EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1801 May 14, 1948

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. FERNANDO ALANO,accused.

Rosario de Jesus-Alano for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Augusto M. Luciano for respondent.

PERFECTO, J.:

Detained since March 7, 1946, in connection with treason case No. 813, petitioner comes to us,
complaining that the Peoples Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his petition for bail
and prays that he be released on bail. His petition, wrongly entitled as one for a writ of certiorari, is, by
its nature, one for a writ of habeas corpus, the proper proceeding for a person claiming to be absolutely
or provisionally released from confinement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner alleges that he is entitled to be bailed because (a) the law presumes him to be innocent until
the contrary is conclusively proved, (b) he has been undergoing a long confinement, while facing a
protracted trial of his case, (c) of the 14 counts of the amended information filed against him, 10 have
been drop or dismissed, upon petition of the prosecution itself, after it had close its evidence, (d) many
other treason indictees, facing more serious charges, and some others who have been convicted in the
first instance have been granted bail by the same People's Court, and (e) the prosecution's allegation,
opposing petitioner's first petition for bail, that the evidence of guilt is strong, is belied by the fact that
later on the prosecution itself had to ask for the dismissal of 10 of the 14 counts of the
information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The case of Pio Duran, Teofilo Sison, Lucio Santos, Exequiel Genecoran, Alfonso Turrillo, Fernando
Chengan, Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Jose P. Laurel, Jorge B. Vargas, Benigno S. Aquino, Medardo Muñoz,
Vicente Anglo, Hilarion Dizon, Vicente Preysler, David Cose, Mariano Abad, Paulino Anulad and Aquilino
Carrasco, are mentioned by petitioner in support of his allegation to the effect that other treason
indictees, facing more serious charges, or convicted in the first instance have been granted bail by the
People's Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In all criminal cases, except for capital offenses, where the evidence of guilt is strong, the accused is
entitled, as a fundamental right constitutionally guaranteed, to be bailed. In cases of capital offense, the
accused is bailable in the discretion of the court, as has been already declared by this Court
in Teehankee vs. Rovira, 43 Off. Gaz., 513. The discretion of the court in such cases is neither absolute
nor beyond control, and must be exercise taking into the consideration the purpose of the pertinent
constitutional and statutory provisions and the rules of the Supreme Court, all supplemented by the
principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be a part of the laws of the
land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After a long deliberation of the petitioner's case, and considering the fact that, of 14 counts of the
information, 10 had to be dismissed upon petition of the prosecution itself, that the trial is being
protracted, and petitioner is undergoing a long confinement, were there are no assurances that his case
can be speedied in accordance with the constitutional intent, we are convicted that petitioner should be
bailed and that the lower court has committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying him
bail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Mention has been made of the fact that petitioner, while confined in the Old Bilibid Prisons, escape on
the afternoon of June 16, 1947, but petitioner's counsel has satisfactorily explained, without any
contradiction, that petitioner took such course so as to be able to contact his witnesses, scattered in
several places, so as to be able to prove his innocence and that, as soon as he was through with said
mission, he contacted the Office of the President of the Philippines as to arrange for his voluntary
surrender which took place sometime in July, 1947, showing his readiness to face the trial and to allow
the administration of justice to take its legal and normal course. Petitioner argued further that the fact
that accused Lucio Santos, in case No. 217, had also escape from detention did not impede the People's
Court to grant him bail. We are satisfied that in petitioner's escape he did not failed the purpose of
avoiding the action of justice, and it is already settled that a detainee's escape does not deprived him of
the constitution right to be bailed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner Fernando Alano is allowed to be bailed and he shall be released upon filing a bond in the
amount of P30,000 to be approved by any member of this Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Paras, Actg. C.J., Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Feria, J., concurs in the result.

July 3, 2017

G.R. No. 224974

MARVIN CRUZ and FRANCISCO CRUZ, in his capacity as Bondsman, Petitioners

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The trial court's failure to comply with procedural rules constitutes grave abuse of discretion and may be
the subject of a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated January 18, 2016 and
Resolution3 dated June 1, 2016 of the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed
by Marvin Cruz (Cruz) and his bondsman, Francisco Cruz (Francisco) for being the wrong remedy. They
filed the Petition before the Court of Appeals to assail the Regional Trial Court's denial of their Motion to
Release Cash Bond after the criminal case against Cruz was dismissed.

In an Information4 dated September 19, 2013, Cruz, along with seven (7) others, was charged with
Robbery in an Uninhabited Place and by a Band for unlawfully taking four (4) sacks filled with scraps of
bronze metal and a copper pipe worth ₱72,000.00 collectively.5 Cruz posted bail through a cash bond in
the amount of ₱12,000.00.6
The private complainant in the criminal case subsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance7 stating that
he was no longer interested in pursuing his complaint against Cruz.8 On October 23, 2014, Assistant City
Prosecutor Deborah Marie Tan filed a Motion to Dismiss,9 which was granted by Branch 170, Regional
Trial Court, City of Malabon in an Order10 dated October 24, 2014.

Cruz, through his bondsman Francisco, filed a Motion to Release Cash Bond.11 In an Order12 dated
January 7, 2015, the Regional Trial Court denied the Motion on the ground that the case was dismissed
through desistance and not through acquittal. The Motion for Reconsideration13 filed by Francisco was
likewise denied in an Order14dated April 6, 2015.

Cruz and Francisco filed a Petition for Certiorari15 with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Regional
Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Motion to Release Cash Bond.

On January 18, 2016, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision16 dismissing the Petition.

The Court of Appeals anchored its dismissal on the ground that Cruz and Francisco should have filed an
appeal, instead of a petition for certiorari, to question the denial of their Motion to Release Cash
Bond.17 The Court of Appeals further stated that it could not treat the Petition for Certiorari as an appeal
since the period for appeal had lapsed before its filing.18

Cruz and Francisco filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied in the Resolution19 dated June
1, 2016. Hence, this Petition20 was filed.

Petitioners Cruz and Francisco insist that the filing of a petition for certiorari was proper since the
Regional Trial Court's denial of their Motion to Release Cash Bond amounted to grave abuse of
discretion. They point out that under Rule 114, Section 2221 of the Rules of Court, bail is deemed
automatically cancelled upon the dismissal of the case regardless of whether the case was dismissed
through acquittal or desistance.22

The Office of the Solicitor General, however, points out that while Rule 114, Section 22 calls for
automatic cancellation, the cancellation is without prejudice to any liabilities on the bond.23 Thus, it
posits that while the cancellation is automatic, the release of the bond is still subject to further
proceedings. It adds that if the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' Motion to Release Cash Bond,
the error is "perhaps . . . a mistake in the application of the law" and not grave abuse of discretion,
which should not be the subject of a petition for certiorari.24

Considering the parties' arguments, the sole issue to be resolved is whether the Court of Appeals erred
in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy to question the denial of a motion to
release cash bond.

The writ of certiorari is not issued to correct every error that may have been committed by lower courts
and tribunals. It is a remedy specifically to keep lower courts and tribunals within the bounds of their
jurisdiction. In our judicial system, the writ is issued to prevent lower courts and tribunals from
committing grave abuse of discretion in excess of their jurisdiction. Further, the writ requires that there
is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to correct the error.
Thus, certiorari may not be issued if the error can be the subject of an ordinary appeal. As explained
in Delos Santos v. Metrobank:25
We remind that the writ of certiorari - being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character,
whose purpose is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction, or to prevent an inferior
court from committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve
parties from arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that courts have no power or authority in law to perform) -
is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every error committed
by a lower court.

In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of
Chancery, or the King's Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record
of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would
enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court's
judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand,
they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the
inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in matters of law. The
writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction
or was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or
quasi-judicial acts.

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in
the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is
largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior
court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose[.]

....

Pursuant to Section 1, supra, the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the
proceeding.26 (Citations omitted)

An essential requisite for filing a petition for certiorari is the allegation that the judicial tribunal acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.27 Grave abuse of discretion
has been defined as a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law."28 In order
to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for being the
wrong remedy, it is necessary to find out whether the Regional Trial Court acted with grave abuse of
discretion as to warrant the filing of a petition for certiorari against it.

Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 22. Cancellation of bail. - Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor,
the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or
execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.

The provisions of the Rules of Court are clear. Bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled in three (3)
instances: (1) the acquittal of the accused, (2) the dismissal of the case, or (3) the execution of the
judgment of conviction. The Rules of Court do not limit the cancellation of bail only upon the acquittal of
the accused.

The Office of the Solicitor General made the same observation in its Comment29 before the Court of
Appeals:

The trial court denied the motion to release cash bond on the ground that the dismissal was only due to
the desistance of the complainant and not because the accused was acquitted or that the crime was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Such ruling, however, has no legal basis. In fact, the provision of Section 22, Rule 114 is clear: the
dismissal of the criminal case results to the automatic cancellation of the bail bond.30 (Citation omitted)

Non-compliance with the Rules of Court is not, as the Office of the Solicitor General asserts, a mere
error of judgment. It constitutes grave abuse of discretion. In Crisologo v. JEWM Agro-Industrial
Corporation:31

This manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

In State Prosecutors II Comilang and Lagman v. Judge Medel Belen, the Court held as inexcusable abuse
of authority the trial judge's "obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure."
Such level of ignorance is not a mere error of judgment. It amounts to "evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law," or in essence,
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Needless to say, judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial competence
requires no less.32 (Citations omitted)

When a court or tribunal renders a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the proper remedy is
to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Rule 65, Section 1 states:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

Considering that the trial court blatantly disregarded Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court,
petitioners' remedy was the filing of a petition for certiorari with the proper court.
The Court of Appeals, however, focused on the Office of the Solicitor General's argument that
petitioners availed the wrong remedy. It cited Belfast Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v.
People33and Bahasa v. Lineharger34as bases to rule that appeal was the proper remedy for a denial of a
motion to release cash bond.

In Belfast Surety,35the trial court declared a forfeiture of cash bond under Rule 114, Section 1536 of the
1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure37 for failure of the accused to appear on trial. This Court stated that
while appeal would be the proper remedy from a judgment of forfeiture of bond, certiorari is still
available if the judgment complained of was issued in lack or excess of jurisdiction:

While appeal is the proper remedy from a judgment of forfeiture, nevertheless, certiorari is available
despite the existence of the remedy of appeal where the judgment or order complained of was either
issued in excess of or without jurisdiction. Besides, appeal under the circumstances of the present case
is not an adequate remedy since the trial court had already issued a writ of execution. Hence, the rule
that certiorari does not lie when there is an appeal is relaxed where, as in the present case, the trial
court had already ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.38 (Citations omitted)

Bahasa, meanwhile, states that an appeal should be available in denials of petitions for the cancellation
of a bond. Nothing in Bahasa, however, limits the remedy to an appeal only:

Inasmuch as the said petition to procure the cancellation of the bond was denied without further
process of law, it is unquestionable that the order of court denying it could be appealed from, for the
reason that if this last decision were not appealable, it would become final, without ulterior remedy, and
would work irreparable injury to the petitioner.39

Thus, a party may still file a petition for certiorari in instances where the lower court commits grave
abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction.

The automatic cancellation of bail, however, does not always result in the immediate release of the bail
bond to the accused.1âwphi1 A cash bond, unlike a corporate surety or a property bond, may be applied
to fines and other costs determined by the court.40 The excess shall be returned to the accused or to the
person who deposited the money on the accused's behalf.41 Here, the Order dated October 24, 2014
reads:

Acting on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Deborah Marie 0. Tan, based on the
Affidavit of Desistance executed by private complainant Efren C. Ontog, which states, among others,
that he is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case, hence, without the active
participation of the said private complainant, the prosecution could no longer effectively obtain the
required evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused, the motion to dismiss is granted.

WHEREFORE, this case of "Robbery in Uninhabited Place and by a Band" against Marvin Cruz (MNU) is
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

City of Malabon, October 24, 2014.42

There was no fine imposed on Cruz. The Order does not specify any costs of court that he must answer
for. There was, thus, no lien on the bond that could prevent its immediate release. Considering these
circumstances, petitioners could not have been faulted for filing a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals since there was no legal basis for the Regional Trial Court to deny their Motion to Release
Cash Bond.

Instead of addressing the merits of the case, the Court of Appeals instead chose to focus on procedural
technicalities, dismissing the petition for certiorari based on cases that did not actually prohibit the filing
of a petition for certiorari. While procedural rules are necessary for the speedy disposition of justice, its
indiscriminate application should never be used to defeat the substantial rights of litigants.43

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 18, 2016 and Resolution dated June 1, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No.
141009 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for a
resolution on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

CARMELO C. BERNARDO, G.R. No. 166980

Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESand F.T. YLANG- Promulgated:

YLANG MARKETING CORPORATION,
April 4, 2007
Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner Carmelo C. Bernardo assails the Resolutions[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30,
2004 and January 14, 2005 dismissing his petition and denying reconsideration, respectively.

Petitioner was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila with six counts of violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing on
December 3, 1997 six postdated checks in equal amounts of P22,500. Save for the check numbers and
dates of maturity, four Informationsunder Criminal Case Nos. 320977 to 320980 were similarly worded
as follows:

That on or about December 3, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously make or draw and issue to F.T. YLANG-YLANG MARKETING, CORP.
rep. by Dennis Tan to apply on account or for value PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK check no. 0007806
[0007805, 0007804, 0007803] dated April 30, [March 30, February 28, January 30] 1998 payable to
YLANG-YLANG MFG. in the amount of P22,500.00 said accused well knowing that at the time of issue
she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date
thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for reason Account Closed and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said F.T. YLANG-YLANG MARKETING CORP.
the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking
days after receiving said notice.

Contrary to law.[2]

The two Informations under Criminal Case Nos. 320975-76 averred that Check Nos. 0007808 and
0007807 respectively dated June 30, 1998 and May 30, 1998 would be dishonored by the drawee bank
for the reason Account Closed if presented for payment as the account against which it was drawn ha[d]
already been closed even before [their] said date[s].[3]

Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by a counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the offenses
charged. At the pre-trial conference on August 25, 1999, petitioner failed to appear despite notice,
prompting Branch 24 of the MeTC to issue a warrant of arrest against him and set the cases for trial in
absentia.
After the prosecution presented its first witness, petitioner filed a Waiver of Appearance, a Motion to
Lift Warrant of Arrest, and a Motion to Quash on the ground that the facts charged in
the Informations under Criminal Case Nos. 320975-76 do not constitute an offense.

By Order of April 5, 2000, the trial court lifted the warrant of arrest in view of petitioners appearance
but denied the Motion to Quash for lack of merit.

At the following trial date, petitioner failed to appear despite notice, drawing the trial court to proceed
with his trial in absentia and issue warrant of arrest[4] against him.

By Decision[5] of October 23, 2001 promulgated in absentia on December 13, 2001, the trial court found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. 22 in all the cases. He was, in each
case, sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of One (1) Year, to pay a fine of Twenty-Two
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P22,500), and to indemnify private complainant in the amount of
Twenty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P22,500).

Ten months following the promulgation of the judgment, petitioner posted a bond before another
branch of the court. Petitioner having been convicted and no motion having been filed for his
provisional liberty pending any appeal from or motion for reconsideration of the Decision, the trial court
cancelled the bond and issued an alias warrant of arrest.[6]

Petitioner thereupon filed an Urgent Motion for New Trial and/or to Set Aside Trial and Judgment
(Motion for New Trial) which was, by Order[7] of January 10, 2003, denied following his and his counsels
failure to appear at the hearing of the motion and comply with the rule on proper service of a
motion.[8] Petitioners Urgent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied, by Order[9] of May 26,
2003.

Petitioner appealed the Orders dated January 10, 2003 and May 26, 2003 as well as the Decision
dated October 23, 2001 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 26 of which, by Decision
of December 22, 2003, affirmed[10] the judgment with modification as to the penalties imposed, thus:

WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with modification. This
Court finds accused/appellant Carmelo C. Bernardo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 but set [sic] aside the penalty of imprisonment and hereby sentences her [sic]
to pay a fine of P22,500.00 in each case, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency or non-
payment not to exceed six (6) months, and, to pay private complainant F.T. YLANG-YLANG MARKETING
CORPORATION the total amount of P113,500.00 by way of indemnity.

Meanwhile, the alias warrant of arrest issued against accused x x x

is hereby ordered lifted and set aside.

No pronouncement as to costs. (Underscoring supplied)

SO ORDERED.[11]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the RTC decision but it was denied.

Unsatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.

Petitioner filed with the appellate court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review within
30 days from June 1, 2004, the 15th day from his counsels receipt of the RTC Order denying his Motion
for Partial Reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals, by Resolution of June 21, 2004, granted petitioner an extension, but only 15 days
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42,[12] to file his Petition.

Apparently unaware of the above-said Resolution of June 21, 2004 under which his petition would be
filed not later than June 16, 2004, petitioner used up the 30-day extension sought and filed his petition
on July 1, 2004. Petitioner in fact received the June 21, 2004 Resolution only on July 9, 2004.[13]

By Resolution[14] of July 30, 2004, the appellate court denied petitioners petition due course for having
been filed 15 days late and for failure to attach the MeTC Decision and other pertinent and material
documents. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by Resolution[15] of January 14,
2005, the appellate court noting that the MeTC Decision attached to the Motion for Reconsideration
was a mere photocopy and uncertified.

Hence, the instant petition faulting the appellate court:

A. . . . IN RECKONING THE PERIOD OF 15 DAYS EXTENSION FROM THE EXPIRY DATE OF THE ORIGINAL
PERIOD OF 15 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OR FINAL ORDER
APPEALED FROM, INSTEAD OF FROM DATE OF THE RECEIPT OF THE ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION;

B. . . . IN APPLYING THE RULES OF PROCEDURE VERY STRICTLY AND IN UTTER DISREGARD OF ITS
INTERNAL RULES WHICH LIBERALLY ALLOW COMPLETION OF PORTIONS OF RECORDS IN COMPLIANCE
WITH THE RULES AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE APPLYING LIBERALLY THE RULES OF PROCEDURE;

C. . . . [IN NOT] CONSIDER[ING] THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR REVIEW.[16] (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner argues that the 15-day extension granted to him by the appellate court should be reckoned
from his date of receipt of its June 21, 2004 Resolution.

The argument fails. A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC[17] issued on February 29, 2000 is clear. It provides that
[a]ny extension of time to file the required pleading should . . . be counted from the expiration of the
period . . . The extension should thus be tacked to the original period, to commence immediately after
the expiration of such period. The court has no discretion to reckon the commencement of the
extension from a date later than the expiration of such original period, not even if the expiry date is a
Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday.[18]

Petitioners reliance on the 1989 case of Vda. de Capulong v. Workmens Insurance Co., Inc.[19] on this
point does not thus lie. Parenthetically, the factual milieus in Vda. de Capulong and the present case are
dissimilar. The respondent in Vda. de Capulong specifically moved that it be given an additional period
from receipt of the order of the court allowing extension, and the court granted an extension of time
without indicating when it would commence. In the present case, petitioner prayed for a period of
extension to be counted from the expiration of the original period or from June 1, 2004, which date the
appellate court correctly used in reckoning the extension.[20]

Petitioner goes on to fault the appellate court in not resolving his motion for extension before the
expiration of the 15-day extension so that he would have known that his request for 30 days was not
granted.

Petitioners position does not lie too.

Section 1 of Rule 42 is clear. The Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of 15 days only within
which to file the petition for review. Albeit under the same section, a further extension not to exceed 15
days may be granted for the most compelling reason, petitioner had no basis to assume that his request
for a 30-day extension is meritorious and would be granted.[21]

Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court, and
lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension or postponement would be granted or
that they would be granted the length of time they pray for.[22]

Petitioner claims, however, that his motion for extension presented a compelling reason for the grant of
a further extension. Justifying the 30-day period sought, petitioner explains that he was implicitly
seeking both a 15-day extension and a further extension of 15 days.

The wording of the rule with respect to further extension is couched in restrictive terms. Section 1 of
Rule 42 provides that [n]o further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and
in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

Petitioners motion for extension was anchored on a lone ground, his counsels being pre-occupied in the
preparation of petitions, memoranda, briefs, and other lengthy pleadings in cases as important as this
case and in daily court appearance and personal commitments. Sustaining petitioners lone ground
would obliterate the distinguishing essence of a further extension for it would do away with the
necessity of presenting compelling grounds addressed to the sound discretion of the court.

But crediting arguendo petitioners implicit justification, this Court sees no reason to disturb the exercise
by the appellate court of its discretion in denying a cumulative extension and in effectively ruling that
heavy workload of counsel is not a most compelling reason.

Respecting the second assigned error, the CA correctly dismissed petitioners appeal for failure to comply
with Section 2 (d) of Rule 42, which specifically requires that both lower courts judgments or final
orders must be attached to the petition in the required form clearly legible duplicate originals or
certified true copies. Indeed, petitioner fell short in his compliance. He attached to his petition only the
RTC Decision of December 22, 2003 and its Order of May 4, 2004. He did not attach thereto
the MeTC Orders dated January 10, 2003 and May 26, 2003, and the Decision dated October 23, 2001
which were appealed[23] to the RTC and which were likewise adverse to him.[24] While to his Motion for
Reconsideration, he attached the October 23, 2001 Decision, it was not in the required form, and while
he attached a duplicate original of the May 26, 2003 Order, he failed to submit the January 10,
2003 Order.
There is no cogent reason to deviate from such requirement under Section 2(d) of Rule 42,
the mandatory tenor of which has been held to be discernible and well settled.[25]

Petitioner having failed to perfect his appeal, the RTC judgment had become final and executory.[26] This
leaves it unnecessary to dwell on petitioners assertion that he was denied due process of law and the
right to counsel before the trial court.

Suffice it to state that the requisites of a valid trial in absentia, viz, (1) the accused has already been
arraigned, (2) he has been duly notified of the trial, and (3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable, are, as
reflected above, present in the case.[27]

Estrada v. People[28] should, under the facts and circumstances attendant to the case, dispel any
lingering doubts of petitioner on the validity of the trial courts proceedings.

The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. x x x

x x x Conformably with our decision in People v. Salas, [the] escape should have been considered a
waiver of their right to be present at their trial, and the inability of the court to notify them of the
subsequent hearings did not prevent it from continuing with their trial. They were deemed to have
received notice. The same fact of their escape made their failure to appear unjustified because they
have, by escaping, placed themselves beyond the pale and protection of the law. This being so, then
pursuant to Gimenez v. Nazareno, the trial against the fugitives, just like those of the others, should
have been brought to its ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule on the
evidence presented by the prosecution against all the accused and to render its judgment
accordingly. It should not wait for the fugitives re-appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to have
waived their right to present evidence on their own behalf and to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses who testified against them.[29] (Emphasis and italics in the original)

As for the promulgation of judgment in absentia, the following pertinent provision of Section 6 of Rule
120 should likewise put to rest any doubts on its validity:

The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in
which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the
province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

xxxx

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden
and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in
absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last
known address.

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice,
the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a
copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.

x x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

A word on the modified penalty imposed by the RTC. Contrary to its reasoning, the penalty of
imprisonment in cases of violation of B.P. 22 was not deleted. As clarified by Administrative Circular 13-
2001, the clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as
an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided
for in B.P. 22.[30]

Since the prosecution did not raise the matter as an issue and, at any rate, there is no showing of
repeated violation or wanton bad faith on the part of petitioner, the non-imposition of the penalty of
imprisonment is in order.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.