AP3 Policy-Making models

Stuart Lenig

A Useful Model in Arriving at FP Decisions?

“it stands to reason that given the complexity of the situations faced and the variety of

factors that might go into selecting a course of action, no single foreign policy model

standing alone will be able to help us fully understand a foreign policy decision or

outcome.” (Hastedt, 246)

While Hastedt himself cautions about investing in one model to the exclusion of

another, much can be gained by a firmer understanding of positions and models that

people might adopt in their decision-making process. However, many of the models by

themselves are problematic like our views of people as singular, simple, clear types. The

late John McCain, lionized at his death, was clearly a pain in the neck to many in his own

party, during his career and was an often wayward and bull-headed soldier in his military

career. But at the same time, he showed enormous courage and pluck throughout his

tempestuous life. There is much to love in the man, but he was anything but perfect, and

we must learn to appreciate the complex mixture of elements that make a person the

interesting individual they are, and are always becoming. Similarly, the mixture of ideas

brought to us through IR models of decision-making illustrate the multiplicity of ways

complex problems can be analyzed and operationalized by foreign policy professionals.

Hastedt uses the example of Obama’s temperate response to the possible use of

chemical weapons in Syria. He asked congress for the authority to use force if he needed

to do so. However, in the end, with few choices, “he saw the conflict as one that at best

could be managed but not one that could be solved. There were no good policy options.”

(Hastedt, 232)
Hastedt provides a thorough analysis of the process that the Obama policy team

used to explore options in Syria. Hastedt also lays out the stakes, the conditions on the

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ground, American options, the ability to use military force, the issue of Russian

involvement and support for the Assad regime, and complicated mechanisms the

government would have had to employed to arrive at a military strategy. Readers are

likely to come to the same conclusions that the Obama administration came to: There

were no good options. As today, the Americans are somewhat helpless to act as the last of

the rebel forces are wiped out in Syria. The US must stand by and see a vicious dictator

triumph in a bloody and probably needless civil war against thousands if not millions of

his own people, and further, the US must tolerate the continuance of an ugly, violent,

repressive regime in the Middle East. Yes, as Hastedt makes clear, considering the wide

instability of the region, and the complicated politics of many actors, the US options to

intervene were severely limited. Here it would seem that the model that Obama’s

administration employed was the ‘small-group decision making model.’ Hastedt cautions

that while there can be advantages to such a group, such groups have made profoundly

bad decisions. He writes, “small group decision making often results in policy decisions

that are anything but rational and effective.” (Hastedt, 239) He cites examples such as

mistakes in Vietnam, Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs as lousy examples of that process.
But again, like Obama in Syria, sometimes an administration is stuck with a

problem that offers no clear or discernable answer. We must rely on models that give us

guidance and a direction. The rational actor model assumes that “foreign policy is a

calculated response to the actions of another actor.’ (Hastedt, 235) The presumption is

that all parties will act like rational adults and respond in a logical manner. Unfortunately,

many actors do not respond in a rational manner. Terrorists, or small countries with little

power or leverage, or other non-state actors (Somali pirates come to mind) can act

audaciously, because they know the risks are high and regardless of what they do, their

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chances of success are low. The bin Laden 911 attack was a risky gambit and the chances

of getting one team on one jet and hijacking one plane was low, but for some reason,

security was lax, the 19 assailants penetrated the security and were, by most estimations,

spectacularly successful, taking out three targets. Not only was their success a product of

a wild scheme that somehow managed to be successful, it probably illustrated the small

group method of decision making (although we do not know the intricate internal

workings of Al-Qaeda’s decision making process). What we do know is that apparently,

Al-Qaeda, worked in cell structures and many cells planned their operations in small

groups. The up side for their foreign policy objectives could be spectacular news headline

grabbing attacks, but the down side was this endless war pushed governments to simply

eliminate the cells by violent means. Their victories were often pyrrhic ones.
The bureaucratic politics model seems an ill state of affairs because, “power is

shared, and the individuals who share power disagree on what should be done because

they are located at different places within the government.” (Hastedt, 236) While this

seems a hesitant and indirect way of proceeding, one imagines that in a non-emergency,

non-threatening issue, this manner of operation is common. Some advantages are that the

ideas are run through a hierarchical model and hopefully, poor solutions are taken out of

the mix as the solutions or potential solutions are sorted. Probably, this quiet and

unobtrusive model has prevailed in our dealings with Korea. Though that government can

be loud and annoying, the fact that bureaucrats did not take Korean boasts and

provocations seriously or at least did not act on such claims or taunts, may have kept the

United States from any number of small engagements with the tiny but vociferous

country.

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 The small group process can be successful if the group creates a good idea but

Hastedt discusses the shortcoming of group think with its drawbacks of “overestimation

of the group’s power, morality, closed mindedness, and pressure towards conformity.”

(Hastedt, 239). I would imagine the neo-cons who were engaged with the Bush White

House enjoyed this sort of special rapport with the president. The fact that his father

attempted to moderate and open up the thinking and policies of this White House through

the Iraq Study Group project suggested that people were attempting to open the doors to a

wider debate over that deeply internalized and perhaps self-blinding course of action.
The elite theory model that responds to “demands generated by the economic and

political system” (Hastedt, 242) reflects the wills of elites and their specific

constituencies. Reagan and Trump seems to reflect the needs of the elites in preferring tax

cuts as a way to stimulate economies to generate more jobs. While it might help the

majority of people it definitely favors the profits and the interests of the elites, and the

one percent first. Contrasted with pluralism where power is “fragmented and defused,”

(Hastedt, 243) there is some chaos in using this method because many voices are heard. I

would argue that perhaps Mr. Clinton might seen as a pluralist seeking to raise taxes,

redistributing wealth and avoiding foreign engagements to focus on domestic well being.
Whichever form of decision making is utilized, it is clear, as Hastedt states that a

variety of decision making processes can guard the executive branch from too much

influence by any one group or concern.