, “The Law of Piracy: Does It Meet the Present and Potential
Challenges?” in Ellen, ed., supra note 27, at 165.
29 See Brad J. Kieserman, “Preventing and Defeating Terrorism at Sea: Practical
Considerations for Implementation of the Draft Protocol to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA)”, paper
presented to the Conference on “New Developments of the Law of the Sea and China”,
Xiamen, China, March 9 –12, 2005, 12 (on file with the author).
30 See “Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation”, at http://www.imo.org/home.asp (accessed March 28, 2005).
from doing any act; transports on board a ship any BCN weapon, knowing it to be
a BCN weapon; any source material, special fissionable material, or equipment
or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production
of special fissionable material, knowing that it is intended to be used in a nuclear
explosive activity or in any other nuclear activity not under safeguards pursuant
to an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement; and transports on board a ship
any equipment, materials or software or related technology that significantly
contributes to the design, manufacture or delivery of a BCN weapon, with the
intention that it will be used for such purpose.31
Another major development regarding the ship boarding regime, initiated by

the United States for the implementation of the PSI (as reflected in the bilateral
agreements signed between the United States and relevant flag-state countries), has
been incorporated into the SUA Convention. According to Article 8bis of the 2005
Protocol, cooperation and procedures are needed if a state party desires to board
a ship flying the flag of a state party when the requesting party has reasonable
grounds to suspect that the ship or a person on board the ship is, has been, or
is about to be involved in, the commission of an offense under the Convention.
The authorization and cooperation of the flag state is required before such a
boarding. A state party may notify the IMO Secretary-General that it would allow
authorization to board and search a ship flying its flag, its cargo and persons on
board if there is no response from the flag state within four hours. A state party
can also notify that it authorizes a requesting party to board and search the ship,
its cargo and persons on board, and to question the persons on board to determine
if an offense has been, or is about to be, committed. The Protocol limits the use
of force and includes important safeguarding measures when a state party takes
action against a ship.32 Through the above amendments, the controversial boarding
regime embodied in the PSI scheme has been legalized under international law,
though with modifications and addition of safeguarding measures to ensure that
there is no abuse of this boarding right.
Finally, the other relevant international treaty is the 2000 UN Convention
against Organized Transnational Crime which requires the contracting states
to establish their jurisdiction when the offense has been committed on board a
ship flying their flags, or in their territories including territorial seas. When a
piratical attack or armed robbery involves organized and transnational criminals,
this convention can be applied. However, this convention came into force on 29
September 2003.
31 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, 1988, at http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=259&doc_
id=686#review (accessed 26 October 2005).
32 Ibid.
National Efforts
The inadequacy of the international legal regime needs a remedy from domestic
legal arrangements. Even a sound legal regime requires effective implementing
efforts.
China
China borders the South China Sea which is located in Southeast Asia. The sea
area with its points in Hong Kong, Luzon Island, Hainan Island is called “the
Hainan Triangle” which is a pirate resort.
Traditionally, China was reluctant to recognize international law as a biding
instrument to govern state-to-state relations. However, since the economic reform
and open-door policy in the late 1970s, China has been more willing to accept
international law. Certainly the process of globalization has pushed all nation
states to rely more upon international law. The LOS Convention is the major
international convention for the suppression of piracy at the global level. China
signed the LOS Convention in 1982 and ratified it in 1996. In addition, China
has also ratified the two 1988 Rome legal documents against maritime terrorism.
China, as a member state, has participated in activities relating to the piracy issue
sponsored by relevant international organizations such as the IMO.
Under the Chinese legal system, there is no law on piracy, even such a
term as “piracy” in law. However, piracy is subject to the Chinese law and law
enforcement via its criminal code. According to its recently amended Criminal
Law, certain crimes, particularly some crimes of endangering public security, are
relevant to piracy so that the piracy can be punishable under its law. This law
also allows China to enforce anti-piracy conventions within the Chinese territory,
as it provides that “for the crimes defined in international treaties, concluded or
acceded to by the People’s Republic of China, which are under the jurisdiction of
the People’s Republic of China within the framework of the treaty obligations, this
Law shall apply.”
Other relevant laws are Maritime Traffic Safety Law, 1984 (concerning the
safety of navigation); Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1992
(establishing the territorial sea and contiguous zone in China and provides the
right of hot pursuit to chase and arrest suspected piracy vessels); and Law on the
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, 1998 (establishing China’s
jurisdiction in its EEZ and on its continental shelf including the right of hot pursuit).
In addition, the Opinion on Strengthening the Safety of Navigation and Fishery
in the East China Sea adopted in 1993 is particularly relevant to the suppression
of piracy within China’s jurisdictional waters. Despite the above efforts, law
enforcement is still weak due to various factors such as lack of effective coast
guard, vastness of sea areas, and local protectionism of interest.33 It should be

pointed out that the rumor that Chinese officials or military men were involved in
piracy was finally proved as unfounded.
With the rapid growth of its economy, China has been more dependent on energy
resources from abroad. Petroleum products are being more frequently transported
to China through sea lanes in East Asia, in particular through the Malacca Straits.
Eighty percent of its imported oil is shipped to China through this sea lane. For this
reason, China recently expressed its deep concerns with the navigational safety of
the Malacca Straits and its strong interests in Straits affairs. As reported, China
expressed its willingness to help strengthen the maritime security in the Straits
though the details have not yet exposed to the public.34 On the other hand, the
Straits littoral states welcome China’s assistance.
Japan
Japan ratified the LOS Convention in 1996 and adopted its own laws on the
territorial sea and on EEZ as well. Punishment of piracy is subject to the Japanese
criminal code. Recently, Japan has increased its efforts on the piracy issue,
particularly after it ratified the SUA Convention in 1998. Japan realized that the
frequent occurrence of piratical incidents and the damages they caused became a
major threat to Japan’s shipping routes as Japan depends on imports for the vast
majority of its oil and other energy supplies and has developed its economy as a
trading country.35 It sent delegations to the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and
Indonesia in September 2000 to make surveys and exchanges of views regarding
specific anti-piracy cooperation and supporting measures in each country. In
November 2000, Japan’s coast guard patrol vessel visited India and Malaysia to
seek bilateral cooperation. Japan also sponsored and organized a series of regional
conferences on combating piracy and armed robbery against ships.
On the other hand, Japan’s initiatives to combat piracy were made at the same
time as Japan expanded its military forces outside its own territory. There is a
suspicion in the Southeast Asian region whether Japan takes the advantage of anti-
piracy and anti-terrorism as a pretext to realize its military expansion which would
create concerns among the Asian countries, particularly linking Japan’s recent
endeavors to its past of aggression. The recent anti-piracy military drills jointly
launched either with India or Malaysia in the South China Sea invited criticism
in mass media. As commented, fighting piracy has paid dividends for Japan and
33 For details, see Zou Keyuan, “Piracy at Sea and China’s Response”, Lloyd’s
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, August (2000), pp. 364–82.
34 See “Indonesian Foreign Minister: China is Willing to Help Strengthen the Safety
of the Malacca Straits”, Liaohe Zaobao (in Chinese), August 2, 2005, at http://www.zaobao.
com/gj/yx050802_501.html (accessed August 2, 2005).
35 See Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Diplomatic Bluebook 2001”, in http://
www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2001/chap2-4-d.html (accessed January 26, 2002).
become a fairly good way to get Japan’s security role in the region accepted.36
Japan continues its joint anti-piracy military drills with other countries including
the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. In addition, Japan joined the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) proposed by the United States.37 In October 2004, it
hosted the PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise off the coast of Sagami Bay and off
the Port of Yokosuka.38
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore
All the three countries ratified the LOS Convention, but only Singapore is
the signatory to the SUA Convention. As reported, there has been no piratical
incident within Singapore’s jurisdictional waters in recent years. This indicates
the effectiveness of Singapore’s law enforcement, though the water area under
Singapore’s sovereignty is much smaller than those under the sovereignty of
Indonesia or Malaysia.
Indonesia has the most serious problem of piracy in the whole Southeast Asian
region. It has been long criticized for its slow and ineffective response to piracy.
In order to strengthen its fight against piracy, Indonesia has established a number
of anti-piracy centers in Medan on Sumatra, on Batam Island, and in Bangka on
Sumatra. It needs 239 ships and 115 aircraft to patrol its 13,000 islands effectively
but currently has only 115 vessels and 60 aircraft.39
Piracy has frequently harassed Malaysian waters as well, in particular the Strait
of Malacca. However, the recent strengthened anti-piracy measures achieved good
results. For example, in 2000, there were 75 attacks in the waters off Malaysia, but
after the Malaysian authorities took some measures, the number was reduced to
17 in 2001.40 However, the piratical situation in the Malacca Straits is not stable. It
36 Anthony Bergin, “East Asian Naval Developments—Sailing into Rough Seas”,

Marine Policy, 26 (2002), at 126.
37 PSI is an effort to consider possible collective measures among the participating
countries, in accordance with national legal authorities and relevant international law and
frameworks, in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles,
and their related materials that pose threats to the peace and stability of the international
community. The PSI is administered by the “core group” countries, which, at present, consist
of 15 countries (Japan, U.S., UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Australia, France, Germany, Spain,
Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Canada, Norway and Russia).
38 See “The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise
hosted by Japan”, October 18, 2004, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/
arms/psi/exercise-2.html (accessed November 11, 2004).
39 “Ship Owners Urged to Install Anti-piracy Tracking Devices”, Agence France-
Presse, May 8, 2002.
40 “ICC Report Sends Six Warships into Battle against Pirates”, in http://www.
iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2002/piracy.asp (accessed May 11, 2002).
is reported that after the tsunami disaster in 2004, piracy surged rampantly in the
Straits again. There were 28 piratical incidents in March 2005 alone.41
The user states are also concerned with the safety of navigation in the Malacca
Straits. For that reason, the United States put forward the so-called Regional
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in March 2004. It was designed to implement
the “President’s Proliferation Security Initiative and State Department’s Malacca
Strait Initiative” with the approach that detailed plans are provided “to build and
synchronize interagency and international capacity to fight threats that use the
maritime space to facilitate their illicit activity.”42 In order to conduct effective
interdiction in the sea it is necessary to use high-speed vessels equipped with
special operations forces or Marines. While Singapore supported this American
idea, Malaysia and Indonesia are doubtful of whether the RMSI can really play a
positive role in curbing piracy and maritime terrorism. They are also suspicious of
the American intention whether it would infringe upon their national sovereignty
and territorial integrity. In order to prevent the potential American military
intervention in the Strait affairs, Malaysia and Indonesia decided to formulate a
cooperative patrol to protect this international waterway. Singapore later joined.
The tripartite patrol consists of 15–20 military vessels and patrol in the Strait all
the year round.43
Due to the severity of the piracy occurrence in the Straits of Malacca, the
above three countries have intensified the degree of their trilateral cooperation. In
July 2004 the scheme of Malacca Straits Patrols was launched. In the end of July
2005, a scheme of maritime air surveillance was discussed, aiming to strengthen
the crackdown of piracy in this critical international waterway.44 In August 2005,
the above three countries agreed to implement the scheme of air patrol over the
Malacca Straits from September 2005 and also agreed to establish a Tripartite
41 See “The Most Dangerous Sea Area? The Malacca Straits Becomes the Paradise
of Pirates Again”, July 28, 2005, at http://news.wenxuecity.com/bbsarticle.php?SubID=ne
ws&MsgID=32294 (accessed July 28, 2005).
42 Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Navy Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command in his
testimony regarding U.S. Pacific Command posture before the House of Armed Services
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. The whole text of the testimony is
available at http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2004/040331housearmedsvscomm.shtml
43 See “Indonesia and Malaysia Jointly Oppose American Army to Patrol in the
Strait of Malacca”, Lianhe Zaobao (in Chinese), May 8, 2004; and “Piratical Attacks are
More Fierce in the Strait of Malacca, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore will Prevent this
Jointly”, October 9, 2004, at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guoji/1029/2905373.html
(accessed October 9, 2004).
44 See “Singapore and Malaysia Discussed Air Surveillance over the Malacca Straits”,
Liaohe Zaobao (in Chinese), July 30, 2005, at http://www.zaobao.com/sp/sp050730_503.
html (accessed July 30, 2005).
Technical Experts Group on Maritime Security.45 It is to be noted that all these

tripartite cooperative operations, whether at sea or in the air, are called coordinated
patrols, instead of joint patrols. In addition, Singapore is a member of the PSI but
Malaysia and Indonesia are skeptical about this initiative and remain outside it.
Other ASEAN Countries
Countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia have
suffered piracy, but not so seriously as Malaysia and Indonesia. Since Cambodia
and Thailand have not yet ratified the LOS Convention, they are not bound by
the treaty obligation under the Convention including the suppression of piracy.
However, when the provisions on piracy in the LOS Convention are regarded as
rules of international customary law, then the countries outside the Convention
should also abide by them. Though not a party member of the LOS Convention,
Thailand expressed its willingness to join the recently adopted anti-terrorism
agreement among Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Thailand also
considered joining the air surveillance scheme created by Singapore, Malaysia and
Indonesia.46 Thailand officially joined the Malacca Straits Patrols by signing the
revised Standards Operating Procedures and Terms of Reference for the Malacca
Straits Patrols Joint Coordinating Committee on September 18, 2008.47 Finally,
it is worth mentioning that the only country in the region which specifically put
“piracy” under its penal code is the Philippines. According to the Philippine penal
code, the death penalty will be imposed upon those who commit piracy.48
Regional Cooperation
After the entry into force of the LOS Convention, the water areas under national
jurisdiction have been greatly expanded. Such expansion gives coastal states
additional sovereignty or sovereign rights over their respective jurisdictional
waters, but on the other, it also brings difficulties in enforcement within these
areas, particularly in regard to piracy. It even poses a big problem for some
45 See “Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia Carry Air Patrol over the Malacca Straits
from Next Month”, Liaohe Zaobao (in Chinese), August 3, 2005, at http://www.zaobao.
com/sp/sp050803_501.html (accessed August 3, 2005).
46 See “Thailand needs Time to Consider Air Patrol over the Malacca Straits”, Liaohe
Zaobao (in Chinese), August 3, 2005, at http://www.zaobao.com/sp/sp050803_509.html
(accessed August 3, 2005).
47 See “Thailand Joins Malacca Straits Patrols”, available at http://www.mindef.
gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2008/sep/18sep08_nr.html (accessed September 19,
2008).
48 See Gabriel V. Trinidad, ed., The Revised Penal Code, 1983 Edition, Quezon City:
U.P. Law Center, 1984, at 52.
small countries which own a vast size of water areas but are lack an effective
enforcement mechanism. As is pointed out, pirate attacks often occur in areas
where the law enforcement response is either non-existent or negligible.49 Second,
the LOS Convention created the EEZ and continental shelf regimes. Accordingly,
the high seas are shrunk upon the expansion of territorial seas and EEZs, and
the free mobility area in the high seas to control piracy is getting smaller. The
question then arises whether the patrol vessels can freely enter into the EEZ
areas of other states. Although the provisions in the LOS Convention regarding
piracy are applicable in the EEZs, the coastal states may not be very happy to
see warships or governmental vessels of other countries pursue and arrest piracy
vessels in their EEZs where they have sovereign rights and jurisdiction. The above
zoning provisions of the LOS Convention may thus complicate the enforcement
of the law of piracy. Potential conflict may arise in this respect and some kind of
coordination and cooperation between/among states concerned seems necessary.
In November 2002, the Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation
in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues (the Joint Declaration) was
adopted, which initiated full cooperation between ASEAN and China in the field
of non-traditional security issues and listed the priority and form of cooperation.
The priorities at the current stage of cooperation include “combating trafficking
in illegal drugs, people-smuggling including trafficking in women and children,
sea piracy, terrorism, arms-smuggling, money-laundering, international economic
crime and cyber crime.”50 In addition, the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of the
Parties in the South China Sea51 also mentions the suppression of piracy and armed
robbery at sea.
When the coastal state has good reason to believe that a foreign ship has
violated its laws and regulations, it may exercise the right of hot pursuit. This
can be directed to suspected vessels of piracy. Hot pursuit can begin from internal
waters, territorial seas and the contiguous zone or even in the EEZs of the coastal
states. The Chinese laws on the territorial sea and on EEZ authorize the Chinese
warships or governmental vessels to exercise the right of hot pursuit.52 However,
the right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea
of its own state or of a third state.53 For that reason, in the case of piratical attacks
occurring within territorial seas, and the attackers then fleeing to the territorial sea
49 Eric F. Ellen, “Piracy”, in Eric F. Ellen ed., Violence at Sea, Paris: ICC Publishing
S.A., 1986, at 228.
50 See Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of
Non-Traditional Security Issues, 6th ASEAN–China Summit, Phnom Penh, Cambodia,
November 4, 2002, http://www.aseansec.org/13185.htm (accessed July 2, 2004).
51 Text is available at http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm (accessed March 28,
2005).
52 See Article 14, Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; and Article
12, Law on Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf.
53 Article 111 (3) of the LOS Convention.
of another state, it is suggested that a regional cooperative arrangement is required

between the affected states to coordinate their enforcement policies. Another
serious matter relating to the suppression of piracy is that many pirates have been
let go unpunished under domestic law after the hijacked ship had detained. This
once happened in Southern China.54 For that reason, in the Petro Ranger incident,
the Royal Malaysian Police considered requesting the Chinese government to
extradite the pirates to stand trial in Malaysia.55 However, extradition requires an
agreement between the two countries concerned, or may be executed under an
international treaty to which both countries concerned are the parties.
In the Southeast Asian seas, different sea zones are established with the
ratification of the LOS Convention by the riparian countries. Therefore the states
concerned have the right as well as the treaty obligation to enforce relevant
laws and regulations within their respective jurisdictional sea areas, including
the suppression and control of acts of piracy therein. Second, as to the sea areas
beyond the territorial seas of the countries bordering the South China Sea, a
regional cooperation is more required than within the territorial sea. According
to some statistics, the average distance of the piratical attacks from shore was
11.55 nautical miles in Indonesian, 68 nautical miles in Northeast Asia, and 94.4
nautical miles in the South China Sea.56 It indicates that most of the piratical
attacks occurring in the South China Sea are within the EEZ and/or high sea areas.
Thus the provisions on piracy in the LOS Convention are clearly applicable there.
However, for piratical incidents within Indonesian waters, they are mainly subject
to Indonesian laws.
Effective law enforcement is extremely difficult in Southeast Asian seas. A
typical example is the South China Sea because of its vastness (more than 200
nautical miles wide) and due to the fact that it is dotted with numerous uninhabited
islands to which pirates can easily retreat.57 It is said that the Natunas and Spratly
island groups are pirate havens.58
Perhaps the main obstacle to the regional cooperation is the overlapping
territorial claims for the islands in the South China Sea. The Spratly Islands
are claimed by five adjacent countries—i.e., Brunei, China including Taiwan,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam—and the territorial dispute has not
yet been resolved. Even if the territorial dispute had been solved, there are
54 Personal interview with the officer in IMB-PRC, August 6, 1998.

55 IMB-PRC, supra note 22, at 7. The IMB-PRC regards this as an effective deterrent
against piratical attacks.
56 Mark C. Farley, “International and Regional Trends in Maritime Piracy 1989–
1993”, thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1993, at 24; cited in Barry Hart Dubner,
“Maritime Violence—The Problems with Modern Day Piracy”, Issue Paper No.9/95,
Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, at 9.
57 See “IMO to Organise Missions, Regional Seminars on Piracy”, IMOFAX 05/98, 8
April 1998, in http://www.imo.org/imo/briefing/1998/fax05.htm (accessed June 17, 1998).
58 Aune, supra note 26, at 21.
still boundary delimitation issues in the South China Sea. As is pointed out,
disputes over maritime boundaries make the accurate delineation of enforcement
responsibility difficult, if not impossible.59 On the other hand, we may realize
that while such dispute is an obstacle, it can also be a window of opportunity for
cooperation, since under such complicated circumstances, cooperation is the only
way for the regional security of navigation. That is why in the recent “track two”
conferences on the South China Sea sponsored by Indonesia put on their agenda
the safety of navigation and suppression of piracy as one of the areas of possible
cooperation among the interested countries bordering the South China Sea.60 The
recent proposal of joint development for the disputed areas in the South China Sea
may have some instructive effect on the cooperation in piracy suppression. The
relevant ASEAN countries together with China do not reject such proposal and on
the contrary they have considered it seriously. The problem lies in the formulation
of the concrete measures of implementation, the discussion of which is beyond
the present chapter. However, such a prospect is helpful for the control of piracy
in Southeast Asia. Or in reverse, successful cooperation in controlling piracy can
facilitate the joint development of the natural resources in the South China Sea, or
cooperation in other areas such as marine environmental protection.
Environmental concern bears some relevance to piracy. It is possible that
piratical attacks which are directed at oil tankers could cause oil spill disasters
at sea. As is stated, the potential for a catastrophic accident involving one or
maybe more vessels carrying environmentally damaging cargoes is huge. Also,
many piratical attacks have taken place in areas of great natural beauty or of
international environmental significance. According to one statistics, over 25 per
cent of the pirate attacks recorded in the Violence at Sea database are against a
tanker of some description. The potential for environmental disaster resulting
from piratical attacks has become a growing concern in the world community.61
In such context, the control of piracy is necessary and helpful for the marine
environmental protection in Southeast Asia.
There is a wide speculation that some of the piratical incidents which occurred
in Southeast Asia involved organized criminals since the hijacking of a whole ship
and resale of its cargo requires huge resources and detailed planning. Individual
59 Clingan, supra note 27, at 171.

60 See, for example, the First Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Safety of
Navigation, Shipping and Communication in the South China Sea, Jakarta, October 3–6,
1995, in “Workshop and Technical Working Group Statements”, http://www.law.ubc.ca/
centres/scsweb/statement.html (accessed March 20, 1998).
61 The IMB-PRC stated in its report that “the potential for environmental disaster
should not be underestimated, as a significant number of attacked vessels drift unsupervised
during and after the piratical incidents.” Piracy Report (January–December 1994),
December 1994, at 7.
pirates do not have these resources.62 This new form of piracy makes the anti-
piracy campaign more difficult.
In Southeast Asia, there is some degree of basis for cooperation against piracy.
The tripartite cooperation amongst Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore has already
begun. The three countries have been conducting a coordinated anti-piracy patrol
off their waters in the Malacca and Singapore Straits and their efforts have resulted
in a significant reduction of piracy in that region. However, after the financial crisis
in 1997 and political instability in Indonesia, this mechanism is not as frequently
used as before.63 This may be one of the reasons why piratical incidents have
increased in the region.
Another basis is the IMB Piracy Reporting Center which was established in
Kuala Lumpur in 1st October 1992. The center acts as a focal point for the industry
and liaisons with the law enforcement authorities in the region as well as in the
world. Its functions include (1) to receive reports of suspicious or unexplained craft
movements, boarding and armed robbery from ships and to alert other ships and
law enforcement agencies; (2) to issue regular status reports of piracy and armed
robbery via broadcasts on Inmarsat-C through its SafetyNET service; and (3) to
collate and analyze all information received and to issue consolidated reports to
interested bodies, including IMO.64 Though a liaison and information distributing
institution, it may help establish the regional mechanism for piracy suppression or
it may expand its functions to have some kind of implementing power to be agreed
upon by the states concerned, such as organizing investigations of piracy incidents
and training law enforcement personnel of the region.
A recent significant step was made by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines,
who signed the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of
Communication Procedures in May 2002 with a view to preventing the utilization
by anyone of their land-air-sea territories for the purpose of committing or
furthering such activities as terrorism, money laundering, smuggling, piracy,
hijacking, intrusion, illegal entry, drug trafficking, theft of marine resources,
marine pollution and illicit trafficking of arms.65 The agreement is open to other
ASEAN countries. Following this agreement, the ASEAN ministerial meeting
held in Kuala Lumpur in early May 2002 adopted the Work Program to Implement
the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, which focuses eight
“priority areas” and piracy is one of them. The ASEAN member states agreed to
62 “Organized Crime takes to the High Seas, ICC Piracy Report Finds”, February
4, 2002, in http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2002/piracy_report.asp (accessed
May 11, 2002).
63 It is reported that Indonesia and Singapore carried a bilateral military drill in their
jurisdictional waters in May 2002. See Lianhe Zaobao (Singapore), 16 May 2002.
64 ICC-IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Annual Report, 1st January
– 31st December 1997, at 2.
65 See “Thailand to Join SE Asian Nations in Terrorism Agreement”, Asia Pulse,
May 9, 2002.
work towards the harmonization of laws among themselves in order to effectively

deal with the issues of transnational crime, and also agreed to develop programs
for joint exercises and simulations in various areas to enhance cooperation and
coordination in law enforcement and intelligence sharing.66
The recent regional anti-piracy conferences have produced some positive results
in terms of regional cooperation and coordination. For example, heads of coast
guard agencies from 16 countries and one region (ten ASEAN countries, India,
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, South Korea, China, Hong Kong and Japan) attended the
first regional conference held in April 2000, where three documents were adopted.
In a statement “Asia Anti-Piracy Challenge 2000”, the coast guard authorities
expressed their intention to reinforce mutual cooperation in combating piracy
and armed robbery against ships. The “Tokyo Appeal” calls for the establishment
of contact points for information exchange among relevant authorities as well
as for the drafting of a national anti-piracy action plan. The Model Action Plan
states specific countermeasures based on the Tokyo Appeal.67 A former Japanese
shipping line official even proposed establishing a United Nations Coast Guard to
battle Asian piracy.68
The most significant development is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia which was formulated
for adoption among 16 Asian countries including Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia,
China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Sri
Lanka, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam. The agreement obliges
contracting states (a) to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against
ships; (b) to arrest pirates or persons who have committed armed robbery against
ships; (c) to seize ships or aircraft used for committing piracy or armed robbery
against ships; and (d) to rescue victim ships and victims of piracy or armed robbery
against ships.69 For cooperation purposes, the contracting parties should endeavor
to render mutual legal assistance as well as extradition for piracy suppression and
punishment. In addition, the agreement establishes an Information Sharing Center
which is located in Singapore. The agreement came into force on September 4,
2006.
Piracy in Southeast Asia is a concern for more than just the countries
immediately involved. The effective suppression and control of piracy there can
benefit not only the adjacent countries but also the interest of the entire world
community. Regional cooperation can play an active as well as effective role
in the suppression of piracy, initiate and coordinate the anti-piracy activities to
66 “Asean Plan to Fight Terror”, The Straits Times, May 18, 2002.
67 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Diplomatic Bluebook 2001”, supra note
35.
68 “Call for Creation of UN Anti-Piracy Force”, Maritime Asia, November 12,
1999.
69 Article 3 of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships in Asia (on file with the author).
be sponsored by either individual countries or jointly, resolve some potential

jurisdictional conflicts arising from the enforcement of law of piracy in Southeast
Asia among the coastal states, to facilitate and safeguard the navigation in the seas.
It is believed that the countries in the region will make untiring efforts to reach
such cooperation.
Table 8.1 Ratification of the LOS and SUA Conventions in East Asia
State The LOS Convention (d/m/y) The SUA Convention (d/m/y)

Brunei Darussalam 05/11/1996 04/12/2003
Cambodia 18/08/2006
China 07/06/1996 01/03/1992
Indonesia 03/02/1986
Japan 20/06/1996 23/07/1998
Korea (North)
Korea (South) 29/01/1996 14/05/2003
Laos 05/06/1998
Malaysia 14/10/1996
Mongolia 13/08/1996
Myanmar 21/05/1996 19/09/2003
Philippines 08/05/1984 06/01/2004
Singapore 17/11/1994 03/02/2004
Thailand
Vietnam 25/07/1994 10/10/2002
Source: complied by the author.
Note: The date here is the date when the depository the United Nations received the
instrument of ratification.
Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations and not qualified to be a signatory of the
LOS Convention.
Chapter 9
Southeast Asian SLOC Security
Joshua H. HO
The Rise of Asia
The emergence of China and India as new major global players is expected to
transform the regional geopolitical landscape. Behind the rise is a combination of
high economic growth rates, expanding military capabilities, and large populations.
The combined 2002 gross domestic products (GDP) of China, India, and Japan
already total half that of the United States in nominal terms. By 2015, a study
by the National Intelligence Council in the United States forecasts that the same
combined GDPs will surpass those of the United States and the European Union
(EU), reaching US$19.8 trillion (China), US$14 trillion (India), and US$11.6
trillion (Japan), respectively, in 1998 dollars. By 2050, Goldman Sachs projects
that the situation will become even more astounding when the three Asian GDPs
combined will add up to slightly more than twice the U.S. GDP and about four
times that of Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy combined
in 2003 dollars. In 2050, therefore, the largest economies in the world will be
China, the United States, and India, respectively, with Japan at a distant fourth.
The sheer size of China’s and India’s populations—projected by the U.S. Census
Bureau to be 1.4 billion and almost 1.3 billion, respectively, by 2020—implies
Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Forecast: United States of America, , p. 5;

Country Forecast: China, p. 11; Country Forecast: Japan, p. 12; and Country Forecast:
India, London, Economic Intelligence Unit, 2003. The 2002 GDPs of the United States,
China, Japan, and India are US$11,145 billion (bn); US$1,299 bn; US$3,986 bn; and
US$501.2 bn, respectively, in nominal terms.
National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future
with Nongovernment Experts, Washington D.C., National Intelligence Council Publication,
2000, pp. 34–8.
Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path
to 2050,” Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper, no. 99, http://www.gs.com/insight/
research/reports/ 99.pdf, October 1, 2003, p. 4 (accessed July 1, 2008). The forecast 2050
GDPs of China, the United States, India, and Japan, are US$45 bn, US$35 bn, US$27 bn,
and US$7 bn, respectively, in 2003 dollars.
National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National
Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, Washington D.C., Government Printing Office,
December 2004, p. 47.
that the standard of living there need not approach Western levels in order for these
countries to become important economic powers.
Besides China, India, and Japan, the economies of other developing countries
such as Indonesia could also approach the economies of individual European
countries by 2020. Experts assess that over the course of the next decade and a
half, Indonesia may revert to high growth of 6–7 percent, which, along with an
expected population increase from 226 million to around 250 million, would make
it one of the largest developing economies.
Barring any unforeseen reversals to the globalization process, the rise of these
regional powers is virtually guaranteed; this will result in an increase in regional
demand for energy and raw materials as factors of production and consumption
and will also spur inter-regional and intra-regional trade flow. Because the sea is
the major transportation medium for trade and the conveyance of energy and raw
materials, dependence on the regional sea lanes will increase. In particular, the sea
lanes along Southeast Asia are vital to the transportation of goods, energy, and raw
materials to the dynamic economies of Northeast Asia.
Major Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia
The major sea lanes in Southeast Asia are constricted at key straits such as the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore Strait, the Sunda Strait, and the Lombok Strait.
The Straits of Malacca are 600 miles long and provide the main corridor between
the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The major sea lanes used by tankers
from the Middle East are the Straits of Malacca and the Singapore Strait: around
26 tankers, including three fully loaded supertankers heading for Asian ports, pass
through the Singapore Strait daily. Because this strait is relatively shallow, only
23 meters deep at most points, the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
has required an under-keel clearance of 3.5 meters for ships transiting the straits,
which translates to ships of at most 200,000 deadweight tons (dwt).
At its narrowest point, the navigable channel is only 1.5 miles wide. In terms
of total volume, more than 200 ships of 300 gross tons and above and of 50
meters or more in length pass through the Straits of Malacca daily—about 60,000
annually—carrying 80 percent of the oil transported to Northeast Asia. In terms
of value, the total tonnage carried by the Straits of Malacca amounts to 525 million
metric tons worth a total of $390 billion. The traffic volume makes Malacca the
busiest straits in the world currently, and it is likely to be even busier in future
because of increasing trade flows and energy demands in Asia. According to the
John J. Brandon, “Piracy on High Seas Is Big Business,” International Herald

Tribune, December 28, 2000.
Sumihiko Kawamura, “Shipping and Regional Trade: Regional Security Interests,”
in Shipping and Regional Security, eds Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates, Canberra:
Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Australian National University, 1998, p. 15.
Southeast Asian SLOC Security 159
Lloyd’s List bulletin, new orders for 200 liquefied nitrogen gas (LNG) carriers will
be required to satisfy the growth in demand during the next 15 years. The trend
of increasing traffic has also been observed for the traffic data as reported via the
Malacca Straits Ship Reporting System, or STRAITREP. The data from 1999 to
2005 indicate that traffic in the Malacca Straits increased by 42 percent within the
six-year period.
The Lombok Strait in Indonesia is wider, deeper, and less congested than the
Straits of Malacca. It separates the islands of Lombok and Bali. The minimum
passage width in the Lombok Strait is 11.5 miles and the depths are greater than
150 meters. Lombok is therefore considered the safest route for supertankers; the
bigger types of these eastbound ships sometimes transit this channel. For example,
tankers that exceed 200,000 dwt have to divert through the Lombok Strait because
of the depth constraints of the Straits of Malacca. Most ships transiting the Lombok
Strait also pass through the Makassar Strait between the Indonesian islands of
Borneo and Sulawesi, which has an available width of 11 miles and a length of
600 miles. About 3,900 ships transit the Lombok Strait annually; in terms of value,
the total tonnage carried by the Lombok Strait is 140 million metric tons worth a
total of $40 billion. Ships carrying iron ore from Australia to China also enter the
Indonesian Archipelago through the Lombok Strait.
The least of the three straits is the Sunda Strait. Located between Java and
Sumatra, it is 50 miles long and is another alternative to the Straits of Malacca. Its
northeastern entrance is 15 miles wide; because of its strong currents and limited
depth, deep-draft ships of over 100,000 dwt do not transit the strait, and it is not
heavily used. About 3,500 ships transit the Sunda Strait annually; in terms of value,
their total tonnage is 15 million metric tons worth US$5 billion.
Important seaborne trade also passes through the Philippine archipelago from
either the Pacific Ocean or the Makassar Strait to East Asia. Important shipping
routes in the area include one across the Sulu and Bohol seas between the Surigao
and Balabac straits used by shipping traveling between Southeast Asia and the
Pacific; one from the Makassar Strait across the Sulu Sea to the Mindoro Strait
used by ships traveling between the Indian Ocean and Australia and southern
China; and one passing between Mindoro and Luzon and then through the San
Bernardino Strait to the east and north of Samar. Some of these straits are very
narrow. The Philippines also has a complex network of inter-island shipping
routes with a high incidence of major shipping disasters. The Sulu Archipelago
(comprising the islands of Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi-Tawi) and the Mindanao and
Tony Gray, “Fears of Growing LNG Carrier Surplus Dismissed by Expert,” Lloyd’s
List, In-forma plc, May 13, 2005.
The STRAITREP is a Mandatory Ship Reporting System adopted by the IMO to aid
in navigational safety in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore whereby ships transiting the
Straits will have to report details of their passage to the respective Vessel Traffic Services
(VTS).
Sulawesi islands all have been neglected by the central governments in Manila and
Jakarta for decades.
In addition to permitting the transport of oil and iron ore to the major economies
in Northeast Asia such as China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, the Straits of
Malacca and Sunda Strait also carry a significant amount of container traffic:
large ports sit astride both these sea lanes. The ports that lie along the Malacca
and Singapore Straits include Singapore as well as Malaysia’s primary port, Port
Klang, and Tanjung Pelepas. In Indonesia, Tanjung Priok sits astride the Sunda
Strait. Singapore, of course, is a major transshipment hub and overlooks the main
east–west route within the global hub and spoke container network. Based on 2007
data, Singapore was the top container port in the world, handling 27.9 million 20-
foot equivalent units (TEUs); Port Klang (the 16th largest container port) handled
7.1 million TEUs; Tanjung Pelepas (18th largest) handled 5.5 million TEUs; and
Tanjung Priok (23rd largest) handled 3.9 million TEUs.
Because the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits are so important to the
transport of oil and raw materials—such as iron ore—as well as for the conveyance
of container traffic, the free and safe navigation of commercial vessels in these sea
lanes is an important issue. In this respect, piracy and terrorism are major threats
to the security of shipping in the sea lanes of Southeast Asia.
Piracy and Armed Robbery
A myth has been perpetuated that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore Strait are
both infected with pirates. However, the data observed do not seem to correlate
with this view. Taking International Maritime Bureau (IMB) data from the years
2000 to 2005, the total number of piracy attacks in these straits ranged from 26
to 64 per year.10 To the puritan, one piracy attack is one too many, but before any
alarm bells are rung we should note the context that these figures represent only a
tiny proportion of the ships that transit the straits. The proportion of ships attacked
in the Malacca and Singapore Straits ranges from 0.04 percent to 0.11 percent of
the total number of ships transiting annually. This figure is dwarfed by figures
for crimes committed on terra firma in some countries.11 Furthermore, attacks
are predominantly made on vessels proceeding on local voyages as well as on
smaller vessels, e.g., fishing vessels or tugs below 1,000 gross tonnes. Relatively
Ravindra Galhena, “Chinese Record Takeaway,” Containerization International,

March (2008), pp. 50–52.
10 Annual International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau Piracy
Reports, 2000–2005.
11 The total number of persons arrested in Singapore in 2007 was 19,371 persons.
This translates to 0.4 percent percent of the total population of 4.9 million. See Zul Othman,
“Unjustified Fears?” Today, September 15, 2008.
few attacks occur on mainline “through-traffic” vessels such as oil and gas tankers
bound for East Asia.
As to the profile of the pirates, it is reported that three types of groups typically
perpetrate sea piracy in Southeast Asia: (1) small criminals, (2) well-organized
criminal gangs, and—it is claimed by academics—(3) armed separatists.12
Although piracy has occurred in the region for centuries, what makes it dangerous
now is that pirate gangs appear to be better equipped and organized than most
local naval authorities. They make use of speedboats, modems, radars, satellite
phones, Very High Frequency (VHF) radios, and modern weaponry to take control
of merchant ships. They also use hijacked ships for human smuggling and the
transport of illicit drugs and weapons.13 Crime syndicates involved in piracy
incidents take advantage of governments that lack the financial resources, political
will, or efficient policing to successfully tackle the pirates’ criminal activities.
The emphasis on combating piracy is important because sea piracy has been
linked to the threat of maritime terrorist attacks since the events of September 11,
2001. Young and Valencia note that the “conflation of ‘piracy’ and ‘terrorism’ has
become common in the U.S. mass media and in government policy statements.”14
However, the authors challenge this conflation, and their article focuses on the
difference between piracy and terrorism. Young and Valencia also think that the
root causes of piracy and terrorism are different: pirates are financially motivated;
terrorists are politically or religiously motivated to redress perceived injustices.
This distinction will be key in determining the long-term approaches to combating
both phenomena, even if short-term measures may appear to be similar. This
view of the different motivating factors behind the pirate and the terrorist has
gained wide acceptance in the region. Even so, we must continue to watch for the
possibility of an overlap between piracy and maritime terrorism simply because
they are operationally similar and it is difficult to distinguish between the two
when an incident is unfolding. Piracy thus forms the background noise from which
maritime terrorist attacks may materialize.
12 Peter Chalk, Grey-Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: Piracy, Drug Trafficking,
and Political Terrorism, Canberra: Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense, no. 123,
Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Australian National University, 1997, chapter 2.
13 William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek, “Maritime Piracy in Asia,” in Asian
Security Handbook 2000, eds W. Carpenter and D. Wiencek, Armonk, N.Y., M. E. Sharpe,
2000, pp. 92–3.
14 Adam J. Young and Mark J. Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in
Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25: 2 (August 2003),
pp. 270–74.
Maritime Terrorism
Another threat to Southeast Asian resource and trade security is the specter of
maritime terrorism. In the new era of globalization, ports have evolved from
being traditional interfaces between sea and land to being providers of complete
logistics networks, spurred chiefly by containerization. Containerization has made
it possible for carriers to shift cargo delivery from a port-to-port focus to a door-
to-door focus. This stems from the interchangeability of the various modes of
transporting containers (by road, rail, or sea) also known as intermodalism, whereby
it has become possible for goods to move from the point of production— without
being opened—until they reach the point of sale or final destination. Ports are also
being differentiated by their ability to handle the latest generation of container
ships coming on-stream. According to a study by Ocean Shipping Consultants,
it is expected that by 2010, ships of 8,000 TEUs will be dominant in all trades.
Concepts for a container ship of 18,000 TEUs, the draft of which will maximize
the available depth of the Straits of Malacca, are already on the drawing board.15
The dual trend for ports is to be providers of complete logistics networks and also
venues capable of handling large container ships coming online. This means that
high-volume, mainline trade will focus on just a few mega-ports that will become
the critical nodes of global seaborne trade.
So important are hub ports in the global trading system that it has been estimated
that the global economic impact from a closure of the hub port of Singapore alone
could easily exceed US$200 billion per year from disruptions to inventory and
production cycles.16 The shutdown of the ports on the west coast of the United
States in October 2002 because of industrial action cost the U.S. up to a billion
dollars a day, highlighting the crucial role of hub ports.17
Hub ports therefore are potentially lucrative targets for terrorists. Maritime
terrorists could hijack carriers of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and turn them into
floating bombs to disable ports.18 The immolation of a tanker carrying 600 tonnes
of LPG would cause a fireball 1,200 meters wide, destroying almost everything
physical and living within this diameter. Beyond, a large number of fatalities and
casualties would occur.19 Other possible scenarios for maritime terrorism include
15 Daniel Y. Coulter, “Globalization of Maritime Commerce: The Rise of Hub Ports,”
in Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. Sam J. Tangredi, Washington, D.C., National
Defense University Press, 2002, pp. 135–8.
16 John H. Noer and David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in
Southeast Asia, Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1996.
17 George Bush, “Remarks by President George W. Bush Re: West Coast Ports Work
Stoppage,” White House Briefing, Federal News Service, October 8, 2002.
18 Michael Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime Related Terrorism
in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2004, pp. 112–14.
19 Ben Sheppard, “Maritime Security Measures,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Jane’s
Information Group, March 1, 2003.
detonation in a hub port of a “dirty bomb”—a conventional bomb configured to

disperse radioactive material. Such a bomb could be smuggled via a container in
a container ship.
Besides attacks on hub ports, attacks on shipping could also be an attractive
option for maritime terrorists. If such attacks were to become severe, owners and
captains might choose to divert from current sea lanes to safer routes. This kind
of diversion would likely be costly for industry. A 2002 study done by the U.S.
National Defense University concluded that if the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and
Makassar Straits and the South China Sea were blocked for transit, the resultant
extra steaming costs would run US$8 billion a year, based on 1993 trade flows.20
No doubt the cost would be even higher if current trade flows were used for the
estimate.
The organization that currently appears to be the only real threat to shipping
in the Straits of Malacca is the Jemaah Islamiah (JI; lit., Islamic community or
organization). The group has shown an interest in attacking shipping in the Straits
of Malacca and U.S. naval vessels visiting Singapore.21
Prominent officials have also indicated that commercial shipping could be
a potential target. At the 2003 Shangri-La Dialogue,22 Singapore’s then-Deputy
Prime Minister Dr. Tony Tan warned that with the hardening of land and aviation
targets, the threat of terrorism is likely to shift to maritime targets, particularly
commercial shipping.23 Other officials have echoed Tan’s warning. On August 5,
2004, England’s First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sir Alan West
warned that al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups were plotting to launch attacks on
merchant shipping. He also said that seaborne terrorism could potentially cripple
global trade and have grave “knock-on effects” on developed economies.24
Singapore and its Western official counterparts tend to highlight the maritime
terrorism threat and to conflate maritime terrorism with piracy to create a sense of
20 Coulter, “Globalization,” p. 139.

21 “Malacca Strait Is Terror Target, Admit Militants,” Lloyd’s List, August 26, 2004;
and Singapore White Paper, The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism,
Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003, pp. 29–30.
22 Started in 2002, the Shangri-La Dialogue is a conference held by the UK’s
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) that has involved, at one point or
another, defense ministers, deputy ministers, chiefs of defense staff, national security
advisers, permanent under secretaries, intelligence chiefs, and other national security and
defense officials from Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, East Timor, France,
India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and
Vietnam.
23 Dr. Tony Tan, deputy prime minister and minister for defense, Singapore, “Maritime
Security after September 11,” Second IISS Asia Security Conference, Singapore, May 30–
June 1, 2003.
24 “First Sea Lord Warns of al-Qa’eda Plot to Target Merchant Ships,” Lloyd’s List,
Informa plc, August 5, 2004.
urgency in developing immediate countermeasures to the threat. Both Malaysia

and Indonesia have preferred to delink the issue of piracy and maritime terrorism
and adopt a low-profile approach. Their predominant Muslim populations
and long-held suspicion of Western intentions have led them to pursue a more
nuanced and sensitive approach; both countries prefer to emphasize indigenous
solutions to the problem and to adopt a long-range view. For Malaysia this means
adopting a more moderate version of Islam; in Indonesia’s case it means focusing
on strengthening the capacity of the security agencies to handle such threats and
economically developing the poorer regions. Despite the different approaches, all
three countries, even the initially reluctant Malaysia and Indonesia, have realized
the need to adopt visible hard measures, not only as a deterrent but also to assure
the international community that something is being done to improve the security
of the sea lanes.
That said, maritime terrorism remains a low-probability event. For example,
over the past three decades maritime terrorist attacks have constituted only 2
percent of all terrorist attacks worldwide. Apart from a small number of hostage-
taking incidents, none of these has taken place in the Straits of Malacca.25
National Measures
Having detailed the nature of the threats of piracy and maritime terrorism, we can
add that the littoral countries have already taken steps to address these issues. Their
measures can be classified as national, bilateral, or multilateral. For example, the
Indonesian Navy is responding to increasing piracy in its waters by promoting a
package of reforms and modernizing the Navy’s ships to push toward a new emphasis
on coastal interdiction and more patrols against illegal activities.26 Indonesia has
also set up well-equipped Navy control command centers (puskodal) in Batam
and Belawan, emplacing special forces that can respond to armed hijackings and
piracy.27 The Indonesian chief of naval staff has urged the shipping community
to contact the two control command centers if it faces problems with piracy in
Indonesian waters. More importantly, Jakarta has shown a greater commitment to
tackle piracy at its source, acting against the pirates’ shore lairs and seeking to rein
in the corrupt officials and military officers whose acquiescence is necessary for
25 Data converted from Lieutenant Commander Krzysztof Kubiak, Polish Navy,
“Terrorism Is the New Enemy at Sea,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 129:12
(December 2003), p. 68.
26 Robert Karniol, “Indonesian Navy to Focus on Coastal Interdiction,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, November 12, 2003.
27 Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, “National Sovereignty and Security in the Strait
of Malacca,” paper delivered at the Conference on “The Straits of Malacca: Building a
Comprehensive Security Environment,” Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur,
October 11–13, 2004, pp. 8–10.
the pirates to operate with ease. Also, in 2005, the government launched Operation
Gurita (Octopus), sending over 20 Indonesian navy ships and several aircraft into
waters frequented by pirates which yielded positive results; the operation has been
conducted on an annual basis since.28
Indonesia is also in the process of developing an integrated maritime
surveillance system (IMSS) comprising of coastal surveillance stations (CSS)
equipped with long-range cameras and radars along the Malacca Straits. There
will be 12 CSSs to provide surveillance for the entire length of the Malacca Straits
and there are plans for 25 CSSs and 40 suitably upgraded vessels to cover the
country’s entire coastline.29 On the December 29, 2005, the Indonesian Maritime
Security Coordination Board (IMSCB or BAKORKAMLA) was reinvigorated
and placed under the coordinating minister for political and security affairs. The
board aims to formulate and determine general policy and enhance coordination
among the various government institutions in the field of sea security.30
The Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs has also undertaken dissuasion
programs that focus on alleviating poverty and bolstering people’s welfare in
remote areas. In particular, the regencies—Rokan, Hilir, Bengkalis, Siak, Palawan,
Indragiri Ilir, and Karimun—that border the Malacca and Singapore Straits are
currently the main priority areas. The next priority goes to the dozens of regencies
that border the other sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) through Indonesia.31
Malaysia has also taken action to keep the piracy rates low in the Malacca and
Singapore Straits. The Royal Malaysian Navy has built a string of radar tracking
stations along the Straits of Malacca to monitor traffic and has acquired new patrol
boats.32 In 2000 at the maritime enforcement level, a special anti-piracy task force
was established by the Royal Malaysian Marine Police with immediate acquisition
of 20 fast-strike craft and four rigid inflatable boats (RIBs) at a cost of RM 15
million (US$4.12 million). Sixty marine police officers have been trained to form
the marine police tactical commando unit. This unit will be assisted by two more
elite police forces, the Special Action Forces and the 69 Commando Unit, which
will accompany the marine police. The marine police tactical commando unit has
28 Vaudine England, “Free Flow: Piracy Ebbs but Not Cost of Insurance,”
International Herald Tribune, May 24, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/24/
business/transco125.php (accessed February 3, 2009). See also “Piracy in the Malacca
Straits Down Thanks to Indonesia Patrols,” Jakarta Post, December 1, 2005.
29 Nick Brown, “Indonesia Moves to Bolster Anti-piracy Surveillance,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, September 27, 2006.
30 Bulletin published by the Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board:
IMSCB.
31 Robert Magindaan, “Maritime Terrorism Threat: An Indonesian Perspective,”
paper presented at the Observer Research Foundation Workshop on “Maritime Counter
Terrorism,” New Delhi, November 29–30, 2004, p. 3.
32 Nick Brown, “Malaysia Asks for Help to Fight Piracy,” Jane’s Navy International,
Jane’s Information Group, November 1, 2003.
been deployed along the Straits of Malacca.33 In addition, the Malaysian police
have also deployed assault weapons on tugs and barges plying the busy shipping
lanes of the Straits of Malacca in response to two attacks involving tugs in March
2005 after a long absence of piracy in Malaysian waters.34 The government also
randomly places armed policemen aboard vessels carrying high-risk cargo through
Malaysian waters or entering Malaysian ports.35 The Royal Malaysian Navy has
also intensified its training activities and patrols in the northern reaches of the
Straits beyond the area of the one-fathom bank, in an effort to increase the naval
presence and thus deter both piracy and maritime terrorism.36
Another important measure adopted by the Malaysian Government is the
formation of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), the
equivalent of a coast guard, which was set up in November 2005. The MMEA will
bring together several existing maritime enforcement agencies such as the Royal
Malaysian Marine Police, the Fisheries Department, Immigrations Department,
Customs Department, and Marine Department. The consolidation of maritime-
related agencies into a single command of the MMEA is expected to enable more
focus and enhance Malaysia’s ability to deal with maritime-related offenses.37
The MMEA will also be involved in enforcement duties and search and rescue.
The Royal Malaysian Navy transferred six patrol vessels to the MMEA in June
2005.38
The Philippines have been dogged by resource constraints and have only
recently started to tighten its southern borders. It has announced a program
called Coast Watch South that is designed to enhance the Philippine Navy’s
ability to conduct surveillance and interdiction of security threats in the country’s
“southern backdoor.” Developed with help from Australia, the concept envisages
the establishment of 17 Coast Watch stations from Palawan to Davao Province
33 Iskander Sazlan, “Counter Maritime Terrorism: Malaysia’s Perspective,”

paper presented at the Observer Research Foundation Workshop on “Maritime Counter
Terrorism,” p. 13.
34 “Malaysia to Deploy Armed Police on Tugs and Barges,” Lloyd’s List, April 4,
2005.
35 “Malaysia to Put Armed Police on Ships in Malacca Strait,” Channel News Asia,
April 1, 2005, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/140335/1/.
html (accessed February 3, 2009).
36 Admiral Dato’ Sri Mohd. Anwar bin H. J. Mohd. Nor, chief of navy, Royal
Malaysian Navy, “Malaysia’s Approach,” presentation at the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) Regional Cooperation in Maritime Security Conference, Singapore, March 2–4,
2005.
37 Iskander Sazlan, “Counter Maritime Terrorism,” p. 13.
38 Nick Leong, “RMN to Transfer Six Patrol Ships to New Agency,” Star (Petaling
Jaya, Malaysia), April 27, 2005, http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file/2005/4/27/
nation/10767646& sec=nation (accessed April 27, 2005).
equipped with fast patrol boats and helicopters.39 In addition, data centers will be
set up in the southern ports of Davao and Zamboanga to coordinate operations
of various state agencies involved in border controls and management. Radar
stations will also be built on two areas on the Tawi-tawi chain of islands, the
country’s southernmost areas, to track movements of vessels entering and leaving
the country.40
Singapore has also implemented a range of measures to step up maritime
security. These include an integrated surveillance and information network for
tracking and investigating suspicious movement, intensified Navy and coast guard
patrols, random escorts of high-value merchant vessels plying the Singapore
Strait and adjacent waters, and the redesignation of shipping routes to minimize
the convergence of small craft with high-risk merchant vessels.41 In addition to
increasing its own patrolling activities, Singapore has cooperated closely with the
IMO by implementing amendments to the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea in the form of the International Ships and Port Facility Security
(ISPS) Code, which came into effect in July 2004.42 Singapore has also signed
the 1988 Rome Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention). The convention would extend
the rights of maritime forces to pursue terrorists, pirates, and maritime criminals
into foreign territorial waters; it also provides guidelines for the extradition and
prosecution of maritime criminals. Under the U.S. Megaports Initiative, Singapore
will install radiation detectors at its ports to scan containers for nuclear and
radioactive material.43 The Singapore Navy has formed the Accompanying Sea
Security Teams (ASSeT), similar to armed marshals, to board selected merchant
ships proceeding into and out of harbor to prevent the possibility of a ship being
taken over by terrorists.44
39 “Navy to Seal Off Southern Sea Borders,” Philippine Daily Enquirer, September
25, 2007.
40 Manny Mogato, “Philippines says Plans to Tighten Southern Border,” Reuters,
March 13, 2006.
41 Richand Scott, “IMDEX: Singapore Stresses Counters to Maritime Terrorism,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 1, 2003.
42 The ISPS Code is an IMO-mandated code that entered into force on July 2004.
The code covers ships of over 500 gross tons on international voyages, port facilities
serving ships on international voyages, passenger ships, and mobile offshore drilling units.
It requires that ships and port facilities carry out security assessments, after which ship and
ports are required to create security plans, appoint security officers, and maintain certain
security equipment.
43 David Boey, “Radiation Detectors for Singapore Port,” The Straits Times, March
11, 2005.
44 Goh Chin Lian, “Armed Navy Escorts for Suspect Ships,” The Straits Times,
February 28, 2005.
Singapore will also be unveiling the Changi Command and Control (C2)
Center in May 2009.45 The center will coordinate local, regional and international
efforts against maritime threats. The C2 Center will comprise the Singapore
Maritime Security Centre (SMSC), the Information Fusion Center (IFC) and the
Multinational Operations and Exercise Center (MOEC). The SMSC, made up of the
Navy’s Coastal Command Headquarters, as well as personnel from the Maritime
and Port Authority (MPA) and coast guard, will jointly monitor and respond to
crisis in and around Singapore waters. The IFC will foster information sharing
between regional armed forces and security agencies, enabling each country to
respond quickly to potential threats. Lastly, the MOEC will help conduct bilateral
and multilateral exercises, such as those held annually under the Five Power
Defense Arrangements.
Bilateral Measures
In addition to individual measures, there have been efforts at bilateral cooperation

based on a web approach. Indonesia and Singapore agreed in 1992 to establish
the Indonesia–Singapore Coordinated Patrols in the Singapore Strait. This has
involved the setting up of direct communication links between their navies and the
organization of coordinated patrols every three months in the strait.46 Singapore
and Indonesia have also set up a joint radar surveillance system, known as Project
SURPIC, for Surface Picture, which will monitor traffic in the Singapore Strait.47
Indonesia and Malaysia also decided in 1992 to establish a Maritime Operation
Planning Team to coordinate patrols in the Straits of Malacca. The Malaysia–
Indonesia Coordinated Patrols are done four times a year, and so is the Malaysia–
Indonesia Maritime Operational Coordinated Patrol, which is conducted together
with other maritime institutions, such as customs, search and rescue, and police
forces from the two countries.48 Beginning in September 2003, Malaysia and
Thailand also publicly increased the intensity of their cooperative maritime patrols
in the northern portion of the straits because of concerns over arms smugglers,
insurgents, and terrorists operating in the area.49
45 T. Rajan, “3 Maritime Centers to be Under One Roof; New Complex will Facilitate
Coordination in Dealing with Threats like Piracy, Terrorism,” The Straits Times, March 28,
2007.
46 Robert Go, “Singapore Strait Patrols Keep Pirates at Bay,” The Straits Times, May
16, 2002.
47 “Singapore and Indonesian Navies Launch Sea Surveillance System,” Ministry
of Defense (Singapore), news release, May 27, 2005, http://app.sprinter.gov.sg/data/
pr/20050527997.htm (accessed June 2, 2005).
48 Sondakh, “National Sovereignty,” p. 11.
49 “Malaysia and Thailand to Boost Maritime Border Crime Watch,” Agence France-
Presse, September 10, 2003, http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se/webnews/wed/bl/Qmalaysia-
thailand-crime. RtY8_DSA.html (accessed May 17, 2005).
There is also some security cooperation between the Malaysia, Indonesia and
the Philippines in the triborder area. Indonesia and the Philippines conduct four
coordinated patrols annually in the Celebes Sea, and both sides have agreed to
strengthen these patrols to stem arms smuggling into the Sulawesi.50 Malaysia and
the Philippines conduct just two coordinated patrols a year. Although the Philippines
has proposed year-round coordinated naval patrols, as well as designated sea lanes
for all maritime traffic to facilitate easier monitoring and inspection by the three
navies, so far none of the states has acted on these proposals.51
Besides the three littoral states, other regional countries have become
involved in the security of the Straits of Malacca. Japan for one has been active in
facilitating anti-piracy activities in the region. Since 2000, the Japan Coast Guard
has been conducting bilateral anti-piracy exercises with security forces throughout
the region. Furthermore, Japan provides significant direct assistance to support
regional states in their anti-piracy activities. For example, in May 2006 officials
announced that Japanese financial aid will provide Malaysian maritime forces with
satellite tracking systems, satellite telephones, high-capacity computers, and radio
telecommunication systems. Similarly, in 2006 Japan transferred ownership of a
maritime security training vessel to Malaysia’s Maritime Enforcement Agency and
pledged over US$15 million to Indonesia for the construction of patrol vessels.
Japanese aid has not been limited to materiel; the Japan Coast Guard provides
subsidized training courses for Southeast Asian coast guard officers and bases
technical experts in the region to assist with local capacity building.52
The United States has also taken a lead role in capacity building efforts. In
2006, U.S. legislation authorized the Pentagon to assist foreign countries improve
maritime security and counter-terrorism operations under the Global Train and
Equip Program (also know as Section 1206 authorization). Indonesia, Malaysia
and the Philippines have been among the prime beneficiaries of the program. In
2007–2008, the U.S. provided Indonesia with US$47.1 million worth of equipment
to improve its maritime situational awareness capabilities, including the coastal
surveillance radars to be installed along the Indonesia side of the Malacca Strait,
along the Makassar Strait and in the Celebes Sea. During the same period,
Malaysia received US$16.3 million in Section 1206 funding, including US$13.6
million for nine coastal radar stations along the Sabah coast and US$2.2 million to
improve aerial surveillance along the Malacca Straits. Since 2006, the Philippines
had received US$15.5 million to upgrade its maritime surveillance interdiction
capabilities. For 2008–2009, the Pentagon is seeking an additional US$9.5 million
50 “Philippines, Indonesia Vow to Boost Border Patrol Cooperation,” Philippine

Star, November 22, 2006.
51 “RP Discussing Anti-terror Sea Lanes with Malaysia, Indon,” Associated Press,
March 13, 2006.
52 Greg Chaikin, “Piracy in Asia: International Co-operation and Japan’s Role,” in
Piracy in Southeast Asia, eds. Derek Johnson and Mark Valencia, Singapore: ISEAS, 2005,
pp. 122–42.
under Section 1206 funding for coastal radars to be sited in the Sulu archipelago
and US$3.5 million for additional radar facilities in Indonesia. While some of
the U.S. funding has gone towards improving security in the Straits of Malacca,
most has been spent on projects in the Sulu and Celebes seas, also known as the
triborder sea area.53
China has also offered the littoral states help with capacity building. In April
2005, China and Malaysia signed a maritime security cooperation agreement and
have since agreed to increase the exchange of information and intelligence.54 China
concluded a similar agreement with Indonesia in April 2006.55 In addition, Beijing
has donated computer equipment to Bakorkamla and offered TNI-AL personnel
training in China.56
Since September 2004, the Indian and Indonesian navies have conducted
joint patrols of the Six Degree Channel, the waterway just west of the Straits of
Malacca that lies between Indonesia’s Sa-bang Island and the coast of Aceh in
Sumatra and India’s Nicobar Islands. All international shipping entering or leaving
the Straits of Malacca normally transits the Six Degree Channel.57 Also, since
2006, Indian officials have repeatedly offered the littoral states capacity-building
assistance, but these offers though welcomed have not yet been translated into
concrete programs.58 The U.S. has conducted anti-piracy exercises with Indonesia
involving the boarding and inspection of shipping.59
Multilateral Measures
In comparison to the bilateral cooperation that exists in Southeast Asia, the

multilateral response to piracy and terrorism has been limited in scope and is only
now starting to take shape. Although many multilateral forums exist such as the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian
53 Ian Storey, “What’s Behind Dramatic Drop in S-E Asian Piracy,” The Straits
Times, January 19, 2009.
54 “Joint Communiqué between the People’s Republic of China and Malaysia,”
Xinhua News Agency, December 15, 2005.
55 “China and Indonesia Seal Strategic Pact,” International Herald Tribune, April
26, 2005, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/04/25/news/indonesia.php (accessed May 9,
2005).
56 “China Provides Technical Assistance to Help Protect RI’s Seas,” Antara News,
February 14, 2007.
57 Donald Berlin, “Navy Reflects India’s Strategic Ambitions,” Asia Times Online,
November 6, 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FK06Df05.html (accessed
May 17, 2005).
58 “India to Help with Security in the Straits of Melaka,” Bernama, June 27, 2007.
59 “TNI Starts Anti-Piracy Exercise with U.S. Military,” Gatra [Phrase] (Jakarta),
May 2, 2005, http://www.gatra.com/2005-05-02/artikel.php?id84037 (accessed May 9,
2005).
Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Plus Three, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
concrete measures have materialized only from the latter two.
ASEAN
ASEAN comprises 10 nations: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,

Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The ASEAN work
program adopted in Kuala Lumpur in 2002 included an agreement to cooperate
in eliminating piracy in the region. The program seeks to increase information
sharing about piracy through several mechanisms involving ASEAN. It asks
member states to disseminate laws, regulations, agreements, and conventions;
cooperate with U.N. agencies and the IMB and IMO; and study piracy trends
in the region. The work program also proposes training efforts and encourages
ASEAN to seek technical and financial assistance from dialogue partners, relevant
U.N. bodies, and other specialized organizations.
The Bali Accord II, adopted at the ASEAN Summit in Bali in October 2003,
declared that maritime issues and concerns are transboundary in nature and
therefore shall be addressed regionally in a holistic, integrated, and comprehensive
manner. The Plan of Action of the proposed ASEAN Security Community also
included recommendations to cooperate mutually and to coordinate border patrols
to combat terrorism.
ARF
The ARF currently comprises 24 countries: the ASEAN countries, plus Australia,
Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Russian Federation, and the United
States. The ARF adopted the Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other
Threats to Maritime Security at the 10th ARF Post-Ministerial Conference held
in Cambodia in June 2003. In this document, ARF participants regard maritime
security as “an indispensable and fundamental condition for the welfare and
economic security of the ARF region.”60 The ARF participants also expressed
their commitment to becoming parties to the SUA Convention and its protocol.
To date, half of ASEAN have signed the convention, namely Brunei, Myanmar,
Singapore, the Philippines, and Vietnam. As a confidence-building measure, the
ARF conducted its first multilateral maritime security shore exercise in January
2007.61
60 The Tenth ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF Statement on Cooperation against

Piracy and Other Threats to Security, Jakarta: ARF Unit of ASEAN Secretariat, June 17,
2003.
61 “Singapore Hosts First Ever ASEAN Regional Forum Maritime Security Shore
Exercise,” MINDEF News, January 23, 2007, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_
and_events/nr/2007/jan/23jan07_nr.html (accessed June 24, 2008).
ASEAN Plus Three
The ASEAN Plus Three forum comprises the ASEAN nations together with China,
Japan, and South Korea. ASEAN Plus Three is an attempt to build a regional
association that is more limited in its geographic membership than APEC or the
ARF. The First ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime
(AMMTC3) was held in Bangkok in January 2004. The meeting focused on all
types of transnational crime in the region, including terrorism, money laundering,
sea piracy, cyber crime, and the smuggling of drugs, arms, and human beings.
Attendees vowed to improve communication and enhance intelligence sharing,
especially against the growing threat of terrorism in the region.62 The meeting’s
joint communiqué recognized that the root causes of transnational crime—
including poverty and development gaps—might be addressed within the ASEAN
Plus Three cooperative framework.63
In November 2001, at the ASEAN Plus Three Summit in Brunei, Japanese
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi proposed convening a government-level
working group to study formulation of a regional cooperation agreement related
to anti-piracy measures. Acceptance of this proposal has led to negotiations for
the establishment of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy
and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) among representatives of
the ASEAN states, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.
At a November 2004 meeting in Tokyo, the 16 nations agreed to set up an
Information Sharing Center (ISC) in Singapore. It will have the status of an
international organization and employ 13–15 full-time staff at full strength,
including representatives from the ReCAAP member countries. The ReCAAP
ISC was launched on November 29, 2006 in Singapore.64 This was the first time
that governments in East, Southeast, and South Asia had institutionalized their
cooperation in combating piracy and armed robbery against ships in the form of a
permanent body with full-time staff.65
62 Nancy-Amelia Collins, “War on Terrorism ‘ASEAN Plus 3’ Pledges to Combat

Transnational Terror,” Clarinews, January 10, 2005, http://quickstart.clari.net./voa/art/ek/
C5EC3E5DB39E-4FB1-872CCDFD76D82D7C.html (accessed April 11, 2005).
63 Joint Communiqué: The First ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on
Transnational Crime (AMMTC3), Bangkok, January 10, 2004, http://www.aseansec.
org/15646.htm (accessed April 11, 2005).
64 The 14 countries that have signed and ratified ReCAAP include Bangladesh,
Brunei, Cambodia, China, Japan, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
India, South Korea, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. Although Indonesia and Malaysia have yet to
sign or ratify the Agreement, they have expressed support for the ReCAAP ISC at the Batam
Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the three countries held in August 2005. ReCAAP ISC,
on its part, has also developed operational links with the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement
Agency and the BARKORKAMLA in Indonesia.
65 “Factsheet on the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and
Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP),” Singapore, Ministry of Transport, April
The ISC maintains a database of piracy-related information and facilitate

communication between national agencies prosecuting piracy cases; it will
critically analyze the whole topic of piracy based on information made available
through government agencies. An information network system (IFN), which is
web-based, has been developed to support the communications flow and exchange
between the ISC and ReCAAP member countries. The expenses of the ISC are
funded largely by voluntary contributions from ReCAAP member countries. As
the host, Singapore will bear the cost of the premises to house the ISC and the
organization’s entire start-up costs, including the development of the IFN, as well
as the ISC’s annual cost of operations.66 Japan is also contributing US$350,000
toward supporting the ISC’s activities.
Malacca Straits Patrols
When the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI)67 was announced by the
U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM),68 the littoral states of Malaysia and Indonesia
perceived it as a way for the U.S. to secure its interests in the Straits of Malacca
by conducting operational patrols. Both Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta opposed the
notion of patrols conducted by extra-regional countries, while Singapore was more
open to this option. As a by-product of the RMSI, and in response to concerns
expressed by the U.S. over security for vessels transiting the straits, Operation
MALSINDO (i.e., Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia) was born. Currently, 17 ships
have been allocated to the patrols, seven from Indonesia, five from Malaysia, and
five from Singapore. The first trilateral naval patrols were launched in July 2004;
they are aimed at reducing piracy and smuggling activities in the straits, around the
clock. Navies patrol only within the territorial waters of their respective countries.
Operation MALSINDO is now called the Malacca Straits Sea Patrols and is part of
the Malacca Straits Patrols, which encompasses air patrols as well as the security
arrangements between the three littoral states. Recently, Thailand has also become
a member of the Malacca Straits Patrols.69
20, 2006.
66 Ibid.
67 The RMSI intends to be a partnership of Asia-Pacific nations that are willing to
contribute their resources to enhance security. The RMSI aims to build and synchronize
inter-agency and international capacity, to harness available and emerging technologies,
to develop a maritime situational awareness to match the picture that is available for
international airspace, and to develop responsive decision-making structures that can call
on immediately available maritime forces to act when required.
68 The USPACOM, based in Hawaii, is a joint command comprising U.S. Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps assets.
69 “Thailand Joins Malacca Straits Patrols,” MINDEF News, September 18,
2008, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/mindef/news_and_events/nr/2008/sep/18sep08_nr.html
(accessed February 3, 2008).
“Eyes in the Sky” Initiative
The “Eyes in the Sky” (EiS) Initiative is also part of the Malacca Straits Patrols.
Launched in September 2005 at the behest of Malaysia, the initiative augments
the sea patrols and focuses on the conduct of maritime air patrols in the Straits of
Malacca by the four littoral countries.70 The participating countries each currently
contribute two maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) sorties per week for the EiS; each
MPA is allowed to fly above the waters of the states in question no less than three
nautical miles from land. Each aircraft has a Combined Maritime Patrol Team
(CMPT) on board, comprising a military officer from each of the participating
states. As a team, the CMPT establishes a comprehensive surface picture over the
patrol area and broadcasts any suspicious contacts on designated radio frequencies
to ground-based Monitoring and Action Agencies (MAAs) in each of the four
countries. Depending on whose territorial waters the incident takes place in, the
respective MAAs can activate patrols to follow up with action. So far the EiS is
still in its first phase, with the four countries as the principal operators of the MPA
flights. Under Phase 2, extra-regional countries will be invited to participate in the
MPA surveillance flights as well.
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand also signed an agreement to
form a Joint Coordinating Committee (JCC) that will oversee the aerial and sea
patrols of the Straits of Malacca.71 The JCC will be the channel of communication,
intelligence exchange, and coordination for all operational security measures
relating to the Malacca and Singapore Straits. Officials also signed the Standard
Operating Procedures for the Malacca Straits Patrols. The procedures enshrine the
existing bilateral cross-border pursuit arrangements between the four participating
countries. There is also an Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG) comprising the
naval intelligence agencies of the participating countries.
The four littoral countries have also developed the Malacca Straits Patrol
(MSP-IS) to aid them in the conduct of patrols.72 The MSP-IS is a data-sharing
system that allows users to share information about shipping to boost security in
the Malacca Strait. The system includes a reference database on more than 150,000
vessels and is able to detect ships with fake identities. It also allows information
70 Graham Gerard Ong and Joshua Ho, “Maritime Air Patrols: The New Weapon
against Piracy in the Malacca Straits,” Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies Commentary
70/2005, October 13, 2005, http://www.idss.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/IDSS702005.
pdf (accessed April 12, 2006).
71 Donald Urquhart, “Malacca Strait Air and Sea Patrols Brought under One
Umbrella,” Business Times, April 22, 2006.
72 “Inaugural Malacca Strait Patrols Information Sharing Exercise”, MINDEF
News, March 28, 2008, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2008/mar/
28mar08_nr.html (accessed June 24, 2008). See also K.C. Vijayan, “Data-sharing System
Boost for Malacca Straits Security; New System Allows Speedy Sharing of Info between
Countries to Tackle Piracy, Terrorism,” The Straits Times, March 29, 2009.
of an incident to be passed quickly to agencies in the four littoral states, so that a

coordinated response can be delivered.
Other Multilateral Arrangements
Besides the agreements and arrangements arising out of existing multilateral

mechanisms, two other arrangements exist that have not originated from these
more formal mechanisms but are nevertheless important. The two arrangements
include the Five Power Defense Agreement (FPDA) and the Western Pacific Naval
Symposium (WPNS).
Five Power Defense Agreement The FPDA was founded in 1971 and brings
together Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom in
a consultative defense arrangement. The FPDA was formed primarily as a response
to the Indonesian Confrontation;73 it calls for mutual consultations if any member
state faces a security threat. The agreement’s original focus on conventional
threats has now given way to more non-conventional threat scenarios. Recently,
the FPDA agreed to expand the scope of its activities to include non-conventional
security threats such as maritime terrorism. Members conducted an anti-terror drill
as part of Bersama Lima (Together Five) in September 2004.
Western Pacific Naval Symposium The WPNS was created in 1988 and brings
together 18 member navies, namely those of Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China,
France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the
Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Tonga, the United States,
Vietnam, plus the observer navies of Canada, Chile, and India.74 The administrator
of the WPNS is the U.S. PACOM. The WPNS originally was a forum designed
to promote mutual understanding among navies of the region and increase naval
cooperation in the western Pacific by providing a forum to discuss maritime
issues, both global and regional. In the process, the WPNS would generate a
flow of information and opinion among naval professionals leading to common
understanding and possibly agreement. The symposium has now grown to include
regular shore-based and sea exercises and could well form the basis of a U.S.-
led security architecture in the Asia-Pacific. At the very least, it is an important
confidence-building measure that will grow in importance as more countries
participate in its activities. It was also decided recently that coast guard agencies
73 The initial underlying rationale for the Five Power Defense Arrangement was
that the defense of Malaysia and Singapore remained indivisible and that they still faced
common potential threats: most importantly, a revival of the Confrontation (Konfrontasi)
approach in the event of reversion to a politically radical leadership in Indonesia like that
in 1963 and 1966, which had attempted to destabilize Malaysia, and included Singapore
before separation in 1965.
74 WPNS, http://www.apan-info.net/wpns/ (accessed May 13, 2005).
will be invited to participate in the next WPNS sea exercise to bolster inter-agency
coordination and understanding.7557 In May 2005, the WPNS conducted a two-
day multilateral sea exercise whose aims included improving the interoperability
of participating navies by compiling a picture of the sea situation and the sharing
of data through a common data link.
Another new initiative is “Connecting Networks for the Enhancement of
Knowledge Sharing,” which aims to allow non-navy agencies and intergovernmental
agencies to be invited to present topics of interest at workshops and symposia.
Towards a Stable Maritime Environment
The Asia-Pacific century is poised to begin, with China, India, and Japan leading
the way. Fueling the Asia-Pacific engine will be the continued economic growth
of China, as well as India, Japan, and the United States. As a by-product and
because of regional economic growth, trade flows into and within Asia-Pacific and
demand for energy in the region have grown and will continue to grow, leading to
an increasing reliance on the sea as a mode of transport.
This surge in the use of the sea means that it is ever more crucial to safeguard
the sea lanes. An act of armed robbery that occurred in February 2005 shows
the transnational character of the threat to shipping in the sea lanes. The incident
involved a Japanese tug and occurred in Malaysian waters; the Japanese crew
was taken hostage. Perpetrators from Indonesia were suspected to be responsible.
The hostages were finally released in the vicinity of southern Thailand after
the Japanese owners paid a ransom. In the wake of transnational threats, the
littoral states—besides taking individual measures—must move toward a more
cooperative regime among themselves and also with other stakeholders to enhance
the security of the sea lanes.
Because countries in the region share significant maritime interests, the creation
of a stable maritime environment needs to remain high on the regional political
agenda. However, it is important to also keep in mind the three broad principles
espoused by Singapore’s Defense Minister Teo Chee Hean at the March 2005 ARF
Confidence Building Measure Conference on Regional Cooperation in Maritime
Security: littoral states have the primary role in addressing maritime security
issues, other stakeholders have important roles to play, and consultation should be
pursued and the rule of international law observed in the implementation of any
new initiatives.
75 Rear Admiral Ronnie Tay, “Multilateral Frameworks and Exercises: Enhancing

Multilateral Co-operation in Maritime Security,” presentation at the ARF Regional Co-
operation in Maritime Security Conference, Singapore, March 2–4, 2005.
Chapter 10
The United States Response to Maritime
Terrorism
Kristen G. JURAS
Introduction
In 1984, Professor Louis B. Sohn and I co-authored a book summarizing the

current principles governing the law of the sea. Our publication contained not
a single reference to maritime terrorism—evidence of the fact that only 25 years
ago, maritime terrorism was not a pressing issue in the area of the law of the sea.
How little did we know then that a topic not even worthy of mention in our book
would become the focus of international attention in such a short time span.
Just one year later, in October 1985, members of the Palestine Liberation Front
(PLF) boarded the Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, as passengers. While
the vessel was sailing off the coast of Egypt in the Mediterranean Sea, the PLF
members seized control of the vessel. They threatened to destroy the ship, its crew
and passengers unless Israel released certain Palestinian prisoners. When Israel
refused to accede to the terrorists’ demands, the terrorists killed an invalid Jewish
American passenger and threw his body and wheelchair overboard. Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak led negotiations with the terrorists, resulting in their
surrender and the release of the ship and hostages.
The Achille Lauro incident drew the attention of the international community
to maritime terrorism. Considerable discussion arose concerning whether the1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provisions governing piracy
were adequate to address acts of maritime terrorism. The United Nations General
Louis B. Sohn and Kristen Gustafson, Law of the Sea in a Nutshell, West, 1984.
For a description of the Achille Lauro incident and the civil lawsuits filed by
members of the victim’s family against the PLF and others, see Dean Alexander, “Maritime
Terrorism and Legal Responses”, Transp. L. J., 19 (1991), pp. 1453, 1464–8.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, UN Doc. A/
CONF.62/122 (1982) (hereinafter referred to as the LOS Convention).
Article 101 of the LOS Convention narrowly defines piracy to include any illegal
acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the
crew or the passengers of one non-government ship against another non-government ship
(or persons or property on board) either on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction
of any state, such as an island constituting terra nullius. The Achille Lauro incident did not
fall within this definition of piracy in that it was committed for political, rather than private,
Assembly quickly adopted Resolution 40/61, condemning “all acts, methods and
practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed,” and requesting the
International Maritime Organization “to study the problem of terrorism aboard or
against ships with a view to making recommendations on appropriate measures.”
On March 10, 1988, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation was adopted in Rome, which established a
legal regime relating to maritime acts of terrorism.
In addition to actively participating in and supporting the International
Maritime Organization’s efforts in drafting the 1988 Rome Convention, the United
States also took steps on a national level in response to the Achille Lauro incident.
In 1986 the United States Congress enacted the International Maritime and Port
Security Act. The Act required the United States Secretary of Transportation to
prepare annual reports to Congress analyzing the threat from acts of terrorism to
United States ports and vessels. Additionally, the Secretary was required to assess
security measures maintained at foreign ports determined to pose a high risk
of acts of terrorism directed against passenger vessels. The Act also authorized
the United States Coast Guard to require inspections, patrol ports and harbors,
establish security and safety zones, and develop contingency plans and procedures
in an effort to combat maritime terrorism.
In 1997 the United States Department of Transportation published Port
Security: A National Planning Guide to provide “an overview of the essential
aspects of port security,” to identify “many of the challenges facing ports” and to
present a common basis for port officials “upon which to establish port security
standards”.10 The guide contemplated the publication of “how-to” manuals for
ends, and it did not involve two ships. For a discussion of the correlation between piracy
and terrorism, see Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., “Hostus Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and
a New International Law”, U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev., 13 (2006), pp. 293.
UN Doc A/RES/40/61, ¶13 (1985).
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, March 10, 1988, 27 Intl. Leg. Materials 668, reproduced at http://untreaty.
un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv8.pdf (accessed January 10, 2008). The Rome Convention
entered into force in March 1992. As of November 2007, there were 146 contracting
parties.
See generally Malvina Halberstam, “Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille
Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety”, Am. J. Intl. L., 82 (1988), p.
269. The definition of “terrorism” continues to be a subject of debate today. See Burgess,
supra n. 4.
Pub. L. 99-399, title IX, 100 Stat. 889 (1986); 46 U.S.C. App. § 1801 et seq.
33 U.S.C. § 1226.
10 The guide was produced under the direction of the U.S. Secretary of Transportation’s
Office of Intelligence and Security in conjunction with the U.S. Maritime Administration
and the U.S. Coast Guard. Input was also sought from the commercial maritime industry
and other federal agencies. It is available at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nmc/security/
portplan.htm (accessed January 10, 2008).
The United States Response to Maritime Terrorism 179
planning and conducting the daily operations of port security, including topics
such as developing port security plans, controlling access to port facilities, cargo
security, and maritime terrorism. The 1997 report noted that “port security must
be included in the national transportation planning framework that establishes
priorities for allocation of resources for governmental and private funding of
infrastructure investments.”
In 1998, the United States Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation to
form a taskforce to assess the adequacy of the United States’ marine transportation
system11 to operate in a safe, efficient, secure, and environmentally sound manner.
In September 1999, the taskforce submitted to Congress An Assessment of the U.S.
Marine Transportation System.12 The taskforce identified seven strategic areas for
action, including the security of the nation’s marine transportation system. The
report noted several areas of concern regarding marine transportation, including
the lack of integrated federal leadership; the lack of shared approaches to security;
the absence of a systemic and integrated approach to track cargo, people, and vessel
operations; and the ability of ports to address terrorism and sabotage threats.
As a result of this report, in 2000 18 federal agencies signed a memorandum of
understanding forming a new Interagency Committee for the Marine Transportation
System (ICMTS)13 to ensure the development and implementation of national
marine transportation system policies consistent with national needs and to report
to the president its views and recommendations for improving the system. The
ICMTS established a Security Committee responsible for addressing the physical
security of ports, vessels and waterways and their infrastructures; cargo, crew and
passenger security; and improvements in efficiency and communication between
agencies with security responsibilities.
Additionally, in 2000 the Secretary of Transportation established the Marine
Transportation System National Advisory Council (MTSNAC).14 The MTSNAC
consists of 30 industry leaders representing every element of the marine
transportation system. The purpose of the MTSNAC is to advise the Secretary of
Transportation on issues, policies, plans, and funding solutions needed to ensure
11 The “marine transportation system” includes waterways, ports, and their intermodal
connections with highways, railways, and pipelines. As noted in U.S. Department of
Transportation, Maritime Administration, An Assessment of the U.S. Marine Transportation
System (Sept. 1999), it consists of more than 1,000 harbor channels and 25,000 miles of
inland, intracoastal, and coastal waterways in the United States and serves over 300 ports,
with more than 3,700 terminals that handle passenger and cargo movements. The waterways
and ports link to 152,000 miles of rail, 460,000 miles of pipelines, and 45,000 miles of
interstate highways. The marine transportation system also contains shipyards and repair
facilities crucial to maritime activity.
12 The report is available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/publications/MTSreport/
index.html (accessed January 10, 2008).
13 See http://www.marad.dot.gov/marad_mts.html (accessed January 10, 2008).
14 For further information on the MTSNAC, visit the MTSNAC website at http://
www.mtsnac.org (accessed January 10, 2008).
that the United States marine transportation system is capable of responding to the
projected trade increases.
Another important national development in 2000 was the publication of the
Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports.15
The report noted the lack of adequate standards for physical, procedural, and
personnel security for seaports. The report rated the security at most United States
seaports as ranging from “poor to fair.”
Building upon the foundation of the various activities and reports described
above, in July 2001 Senator Ernest F. Hollings introduced Senate Bill 1214,
The Port and Maritime Act of 2001, to establish a program to ensure greater
security at United States ports. The proposed legislation incorporated several of
the recommendations contained in the Report of the Interagency Commission
on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports. Thus, the United States Congress was
well positioned to move forward with increased port security measures when the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center occurred in
New York City.
The United States response to the September 11, 2001 attack was swift and
many-faceted. On October 7, 2001, President Bush ordered United States Armed
Forces to begin combat action in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda terrorists and
their Taliban supporters.16 On October 8, 2001, President Bush established the
Office of Homeland Security to develop and coordinate the implementation
of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist
threats or attacks.17 On October 26, 2001, the president signed the “Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001” (USA PATRIOT Act).18 The PATRIOT Act was
a comprehensive piece of legislation, implementing significant changes to both
substantive and procedural criminal law, immigration law, money-laundering
statutes and other areas of law. As a part of its overall response to the terrorist
15 The Commission was formed by President Bill Clinton in 1999 to undertake “a

comprehensive review of the nature and extent of seaport crime and the overall state of
security in seaports.” The final report is available at http://www.securitymanagement.com/
archive/library/seaport1200.pdf (accessed January 10, 2008).
16 See the president’s letter to Congress informing them of his decision to initiate
combat at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011009‑6.html (accessed
January 10, 2008).
17 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011008‑2.html (accessed
January 10, 2008). The Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116
Stat. 2135 (2002) created the Department of Homeland Security in the largest government
reorganization in 50 years. The Department superseded, but did not replace, the Office of
Homeland Security, which retained an advisory role. The U.S. Coast Guard (formerly part
of the Transportation Department), U.S. Customs Service (formerly part of the Treasury
Department), and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (formerly a part of the
Department of Justice) were reorganized under the Department of Homeland Security.
18 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. (2001).
attacks, the United States also implemented significant changes to its maritime
policies, both on a national and international level.
Legislative Response: The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
In 2002, Congress focused on legislation to improve the security of its maritime

transportation system. Congress recognized the importance of the nation’s 361 public
ports as an integral part of the nation’s commerce, which handles approximately 95
percent of United States trade from overseas (exclusive of Canada and Mexico trans-
border shipments).19 Building upon Senator Holling’s 2001 proposed legislation as a
platform, in November 2002 Congress enacted the Maritime Transportation Security
Act20 to protect the nation’s ports and waterways from terrorist attacks.
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 established the following
cornerstones of a national port security program:
1. assessment of the vulnerability21 of vessels and national port facilities to

terrorist attacks and other transportation security incidents;22
2. development and implementation of national and regional maritime security
plans, as well as individual security plans for (a) port facilities and related
infrastructure (such as factories, cargo terminals, and power plants) and (b)
certain individual cargo and passenger vessels;23
19 In its findings, Congress also determined that current inspection levels of
containerized cargo were insufficient, due in part to inadequate scanning technology.
Congress also expressed concern over the lack of procedures to limit individual access to
secure areas in port facilities. See Section 101 of the Maritime Transportation Security Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2102 (2002).
20 Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2102 (2002).
21 The assessment must identify critical assets and infrastructures, threats to those
assets and infrastructures, and weaknesses in physical security, passenger and cargo security,
structural integrity, protection systems, procedural policies, communications systems,
transportation infrastructure, utilities and other areas. The vulnerability assessment must be
updated every five years. 46 U.S.C. § 70102. See generally U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies Report A-8 (July 2003), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/vamreport.pdf (accessed January 10, 2008).
22 A “transportation security incident” is defined as a “security incident resulting
in a significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or
economic disruption in a particular area.” 46 U.S.C. § 70101.
23 46 U.S.C. §§ 70103, 70104. The national plan must include (1) assignment of duties
and responsibilities among federal agencies and coordination with state governments; (2)
establishment of a surveillance and notice system to ensure the earliest possible notice of a
transportation security incident to the appropriate federal and state agencies; (3) a response
plan for ensuring that the flow of cargo through United States ports is reestablished as
efficiently and quickly as possible. In addition, the Secretary must designate regional
3. prohibition of entrance of individuals to secure areas of port facilities unless

the individual has been issued a biometric transportation security card;24
4. the assessment of the effectiveness of the antiterrorism measures maintained
at foreign ports25 and implementation of conditions restricting entrance of
vessels into the United States if departing from any foreign ports that do not
maintain effective antiterrorism measures;26
5. the implementation of automatic identification and other security systems
for vessels (intended to implement the international maritime security
regime developed in 2002 under the auspices of the International Maritime
Organization);27
6. the establishment of standards for screening cargo prior to loading in a
foreign port for shipment to the United States and for securing cargo while
in transit.28
The Coast Guard, under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, has
significant responsibility for implementation of the various measures adopted by
Congress to improve the security of United States ports and marine transportation
systems.29 In July 2003 the Coast Guard published interim rules implementing the
Maritime Transportation Security Act, which became final on October 22, 2003.30
areas for which an Area Maritime Transportation Security Plan must be established, to be
implemented in conjunction with the national security plan.
24 Biometric identification relies on physical characteristics that are unique to each
person to ascertain the identification of an individual. Biometric identification can include
scanning of fingerprints, retina or iris, and voice identification. The cards have been designated
as “Transportation Worker Identification Credentials,” or “TWICs.” 33 C.F.R. § 101.105.
25 46 U.S.C. § 70108.
26 46 U.S.C. § 70110.
27 46 U.S.C. §§ 70114 - 70115. In the same time frame that the Maritime Transportation
Security Act was being drafted and enacted, the International Maritime Organization was
drafting a comprehensive security regime to strengthen maritime security and prevent
and suppress acts of terrorism against shipping, including implementation of automatic
identification and tracking systems. Its efforts resulted in the adoption of a number of
amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), the most far-reaching
of which were the new International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).
IMO Doc. SOLAS/CONF.5/34, annex 1 (Dec. 12, 2002) (containing Resolution 2 of the
December 2002 conference, which contains in its annex the ISPS Code), available at http://
www.imo.org (accessed January 10, 2008).
28 46 U.S.C. § 70116.
29 Prior to September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard operated under the auspices of the
Department of Transportation. Jurisdiction over the Coast Guard was transferred to the
Department of Homeland Security after its establishment under The Homeland Security
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
30 Implementation of National Maritime Security Initiatives, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,448
(Oct. 22, 2003).
Agency Response: C-Tpat and the Container Security Initiative
The United States Customs and Border Protection (formerly the United States
Customs Service) is the agency primarily responsible for inspecting cargo entering
the United States.31 It was one of the first United States agencies to take steps
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to improve maritime security. In
November 2001, it announced its voluntary Customs–Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT) program, and in January 2002 it announced its Container
Security Initiative.
Under the C-TPAT program, United States Customs officials review the
compliance history, security profile and practices of private companies who
volunteer to participate in the program. Over 7,400 companies are enrolled,
including importers, customs brokers, forwarders, terminal operators, carriers,
foreign manufacturers and other entities in the international supply chain and
transportation system. If a company is certified, it receives certain benefits, such
as reduced examinations of cargo or reduced delays if their cargos are examined.32
In October 2006, the C-TPAT was officially enacted as part of United States law
with the enactment of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE
Port Act).33
Most of the world’s non-bulk cargo travels in marine shipping containers.34
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, attention quickly shifted to the
possibility that containers could be used to conceal weapons of mass destruction
or terrorists.35 In January 2002, United States Custom announced the Container
Security Initiative, consisting of four core elements:
31 Previously a division of the Department of Treasury, the United States Custom
Service became a part of the Homeland Security Department in March 2003. It is now
officially referred to as the United States Customs and Border Protection.
32 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Securing the Global Supply Chain: Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) Strategic Plan (November 2004), available
at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/ctpat_
strategicplan.ctt/ctpat_strategicplan.pdf (accessed January 10, 2008).
33 Pub. L. No. 109-347, §§ 211-223, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006).
34 Approximately 90 percent of the world’s trade moves by cargo container. See U.S.
General Accounting Office, Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will
Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors (GAO Report 03-770 July 2003).
For the period 1999 to 2004, United States container imports increased by 58 percent.
As of year-end 2004, the world containership fleet was comprised of 3,375 vessels of 7.2
million TEUs. U.S. Maritime Administration Office of Statistical and Economic Analysis,
Containership Market Indicators (August 2005), available at http://www.marad.dot.
gov/MARAD_statistics/2005%20STATISTICS/Container%20Market%20Indicators.pdf
(accessed January 10, 2008).
35 OECD Maritime Transport Committee Report, Security in Maritime Transport:
Risk Factors and Economic Impact (July 2003) available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/19/61/18521672.pdf (accessed January 10, 2008).
1. development of security criteria to identify high-risk containers,

2. pre-screening those containers identified as high-risk before they arrive in
United States ports in cooperation with foreign governments,
3. use of scanning technology to quickly pre-screen high-risk containers, and
4. development of smart and secure containers.36
United States Customs identified 20 ports as potential Container Security

Initiative partners, based upon the highest volume of ocean container shipments
to the United States. Within its first year, agreements had been entered with 15
foreign governments for the placement of United States Customs personnel at 24
foreign ports (including 18 of the 20 target ports).37
When United States Customs personnel ran into legal and logistical problems
that made it difficult for them to obtain vessels’ cargo manifests, an essential
component in identifying potential high-risk containers for screening, Customs
adopted the “24-Hour Rule.” This rule requires all sea carriers (with the exception
of bulk carriers) to provide proper cargo descriptions and valid consignee
addresses 24 hours before cargo is loaded at the foreign port for shipment to
the United States.38 The OECD reported that this rule, which exceeded existing
international requirements as established under the ISPS Code, was “probably the
most contentious of all of the security measures announced to date.”39
36 Each container trip to the United States has, on average, 17 different stops, or points
at which the container’s journey temporarily halts. Security measures need to be layered,
with checks at multiple stages on a container’s journey, including gaining information about
which containers might be risky, creating uniform procedures regarding packing and moving
goods so that anomalies will be seen more easily, limiting access, and improving screening
and tracking technologies. Stephen S. Cohen, “Boom Boxes: Containers and Terrorism”, in
John D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz, eds, Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing
Security and Cost, Public Policy Institute of California, 2006, available at http://www.ppic.
org/content/pubs/report/R_606JHR.pdf (accessed January 10, 2008).
37 Two of the twenty priority ports, Shanghai and Yantai, are located in China.
Although China did not sign a bilateral agreement, it agreed “in principle” to participate
in the Container Security Initiative. U.S. General Accounting Office, Container Security:
Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success
Factors, p. 20. United States Customs planned to have a total of 58 ports participating in the
Container Security Initiative by the end of 2007. U.S. General Accounting Office, Maritime
Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later (GAO Report
08-126T October 2007), p. 31.
38 The 24-hour rule became fully effective on February 2, 2003. Section 343 (a) of
the Trade Act (Public Law 107-210—as amended) required the promulgation of regulations
by October 1, 2003 to provide for the mandatory collection of electronic cargo information
by United States Customs prior to importation into or exportation from the United States.
39 For a general discussion of the 24-Hour Rule and international reaction, see OECD
Maritime Transport Committee Report, Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and
Economic Impact, pp. 138–46.
United States Customs has developed the “Automated Targeting System” to

assess the risks of individual cargo containers by using a complex mathematical
model to assign a risk score to each arriving shipment based on shipping
information.40 If a shipment is determined to be high risk, United States Customs
personnel refer the shipment to the foreign port officials, who then make the
decision whether or not to inspect the shipment. Since the adoption of the Container
Security Initiative, United States Customs has worked diligently to develop high-
technology scanning equipment in an effort to make inspections more efficient.
The SAFE Port Act of 2006 incorporated the Container Security Initiative into
law, and required all containers entering the United States through the 22 highest-
volume United States ports to be scanned for radiation by July 2007.41 The Act
authorized the Department of Homeland Security to establish a pilot program at
several overseas ports to determine if 100 percent scanning of containers bound
for all United States ports would be possible in the future. The Act also required
pilot testing of new integrated scanning systems that combine non-intrusive
imaging equipment and radiation detection equipment. In 2007, the Department
of Homeland Security initiated the Secure Freight Initiative at six foreign ports,
using a combination of existing technology and nuclear detection methods to
test whether 100 percent scanning can be accomplished.42 Under the Megaports
Initiative established by the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security
Administration, the United States has installed radiation detection equipment at
eight foreign ports as of August 2007, to enable foreign government personnel to
screen shipping containers for nuclear and other radioactive material.43
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
amended the SAFE Port Act requirements by requiring all containers bound for
the United States to be screened for radioactive materials by July 1, 2012, with
exceptions to be given on a case-by-case basis under strict parameters.44 The
requirement of 100 percent scanning of United States-bound containers has raised
objections throughout the international community.45 The United States General
40 U.S. General Accounting Office, Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status
and Implementation One Year Later, p. 27. The SAFE Port Act requires the United States
Customs and Border Protection to take additional actions to improve the Automated Target
System. Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 203(e) (2006).
41 Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 121.
42 Blank Rome Counselors at Law, The Requirement for 100% Scanning of Cargo:
Impediment to Trade or Technologic Opportunity? (Sept. 2007) available at http://www.
blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentID=37&itemID=1348 (accessed January 10, 2008).
and Implementation One Year Later, p. 41.
44 Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1701(a), 121 Stat. 266, 489-90.
45 See World Shipping Council, Statement Regarding Legislation to Require 100%
Container Scanning (July 2007).
Accounting Office has also raised several concerns regarding the 100 percent
scanning requirement in recent testimony before Congress.46
Both the C-TPAT and Container Security Initiative have served as world-wide
models to improve security of the global supply chain. In June 2005, member
countries of the World Customs Organization adopted the WCO Framework of
Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade. The SAFE Framework consists
of four core elements, including (1) harmonizing the advance electronic cargo
information requirements on inbound, outbound and transit shipments; (2)
adoption by all participating countries of a consistent risk management approach
to address security threats; (3) providing for inspection of high-risk containers
upon the reasonable request of a receiving nation, using non-intrusive detection
equipment such as large-scale X-ray machines and radiation detectors and (4)
establishing benefits to be provided to businesses that meet minimal supply chain
security standards and best practices.47
Executive Response: Proliferation Security Initiative
In May 2003 President George W. Bush announced the Proliferation Security

Initiative as an international effort to stop the shipment of “weapons of mass
destruction,” or “WMD.”48 Ten countries originally joined with the United States
to shape and promote the Proliferation Security Initiative, including Australia,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom. Other nations, including Canada, Norway, Russia, and Singapore,
have since joined the effort and some 40 additional states have voiced support for
the initiative. The nations initially participating in the initiative released a set of
principles September 4, 2003,49 which set forth the purpose of the PSI as:
to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and
stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and
from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national
and Implementation One Year Later, pp. 43–6.
47 As of September 11, 2007, 148 WCO member countries had signed letters of intent
to implement the SAFE Framework. World Customs Organization, WCO SAFE Framework
of Standards (June 2007) available at http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/
PDFandDocuments/SAFE%20Framework_EN_2007_for_publication.pdf (accessed
January 10, 2008).
48 See press release, U.S. Department of State, Proliferation Security Initiative (May
26, 2005), www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/46858.htm (accessed January 10, 2008).
49 The interdiction principles can be found on the U.S. State Department’s website at
http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm (accessed January 10, 2008).
legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the
U.N. Security Council.
The Statement identifies four practical ways that participating states can pursue
the Proliferation Security Initiative’s overall objective:
1. by undertaking effective measures, either alone or in concert with other

states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD or related
materials;
2. by adopting streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant
information concerning suspected proliferation;
3. by reviewing and working to strengthen relevant national and international
legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives; and
4. by taking specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes
of WMD or related-materials.
The United Nations endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative when the
UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 on April 28, 2004.50
However, several major maritime countries, including China and North Korea,
have not joined the Proliferation Security Initiative.
The 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security
In December 2004, President Bush directed the Secretaries of the Department of

Defense and Homeland Security to lead the federal effort to coordinate various
United States agency maritime security programs “to achieve a comprehensive
and cohesive national effort involving appropriate Federal, State, local, and private
sector entities.” This effort resulted in the National Strategy for Maritime Security,
announced on September 20, 2005.51 The document identifies the nation’s maritime
security objectives to include:
1. the prevention of terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts;

2. the protection of maritime-related population centers and critical
infrastructures;
3. minimizing damage and expediting recovery in the event of a terrorist
attack or other significant event;
4. safeguarding the ocean and its resources.
50 UN DOC. S/RES/1540 (2004).

51 http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/maritime‑security.html (accessed January
10, 2008).
To achieve these objectives, the document identifies the following five strategic
actions:
1. enhance international cooperation;

2. maximize awareness of the “maritime domain;”52
3. embed security into commercial practices;
4. deploy layered security that “integrates the capabilities of governments and
commercial interests throughout the world;” and
5. assure continuity of the marine transportation system.
Reducing Crime and Terrorism at America’s Seaports Act of 2005
The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (the Act)53
enacted several criminal measures to penalize terrorist activities committed at
U.S. seaports or aboard vessels.
It is a federal crime to use fraud or false pretenses to enter federal property, a
vessel or aircraft of the United States, or the secured area in an airport.54 Section 302
of the Act extended the crime to seaports and increases the period of imprisonment
for violations from five to ten years. Section 303 of the Act establishes a new
crime making it illegal, in the case of a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, to fail to heave to, or to forcibly interfere with the boarding of the
vessel by federal law enforcement or resist arrest, or to provide boarding federal
law enforcement officers with false information concerning the vessel’s cargo,
origin, destination, registration, ownership, nationality or crew.55 The crime may
be punished by imprisonment for up to five years.
Section 304 of the Act makes it unlawful to place a dangerous substance or
device in the navigable waters of the United States with the intent to damage
a vessel or its cargo or to interfere with maritime commerce. This new crime
is punishable by imprisonment for any term of years or for life (or the death
penalty if death results).56 Section 304 also makes it unlawful to tamper with any
52 The maritime domain is defined to include “all areas and things of, on, under,
relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway,
including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other
conveyances.”
53 Pub. L. 109-177, 120 Stat. 233 (2005)
54 18 U.S.C. § 1036.
55 Pub. L. 109-177 § 303(a), adding new 18 U.S.C. § 2237.
56 Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 304(a), 120 Stat. 235 (2006), adding new 18 U.S.C. §
2282A.
navigational aid maintained by the Coast Guard, punishable by imprisonment of

up to 20 years.57
Section 305 of the Act establishes a new federal offense making it unlawful
to knowingly transport aboard any vessel in the United States, in waters subject
to United States jurisdiction, on the high seas, or aboard a vessel of the United
States, an explosive or incendiary device, biological agent, chemical weapon, or
radioactive or nuclear material, knowing that any such item is intended to be used
to commit a federal crime of terrorism. The crime is punishable by imprisonment
for any term of years or for life and may be punishable by death if death results
from commission of the act.58
Section 305 also establishes as a new crime the knowing and intentional
transport of any terrorist aboard any vessel within the United States and on waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or any vessel outside the United
States and on the high seas or having United States nationality. The crime is
punishable for any term of years or for life.59
Section 308 of the Act increases from one year to five years the penalty for
stowing away on a vessel if the offense is committed with the intent to inflict
serious injury upon another or if serious injury to another results. If death results,
punishment is by death or imprisonment for any term of years or for life).60
Section 309 of the Act makes it a federal crime to bribe any individual (private
or public) with respect to various activities within any secure or restricted area or
seaport with the intent to commit international or domestic terrorism.61 Offenders
face imprisonment for not more than 15 years.62
State Response
In the United States, each individual state has the ability to adopt its own maritime
strategic policies, provided that they are not inconsistent with federal law. For
example, on October 12, 2006 Governor Schwarzenegger created the California
57 Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 304(b), 120 Stat. 235 (2006), amending 18 U.S.C. §
2282B.
58 Pub. L. No. 109-177, §305(a), 120 Stat. 236 (2006), adding new 18 U.S.C. §
2283.
59 Pub. L. No. 109-177, §305(a), 120 Stat. 236 (2006), adding new 18 U.S.C. §
2284.
60 Pub. L. No. 109-177, §308, amending 18 U.S.C. § 2199.
61 18 US.C. 2331 defines both domestic and international terrorism to include acts
dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of
any state, and appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii)
to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.
62 Pub. L. No. 109-177, §309, adding new 18 U.S.C. § 266.
Maritime Security Council.63 Specific duties of the California Maritime Security

Council include identifying potential maritime threats; improving maritime
security measures, procedures, and communications; coordinating contingency
planning and information sharing among the 11 California ports and various
state and federal agencies; conducting training exercises; developing a statewide
maritime security strategy; and preparing to quickly recover from a catastrophic
event at a California port.
The Council recently reported that the California Maritime Security Strategy is
being prepared to accomplish three key outcomes:
1. Establish a state strategy to allow state, local, and private sector officials to
prioritize the investment in resources and efforts to strengthen the security
posture at California ports to prevent incidents and develop resilience
in operations so they can quickly recover in the aftermath of disruptive
events.
2. Coordinate the security strategies of California’s 11 commercial ports to
develop baseline and escalating security measures and resources while also
recognizing the uniqueness and special needs of each port.
3. Provide technical assistance to the ports in developing their own operational
security strategy that meets the state and federal requirements, and is
tailored to the unique nature of each port. Operational and tactical plans
for security will remain with the individual ports in support of the overall
state strategy.64
2007 Status Report
The United States General Accounting Office recently reported to Congress as to

the nation’s progress in implementing the various measures discussed above to
protect the security of United States ports and marine transportation systems.65
Administration and Information Sharing
As of August 2007, the Coast Guard has organized 46 Area Maritime Security
Committees for various geographic areas around the country. Each Area Maritime
Security Committee is comprised of experienced representatives from a variety
63 See Executive Order S-19-06 at http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/4423 (accessed

January 10, 2008).
64 California Maritime Security Council, Report to the Governor and Legislature
(November 1, 2007), available at http://www.homeland.ca.gov/pdf/CMSC_AnnualReport-
2007.pdf (accessed January 10, 2008).
and Implementation One Year Later, pp. 43–6.
of port interests. The Area Maritime Security Committees have each prepared an
Area Maritime Transportation Security Plan for its port area in compliance with the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. Each area plan coordinates with the
national and other area plans, and must be updated every five years. The committees
share information with each other, the Coast Guard and other agencies involved
in maritime security operations. Information exchange has greatly improved.66 In
addition, the Coast Guard has established 35 sector command centers across the
country, four of which operate in partnership with the U.S. Navy. Additionally, the
SAFE Port Act requires the establishment of interagency operational centers at all
high-priority ports no later than three years after the Act’s enactment. The Coast
Guard is currently working with multiple agencies to establish pilot interagency
operational centers.
Maritime Security Exercises
The Maritime Transportation Security Act requires the Coast Guard and Area
Maritime Security Committees to conduct or participate in exercises to test the
effectiveness of Area Maritime Security Plans regularly, with no more than 18
months between exercises. In August 2005, the Coast Guard and the Transportation
Security Administration established the Port Security Training Exercise Program
(PortSTEP). Between August 2005 and October 2007, the Coast Guard expected
to conduct PortSTEP exercises for 40 Area Maritime Security Committees.
Additionally, the Coast Guard initiated its own Area Maritime Security Training
and Exercise Program (AMStep) in October 2005. Both programs were designed
to involve the entire port community in the implementation of the Area Maritime
Security Plan. Between the two programs, all port areas have received a port
security exercise each year since inception. The SAFE Port Act has added
additional requirements for port exercises, which the Coast Guard is working to
implement.
Foreign Port Assessments
As mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act, in April 2004 the

Coast Guard developed its International Port Security Program to assess security
measures at foreign ports. Under this program, the Coast Guard negotiates with
the host nations a time and location to review the implementation of security
measures in the host nations’ ports against established security standards,
including the International Maritime Organization’s International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) Code.67 The SAFE Port Act requires the Coast Guard to
66 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Maritime Security: Information-Sharing

Efforts Are Improving (Report No. GAO-06-933T July 10, 2006).
67 The ISPS code requires facilities to conduct an assessment to identify threats and
vulnerabilities and then develop security plans based on the assessment. Other nations also
increase the pace of its visits to foreign ports, and to reassess the foreign ports once
every three years. The Coast Guard intends to complete its assessment of foreign
ports by March 2008, at which time it will begin reassessments. The Coast Guard
has faced some resistance by several countries who believe that the frequency of
the reassessments (once every two to three years) interfere with the host nation’s
sovereignty.
Port Facility Security Plans
The Maritime Transportation Security Act required owners and operators of

certain port facilities to assess their security vulnerabilities and to develop security
plans to mitigate those vulnerabilities, which were required to be implemented by
July 1, 2004. The Coast Guard adopted regulations governing the content of the
plans, including items such as measures for access control, responses to security
threats, and drills and exercises to train staff and test the plan.68 The SAFE Port Act
has increased the required number of Coast Guard inspections of these facilities
from once to twice each year, and requires that at least one annual inspection be
unannounced.
Transportation Worker Identification Cards
The Transportation Security Administration, a division of the Department of

Homeland Security, is responsible for the development and issuance of biometric
transportation worker identification cards, or TWICS, to control access to secure
port facilities. Before issuing a TWIC, the Transportation Security Administration
must conduct background checks on transportation workers to ensure they do not
impose a security risk. It is anticipated that more than 750,000 workers including
longshoremen, truckers, port employees and others will be required to obtain a
TWIC. The Transportation Security Administration encountered several difficulties
and delays in implementing the TWIC program. It failed to meet its obligation
under the SAFE Port Act to implement TWIC at the 10 highest-risk ports by July
1, 2007. Enrollment and issuance of TWICs began at the Port of Wilmington,
Delaware on October 16, 2007 and will continue through calendar year 2008. To
obtain a TWIC, an individual must provide biographic and biometric information
such as fingerprints, sit for a digital photograph and successfully pass a security
threat assessment. The Transportation Security Administration is currently
planning a pilot to test TWIC access control technologies, such as biometric card
readers, in the maritime environment as required by the SAFE Port Act.
have the right to make reciprocal visits to United States ports to assess their implementation
of ISPS code requirements.
68 Requirements for security plans for facilities are found in 33 C.F.R. Part 105,
Subpart D.
CBP In-Bond Program
To facilitate trade, the United States Customs and Border Protection implemented
a system that allows imported cargo intended for either United States or
foreign markets to move from one United States port to another without being
assessed United States duties or quotas and without officially entering United
States commerce. This cargo referred to as an in-bond shipment, and requires a
responsible party to be covered by an approved bond and agree to comply with
applicable regulations. Some port officials have estimated that in-bond shipments
represent from 30 percent to 60 percent of goods received at their ports. The in-
bond system allows the trade community to avoid congestion and delays at United
States ports whose infrastructure has not kept pace with the dramatic growth in
trade volume. Because data regarding in-bond cargo is not put into the Automated
Targeting System to analyze the cargo’s risk, in-bond goods are able to transit
the United States without having the most accurate Automated Targeting System
score. As required by the SAFE Port Act of 2006, United States Customs and
Border Protection has prepared for review by several congressional committees
regarding potential improvements to the in-bond system. The report includes
an assessment, among other matters, of whether ports of arrival should require
additional information for in-bond cargo, the feasibility of reducing transit
time while traveling in-bond, and an evaluation of the criteria for targeting and
examining in-bond cargo.
Conclusion
Over the past ten years, the United States has taken significant steps to protect its
vitally important seaports and marine transportation system. Numerous factors
make the development and implementation of a national maritime strategy
complex, including the following factors excerpted from a report by the Public
Policy Institute of California:69
Volume. An extremely large amount of goods flows through the maritime supply
chain. In 2004, America’s ports handled almost 20 million ocean containers.
Intermodality. Goods arrive at and depart from the port not only by ship but by
rail and truck.
Jurisdictional conflicts. Federal, state, and local governments all may have
oversight over some portion of port activities. In addition, some ports are
69 John D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz, eds, Protecting the Nation’s Seaports:
Balancing Security and Cost (Public Policy Institute of California 2006), available at http://
www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_606JHR.pdf (accessed January 10, 2008).
managed by local or regional port authorities, whereas others are managed by

local or state governments or by private entities.
Quantity of stakeholders. Carriers, shippers, logistics firms, producers, labor

unions, and others all work at or use the ports and all must be involved in security
efforts for these to be effective.
Global nature of industry. Any serious security effort requires international

cooperation from foreign governments, foreign port operators, and foreign ship
owners.
Time sensitivity. Production has moved to just-in-time processes, with

manufacturers relying on steady shipments of inputs.
Public and private involvement. Both sectors are likely to be interested in

having the other carry the burden of financing or even planning security efforts.
The costs of implementing a comprehensive maritime strategy are significant.

The Coast Guard estimated that implementation of the regulations enforcing the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 would cost more than $7.3 billion
in 2003 dollars at the lowest maritime security level one. The cost would increase
significantly if a higher maritime security level were required.70 The United States
must continue to make decisions regarding the allocation of its resources in
protecting the vast and complex maritime transportation system.
The United States cannot act in isolation to protect its maritime transportation
system. Protection can only be achieved through the collective efforts of the
international community. The United States’ National Strategy for Maritime
Security recognizes the importance of global cooperation. The United States must
continue to work together with its trading partners, the International Maritime
Organization and other international organizations to suppress maritime terrorism.
The comprehensive actions taken to date by the United States will require on-going
assessment and revision to meet the challenge of protecting the vital international
maritime transportation system.
70 Implementation of National Maritime Security Initiatives, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,448

(Oct. 22, 2003).
Chapter 11
Commentary: Enhancing Sino–U.S.
Maritime Cooperation for Regional Security
BAO Hongjun and ZHU Huayou
The Status Quo of Regional Security in the South China Sea Area Regional
and Global Implications
The South China Sea (SCS), which is an open geographical unit politically and
economically, is heavily relied upon by countries and regions around it since the
sea is crucial for their development and even survival. Consequently, the maritime
security of the SCS is connected not only to geographical factors but also to
political, economic and social development in the area. ASEAN has formed a
political and economic unit to pursue open regionalism and to promote the mutual
development of its members. However, due to the great difference in political
systems and economic levels among the ASEAN member countries, many
challenges have been and will still be met in the process of regional integration.
Because the SCS connects the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean, it is of great
geographical advantage and strategic interest. Furthermore, the SCS is of great
significance to the social and economic development of the countries and regions
in the area. The two factors mentioned above together endow the maritime security
on the SCS with an obvious regional feature.
In the process of regional integration and economic globalization, the
maritime security of the SCS should accordingly be understood in the context
of globalization. As a logistic channel commercially, the sea has become an
important factor impacting on the global economy and a key area in the global sea
route system. The economy in this area has also become very conspicuous with
its dynamism and influence among the Asian and even the global economies. The
changes of political and economic patterns in this area also reflect the adjustment
of the international political and economic orders— international cooperation
is resorted to by countries in this area for the maintenance of regional security;
further, powers outside the area have strategic and real interests in the area and
also try to get involved in regional issues.
Interaction of Traditional and Non-traditional Security Issues
Although there has been a weakening trend of traditional security threats since
the end of the Cold War, traditional security threats will still be a very important
part of national security together with changes and adjustment of the geopolitical
and economic patterns. In particular, as we see, some military alliances outside
the SCS area are strengthening instead of weakening, and seeking new partners
as well; this, will have some effects on the development of traditional forces
in the area. In the meantime, non-traditional security issues, piracy, maritime
terrorism and maritime eco-security in particular, have become new challenges.
The intertwinement of traditional and non-traditional security has brought us
new understanding about the intervention of traditional security forces into the
nontraditional security issues. A new trend has emerged.
Co-existence of Positive and Negative Factors
A consensus has been built up among interested countries and regions that the
maritime security of the SCS plays a significant role in the regional and even
the global economy. With the increase of economic, cultural and human resource
exchanges between nation-states, more and more factors affect and even decide
maritime security cooperation. Thus, a consensus of sharing interests and taking the
responsibility of guaranteeing security should be built up as well. Of course there
are still many factors that have a negative effect on maritime security and maritime
security cooperation. At the macroscopic level, the lack of strategic mutual trust
due to the problems inherited from history and the clashes of national interests
may constitute one important factor. At the microscopic level, a significant factor
may be the deficiency of money and technology, which limit the means available
for guaranteeing maritime security.
The Status Quo of Regional Security Cooperation in the South China Sea
At present, maritime security cooperation in the South China Sea area mainly
takes the form of cooperation on non-traditional security issues such as counter-
terrorism and counter-piracy. As there may be some strategic concerns deriving
from traditional security behind the non-traditional security cooperation, regional
crisis management is kept at a low level with limited effects.
Bilateral and multilateral non-traditional security cooperation is increasing and
being strengthened. The projected “ASEAN Security Community” is organized
to combat terrorism and sea piracy. The ministers of defense of the “Five
Power Defense Arrangements” have discussed new cooperation mechanisms to
strengthen cooperation in providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
The “Five Power Defense Arrangements” supports Malaysia’s proposal of setting
up a regional relief center in order to strengthen the coordination in disaster relief.
The “Regional Co-operation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia” (ReCAAP) took effect in 2006 and an Information Sharing
Center (ISC) was established in Singapore with the objective of facilitating the
sharing of piracy-related information. The Philippines has decided to improve the
Commentary: Enhancing Sino–U.S. Maritime Cooperation for Regional Security 197
nation’s ability to combat and counter any biological weapons attack made by
terrorists.
Non-traditional security cooperation among the ASEAN member countries is
also promoted by countries outside the Southeast Asian region. The warning seismic
sea wave apparatus developed by Indonesia, when combined with the tsunami
warning systems developed by Germany and the U.S., can markedly shorten the
time taken to warn of an approaching tsunami. The Philippine Government got
help from the U.S for the raid against the Abu Sayyaf Camp and a mechanism of
military cooperation, namely, “Security Engagement Board” (SEB), has been built
as the complement to the existing military cooperation between the two countries.
Malaysia signed the “Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters” in
2006 with the U.S. to enhance the cooperation between the two countries to combat
transnational crime, including international terrorism. On behalf of ASEAN,
Malaysia and Canada signed a “Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat
International Terrorism” in July 2006. Several trainings to enhance the capacity
of enforcement personnel from the ASEAN member countries in dealing with
various aspects of drug production and trafficking have been held in collaboration
with Australia. Vietnam and Russia signed an agreement to strengthen cooperation
on counter-terrorism. Besides, Japan and India also strengthened cooperation with
ASEAN on counter-terrorism.
Initial success has been achieved. According to the Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships Annual Reports compiled by the International Maritime Bureau
(IMB), there has been a decrease in the number of reported incidents of piracy
and armed robbery against ships. In 2006, a total of 239 incidents were reported
all over the world, 88 of which happened in waters of SCS. Of these incidents, 50
were reported in Indonesian waters, dropping from 79 in 2005, 11 in the Malacca
Straits and 10 in the Malaysian waters. The drop in the number of reported attacks
shows that the attempts by the international community to combat piracy and
armed robbery against ships have yielded good results.
Multilateral and non-traditional security cooperation between China and
Southeast Asian countries is becoming much more frequent. In August 2006, the
“ASEAN–China Seminar on Maritime Law Enforcement Cooperation” was held
in Dalian, Liaoning Province, China. The seminar was the first one co-hosted by
the two sides, symbolizing a concrete step forward for cooperation on maritime
law enforcement and enhancing the law enforcement cooperation in the field
of non-traditional security issues. China respectively signed with Malaysia and
Indonesia the “Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Affairs Cooperation”
and the “Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Cooperation,” stepping
up cooperation with the ASEAN member countries against money laundering
and guaranteeing maritime security in the Malacca Straits. China, Singapore
and Norway signed the “Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Research
Development, Education and Training” to further strengthen cooperation in
maritime and shipping research among the three countries. China also joined the
Regional Co-operation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against ships in Asia (ReCAAP). During the Commemorative Summit Marking the
15th Anniversary of ASEAN–China Dialogue Relations in 2006, Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao and leaders of ASEAN members signed a joint statement to strengthen
cooperation and information sharing in non-traditional security issues; to promote
cooperation on criminal justice and law enforcement, including in anti-corruption
efforts; to encourage exchange of defense/security officials; and to work together
in ensuring maritime security in the region.
In conclusion, cooperation over the maritime security of the SCS is part of
regional security cooperation. The cooperation is constantly expanding and
deepening; ways that the powers in and outside the region combine and cooperate
also offer some new features. The security cooperation mechanism or crisis-
handling mechanism that covers the whole SCS, however, is still under formation
and since the strategic interests and safety boundaries of the related powers overlap
and sometimes collide with each other, the crisis management is still just some
kind of “soft constraint.”
Necessities for China and the United States to Enhance Maritime Security
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region
Common Interests
In recent years, China and ASEAN countries, based on their close geographical
location, have established a reciprocal and mutually beneficial partnership for
win–win cooperation in both political and economic areas. They are now moving
to establish a China–ASEAN Free Trade Area so as to further boost cooperation
in all respects in this region. As a major investment partner and export market,
the United States serves as an important driving force for the rapid growth of the
ASEAN economy. The United States is not only ASEAN’s top trade partner; much
more significantly, it remains ASEAN’s most important security partner as well. It
is of the strategic interests of both China and the United States to enhance maritime
cooperation, as so to safeguard the economic prosperity, political stability, security
and peace in the Asia-Pacific region.
Wang Guanghou, “Analysis on the Anti-terrorism Cooperation between U.S. and

ASEAN”, Southeast Asia Studies, 5 (2007), pp. 41–5 (in Chinese).
Zhai Kun, “The U.S. and ASEAN Relations,” Contemporary International
Relations, 4 (2003), pp.51–2 (in Chinese).
Cao Yunhua, “The U.S.–ASEAN Relations after September 11,” Contemporary
Asia-Pacific, 12 (2002) (in Chinese).
Solution to Traditional and Non-traditional Security Issues Relying on Sino–U.S.

Cooperation
The political security situation in the Asia-Pacific region is now undergoing

profound changes which are connected with economic globalization and
Asia’s economic growth. Besides traditional security problems, non-traditional
security issues—such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
environmental pollution, marine routes safety—are increasing, and these all
affect economic development and social progress in the region. To deal with
such challenges, bilateral and multilateral security cooperation is increasingly
active and cooperative mechanisms of various forms are taking shape. However,
uncertainties still persist. The ultimate settlement and management of these issues
can not be achieved without Sino–U.S. cooperation, especially Sino–U.S. maritime
cooperation. China and the United States should cooperate on the basis of a mutual
understanding of each other’s interests, as it is of great importance to maintain
peace and stability in Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia region.
Practical Possibility for Sino–U.S. Maritime Cooperation in the Region
Willingness of China and the United States
Since the normalization of Sino–U.S. diplomatic relations, both countries are willing
to enhance cooperation in security area. The U.S. realizes that China, as a major
regional power, one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and
a major nuclear power, plays an inevitable role in its security interests, both in the
region and the globe. China strives to maintain a secure surrounding environment
by means of security cooperation so as to ensure its peaceful development. It is
the common will of both countries to work together to eliminate conflicts arising
from any misjudgment made by one side or the other. This creates the ground for
the possible enlargement of the scopr of their cooperation.
Cheng Xuefeng, “ASEAN Counter-Terrorism: Its Cooperation and Existing

Problems after “September 11 Attacks,” Southeast Asia Studies, 3 (2003), pp. 23–32 (in
Chinese).
Lu Guangsheng, “The Economic Relations between the U.S. and ASEAN:
Development, Present and Importance,” Contemporary Asia-Pacific, 9 (2007), pp. 37–46.
Wei Hongxia, “The Bush Administration’s Policy towards ASEAN and Its
implications for China,” Southeast Asia Studies, 4 (2006), pp.56–62.
Wei Hong, “Influence of American Factor on China–ASEAN Relations,” Southeast
Asia Affairs, 1 (2006), pp. 10–15 (in Chinese).
Chen Yiping, “The Economic Integration between the U.S. and East Asia,” Jinan
Academic Newspaper,3 (2007), pp. 3–7 (in Chinese).
Confidence Building
Along with the changing international strategic environment and increasingly active
contact between the two nations, China and the U.S. have greatly enhanced mutual
understanding. In recent years, U.S. elites have gradually reached a consensus on
China. Mr. Robert B. Zoellick identified China as a “stakeholder” in 2005, which
was repeated in documents of the State Department, the Pentagon and the White
House. The Bush Administration followed a policy of engagement with China.
The Armitage Report II in 2007 (The United States and Japan: Getting Asia Right
Through 2020) presented a much more positive attitude towards China, in that it
regarded China as a key factor in maintaining regional stability and emphasized
the need of coordination and cooperation with China in Asian affairs. The Chinese
Government also attaches great importance to Sino–U.S. relations, stressing to
“enhance trust, reduce trouble, develop cooperation and avoid confrontation.”
China is convinced that enhancing Sino–U.S. security cooperation and the sound
development of Sino–U.S. relations will be instrumental in alleviating its security
predicament and maintaining world peace.
Existing Security Cooperation Mechanism
The existing security cooperation mechanism serves as a frame or platform for

maritime cooperation. Besides bilateral cooperation, both China and the United
States are actively engaging in multilateral security cooperation. It is believed
that the existing security cooperation mechanism provides an excellent platform
for further security cooperation and maritime security cooperation. Sino-U.S.
interactions in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) and other mechanisms also give birth to some useful experiences
and practices for cooperation, and thus enhance mutual understanding, trust, and
the expansion of common benefits.
Moreover, China and the U.S. have laid a good foundation for maritime
cooperation. In 1998, the two countries signed the “Agreement on Establishing
and Strengthening Maritime Military Security Consultation Mechanism” for
intensifying maritime security consultation. The formation of the Sino–U.S.
Maritime Security Consultation Mechanism, the Annual Defense Affairs
Consultation Mechanism and the Sino–U.S. Joint Rehearsal of Maritime Search
and Rescue help to increase mutual understanding and decrease security barriers.
Since 9/11, China and the U.S. have strengthened the bilateral and regional
cooperation in non-traditional security areas.10 The “Containers Security Proposal”
signed by the two countries has also enhanced the maritime security cooperation
Liu Hongsong, “Hegemony’s Limited Participation in Multilateralism,” Foreign

Affairs Review, 4 (2007) (in Chinese).
10 Tang Xiaosong, “Governance under Three Powers: the Choice for Regionalization
in East Asia,” Contemporary International Relations, 2 (2008), pp.10–15 (in Chinese).
and the prevention of weapons of mass destruction. The cooperation on non-

traditional security areas has not only increased the mutual understanding between
two countries but also laid a foundation for further synergy. In 2006, more progress
was found in Sino–U.S. maritime cooperation.11
Table 11.1 Sino–U.S. Maritime Cooperation in Relevant Sea Areas in 2006
Time Events Participating Sea areas

countries
May Joint Serial Maritime China, U.S., Japan, Northeast Asia Sea
Defense Rehearsal for Russia, Canada Area
the first time
September Maritime China, U.S. Hawaii Sea Area
Telecommunication
Rehearsal
September Joint Maritime Search China, U.S. San Diego Sea Area
and Rescue Rehearsal
November Joint Maritime Search China, U.S. South China Sea Area
and Rescue Rehearsal
Suggestions on Strengthening Sino–U.S. Maritime Security Cooperation in

the South China Sea
Professional Dialogues
Professional dialogues can be carried out three ways. Firstly, the two countries
can exchange scholars for sharing research on issues such as regional security
and maritime cooperation, on either a regular or an irregular basis. Secondly,
workshops, training courses and conferences can be designed to accommodate
connections between universities and research institutes and to enrich the channels
of dialogue. Thirdly, the regular exchange of visits of scholars is likely to help
expand the cooperative opportunities for Sino–U.S. regional maritime security.
Broadening Topics of Dialogues
Less-sensitive topics such as maritime search and rescue are feasible areas for
Sino–U.S. cooperation. An example might be the threats to property and the
loss of the lives of fishermen and passing vessels posed by bad weather and
pirates. If a Sino–U.S. joint rescue mechanism on sea were created, lives and
property vulnerable on sea would be safer, and trust between U.S. and China
11 Wei Hongxia and Chen Feng, “The U.S. and East Asia Relations,” The U.S.
Studies, 1 (2006) (in Chinese).
would be cemented, which is of significance for further cooperation on future

maritime security issues. In addition, other non-sensitive subjects like maritime
environmental protection and maritime climate study could also be discussed as
areas for Sino–U.S. cooperation.
Creating More Sino–U.S. Maritime Cooperation Mechanisms
With greater Sino–U.S. cooperation in less-sensitive area including maritime

search and rescue, the issue of systematic joint maritime cooperation could be
discussed. For example, passing on information on maritime terrorism, maritime
environmental protection, maritime search and rescue, and fighting against pirates
will help build a solid foundation for closer ties and the safeguarding of regional
security.
Part IV
Environmental Security and
Maritime Rescue
Chapter 12
The Development of Oil Spill Preparedness
and Response in China
XU Shiming
Introduction
The ocean, vast and mysterious, embodies the future of we human beings. Because
of her abundant natural resources and advantages for shipping, the marine economy
is booming. However, with the flourish of shipping industry, the exploitation of
petroleum and natural gas at sea, the marine environment is facing challenges.
China is a big coastal country and the marine economy plays a very important
role in its gross domestic product (GDP). Therefore, the protection of the marine
environment for sustainable development and utilization of marine resources is
now a crucial topic for the Chinese Government. With the rapid development of
our national economy, the demand for petroleum is greatly increasing, so is the
transport of petroleum by sea. The development of petroleum shipping, on the
one hand, has promoted the economy; on the other hand, it is posing the risk of
serious pollution from ship-related incidents. Some major oil spill incidents, like
those involving the Prestige in Spain, the MSC Ilona and the Arteaga in China, are
remind us to well prepare against oil pollution in future.
The Chinese Government has been attaching great importance to the protection
of the marine environment and prevention of pollution from ships. China Maritime
Safety Administration (China MSA in short), the competent authority under the
Ministry of Transport responsible for the prevention and control of pollution from
ships, enforces laws strictly and has been devoting itself to establishing an anti-
pollution model with prevention, response and compensation as a trinity. In recent
years, China MSA has done a lot in implementing international conventions,
forming oil pollution response systems, and establishing compensation regimes,
and has continued to make achievements ever since. Meanwhile, the establishment
and perfection of oil pollution response system have always been our primary tasks.
In the following sections an emphasis is placed on the description of emergency
response work done in China.
The Busier Transport of Oil in Coastal Waters, the More Risk of Pollution
from Ships
China is now the third largest oil consumption country in the world. In 2006,
the cargo throughput of all ports in China reached 5.6 billion tons. The quantity
of imported oil has been continuously on the rise since 1993 when China made
itself an oil importer from an oil exporter. In 2006, nearly 431 million tons of
oil was transported along the coast of China including 187 million tons of crude
oil. At present, China ranks third only after the U.S. and Japan in respect of oil
transported by sea and 90 percent of the imported oil is transported by ships. The
year 2006 saw 4.64 million ship transits in the coastal waters of China, an average
of 12,700 transits per day, while 162,949 transits were made by oil tankers of
various types, an average of 446 transits per day. The risk of oil pollution from
ships and particularly major serious pollution incidents is becoming higher with
the increasing density of oil tanker numbers in port and coastal areas due to rapid
increase of oil importing and the emergence of larger oil tankers at sea. Based on
comprehensive research and assessment, we have identified the Bohai Gulf, the
Figure 12.1 High-risk Areas of Ship Pollution Accidents along Chinese

Coastal Waters
Source: China MSA, Research on Prevention and Response of Major Oil Pollution
Accident, 2006
The Development of Oil Spill Preparedness and Response in China 207
estuary of the Changjiang River, the Straits of Taiwan and the estuary of the Pearl
River as high-risk water areas prone to major serious oil pollution incidents caused
by ships in the coastal waters of China.
Ship-related Pollution Incidents in the Coastal Waters of China
As statistics shows, in the last decade, more than 14,900 maritime traffic accidents
occurred in the coastal waters and 3,107 vessels sank. From 1973 to 2006, 2,635
oil spill incidents occurred in the coastal waters, 69 of which were rated as serious
incidents with an oil spill of over 50 tons each, meaning two incidents every year.
The total quantity of spilled oil reached 37,544 tons and the average quantity of
spilled oil is 537 tons in each incident.
Table 12.1 Breakdown of Serious Oil Spill Incidents in China (1973–2006)
Classification Number Percentage Quantity of Average Percentage

of oil spill of oil over total spilled oil quantity of in respect
incidents spills number (in metric spilled oil in of total
(in metric tons) tons) each incident quantity of
(in metric spilled oil
tons)
50–99 9 13 640 71 1.7
100–499 43 62 10263 239 27.7
500–999 10 15 7263 726 19.6
1000 and more 7 10 18911 2701 51.0
In total 69 100 37077 537 100
Source: China MSA, Annual Report, 2007
Oil pollution from ships usually causes huge economic losses and great damage
to the environment including oil cleaning expenses, fishery losses, tourism losses
and environmental restoration. In the last decade, major oil spill incidents were
seen almost every year in the coastal waters, which have caused a negative effect
on the marine environment and ecological resources. Some major incidents are as
follows:
• In 1983, M/T Oriental Ambassador of Panamanian registry ran aground

in the water areas near Qingdao with 3,343 tons of crude oil spilled, badly
contaminating the Jiaozhou Gulf and a 230-kilometer long coastline in the
vicinity. Moreover, 1,000 Acres of the aquaculture area and over 900,000
square meters of tourist spots and seaside bathing places were affected.
The city of Qingdao suffered an unprecedented and destructive damage
to its aquaculture and tourism industries with an economic loss of tens of

millions yuan.
• On March 24, 1999, M/T Bunker Supply 2 collided with East Sea 209 in
the estuarial area of the Pearl River causing an oil spill of 589.7 tons. More
than 300 square kilometers of sea areas and a 55-kilometer long coastline
were polluted; 190,000 acres of aquafarm were badly contaminated and
70 hectares of precious plants—mangroves, an environmentally sensitive
resource—were seriously damaged. The direct economic losses amounted
to RMB 40,000,000 yuan.
• On April 22, 2006, M/V Hyundai Independence of British registry struck
the dock at Yongyue Shipyard in Mazhi Anchorage, Zhoushan, while
entering the dock and a crack in a portside shell plate led to an oil spill of
477 tons of fuel oil (heavy oil) from the third fuel tank. Immediately after
the incident, the local maritime authorities initiated a quick clean-up action
and recovered 407.75 tons of oily water. The nearby sea area was seriously
polluted with an estimated economic loss of tens of millions of yuan.
Up to the present day, China has never experienced any major incident (a spill
of over 10,000 tons of oil), but the risk of serious oil spills is very high. Besides
these 69 serious incidents each of which involved spillages of over 50 tons of oil,
from 1999 to 2006 there were seven other major oil pollution incidents which had
the potential to cause serious damage in the coastal waters of China. For example,
in 2001, a crack was found in the bottom plate of M/T Al Samidoon with a shipload
of 260,000 tons of crude of oil when entering the Port of Qingdao; in 2002, M/T
Erpus Asia, with 240,000 tons of crude oil, was in distress in the Straits of Taiwan
due to main engine breakdown caused by a typhoon; the year 2004 saw a collision
between M/T Sea Horn and M/T Horse Transporter in Meizhou Gulf, Fujian
Province, each of which carried 120,000 tons of crude oil on board; in 2005, M/T
Arteaga with 120,000 tons of crude oil ran aground after striking a rock near
the port of Dalian. Although maritime safety administrations have successfully
avoided serious pollution from the above-mentioned incidents by taking effective
measures, it is obvious that the risk still exists.
Seen from the above facts, the Chinese Government is now facing a very
arduous task of preventing pollution from ships, protecting the marine environment
and safeguarding marine ecological resources. Therefore, an emergency response
to ship pollution has been on the top agenda of the Chinese Government.
Competent Authorities in Charge of Pollution Prevention From Ships in

China
In a world where the transport of energy resources becomes the focus of attention,
the protection of the marine environment and the prevention of pollution from
vessels have become the most significant means to better serve the economic
and social development and to build an environment-friendly and energy-saving

society.
China MSA, in accordance with national laws and regulations, exercises
uniform supervision and control over vessels navigating in the sea areas under
the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China including the internal waters,
territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and continental
shelves, and over ship-related activities with respect to pollution prevention.
Besides, China MSA represents the Chinese Government in implementing the
international conventions concerning prevention and control of marine pollution
from vessels in an effort to fulfill the objective of safer shipping and cleaner oceans
set forth by the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
There are 14 Maritime Safety Administrations under China MSA in coastal
provinces: autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the central
government, trans-provincial arterial river areas as well as some major port
cities.
As a major maritime nation, China always supports the initiatives of the IMO
and has made every endeavor to enhance international cooperation. China has been
elected as Category A Council Member of IMO for nine consecutive times. China
has ratified or acceded to virtually all important conventions and protocols adopted
by the IMO (such as SOLAS, and MARPOL73/78) and has faithfully discharged
its obligations under these international instruments. Legislative, administrative
and technical measures have been employed to upgrade the flag state control
(FSC) and port state control (PSC) with a view to effectively safeguarding safe
navigation and protecting the marine environment.
Major Measures to Strengthen Safety Control and to Prevent Pollution

From Ships
To Accelerate Phasing-out of Single Hull Tankers
We have strictly implemented the regulations prescribed by IMO in respect of

phasing-out of single hull tankers, limited the import of aged vessels and single
hull tankers, and made policies to speed up the phasing-out of domestic single hull
tankers in an effort to optimize the structure of the Chinese merchant fleet.
To Strengthen Port State Control and Flag State Control
China Maritime Safety Administration has been placing importance on port state
control and flag state control and has made great contributions to ensure maritime
traffic safety in water areas under the jurisdiction of China and to prevent pollution
from ships by taking measures to strengthen inspections and inspection quality
in order to further improve the current situation of coastally trading ships and to
combat substandard ships.
Since 2003, 4,000 inspections have been made on foreign registered ships in
exercising port state control but the number of ships found to be defective has
increased by 67.29 percent and the number of detained ships increased by 95.38
percent. The number of inspections on Chinese ships navigating along the coast
remains almost the same but the number of defective ships increased by 23.21
percent and the number of detained ships increased by 254.87 percent.
To Promote Maritime Traffic Management Level for the Prevention of Accidents
In recent years the China Maritime Safety Administration has invested more and
effectively reduced the number of accidents by establishing 94 AIS shore stations
covering the important water areas along the coast and 28 vessel traffic management
systems and 86 radar stations in the coastal areas and along the Changjiang River.
A ship’s routing scheme has been applied to Chengshantou, the Changjiang River
in Jiangsu Province, the estuary of the Pearl River, the estuary of the Changjiang
River and the Three Gorges reservoir. Moreover, ISM has been implemented and
the national safety management rules, NSM for short, are being actively promoted,
which has effectively enhanced the management level of shipping companies and
ship crew. Information technology has been widely applied for the purpose of
increasing efficiency.
All foreign vessels are subject to compulsory pilotage. Large oil tankers and
bulk chemical carriers entering and leaving a port are monitored and convoyed to
ensure the safety of the port and its adjacent water areas.
To Launch Special Inspection Campaigns
The traffic safety environment has been improved by launching special inspection
campaigns to tackle the problems affecting maritime traffic safety. By means of a
campaign to clear out low-quality ships , more than 1,000 shipyards were asked to
make corrections; 303 have been shut down; 291 have fulfilled the requirement and
406 are being under correction. Additional inspections were made on 8,055 ships
in total and 297 ships found to have major defects were detained. During the 100-
day campaign on ships carrying dangerous goods, 2845 inspections were made on
cargo containers and 120 cases involving the concealment of dangerous goods were
investigated; besides, 2,156 wharfs handling liquid cargoes were examined and
the qualification certificates of 32 wharfs were withdrawn. Furthermore, 24,105
small liquid tankers of small size were inspected, 235 of which were detained.
To Strengthen Education of Seafarers
At the same time, reinforcing the training of seafarers about pollution prevention
and environmental protection has been held to improve seafarers’ awareness with
respect to marine environmental protection.
The Current Status of the Oil Spill Emergency System in China
The Legal Basis
China acceded to the OPRC Convention on March 30, 1998, upon the approval of
the State Council and it became effective in China after three months. Authorized
by the State Council in its Decree, the Ministry of Transport and other ministries
were made responsible under the unified coordination and guidance of the
State Environmental Protection Administrations for the implementation of the
Convention with national laws and statutory regulations as the legal basis. The
revised Marine Environmental Protection Law of China, effective on April 1, 2000,
stipulates in Regulation 18 that China MSA is responsible for the formulation
of the national contingency plan for serious marine pollution from ships and the
plan has been presented to the State Environmental Protection Administration for
record.
The Formulation of Contingency Plans
The Ministry of Transport began in 1999 to formulate the national contingency

plan for oil spills from ships as well as other contingency plans used for the
northern sea areas, East China Sea, South China Sea and the Straits of Taiwan. On
March 31, a press conference was jointly held by the Ministry of Transport and the
State Environmental Protection Administration to make public the national and sea
area contingency plans which were promulgated by both ministries and became
effective as of April 1, 2000. Gradually, a tiered oil-spill pollution response system
came into being at national, provincial, municipal and port levels.
In 2004, following the requirement of the State Council to formulate relevant
emergency plans for imminent incidents, the Ministry of Transport conducted
a major revision to the national contingency plan for oil spill from ships and
produced the national contingency plan for pollution from ships in all water areas
to prepare against HNS incidents as well as oil pollution.
The Establishment of Model Project in Yantai
In order to heighten the ability of combating oil pollution from ships, in 1994 the
Ministry of Transport made a proposal to build a model project for oil spill control
in the northern sea areas and in 1996 the project was officially on the agenda. It
was also one of the 63 projects of top priority on the White Paper of Chinese 21st
Agenda.
The project is the basis for implementing the contingency plan for the northern
sea areas of China, mainly consisting of an oil spill controlling and cleaning system,
a surveillance and detection system, an information system, a communications
system, and a training and demonstrating system. The objective is to track oil spills
in the northern sea areas and to keep Chengshantou Channel, Laotieshan Channel
and Changshan Channel under surveillance. The project will control and clean
medium-scale oil pollution from ships. Experiences have been gained concerning
the managing system of oil spill prevention and control as well as compensation
regime for claims. The model project passed the acceptance check organized by
the Ministry of Transport at the end of 2001. Since its foundation, the project has
been successfully used for emergency responses to several major ship pollution
incidents and for professional in-house training.
Qinhuangdao Oil Spill Emergency Response Center
In November, 2002, Qinhuangdao Oil Spill Emergency Response Center was

founded. It is the first non-profit oil spill response unit jointly organized by the
Ministry of Transport and the provincial government.
Other Oil Spill Emergency Response Resources
Under the auspices of local governments, major coastal and river harbors are
equipped with a certain number of emergency response facilities while some non-
state-owned professional cleaning companies and oil spill emergency response
units have been established. For example, the city of Shenzhen, without any
national investment, has formed several self-financed professional pollution clean-
up units through the efforts of local maritime safety administration.
At present, major coastal ports have established resources capable of controlling
and cleaning small-sized and medium-sized oil spills from ships in the harbor and
near-shore water areas.
Training and Drills
Since 1980 when the first international training course on oil pollution response
was initiated in Beijing by the Ministry of Transport, China MSA has organized,
individually or through the cooperation with IMO or Singapore East Asia
Emergency Response Company, ship pollution control and emergency response
courses of various scales in major coastal ports of China on a yearly basis, including
training courses designed for personnel from oil companies and has strengthened
ties with relevant oil companies. Meanwhile, in order to have more professional
staff, several tours to North America, Europe, Japan, Singapore were organized for
the purpose of research and training. The maritime safety administrations under
the Ministry of Transport have organized six large-scale oil spill response drills in
the water areas of Shenzhen, Shanghai, Qingdao, Dalian and Hainan respectively,
such as the maritime SAR and oil spill response drill in the Pearl River on June 5,
2000, and the joint search and rescue (SAR) exercises in Bohai Sea in 2006. As a
result of all these programs, lots of emergency commanders and proficient clean-
up personnel have been well trained, which in general has promoted the ability to
combat oil spills.
Through years of efforts, oil spill response resources have been built up and
are capable of combating oil pollution on small and medium scales; they have also
played an important role in several incidents which occurred in recent years. In
2004, for better dealing with major serious pollution incidents involving ships, the
Ministry of Transport entrusted the Research Academy of Sciences and Shenzhen
MSA with a research topic on the prevention and control of serious oil pollution
incidents making a comprehensive study on pollution risks existing in the coastal
areas of China. Now the Ministry of Transport is organizing a compilation of
the supporting system of transport industry for the 11th national five-year plan,
in which a development plan for pollution emergency resources is addressed to
further promote the ability of combating pollution from ships on a national scale.
With respect to the construction of resources, we believe that social resources are
encouraged to make investments on stockpiles and clean-up units based on the
principle of governments taking the lead with social resources participating and
operating on the market basis.
Establishing an Effective Organizing and Commanding System
China MSA has established an effective organizing and commanding system,

formed a capable law enforcement staff, prepared a quick oil spill response force,
and equipped themselves with modern monitoring and controlling facilities.
Cruising aircrafts are deployed to patrol over key sea areas and 678 standby
boats from maritime safety administrations are also deployed in key sea areas and
ports.
If an oil spill incident occurs at sea, an alarm can be triggered through the
multi-channel and all-weather distress alert system established by Maritime Safety
Administrations at all levels. The on-scene pictures can be transmitted in real time
through INMARSATF installed on maritime patrol vessels. The information on
oil spill incidents can be communicated immediately to the local Maritime Safety
Administration via telephone number 12395 which is specially used for maritime
search and rescue.
The remote sensing system on airplanes and satellites, the oil spectrum
identification system as well as the oil spill containment and clean-up system
are used to offer technical support for oil spill response. Liaoning MSA, Hebei
MSA, Tianjin MSA and Shandong MSA have created a Response Cooperation
Mechanism for Combating Pollution from Ships in Bohai Sea. Through this
mechanism, they can share information, mobilize joint response resources and
improve the efficiency and overall the capacity of oil spill response in this area.
On receiving any report on oil spill incident, Maritime Safety Administrations
will use the databank of sensitive resources to make a quick decision and begin
to monitor floating oil, predict its trajectory and assess the damage accordingly.
At the same time, the Environmental Protection Administration, the Oceanic
Administration, the Meteorological Administration, the Public Security Bureau,
the Medical Service and the Fire Fighting Service are also mobilized to ensure an
efficient and quick response.
After the initial assessment on the incident, local governments and other
departments like the Environmental Protection Administration, the Oceanic and
Fishery Administration and the Tourism Administration will be informed in due
time in order for them to take action to protect the areas which would possibly
be affected. Through constant monitoring by satellites, vessels, and airplanes and
by using oil spill prediction model, the trajectory range and tendency of floating
oil can be predicted quickly and accurately. Depending on the type of oil spilt,
the response teams use facilities like booms to contain spilled oil to prevent its
spreading and to protect sensitive areas. The oil on water surface and on shore is
collected by using devices and equipment like oil spill recovery boats, skimmers
and absorbent materials. Chemical dispersants is also used to remove the oil from
water surface. In order to ensure immediate and accurate information releases in
the case of an emergency at sea, spokespersons from the MSA at all levels have
been well trained to deal with the press.
To familiarize the public with the knowledge about prevention, alarming and
self-protection in the case of an emergency and to improve their ability to cope
with incidents at sea, Maritime Safety Administrations have complied and handed
out propaganda materials on such matters.
The Development of the Oil Pollution Compensation Regime in China
The development of an oil pollution compensation regime is an important

safeguard for effective response to pollution incidents and for protection of the
rights of victims. According to the Marine Environmental Protection Law, the
State Council of China is responsible for the stipulation of relevant regulations
concerning compulsory insurance for oil pollution and the establishment of a
compensation fund. The Ministry of Transport has listed this task as one of its
priorities and the regulations on compulsory insurance have been included in the
Statutory Regulations Governing Prevention and Control of Pollution From Ships
at Sea which is now under revision. The statute, estimated to be promulgated in the
year 2009, has been submitted to the State Council for consideration. Meanwhile,
the draft method for collection and management of a fund for compensation for oil
pollution damage by ships has been jointly completed by the Ministry of Transport
and the Ministry of Finance, so does the phase for comments. The method is to be
promulgated and will enter into force after its approval by the State Council. It is
believed that with the establishment of compulsory insurance and compensation
fund regimes for oil pollution, the rights of victims will be better protected and the
current situation of “the cleaner pays” is to be fundamentally changed.
Oil Spill Emergency Response in the South China Sea
The South China Sea area, located to the south of the Tropic of Cancer, is considered
richest in marine environmental resources, precious species and ecological
families and also important for biological diversity, survival and development of
mankind and navigation of ships. The island of Hainan, near the oil transport route
connecting the Middle East and Northwest Asia, is now expanding its harbor areas
and the construction of an oil refinery with an annual production of 8,000,000
tons of oil is underway in the economic development zone of the city of Yangpu,
which came into service in 2006. Such a project had attracted hundreds of VLCCs
into the ports of Hainan. It is estimated that in the near future the traffic density in
this area will be heavier and heavier and accordingly the risk of oil pollution from
ships will be higher and higher. But the emergency resources are comparatively
dispersed and insufficient, which calls for an intensified regional cooperation to
deal with oil spills. Since 2001, the maritime safety administrations in Guangdong
and Shenzhen, Hong Kong Marine Department and Macao Port Authority have
been urging the implementation of contingency plan for oil pollution from ships
in Pearl River, and a memorandum of understanding regarding oil pollution
emergency response was jointly signed by the relevant parties in 2008 . In 2003,
China and ASEAN countries in the action plan for the implementation of strategic
partnership between China and ASEAN countries towards peace and prosperity
made a clear declaration: under the conference mechanism of Chinese and
ASEAN countries’ ministers of communications or transportation, a consultation
mechanism was to be established for cooperating over shipping and for close
coordination on shipping affairs among relevant authorities in China and ASEAN
countries. Projects for mutual benefits on maritime safety, SAR, prevention of
pollution from ships, ship ballast water management, PSC and other activities in
international shipping will be initiated. We will continuously promote regional
cooperation by sticking to the action plans in order to prepare for serious pollution
incidents involving ships.
Future Prospects
There are several plans in China which are related to the oil spill emergency
response. The first is to improve contingency plans at all levels. Within the next few
years all the plans on provincial and municipal levels will be formulated. Second,
facilities for oil spill response will be developed. We will actively urge relevant
authorities to establish oil spill emergency response centers in high-risk areas and
at the same time to prepare stockpiles in major harbors. Thirdly, it is to establish
a compensation fund for oil pollution damage. The International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund is only applicable to Hong Kong SAR, China. But the Chinese
Government is planning to establish a domestic oil pollution compensation fund
which will enhance oil response capability and will get victims compensated
in a timely way. We consider environmental protection a fundamental national

policy which concerns our economic growth as well as individual human beings.
Bearing this in mind, we will continue to make efforts to establish and perfect the
emergency response system for oil pollution from ships and the compensation
regime with a view to making our contribution to the protection of the marine
environment, a sacred cause we pursue.
China MSA will further fulfill the responsibilities of protecting the marine
environment and its obligation of implementing international conventions, reinforce
its efforts in the prevention and control of pollution from ships and improve the
ability of oil spill emergency response. By 2020, we will have established an all-
round, all-weather water safety administration system and been capable of dealing
with 1,000 tons of spilled oil in a single incident.
Chapter 13
Regional Cooperation for Marine
Pollution Contingency Response in the
South China Sea
ZHANG Xiangjun
Introduction
With economic developments in Southeast Asia, the South China Sea has been
demonstrating its ever greater importance to all its riparian states, economically,
geopolitically and environmentally. Nonetheless, the South China Sea is now one
of the least protected sea areas among all the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas.
Disputes over sovereignty and jurisdiction between its coastal states have impeded
regional cooperation in combating pollution. On the request of the Coordinating
Body on the Seas of East Asia (COBSEA), the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) launched a project,
Reversing Environmental Degradation Trends in the South China Sea and Gulf
of Thailand, in 2002. According to the research findings made by UNEP/GEF,
the South China Sea has been suffering from land-based pollution, over-fishing,
unreasonable offshore and coastal development, and is threatened by the present
unsustainable exploration activities … One of the most bio-diversified areas is at
risk of disappearing in the coming century.
Of all the environmental threats, marine pollution is undoubtedly one of
the primary; and among all the causes of marine pollution, grave accidental oil
spillage is undoubtedly one of the most destructive forces. This has been proved
by numerous accidents in history, such as Torrey Canyon, Erika, Prestige, and so
on, which also indicates the necessity for all the coastal states, including China, to
cooperate in protecting the marine environment.
With research on practices in other regional seas and an examination of the
situation in the South China Sea, the author proposes to establish a system of
cooperation in combating pollution resulting from emergencies in this sea area.
While establishing such a policy, China should recognize its indispensable role
and push forward the proposal to establish the policy.
For a detailed description, see UNEP/GEF/SCS project document, November

2001, p. 4, available at http://www.iwlearn.net/iw-projects/unepscs (accessed December
30, 2008).
In terms of environmental protection, all regional seas share a common

characteristic, which relates to their limited capability to decontaminate. As for
a definition for “regional seas”, there is no generally accepted one. The term
“regional sea” used in the UNEP Regional Seas Program may shed light upon such
an issue, which in practice has the same meaning as the terms “enclosed sea” and
“semi-enclosed sea” used in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). According to UNCLOS, enclosed and semi-enclosed sea means:
a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another
sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the
territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States.
The clear geographical boundary of a regional sea, its limited capability to

decontaminate and its vulnerability to grave oil spillage require cooperation
among the states within the region to combat pollution. In UNCLOS, there are
provisions on enclosed and semi-enclosed seas which set out obligations for states
bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea to cooperate. In fact, such provisions
were inspired by the implementation of regional marine environment protection
conventions prior to UNCLOS in 1982. The definite geographical boundaries of
a regional sea naturally make it a manageable unit, which won’t be too small to
count for little, or too large to be managed. Similar, more recent conventions may
also justify a regional way to tackle marine environmental problems.
Compared with the high seas, enclosed or semi-enclosed seas are more
vulnerable to pollution accidents and more affected by the activities of bordering
states, and thus they need a legal framework for marine environment protection
different from the one set out by international conventions such as UNCLOS.
1982 UNCLOS Part IX, art. 122.

Such conventions include: Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with Pollution of
the North Sea by Oil, 1969, available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/marine.html (accessed
February 25, 2007); the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Baltic Sea Area/the Helsinki Convention, 1974; the Convention for the Protection of the
Mediterranean against Pollution,1976 (replaced by the Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean,1995); Kuwait Regional
Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution,
1978; Abidjan Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Development of the
Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region,1981; Regional
Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, 1982
(February). See http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/ (accessed December 30, 2007).
See D.M. Johnston and L.M. Enomoto, “Regional Approaches to the Protection and
Preservation of the Marine Environment”, in D.M. Johnston ed., The Environmental Law of
the Sea, Berlin: E. Schmidt, Berlin, 1981, p. 285.
See United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process established by the
General Assembly in its resolution 54/33 in order to facilitate the annual review by the
Assembly of Developments in Ocean Affairs (Third Meeting, April 8–15, 2002), p. 64.
Regional Cooperation for Marine Pollution Contingency Response 219
Conventions like UNCLOS set out rules for marine activities and are internationally
accepted, but they may not have enough considerations specifically for particular
regions. Due to the definite geological boundaries and the similar historic
backgrounds of adjacent states, their exploration activities and the environmental
issues thus raised, regional cooperation will cater for the need of specific regions
much better than cooperation under those internationally accepted conventions.
When a regional policy is more attractive to states, they are more willing to ratify
conventions governing regional issues and to fulfill their treaty obligations.
Such an argument may find its support from the development of regional ways
to protect the marine environment. In 1967, the Torrey Canyon accident shocked
the international community and became a propelling force for the development of
international law on environmental protection, in particular marine environmental
protection, in the following two decades. Henceforth marine environment
protection began to attract attention from the whole international community,
which subsequently became one of the most remarkable subjects in international
law.
Due to the Torrey Canyon accident, states bordering the North Sea took the
lead in regional cooperation to tackle emergent oil spills, which resulted in the
conclusion of the Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with Pollution of the
North Sea by Oil in 1969 (hereafter referred as the 1969 Bonn Agreement). It
was and is still unique for it took only two months for states bordering the North
Sea to conclude such an agreement and bring it into force. Internationally, the
convening of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment marked
the commencement of the international community taking actions to protect
environment. Based on the Action Plan for the Human Environment adopted at
this conference, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) was launched
to manage and coordinate environmental protection internationally. The UNEP
handled environmental problems by a three-step approach, which was also known
as a programmatic approach. As for marine environment protection, it was
recognized by the Governing Council of UNEP as one of the priorities for actions.
The Regional Seas Program (RSP) thus had its inception in 1974, and the regional
approach taken by the North Sea countries undoubtedly played a part in it. The
See A.O. Adede, “Lessons from Twenty Years of International Law-Making in

the Field of the Environment, 1972–1992”, in A.C. Kiss and F. Burhenne-Guilmin, eds,
A Law for the Environment: Essays in Honour of Wolfgang E. Burhenne, Bonn: IUCN
Environmental Law Center, 1994, pp. 11–16.
See http://fletcher.tufts.edu/ multi/texts/BH834.txt (accessed February 25, 2007).
Report of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm, June
5–16, 1972. See http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=
97&ArticleID= (accessed February 27, 2007).
See Essam, El-Hinnawi, UNEP: Two Decades of Achievement and Challenge, Nairobi:
UNEP, 1992, p. 9.
regional approach was also taken with regard to other regional seas, such as the
Baltic, the Mediterranean being the most prominent of these.
Since 1970s, many conventions on marine environment have been concluded,
both internationally and regionally. For the 18 regional seas, there are now 14
regional conventions on marine environment and a number of relevant protocols
addressing specific issues. The protocol on emergency spills, including oil and
other hazardous and noxious substances, is the one attached to and enforced by
most of the regional seas conventions.
As one of the semi-enclosed seas, features of the South China Sea include
busy waterways, dense sea routes, diversities between coastal states in terms
of economic development and political systems, which expose this sea area to
potential pollution crises, such as those caused by oil spills, and create difficulties
in inter-state cooperation to combat pollution. Whatever discrepancies there might
be between coastal states, once pollution accidents occur, there is no doubt that it
is they which suffer and have to deal with the attendant problems.
All regional seas are pertinent to the territory of littoral states. Tankers entering
and leaving ports are thus frequent, which makes the sea routes, especially
tanker routes, quite densely used. Furthermore, for considerations of safety and
economy, most tankers choose sea routes near the land so that they may take
advantages of the port facilities provided by coastal states and, in the case of an
accident or emergency, are closer to sources of help. Correspondingly, there is
a high possibility of oil spill accidents which may cause grave pollution. Most
known serious oil spill accidents have occurred near coastal states, causing severe
environmental damage because of the low speed of water body exchange with the
high seas which is a feature of closed or semi-closed seas. Since the coastal states
in such areas rely on navigation, fishing, amenities and other legitimate uses of the
sea for their economies, the consequences of a severe spillage are more than just
environmental.10
For these reasons, most of the states bordering regional seas take oil spillage
as one of the primary environmental problems and have adopted protocols to deal
with it. Besides, although there have been considerable technical improvements
of shipping facilitation, such as the Traffic Separation Scheme and the double-
hull tanker requirement to reduce the probability of oil spill accidents, what has
been demonstrated is that such improvements are only be effective to control
potential operational pollutions. As for the more disastrous accidental pollutions,
such improvements hardly have any effects. According to the International Tanker
Owners Pollution Federation Limited (ITOPF), accidents causing oil spillages
10 These accidents are: Exxon Valdez, Hawaiian Patriot, Torrey Canyon, Amoco
Cadiz, Odyssey, Aegean Sea, Urquiola, Prestige, Jakob Maersk, Khark’s Atlantic Empress,
Abt Summer, Castillo De Bellver, Katinap, Braer, Sea Empress, Haven, Independenta,
Irenes Serenade, Sea Star. For the specific localities of such oil spills, see Figure 6 at
http://www.itopf.com/information-services/data-and-statistics/statistics/ (accessed June 20,
2009).
over 700 tons are usually not due to operational failures, as the following data
show.
According to the ITOPF, among the incidence of spills over 700 tonnes,
groundings account for 34.2 percent, collisions for 28.4 percent, hull failures for
12.4 percent, fires and explosions for 8.6 percent, loading and discharging for 8.6
percent, unknown causes for 7.5 percent, and other operations for 0.3 percent.11 It
seems to be a sad situation since such data may indicate that the more disastrous
oil spill accidents are the less we can do to prevent them from taking place. On the
other hand, it confirms the necessity to cooperate regionally or globally to mitigate
the result of such accidents to as far as possible.
The South China Sea is no stranger to oil spillages. Since 1975, the Malacca
Straits have witnessed several oil spill accidents.12 More than half of the oil
imported into China, Japan and Korea must be transported via this sea area,13
which spontaneously raises the risk of oil spillage. According to other regional seas
schemes, regional cooperation to combat such pollution accidents is the preferable
approach,14 which may highlight the way to resolve environmental problems in the
South China Sea, especially on how to deal with emergent oil spill accidents.
Compared with other regional seas, the South China Sea is now facing not
only environmental challenges, but more complicated disputes over sovereignty
and jurisdiction concerning islands and maritime zones. Due to such complicated
situations, the coastal states are very cautious when dealing with issues relating to
disputed areas. Thus, environmental protection in the South China Sea has been
overlooked for decades compared to that in other regional seas. So far fortunately
no serious oil spill has occured close to the shore, but how much longer can we
rely on such good fortune?
In addition to the danger of oil spillage, there are other environmental risks
in the South China Sea. According to the regional profile of the East Asian Seas
region:
11 See http://www.itopf.com/information-services/data-and-statistics /statistics/

(accessed June 20, 2009).
12 In 1975, the Japanese tanker Shawa Maru ran aground. See Peter Tillman, “Strait
of Malacca and the Law of the Sea”, Austrl. L.J., 68 (1994), p. 891. See also Craig J. Capon,
“Comment: The Threat of Oil Pollution in the Malacca Strait”, Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y, 7
(January 1998), pp.123–4.
13 Since 2004, oil imported by Japan from the Middle East has reached 0.6 ton per
day, the total amount per year is about 0.24 billion tons, of which over 80 percent is from
the Middle East; of that, 70 percent has to be via the Malacca Strait. See http://news.tom.
com/2007-01-05/004H/ 26667701.html (accessed April 8, 2007). Since 1993, China has
been an oil importer. Soon China will be the second oil consumer in the world. Over 70
percent of the imported oil has to be via this strait. See http://www.gmw.cn/03pindao/
lunwen/show.asp?id=4780 (accessed April 9, 2007).
14 See D.M. Johnston and L.M. Enomoto, supra note 4, 285. Also see Chung, Suh-
Yong, “Is the Mediterranean Regional Cooperation Model Applicable to Northeast Asia?”
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 1999, p. 364.
The threats to the region are just as varied, and include erosion and siltation
from land development, logging and mining, blast fishing in coral reefs, cutting
and conversion of mangroves, overfishing, unimpeded coastal development and
disposal of untreated wastes.15
All these problems make it necessary for the South China Sea coastal states to
cooperate over marine environmental protection. While many factors especially
political wills affect disputes resolution, threats to the marine environment
including those caused by major oil spill accidents will not consider political wills
at all. Thus, the coastal states are obliged to cooperate in resolving the most urgent
issues. Precedents in other regional seas indicate that the pollution caused by oil
spill accidents is undoubtedly such an issue.
Although it is necessary for the coastal states in the South China Sea to
cooperate in combating pollution in case of emergency, disputes among these states,
especially disputes over the Spratly Islands, have impeded such cooperation for
years. The Spratly Islands are situated around rich gas and oil reserves and sea lanes
of important transportation interests. While all the coastal states may make claims
and realize them, the marine environment must be capable of accommodating the
realization of all those interests. Once it is irretrievably polluted, all those claims
will be meaningless.
Such a viewpoint has been clearly expressed at the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment. In the preamble of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, it
is unambiguously stated that there existed a tension between human development
and environment protection:
In our time, man’s capability to transform his surroundings, if used wisely, can
bring to all peoples the benefits of development and the opportunity to enhance
the quality of life. Wrongly or heedlessly applied, the same power can do
incalculable harm to human beings and the human environment.16
Any reconciliation of such tension requires the international community and

national governments to balance economic developments with environmental
protection, although the balancing point is difficult to be located. We may search
for such a balancing point through the development of marine environment
protection under the auspices of UNEP/RSP for each regional sea. Because it caters
for specific needs in specific regions, such a regional way has been proved to be
effective and accepted by many regions. The practice in the North Sea indicated
that when there was serious unbalance between economical and environmental
interests, demonstrated by serious oil spill accident, bordering states would soon
agree to take actions. In 1983, the 1969 Bonn Agreement was replaced by a new
15 Regional Profile, East Asian Seas Region, p. 3.

16 See http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=97
&ArticleID=1503 (accessed December 23, 2008).
agreement, the Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing With Pollution of the North Sea
by Oil and Other Harmful Substances (hereafter referred as the 1983 Bonn Agreement), to
cover accidents caused by hazardous and noxious substance. It took six years for
the new agreement to be ratified and brought into force.17
In the North Sea protection scheme, there had been a number of marine
protection conventions to deal with different specific issues in the first 20 years.
In addition to the Bonn Agreement, there were the Oslo Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft for dumping at
sea, and the Paris Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-
based Sources for land-based pollution. And, later in 1990s, for the whole North
East Atlantic region, there was a new convention on accidental pollution: the
Agreement for Cooperation in Protecting the Shores and Coastal Waters of the
North East Atlantic Ocean form Accidental Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful
Substances/Lisbon Accord.18 Although in 1992, the Oslo Convention and the Paris
Convention merged into the 1992 Oslo-Paris Convention,19 the updated 1983
Bonn Agreement is still a convention on accidental pollution. Such an approach
is called a piecemeal approach, which means a specific convention is adopted for
a specific issue.
Theoretically, such an approach will be the most effective way for states
bordering a regional sea to tackle marine environmental problems since it
may take into account the specific requirements of specific aspects of marine
environment, including land-based pollution, dumping at sea, accidental pollution
and so on. Practically, such an approach will demand a high degree of economic
development which could afford the high cost of environment protection, and
a high concurrence of political willingness which can get different agreements
accepted and enforced.
The states which border the North Sea region and the wider North East Atlantic
are all developed industrial countries with similar cultural and political values.20 The
same level of economic development and close relationships with each other help
them work willingly together to set out goals for marine environmental protection.
This sense of identity to a great degree made it easier for states to cooperate on
concluding and enforcing legally binding agreements and on carrying out non-
legally binding political commitments. Actually this approach may tackle marine
environmental issues more specifically and more effectively, while it needs support
from better political and economic capabilities to fulfill treaty obligations.
17 See http://fletcher.tufts.edu/ multi/texts/BH834.txt (accessed February 25, 2007).

18 This agreement has not been in force yet, available at http://www.itopf.com/
country_profiles/profiles/northeastatlantic.pdf (accessed March 29, 2007).
19 ILM, 32 (1993), p. 1069.
20 See Steinar Andresen, “The North Sea and Beyond: Lessons Learned”, in Mark
J. Valencia, ed., Maritime Regime Building, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001,
p. 68.
As for the Mediterranean region typically administrated by UNEP and known

as the “cradle for Regional Seas Program”, things are totally different. In the
Mediterranean, there is a great gap in economic development between European
and African states. Due to the colonial period from the mid-nineteenth century to
the twentieth century, African states have been influenced by the European states
politically. Such discrepancies in economic development between South and
North made the littoral states greatly divided in their respective capabilities to
fulfill obligations under international conventions. To adjust to such a situation,
a convention-protocol approach found its origin in the Mediterranean, which
allows member states to find a most appropriate scheme for making commitments.
Under this convention-protocol model, there should be a framework convention
to set rules on decision-making procedures, information exchange and primary
general obligations.21 Once the framework convention is concluded, more specific
obligations are set down in respective protocols.
Generally, a member state will have to commit itself to marine environment
protection by signing and approving or acceding to the marine environment
protection convention. There will be respective protocols for specific problems,
such as land-based pollution, dumping at sea, offshore oil and gas exploration,
specially protected areas, hazardous waste and emergent pollution. A member
state will have to approve at least one protocol, and commit itself to approve other
protocols when it is capable of doing so.
Such a convention-protocol approach has been applied to other regional seas
since it can bridge gaps between industrial and underdeveloped countries, especially
gaps caused by different levels of economic development and capabilities to
fulfill treaty obligations. With the support of the UNEP, almost all other regional
seas under its auspices take this approach for marine environmental protection
without doubting its applicability at all. Therefore, it is also known as the model
and the best working example of regional cooperation agreements.22 According to
Gavouneli, inheriting a model in this way without considering the context is not
justifiable since the applicability of a certain approach is decided by the certain
situations of a region.23
This convention-protocol approach is justified and applicable in the
Mediterranean for it took into account the specific situations of the Mediterranean.
Before the launching of the UNEP, France had initiated regional cooperation to
protect the marine environment by using its political, economic and scientific
21 George W. Downs, Kyle W. Danish and Peter N. Barsoom, “The Transnational
Model of International Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?” Colum. J.
Transnat’l L., 2000, p. 470.
22 See Maria Gavouneli, “New Forms of Cooperation in the Mediterranean System
of Environmental Protection”, in Myron H. Nordquist and John Norton Moore eds, The
Stockholm Declaration and Law of the Marine Environment, Leiden/Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 2003, p. 223.
23 Ibid.
advantages in the region.24 The leading role France played in marine environment
protection was critical to the subsequent Mediterranean Action Plan since there
needs a dominant member in the region to realize goals for regional cooperation.
France hoped to exert its political influence over the Mediterranean region and
took the leading role in marine environmental protection. Actually environmental
issues are related to both legal-political and economical factors. As the most
important trade partner for other member states in this region in the 1970s, France
undoubtedly took the leading role in economic development; technologically,
France was capable of detecting marine pollution sites while other underdeveloped
countries was not aware of marine pollution occurrences in their maritime zones;25
financially, France put a big sum of money into marine environmental protection.
The French efforts continued until the UNEP began to take over the role France
had played.26
To overcome the obstacles brought by different political interests, a general
and comprehensive marine environmental protection convention is needed to
highlight the ecological importance as a region instead of political boundary
separating nation states. To overcome the obstacles brought by different economic
development levels, a step-by-step procedure of treaty obligations fulfillment is
needed. It is only in such a context that this convention-protocol approach will
be effectively put into practice. Actually, the convention-protocol approach is not
always applied, as in the case of the Baltic, where there were also states with
different economic development levels and political interests.
In the Baltic, there was a hostile confrontation between “Western” and
“Eastern” countries in the 1970s. Due to this confrontation and the Cold War, the
first attempt to launch the regional cooperation to combat oil spillage failed.27 This
failure showed the coastal states the difficulties of cooperation in environmental
protection when they pursued contradictory political interests. States bordering
the Baltic finally chose to take marine environment protection as a priority issue,
so that the common interests in environmental protection overtook the divergent
political interests. With the awareness of marine protection permeating the whole
international community, the states bordering the Baltic recognized that they had
to find a way to protect the enclosed sea. Under the support from the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe28 and the Economic Commission for
24 Suh-Yong Chung, supra note 14, 364.

25 See, e.g., Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Chapter 1: Regional Environmental
Management Frameworks”, http://israel.org/peace/projects/env96-1.html (accessed July 4,
2006).
26 See Peter M. Haas, “Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International
Co-operation”, in Volker Rittbeger ed., Regime Theory and International Relations, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 193.
27 Hanns J. Buchholz, “The Baltic Sea: Lessons Learned”, in Valencia, Maritime
Regime Building, supra note 20, pp. 21–2.
28 Ibid, p. 22.
Europe Sub-committee to the United Nations Economic and Security Councils, the
states bordering the Baltic finally started cooperating in 1974 and concluded the
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area/
the Helsinki Convention. The 1974 Helsinki Convention was designed to prevent
and control land-based pollution, pollution from ships, and dumping at sea.29 Oil
spills were regulated in the provisions concerning the prevention of pollution from
ships. There was no specific agreement for any issue due to divergent political
positions. All issues were dealt with by one package, which was the only possible
way for member states to cooperate, since only thus would there be bargaining
space for all those states.
Agreements between the bordering states of other regional seas indicate
that conflicts between political, economical and environmental interests do not
necessarily impede cooperation in marine environmental protection, especially
since the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in
1972, when the whole international community was persuaded of the importance
of environment and the need to protect the marine environment. As a result, the
United Nations created its UNEP. Under the auspices of UNEP, Regional Seas
Program was launched to protect regional seas and covered most enclosed and
semi-enclosed seas. As for emergencies caused by accidental spillage of oil and
other hazardous and noxious substance (HNS), the states bordering most regional
seas have found their ways to combat such marine pollution. Generally speaking,
there are three modes of cooperation including the Mediterranean convention-
protocol mode, the North East Atlantic piecemeal legislation mode, and the Baltic
synthesis mode.
Different modes in marine environment protection are due to the political and
economical situations of the regions they were applied to, despite the consensus
for regional cooperation to tackle marine environmental problems. Practice and
lessons from these regions indicate that the establishment of a particular system
for cooperation in combating pollution is decided by environmental interests,
while a specific mode for such cooperation is decided by political and economical
interests in that region.
Cooperation on Marine Environmental Protection in the South China Sea
In the South China Sea, cooperation in combating pollution is definitely necessary,

just as has been demonstrated in other regions. What the coastal states adjacent to
the South China Sea have to consider is how to cooperate.
29 As for fishing in this area, there was the 1973 Convention on Fishing and Conserving
of the Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts, 1973 Gdansk Convention. See Jonas
Ebbesson, “Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area—The Impact of
the Stockholm Declaration”, in Myron H. Nordquist and John Norton Moore, supra note
22, p. 155.
Political and economical situations in the littoral states vary greatly, which
make their cooperation on marine environment protection under the auspice of
UNEP rely only on the member states’ goodwill.30 Political situations in the region
are also quite complicated. The establishment of ASEAN was initially meant to
countervail the expansion of communism to Southeast Asia. The confrontation
between different political systems lasted from the 1970s to the 1990s.
Economically, ASEAN includes developed Singapore, a number of developing
countries, and underdeveloped Cambodia. Most of the states prefer economic
development to environmental protection, that is to say, these states have not taken
marine environmental protection seriously or attached due importance to it. Such a
situation will only make it worse once a grave oil spill accident occurs.
For cooperation to work, there must be some catalysts to push different states
into concluding an agreement on taking necessary actions. In the case of the North
Sea and the later North East Atlantic alliances, it was the occurrence of the Torrey
Canyon accident. In the case of the Baltic, it was the support of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Economic Commission for
Europe Sub-committee to the United Nations Economic and Security Councils
and the awareness aroused by the 1972 Stockholm Declaration. In the case of the
Mediterranean, it was the efforts from France and the UNEP. As for the South
China Sea, the most preferable way is for one of the bordering states to push
forward the cooperation with the help of UNEP as the East Asian Sea Region
is one of the UNEP-administrated regions. Unfortunately no state would like
to play such a role. The principal reason for this is the great discrepancies of
political interests. Disputes over the Spratly Islands have not been appropriately
resolved, not even appropriately arranged for disputes resolution to begin. Such
tensions between states make coastal states very sensitive to commitments which
may indicate their attitudes toward the disputed issue. Even in terms of marine
environment protection, these states feel reluctant to make any compromise since
it might be interpreted as a compromise over sovereignty or national jurisdiction.
In other regional seas, there were and are also disputes over territory or maritime
jurisdiction, while the specific historic background in Southeast Asia makes it more
difficult for the coastal states to resolve disputes through international judiciary
procedures. Actually, these disputes are in relation to conflicts of various interests.
Furthermore, Japan and the United States are actively involved in the South China
Sea affairs due to the geopolitical value of the Malacca Straits and thus make the
political situations even more delicate and complicated.
Such complicated political situations render a great impact on the establishment
of a legal regime on marine environmental protection in the region. The most
difficult is the conclusion of a legally binding convention. Under the auspices of
the UNEP, there is an Action Plan for the whole East Asian Seas Region, of which
the South China Sea is a sub-region, while concluding a convention has just been
suspended for years.
30 Regional Profile, East Asian Seas Region, p. 3.

With the disintegration of the USSR, political confrontation between the

two political systems began cooling off in Asia. ASEAN has began to pay more
attention to economical development and integration, and tension formerly
existing between China and the ASEAN member states has also eased up. The
twenty-first century also marked the new cooperation opportunity between
China and ASEAN. In 2002, the conclusion of the Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was a landmark which enhanced
economic interdependence between China and ASEAN and promoted their
economic integration. ASEAN and China is now the 4th biggest trade partner for
each other.31
Based on the above analysis of political and economical situations and
real practices in other regions, we may find comparability between the South
China Sea and the Mediterranean. In terms of marine environment protection,
the Mediterranean in the 1970s was quite like the South China Sea nowadays.
Politically, there had been confrontation between European states and African
states during the colonial period, which correspondingly made the African
states depend on Europe economically. There was also political confrontation
in Southeast Asia, due to discrepancies between communist states and capitalist
states, which then brought out economic gaps between these states. Geopolitically,
the Mediterranean connects Europe, Africa and Asia, which makes it one of the
most important sea areas in the world and attracts attention from states outside the
region, such as the United States. The South China Sea is part of the East Asian
Seas under the UNEP, and thus connects the Pacific with the Indian Ocean, Europe
with Asia, making it quite attractive to states such as the United States and Japan.
Economically, the Mediterranean sustains tanker lines and pipe lines from south
to north, east to west, due to the oil trade in the region. As for Asian states like
China, Japan and Korea, over 70 percent of their oil is imported from the Middle
East by sea, which has made the South China Sea critical to oil transportation.
Environmentally, the Mediterranean underwent environmental degradation in
the 1970s due to inappropriate management of activities affecting the marine
environment and to the lack of a legal regime, which was just an example of
“tragedy of commons.” When it was for everyone, there was no one for it. As for
the South China Sea, its resources are claimed by all the surrounding states while
marine environment protection just relies on the good will of those states, which
may be interpreted as unreliable.
The convention-protocol model from the Mediterranean practice and promoted
by the UNEP is the preferable way for the South China Sea, even for the whole East
Asian Sea Region, to approach marine environmental protection. When deciding
what approach to be taken in the cooperation, we need to further consider whether
31 See http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/Nocategory/200704/ 20070404538185.

html, and http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/ aarticle/Nocategory/200702/20070204344141.html
(accessed December 31, 2008).
there exists a state with a leading role in the region. It is not difficult for the region
to get help from the UNEP since it has always been responsible for administrating
this region. As for a bordering state which can push forward cooperation, China
should take the main responsibility to get cooperation operational in the near
future.
As a coastal state, the sea provides China with transportation advantages and
rich natural resources. Since the “Reform and Opening-up” policy was carried
out, coastal cities in China have benefited mostly and become the most prosperous
region in China.32 With fast economic development, China faces challenges in
maintaining the marine environment quality. Since the end of 1970s, the marine
environment in China has been worsening continuously (see Table 13.1).
As a result, the Chinese Government had to pay attention to marine environment
protection from the middle of 1980s. Environment protection was included in
the national plan—the sixth “Five-Year Plan” (1981–5). Since then, China has
enacted laws and regulations on the marine environment, and carried out plans for
environment protection in focal seas. Marine environmental protection has gone
from controlling pollution levels to controlling seawater quality and improving the
marine ecological environment.33
Legally, there is a set of laws for marine environment protection.34 Politically,
China has changed its economic development policies and taken environmental
protection into consideration. In the 11th “Five-Year Plan” (2006–10), reducing
energy consumption per GDP has been stipulated.35
To international cooperation and capacity building and improvement, China has
also attached great importance. At the second Conference of PEMSEA (Partnerships
in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia) held in Haikou, China,
it was formally proposed to work out plans in response to emergent spills of oil
and chemical substances at sea. With such a start, China should push forward the
realization of cooperation in combating pollution in cases of emergency.
32 By the end of the 2000, 11 coastal provinces and cities had produced 60 percent of
the GDP in China. See http://www.coi.gov.cn/hygb/hyhj/20shjimo/huanji1.htm (accessed
February 2, 2001). In the new century, coastal areas are still the better developed part in
China when the middle and west part are also getting developed.
33 See http://www.soa.gov.cn/hygb/2004hjgb/4.htm (accessed December 4, 2006).
34 See Kuen-chen Fu and Binghe Shui (eds), China and the South China Sea Issues,
Taipei: Wenjintang, 2007, pp.288–90.
35 See http://www.stats.gov.cn/ tjgb/ndtjgb/qgndtjgb/t20070228_402387821.htm
(accessed May 11, 2007).
Table 13.1 Marine Environment Quality Variations in China (1989–2006)
Year Quality Polluted Major pollutants Areas seriously Oil emission

areas polluted
1989 Not so good Coastal seas Oil, organic Kiaochow Bay 71051 tons,
matter, nutrient (10% polluted) decreasing by 8%
salt, heavy metal
1990 Mostly good Coastal seas, Nutrient salt, oil West part of 66560 tons,
estuary areas Bo Hai bay decreasing by
and bays and Pearl River 6.3%
estuary
1991 Mostly good Part of the Ammonia, The Yangtse 68353 tons,
coastal seas, nitrogen, nitrite River estuary, increasing by
estuary and nitrogen. nitrate Hangzhou 2.7%
ports nitrogen and oil Bay, Zhoushan
archipelago,
Pearl River
estuary, Haikou
Bay
1992 Mostly good Estuaries, Inorganic Yangtse 65076 tons,
gulfs and phosphor, River estuary, decreasing by
inner bays inorganic Hangzhou Bay, 4.8%
nitrogen and oil Haikou Bay,
east and west
coastal seas of
Guangdong,
Beibu Gulf
1993 Inorganic 71399 tons,
phosphor, increasing by
inorganic 9.7%
nitrogen, oil
1994 Coastal seas Inorganic Pearl River
phosphor, estuary, Dalian
inorganic Bay, Kiaochouw
nitrogen Bay
1995 Coastal seas Bo Hai and Inorganic Coastal seas
deteriorated East China phosphor, pertinent to
obviously Sea severely inorganic metropolitans
polluted nitrogen, oil
1996 Pollution Coastal seas Inorganic Pearl River
worsening phosphor, estuary,
inorganic Kiaochouw Bay
nitrogen, oil
1997 Equivalent to Coastal seas, Inorganic Pearl River
last year East China phosphor, estuary
Sea mostly inorganic
polluted nitrogen, oil
(better than last
year)
1998 Polluted Pollution Inorganic

severely in Bo Hai phosphor,
worsening, activated
East China phosphate, heavy
Sea severely metal
polluted
1999 Polluted East China
severely Sea mostly
polluted
2000 Seawater Pollution in Inorganic
quality of II coastal areas nitrogen,
and III levels of East China phosphate, oil,
mostly Sea worsening mercury and lead
2001 II and IV Part of the Activated
levels mostly coastal seas phosphate,
severely inorganic
polluted nitrogen, COD,
oil and lead
2002 Percentage of Part of the Inorganic
levels I and II: coastal seas nitrogen,
49.7% severely activated
polluted phosphate, oil,
COD, lead,
cuprum, mercury,
cadmium
2003 Percentage of Generally Inorganic
levels I and II: improved nitrogen,
50.2% activated
phosphate, oil,
COD, lead,
dissolved
oxygen, cuprum,
mercury
2004 Percentage of Part of the Inorganic No level I
levels I and II: coastal seas nitrogen, seawater in
49.6% worsening activated East China
phosphate, oil Sea, Bo Hai
and East China
Sea seemingly
worsening
2005 Percentage of Part of the Inorganic Yangtse
levels I and II: coastal seas nitrogen, River estuary,
67.2% severely activated Hangzhou Bay
polluted phosphate
2006 Mostly good Part of the Inorganic Liaotung
coastal seas nitrogen, bay, Bohai
activated Bay, Yangtse
phosphate, oil River estuary,
Hangzhou Bay,
coastal seas close
to Jiangsu, Pearl
River estuary
Source: This table is based on statistics released by Ministry of Environmental Protection
of the People Republic of China, see http://www.mep.gov.cn/plan/zkgb/ (accessed
December 20, 2008)
Suggestions on Building Convention-Protocol Cooperation in the South

China Sea
The nature of regional marine environmental protection suggests that regional

cooperation will be the best available approach. For the coastal states to cooperate,
the following priorities are to be taken into consideration.
The Priority Issues in the South China Sea
The South China Sea has been undergoing serious environmental degradations
caused by land-based pollution, sea-based pollution, habitat loss, etc.36
Land-based Pollution The South China Sea is surrounded by quite a few

large and rapidly growing cities, e.g. Guangzhou, Hong Kong in China, Ho Chi
Minh City in Vietnam, Bangkok in Thailand, Manila in the Philippines, Jakarta
in Indonesia, and Singapore.37 Waste water from those cities has been flowing
into the sea without being appropriately treated due to lack of sewage treatment
facilities. Additionally, pesticides are contributing to environmental degradation
in this region.38
Sea-based Pollution Oil spills are not yet the critical issue in this region.
According to the UNEP, the major causes of oil pollution are ships, oil and gas
exploration and production platforms.39 Nonetheless, with the rapid growth of
Asian economy, e.g. China, Japan and Korea, growth of oil demand will bring on
growth of oil transportation via the sea, which will definitely increase the risk of
oil spills. The UNEP has recognized the risk of oil spills in the region and raised
this issue in particular in 2006 on the second East Asian Seas Congress held in
Haikou, Hainan, China.40
Habitat Loss The main habitats in the South China Sea, coral reefs, mangroves
and estuaries, are exposed to grave pollution and over-exploitation. Living
36 Supra note 30.

37 Supra note 30, p29.
38 For the “hotspots” or areas of most concern refer to: UNEP (1999) Strategic Action
Program for the South China Sea. Draft Version 3, February 24, 1999 UNEP SCS/SAP
Ver. 3, UNEP (2000) Overview on Land-based Pollutant Sources and Activities Affecting
the Marine Environment in the East Asian Seas, Regional Seas Reports and Studies 173,
available at http://www.gpa.unep.org/documents/technical/rseas_reports/173-eng.pdf
(accessed Jan 18, 2009).
39 Supra note 30, p30.
40 For further information, see UNEP (1999) Strategic Action Program for the South
China Sea, supra note 39.
resources in this region are now decreasing due to their habitats being lost.41
Building a Framework Convention System
The Mediterranean has illustrated that a framework convention is indispensable

for all coastal states to cooperate. With the analysis made above on the South
China Sea and cooperation in other regional seas, the author proposes that the
future framework convention for the South China Sea, or even for the whole East
Asian Seas region, should be composed of the following parts:
1. Consciousness of the indispensable economic, social and cultural values of

the marine environment of the South China Sea and its living resources for
the peoples of the region; recognizing pollution in the region; acknowledging
that existing international conventions being not the best available approach
for solving regional marine problems; and the affirmation of regional
cooperation as the most appropriate way.
2. Ascertaining whether the convention applies to internal waters in all
member states.
3. Defining key terms used in the convention, inter alia definitions of
“pollution,” “incident” and “environment emergency.”
4. General obligations and principles: whether contracting parties may
conclude bilateral or sub-regional agreements on marine environment
when being consistent with the regional agreement. All contracting parties
are obliged to collaboratively or unilaterally take all appropriate legislative,
administrative or other relevant measures to prevent and abate pollution
and to protect and enhance the marine environment.
5. Specific provisions including regulations on different sources of pollution,
such as dumping from vessels and aircrafts, land-based pollution,
cooperation on combating emergent pollution incidents; regulations on
routine marine environmental protection, such as marine environmental
monitoring, cooperation on scientific research and technology; regulations
on pollution incidents, such as obligation, remedy and dispute resolution;
regulations on procedural issues, such as secretariat, contracting parties
conferences and financial arrangements; regulations on amendments,
adaptation, implementation, access, withdrawal and depository.
41 For further information, see UNEP (2000) Overview on Land-based Pollutant
Sources and Activities Affecting the Marine Environment in the East Asian Seas, Regional
Seas Reports and Studies 173, available at http://www.gpa.unep.org/documents/technical/
rseas_reports/173-eng.pdf (accessed Jan 18, 2009).
Protocol on Combating Pollution in Case of Emergency
Cooperation on combating pollution in case of emergency will be one of the

priority issues to be tackled. With reference to existing examples, cooperation on
such an issue may be achieved by the following steps:
1. Ascertaining goals of cooperation on combating pollution in case of

emergency are to prevent pollution from vessels and to deal with pollution
incidents; affirming that the cooperation of all members is necessary to deal
with such emergencies.
2. Setting out general principles for such cooperation in case of emergency,
which are composed of precaution and polluters paying.
3. Defining key terms used in the protocol, such as “pollution incident,” “oil,”
“hazardous and noxious substances,” “marine-related interests,” “relevant
international instruments,” “protocol area,” which should be consistent
with the convention.
4. General articles, such as obligations to cooperate when preventing, abating
and controlling pollution incidents, and to cooperate when pollution
incidents occur.
5. Specific provisions including regulations on members’ contingency plans;
regulations on obligations for members when incidents occur; regulations
on information exchange; regulations on emergent measures; regulations
on reimbursement; regulations on port reception facilities and reception of
ships in distress and places of refuge.
6. Procedural issues of the protocol, such as conferences, the relationship
between the protocol and the frame convention, signing, approval, access
and enforcement of the protocol.
Conclusion
For the South China Sea, and even the whole East Asian Seas Region, it is necessary
to realize cooperation in combating marine pollution and to have an appropriate
legal framework to enhance and strengthen such cooperation. The importance
and indispensability of marine environment protection has been recognized by
the international community since the end of 1960s. The need to cooperate in
such protection has been stipulated in many international instruments. The
effectiveness of a regional way to cooperate has been proved by the precedent of
practices in many regional seas. Theoretically and practically, regional cooperation
in combating pollution in the South China Sea will be the best way. Pollution in
case of emergency by oil and HNS causes grave harm to the marine environment,
which draws constant attention as the South China Sea is a critical sea route for
oil tanker transportation.
Based on the analysis made above, it is proposed that the Mediterranean

convention-protocol approach to establish a legal framework for the region be
followed, as these two regions have many comparables. For the forming of such
a legal framework, the UNEP will be of adequate help as an external pushing
force, while a bordering state shall play an internal pushing force role. China has
always greatly relied on the resources and transportation advantages provided by
the South China Sea. With such great interests, China should consider playing
the role as an internal propellant since the maintenance of any such interests
must have a favorable marine environment. The adjustments within the Chinese
economic structure and economic developing pattern, the reform of the Chinese
marine environmental protection regime and the rapid development of its response
capability make China capable of pushing the establishment of emergency regime
in this region. Nonetheless, to avoid deepening different political interests in this
region, it is preferable for China to “push” rather than to “lead” in the regime
establishing course.
Although there are difficulties and obstacles in this region to realizing
cooperation under an appropriate legal framework, it is not impossible. With the
economical interdependence and integration between ASEAN and China, it will
be more and more favorable for the bordering states to cooperate with each other.
Since the whole international community is aware of the indispensability of marine
environment to human survival, the states bordering the South China Sea are also
compelled to tackle this issue. “Put aside controversy and protect jointly” will be
the best choice through which all the bordering states may realize their respective
interests, economically, politically and environmentally.
Chapter 14
International Submarine Rescue: A
Constructive Role for China
Lyle J. Goldstein and William S. Murray
China is emerging as a significant maritime power. Its shipbuilding sector is

extremely dynamic. Beijing is also investing heavily in oceanographic research
and ocean resource exploitation. Sovereignty concerns along China’s maritime
periphery combine with these maritime commercial tendencies to create the
impetus for an ambitious program of naval modernization. At the center of China’s
naval modernization is the submarine force, which in 2006 is building four classes
of submarines simultaneously, while acquiring a significant number of submarines
from abroad. This rapid naval modernization, with its obvious emphasis on
undersea warfare, has aroused the suspicions of regional states as well as those of
the traditional East Asian maritime powers, including the United States.
Underlining the imperative for greater cooperation between the U.S. and
Chinese navies, in October 2006 a Chinese submarine operated in close proximity
to the U.S. Navy’s Kitty Hawk battle group. Commenting on this incident, Admiral
William Fallon, then Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, underlined the
possible risks of such unscripted encounters between warships observing, “ [I]f
this Chinese sub came in the middle of [an ASW exercise], then it could have
escalated …” To envision an alternative future of cooperative security and not
rivalry, it is worthwhile to consider how cooperation in submarine rescue could
help to spur a larger vision in which U.S. and Chinese fleets cooperate together
within a global “thousand ship navy,” to protect the shared interest in a global
commons.
The opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the authors, and do not necessarily
reflect the official positions of the United States Government or United States Navy. This
chapter draws extensively from research that was first published in Asia Policy, 5 (January
2008), pp. 167–83.
Audra Ang, “U.S. Admiral Says China Submarine Incident Not Dangerous,” San
Diego Tribune, November 17, 2006.
On the “‘Thousand Ship Navy’” concept, see John Morgan Jr. and Charles
Martoglio, “Global Maritime Network,” USNI Proceedings, November 30, 2005 on the
website Military.com at http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,81652,00.html (accessed
November 13, 2006).
Traditionally a continental power, China’s emergence as a maritime power

necessarily raises profound questions for the stability and security of the Asia-
Pacific region. Most particularly, can the United States, the most dominant Pacific
power, find a modus vivendi with a rising China given Beijing’s evident maritime
aspirations? The potential for extended naval rivalry is obvious, but to avoid this
dangerous future an agenda for positive maritime cooperation must be developed.
The small-scale, but historically significant, bilateral search and rescue exercises
conducted by Chinese and U.S. ships in late 2006 should form the beginning
of an expanded naval cooperation agenda. This chapter explores how increased
cooperation in submarine rescue is one potential avenue for expanded maritime
cooperation between the established and the emergent naval power in the Asia-
Pacific region. While the promise of such cooperative initiatives should not
be exaggerated and cannot be expected to alter potentially conflicting national
interests, such mechanisms may facilitate greater trust and transparency, in
addition to having an impact on the “world-view” of decision-makers in sensitive
national security positions.
Among many Asia-Pacific maritime cooperation initiatives including, for
example, multilateral oceanographic research, fisheries management, and coast
guard cooperation, submarine rescue may be regarded as particularly sensitive.
After all, the details of submarine operations and capabilities comprise some of
the most closely held secrets of nations that operate such warships. Nevertheless,
the value of international cooperation in submarine rescue is a concrete and
incontestable fact that can be measured in lives saved—as the August 2005
rescue of the Russian submersible AS-28 Priz by a team from the UK’s Royal
Navy vividly demonstrated. Meanwhile, the increased domestic and international
attention given to China’s submarine fleet and its accidents, suggest that submarine
rescue capabilities will become much more important to the People’s Republic
of China (PRC). The tragic loss of an entire Chinese submarine crew in 2003
powerfully underlines this imperative. Cooperation among submarine forces in
the Pacific may be more challenging than other aspects of regional naval and
maritime cooperation, but the consequences for mutual confidence could be much
more profound as elite (and hence influential) military organizations are drawn
into cooperative activities. A considerable consensus in Washington has now
seemingly coalesced around former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s
articulation of the “stakeholder” concept for U.S.–China relations. The naval
component should not be neglected in this effort to encourage Beijing to exercise
See, for example, Benjamin Self and Yuki Tatsumi, eds, “Confidence-Building
Measures and Security Issues in Northeast Asia,” Report no. 33, Washington DC: Henry L.
Stimson Center, 2000. “Confidence building measures or confidence and security building
measures are actions taken to reduce fear of attack by both (or more) parties in a situation
of tension …” and typically involve both information exchange and people-to-people
contacts. From Wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confidence_and_Security-
Building_Measures (accessed November 13, 2006).
International Submarine Rescue: A Constructive Role for China 239
its new power in order to “sustain, adapt, and advance the peaceful international
system that has enabled its own success.”
This analysis is comprised of three sections. The first examines China’s
record of submarine accidents, focusing on the most recent tragedy of Ming 361.
A second section places China’s record in a larger context, illustrating that all
submarine powers have inevitably suffered disastrous accidents. This section also
discusses in some detail two recent disasters, the loss of Kursk and the rescue
of AS-28 Priz, which have together created strong momentum behind submarine
rescue initiatives. The third section surveys the multinational, institutional basis
for submarine rescue, while the conclusion presents policy recommendations.
China’s Experience with Submarine Accidents
China has suffered a great many submarine accidents. Perhaps the most notorious
of Beijing’s underwater mishaps is the loss of the Ming-class submarine 361, in
which the entire crew of 70 officers and sailors perished in late April 2003 while
operating in relatively shallow water near the entrance to the Bohai Gulf. Some
reports suggest that local fishermen found the vessel floating in a semi-submerged
condition with its air induction mast and periscope raised above the surface of the
water and that the entire crew perished so quickly that “the positions of all 70
officers and sailors were ‘very peaceful.’ Some were lying in bed. Some were at
work positions. There was no single trace of [struggle].”
The exact cause of the disaster is not known outside of the Chinese Navy,
however, it was publicly declared to be the result of a “mechanical problem” that
occurred during “valve testing.”10 A logical explanation that fits with the majority
of reported features of the accident is that the ship operated its diesel engines
without opening the air induction valve. With no air entering the ship, the ship’s
“Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick Statement on Conclusion of Second U.S.-China

Senior Dialogue,” December 8, 2005, on the website of the Embassy of the United States
at Beijing, China, at http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/120905p.html (accessed June
26, 2009).
Wang Chine-min, “Story Behind the Truth of Submarine No. 361”, Yazhou Zhoukan,
May 12, 2003, FBIS Doc. No. CPP20030513000070.
Nanfang Wang, “Mystery Surrounding No. 361 Submarine Accident Remains
Unsolved, Outdated Equipment Become Potential Danger for National Defense”, Jianghuai
Chenbao, May 6, 2003, FBIS Doc. No. CPP20030506000139.
Wang Jianmin, “Military Family Revealed Inside Secret,” Yazhou Zhoukan, May
26, 2003, pp. 48–49l. FBIS Doc. No. CPP20030619000201.
Ibid.
10 “CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin Denounces PLA Navy for Errors Behind
Submarine Accident”, Kuang Chiao Ching, August 15, 2003, p. 15, FBIS Doc. No.
CPP20030815000047.
atmosphere became rapidly depleted of oxygen (since the ship is quite small and
the engines have a voracious appetite) and the crew suffocated.
The loss of the Ming 361 resulted in an unprecedented political–military
dynamic within the Chinese leadership. It is noteworthy how quickly this event
became public, perhaps owing to the difficulty of containing information in an
age of the internet and increasing globalization, 11 as well as the public relations
disaster that had befallen the Russian government during the Kursk tragedy just
a couple of years prior. Shortly after the accident, Central Military Commission
(CMC) Chairman Jiang Zemin and Vice Chairman Hu Jintao were shown on
television inside the recovered submarine. Those in the military chain of command
deemed ultimately responsible, including the People’s Liberation Army (Navy)
(PLAN) Commander and Political Commissar, and the North Sea Fleet (NSF)
Commander and NSF Political Commissar, were publicly dismissed.12 The
message, it would appear, was that PLAN Commanders will be held personally
accountable for preventable accidents. This is a hallmark of an increasingly
professional organization.
The Ming 361 incident left no opportunity for rescue. But this has not been
the only accident that China has suffered. Like other submarine powers, China
has a long history of submarine accidents. There is a report of the loss of a large
group of skipper trainees when a Romeo-class submarine sank in 1993.13 Another
possible loss of a Ming, with all hands, is said to have occurred in the Yellow Sea
in the 1980s, allegedly after the submerged submarine collided with a merchant
ship.14 Rumors exist of another accident, killing 10 in the 1980s, and of an even
more serious incident in the 1960s in which there was only one survivor.15 At
some point, the Chinese may have even lost an additional Ming to a fire.16 There is
likewise speculation regarding a second Xia-class ballistic missile submarine that
might have been “lost in a fire before it went to sea.”17
Beijing continues to operate a large fleet of submarines, nearly half of which
are relatively obsolete, in the relatively shallow waters around the South Sea, East
11 A similar phenomenon appears to have been at work when it was revealed rather
quickly that China had lost one of its experimental early warning aircraft (KJ-200) in an air
crash in June 2006.
12 “Enforce Strict Discipline to Avoid Repeat of Tragedy,” Ta Kung Pao, June 16,
2003, FBIS Doc. No. CPP20030616000032.
13 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Lyle J. Goldstein and William S. Murray, “China and
Northeast Asia, Navy,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, November 19, 2002, www.
janes.com (accessed November 13, 2006).
14 Wang Chine-min, “Story Behind the Truth of Submarine No. 361.”
15 Ma Ling and, Li Ming, “Why Did China Make Public the Submarine Accident?”
Ming Pao, May 9, 2003, FBIS Doc. No. CPP20030509000043
16 “Ming Type 035” on the website of the Federation of American Scientists at http://
www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/row/plan/ming.htm (accessed November 13, 2006).
17 Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the 21st Century,
Annapolis, M.D.: Naval Institute Press, 2001, p. 196, n. 46.
Sea and North Sea Fleet submarine bases. These waters are becoming increasingly
crowded with merchant shipping as China’s export economy expands. This
confluence of ever-growing merchant ship activity combined with the continued
obsolescence of some proportion of the PLAN submarine force, together with
often young and inexperienced crews, practically guarantees further accidents.
Indeed, the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun recently reported that another
Ming-class submarine suffered a fire at sea in May 2005 and had to be towed back
to its South Sea Fleet port.18 A PLA Navy corvette was severely damaged in a
collision with a large merchant ship in late June 2006. Thirteen Chinese officers
and men were reported missing as a result of this accident.19 Submarines operating
in these intensely congested waters face the same risk of collision and sinking,
especially while operating on the surface.
China might be able to execute an effective submarine rescue by drawing solely
on indigenous naval assets. In fact, one source suggests that successful escapes from
stricken submarines by PLA Navy sailors were made through the torpedo tubes
during incidents in 1959 and in 1987.20 China continues to train its submariners in
that method of escape, but also has some additional submarine rescue capabilities.
The PLAN operates Dajiang, Hudong, and Kancha-class support vessels, all of
which have some ability to facilitate submarine rescue operations. The Chinese
Navy does have two deep submergence rescue vehicles (DSRVs). The PLA Navy
DSRV was first tested in 1986 and is capable of conducting “wet rescue” at depths
up to 200 meters. Deployed from the above salvage vessels and with a capacity to
carry six survivors, these rescue vessels are equipped with underwater cameras,
high-frequency active sonar, and a manipulator arm.21 PLA Navy submarine
rescue exercises are becoming more common to be sure, but according to Chinese
sources, the first major submarine rescue exercise only occurred in 2004.22 In
September 2006, the PLA Navy successfully conducted a joint exercise employing
18 See Qiu Yongzheng, “US, Japan, Taiwan Work Together to Forge Antisubmarine
Chain”, Qingnian Cankao, June 9, 2005, FBIS Doc. No. CPP20050609000045. This article
disputes the Yomiuri Shimbun’s account, and relays a PRC Foreign Ministry explanation
that the submarine was instead engaged in “emergency rescue training.”
19 “Hong Kong Ship Rams Into Missile-Carrying Vessel, Leaving 13 People
Missing”, Tung Fang Jih Pao, June 26, 2006, FBIS Doc. No. CPP20060627710002.
20 From the website of the International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office
(ISMERLO) at http://www.ismerlo.org/assets/prc.htm (accessed November 13, 2006).
21 Stephen Saunders, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2005–2006, London: Jane’s, 2005,
p. 149. The Chinese Navy’s first deep diving manned submersible was Osprey-1, which
was completed by Institute 705 in 1969. This submersible, however, was not created for
submarine rescue but rather primarily for salvage tasks associated with torpedo development.
For an extensive discussion of this system, see Zheng Chu, “A Deep Water Torpedo Salvage
Vessel Goes to Sea”, Naval and Merchant Ships (October 2006), pp. 10–13 (in Chinese).
22 “The Chinese Navy Conducts a Large-Scale Submarine Rescue Exercise for the
First Time,” Zhongguo Xinwen, June 1, 2004, FBIS document no. CPP20050601000107.
Another recent report on Chinese submarine rescue exercises is Li Gengcheng and Li
a diving bell for submarine rescue. The People’s Liberation Army Daily report
on this exercise, which was conducted by the North Sea Fleet, suggests that the
exercise demonstrates that China is aiming to reach international standards in
this arena.23 China’s evident lack of significant experience in this aspect of naval
development suggests that Beijing could benefit from studying foreign submarine
accidents, and more importantly in interacting with foreign navies that have much
more experience with submarine rescue.
Submarine Accidents and Factors Influencing Rescue
Although China is the most recent country to lose a submarine crew due to a
peacetime accident, all of the other permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council have suffered similarly fatal submarine disasters. Russia has the
sad distinction of experiencing the most.
The United Kingdom lost four diesel-powered submarines during the Cold
War. France lost two Daphne-class diesel submarines, both with all hands. The
United States suffered two submarine losses in the 1960s, with the USS Thresher,
a nuclear-powered attack submarine, sinking during sea trials in the Gulf of Maine
in1963, and the USS Scorpion, which was lost near the Azores in 1967, most
probably due to an internal explosion. Altogether, since 1945 at least 12 countries
have lost submarines and their crews due to accidental causes in peacetime.24
Potentially catastrophic submarine accidents are more common than is usually
realized. The Canadian submarine HMCS Windsor, for example, recently suffered
a small electrical fire.25 This would never have been reported in the newspapers
had not the HMCS Chicoutimi suffered a fire and the death of a crew member only
Bingzheng, “South Sea Fleet Successfully Organizes Submarine Rescue Drill,” Jiefang
Junbao, July 28, 2005, FBIS document no. CPP20050826000230.
23 Zhang Jian, “Navy Lifesaving Bell Successfully Rescues Submarine for the First
Time”, People’s Liberation Army Daily, 21, p. 12 (in Chinese). See also “PLA Navy North
China Sea Fleet Organizes Underwater Submarine Rescue Training Exercise Involving
Warships, Helicopters, Divers in Yellow Sea Area,” Jiefang Junbao, September 21, 2006,
FBIS document no. CPP20060921711001. Another article suggests that rescue bells were
developed for the Chinese Navy in the 1980s and first successfully tests in 1989. See
Wang Longqi, “A Insider Account of Submarine Crew Undersea Escape”, Modern Navy
(November 2004), pp. 44–5 (in Chinese).
24 Smaller countries have also suffered submarine accidents and losses. Peru lost the
Pacocha in 1988, and Israel the Dakar in 1968. Turkey lost the Dumlupinar in 1953 and
Spain the C4 in 1946. Edwyn Gray, Disasters of the Deep, Annapolis, M.D.: United States
Naval Institute Press, 2003, pp. 282–9.
25 Kelly Toughill, “Blaze Eamages Navy’s Last Working Submarine,” The Toronto
Star, November 1, 2005.
13 months earlier.26 Other accidents, however, avoid becoming major disasters

by the narrowest of margins. USS Dolphin, formerly the U.S. Navy’s only diesel
submarine, suffered major flooding in May 2002 and was almost lost. More widely
known was the collision in 2001 between USS Greeneville and a fishing school
vessel in which nine Japanese students were killed. In January 2005, when the
USS San Francisco struck an undersea mountain while operating submerged at
high speed several hundred miles south of Guam, there was one fatality.27
An example of a relatively minor submarine accident that had the potential to
be a major disaster occurred in September 2005 when the USS Philadelphia was
struck by a Turkish freighter while the submarine was operating on the surface as
it entered Bahrain. The nature of the damage, though relatively minor, suggests
the submarine could just as easily have been sunk.28 One has to conclude that
submarining is simply a dangerous business, for even the most accomplished
practitioners of undersea warfare. As the professionalism of China’s Navy
increases, therefore, submarine accidents will remain a major concern. The Kursk,
Thresher, Scorpion, Ming 361, Dakar, and many other submarine accidents
occurred with the loss of all hands, but less fatal submarine accidents also occur
relatively frequently. This discussion also illustrates that, unlike air crashes,
submarine accidents frequently have survivors, so that the imperative to develop
rescue capabilities is, therefore, acute.
In order to affect a rescue of stranded submariners the time delay between the
accident and rescue attempt must be short. Hypothermia and asphyxiation from
the buildup of carbon monoxide or noxious gasses from fires or chemical reactions
between seawater and battery acids generally kill their victims within 72 hours.
HMS Thetis’ 99-member crew, for example, succumbed during rescue efforts
while trapped in their stranded vessel in 1939.29 Two crucial elements will have a
direct impact on the time to rescue.
26 “Canadian Dies of Injuries from Submarine Fire,” CBC News, October 7, 2004,
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2004/10/06/saunders041006.html (accessed June 26,
2009). This incident was reported upon in China’s most important naval publication: see
Liu Linkun, “Examining Submarine Rescue from the Perspective of the Recent Russian
and Canadian Submarine Rescue Failures”, Modern Navy (December 2004), pp. 58–9 (in
Chinese).
27 The USS San Francisco accident was covered extensively in the Chinese military
press. See, for example, Ge Lide, “The U.S. Nuclear Submarine Fleet In the Wake of USS
San Francisco’s Collision with the Sea Bottom” on the website of China Military Net at
http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2005-01/19/content_117477.htm (accessed
November 13, 2006).
28 Robert A. Hamilton, “Sources: Sub Not at Fault in Collision,” New London Day,
September 7, 2005. See also Robert A. Hamilton, “Damage to Groton-Based sub is Worse
Than Expected,” New London Day, September 10, 2005.
29 Delays in first locating the stricken submarine and in getting personnel to the
accident site with adequate equipment that could cut a hole through the exposed stern of the
vessel contributed to the severity of this disaster. Gray, Disasters of the Deep, pp. 162–71.
First, there is the problem of accurately determining the stranded vessel’s

location. Occasionally, this task has been simple, as in 1923 when the US
submarine O-5 sank as the result of a collision and was quickly lifted off the
30-foot deep bottom near the entrance to the Panama Canal. The water was so
clear that submarine could be clearly seen from the surface.30 Similar accidents
are quite possible to this day, perhaps including in the extensively shallow waters
of China’s littoral. Unfortunately, locating the stricken submarine is rarely as easy
as in the above case, even in shallow waters. To help solve this problem, many
submarines—China’s included—are equipped with lighted or radio beacon buoys
that can be released from a stranded submarine. These buoys, painted yellow and
located in the bow and stern, are plainly visible in photos of contemporary PLA
Navy submarines. Submarines also carry flares that can be launched to attract
attention.
A second factor crucial for rescue, of course, is that adequate rescue forces
and machinery must be nearby. The crew of the USS Squalus was rescued in 1939
from waters off the New Hampshire coast by a rescue bell lowered and raised by
cables onto the hatch of the submarine from the rescue vessel USS Falcon, which
had fortuitously been ready to sail from Groton, Connecticut. Unfortunately, even
the close proximity of rescue forces cannot guarantee a successful rescue outcome,
as two recent cases from the Russian Navy illustrate. It is worth dwelling on these
two cases in particular because they demonstrate the strong imperative to develop
international cooperation in this sphere.
The Kursk Tragedy
On August 12, 2000, the Russian Navy’s five-year-old Oscar II-class guided
missile submarine (SSGN) Kursk became disabled by an internal explosion and
plunged to the bottom of the Barents Sea. The vessel lay trapped at a depth of 108
meters, approximately 85 miles off of the Russian port of Severomorsk. Up to 23
crew members trapped in the submarine’s rear compartments may have survived
until approximately August 15.31 Repeated attempts by the Russian Navy to reach
the submarine and save the surviving crew members ended in failure. Thus, the
Kursk’s entire crew of 118 sailors and officers perished.
30 The entire 18-member crew was saved in this rapid rescue operation. See Gray,
Disasters of the Deep, p. 117.
31 A thorough chronicle of the Kursk’s foundering and subsequent steps to rescue
and then recover the crew is available at The Kursk Accident section of the Center for
Non Proliferation Studies website at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/kursk.htm (accessed
November 13, 2006). A note later found on the recovered body of a crew member stated
that a total of 23 men survived the initial explosion and waited in vain for rescue in the aft
section of the vessel. See “Kursk Timeline,” CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/
world/0008/kursk.timeline/frameset.exclude.html (accessed November 13, 2006).
On the day following the accident, August 13, the submarine was located by
the sonar of the cruiser Pyotr Veliky,32 and Russian submersibles already may have
been diving on the site later that evening.33 On August 14, Moscow revealed the
submarine accident to the world. During the same day, foreign navies including
Norway, the UK and the U.S., all offered assistance to the Russian Navy. However,
these offers were initially rejected. Thus, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya
Klebanov commented on August 15: “We have all the necessary technology to
carry out the [rescue] operation.”34 Meanwhile, numerous Russian Navy attempts
to dock Priz-class rescue vehicles with Kursk failed – perhaps partially due to a
storm that passed through the area.35 By August 15, Russian sources reported that
there were no longer any signs of life aboard Kursk.
The increasingly desperate situation finally pushed Russian leaders to explore
the possibilities of international assistance. However, these efforts appear to have
been somewhat half-hearted in nature. For example, a British submersible was
flown into Norway, instead of to any of the Russian naval bases that were much
closer to the stricken submarine.36 Moreover, when international aid from the UK
and Norway did finally arrive on site on August 19, further time was expended on
negotiations concerning how the countries intended to cooperate during the rescue
operation.37 Norwegian deep sea divers succeeded in opening the Kursk’s rear
escape hatch by August 21, just one day after beginning their operations.38
An April 2006 series that appeared in the Chinese naval journal 舰船知识
(Naval and Merchant Ships) provides a detailed examination of the Kursk accident.
The analysis cites the initially held belief in the Russian Navy that the incident
was triggered by a collision with a U.S. Navy submarine, noting the frequency of
such undersea collisions in the Barents Sea. However, the Chinese author states
unequivocally that the discovered cause of the accident was a faulty Russian
torpedo. Moreover, this analyst pulls no punches in blaming Russian Navy leaders
32 “The Kursk Disaster: Day By Day,” August 24, 2000, BBC News, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/894638.stm (accessed November 13, 2006).
33 “Project 1855 Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle,” Global Security.org, http://
www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/1855.htm (accessed November 13, 2006).
34 “Russian Submarine Rescue Attempt Underway in Arctic Waters,” CNN, August
15, 2005, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/08/15/russia.submarine.04/
35 “Project 1855 Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle,” Global Security.org.
36 “U.S. Analysis Suggests Crew Died Early,” August 17, 2000, CNN.com, http://
archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/08/16/russia.submarine.04/.
37 “UK ‘Underwater Helicopters’ Arrives to Help Entombed Russian Sub,” August
19, 2000, CNN.com, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/08/19/russian.
submarine.03/ (accessed November 13, 2006).
38 “Norwegian Divers Open Hatch of Stricken Nuclear Sub,” August 21, 2000, CNN.
com, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/08/21/russia.submarine/ (accessed
November 13, 2006).
for their reluctance to accept international assistance, which it is observed was

offered immediately after the accident was made public by Russian authorities.39
Rescue of AS-28 Priz
Almost exactly five years after the Kursk tragedy, the AS-28 Priz submersible
deployed on a training mission in the waters of Beryozovaya Bay, approximately
50 miles south of Kamchatka’s capital, Petropavlovsk. The propeller of the mini-
submarine appears to have become ensnared by a discarded fishing net or by Soviet-
era surveillance equipment lying on the sea bottom.40 Trapped at 190 meters (about
625 feet)—significantly deeper than the wreck of the Kursk—the AS-28 Priz was
too deep to allow the crew to simply abandon ship and swim to the surface. The
following day, August 5, Russian ships appeared on the scene and attempted to
free the submarine by dragging it along the bottom. When this was unsuccessful,
the Russian Navy, out of options, wisely opted to call for international assistance
at an early point in the developing crisis.41
Within 24 hours, help was on its way from the UK, the U.S., and also from
Japan. In Scotland, a Royal Navy remotely controlled mini-submarine capable
of cutting through steel cables 70 mm thick, was put aboard a military transport
aircraft and began the long flight to the Russian Far East.42 The same day, a U.S.
Navy Super Scorpio submersible was loaded on a C-5 Galaxy transport to make the
same journey.43 Meanwhile, a flotilla of Japanese navy ships including Chiyoda, a
submarine rescue mother ship, readied to sail for the waters of Kamchatka.44
On August 6, foreign assistance began to arrive in Kamchatka. While U.S.
Navy elements, including deep-sea divers, waited in reserve, the Royal Navy
39 Wang Xinsen, “In Memoriam: the Kursk (1)”, Naval and Merchant Ships, 318
(March 2006), pp. 46–9 and Wang Xinsen, “In Memoriam: The Kursk (2)”, Naval and
Merchant Ships, 319 (April 2006), pp. 54–8 (both in Chinese).
40 “Project 1855 Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle,” Global Security.org.
41 It is worth noting, however, that the decision to seek international assistance was
still opposed by some quarters within the Russian military. Thus, ADM Eduard Baltin,
commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, stunned observers on August 5—particularly
in light of the Kursk tragedy—when he said that asking NATO countries for help was a
mistake, because the region in question was “filled with [Russian] military secrets.” See
Anna Arutunyan, “Scorpio’s Subprize,” Moscow News, http://english.mn.ru/english/issue.
php?2005-30-1 (accessed November 13, 2006).
42 Michael Thurston, “Britain Trumpets Role in Rescuing Russian Sailors,” Defense
News, August 8, 2005, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1019711&C=navwar
43 “Russian Mini-Submarine Rescue Efforts in the Pacific,” Moscow News.com,
http://www.mosnews.com/images/p/9956.shtml (accessed November 13, 2006).
44 Iain Ballantyne and Yoshiharu Fukushima, “Happy Outcome for International
Sub Rescue,” Warships IFR, http://www.warshipsifr.com/pages/signal.html (accessed
November 13, 2006).
contingent, led by Commander Jonty Powis, spearheaded the international rescue

effort, freeing the Priz on August 7. Thanks to the efforts of the international
rescuers, but also the difficult and brave decision to invite foreign assistance, the
entire seven-man crew of the Priz escaped from the episode unharmed.
In November 2005 Modern Navy, one of China’s most prestigious naval
publications, carried an extensive story related to the Priz rescue. Oddly, the focus
of the article was not on the rescue itself, but rather on a remarkably detailed
survey of the operational history of Russia’s Project 1855 Priz-class rescue
submersibles. Though it does not directly relate the compelling details of the
rescue, the discussion is nevertheless noteworthy in that it honestly identifies that
the U.S., the UK and Japan all took actions to assist the Russian Navy with the
rescue effort. It also minces few words in criticizing the Russian Navy: “This
accident once again demonstrates that condition of Russian Navy undersea rescue
equipment allows for little optimism.”45 This may reflect an internal PLAN debate,
for another article from this same official PLA Navy journal (December 2004)
expresses some evident reluctance with regard to asking for foreign assistance
with respect to submarine rescue.46
Another Chinese article on the Priz rescue was published in September 2005
issue of Naval and Merchant Ships. Like the article described above, it does
not address the facts of the actual incident, but rather explores the technical and
doctrinal aspects of the “NATO submarine rescue system.” This article begins
with the assertion, particularly applicable to the circumstances of China’s naval
development, that the vast majority of submarine accidents have occurred in waters
shallow enough to feasibly undertake rescue. Most encouraging, for the purposes
of the present study, is that this article highlights the major efficiency benefits of
submarine rescue activities that are international in scope.47 Highlighting China’s
45 Jin Tao, “The Former Soviet Union and Russia: A Review of Diving Capability
Development”, Modern Navy, 146 (November 2005), pp. 48–51 (in Chinese). In this
rendering of the operational history of the Priz-class rescue submersibles, it is mentioned
that these platforms were used to investigate the crash site of the Korean airliner shot down
by a Soviet fighter in 1983.
46 Here it is explained that “the U.S. and the former Soviet Union, these two maritime
powers, themselves experienced serious accidents in the course of various patrols, and even
when confronting the peril of destroyed vessels and lost crew members, still declined the
assistance of foreign military forces …” Liu Lunkun, “Examining Submarine Rescue from
the Perspective of the Recent Russian and Canadian Submarine Rescue Failures”, p. 58.
47 Zeng Zhirong, “New Spirit for Undersea Rescue: NATO’s Submarine Rescue
System”, Naval and Merchant Ships, 312 (September 2005), pp. 28–30 (in Chinese). The
analysis discusses the different advantages and disadvantages of both manned and unmanned
rescue systems. It concludes that submarine rescues must generally be completed in less
than 72 hours to be successful, and in that regard describes the importance of air mobility
for rescue submersibles. The author additionally points out that rescue submersibles can
also perform non-military tasks, such as retrieving the so-called “black boxes” from aircraft
crash sites.
interest in submarine rescue issues, an article from the October 2005 issue of the
same journal actually shows a sequence of underwater photos of the Royal Navy
Scorpio systems at work in cutting the Priz free from the cables that were trapping
it.48
The above survey of historical accidents leads to some inescapable conclusions.
Despite the best efforts of every country involved, future submarine accidents are
a certainty, and some of these will present the opportunity for rescue. In some
future cases, it may be that the crews will be able to leave the ship on their own
accord using individual rescue gear.49 But history shows that more often, stranded
submariners will perish without external assistance. In order to affect a successful
rescue, a submarine’s location must be quickly determined and the vital equipment
and expert personnel must reach the scene in a timely manner. As illustrated above,
the Kursk offered an opportunity for rescue, and the consequent failure underlines
the requirement to develop faster and more effective cooperative mechanisms
for submarine rescue. The Priz example of successful international submarine
cooperation stands in stark contrast to the Kursk tragedy. Evidently, some vital
lessons have been learned by the international community.
Opportunities for China in International Submarine Rescue
China’s “new diplomacy” features a variety of bold and almost unprecedented

(in the Chinese context) multilateral initiatives, for example the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, but has also encompassed bilateral naval exercises on
a limited but growing basis. Perhaps in part spurred by China’s increasing stature
as a global trade juggernaut, Chinese commercial aircraft and ships have adjusted
to global operating and safety standards. In the context of U.S.–China relations,
this process has been manifested in a variety of new initiatives and agreements.
For example, China has led other nations in cooperating with the U.S. container
security initiative (CSI), so that new port security measures do not significantly
hinder the efficiency of maritime trade.50
48 Zhi Ge, “The Heavenly Scorpion and the LR5 Rescue Vehicle”, Naval and
Merchant Ships (October 2005), pp. 20–21 (in Chinese). Interestingly, the authors have
not encountered these photos in any other venue, either on the web or in any Western naval
publication.
49 Apparently, the Chinese Navy regularly practice self-rescue via torpedo tube,
using special breathing apparatus. See Wang Longqi, “A Insider Account of Submarine
Crew Undersea Escape”, Modern Navy (November 2004), pp. 44–5 (in Chinese). There
is some evidence that the PLA Navy is undertaking submarine rescue exercises with its
newest classes of submarines. See Qian Xiaohu and Yu Zifu, “Submarine Probes into Ways
of Turning New Armament into Fighting Power,” PLA Daily, August 21, 2006.
50 For background on this cooperative initiative, see “China Implements Container
Security Initiative at Port of Shanghai to Target and Pre-Screen Cargo Destined for U.S.,”
on the website of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/
With respect to military-to-military cooperation, a Military Maritime

Consultative Agreement (MMCA) was signed between Beijing and Washington
in 1998. The MMCA is designed to raise “measures to promote safe maritime
practices and establish mutual trust [such] as search and rescue, communications
procedures when ships encounter each other, interpretation of the Rules of the
Nautical Road and avoidance of accidents-at-sea.” The agreement provides for
annual meetings and also for working groups of naval professionals to discuss
specific topics.51 Despite this clearly positive step, the overall military relationship
was gravely damaged by the so-called “EP-3 incident” of April 2001, after which
many cooperative activities were suspended. Since 2005, however, Admiral
Fallon has spearheaded efforts to reengage with the PLA—an initiative that led
to the fall 2006 bilateral naval search and rescue exercises. During one of these
events recently, the PLA Navy Deputy Chief of Staff spoke of a desire to add
“momentum” to the relationship.52 In spite of some recent tensions, for example
related to the January 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test, Admiral Fallon’s initiative
generally has set the tone for enhanced U.S.–China navy-to-navy cooperation.
From a submarine-rescue perspective, the Kursk tragedy has served as a strong
impetus for the world’s various submarine powers to accelerate cooperative
submarine rescue initiatives. These initiatives have been concentrated among
traditional alliance partners, but the subsequent founding in September 2004 of
the International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office (ISMERLO) offers
the potential for significantly widening the scope of international cooperation in
this sphere. The opportunities for enlarged Chinese participation in these activities
need to be taken seriously, especially in Beijing and Washington, if China is to
develop as a “responsible maritime stakeholder.”
An especially significant international submarine rescue exercise, dubbed
Sorbet Royale, occurred near Taranto, Italy, in June 2005. During this NATO
exercise, four submarines from Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Turkey rested on
the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea. Rescue vehicles from the U.S., Italy, France
and the United Kingdom practiced “rescuing” sailors from these submarines, and
were supported by vessels, divers, and medical support personnel from France,
the Netherlands, Israel, Italy, Spain and the UK. Significantly, despite the secrecy
traditionally associated with submarines, forces from Russia and the Ukraine
also participated in the exercise. This proved to be of particular importance less
newsroom/news_releases/archives/2005_press_releases/042005/04282005.xml (accessed
November 13, 2006).
51 See Charles A. Meconis, “U.S.-China Confidence-Building More Important than
Detargeting,” Global Beat Issue Brief, 39, 14 July 1998, on the web at http://www.bu.edu/
globalbeat/pubs/ib39.html (accessed November 13, 2006).
52 Adam R. Cole, “Juneau, 31st MEU Arrive in Zhanjiang,” on the website of the
Marine Corps News, November 15, 2006, at http://www.marines.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.
nsf/lookup/20061116224611 (accessed November 13, 2006) .
than two months later when the rescue of the Priz described above was strongly
facilitated by international efforts.53
Similar efforts have been undertaken in the Asia-Pacific region, where
major biannual submarine rescue exercises have been underway since 2000. In
Pacific Reach 2004, held in the waters off of Cheju Island in South Korea, five
participating countries conducted submarine rescue exercises involving three
submarines and three surface ships. The priority that Washington placed on this
event was demonstrated when a Russian heavy transport was contracted to deliver
the U.S. Navy’s DSRV Mystic, because U.S. Air Force transports were committed
to on-going operations in the Middle East. According to Captain Russell Ervin of
the U.S. Navy’s Submarine Development Squadron 5:
From arctic to tropical waters, from reef and shoal-littered littorals to the deepest
blue water in the world … navies operating in Asian waters contend with the
most challenging operating theater on the planet. Asian navies are emerging as
submarine rescue thought leaders and have a great deal to offer the international
community … In Asia, especially due to the distances and limited rescue assets,
we depend on one another more than other areas of the world. 54
China was among the eight countries that sent observers to Pacific Reach
2004. In fact, a major article in Modern Navy discusses Pacific Reach 2004, and
highlights China’s observer status in that event.55 This development may be a
signal of Beijing’s increasing inclination to realize the benefits of international
submarine rescue cooperation.
The founding of a new and unprecedented international organization, ISMERLO,
is a broader initiative that supports international cooperation in submarine rescue.
According to the organization’s sophisticated and well-maintained website, the
ISMERLO will “establish endorsed procedures as the international standard for
submarine escape and rescue using consultation and consensus among submarine
operating nations.”56 ISMERLO “is the international hub for information and
coordination on submarine rescue, acting as the liaison office between the nation
that has a disabled submarine and the rest of the submarine escape and rescue
53 Phil Maguinn, “ISMERLO Comes to Aid of Disabled Russian Submarine”,

Undersea Warfare (Fall 2005), http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/n87/usw/issue_
28/perfect.html (accessed November 13, 2006).
54 See Kyung Choi, Lt., USN, “Pacific Reach 2004, U.S. Foreign Navies Practice
Submarine Rescue, Foster Cooperation, and Improve Interoperability,” Undersea
Warfare (Summer 2004) http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/NAVPALIB/CNO/N87/usw/issue_
23/reach2004.htm (accessed November 13, 2006). The primary mission of Submarine
Development Squadron 5 (San Diego) is submarine rescue.
55 Zhao Yu, “The US, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Australia Conduct a Submarine
Rescue Exercise”, Modern Navy (July 2004), pp. 44–5 (in Chinese).
56 See the International Submarine Search and Rescue Office website at http://www.
ismerlo.org/ (accessed November 13, 2006).
community.” According to the organization’s coordinator Bill Orr, “We look at

the availability of rescue assets out there, provide notice for urgent requirements
for rescue, and post that information on our web site. The nation that lost the
submarine, as well as nations that can respond, can see that information and
identify the best possible assets to respond to the disabled submarine.”57 While
perhaps the organization’s co-location with major U.S. Navy facilities in Norfolk,
Virginia, could be objectionable to certain states, it is still logical given the U.S.
Navy’s long history in the realm of submarine rescue.58
This young international organization has already amassed an impressive
record in submarine rescue—playing a vital role in the successful outcomes of
both the Chicoutimi and Priz incidents. In the former case, ISMERLO information
enabled the rapid location of a suitable towing vessel that proved crucial.59 And
in the latter instance, ISMERLO played an important coordinating function, for
example helping to locate a U.S. “K-loader” in Japan that was necessary for off-
loading of the Royal Navy’s rescue equipment in Kamchatka.
China actually has already joined ISMERLO and provided some limited
information, including, for example, points of contact within the PLA Navy. But
unfortunately, according to ISMERLO’s website, “No details [regarding rescue
systems] have been received from the People’s Liberation Army (Navy).”60 This
source speculates that Chinese submarine rescue systems may conform to Russian
specifications; hence, PLA Navy “submarines with a docking seat can receive a
Submarine Rescue Vehicle (SRV) fitted with a NATO STANAG rescue skirt.”
Obviously, the level of cooperation from the Chinese Navy in this regard is
disappointing and there is ample room for improvement.
It should be recognized that more robust membership for China in ISMERLO,
and greater participation in international submarine rescue activities more
generally, may come at some cost to Beijing, particularly when considered in the
context of China’s traditional tendency toward secrecy. The Chinese military has
long resisted Western-style transparency in an effort to hide its deficiencies and
protect military secrets. This is less and less true today, and the PLA has made
substantial progress in this realm. Submarine rescue information, in any case, is
relatively benign, consisting of data such as rescue vehicle mating surface and
57 Mark O. Piggott, “ISMERLO Put into Action for Submarine Rescue Exercise”,
Navy News Stand, June 15 2005, at the Global Security website http://www.globalsecurity.
org/military/library/news/2005/06/mil-050615-nns01.htm (accessed November 13, 2006).
58 The U.S. Navy’s long history with submarine rescue has been noted in the Chinese
military press. See, for example, Zhang Yanming, “A Memoir of the S-5’s Narrow Escape”,
Global Military Affairs (2005), pp. 17–19.
59 HMCS Chicoutimi was disabled by a fire which killed one officer, and stranded in
heavy seas in the North Atlantic without power. Absent ISMERLO’s quick identification
and dispatch of a towing vessel the submarine would have sunk with significantly larger
loss of life.
60 The ISMERLO website is at http://www.ismerlo.org/ (accessed November 13,
2006).
hatch dimensions. Neither of these engineering issues is relevant to war-fighting.

Besides, the U.S. and China both possess high-quality pictures of the relevant
hull exteriors, so this should also not be a major concern.61 It is worth noting
that all other major submarine powers, including Russia, have shared this sort of
information with each other through ISMERLO. Moreover, any rescue operation
involving a Chinese submarine would take place in direct collaboration with
Chinese naval officers, implying that they could strictly control access to the
stranded vessel, thus protecting any secrets in the submarine’s interior. Finally, the
Chinese leadership should consider that more robust submarine rescue cooperation
could become a positive example of the Chinese Navy’s willingness to address
transparency—even with respect to some of its most advanced platforms.
As two recent submarine accidents detailed in this chapter involved Russia, it is
natural that much submarine rescue attention has focused on Europe and especially
enhanced NATO cooperation with Russia in this realm. Nevertheless, it would be
wrong to neglect the Asia-Pacific region, wherein a variety of powers, including
Australia, Canada, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, North Korea, Pakistan,
Singapore, and South Korea, in addition to China, continue to invest significantly
in submarine capabilities. Chinese naval analysts have observed the important role
that NATO has played in the submarine rescue arena, 62 and it is possible that
multilateral forums will be most appropriate for addressing these issues in the
Asia-Pacific region, as well. Indeed, Beijing’s special interest in undersea warfare
provides an opportunity for drawing this rising power into a nascent, but growing
web of cooperative relationships among “maritime stakeholders” that could bind
Asia-Pacific states together for the twenty-first century and beyond.
Conclusion
Beijing should honor the memory of the crew that perished in the 2003 Ming
361 tragedy by pursuing submarine rescue technology, doctrine and training
with full vigor. This imperative is underlined by three fundamental factors: (1)
the expanding pace and sophistication of Chinese submarine operations; (2)
that shallow littoral regions surround China and are thus amenable to rescue
operations; and (3) the immense amount of merchant traffic off the Chinese coasts
that increase the risks to submarines. These factors combine to virtually guarantee
future accidents. Preparing for these incidents through increased participation in
ISMERLO, and taking advantage of international rescue capabilities during future
61 There are hundreds of detailed photos of Chinese submarines on the internet, for
example, see the website of China Defense Forum at http://www.sinodefenceforum.com/
62 See, for example, Liu Lunkun, “Examining Submarine Rescue from the Perspective
of the Recent Russian and Canadian Submarine Rescue Failures”, p. 59 and Zeng Zhirong,
“New Spirit for Undersea Rescue: NATO’s Submarine Rescue System”, pp. 28–30.
rescue operations will save lives, reduce distrust, and establish momentum towards
greater integration of the PLAN into other international maritime initiatives.
If the PLAN becomes a more active partner in ISMERLO, it would enjoy
numerous benefits, not least the benefit of exchanging views on submarine rescue
with the world’s foremost submarine powers. Full participation in submarine rescue
exercises would help to “operationalize” U.S. Navy and PLAN confidence-building
measures above and beyond the search and rescue exercises recently held, and also
increase the personal exposure between elite segments of the two sides’ officer
corps. Such a policy of enhanced military-to-military engagement and increasing
participation in international organizations would increase transparency, would
demonstrate a Chinese commitment to becoming a stakeholder in an important
arena, and actually is wholly consistent with recent developments in Chinese
foreign policy. For example, China has been steadily increasing its contribution
to UN peacekeeping operations, offering up to 1,000 troops in September 2006
for service in Lebanon. China’s Navy is also increasingly active in world-wide
military diplomatic initiatives such as a multilateral exercise planned for Spring
2007 with naval forces from Pakistan and the United States, among others.
Washington and other Western states should encourage the above developments
and warmly welcome the PLA Navy more fully into multilateral submarine
rescue exercises such as Sorbet Royale and Pacific Reach. Since the April 2001
“E-P3 incident” when U.S.–China relations reached a new nadir and military-
to-military relations were suspended, the situation has improved and both sides
appear ready to enhance U.S.–China military cooperation. There seems to be a
broad recognition in Washington that, although China has a different political
system, this rising power must be treated with due regard, so that new power will
in turn breed new responsibility. Nowhere is this process more important than in
the maritime domain. It is incumbent on the naval analytic community in both
countries and throughout the Asia-Pacific region to elaborate further opportunities
for naval cooperation, such as submarine rescue.
Chapter 15
Commentary: Search and Rescue in South
China Sea and Regional Cooperation
ZHANG Jie
Chinese government has paid great attention to maritime search and rescue (SAR)
for many years and has considered SAR as one of important public welfare
establishments. SAR service is an important part of the state emergency response
and rescue system. After years of effort and construction, China has primarily
set up a relatively complete SAR system that aims at becoming “a modern full-
coverage, all-weather and quick-reaction water traffic safety guarantee system for
effective and rapid SAR in case of any maritime distress in the area of China’s
SAR responsibility,” and that has been greatly contributed to the fulfillment of
international convention.
Maritime SAR Resource Construction
In order to normalize maritime SAR actions, rapidly, methodically and efficiently

organize reactions to maritime emergencies, and minimize the losses of life and
property at sea, the Chinese Government has formulated the “State Emergency
Plan for Maritime SAR.” According to this plan, the maritime distress prevention
and presentiment mechanism, emergency reporting system, SAR guarantee
mechanism, and scientific decision mechanism are set up to perfect the maritime
SAR support system, improve maritime emergency response and rescue abilities,
and ensure the safety of life at sea. In addition, by formulating the “Maritime
Distress Response Procedures for China Maritime Search and Rescue Center” and
the “Emergency Response Plan for Oil Spillage in Sea Areas of China”, the SAR
has been normalized and routinized gradually.
China’s SAR operation is organized and conducted by China Maritime Search
and Rescue Center under the coordination of “State Maritime SAR Inter-sector
Meeting” composed of ministries and military authorities. The resources owned
by members of the inter-sector meeting, maritime authorities, enterprises and
individuals make up the force of China’s maritime SAR.
The state’s public service, including Maritime Safety Administration
watercrafts, naval vessels and aircrafts of maritime affairs, maritime police, and
government authorities, are also the important resources to guarantee the maritime
SAR operations and play an important role in maritime salvage. Now a maritime
law-enforcement and SAR system covering the sea areas under China’s jurisdiction
has been basically formed in China with information support and necessary
guarantee provided by departments of meteorology, ocean and communications.
In addition to developing and mobilizing the social resources for maritime
SAR, China has kept specialized maritime SAR force through building the national
specialized SAR network. The national specialized SAR force is under the control
of Ministry of Communications. According to the changes of seasons and climate
as well as maritime transportation, the Ministry of Communications can readjust
the stand-to points of specialized SAR force to keep up with safety requirements
of the ever-changing maritime transportation, operation and production.
In order to increase the SAR success ratio and quicken salvage reaction of
watercrafts nearby the maritime distress site, the state has built “China Watercraft
Reporting System”. Chinese watercraft sailing in the sea area north of 9o N. and
west of 130o E. are requested to report to China Watercraft Reporting Center in the
effect that the center can estimate the watercraft’s situation and coordinate salvage.
In addition, the shipping traffic system and automatic watercraft identification
system have been successively built in China’s coastal waters and Pearl River
estuary and Qiongzhou Straits of South China Sea. Additionally, China has
built a maritime communication satellite system, a maritime safety information
broadcasting system, a digital selective calling system, and a SAR satellite system
in recent years. All of them have formed a network that receives and broadcasts
maritime distress and safety information covering the area of China’s SAR
responsibility. The construction and operation of these facilities are of important
significance to China’s development in maritime emergency reaction.
Maritime SAR Mechanism and Exercises
According to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979,

it is the coastal states’ obligation and duty to search and rescue life at sea. As
a contracting state, the Government of China pays great attention to the safety
of life at sea and has contributed greatly to maritime SAR. In order to facilitate
the maritime SAR operations and heighten the success ratio of life at sea search
and rescue, a full scale maritime SAR exercise has been organized by the China
Maritime Search and Rescue Center every year since 2000, each at a different
marine area, which has accumulated precious experience for the center in maritime
SAR operations in China’s offshore marine areas.
The maritime SAR exercises conducted by the China Maritime Search and
Rescue Center are in accordance with China’s maritime SAR mechanism that
The Control Regulations of Ship Report System of the People’s Republic of

China.
The Ship’s Routing System in the Waters of the Pearl River Estuary (Provisional).
The Ship’s Routing System in the Qiongzhou Straits (Provisional).
Commentary: Search and Rescue in South China Sea and Regional Cooperation 257
focuses on coordinating national and social resources. In the case of a maritime

accident, the China Maritime Search and Rescue Center will mobilize the state
agencies and local communities for joint maritime SAR operations. Maritime
SAR exercises are essentially required to ensure unified command and concerted
action of all SAR units in maritime SAR operations.
In 2004, the China Maritime Search and Rescue Center and the Maritime
Department of the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(HKSAR) jointly held a comprehensive SAR exercise that was named “2004
Joint Search and Rescue Exercise in South China Sea”. This exercise included
salvage, maritime firefighting, and oil spill clean-up, and mobilized multiple
forces including Government Flying Service of HKSAR, China’s state service,
troops, medical institutions and other social forces totaling over 70 units, about 500
persons include 12 live “survivors”, two aircraft, 27 watercraft, two ambulances,
1,000-meter oil fence, four oil skimmers and a great amount of oil absorption felts
etc.
This joint SAR exercise staged by the China Maritime Search and Rescue
Center was aimed at improving the participant units’ SAR skill and emergency
response, lowering any failure possibility that might be caused by unskilled
operations, and meanwhile, enhancing the coordination and cooperation among
participant sectors, thus ensuring concerted action of all participant units and
sectors in the SAR operations. Through this comprehensive exercise, each sector’s
SAR ability, skill, integral consciousness, risk awareness, and peacetime practice
were tested; and additionally, some problems and defects in SAR plans were found
and relevant solutions were produced.
In the exercise, the air, sea and land SAR forces of different sectors acted
jointly and strengthened communication and understanding with each other, thus
enhancing the cooperation and ensuring synergetic operations. The exercise also
provided the participant units with an opportunity to understand the action plans
and enhance their integrated strength. Through drawing up, amending, perfecting
and implementing the exercise plans, all participant personnel were well informed
and practiced. Through the exercise, some hidden problems such as communication
frequency coordination, cooperation of aircrafts and watercrafts, utilization of
firefighting and pollution-preventing facilities, equipment maintenance of rescue
ships, skills of rescue personnel, and etc. were discovered. Any of these problems
might bring about a great loss to the exercise and even the actual SAR operations,
and the solutions to them were the basis for future action plan amendment and
improvement.
The Pacific Northwest is one of the regions with the fastest rate of economic
development in the world. The economic development has brought about marine
transport’s growth and prosperity. Meanwhile, the Northwest Pacific is a marine area
frequently suffering typhoons, seasonal fresh gales, earthquakes and other natural
disasters. On average 20–30 typhoons per annum are formed in the Northwest
Pacific and South China Sea, which greatly threatens navigational safety. In recent
years, the coastal states have realized that it is their joint obligation to protect the
safety of life at sea, and have started to cooperate in maritime SAR operations.
It is of great importance to strengthen communication and understanding in the
SAR cooperation among states and regions. The interregional and transnational
coordination exercises, and full-scale exercises and their planning, will be the
optimal approach for SAR exchange, communication and cooperation. Therefore,
the nature of cooperation in transnational and interregional full-scale exercise
needs to be further discussed.
Regional Cooperation in Maritime SAR
As a contracting state of the International Convention on Maritime Search and

Rescue, 1979, China has solemnly promised to ensure the safety of watercraft
and personnel in the sea areas under China’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the Chinese
Government has been focusing its attention on strengthening cooperation in
maritime SAR with surrounding countries and regions. We signed the cooperative
agreement for maritime SAR with the U.S. in 1987, started to take regular meetings
for maritime safety with surrounding countries and regions every year from the
1990s, and achieved relevant agreements on the utilization of waters in maritime
SAR, which provides effective and reliable guarantee for rapid and effective SAR
in case of maritime emergency in neighboring waters. In 2004, the China Maritime
Search and Rescue Center took part in the maritime SAR cooperation in Pacific
areas, received the visit of U.S. Coast Guard Commander, held a sand-table exercise
coded “Sino–Philippine Cooperation 2004” in October 2004, and convened the
Ninth Four-Nation Maritime SAR Working Conference in November 2004. These
regional cooperative activities strengthened communication and exchange and laid
a firm foundation for cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues.
In May 2004, China’s coast-guard cutters visited Japan, participated in the
comprehensive SAR drill held by Japan Coast Guard as a visitor, and made far-
ranging exchanges. In July 2005, the Korean National Maritime Police Agency
and Japan Coast Guard also sent their ships to the joint comprehensive SAR drill
held in East China Sea.
In recent years, in the SAR responsibility area of South China Sea, the China
Maritime Search and Rescue Center has achieved great development in regional
maritime SAR cooperation with the maritime SAR coordination centers of
surrounding countries and regions. It, together with centers in Vietnam, Philippines,
Malaysia, Hong Kong and Taiwan, has successfully completed the commissions in
personnel rescue, information exchange and transmission in maritime distresses,
and fulfilled its obligations and international liabilities. In order to improve its
ability to organize, coordinate and command reaction in secure of life at sea and
See http://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/8198/75410/75417/5142367.html (accessed

September 23, 2007).
See http://news.qq.com/a/20040525/000581.htm (accessed September 23, 2007).
oil spillage accidents, and to strengthen the exercises of maritime SAR forces,
China Maritime Search and Rescue Center cooperated with Hong Kong and
Macao for the first time in June 2000 to hold the joint SAR exercise at the Pearl
River estuary. In order to improve its regional cooperative SAR level and quick
reaction capability, in 2004, China Maritime Search and Rescue Center and the
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) jointly held
a comprehensive SAR exercise in the South China Sea. Those exercises included
maritime SAR, maritime firefighting, and oil spill clean-up. Such exercises
greatly improved the cooperative SAR skills and emergency treatment ability, and
strengthened the regional SAR coordination and consciousness of cooperation.
In December 2004 in the 28th typhoon of the year, 1,125 fishermen from 45
fishing vessels from Hainan were stranded near Dongsha Island in the South China
Sea. They were in danger, and without food or fresh water supplies. After receiving
the distress signal, the China Maritime Search and Rescue Center coordinated
with Taiwan’s China SAR Association. Taiwan’s other departments also provided
necessary assistance in typhoon prevention and salvage. Hong Kong dispatch
aircrafts to examine the fishermen in distress. The South China Sea Rescue Bureau
and Ministry of Fisheries respectively sent rescue vessels loaded with food, fresh
water and medicines to the distress site under atrocious weather conditions. Thanks
to the joint efforts of the three parties, the fishermen in distress were rescued in
time. In this rescue action, the maritime SAR centers of three parties exchanged
information in a smooth and timely manner and maintained mutual understanding
and support, which was the guarantee of success.
In August 2005, a fishing vessel from Hainan was in distress at sea and
13 fishermen floated to near Malaysia. With the efforts of Malaysian military
authority and maritime SAR coordination center, the fishermen in distress received
the necessary assistance in time. However, the rescue was delayed because of
a misunderstanding between the persons in distress and the rescue persons, and
there were some difficulties in the rescue coordination because of less-than-ideal
communication. The persons in distress finally returned to China safely with the
help of the Malaysian Government. This rescue action was a significant moment
in the cooperation between the SAR centers of China and Malaysia and laid a
foundation for future cooperation.
See http://www.hq.xinhuanet.com/tbgz/2004-06/25/content_2380102.htm
(accessed September 23, 2007).
See http://www.southcn.com/news/gdneWs/gdtodayimportant/200412080258.htm
See http://www.southcn.com/news/gdneWs/gdtodayimportant/200412080258.htm
Development and Perspective of Regional SAR Cooperation
A great development has been made in recent years in the regional SAR cooperation
at the South China Sea. However, because of imbalanced development of the
regions and problems of regional difference, further efforts should be made to
strengthen cooperation, make up information gaps, and overcome inefficiencies in
rescue caused by insufficient coordination.
In 2002, there were two accidents in the South China Sea involving towed
vessels floating away after a towline rupture. Both of the vessels were registered
in Singapore and lost touch with the tug on the way from Japan to Singapore.
When seeking the towed vessels, the tugs reported to the nearby Philippines Coast
Guard. The Philippines sent aircraft to search but didn’t find the towed vessels.
After one to three months of drifting, the two towed vessels finally stopped on
the reef nearby Xisha Islands (Paracel Islands). Fortunately, both of the vessels
had been treated before towing and carried no fuel, so there was no pollution to
the South China Sea. However, in the course of drifting, the vessels, which were
without any indicators or lights, might have brought great danger to navigational
safety, especially to vessels sailing at night. The China Maritime Search and
Rescue Center didn’t received any information about the two vessels in the course
of drifting, and therefore didn’t release any information on navigational safety
about the two vessels. As a result of this failure of information transmission and
communication, the two hidden dangers existed at the South China Sea for months,
and the rescue came up against many difficulties.
The main task for the maritime SAR and coordination centers of surrounding
countries and regions is to rescue fishermen in distress at South China Sea. There are
a number of factors restricting this. The first is there is no unified channel for alarm
information transmitting and receiving. Unlike merchant ship crews, fishermen in
fishing operations are not good at calling for help with the international uniform
distress frequency. Meanwhile, restricted in their understanding of the rescue
systems of surrounding countries and regions, the fishermen in distress, especially
in maritime distress far from land, have difficulties transmitting the distress
information in time to the maritime SAR and coordination center of the nearest
country or region, and as a result, it is hard to get timely rescue. The fishermen
usually transmit the distress information back to their country using production
communication frequency, and then the information is reported to the maritime
SAR center via a local alarm channel. In such case, it is especially important for
a timely rescue operation to strengthen coordination and communication among
international and regional rescue centers.
According to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue,
1979, unless otherwise agreed between the states concerned, a party should
authorize, subject to applicable national laws, rules and regulations, immediate
entry into or over its territorial sea or territory of rescue units of other parties solely
for the purpose of searching for the position of maritime casualties and rescuing
the survivors of such casualties. Most of the countries and regions have entered
into or approved the international convention on maritime search and rescue, but
to all appearances, this clause to facilitate timely and effective rescue in case of
maritime distress has not been performed completely. One of the reasons is that
a sound and complete communication and coordination mechanism has not been
built among national and regional maritime SAR and coordination centers, and as
a result, necessary understanding and dialogues are unavailable.
It is required by the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue,
1979, that a sound communication and coordination mechanism is built among
the national and regional maritime SAR coordination centers, to increase SAR
success ratio and lower losses of life at sea, and the contracting states have the
responsibility and obligation to enact the convention. We believe that the goal can
be achieved through joint efforts of all maritime SAR centers, and are looking
forward to its coming at an early date.
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, Annex, Chapter

3; 3.1.2.
Index
Figures are indicated by bold page numbers, tables by italic numbers.
9/11 attacks bilateral cooperative programs

aftermath of and piracy 92–3, 94 between littoral states 119–20, 168–9
response of the US 180–1 between littoral states and user states
24-Hour Rule (US) 184 120–4, 169–70
boundaries, maritime
Achille Lauro incident 138, 138n16, 177–8 and control of piracy 48
Agreement on Information Exchange and delimitation 5
Establishment of Communication disputes over 151–2
Procedures 153 and environmental protection 32–3
air patrols 62, 124 as problematic 29–30, 30
al-Qaeda, sea base of 41 burden-sharing mechanism, need for 133
Area Maritime Security Committees (US) business, maritime
190–1 country specializations 38–9
armed robbery 27–8 supply of in Asia 38
See also piracy
AS-28 Priz incident 246–8 California Maritime Security Council
ASEAN Plus Three 172–3 189–90
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 171 Cambodia, domestic legal arrangements
Asia in 149
containerized trade 36–7 capacity building 75, 95
economic background 35 Chertoff, Michael 60
economic growth of 157–8 Cheung Son case 87
ports and shipping services 37 China
supply of maritime business in 38 analysis of Kursk tragedy 245–6
threats to maritime trade 39–42 articles on AS-28 Priz incident 247–8
Assessment of the US Marine Transporta- authorities in change of prevention of
tion System, An (US) 179 oil pollution 208–9
Association of Southeast Asian Nations capabilities for submarine rescue
(ASEAN) 171 241–2
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties Container Security Initiative (CSI) 73
in the South China Sea 3–4 containerized exports 36–7
partnership with China 10, 93, 104–5, contingency plans for oil spills 211
150, 198–9 cooperation with ASEAN 150
Automated Targeting System (US) 185 in cooperative submarine rescue initia-
Automatic Identification System (AIS) 26 tives 249–53
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
Baltic Sea 225–6 in the South China Sea 3–4
Bateman, Sam 63 domestic legal arrangements 145–6
e nergy security as vital to 58–9 congestion on sea routes 84

environmental quality variations constitution of oceans 4–5
230–1 Container Security Initiative (CSI) 70–3,
experiences with submarine accidents 92, 183–6
239–41 containerized trade 36–7
as force for security 103 growth of 162
growing maritime interests of 57–8 Malacca and Singapore Straits 160
as leader in cooperation against pollu- contiguous zone 4–5
tion 228–9 continental shelf 5
legislation concerning oil spills 211 Convention against Organized Crime 144
maritime business in 39 Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-
measures to prevent oil pollution in ful Acts against the Safety of Mari-
209–10 time Navigation (SUA Convention)
membership of ISMERLO 251–2 22, 141, 144, 178
Military Maritime Consultative Agree- Convention on the Conservation of Highly
ment (MMCA) 249 Migratory Fish Stocks in the West-
need for cooperation over submarine ern and Central Pacific Ocean 31
rescue 237–9 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
oil imports 206 CLOS Convention) 4–5, 16–17,
oil pollution compensation regime in 18–19, 82, 133, 141, 155
214 convention-protocol cooperation against
oil pollution emergency system in pollution 232–4
211–14 conventions
oil pollution in coastal waters 207, for international transport 47
207–8 conventions for good order at sea 19–24,
oil spill control model project in Yan- 23
tai, 211–12 cooperation
partnership with ASEAN 10, 93, assistance from other countries 62–3
104–5, 198 bilateral programs 119–24, 168–70
plans for oil spill emergency response boundaries and control of piracy 48
215–16 capacity building 75
and regional cooperation 104–7 catalysts for action on the environment
risk of oil pollution 206, 206–7 227
search and rescue exercises 256–8 challenges and opportunities for 47–9
search and rescue system 255–6 China as leader 228–9
shipbuilding in 59 Container Security Initiative (CSI) 70
Sino-American cooperation 75–80, convention-protocol, against pollution
199–202, 201 232–4
training and drills for oil spills in 212 current situation 196–8
use of liquefied natural gas (LPG) in difficulties in 102–4
59 difficulties in with search and rescue
Chung, C. 17 260–1
coastal habitats, degradation of 31 information sharing 48–9
coastguards, Sino-American cooperation in law enforcement 71
76–7 limitations of programs 132–3
coastguards (US) 191–2 Malacca Strait Patrol Network 61–3
Combined Maritime Patrol Teams Malacca Straits 45
(CMPTs) 125, 174 need for 42–3, 60–1
Index 265
need for burden-sharing mechanism energy resources

133 development of 31–2
new US maritime strategy 73–5 supply of to China as vital 58–9
obligations and difficulties with 16–17 environment
over environmental protection 222, concerns around piracy 152
226–9 programs for protection of 33
partnerships 73–80 protection of and problems with
and political situations 227–8 boundaries 32–3
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) See also oil pollution; pollution
68–9 Ervin, Russell 250
regional 45–6, 149–55 exclusive economic zone 5, 141–3
regional, and China 104–7 ‘Eyes in the Sky’ program 62, 124, 174–5
regional, and pollution control 218–19
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Fallon, William J. 64–5, 77, 122, 249
Combating Piracy and Armed Fargo, Thomas B. 43, 44, 92
Robbery against Ships in Asia fishing
(ReCAAP) 68 Convention on the Conservation of
Regional Maritime Security Initiative Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in
(RMSI) 43 the Western and Central Pacific
required developments in 10–12 Ocean 31
in search and rescue and China 258–9 degradation of coastal habitats 31
Secure Freight Initiative 70–1 illegal 31
Shangri-La Dialogue 44–5 Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA)
Sino-American 75–80 44, 175
submarine rescue initiatives 249–53 Fixed Platforms, Protocol on 22
tripartite patrolling programs 124–5, flags of convenience 85–7
148–9, 153 France 225
corruption in security forces 41 freedom of navigation 104
Council for Security Cooperation in the
Asia Pacific (CSCAP) 16–18, gas
16n6 d evelopment of resources 31–2
country specializations in maritime busi- transport of 52
ness 38–9 good order at sea
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terror- boundaries 29–30
ism (C-TPAT) (US) 183, 186 defined 17–18
environmental protection 32–3
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in illegal activities 27–9, 28
the South China Sea 3–4, 24, 93 and international law 18–24
Deep Sabre PSI exercise 69 marine resources 31–2
degradation of coastal habitats 31 mindset change as necessary 33–4
disasters, natural, as threat to trade 42 requirements for 18
domestic legal arrangements 145–9 shipping and seaborne trade 24–7
Doran, Walter F. 112 Gu Wengen 79
Guo Boxiong 77
economic development and piracy and
terrorism 49 habitats
economies degradation of 31
Asian 35, 157–8 loss of 232–3
hazards, man-made, as threat to trade 42 and definitions of piracy 137–40

Hong Kong 70–1 f or good order at sea 18–24
hot pursuit 125, 150 inadequacy of against piracy 140–4
Huang, Victor 61–2, 69 See also law
hub ports 162–3 International Maritime and Port Security
Act (US) 178
ID cards for transportation workers 192 International Maritime Bureau Piracy
identification of ships Reporting Center (IMB-PRC) 82,
Automatic Identification System (AIS) 139, 153
26 International Maritime Organization (IMO)
long range identification and tracking anti- piracy/terrorism measures 94–5
(LRIT) 26–7 Jakarta Meeting on the Straits of Ma-
illegal activities See piracy; smuggling; lacca and Singapore 127–8
terrorism International Ship and Port Facility Secu-
in-bond system (US) 193 rity (ISPS) Code 20, 20n17, 95
India, future influential role of 100 ISMERLO 250–2
Indonesia
attitude towards piracy 90–1 Jakarta Meeting on the Straits of Malacca
bilateral program with Malaysia 120, and Singapore 127–8
168 Japan
bilateral program with Singapore assistance from 63
119–20, 168 bilateral cooperation with littoral states
cooperation with US 121–2, 123 123–4, 169
domestic legal arrangements 147–9 containerized exports 37
military and economic contributions domestic legal arrangements 146–7
from US 64–6 nuclear waste shipping 102
national measures against piracy and and security in the South China Sea
terrorism 164–5 100
as outside the SUA Convention 143 Tokyo Ministerial Conference on Inter-
and piracy 40–1 national Transport Security 129
responses to Regional Maritime Secu- John, Eric G. 54
rity Initiative (RMSI) 43, 111–13, Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China
116–18 on Cooperation in the Field of
tripartite patrolling programs 124–5, Non-traditional Security Issues 10,
153 93, 150
Information Sharing Center (ISC), Singa-
pore 68, 130, 172–3 Kursk tragedy 244–6
information sharing for cooperation 48–9,
153–4 law
insurance and piracy 87–9 d efinitions of piracy 137–40
intelligence gathering 47–8 domestic arrangements 145–9
Interagency Committee for the Marine inadequacy of against piracy 140–4
Transportation System (ICMTS) for international transport 47
(US) 179 Maritime Transportation Security Act
International Convention for the Safety of of 2002 (US) 181–2, 181n19–23
Life at Sea (SOLAS) 20, 20n17, PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthori-
94 zation Act of 2005 (US) 188–9
international law against piracy, early 135
Index 267
a nd regional cooperation 105–6 military and economic contributions

SAFE Port Act of 2006 (US) 185–6 from US 66
law enforcement national measures against piracy and
complicated by LOS Convention terrorism 165–6
149–50 as outside the SUA Convention 143
cooperation in 71 piracy and terrorism as threat to 61
liquefied natural gas (LPG) response to Regional Maritime
transport of 52–3 Security Initiative (RMSI) 44–5,
use in China 59 113–14, 116, 118
living resources 31 tripartite patrolling programs 124–5,
Lombok Strait 159 153
long range identification and tracking Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency
(LRIT) 26–7 (MMEA) 166
Long-Range Identification and Tracking Malsindo Coordinated Patrol (MCP) 124
(LRIT) regulation 129 man-made hazards as threat to trade 42
LOS convention See UNCLOS Convention Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) 33
marine resources
Makassar Strait 159 living 31
Malacca Strait non-living 31–2
assistance from Japan 63 Marine Transportation System National
bilateral cooperative programs Advisory Council (MTSNAC)
119–24, 168–70 (US) 179–80
congestion in 84 Maritime Transportation Security Act of
container traffic 160 2002 (US) 181–2, 181n19–23,
cooperation in maritime security 45 182n24–30
as high-risk zone 116, 119, 127 MARPOL Convention 20–1
Indonesia’s initial reactions to RMSI Mediterranean region 224–5, 228
111–13 mega-hubs, security of 53
Malaysia’s initial reactions to RMSI Memorandum of Understanding between
113–14 ASEAN and China on Coopera-
piracy in 40, 160–1 tion in the Field of Non-traditional
Singapore’s initial reactions to RMSI Security Issues 10, 93
114–16 Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
size and amount of traffic 158–9 (MMCA) 249
traffic through 52 Ming-361 incident 239–40
Malacca Strait Patrol Network 61–3, 153, Mitropoulos, Efthimios 127–8
173, 174–5 Mullen, Michael 60, 66, 69, 74, 79
Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol (MAL- multilateral measures 170–6
SINDO) 44, 61–2, 173
Malaysia Najib Tun Razak 61, 62, 113, 114, 122
aid from the US 122 National Strategy for Maritime Security
attitude towards piracy 91 (2005) (US) 187–8
bilateral program with Indonesia 120, natural disasters as threat to trade 42
168 navigation, freedom of 104
bilateral program with Singapore 120, Nazri Abdul Aziz, Mohamed 113
169 Nguyen Hong Thao 24
domestic legal arrangements 147–9 9/11 attacks
aftermath and piracy 92–3, 94
response of the US 180–1 a nti-piracy conferences 154

non-living resources 31–2 association with terrorism 41
North Sea, cooperation against oil pollu- bilateral measures against 168–70
tion 219–20, 222–3 capacity building against 95
nuclear materials, transport of 101–2 Cheung Son case 87
and congestion on sea routes 84
oil, transport of 52, 102 data and reports on 82–3
oil pollution decline of incidents 92–7, 101, 130–1,
causes of 220–1 197
in China’s coastal waters 207, 207–8 definitions of 81–2, 137–40
Chinese authorities in charge of pre- different attitudes of countries towards
vention 208–9 90–1
compensation regime in China 214 and economic development 49
emergency response in the South China economic situation of littoral countries
Sea 215 89–90
emergency system in China 211–14 environmental concerns 152
measures to prevent in China 209–10 extent and reporting of 27–8
model project in Yantai, China 211–12 first laws against 135
North Sea cooperation against 219–20 flags of convenience 85–7
plans for emergency response in China and insurance 87–9
215–16 limited success against 48
risk of in China 206, 206–7 in Malacca and Singapore Straits
in the South China Sea 222 160–1
technical improvements in shipping modern 135–7
220–1 multilateral measures against 170–6
training and drills in China 212 national measures against 164–8
oil resources, development of 31–2 phantom ships 87
over-fishing 31 private armed escorts 88
profile of pirates 161
partnerships 73–80 regional cooperation against 149–55
China and ASEAN 10, 93, 104–5, 198 and sea zones 151
PATRIOT Act (US) 180–1 statistics on 27–8, 28
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthoriza- surge of incidents 83–91
tion Act of 2005 (US) 188–9 and terrorism 136, 161
petroleum products as threat to trade 39–41
trade in 24–5 vulnerable shipping 84–5
transport of 52–3 war-risk areas 89
phantom ships 87 political situation and cooperation 227–8
Philippines pollution
domestic legal arrangements 149 China as leader in cooperation against
military and economic contributions 228–9
from US 67 convention-protocol cooperation
national measures against piracy and against 232–4
terrorism 166–7 cooperation against in regional seas
seaborne trade through 159–60 219–26
piracy cooperation over environmental protec-
9/11 aftermath 92–3 tion 226–9
anti-piracy capabilities of countries 91 habitat loss 232–3
Index 269
l and-based 232 Indonesia’s responses to 111–13,

MARPOL Convention 21 116–18
oil pollution risks in China 206–7 main goal of 109
regional cooperation as more effective Malaysia’s responses to 113–14, 116
218–26 positive results from responses to
sea-based 232 130–1
by ships 21 Singapore’s responses to 114–16
South China Sea compared to the tripartite patrolling programs 124–5,
Mediterranean region 228 153
See also oil pollution regional seas
Port Security: A National Planning Guide Baltic Sea 225–6
(US Department of Transportation) definition 218
178–9 Mediterranean region 224–5, 228
Port Security Training Exercise Program See also South China Sea
(PortSTEP) (US) 191 Report of the Interagency Commission on
Portand Maritime Act of 2001 180 Crime and Security in US Seaports
ports 180
deep-water 53 rescue See search and rescue; submarine
hub 162–3 rescue
number and size of 37 Reversing Environmental Degradation
private armed escorts against piracy 88 project (UNEP) 33
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Rice, Condoleezza 64, 121
68–9, 92, 186–7 Rodman, Peter 77
Protocol on Fixed Platforms 22, 141, Rosenberg, D. 17
143–4 Roughead, Gary 74, 79
Rumsfeld, Donald H. 112, 123
Qian Lihua 77, 79
SAFE Port Act of 2006 (US) 185–6, 191
ratification of conventions 22–3, 23, 155 SAR Convention 21
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Com- SAREX 78–9
bating Piracy and Armed Robbery sea zones and piracy 151
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) seaborne trade
68, 82, 83, 96–7, 130, 154, 172 containerized 36–7
regional efforts in maritime security 45–6 extent of Asian 36
cooperation 149–55 importance and growth of 24
and globalization 195–6 petroleum products 24–5
IMO Jakarta Meeting on the Straits of safety and security of 25
Malacca and Singapore 127–8 threats to in Asia 39–42
Information Sharing Center (ISC), world 36
Singapore 130 search and rescue
Tokyo Ministerial Conference on Inter- difficulties with cooperation in 260–1
national Transport Security 129 exercises in China 256–8
Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the regional cooperation and China 258–9
Littoral States on the Malacca and regions 25
Singapore Straits 126–7 SAR Convention 21
Regional Maritime Security Initiative Sino-American joint exercise 78–9
(RMSI) 43–4, 92, 148, 173 system in China 255–6
bilateral cooperative programs 119–24
transmission of distress information national measures against piracy and

260 terrorism 167–8
See also submarine rescue responses to RMSI 114–16, 118–19
sector specialization of countries 38–9 tripartite patrolling programs 124–5,
Secure Freight Initiative 70–1 153
security Singapore Strait
challenges in the South China Sea cooperation in maritime security 45
51–3 piracy in 40, 160–1
non-traditional factors 101–2 size and amount of traffic 158
traditional factors 99–100 Sino-American cooperation 75–80,
security forces as underpaid and corrupt 199–202, 201
41 smuggling 28–9
security issues, traditional and non-tradi- soft law 23–4
tional See piracy; terrorism SOLAS Convention 20, 20n17, 94, 129
Shangri-La Dialogue 44, 93, 112, 113–14, Sondakh, Bernard Kent 62, 111
163 Sorbet Royale 249
Ship Identification Number Scheme (SINS) South China Sea
94 as busy international sea lane 42–3
ship safety and security clash of interests in 103–4
identification of ships 26–7 compared to the Mediterranean region
International Ship and Port Facility 228
Security (ISPS) Code 20, 20n17 cooperation over environmental protec-
SOLAS Convention 20 tion 222, 226–9
ship security alert system (SSAS) 25 as flashpoint for conflict 3
shipboarding regime 143–4 geo-strategic focus of Southeast Asia
shipbuilding in China 59 15–16
ShipLoc 95 as important sea 15
shipping services 37 non-traditional security factors 101–2
ships oil pollution emergency response in
phantom 87 215
technical improvements in and oil pol- security challenges 51–3
lution 220–1 as semi-enclosed sea 16
vulnerability to piracy 84–5 size and resources of 15
Singapore traditional security factors 99–100
agreement with the US 120–1 Southeast Asia
attitude towards piracy 91 influence of US in 54–7, 55
bilateral program with Indonesia major sea lanes 158–60
119–20, 169 security challenges in 51–3
bilateral program with Malaysia 120, Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Ter-
169 rorism (SEACAT) 56
close relations with US 114 Spratly Islands 3, 4
Container Security Initiative (CSI) status of conventions 22–3, 23
72–3 Straits of Malacca
Deep SabrePSI exercise 69 assistance from Japan 63
domestic legal arrangements 147–9 bilateral cooperative programs
Information Sharing Center (ISC) 68 119–24, 168–70
military and economic contributions call for burden-sharing 110–11
from US 66–7 congestion in 84
Index 271
c ontainer traffic 160 threats to maritime trade in Asia 39–42

cooperation in maritime security 45 Tokyo Ministerial Conference on Interna-
as high-risk zone 116, 119, 127 tional Transport Security 129
Indonesia’s reactions to RMSI 111–13 trade
Malaysia’s reactions to RMSI 113–14 Asian economy 35
piracy in 40, 160–1 threats to in Asia 39–42
Singapore’s reactions to RMSI 114–16 See also seaborne trade
size and amount of traffic 158–9 Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the Lit-
traffic through 52 toral States on the Malacca and
Straits of Singapore Singapore Straits 126–7
cooperation in maritime security 45 tripartite patrolling programs 124–5,
piracy in 40, 160–1 148–9, 153
size and amount of traffic 158
SUA Convention 22, 141, 143, 144 UNCLOS Convention 4–5, 16–17, 18–19,
submarine rescue 82, 133, 137, 141, 150, 155
AS-28 Priz incident 246–8 United Nations
China’s capabilities for 241–2 Convention against Organized Crime
China’s experience with accidents 144
239–41 Convention on the Law of the Sea
cooperative initiatives 249–53 (UNCLOS Convention) 4–5,
factors influencing 242–8 16–17, 18–19, 82, 133, 137, 141,
Kursk tragedy 244–6 149–50, 155
need for cooperation over 237–9 United Nations Environmental Program
See also search and rescue (UNEP) 33
Sudarsono, Juwono 123 United States
Sunda Strait 24-Hour Rule 184
container traffic 160 agency response to maritime terrorism
size and amount of traffic 159 183–6
Syed Hamid 115 anti-piracy policies 92
Area Maritime Security Committees
Tan Keng Yam, Tony 115, 116, 163 190–1
Teo Chee Hean 115 Assessment of the US Marine Trans-
terrorism portation System, An 179
association with piracy 41 Automated Targeting System 185
bilateral measures against 168–70 bilateral cooperative programs with
multilateral measures against 170–6 littoral states 120–3, 169–70
national measures against 164–8 California Maritime Security Council
and piracy 136, 161 189–90
SUA Convention 22 Container Security Initiative (CSI)
as threat to trade 41 183–6
threats from 162–4 Customs-Trade Partnership Against
US agency response to 183–6 Terrorism (C-TPAT) 183, 186
US developments against 177–81 developments against maritime terror-
US executive response to 186–7 ism 177–81
US states response to 189–90 executive response to maritime terror-
Thailand ism 186–7
connections with the US 67 foreign port assessments 191–2
domestic legal arrangements 149
ID cards for transportation workers Report of the Interagency Commis-

192 sion on Crime and Security in US
in-bond system 193 Seaports 180
influence of in Southeast Asia 54–7, response to 9/11 attacks 190–1
55 SAFE Port Act of 2006 185–6, 191
Interagency Committee for the Marine security exercises 191
Transportation System (ICMTS) Sino-American cooperation 75–80,
179 199–202, 201
International Maritime and Port Secu- state responses to maritime terrorism
rity Act 178 189–90
legislative response to maritime terror- status report of 2007 190–3
ism 181–2 See also Regional Maritime Security
Marine Transportation System National Initiative (RMSI)
Advisory Council (MTSNAC) user states, bilateral cooperative programs
179–80 between littoral states and 120–4,
Maritime Transportation Security Act 169–70
of 2002 181–2 USS Philadelphia 243
military and economic contributions
from 64–7 Valencia, Mark J. 161
Military Maritime Consultative Agree- Vietnam, connections with the US 67
ment (MMCA) 249
National Strategy for Maritime Secu- Wang Fushan 78
rity (2005) 187–8 war-risk areas 89
need for cooperation over submarine Weatherbee, Donald 65, 75
rescue 237–9 West, Alan 163
new maritime strategy 73–5 Western Pacific Naval Symposium
PATRIOT Act 180–1 (WPNS) 175–6
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthori- Wisnumurti, Nugroho 111
zation Act of 2005 188–9 Work Program to Implement the ASEAN
Port Security: A National Planning Plan of Action to Combat Interna-
Guide 178–9 tional Crime 153–4
Port Security Training Exercise Pro-
gram (PortSTEP) 191 Young, Adam J. 161
Portand Maritime Act of 2001 180
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Zoellick, Robert 54, 76, 122
186–7 zones, different legal status of 4–5

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Maritime Security in the

South China Sea

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ISBN: 978-0-7546-7727-7 (hbk)

List of Editors and Contributors  vii

1 Maritime Security in the South China Sea:

Part II: Securing Navigation in the South China Sea

2 Good Order at Sea in the South China Sea  15

3 Maritime Trade Development in Asia: A Need for Regional Maritime

4 Maritime Security Cooperation in the South China Sea Region  51

5 Myth and Reality:

Part III: Regional Cooperation Combating Maritime

7 Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) and

8 Crackdown on Piracy in Southeast Asian Seas:

9 Southeast Asian SLOC Security  157

10 The United States Response to Maritime Terrorism  177

Part IV: Environmental Security and Maritime Rescue

12 The Development of Oil Spill Preparedness and Response in China  205

13 Regional Cooperation for Marine Pollution Contingency

14 International Submarine Rescue: A Constructive Role for China  237

ZOU Keyuan is currently Harris Professor of International Law at the Lancashire

Contributors (in alphabetical order)

BAO Hongjun is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Nanjing University, China. His

Andrew S. ERICKSON is an assistant professor of strategic studies within the

Lyle J. GOLDSTEIN is an Associate Professor in the Strategic Research Department

Joshua H. HO is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International

Meeting, MINDEF. Joshua Ho’s research interests include military transformation

Kristen Gustafson JURAS is currently an Assistant Professor at the University of

HONG Nong is an Assistant Research Fellow at the National Institute for

William S. MURRAY is an associate research professor at the U.S. Naval War

Yann-huei SONG received his undergraduate degree from National Chengchi

XU Ke is a research fellow at the Centre for Maritime Studies, National University

XU Shiming started his career in Hebei Maritime Safety Administration (MSA)

ZHANG Jie is Deputy-Director of Hainan Maritime Safety Administration

ZHANG Xiangjun is currently a lecturer in Fuzhou University Law School, PR

Text is available at http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm (accessed March 4, 2009).

the People’s Republic of China. However, unilateral actions of the claimants

“Bicam OKs Baseline Bill”, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/

Securing Navigation in the South China Sea

Art. 56 (1)(b) and Art.77 (1) of the LOS Convention.

See Chapter 2 of this book.

Regional Cooperation Combating Maritime Terrorism and Piracy

See Chapter 5 of this book.

Environmental Security and Maritime Rescue

11 See Chapter 9 of this book.

pollution by coastal construction projects, pollution from offshore oil exploration

The Way Forward

15 See Office of Laws and Regulations, ibid., 115-147.

16 Texts of these documents are available at http://www.aseansec.org/4979.htm

17 Text is available at http://www.recaap.org/about/pdf/ReCAAP%20Agreement.pdf

The Geopolitics of the South China Sea

States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with

While resource management, the protection of the marine environment and

Stefan Eklof, Pirates in Paradise——A Modern History of Southeast Asia’s

Good Order at Sea

ecologically sustainable and peaceful manner in accordance with international

A breakdown in good order at sea is evident with unregulated pollution of

• adherence to agreed principles of international law;

Using the framework provided by UNCLOS, other important international

• 1974 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention;14

SOLAS Convention The SOLAS Convention is the most important of

MARPOL Convention MARPOL 73/78 is a combination of two treaties adopted

List of Editors and Contributors vii

2 Good Order at Sea in the South China Sea 15

4 Maritime Security Cooperation in the South China Sea Region 51

9 Southeast Asian SLOC Security 157

10 The United States Response to Maritime Terrorism 177

12 The Development of Oil Spill Preparedness and Response in China 205

14 International Submarine Rescue: A Constructive Role for China 237