1

Montenegro, R.A. 2007. "The nuclear programme of Argentina and the creation of
nuclear-free zones for reducing risks of nuclear facilities". In: "Updating
International Nuclear Law", Eds. H. Stockinger, J. Van Dyke, M. Geistlinger, S. K.
Fussek y P. Marchart, Ed. NW Verlag, BMW Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag &
Intersentia, Wien-Graz, pp. 259-284 (Total del libro: 510 p.).

THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMME OF ARGENTINA AND THE CREATION OF

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES FOR REDUCING RISKS OF NUCLEAR
FACILITIES.

Raul A. Montenegro.1

I. INTRODUCTION.

The nuclear program of Argentina was initiated by a fraud. The 24th August 1948 a
Austrian scientist, Ronald Richter, proposed to Juan Domingo Peron, at this time
president of Argentina, the building of a "pilot plant of atomic energy". Peron was
convinced, and provided to Richter both financial and political support. The 21st July
1949 began the construction of secret premises in Huemul Island, near Bariloche city in
Southern Argentina. Through national Decree n° 10936 the government created the
National Commission of Atomic Energy, CNEA (31st May 1950). One year later, the
16th February 1951, Richter supposedly achieved "thermonuclear reactions under
conditions of control at technical scale" in Huemul Island. The 24th March 1951 the
government announced Richter's "achievements". At this time most of foreign scientists
were reluctant to accept Huemul's experiments. Besides the fact that Richter's
objectives -not Richter's achievements- indirectly contributed to accelerate independent
research in thermonuclear fusion outside Argentina, his project was a fraud
investigated in 1952 by Jose Antonio Balseiro, Mario Bancora, Manuel Beninson,
Pedro Bussolini and Otto Gamba. Two of them, José Antonio Balseiro and Mario
Báncora reached CNEA, and contributed with other scientists to the official beginning
of the new nuclear program of Argentina [Mariscotti, 1985].

Most of the complex nuclear programme of Argentina was originally developed by

military governments, and afterwards supported by civilian governments. During more
than 50 years the secrecy of CNEA permitted a complicated, chaotic and expensive
nuclear development without citizen and parliamentarian control. Such situation began
to change during the first democratic period that followed the 1976-1983 military
regime. Since 1983 the nuclear programme and his environmental and health risks was
increasingly perceived by the civil society. This process of social awareness was
increased by the visibility of nuclear reactors, pollution produced by Los Gigantes
uranium mining, Chernobyl accident, and contact with sensitive information never
released before.

Most of the antinuclear movement was initiated in Argentina by FUNAM, the

Movimiento Antinuclear del Chubut (MACH) and Tierralerta at the beginning of the
1980s, and strengthened by Greenpeace Argentina since 1988. FUNAM revealed

1
President of FUNAM and Professor of Evolutionary Biology at the National University of
Cordoba (Argentina). Alternative Nobel Prize 2004. FUNAM, Casilla de Correo 83, Correo
Central, (5000) Cordoba, Argentina. Email: montenegro@funam.org.ar.
 2

information kept secret by CNEA, denounced abuses of public interest, and make clear
the risks of radioactive materials and radioactivity. Its judiciary claims were
unprecedented in Argentina.2 The first major struggles involved uranium mining at Los
Gigantes (closed in 1989), the uranium dioxide plant (whose operations still continue),
and the Gastre repository for high-level waste (HLW), a project finally dismissed by the
government. Contributions from Javier Rodríguez Pardo from MACH and Juan
Schroeder from Tierralerta were substantial at the time.

II. THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMME OF ARGENTINA.

Argentina has 2 power plants: Embalse in Cordoba, a PHWR Candu reactor imported
from Canada, with a net electric potency of 600 MW(e), and Atucha I in Lima, Buenos
Aires province, a PHWR reactor imported from Germany with a net electric potency of
335 MW(e). Embalse reached critical state in march 1983 and began commercial
operations in 1984. Atucha I reached its critical state in march 1974. A third one is
under construction, Atucha II, a PHWR reactor of Siemens design with a net electric
potency of 693 MW(e). Most of their nuclear fuel is natural uranium, but Argentina is
using rods with slightly enriched uranium (the so called SEU nuclear fuel) with a
content of 0,85% of uranium 235. In 1998 Atucha I was using 109 channels with natural
uranium and 143 channels with SEU [ARN, 1998]. Atucha I, originally designed to use
natural uranium is presently operating with a full slightly enriched uranium core at an
0,85% of enrichment [IAEA, 2001].

Embalse and Atucha I reactors are managed by a governmental company,

Nucleoelectrica Argentina S.A. (NASA). In 2006 the federal government of Argentina
decided the life extension of Embalse nuclear power plant as a part of the Plant Life
Management programme, PLIM. Embalse was planned for being closed in 2014.
Through the PLIM his life could be extended 25 years. Without any kind of public
consultation, Nestor Kirchner's administration also decided the building of a fourth
nuclear power plant (2006). His location is unknown. Previous proposals of new
nuclear reactors were dismissed after strong and unprecedented citizen's claims. The
first public demonstration against nuclear power in Argentina took place in the city of
Cordoba the 28th August, 1987. More than 1,200 adults and children walked over the
streets of the city, and asked for "no more nuclear power plants" in Argentina.

Argentina has 6 critical assemblies and research reactors. The three critical assemblies
are: RA-0 in the National University of Cordoba with a potency of 1 W(t) (<20%
enriched uranium); RA-4 in the National University of Rosario with 1 W(t) (<20%
enriched uranium), and RA-8 in Pilcaniyeu with 10 W(t) (<3.4% enriched uranium). RA-
8 is a particular case linked with de development of the CAREM nuclear facility (see
below). The three existing research reactors are: RA-1 in Centro Atomico
Constituyentes with 40 kW(t) (<20% enriched uranium); RA-3 in the Centro Atomico
Ezeiza with 5 MW(t) (<20% enriched uranium) and RA-6 in the Centro Atomico
Bariloche with 500 kW(t) (90% enriched uranium) [Waldman, 2005]. CNEA was
increasing the potency of the RA-3 to 10 MW(t) and the RA-6 to 3 MW(t) [CNEA, 2001;
Quintana Dominguez and Cataldi, 2003]. All these reactors and critical assemblies are
under the umbrella of CNEA.

Argentina has three separate governmental bodies for addressing nuclear issues:
CNEA (research, development, general operator, decommissioning), ARN (the
regulatory authority, National Decree 24804/1997, Article 7th) and NASA (the operator
of nuclear power plants, National Decree 1540/1994). Nevertheless, the independence
of ARN has been questioned by NGOs and citizens movements. Most of their

2
For antinuclear achievements of FUNAM see www.funam.org.ar
 3

professional staff come from the National Commission of Atomic Energy. CNEA has
three "atomic" centres: Bariloche (BAC), Ezeiza (EAC) and Constituyentes (CAT).

CNEA also created the mix company INVAP for the development and export of both
nuclear and non nuclear technology but as a property of the provincial government of
Rio Negro (provincial law n° 661/1976). INVAP, Investigaciones Aplicadas del Estado,
is a daughter of the military regime. A connected agreement established overlapped
objectives between CNEA and INVAP (September 6th 1976). The first task of INVAP
was a secret one, the building of Pilcaniyeu enrichment plant. INVAP began to work
over 8,900 hectares of a quite isolated place (1978). CNEA envisioned at this time the
building of a local version of Los Alamos [Greenpeace, 2002]. INVAP chaired phase
one (essential premises plus Mock up) and phase two (gaseous diffusion plant), also
called A1. The third phase was expected to be chaired by CNEA (A2). For political
reasons Pilcaniyeu was a revival of Richter's scandal. In November 1983, during the
beginning of the democratic period, Carlos Castro Madero publicly announced
successful uranium enrichment at Pilcaniyeu. Such success was a lie discovered by
IAEA. True first uranium enrichment was achieved in 1991 [Greenpeace, 2002].

INVAP was involved in the building of the RA-7, also known as RXI or RPI (Reactor of
Intermediate Potency). Head of the process was a military man, Hugo Duran. The
purpose of this secret facility located in the Centro Atomico Constituyentes was the
production of exhausted nuclear having high content of plutonium (1980-1982). For this
reactor CNEA secretly purchased 50-60 tonnes of Chinese heavy water. Such
commercial operation took place without safeguards [Pagina 12, 1995]. This premise
was designed for providing exhausted nuclear fuel to the reprocessing LPR facility (see
below reprocessing and the Apple Cake Strategy).

The first of the reactors built by INVAP was the RA-6 reactor. This 500 kW(t) power
reactor for research and training was inaugurated in 1982. It is an MPR type open-pool
reactor, designed to use 20% enriched uranium fuel, and is moderated and cooled by
light water (see above). The reactor building consists of two separate units, each
constructed in compliance with seismic structural regulations which apply to the
construction site. One of the buildings houses the reactor while the other houses the
ancillary systems, laboratories and other facilities. The starting point for RA-6 was a
basic design by the Reactor Design Department of CNEA. From that point on, INVAP
was responsible for managing the construction of the reactor. INVAP designed and
made key systems for the reactor, including all the components pertaining to the
electronic control chains, both nuclear and conventional, the instrument bridge, the
mechanics of the control rod movement, as well as the neutron and gamma detection
systems [INVAP, 2006].

INVAP is developing the CAREM, a small LWR nuclear power plant that use slightly
enriched uranium. This project reconverted the failed building of a compact reactor for
submarines (see below). The CAREM reactor is a 27 MW(e) nuclear station with so
called "passive safety systems". Feasibility studies show that it is possible to expand
the CAREM through the incorporation of minor engineering changes to a power of 300
MW(e) with installation costs economically competitive with respect to other sources of
similar importance [CNEA, 1997; INVAP, 2002]. In march 1997 people and NGOs from
Bariloche denounced transfer of radioactive materials from the local airport to
Pilcaniyeu facilities. In June 1997 year CNEA announced the functioning of RA-8
critical assembly. This was the beginning of assays towards the CAREM, a never built
reactor (2006). Such assays were illegal. Greenpeace and FUNAM denounced that
RA-8 functioning violated National Regulation on Nuclear Activity n° 24804. Alejandro
Beletzky in Bariloche and Raul Montenegro from FUNAM in Cordoba presented claims
 4

against INVAP at the Court of Justice (1997). Even if the Judge dismissed FUNAM's
claim, the illegality vas probed.

Since 2000 INVAP is building a research reactor in Sydney, Australia. The OPAL
(Lucas Heights II) will have a potency of 20 MW(t). It is an open pool reactor, whose
fuel is low-enriched uranium; it will be water-cooled and employs heavy water as
reflectant. Its core is of compact design, in order to provide the highest possible
neutron yield. The facility consists of several buildings. There is, first of all, that of the
reactor proper, which stands higher than the rest. Then there are: the neutron guide
building, the Visitors´ Centre and office building; the auxiliary services; the
powerhouse; and the cooling towers. The OPAL reached critical status on August 12th,
2006. Its uranium silicide fuel was provided by CNEA and was loaded very recently
after the Australian Nuclear Control Agency (ARPANSA) gave the go-ahead to operate
the reactor. According INVAP criticality allows the performance of low-power tests, and
this is the first step of a lengthy process of power increase and measurements of
diverse yield and safety parameters. Full power of the OPAL reactor is expeted to be
achieved at the end of 2006, and official inauguration is scheduled to take place in April
2007 [INVAP, 2006b; ANSTO, 2005].

Other four research reactors have been built by Argentina: two in Peru (reactor RP-0 of
1 to 10 Wt in San Borja and RP-10 of 10 MW in Huarangal, both in Lima), one in Egypt
(reactor ETRR-2 of 22 MWt), and one in Algeria (reactor NUR of 1 MWt). An INVAP
project for exporting a nuclear power plant to Robert Mugabe's regime in Zimbabwe
was filed after FUNAM's campaign in southern Africa [FUNAM, 2000a]. In response to
a request by IAEA and the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran INVAP remodelled an
experimental reactor in Iran. The purpose of the remodelling was the downgrading of
the fuel from 90% to 20% uranium enrichment [ANSTO, 2000]. In early 1990 the
Secretary for Special Affairs of the Chancellery of Argentina, Alfredo Karim Yoma,
began conversations with head of the Iranian government Hashemi Rafsanjani. An
achieved agreement included nuclear projects with a cost of 300 million dollars (50
million per year) involving the provision of two reactors for the Busheir complex and the
supply of food irradiation facilities [Ambito Financiero, 1987; Greenpeace, 2002]. In
1992 the sending to Iran of elements for a pilot uranium purification plant and for
nuclear fuel production was stopped in the port of Campana (Buenos Aires Province).
All these material were contained in the Fathulkhair, an Iranian ship [Goobar, 1994].
According Kenneth Timmerman, director of Middle East data Project, INVAP signed a
18 million dollars contract with Iran for the building of non safeguarded facilities
[Timmermann, 1995]. Other failed agreement for the building of nuclear reactors
included Turkey and Syria. After supplying the Istambul Nuclear Centre with a furnace
for uranium oxide sinterisation, INVAP promoted a joint venture with the Turkish
nuclear agency, but the agreement was cancelled by TAEA (1992) [Kibaroglu, 1997;
Greenpeace, 2002]. In August 1995 the national cabinet approved the sale of a nuclear
power plant to Syria despite warnings from chancellor Guido di Tella. The total cost of
the reactor was 100 million dollars. According different sources both governments also
agreed on the transfer of missile technology (the Condor II, see below). Argentina was
at the time a new signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). USA make pressure
over Carlos Saul Menem government, and the agreement was cancelled (1991). In the
1980s Carlos Saul Menem visited these countries and some of them (Siria and maybe
Libya) provided funds for his political campaign [Greenpeace, 2002]. Argentina don't
fulfilled his promises of nuclear and missile technologies transfer to Iran, Siria and
maybe Libya. Carlos Saul Menem also decided to be aligned with USA in the Gulf War.
Such positions created both bilateral and multilateral crisis with Arab countries, and
could be related with two terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires city whose targets were the
Embassy of Israel and the AMIA building [Montenegro, 2001a]. In March 1992 the
terrorist attack over the Embassy of Israel produced 24 deaths and 150 injured people.
 5

Two years later, in July 1994, a second terrorist attack over the AMIA building
produced 89 deaths and 206 injured people.

Since its creation INVAP offered nuclear technologies and services for maintaining his
increasingly expensive infrastructure. In most of the cases INVAP was helped by pro
nuclear members of the Chancellery (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). INVAP efforts were
concentrated in South-South transfer. Unfortunately, INVAP promoted business
agreements among countries suspected of having non-peaceful nuclear development
(e.g. Algeria, Syria, Iran), or being associated with violations to human rights (e.g.
Zimbabwe). Most of their gaps and economical disasters were paid by the federal
government, thus by citizens' taxes. According its needs INVAP acts like a
governmental department, or like a private company [see Greenpeace, 2002]. For the
development of the CAREM reactor, INVAP asked the financial support of the federal
government (132 million dollars). An unprecedented coalition of scientists and NGOs
stopped the inclusion of such demand in the national budget (1997).

Most of nuclear facilities of Argentina are concentrated in two centres, both located in
the province of Buenos Aires: Centro Atomico Constituyentes (CAC), and Centro
Atomico Ezeiza (CAE). The Centro Atomico Constituyentes has: Research reactor RA-
1 (see above), Laboratory facility alpha, Central deposit of special fissile material
(mainly enriched uranium and plutonium), Laboratory for the production of nuclear fuel
for research reactors (ECRI), Electrostatic accelerator TANDAR, Plant of ceramic
nucleus, and Plant for the conversion of uranium hexafluoride to uranium oxide [ARN,
1998]. The Centro Atomico Ezeiza has: Research reactor R-3 for the production of
radioisotopes (see above), Plant for the production of radioisotopes, Plant for the
production of molybdenum 99 (by fission), Plant for the production of encapsulated
sources (cobalt 60), Plant of irradiation (partially industrialized), Cyclotron for the
production of radioisotopes, Factory for the production of nuclear fuel (CONUAR),
Factory for the production of nuclear fuel for research reactors (FECRI), Triple height
laboratory, Laboratory of enriched uranium, Laboratory of radiochemical facilities,
Laboratory for post irradiation assays, Special alloys' factory, and Area for
management of radioactive waste [ARN, 1998]. There is also a third centre, the Centro
Atomico Bariloche (CAB) in southern Argentina. The CAB has a nuclear research
reactor (RA-6), a linear accelerator (LINAC), and the critical assembly RA-8 (see
above).

For providing heavy water to existing nuclear power plants CNEA built a heavy water
production factory in Arroyito, Neuquen province (PIAP). The PIAP is managed by
ENSI (Empresa Neuquina de Servicios de Ingenieria), composed by CNEA and the
government of Neuquen province. This plant, the largest of the world, could produce
200 tones per year of high quality heavy water (99,8% deuterium). Besides Argentina
solely India an Romania have huge factories for producing heavy water. PIAP restarted
its operations in 2006. Initial 25 tonnes of heavy water will be provided to nuclear
power plants Atucha I and Embalse (15 tonnes) and Lucas Heights II in Australia (10
tonnes). PIAP will also provide heavy water for Atucha II reactor (three years of PIAP
full work). Since its beginning the "largest heavy water production plant of the world"
solely produced a total of 650 tonnes of heavy water according CNEA's own figures
[CAB, 2006]. The total cost of the plant was 1,300 million dollars, and the benefit for the
total sale of 650 tonnes of heavy water was scarcely 13 million dollars (with 2006
prices of heavy water, 200 US dollars per kilogram). This is an example of illogical
investment produced by a nuclear plan operating most of the time without social
control. This megalomaniac chapter was preceded by the fiasco of the Heavy Water
Pilot Plant. Even if the 1976 Nuclear Plan of Argentina included the building of the
PIAP (finally built by Sulzer Brothers) CNEA begins to build a parallel Heavy Water
Pilot Plant, also called Experimental Plant of Heavy Water (PEAP). Main constructors
 6

of this non safeguarded plant were INVAP and the Litoral National University. After
some delay during Malvinas' War, in 1985, works recommenced. The PEAP was
finalized in 1991 but never produced heavy water (even having paid staff and a
director). The total cost of the plant was nearby 120 million dollars. The same year of
his completion it was a governmental proposal for dismantling it, and to sale the failed
PEAP to Iran. Such negotiations abruptly ended when president Carlos Saul Menem
cancelled all operations and sensitive negotiation with Iran in 1992 [Greenpeace,
2002].

This and other non sense investments were decided by military governments despite
more urgent social needs. The Nuclear Plan substantially augmented Argentina's
foreign debt and diverted resources to non sense secret investments. Such cumulative
inequity and lack of justice favoured the 2001 economical crisis. In Argentina the rate of
poverty at the Great Buenos Aires increased from 19.7% in 1999 to 41.5% in 2002, and
indigence from 4.8% on 1999 to 18.6% in 2002 [Calvento, 2006]. The complexity, cost
and trans generational impact of the nuclear programme is immoral vis-à-vis social and
health needs of Argentina [see Montenegro and Stephens, 2006].

At the end of the 1970s a secret delegation tried to offer place for the deposit of foreign
exhausted nuclear fuel in Patagonia, and to receive as payment a key-in-hand heavy
water plant (at the time Sulzer Brothers of Switzerland was seen as potential provider,
see above). Towards this purpose, delegates of Argentina contacted NAGRA, the
National Cooperative for the Disposal of Nuclear Waste in Switzerland. NAGRA and
the government of Switzerland rejected the offer (1979). FUNAM and Greenpeace
investigated this negotiation in Zurich (1988). Ironically the contacts between the
military government and NAGRA were secret in Argentina, but covered by the media in
Switzerland (e.g. by Tages Anzeiger in Zurich, 1979).

CNEA has developed different technologies for irradiation. Besides those located in
CAC and CAE there is a factory for irradiation with high doses in Tigre county (partido),
province of Buenos Aires: Ionics S.A. This premise has sources of cobalt 60 with a
maximum designed activity of 37 PBq. In Mendoza province the government owns a
mobile equipment for irradiation, the IMCO 20, which use 4 sources of cobalt 60, each
of them with an activity of 190 TBq. This technology was developed by INVAP. There is
another mobile laboratory for irradiation, the IMO 1 which is property of CNEA. His
chamber of irradiation has 94 sources, and a maximum authorized activity of 370 TBq
of cobalt 60 [ARN, 1998]. Both are used for the sterilization of males of fruit flies
(Insecta: Tephritidae) for being released in the environment [see Montenegro, 2001c].
At the end of the 1990s CNEA began to build a plant for the irradiation of municipal
sludge in the province of Tucuman, the PIBA. The original design contains a source of
cobalt 60 with a maximum activity of 26 PBq. CNEA attempted to build this plant in
Pilar city, province of Buenos Aires, and Cordoba city in the province of Cordoba. But
FUNAM and other NGOs were successful in convincing both municipalities not to
permit the PIBA. According Montenegro [1999] such plant could increase the
probability of mutation among viruses and bacteria, and eventually, the survival of more
pathogenic individuals. CNEA and ARN do not control in Argentina this kind of hazard.

III. INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS.

Some facilities suffered several accidents and incidents, the first one in the RA-2
critical assembly at Constituyentes (CAT), in Buenos Aires province. Such reactor,
which operated at 0.1 W of rated power since 1966, was used to conduct experiments
with various core configurations. On Friday afternoon September 23, 1983, a
modification of the core configuration had been scheduled so that an experiment using
the pulsed source technique could be conducted. The operating procedure requires the
 7

complete removal of the moderator. However, this was only partially done. A short time
afterwards, when the exchange operations were being carried out, a criticality
excursion occurred. It is estimated that the excursion was about 10 MJ (megajoules).
The operator, who was the only person present in the containment, was fatally
exposed. He received a lethal, absorbed dose of about 2000 rads of Gamma radiation
and 1700 rads of neutrons, which precluded any effective therapeutic measures. Two
persons in the control room at the time of the accident received doses of about 15 rads
of neutrons and 20 rads of Gamma; five persons received a dose ranging from 4 to 8
rads of neutrons and 7 to 10 rads of Gamma, and a person received a dose of about
rad of neutrons and 0.4 rad of Gamma. Nine other persons received doses below 1 rad
[US NRC, 1984].

The most serious accident happened at Embalse's nuclear power plant the 30th
June1983, fortunately without radioactive releases to the environment. Due to a valve
failure, water in the secondary circuit overheated. A shut-down cooling system was
improperly turned on, setting off vibrations which caused pipe displacement to 20 cm.
More than 3 hours later, technicians working in the pump room, surrounded by steam
and waters, managed to close the offending valve with a tool they had feverishly
produced on the spot. Cause of the accident: a missing screw. This accident was
maintained secret until 1987 [WISE, 1987; FUNAM, 1992a]. Since the beginning of its
operations this reactor suffered a great number of leaks that increased the radioactive
pollution of Embalse's lake. Most of them were discharges of heavy water containing
fission radioisotopes, particularly tritium 3. As result of the pricking of a tube at the
vapour generator, this nuclear power plant released 1.32 to 7.95 kg of heavy water per
hour to the lake (17th February to 16th March 1986). In August 1987 Embalse released
790 kg of heavy water into the lake. More leaks were produced in September 1987,
December 1987, December 1995 and October 2003. These are only examples of a
long list of accidental discharges [FUNAM, 1992a; Clarin, 1987].

In December 9th 1989 Embalse suffered 3 scrams in 4 days, because of several

operating problems; first scram was probably caused by a valve failure. Plant
managers did not publish details [AEI, 2006]. The 12th December 1995 Argentine
regulators have provisionally rated a pressure tube failure and loss-of-coolant accident
at Embalse at Level 2 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) because plant
defense-in-depth was degraded. The incident occurred when the 648-MW pressurized
heavy water reactor was returning from an outage. Two fuel-bearing pressure tubes
were damaged during the inspection but only one was detected and replaced. Two
days after the unit reached full power, the annulus gas system showed a pressure
increase and increased tritium was detected in the reactor building. The unit was
brought to cold shutdown, and a 7-millimeter-long hole was found in one pressure tube.
The damaged tube was replaced as of December 29th and Embalse reached full
power January 2 1996 [AEI, 2006].

Between June 29th and 7 July 1996 Embalse suffered an internal leak involving tritium
3, and released 300 cubic meters of water polluted with tritium 3 into the lake. The
repair began 22 days after the initial failure). One of the most recent incident was the
heavy water spilling through fuelling machine "A" in Embalse (June 8th 2005).

FUNAM repeatedly denounced the potential deleterious effects of tritium 3 releases on

the health of those citizens living near Embalse nuclear power plant due to tritium long
half life (12.26 years) and tritium 3 ability for entering into short and long food chains.
The lake of Embalse is the main water purveyor for many populations in the area.
Neighbours of the city of Embalse receive drinking water containing 110 to 220 Bq/L of
tritium 3 (1998) [ULA, 1999]. During a single year Embalse released 9.39 x 1012 Bq of
tritium 3 to the water, and 3.57 x 1012 Bq of tritium 3 to the air (1985) [FUNAM, 1992a].
 8

It's important to mention that Embalse nuclear power plant showed the highest
collective dose among his workers when compared with other Candu reactors in the
world. In 1989 and further years such doses were 2 fold an even 3 fold greater than
observed doses in other Candu reactors. In 1989 Embalse showed a collective dose
for workers of 334 rem per man for a single nuclear power plant, meanwhile the second
higher figure for another Candu, not located in Argentina, was 125 rem per man for a
single nuclear power plant [CSPN, 1990; FUNAM, 1992a].

INVAP's industrial plant in Pilcaniyeu also suffered a serious accident in 1984. The
explosion of a vessel containing uranium hexafluoride produced a fatality. Technician
of INVAP Daniel Bonazzi died, and three workers were injured [Rio Negro, 1984a,
1984b; Greenpeace, 2002].

IV. LUCAS HEIGHTS II AND THE ENTERING OF FOREIGN NUCLEAR WASTE.

Argentina filed two projects that involved the entering of foreign nuclear waste to
Argentina: the Clean Kilowatt Project (Kilovatio Limpio), and the Tandem project. The
Kilovatio Limpio was promoted by INVAP for attracting buyers from foreign countries.
Through such plan Argentina offered the nuclear reactor (e.g. a CAREM), the nuclear
fuel, and interim (final) storage in Argentina for exhausted nuclear fuel. The Tandem
Project also involved the import of radioactive waste. The Tandem plan was designed
for receiving exhausted nuclear fuel discarded by Brazil (whose LWR nuclear power
plants use enriched uranium), and to use such waste as rough material for producing
new nuclear fuel (to be used in the PHW reactors of Argentina). The approval of Article
41st of the Constitution of Argentina that forbid the entering of foreign nuclear waste
was lethal for both projects [Montenegro, 2002].

Nevertheless INVAP developed a replacement strategy for the Clean Kilowatt Project.
Through the secret contract signed between INVAP of Argentina and ANSTO of
Australia (2000) a special provision opened future entering of exhausted nuclear fuel
from Sidney's replacement reactor (Lucas Heights II) to Argentina. According the
contract Argentina could process high level waste (HLW) produced by INVAP's reactor
(exhausted nuclear fuel rods). Such processing involve dilution and vitrify, and the
devolution of resulting LLIL to Australia (Long Lived Intermediate Level waste). The
provision of the contract violated both Article 41st of the Constitution of Argentina and
Article 3rd of National Law n° 25018. INVAP argued that exhausted nuclear fuel is not
radioactive waste. An unethical exchange of memoranda between the National
Regulatory Authority (ARN) and INVAP provided technical basement for the contract
that violated Article 41st of the Constitution [Moreno, 1999; Otheguy, 1999;
Montenegro, 2002]. According ARN "the importation of radioactive material in the form
of radiated or wear out fuel elements and the further re-exportation of the resulting
product and the wastes generated by such a treatment process should be in
compliance with standards in force" [Moreno, 1999]. Besides their constitutional
violations, both ARN and INVAP ignored that acording the Civil Code of Argentina any
contract signed in another country for violating the law of Argentina has "no value" and
it is null (Article 1207) [Montenegro, 2002].

Working together with Australian NGOs, among them National Conservation

Foundation (NCF) FUNAM confirmed the illegal provision contained in the contract.
After informing to the public both in Australia and Argentina that the secret contract
violated the Constitution of Argentina (October 2000) INVAP reacted against FUNAM,
and unsuccessfully tried to block their claims. At the end of 2000 INVAP began an
active lobby work for convincing citizens and institutions that exhausted nuclear fuel "is
 9

not radioactive waste". Their attempts were unsuccessful, and public pressure in
Argentina against the import of Australian nuclear waste increased (2001-2002).

In September 2000 the representative of FUNAM told to the "Select Committee for an
Inquiry into the Contract for a New Reactor at Lucas Heights” of the Australian Senate:
"this contract, which was never noticed to the public, had a provision for the possible
sending of spent fuel to Argentina, and this provision is illegal in our country. According
Article 41 of Argentina’s Constitution, approved in 1994, the entrance of radioactive
waste is prohibited. And spent fuel is radioactive waste" [Montenegro, 2000]. Since
2000 more than 300 NGOs from Australia and Argentina worked together against the
sending of radioactive waste [cf. Montenegro, 2002]. Coincidental with FUNAM
participation at the Inquiry Committee and press release coverage on illegality of
CAREM assays in Argentina (October-November 2000), FUNAM received pressure
from INVAP. Michael Forsaw, at the moment president to the Inquiry Committee at the
Australian Senate gave his solidarity to FUNAM's president and stated that the
protection he has in Australia "cannot be guaranteed outside Australia" [Australian
Senate, 2000].

The secret provision was widely covered by media, and people from all over Argentina
protested against the import of nuclear waste. The contract was under threat for being
secret and unconstitutional. Such uncomfortable situation moved both INVAP and the
government to promote a nuclear agreement with Australia despite constitutional
prohibition. This agreement was written with more illegal provisions, and established
the eventual processing and reprocessing of Australian nuclear waste. For the first time
and publicly Argentina was offering services of reprocessing. According FUNAM "his
proposal was non sense, authoritative and illegal" [FUNAM, 2001a, 2001b].

More than 100,000 physicians of Argentine produced a document asking the

government to accomplish Article 41st of the Constitution, and not to permit the
entering of radioactive waste. They also requested to the Parliament "not to approve
the Agreement". This document was produced by the National Forum of Medical
Institutions which involve 9 coalitions of physicians (June 13th 2002) [see FUNAM,
2002a]. The Medical Association for Preventing War from Australia (MAPW) also
supported the claim of the physicians of Argentina. Bill Williams, from MAPW stated
that "the Constitution of Argentina forbid the import or radioactive waste" and that
physicians of Argentina "solidly support this Constitutional prohibition. The disposal of
Australian nuclear waste it is not a responsibility of the people of Argentina" [FUNAM,
2002b].

After years of delay the Nuclear Agreement with Australia was finally approved by the
parliament (16th December 2004). But a recognized environmentalist of Argentina,
Juan Schroeder, put a claim at the Federal Court of Justice of Bahia Blanca in Buenos
Aires province, and asked to the Court a protective decision ("recurso de amparo") for
avoiding the entrance in Argentina of Australian nuclear waste [FUNAM, 2006]. After a
first rejection, his claim was finally accepted (19th October 2006). The Court forced the
government to prevent the entering of Australian "waste and radioactive waste" into the
country and clearly established that the constitutional prohibition for importing foreign
radioactive waste "is permanent". The Court also established that exhausted nuclear
fuel is waste, and obliged the deletion of those provision in the Contract and
Agreement that established the entering of Australian nuclear waste. This historical
verdict was signed by Judges Luis Cotter, Ricardo Planes and Angel Argañaraz from
the Federal Court of Bahia Blanca [Cotter et al., 2006]. "Now the verdict of the Court
turned unconstitutional both the contract and the agreement with Australia. The best
way now it's to revisit both documents, and to exclude their provisions on processing
and reprocessing in Argentina" [FUNAM, 2006].
 10

V. URANIUM MINING AND THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE.

Argentina is a country that completed the nuclear fuel cycle. Among the most relevant
premises of this cycle are: uranium mines (Sierra Pintada is currently closed, but CNEA
is trying to reopen it), uranium dioxide production plant (Dioxitek S.A.), uranium
enrichment facility and conversion plants in Pilcaniyeu, nuclear fuel production plant
(CONUAR), Laboratory for the manufacture of nuclear fuel for research reactors
(ECRI), Plant for the conversion of uranium hexafluoride to uranium oxide, Factory for
the production of nuclear fuel for research reactors (FECRI), Triple Height Laboratory,
Alpha laboratory, and the Laboratory of enriched uranium.

Argentina has six closed uranium mines all them without remediation: Malargüe, Sierra
Pintada and Huemul in Mendoza province, Pichiñán in Chubut, Los Gigantes in
Cordoba, La Estela in San Luis, Tonco in Salta, and Los Colorados in La Rioja
province.

Malargüe has 700,000-t of milling tailings. Sierra Pintada in San Rafael has 871,920
m3 of polluted water (agua de cantera) with 3,749 kg of uranium; 1,067.6-t of solid
waste contained in 5,223 drums with 14,249 kg of uranium; 1,704,000-t of milling
tailings with 306,720 kg of uranium; 376,000-t of marginal ore with 110,636 kg of
uranium; 323,016-t of solid precipitates with 47,379 kg of uranium and 9,470,000-t of
sterile residues with 1,900 kg of uranium. Huemul has 19,500 m3 of sterile residues and
2,500 m3 of marginal ore. Los Gigantes in Cordoba province has 120,000 m3 of
polluted water, 101,350 m3 of precipitated mud, 2,400,000-t of heap-leap tailings,
1,000,000-t of sterile residues, and 600,000-t of marginal ore. Pichiñan mine in Chubut
province has 145,000-t of milling tailings. Tonco mine in Salta province has 500,000-t
of milling tailings. La Estela mine in San Luis province has 70,000-t of milling tailings
and 1,140,000-t of sterile residues, and Los Colorados mine in La Rioja province has
135,000-t of milling tailings and 1,000,000-t of sterile residues [PRAMU, 2005, 2006].
All these figures are conservative.

These mining complexes maintain solid and liquid deposits having low level radioactive
waste, mainly constituted by uranium, radium and other uranium daughters, like radon
222 and lead 210. There is also important concentrations of thorium 230. The Sierra
Pintada uranium mine in San Rafael is a recognized source of pollution. Even being
closed, their leaks increase the total content of natural uranium downstream.
Meanwhile the river basin of Diamante has an average of 1.40 µg/L of natural uranium,
with a maximum of 3.50 µg/L [Tomellini et al., 1995], the El Tigre river, downstream
Sierra Pintada, has an average of 10.88 µg/L with a maximum of 75 µg/L. Sierra
Pintada also contains high values of toxic materials like arsenic in their liquid ponds
(until 48 µg/L) [Montenegro, Reyna, Balbis and Pesci, 2006]. At Los Gigantes uranium
mining in Cordoba province CNEA measured until 34,4 ug/L of uranium downstream,
and until 92 µg/L of uranium in groundwater [CNEA, 2006].

CNEA has two mines with confirmed reserves, Sierra Pintada in Mendoza with 9,200
tonnes of uranium, and Cerro Solo in Chubut province with 5,200 tonnes of uranium.
CNEA is trying to reopen Sierra Pintada uranium mine, and to combine remediation
with reopening. This proposal is rejected by citizens and NGOs from San Rafael
(Mendoza province). In mid 2006 the government of Mendoza organized a biased
public hearing for analysing the impact assessment of the remediation. This event was
planned for the 2nd November. The "Multisectorial del sur", a coalition of 38
institutions, presented a claim at the Court of Justice and asked a protective measure
(Recurso de Amparo). The Court accepted the claim, and ordered the suspension of
the public hearing (1st November). This was a defeat for CNEA and some officials of
 11

Mendoza's government (the same that previously banned the transfer of the uranium
dioxide plant from Cordoba to Sierra Pintada in Mendoza).

Exploration for detecting new mines were rejected in the past. Neighbours and NGOs
from the Traslasierra Valley successfully fights research works conducted by CNEA
(1992). The same opposition against Cerro Solo is currently observed in Patagonia
(2006). In Cordoba province several new nuclear-free zones were approved by local
regulations as a reaction against uranium prospection (see below). FUNAM denounced
new secret uranium research in La Negra site in Cordoba province despite local
interdictions [CNEA, 2001]. Both regional demonstrations and judicial claims are
expected (November 2006).

Dioxitek S.A. produce uranium dioxide for CONUAR. Both are companies created by
CNEA (other companies are Nuclear Mendoza S.E., FAE S.A., ENSI S.E. and INVAP
S.E.). Dioxitek has a capacity of 150 t HM/year. This plant has a non isolated deposit of
>36,000 m3 of mineral waste containing uranium, radium, radon and other natural
radioisotopes (= 57,600-t). The so called "el chichón" deposit is located within one of
the most populated neighbourhood of Cordoba city, Barrio La Fraternidad and Barrio
Alta Cordoba. Their solid deposits are also polluted with high levels of vanadium (4,325
µg/L), cooper (2,650 µg/L) and chromium (755 µg/L). Radon 222 measurements made
by ARN attained 119 ± 6 Bq/m3 in water reservoirs of the plant (1997) [ARN, 1997]. In
soil samples of the plant CNEA measured a maximum of 2,172 pCi/g of radium (1981)
[CNEA, 1997].

After a strong pressure from citizens and NGOs Dioxitek S.A. is trying to move outside
Cordoba. Nevertheless, all proposed locations, e.g. Despeñaderos in Cordoba and San
Rafael in Mendoza, were discarded after local protestations. The routine operations of
the plant release uranium dust to the atmosphere (e.g. from 553 g/year in 1984 to
>1,022 g/year in 1983) and uranium to the sewage system (e.g. from 98,64 kg/year in
1984 to 110,13 kg/year in1985) [CNEA, 1986; Montenegro, 2005]. Slightly enriched
uranium for producing SEU nuclear rods is currently obtained in Dioxitek S.A. (such
SEU product has 0.85 % of 235 uranium). IAEA mention in his report: "the use of
REPU [= uranium from reprocessing] as raw material for slightly enriched uranium is
under development. Dioxitek operates this plant" [IAEA, 2001]. Nevertheless, such
processes have not been informed to neighbours. FUNAM began a research on the
issue, and is transmitting results to the civil society and the local government
(November 2006).

During decades CNEA don't treated nor isolated low level radioactive waste and toxic
waste among closed mines and Dioxitek S.A. Most of CNEA's funds were preferentially
directed to development and maintaining of nuclear technology, not to remediation of
uranium mines. In 1994 CNEA envisaged negotiations for obtaining international
financial support for the remediation of closed uranium mines and Dioxitek. In the
meantime CNEA's own budget for remediation remained insignificant. In 2000 CNEA
created the PRAMU (Proyecto de Restitucion de la Minería de Uranio). Such organism
continued the negotiations with the World Bank until unilateral interruption (2002). Two
years later new negotiations were envisaged for obtaining a loan of 25 million dollars
with a local contribution of 5,8 million dollars [PRAMU, 2005]. Sites for being restored
with the loan are the following: Malargue and Huemul in Mendoza province, uranium
dioxide plant and Los Gigantes in Cordoba, Pichiñan in Chubut province, Tonco in
Salta province, La Estela in San Luis province, and Los Colorados in La Rioja province
[PRAMU, 2005]. One of World Bank requisites is the creation of participatory
mechanisms (Social Forums). Strangely, CNEA began to promote Social Forums in
permanent closed mines which included as objectives in the loan. But don't promoted
 12

identical forum in Sierra Pintada, a closed mine whose remediation will be done without
support of foreign loan (see below).

The creation of Social Forums by CNEA obey more to World Bank requisites than
genuine interest in promoting participation. To evaluate remediation plans for Dioxitek
and Los Gigantes uranium mine, CNEA created a specific Social Forum in Cordoba
which include both social and environmental NGOs, among them APROAS, FUNAM
and Greenpeace (February 2005). After his first year of work the Social Forum
denounced lack of seriousness by CNEA because "they never provided remediation
projects nor technical information. Their main interest was to obtain a loan from the
World Bank, whose requisites include the creation of participatory bodies like the
Forum". In 2006 the Social Forum of Cordoba asked the World Bank "not to approve
the loan requested by CNEA".

CNEA operate two facilities at Ezeiza Atomic Center for supplying purified enriched
uranium which is employed in nuclear fuel production. At one of these facilities, the
Triple Height Laboratory (LTA), scraps from the production of MTR type fuel elements
(mainly out of specifications U3O8 plates or powder) are purified to nuclear grade. The
another facility, the Enriched Uranium Laboratory (LUE) produces 90% enriched
uranium metal to be used in molybdenum 99 production (originally the uranium was
used for the manufacture of MTR fuel elements made of aluminium-uranium alloy).
This laboratory also provides metallic uranium with a lower enrichment (20%). LTA and
LUE facilities are not authorized for processing irradiated material [Bonini et al., 1998].

As it was mentioned before Argentina has a factory for producing uranium enrichment
with a capacity of 20 t SWU/year in Pilcaniyeu (Neuquen province). New types of axial
compressors, a new generation of membranes, and a new gaseous diffusion stage
concept, called SIGMA, have been introduced [IAEA, 2006]. Argentina claimed that the
gaseous diffusion enrichment plant of Pilcaniyeu was built to service research reactors.
Before building the enrichment plant, Argentina had been supplied with enriched
uranium by China and the former Soviet Union [Green, 2000; see Poneman, 1985;
Jones et al., 1998]. CNEA also has in Pilcaniyeu a plant for converting uranium dioxide
into uranium hexafluoride with a capacity of 62t HM/year [IAEA, 2006].

The Fuel Cycle programme of CNEA has 7 projects: CARA, SIGMA, DELTA, LAPEP,
CADRIP, LFR and CREA. The CARA project is developing nuclear fuel for being used
in all nuclear power plants (Embalse, Atucha I, Atucha III). Some of these projects are
linked with the development of uranium silicide fuel (e.g. P04, P06, P07) and uranium
molybdenum [CNEA, 2001; Calabrese, Estryk and Notari, 1996].

NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT.

Atucha I nuclear power plant has 2 pools for underwater storage of its spent fuel, and is
evaluating the building of dry silo for long term storage. Embalse has a pool with a
spent fuel storage capacity of 10 years, and vertical dry silos. Since 1993 Embalse use
the ASECQ system developed by INVAP for the dry storage of exhausted nuclear fuel
[INVAP, 2006c]. Unfortunately both underwater and dry storage in vertical silos are
quite exposed to terrorist and accidental plane crash, and cannot resist the impact of
big commercial planes. This risk has been put in the international agenda after WISE's
report on the issue (Coeyteaux, Faïd, Marignac and Schneider, 2001], and terrorist
attack over Twin Towers in New York, USA (2001).

According NRC estimates [NRC, 2000] a big aircraft with >5,4 t of mass at 8 or less
kilometres away from the airport has a penetration probability of 96% when the
thickness of concrete is 30.48 cm; 50% probability for 45.72 cm, and 28% for 60.96 cm.
 13

In the worst scenario a Boeing 747 with a mass of 397 t could be crashed over dry silo
or even a nuclear power plant at a speed of 252.8 m/s, a kinetic energy of 12,680 MJ
and a content of 216,840 litres of fuel. Figures for an Airbus 380 with 560 t of mass are
261.7 m/s (speed), 19,177 MJ (kinetic energy) and 310,000 litres (fuel) [Coeyteaux,
Faïd, Marignac and Schneider, 2001]. Surface dry silo of Embalse (Asecq system)
cannot resist such impacts. After a terrorist attack with commercial plane (or plane
accident) his mechanical effects are followed by the burning of both fuel and plane
materials that generate high temperatures, additional mechanical effects and strong air
convection. This vertical and fluid current could effectively disseminate those
radioisotopes released by the crashed facility. Near the Centro Atomico Ezeiza and his
deposit of exhausted nuclear fuel (see below) is located the Minister Juan Pistarini
International Airport which has one of highest plane traffic of South America. In 1978 a
LAN Chile plane crashed near undergoing works for the LPR reprocessing facility. Due
to this accident the LPR location was changed [Greenpeace, 2002]. The non sense
vicinity of the airport and the Ezeiza Atomic Centre create a permanent risk scenario.

Besides deposits of exhausted nuclear fuel in Embalse and Atucha there are interim
storage of HLW and deposits for low level radioactive waste in Ezeiza (CAE). The
"Area for the management of radioactive waste" has five plants, deposits and
containing systems, one of them the "Central deposit for irradiated fissile material".
This facility contains exhausted nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants and research
reactors (HLW). One of the sites is currently investigated by the Court of Justice after
the detection of high levels of natural uranium in groundwater. Campo 5 trench is one
of CAE's suspected source of pollution. Most of groundwater analysis made by
independent and non independent institutions confirmed values of >36 micrograms of
uranium per litre of water. Provisionally the government of the province of Buenos Aires
decided to provide with non polluted drinking water all affected neighbourhoods (2006).
CNEA minimize this pollution after comparing the maximum observed level of natural
uranium (>36 µg/L) with legal standard in Argentina for drinking water sources
(National Law n° 24585), which is 100 µg/L. Current drinking water standards for
uranium in Canada and Australia is 20 µg/L, and 30 µg/L in United States.

CNEA is attempting to establish a repository for HLW. For this purpose CNEA
produced a series of studies, mostly based in Sweden local research for a deep
geological repository. First approaches were developed in 1977 (one year after the
coup leaded by the military Junta) and the decision was taken in 1978. The regulation
302/1970 approved studies towards the establishment of a repository in Chubut. The
research began in the 1980s. CNEA and the National University of San Juan identified
198 granite masses and selected 7 sites locates both in Chubut and Rio Negro
provinces. In a third step they chosen La Esperanza and Chasico in Rio Negro, and
Calcatapul and Sierra del Medio in Chubut. Finally they concentrated the research on
Sierra del Medio, 60 km away from Gastre [see Cialella, 1997; Montenegro, 1997]. The
first public demonstration against the repository was the beginning of the end of the
project (Trelew, 22nd October 1986). At this time president Raul Alfonsin received a
petition signed by 10,168 citizens. They asked the dismissal of Gastre's repository
project. The 11 October 1994 the Constitution of Chubut prohibited the entering and
deposit of radioactive waste generated outside Chubut (Article 110), and the Gastre
project was definitively filed.

Nevertheless CNEA continue to work towards the building of a repository for HLW. In
his report to the Parliament (2003) CNEA states: "During the 1980s CNEA initiated a
feasibility analysis that included pre-engineering studies for the construction of a deep
geological repository to permanently dispose of the high-level residues. It was decided
then, to search for a stable granite zone of low seismic activity and low hydraulic
conductivity. It was determined that the most likely area was at Sierra del Medio, close
 14

to Gastre locality at the Chubut province. The studies began to fully characterize this
area. The Argentinean Congress received the timely report; however, by the early
1990s, due to public pressure, the political decision of suspending the studies was
adopted. Currently CNEA is performing geological studies in order to identify other
possible areas of interest" [CNEA, 2003]. Such studies remain secret.

Other CNEA secret studies for identifying possible sites for low-level and intermediate-
level radioactive waste both in Cordoba, Catamarca, La Rioja and Santiago del Estero
provinces were denounced by FUNAM, and filed. One of the sites was Salinas
Grandes, in North West Cordoba province (1992-1993) [FUNAM, 1992b].

Outside Argentina PANGEA Resources worked towards the identification of possible

sites for international HLW repositories. Based in USA (Redmont, Washington) and
leaded by Canadian Golder Associates, their main investors are British Nuclear Fuel
(BNFL) from UK, NAGRA from Switzerland, and Enterra Holding Ltd. from Canada.
PANGEA has been conducting research in Argentina with probably unofficial support
from CNEA, and local geologists. At the beginning of 1999 UIC Newsletter confirmed
that both Australia and Argentina "have appropriate geological, economic and
democratic conditions for a deep [international] repository" [UIC, 1999]. In March 2000
Charles McCombie, a top official of PANGEA, told to Southern Cross Magazine in
London: "Australia is not the solely place we are interested (…) also is the South of
Argentina [Southern Cross Magazine, 2000]. According The Observer of London BNFL
invested up to 6,6 million in PANGEA [The Observer, 1999]. All these studies and
comments are illegal in Argentina due to Article 41st of the National Constitution that
forbid the entering of foreign radioactive waste.

The shipments of plutonium and high level waste from Japan to France and vice versa
offered an interesting scenario for observing the reactions of the nuclear lobby in
Argentina vis-à-vis Article 41st of the Constitution which forbids the entering of foreign
nuclear waste. Most of these shipments travelled trough Argentina's Exclusive
Economic Zone. CNEA adopted a soft position, don't recognized risks for oceanic
ecosystems, and avoided accomplishment of Article 41st. In 2001 FUNAM presented a
claim at the Court of Justice against the president of CNEA, Aldo Ferrer, CNEA's
member Roberto Ornstein and officials from ARN for not having fulfilled Article 41st of
the Constitution [FUNAM, 2001d, 2001e].

VI. REPROCESSING AND THE APPLE CAKE STRATEGY.

Most of the nuclear programme of Argentina was designed and decided during military
governments. According Jim Green "a civil/nuclear program was pursued by Argentina
from the 1950s. After a military junta seized power in 1976, and motivated in part by
Brazil's deal with West Germany to obtain extensive nuclear fuel cycle, Argentina's
nuclear programme expanded and the military objective became pronounced.
Argentina rejected IAEA inspections of most of its nuclear facilities, and at the time
refused to sign the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and
the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), or the NPT".

In the 1960s Argentina began to develop and achieve pilot reprocessing capabilities. In
1968 Argentina, possibly with assistance from an Italian firm, built the PR1, a
laboratory scale reprocessing facility at the Ezeiza Atomic Centre (CAE). Such
laboratory obtained 435 milligrams of plutonium [Santoro 2006a, 2006b, 2006c]. In
1973 Santiago Morazzo was designed as head of the "Priority Programme for the
Assembling of Reprocessing" (ERE). It seems that through PR1 and ERE the president
Domingo Peron promoted reprocessing techniques for dissuasive purposes, not for the
building of a nuclear weapon. Prior to the military coup Santiago Morazzo and other
 15

scientists were jailed and tortured at the ESMA, the clandestine prison of the Army. In
1976 the Junta Militar designed Admiral Carlos Castro Madero as president of CNEA.
The PR1 was closed, and the ERE dismantled.

When the military people seized the power in 1976 they suspected secret research for
the development of a nuclear weapon during Domingo Peron administration (la bomba
de Peron = the atom bomb of Peron). At this time (1977) Castro Madero launched the
ambitious Nuclear Plan of Argentina (Regulation n° 3183) and promoted the building of
six new nuclear power plants in Argentina (Atucha I began to work in 1974). The
Laboratory of Radiochemical Processes (LPR) was created in 1977 for replacing the
PR1. Luis Arguello was his director. The main goal of the LPR was to reprocess Atucha
I and Embalse exhausted nuclear fuel, and to produce mixed oxide fuels (MOX). His
design capacity was 10-20 kg of plutonium per year [Green, 2000]. The total cost of the
LPR was 400 million dollars [see Santoro, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c]. In 1981 CNEA and
Techint Snia signed a secret contract for the transfer of technology that permit the
conversion of uranil nitrate into oxide [Santoro, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c].

Between 1980 and 1982 the scientist and military Ricardo Rapacioli developed a
parallel and secret nuclear plan for the Army (CNEA was in the hands of the Navy).
The new programme was indirectly accelerated by the growing complexity of Brazilian
nuclear plan. Rapacioli developed initial calculations for nuclear explosions, and a
reflector of neutrons. He failed however in introducing his vision and logistics within the
LPR. It seems that Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri (before being dictatorship) was mentor
of the nuclear weapon project. The president of CNEA at the time, Carlos Castro
Madero, permanently refused to develop the atomic bomb. Nevertheless historical
testimonies confirm pro bomb attitudes among dictatorship (e.g. Emilio Massera,
currently jailed). For unknown reasons Rapacioli's plan was filed prior to the beginning
of Malvinas' [Falkland] war. The failed attempt to build a nuclear weapon in Argentina
was less real than Brazilian attempt. Former president of Brazil, Jose Sarney, publicly
recognized he stopped a secret nuclear military assay in 1986. A deep drill for
underground testing was built in Serra do Cachimbo, Para state [Santoro, 2006a,
2006b, 2006c; Brazzil Magazine, 2006]. Such project was mainly developed during
1964-1985 dictatorship. According Jose Luiz Santana, from the Brazilian Commission
on Nuclear Energy, even after Sarney's decision the military continued research and
works towards the bomb. In 1990 their project was dismantled.

Even if Carlos Castro Madero stopped all attempt for the building of nuclear weapons,
he strongly contributed to the military profile of the nuclear plan. As it was previously
described, CNEA and INVAP were involved in the secret building of the RA-7, also
known as RXI or RPI, Reactor of Intermediate Potency (1980-1982). Castro Madero
decided to transform the RA-7 development, clearly oriented to plutonium production,
into the development of a compact reactor for submarines (June 1982). This idea was
launched by the Navy in 1970 [CNEA, 1970]. In 1979 Admiral Emilio Massera, one of
the members of the Junta Militar, purchased 4 submarines to the German firm Thyseen
Nordenseewerke. INVAP continued the development of the submarine reactor even
during first years of the democracy, but never produced results. En 1996 all
submarines were dismantled and sold [Clarin, 1996a, 1996b]. The submarine fiasco
had a cost of more than 1,200 million dollars [Greenpeace, 2002].

At the beginning of Raul Alfonsin democratic government (1983) he asked the

resignation of Castro Madero and suspended the provision of funds for the LPR.
Nevertheless the project remained alive. Due to protest of neighbours of Ezeiza,
Greenpeace and FUNAM (1988-1989), and the pressure from USA, the second Ezeiza
reprocessing plant was halted in 1990 and finally closed in 1993. Six years before, in
1988, the first public hearing on plutonium and reprocessing was held in Ezeiza. From
 16

the side of NGOs spoken at the panel Federico Westerkamp and Raul Montenegro,
and from the side of CNEA Alberto Kattan and others. Valentin Stiglitz was the chair
(1998). This was the first movement against reprocessing and plutonium in Argentina.
Nevertheless reprocessing goals continued. CNEA is operating a facility for producing
mix oxide fuels of uranium and plutonium, and their encapsulation in fuel rods (the
Alpha Laboratory, Constituyentes Atomic Centre). In 2000 the Nuclear Agreement with
Australia included the offer of reprocessing for Sydney's Lucas Heights II exhausted
nuclear fuel. For the first time Argentina entered in future competition with countries like
France and UK. But the verdict of the Federal Court of Bahia Blanca drastically
interrupted all business involving import of radioactive waste (2006).

In 1984 the national Depute Julio Cesar Araoz presented a project of national
regulation for the peaceful use of nuclear weapons. His proposal contained 10 articles.
Article 4th said: "The Argentine republic ratify his rights to explode nuclear weapons
with peaceful purposes (…) for exploiting natural resources, the making of engineering
works, or any other civil purpose (…)". Araoz proposed a makeshift version of
Operation Plowshare. In United States, in the 1960s, the Niblick operation involved 27
underground nuclear explosions, four of them as part of the Operation Plowshare:
Tornillo the 11th October 1963 (unknown yield); Klickkitat the 20th February 1964
(probably 24 kilotons), Ace the 23rd January 1964 (<20 kilotons), and Dub the 23rd
January 1964 (<20 kilotons). Araoz and his Latin American version of Plowshare were
analysed in several technical publications devoted to energy (e.g. Energeia, 1984). The
1st July 1984 FUNAM launched his campaign against Araoz project [Montenegro,
1984]. Few weeks later the project was filed.

During dictatorship and even civilian governments an archipelago of sensitive premises

and inputs were achieved in Argentina. Most of them increased the foreign debt.
Sensitive and not declared projects were protected by the complexity and traditional
secrecy of CNEA. Both in Brazil and Argentina the "apple cake" strategy maintained
military potentiality behind peaceful nuclear programmes. For the making of a bomb all
essential processes, elements and know-how remains distributed in different premises
and projects with diversified chronograms (like in a kitchen before the making of a
cake). There is not a nuclear weapon: there are distributed elements for eventually
making it. This is one of the explanations for a extremely complex and non sense
development of so many nuclear technologies. Argentina has the world's largest plant
for producing heavy water, but solely two nuclear power demand it. These two reactors
scarcely produce 7.5 % of the total available electricity (2006). Among main reasons for
a so megalomaniac nuclear programme are military interventions, nationalism, and
secrecy. Secret is essential for maintaining non sense investments. According
conservative estimates the Nuclear Plan 1976-1983 had a cost of 5,000 million dollars,
13% of the foreign debt at the time [Greenpeace, 2002]. During successive
governments the apple cake strategy resisted both bilateral and multilateral signed
agreements and conventions. Further political decisions could change the current
peaceful purpose of the nuclear programme of Argentina. It' depends on public
information, social control, and time.

It's important to remember a special element of the apple cake strategy: the quite
efficient Condor II missile. This project was finally dismantled after pressures received
from USA. Underground premises for the development and manufacture of missile was
located in Falda del Carmen, near Alta Gracia city (Cordoba province).

According Jones et al. [1998] during the period of military rule, the Argentine Air Force
began work on a single-stage weather rocket called the Condor I; if converted for
military use, the Condor I could have served as a short-range tactical missile. Despite
the change of government in 1983, missile development by the Air Force continued. In
 17

1984 Argentina concluded an agreement with Iraq and Egypt to develop a 600-mile,
two-stage system called the Condor II, with a potential payload of 1,100 pounds. Iraq
agreed to fund the project, Egypt would provide technical expertise, and Argentina
would construct and test the missiles. Acquisition of key components and technology
was done in secret, suggesting that the Condor II was a military system. The Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) identified the Condor II project as one of concern,
causing Egypt to withdraw from the project in September 1989; by March 1990
Argentina had frozen the Condor II project due to lack of funds and in April, President
Carlos Saul Menem decided to cancel it. The U.S. insists on the requirement for
jointing the MTCR of renouncing offensive missiles inherently capable of travelling at
least 300 km with a 500 kg payload, criteria that the Condor II project violated. Once
the Condor II was scrapped, however, the path was cleared for Argentine membership
in the MTCR, and on November 29, 1994, Argentine Foreign Ministry officials
announced that Argentina had indeed become a member [Jones et al., 1998].

In early 1994 Argentina joined both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), and on February 10, 1995, it became a party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In 1991 Argentina and Brazil allowed joint inspections of
each other's nuclear facilities (1991).

VII. THE NUCLEAR FREE ZONES STRATEGY AS MECHANISM FOR SOCIAL

PROTECTION.

The creation of legal nuclear free zones (NFZ) is one of the strategies for being
protected from current and future nuclear risks. In Argentina the first nuclear-free zone
was declared in 1984. That year was the first without dictatorship after the 1976-1983
"years of lead" (años de plomo). This bloody period came to an end on 12th December
1983 when elected governments began their mandates. The first municipality to
declare itself nuclear-free was El Bolson in the Province of Rio Negro.

The nuclear-free zones strategy was successful from its beginning in 1984. Since then,
a great number of NFZ projects have been submitted to municipal parliaments
(Concejos Deliberantes), by both NGOs and individuals, and approved. The most
recent NFZ was declared by the Municipality of Serrezuela in Cordoba province (2005).
Menaced by the entering of important volumes of DDT and other obsolete pesticides,
the Concejo Deliberante decided to forbid both the entering of stable toxic materials
and radioactive materials. Such project was developed by FUNAM [FUNAM, 2005].

One of the great waves of NFZ approvals was observed in Cordoba province after
FUNAM denounced secret research by CNEA. The National Commission for Atomic
Energy developed secret geological surveys towards the identification of uranium
mines in the Traslasierra Valley (Cordoba), and the building of low and medium
radioactive waste repositories in the provinces of Cordoba, Catamarca, La Rioja and
Santiago del Estero (see above). FUNAM produced a draft of NFZ regulation for
municipalities Montenegro, 1992, and a model of regulation for provinces
Montenegro, 1993. Twelve municipalities of the Traslasierra Valley in Cordoba used
the FUNAM draft and declared themselves nuclear-free zones (1992-1993).

The creation of nuclear free zones create a strong legal wall against nuclear projects
and operations. Apart from CNEA's menaces to bring judicial claims against all
municipal NFZ, the NFZ architecture remains intact all over Argentina, and quite
effective. Solely two provincial regulation and one municipal regulation were annulated.

VIII. NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES OF ARGENTINA.

 18

Since the municipality of El Bolson proclaimed its nuclear-free status in 1984, many
other territorial entities have taken similar decisions. Besides national (federal) level
there are two categories of involved jurisdictions: provincial and municipal. NFZ at the
provincial level could be declared by law, by Constitution, or by both instruments. NFZ
at municipal level includes municipalities and neighbours' commissions (Comisiones
Vecinales). Such NFZ could be declared through municipal regulations ("ordenanzas"),
by Organic Charter ("Carta organica") or by both instruments. When a province has
been declared NFZ, their municipalities are also NFZ. Nevertheless some provinces
had municipal NFZ prior to their provincial declarations. In these cases both NFZ
coexist, and reinforce the NFZ strategy. Buenos Aires has a particular status. It's an
autonomous city that produce local laws. Located in the province of Buenos Aires, the
capital city is independent of the province of Buenos Aires. There is also a secondary
level of regulations that could be used for declaring NFZ: decrees and resolutions.
Such regulations are less stable than municipal Organic Charter and ordinances, or
provincial Constitutions and laws. Hierarchy of main regulations' types in Argentina are
as follows: Constitution, Conventions and other international agreements, national
laws, national decrees and resolutions, provincial laws, provincial decrees and
resolutions, municipal ordinances, municipal decrees and resolutions.

The 1994 Constitution of Argentina approved an unprecedented nuclear-free position.

Article 41st prohibit the entering of foreign radioactive waste. Both INVAP's contract
with ANSTO of Australia and the Nuclear Agreement between Argentina and Australia
challenged such article. They considered exhausted nuclear fuel as non radioactive
waste. Recent verdict of the Federal Court of Bahia Blanca ratified the prohibition
contained in Article 41st, and considered illegal its entering (see above).

NFZ declaration are not homogeneous. Both at Provincial and Municipal level there are
regulations that forbid e.g. the building of nuclear power plants, repositories, transport
and deposit of radioactive waste and nuclear assays, and that specify each of their
interdictions. Other regulations, like Law n° 3902 of Chaco province prohibit: "All
premises dedicated to research, development and use of nuclear energy, except uses
in nuclear medicine and monitoring in the area" (Article 6, Law n° 3902). The province
of Corrientes, for instance, forbid "the installation of nuclear plants and their
accessories all over the territory of Corrientes" (Article 1, Law n° 4207/1998). Besides
such diversity of scopes, most of these regulations reflects the decision of both citizens
and local and provincial parliaments to control nuclear activities. The traditional secrecy
of CNEA and NASA and the doubtful impartiality of the National Regulatory Authority
are now questioned. Worries of the nuclear sector vis-à-vis NFZ are reflected in the
paper published by N.R. Ciallela and N. Grancelli Cha in the Nuclear Argentina
Magazine: "Non nuclear legislation and the commons" [Ciallela and Grancelli Cha,
1996]. Both authors fights NFZ strategy arguing extreme and non sense situations.
They said NFZ regulations have mandatory effects that could avoid "food ingestion
because all them contains natural radioactive materials which exist in Earth's cortex
(…)" or consumption of drinking water due to "naturally contained radioactive elements"
(sic). Ciallela and Grancelli Cha conclude that NFZ regulations "could discourage
projects and programmes towards the building of nuclear power plants and other
relevant nuclear facilities, that could be more or less affected by those regulations".
Besides legitimacy of opinions that favours or discourage nuclear development the
nuclear sector in Argentina need self-criticism, transparency and consultation. Lack of
them favoured the successful NFZ strategy in Argentina. Regulations are not solely
technical instruments for prohibiting or permitting things. They also reflect social
attitudes, scientifically based fears, and the precautionary principle. It's important to
mention that: a) National Law n° 25675/2002 establish the precautionary principle in
Argentina (Article 4th); b) Radioactivity has no safe doses (see BEIR VII Phase 2); c)
People is exposed to cocktails of stable and unstable pollutants which simultaneously
 19

act, and d) Several man made radioisotopes have long half-lives like caesium 137,
strontium 90, iodine 131 and tritium 3 whose deleterious effects could affect both
current and future generations [see Montenegro, 1999; 2005].

In Argentina most of nuclear accidents with fatalities (like the RA-2 accident) and
serious leaks of radioactive heavy water by Embalse nuclear power plant were noticed
to the public by NGOs and media. Also by CNEA's employees that anonymously
provide secret information. Thus NFZ could be considered a legitimate legal
mechanism for social protection vis-à-vis nuclear projects decided and managed
without social controls (see this paper).

1. Provinces. Over a total of 23 provinces in Argentina, 14 provinces and the

Autonomous City of Buenos Aires were declared nuclear-free zones (zona no nuclear)
with different combinations of forbidden issues (total: 15 NFZs). Five of them and the
Autonomous city of Buenos Aires were declared by Constitution, or by Constitution and
law, and nine by provincial law [Ciallela and Grancelli Cha, 1996; Zeballos de Sisto,
1994; Montenegro, 2005). They represent >62 % of all provinces (including the
Autonomous city of Buenos Aires).

This is the coverage of such regulations: a) Forbid the building of nuclear power plants:
Santa Fe, Entre Rios, Tucuman, Santa Cruz (annulated), Tierra del Fuego and Chaco;
b) Forbid the building of repositories for nuclear waste: Santa Fe, Rio Negro, Entre
Rios, San Luis, Formosa, Tucuman and Santa Cruz (annulated); c) Forbid the transport
of radioactive waste: Santa Fe, Rio Negro, San Luis , Chubut, Chaco, Autonomous city
of Buenos and Cordoba (annulated); d) Forbid the deposit of radioactive waste: Santa
Fe, Rio Negro, Entre Rios, San Luis, Formosa, Tucuman, Tierra del Fuego, Chubut,
Chaco, Cordoba (annulated) and Catamarca; e) General declaration on NFZ: San Luis,
Chaco, La Pampa and Autonomous city of Buenos Aires; f) Provisions for acting if
neighbourhood provinces decide to build repositories of nuclear waste: Rio Negro; g)
Forbid the entering of radioactive waste into the territory: Rio Negro, Tucuman, Santa
Cruz, Tierra del Fuego, Chubut, Buenos Aires, Autonomous city of Buenos Aires,
Cordoba (annulated) and Catamarca; h) Forbid assays of nuclear weapons: Formosa,
Tucuman and Tierra del Fuego; I) Forbid premises devoted to nuclear research and
development (see Table 1).

Table 1.
NUCLEAR FREE ZONES DECLARED BY
PROVINCES OF ARGENTINA AND BUENOS AIRES CITY (1).

PROVINCE TYPE OF REGULATION

Buenos Aires Constitution 1994, Art. 26 & 28
Catamarca Law (3)
Cordoba Law 8509/1995 (2)
Corrientes Law 4207/1988
Chaco Law 3902/1993
Chubut Constitution 1994, Art. 110
Entre Rios Law 8785/1994
Formosa Constitution 1991, Art. 38
Law 1060/1993
La Pampa Constitution 1994, Art. 18
Rio Negro Law 2472/1992
San Luis Law 4958/1992
Santa Cruz Constitution 1994, Art. 73
 20

Law 2155 (2)

Santa Fe Law 10753/1992
Tierra del Fuego Constitution 1991, Art. 91
Law 105/1993
Tucuman Law 6253/1991

Notes:
(1) Type of regulations: Constitution of the province [Constitucion] and
provincial laws [Leyes provinciales].
(2) Annulled regulation.
(3) Number of regulation not available at the moment of the study.

Sources:
Ciallela and Grancelli Cha(1996), Zeballos de Sisto (1994) and
Montenegro (2005).

2. Municipalities and Neighbours’ Commissions. There are 90 Municipalities and

Neighbour Commissions that were declared nuclear-free zones (zona no nuclear) with
different combinations of forbidden issues (total: 90 local NFZs). These are the
numbers of local NFZs per province: a) Province of Buenos Aires 12 local NFZs; b)
Province of Chaco 1 local NFZ; c) Province of Chubut 11 local NFZs; d) Province of
Cordoba 37 local NFZs; d) Entre Rios province 1 local NFZ; e) La Pampa province 2
local NFZs; e) Misiones province 1 local NFZ; f) Neuquen province 5 local NFZs; g) Rio
Negro province 14 local NFZs; h) Santa Cruz province 1 NFZ; I) Santa Fe province 3
local NFZs; j) Santiago del Estero 1 local NFZ, and Tucuman 1 local NFZ (annulated)
(see Table 2).

Table 2.
NUCLEAR FREE ZONES DECLARED BY MUNICIPALITIES AND
NEIGHBOURHOODS COMMISSIONS IN ARGENTINA.

MUNICIPALITIES AND REGULATION TYPE

PROVINCE NEIGHBOURHOOD AND
COMMISSIONS NUMBER (1)
Buenos Aires Almirante Brown Ordenanza 5361/1988 (bis)
Bahia Blanca (3)
Balcarce Ordenanza 183/1990
Berazategui Ordenanza 1832/1989
Carmen de Patagones Ordenanza 624/1991
Florencio Varela Ordenanza 3372/1994
General Alvarado Ordenanza 208/1993
Partido de Miramar
Ituzaingo (3)
La Plata Ordenanza 7966/1992
Moron Ordenanza 13992/1994
Decreto 93/1995
Partido de General Paz Ordenanza 27/1992
Pilar Ordenanza 94/1992
Chaco La Clotilde Resolución 024/1995
Chubut Cholila Ordenanza 9/1990
Corcovado Ordenanza 19/1995
El Hoyo Ordenanza 27/1984
 21

El Maiten Ordenanza 69/1984 7/1985

Epuyen Ordenanza 2/1988
Esquel Ordenanza 175/1990
Gaiman Ordenanza 319/1992
Gan-Gan (3)
Puerto Madryn Ordenanza 1223/1991
Trelew Ordenanza 3731/1991
Trevelin Ordenanza 25/1990
Cordoba Cordoba city Ordenanza 9652/1997
Agua de Oro Ordenanza 462/1994
Alta Gracia Ordenanza 2665/1993
Capilla del Monte Ordenanza 626/1987
Colonia Caroya Ordenanza 714/1993
Cura Brochero Ordenanza (4)
Falda del Carmen (3)
Hernando Ordenanza 253/1994
Jesus María Ordenanza 1557/1994
La Calera Ordenanza 065/1994
La Cumbre Ordenanza 19/1993
La Falda Ordenanza 850/1993
La Granja Ordenanza 181/1993
La Paz Ordenanza 27/1992
Los Cocos Ordenanza 357/1992
Los Hornillos Resolución 1895/95
Mina Clavero Ordenanza 429/1992
Nono Ordenanza 025/1992
Río Ceballos Ordenanza 743/1993
Río Cuarto Ordenanza 497/1993
Río Segundo Ordenanza 377/1991
Salsipuedes Ordenanza (4)
San Javier y Yacanto Ordenanza 36/1992
San Jose Ordenanza 159/1992
San Marcos Sierras Ordenanza 186/1988
San Pedro (3)
Serrezuela Ordenanza 103/2005
Decreto 70/2005
Sinsacate Ordenanza 151/1994
Tanti Ordenanza (4)
Unquillo Ordenanza (4)
Villa Cura Brochero Ordenanza 83-12/1992
Villa de las Rosas Ordenanza 316/1992
Villa Dolores Ordenanza 797/1992
Villa Giardino Ordenanza 80/1989
Villa Maria Ordenanza 3118/1992
Villa Nueva Ordenanza 65/1992
Villa Sarmiento Ordenanza 312/1992
Entre Rios Parana Ordenanza 7705/1995
La Pampa General Pico (3)
Santa Rosa Ordenanza 1333/1993
Misiones El Dorado Ordenanza 81/1994
Neuquen Neuquen City Carta Organica
Centenario Ordenanza 670/1991
Plottier Ordenanza 769/1991
 22

San Martín de los Andes Ordenanza 512/1990

Villa La Angostura Ordenanza 670/1991
Rio Negro Choele-Choel Ordenanza 64/1991
Contralmirante Cordero Ordenanza 38/1991
Coronel Belisle (3)
Cinco Saltos (3)
El Bolson Ordenanza 69/1984
General Conesa Ordenanza 1084/1991
General Roca Ordenanza 1330/1991
Ing.Jacobaci Declaración 18/1993
Ñorquinco Ordenanza 09/1988
San Antonio Oeste Ordenanza 189/1991
Sierra Grande Ordenanza 093/1991
Valcheta Carta Organica 1991
Viedma Ordenanza 2702/1991
Villa Regina Ordenanza 64/1984
Santa Cruz Los Antiguos Ordenanza 395/1992
Santa Fe Esperanza (3)
Rosario Ordenanza 5039/1990
Santa Fe (Capital) Ordenanza 9047/1988
Santiago del Santiago del Estero City Ordenanza (4)
Estero
Tucuman San Miguel de Tucuman Ordenanza (2)

Notes:
(1) Type of regulations: a) Carta Organica [Organic Charter, Constitution of the city]; b)
Ordenanza [Ordinance] and c) Resolucion [Resolution].
(2) Annulled regulation.
(3) Media information. Requested confirmation was not answered (see Ciallela and
Grancelli Cha, 1996).
(4) Number of regulation not available at the moment of the study.

Sources:
Ciallela and Grancelli Cha (1996), Zeballos de Sisto (1994) and Montenegro (2005).

XI. SELECTED ACTIVITIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS WITH LEGAL OR

REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS.

1. Lack of Citizen's Emergency Plans for facing nuclear accidents.

Responsible of CNEA and NASA facilities permanently minimize risks from routine
activities and accidents. Their emergency plans are unreal and don't prepare citizens
for the worst nuclear accident (degree 7 at INES scale). Simulacrum in Embalse
nuclear power plant is restricted to a radium of 10 km. Terrorist attack and serious
internal event are not considered. Outside this circle citizens, institutions and local
governments are not prepared.

In 2003 Rosana Guerra finished a study on emergency plans for chemical and nuclear
accidents [Guerra, 2003]. This Thesis directed by R. Montenegro was the first research
on the issue developed in Argentina. This research identified lack of plans, lack of
coordination among governmental bodies, and lack of preparation of hospitals in the
case of major nuclear accident vis-à-vis two main nuclear facilities: Embalse nuclear
power plant, and the experimental nuclear reactor at the National University of Cordoba
 23

(RA-0). The research included statistically valid consultation of citizens. Most of them
revealed a lack of preparation for facing severe nuclear accidents.

FUNAM linked two critic situations: citizens under nuclear threat, and lack of citizens'
emergency plans for facing accidents. In 2003 FUNAM printed the "Citizen's
emergency plan for facing nuclear accidents” (Plan ciudadano de emergencia para
enfrentar accidentes nucleares). This plan includes both citizen and governmental
chapters Montenegro and Guerra, 2003; Guerra 2003. When distributed in critic
areas, citizens could learn about radioactive risks and get advice for facing nuclear
accidents in zones of risk (e.g. around the power plant at Embalse; around the closed
Los Gigantes uranium mine; around the dioxide uranium plant Dioxitek S.A. in
Cordoba, etc). Most recently FUNAM has planned the distribution of similar documents
among neighbours of nuclear facilities in Buenos Aires Province, e.g. Ezeiza's Atomic
Center (EAC), and Mendoza province (2006).

2. Lack of knowledge about health and environmental effects of low level

radioactivity.

According BEIR VII Phase 2 there are not safe level of radioactivity. Any dose could
produce deleterious effects over and within living organisms [WISE-NIRS, 2005]. Such
finding was demonstrated in the past by independent researchers (among them J.W.
Gofman, Rosalie Bertell, A.R. Tamplin, K.Z. Morgan, A. Petkau, E.J. Sternglass, A.M.
Stewart, G.W. Kneale, E.P. Radford, Jay M. Gould). Nevertheless deleterious effects of
low level doses of ionising radiation continue to be unconsidered or minimized by
CNEA, NASA and ARN in Argentina. FUNAM is transmitting to citizens, media and
institutions deleterious effects of radiation (Alpha and Beta particles, Gamma radiation,
electron bullets, “exotic” radiation like Mg24, etc.).

Currently most of national governments and international organizations establish

maximum reference doses for individual pollutants, not for mixes. When several
pollutants act simultaneously (e.g. ionising radiation, nitrogen oxides, ultraviolet
radiation, some pesticides) for producing coincidental deleterious effect (e.g. immune
system depletion), any exposed person could be affected by their mixes (cocktails)
[Montenegro, 2004a, 2004b]. CNEA and ARN never evaluated this cocktail
phenomenon around uranium mines and other nuclear facilities. FUNAM and the Chair
of Evolutionary Biology at the National University of Cordoba are publicly underlying
the risk of cocktails of pollutants: cocktail of natural and man-made radioisotopes;
cocktail of ionising and non ionising radiation; cocktail of radioisotopes, ionising and
non ionising radiation and toxic stable materials, etc.

3. Public campaigns chaired by FUNAM.

Since its foundation in 1982 FUNAM leaded campaigns and moves for improving a
better environment, and for promoting responsible controls by governments, NGOs and
citizens. Campaigns linked with nuclear issues are included in the following list.

1988. Campaign against the building of a cobalt-60 cartridge facility designed by

CNEA. The plant was planned to be built near Embalse nuclear power complex.
FUNAM argued lack of accomplishment of Regulation 7343/85 on Environmental
Impact Assessment, ant the cobalt-60 cartridge facility was never built.

1988-2004. Campaign against CNEA’s uranium dioxide plant, currently Dioxitek S.A.
This plant is located in Barrio La Fraternidad (Cordoba), a densely populated area.
After the claims of FUNAM the municipality of Cordoba established a term for the
removal of the plant (2001). Public hearings and diverse information activities
 24

enhanced the process. Transfer attempts failed (see above) and Dioxitek S.A.
remained in Cordoba city.

1992-1993. Campaign against the building of a radioactive waste dump site in Salinas
Grandes. FUNAM discovered top-secret missions for identifying sites for a low-level
radioactive waste deposit. After disclosure to the press and the claim FUNAM made at
the Court of Justice, the project was cancelled.

1992. Elaboration of a regulation draft for prohibiting the construction of repositories

and the dumping of radioactive waste. More than twelve municipalities adopted the
project (1992-1993), and they still continue as nuclear-free zones (see above).

1996. FUNAM denounced the transfer of more than 3,000 barrels containing low level
radioactive waste from Cordoba to Mendoza. The disclosure of this transfer got media
coverage all over Argentina. FUNAM’s representative presented a claim to the Federal
Court of Justice.

1996. An internal leak of uranium within CNEA’s uranium dioxide plant in barrio La
Fraternidad (Cordoba) was notified to the public and had wide media coverage in
Argentina and abroad. This large leak polluted both workers and machinery. CNEA
publicly recognized the accident after days of silence. FUNAM presented relevant
documents to the Federal Court of Justice.

1997-2002. Campaign against largest urban deposit of uranium waste in Argentina.

FUNAM discovered an illegal dumpsite containing tailings from uranium mining and
toxic waste. This dumpsite is located within CNEA’s uranium dioxide plant in barrio La
Fraternidad (see above). After FUNAM public revelations media throughout Argentina
qualified the dump as an “environmental scandal”. FUNAM’s representative presented
a claim to the Federal Court of Justice.

1997-1999. Move to stop the transportation of 36,000 cubic meters of uranium low level
radioactive waste from the city of Cordoba to the former uranium mining of Los
Gigantes. FUNAM supported the opposition of the citizens of Tanti. Such tourist village
is located near the closed uranium mining site. Their inhabitants stopped the passage
of trucks. FUNAM accompanied their struggle, produced a technical report on the issue
and participated in several public hearings. Neighbor’s actions were successful. The
transportation was delayed for the time being (1999).

1997. Various moves and campaigns to stop the shipment of exhausted nuclear fuel,
plutonium-239 and radioactive waste containing plutonium-239, from Japan to France
and back. In 1997 a claim was brought before the Federal Court of Justice against the
Argentine government for not having banned the passage of the ship "Pacific
Sandpiper" through Argentine waters. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Di Tella
and others officials were denounced. This claim improved Argentina’s position vis-à-vis
plutonium shipments. An indirect product was the reinforcement of Argentina’s position
at the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Conference in New York.

1997. Together with Instituto de Ecologia Politica FUNAM produced a project of

regulation for prohibiting the transport of radioactive materials and waste within the 200
miles zone both in Argentine and Chilean seas.

1997. Campaign to denounce the illegal testing of the CAREM nuclear reactor, which
was developed in Argentina. FUNAM brought a suit against the president of the Atomic
Energy Agency of Argentina (CNEA), Gustavo Santos, and the chairman of INVAP,
Hector Otheguy, before the Federal Court of Justice on 22 December 1997. Both were
 25

accused for having illegally tested elements of the CAREM, a nuclear power plant of
275 MW(e) at Pilcaniyeu near Bariloche City, Rio Negro Province in July 1997. A
Federal Judge in Bariloche dismissed the case, but prior to the suit top governmental
officials confirmed the illegality of the test (see above).

1998. National campaign against a federal project declaring “for sale” three nuclear
power facilities (two built, one under construction). The proposed regulation promoted
an unacceptable limit for private responsibility in case of an accident (no more than 80
million dollars), and the construction of a high level waste (HLW) repository. The
privatization process was suspended.

1998. Action to stop the transport of 120 tons of uranium from the port of Buenos Aires
to the city of Cordoba. Cooperating with Greenpeace Argentina, FUNAM obliged the
company Dioxitek S.A. and CNEA to produce an environmental impact assessment
(EIA). FUNAM brought charges against the provincial minister of Health and Social
Safety (25th September 1998) before the provincial Court of Justice. In the meantime
another Court ordered the release of the shipment, and permitted his transport from the
city of Buenos Aires to Cordoba (1999).

1999. Action against CNEA for having infringed national regulation on hazardous waste
in Los Gigantes uranium mine (activities prior to its closure in 1989). FUNAM lodged a
claim with attorney-general Graciela de Filoñuk, who prosecuted several CNEA
officials. This mine still remains without remediation.

2000. Campaign to protect an existing regulation in the municipality of Tanti, Cordoba

Province, that forbid the entering of radioactive waste into the community. Four local
councillors (concejales) intended to delete this regulation. The strong opposition led by
local citizens and FUNAM stopped their attempt.

2000. Action to stop the illegal dismantling of furnaces containing uranium located at
the Dioxitek uranium dioxide plant in Cordoba. FUNAM presented a claim to the
Federal Court of Justice, asking the attorney general to stop the dismantling. The Court
don't produced the requested order.

2000-2004. Campaign to prevent the signature of the Nuclear Agreement between the
governments of Australia and Argentina (see above). This agreement establishes the
transfer of radioactive waste from Australia to Argentina for processing or reprocessing.
FUNAM discovered the import provision in the secret contract signed by the Australian
Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) and by INVAP for the building
of a nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights, Sydney, and divulged this provision to the public.
The waste import infringes article 41 of Argentina’s constitution. FUNAM’s campaign
was widely covered by media in Australia and South America. FUNAM was invited to
explain its technical position through a document, and to take part in a hearing with
Australian senators (teleconference). Its inputs were published in May 2001 by the
Australian Senate [Australian Senate, 2001]. This campaign involved NGOs from
Australia and Argentina. Such coalition blocked during 5 years the approval of the
Agreement by Deputies at the National Parliament, but was finally approved. More
recently (October 2006) a verdict of the Federal Court of Justice stated that import of
exhausted nuclear fuel from Australia violate Article 41 of the National Constitution, and
cannot enter into the country. This judicial claim was leaded by Juan Schroeder, a
recognized environmentalist of Argentina.

2000-2001. Campaign to stop the passage of the Pacific Swan around Cape Horn in
Argentina. This vessel contained high level radioactive waste. FUNAM presented two
claims to the Court of Justice against the former Chancellor Rodriguez Giavarini, the
 26

former Minister Graciela Fernandez Meijide and the former president of the Atomic
Energy Agency of Argentina, Aldo Ferrer, “for not having complied with the law”, as
such a passage through Argentina’s Exclusive Economic Zone is prohibited by Article
41 of the constitution.

2004. FUNAM produced a 110-page technical report that analyzes health and
environmental risks produced by uranium mining at Sierra Pintada and by Dioxitek’s
uranium dioxide plant. This document is used by neighbors of San Rafael in their
public, administrative and legal fights against the Atomic Energy Agency, and the
government of Mendoza Province. CNEA is attempting to reinitiate uranium mining
activities. In 2005 the Multisectorial del Sur, an NGO of San Rafael which works with
FUNAM presented a claim at the Court of Justice for stopping such attempt. The case
still continue in the Court (2005-2006). CNEA presented an Environmental Impact
Assessment for the remediation of Sierra Pintada (February 2006). Raul Montenegro
analyzed such document with a team of independent professionals. The document they
produced considered "inadequate" and "full of technical errors" the Environmental
Impact Assessment presented by CNEA (2006). Both positions will be analyzed in a
public hearing to be held in Sierra Pintada, Mendoza province (2006).

2005. Public moves by FUNAM and the Asociacion Contra la Contaminacion Ambiental
de Esteban Echeverria against uranium pollution of underground waters in Ezeiza, La
Matanza and other neighborhoods of Buenos Aires. There is a judicial process that still
continue (November 2006). Several technical studies have been commissioned by the
Court. All them confirmed uranium pollution and great Alpha and Beta activity in
groundwater. A public hearing was held in front of the municipality of Esteban
Echeverria. More than 3,000 people attended the hearing. Three new studies were
conducted by Greenpeace, EPA (requested by the government of the province of
Buenos Aires), and IAEA (requested by CNEA). FUNAM continue to work in the issue,
and consider as one of the problems the inadequacy of uranium standards adopted by
CNEA (100 µg/L).

2005. Regulation that declare Serrezuela in Cordoba Province as a nuclear-free zone

(Ordenanza 103/2005 and Decreto 70/2005, 3 August 2005). Article 4 establishes:
"The Municipality [of Serrezuela] is declared a nuclear-free zone. [It] forbids the entry of
radioactive waste of any level of activity, and/or its temporary or permanent storage
within the municipal boundary, independently of its conditioning and transport".

XII. MAIN TACTIC AND STRATEGIC PROPOSALS.

1. To spread the nuclear-free zone strategy using standard projects of regulation, and
to strengthen linkages and joint work among NFZ.

2. To elaborate and distribute "Citizen's emergency plans for facing nuclear accidents”
(Planes ciudadanos de emergencia para enfrentar accidentes nucleares). To organize
parallel and non-governmental simulations in real territories and among populations
potentially affected. Among news areas of risks are deposits of high level radioactive
waste near nuclear power plants, and reprocessing facilities. Both kind of premises,
less protected than nuclear reactors, could be the target of terrorist attack with
commercial planes.

3. To publicise any accident or event with or without radioactive leaks using a media
strategy, and to explain both health and environmental risks using popular terms in
comics, leaflets, videos, TV programs, radio programs, Web pages, etc. Each accident
may be seen as an occasion to educate the public on important technical facts of the
facilities involved, on the half-life of radioisotopes, on ionising radiation, low doses, on
 27

the concept of cocktail of pollutants, and on transgenerational risks linked to many of

these.

4. To establish or to promote independent monitoring of radioactive releases and

pollution, and to publicise the results among citizens, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and toward the media. Successful experiences like those addressed by CRII-
RAD in France could be repeated.

5. To develop precautionary standards for single natural and man-made radioactive

materials (radioisotopes), for radioactivity, for cocktails of natural radioisotopes, for
cocktails of natural and man-made radioisotopes, for cocktails of ionising and non
ionising radiation, for cocktails of radioisotopes and stable toxic materials, for cocktails
of radioisotopes, ionising and non ionising radiation and stable toxic materials, and
other combinations. To establish the "legal minimum level dose" for uranium and other
radioactive materials considering the more strict legal governmental standard.

6. To create independent technical bodies for the revisiting of ICRP, BEIR and
USCEAR methodologies and standards.

7. To consider new areas of biological and ecological risks, like the potential
mutagenicity of virus and bacteria involved in processes like food irradiation, slug
irradiation, insect sterilization, medical use of internal radioisotopes, routine discharges
of radioactive materials to the environment, gammagraphy, etc. This risk could be
evaluated vis-à-vis the reduced capability of disturbed ecosystems for facing new
genetical hazards.

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 28

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 30

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 31

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 32

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 33

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 34

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A-Z Ed., Buenos Aires, 656 p.

APPENDIX.

PROJECT OF NUCLEAR-FREE REGULATION FOR MUNICIPALITIES.

This is a copy of the project of regulation presented by FUNAM to the Municipality of

Despeñaderos (2005). His structure and content could help in the writing of projects for
declaring a nuclear-free Municipality (NFZ).

VISTO:

Los peligros que entraña la utilización de la energía nuclear y sus actividades

complementarias; la extracción, concentración artificial, purificación, almacenamiento y
transporte de materiales radiactivos naturales; la generación, almacenamiento y
transporte de materiales radiactivos de alta, media y alta actividad producidos en las
centrales nucleares de potencia y los reactores experimentales; y el almacenamiento,
tratamiento y transporte de residuos radiactivos, cualquiera sea su actividad y origen, y

CONSIDERANDO:

Que es deber del gobierno municipal la protección de la salud pública de la población

ante la posible contaminación con materiales radiactivos naturales y artificiales, y sus
emisiones de radiación ionizante, habida cuenta que las partículas Alfa y Beta, la
radiación Gamma y la radiación exótica que tales sustancias producen pueden alterar
el código genético de las células vivas, el funcionamiento de las células y el organismo
de las personas expuestas, generando enfermedades de toda índole;

Que la concentración y purificación de uranio y la posible localización de plantas

dedicadas a estas tareas contaminan el suelo, el aire y las aguas con residuos
radiactivos, entre ellos el propio uranio; el radio 226 (un contaminante sólido del suelo
y del agua), que es radiactivo por más de 1600 años, y el radón 222 (un contaminante
gaseoso del suelo, el aire y el agua), que junto a sus derivados radiactivos, como el
plomo 210, puede provocar cáncer de pulmón.

Que estas plantas dedicadas a la concentración y purificación de uranio también

provocan contaminación química, no radiactiva, del aire, el suelo y el agua, por
ejemplo con sustancias ácidas y alcalinas (la plantas mineras de concentración), y
amoníaco y otras sustancias (las plantas purificadoras de dióxido de uranio), y que sus
 35

materias primas son susceptibles de sufrir accidentes químicos de envergadura, por

ejemplo fallas, explosión e incendio, lo cual provocaría no solo la descarga de
sustancias de alto riesgo, como el amoníaco, sino también la descarga de materiales
radiactivos de baja actividad;

Que la amenaza nuclear no se limita a las minas de uranio y plantas de purificación

sino también a otras actividades hoy consideradas de alto riesgo, como las centrales
nucleares de potencia, los reactores experimentales, los depósitos de materiales
radiactivos de media y alta actividad de las centrales, y los depósitos de residuos
radiactivos de cualquier nivel, pues todas estas instalaciones pueden sufrir accidentes,
explosión e incendios, y son además blanco reconocido de eventuales ataques
terroristas;

Que la mayor parte de las comunidades hoy expuestas a los riesgos de las actividades
nucleares no han sido capacitadas con planes de emergencia para enfrentar, por
ejemplo, el máximo accidente posible de una central nuclear, numerado como 7 en la
escala del INES, dado que los simulacros encarados en Argentina se limitan a las
poblaciones situadas dentro de un radio de 10 kilómetros, lo que no cubre por cierto
los efectos de un accidente grado 7, como el que ocurrió en Chernobyl (ex Unión
Soviética).

Que las investigaciones recientes muestran que aún las mas bajas dosis de
radioactividad emitidas por materiales radiactivos procedentes de reactores nucleares
y otras instalaciones son riesgosas para la población, lo que fue demostrado por el
investigador canadiense Abraham Petkau. El proceso, actualmente conocido como
"efecto Petkau", implica que los oxidantes producidos por las bajas dosis de
radiactividad producen daños en las membranas celulares. También debe tenerse en
cuenta que los electrones disparados desde los átomos afectados por radiación
ionizante también producen daños muchas veces irreparables en las células y tejidos
expuestos.

Que la zona de Despeñaderos ha alcanzado un desarrollo agropecuario con

reconocimiento nacional;

Que nuestros productos son comercializados no solo en el país, sino que también
poseen el nivel de calidad necesario para su exportación, todo lo cual peligraría con la
radicación de instalaciones nucleares. Que es notable y creciente el rechazo público a
las instalaciones de este tipo, como ocurre actualmente en la ciudad de San Rafael
(Mendoza), donde la justicia, ante la presentación de organizaciones civiles, y en
primera instancia, rechazó la intención de CNEA de reabrir la mina de uranio de Sierra
Pintada. En San Rafael el principal argumento contra la mina de uranio y las
instalaciones nucleares es su impacto negativo sobre la calidad y la imagen
internacional de sus productos agropecuarios, en particular vinos, uvas, frutas y
legumbres.

Que es constante la preocupación de promover el turismo sobre la cuenca del río

Xanaes, preservando su entorno natural;

Que la instalación de plantas de concentración y purificación de uranio, y de cualquier

otra instalación nuclear que impliquen además el almacenamiento y traslado de
materiales radiactivos a través del Ejido Municipal deben ser absolutamente prohibidas
en nuestra zona para proteger la salud de sus habitantes y la economía local.

Que este mismo razonamiento ha sido hecho en muchas provincias, entre ellas
Corrientes, Santa Cruz, Santa Fe, Tierra del Fuego, Tucumán, Formosa y Chaco, que
 36

se declararon no nucleares, y en numerosos municipios y comunas que a través de

normas especialmente dictadas también se declararon no nucleares, entre ellos,
dentro de la provincia de Córdoba, Villa Maria, Jesus María, Alta Gracia, Tanti, Villa
Giardino, La Falda, La Cumbre, Los Cocos, Salsipuedes, Agua de Oro, Río Ceballos,
Unquillo, San Marcos Sierra, Villa de las Rosas, Villanueva, Capilla del Monte, Río
Segundo, Los Hornillos, Nono, Villa Dolores, Mina Clavero, Cura Brochero, San Javier,
Yacanto, La Paz, San Jose, Villa Sarmiento y más recientemente, Serrezuela.

Que cada declaración municipal de “zona no nuclear” contribuye a alejar

definitivamente esta amenaza, generada por actividades que en nada contribuyen a la
economía regional, y que por el contrario la perjudican; por todo ello

EL HONORABLE CONCEJO DELIBERANTE DE LA LOCALIDAD DE

DESPEÑADEROS SANCIONA CON FUERZA DE

ORDENANZA

Artículo 1. Declárase "Zona No Nuclear” a la totalidad de la localidad de Despeñaderos

y su Ejido Municipal..

Artículo 2. Como consecuencia directa de esta declaración , quedan prohibidos dentro

del Ejido Municipal las siguientes actividades, obras, instalaciones, transportes y
operaciones que involucren material radiactivo: a) Las centrales nucleares
experimentales y de potencia en todos sus tipos y cualquiera sea su finalidad; b) Las
minas de uranio y la explotación superficial o subterránea de los yacimientos de uranio
y de otros materiales radiactivos; c) Las plantas dedicadas a la concentración y
purificación del uranio y de otros materiales radiactivos naturales, incluida en dicha
prohibición la producción de diuranato de amonio y de dióxido de uranio; d) Las
plantas de irradiación de alimentos y de líquidos cloacales a base de Cobalto 60,
Cesio 137 y de otros radioisótopos de riesgo; e) El tránsito por vías públicas de
sustancias radiactivas; f) Repositorios y cualquier otro depósito de residuos
radiactivos, cualquiera sea su actividad; g) Las cápsulas conteniendo materiales
radiactivos para uso agropecuario, y h) Toda otra instalación nuclear.

Artículo 3. Sólo quedan exceptuadas de la prohibición contenida en el artículo 2º el

tráfico y tenencia de radioisótopos de uso médico y médico-hospitalario, cuya
existencia y movimiento deberá ser comunicada fehacientemente a la Municipalidad
para que ésta adopte todas las medidas precautorias del caso, ello en un total acuerdo
con el artículo 4 de esta Ordenanza.-

Artículo 4. Todas las instalaciones hospitalarias públicas y privadas u otras que

gestionen, manejen y/u operen cápsulas conteniendo materiales radiactivos, o
radioisótopos en general, cualquiera sea su tipo y actividad, deberán: inscribirse ante
la Municipalidad acompañando dicha inscripción con un informe con carácter de
declaración jurada donde conste como mínimo: a) Localización; b) Naturaleza del
material radiactivo, indicando cantidad y actividad por radioisótopo; c) Sistemas y
tecnologías involucradas en ese uso; d) Sistema de seguridad; e) Programa de acción
en caso de accidente, por ejemplo ruptura de una cápsula conteniendo Cobalto 60,
Cesio 137 o cualquier otro radioisótopo, y/o cualquier otro tipo de contingencia que
libere material radiactivo al ambiente; f) Programa de control y disposición final de los
residuos cuando se trate de isótopos radiactivos de trazado intraorgánico como Iodo
131 y/u otros materiales radiactivos, y g) Autorización vigente emanada de la Comisión
Nacional de Energía Atómica (CNEA) y de la Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear (ARN).
Todos los responsables de las instalaciones a que hace referencia este artículo
deberán comunicar al Municipio de Despeñaderos, independientemente de cualquier
 37

otra exigencia a nivel Provincial y Nacional, el cambio de localización, de operaciones

y de materiales radiactivos utilizados, y notificar con antelación cualquier operación de
traslado de material radiactivo. El informe requerido ut supra deberá ser actualizado y
presentado ante la Municipalidad, para todos los items señalado, como mínimo cada
seis (6) meses.

Artículo 5. Queda exceptuada de esta ordenanza y su alcance los sistemas de Rayos

X, cuya gestión y control se efectuará a través de las disposiciones legales de fondo
que regulan su uso.

Artículo 6. .Queda estrictamente prohibido en todo el municipio el pasaje de vehículos

que transporten materiales radioactivos y residuos radioactivos, cualquiera sea su
cantidad, su composición y su nivel de radioactividad. Quedan exceptuados
únicamente los materiales para uso médico y médico-hospitalario a que hace
referencia el artículo 3º.

Artículo 7. La Municipalidad de Despeñaderos hará los contactos necesarios con otras

Provincias y Municipalidades No Nucleares de la Argentina, y con zonas no
nucleares de otros países, para intercambiar información y experiencia en la
protección de la salud y de las economías regionales. Asimismo contactará a los
Municipios vecinos para alentarlos a generar normativas equivalentes que impidan los
riesgos de posibles instalaciones nucleares en sus respectivas jurisdicciones.

Artículo 8. Es autoridad de aplicación de la presente Ordenanza y de su decreto

Reglamentario del Departamento Ejecutivo Municipal, o el organismo que lo
reemplazare en sus funciones, cualquiera sea su denominación.

Artículo 9. Las infracciones a la presente Ordenanza serán castigadas con: a)

Clausura temporaria; b) Clausura total; c) Comiso; d) Multas; ello conforme al
Código Municipal de Faltas y a la Ordenanza tarifaria respectiva. En los casos que
debiera realizarse comiso de materiales radiactivos o tecnologías y de dispositivos
conteniendo tales materiales, se requerirá el auxilio de los organismos ad hoc de la
Provincia, de la Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica (CNEA) y de la Autoridad
Regulatoria Nuclear (ARN)..

Artículo 10. Esta Ordenanza, independientemente del momento que sea efectuada su
Reglamentación, instituye formal y definitivamente la declaración de Zona
No Nuclear (Artículo 1) y la prohibición de actividades, obras, instalaciones,
tráfico y operaciones que involucren materiales radioactivos (Artículos 2 y 6).

Artículo 11. El D.E.M. arbitrará los medios para la colocación de carteles que anuncien
que el municipio de Despeñaderos es “ZONA NO NUCLEAR” con el
número de Ordenanza, los que deberán ser colocados en todas las entradas del Ejido
Municipal. Asimismo se remitirán copias de la presente Ordenanza a Clínicas,
Hospitales, Colegios y toda otra institución de Despeñaderos.

Articulo 12. Comuníquese, publíquese en el Boletín Oficial, dese al Registro Municipal

y a las Secretarias respectivas y Archívese.