Hans Olav Melberg
Rejoiner
C ritical comments present an opportu-
nity to learn and improve and in this
spirit I welcome the comments made by
Jarl, Bergmark and Österberg. After reflect-
ing on the comments the improvements
I offer below take three forms: Clarifica-
tions, regrets and counter-attacks.
Österberg agrees with the general line of
the argument in the paper. Jarl agrees with
some of the arguments but believes that
progress has been made and that the philo-
sophical issues may easily lead to unpro-
ductive discussions and the conclusion
that “nothing can be proven.” Bergmark
disagrees with several of the arguments,
but he is more optimistic than Jarl, argu-
ing that it is possible to settle the debates
by scientific and factual arguments.
To make the issues less abstract, imagine
that you have been asked to calculate the
optimal tax on alcohol. This is a practical-
ly relevant question and in order to find
the optimal tax you have to calculate the
costs and benefits associated with alcohol
consumption. The relevance of the philo-
sophical question is that if you believe
part of the consumption is compulsive,
addictive, or not based on the true or au-
tonomous preferences of the person, then
you will end up with a higher tax rate. For
instance, Pogue and Sgontz (1989) con-
clude that “Significantly higher rates may
be called for if it is accepted that alcohol-
ism is a disease that causes alcoholics to
lose rather than gain utility from alcohol
354 NORDIC STUDIES ON ALCOHOL AND DRUGS V O L . 27. 2010  .  4
consumption.” In fact their calculated op-
timal tax rate varies from 19% to 305% de-
pending on the assumptions made on these
issues. This shows that the definitions of
terms like disease, compulsive, voluntary
and “true preferences” is important and
they cannot be avoided even if we start
with a very practical question.
One may argue that we can reduce the
problem by following the most recent
guidelines or that scientific argument will
lead the issue to be settled. Adopting an
approach in which two economists work-
ing independently will arrive at the same
number is desirable, but it does not guar-
antee that the number is valid or neutral.
It just means that we have deferred to the
guidelines and the question then becomes
whether these are correct.
As for the second issue, it is important
to distinguish between the possibility of
settling an argument and having a scien-
tific discussion. It is certainly possible to
have scientific debates about the meaning
of terms like justice, autonomous prefer-
ences and voluntary choice by pointing out
inconsistencies or implications that the
other person has not considered. However,
the possibility of rational reflection does
not imply that we will reach an agreement
after the discussion. Some terms are es-
sentially contestable and they are by their
very nature subjective. I cannot prove that
my definition of justice is correct, but it is
still possible to have a rational debate and
make some progress. In the same sense it
seems difficult to scientifically prove that
“30% of alcohol consumption is compul-
sive” or that a preference for using canna-
bis should be deemed socially illegitimate
and excluded from the calculation of the
costs associated with drugs.
Bergmark does not want to label the ac-
tion made while threatened by a gun in-
voluntary since it is intentional. I agree
that we should adopt a choice perspective
on alcohol and drug use since the actions
involved are too complex to be a reflex
like hitting somebody. I also agree with his
criticism of the example of falling asleep
in the sense that it is not an action. Finally,
I agree that the notion of intentional but
involuntary action is incoherent. I regret
this choice of terminology. Unfortunately
there was no gunman threatening me, so
I can only blame myself for writing invol-
untary action when I should have written
“involuntary choice”, “not freely chosen”
or even more precise – an action derived
from a restricted choice set. This is a grad-
ual concept in the sense that the perceived
set of good alternatives is sometimes only
a little restricted and sometimes heavily
restricted. As Jon Elster (1999) has argued
“If the effect of a desire or a craving is to
make some options and consequences dis-
appear from the cognitive horizon of the
agent, there is a real sense in which he 'has
no choice'”.
Bergmark also argues that the concept
of the individual’s “loss of control” is not
empirically supported” but “fairly well re-
NORDIC STUDIES ON ALCOHOL AND DRUGS
futed” This, of course, depends on what
we mean by loss of control. To clarify, the
argument is not that a mysterious force
suddenly takes control over the limbs of
the person drinking alcohol. The point is
that there are psychological mechanisms
like discounting which in some situa-
tions make it much more likely that we
do things that are inconsistent with what
we prefer most of the time. A person may
want to stay sober, but occasionally give
in to temptation and go on a binge. The
alcohol consumed during this binge may
be counted as a benefit based on the short-
run self, but not if we base our evaluation
on the preferences expressed by the long
run-self. And these are not just esoteric
philosophical problems: The optimal tax
rate on alcohol will depend on the weight
we put on the preferences expressed by
the short-run versus the long-run self.
I agree with Bergmark that Ainslie has
done much to describe how the individual
can fall for temptations, but even Ainslie
has used terms like “temporary preferenc-
es”, “shorter term” or “short range” inter-
ests and “higher interests.” The terminol-
ogy was in no way meant to argue against
Ainslie or imply that we are not respon-
sible for our actions in the short or long
term. Sartre's theories of false conscious-
ness, marxism and 1968 was long before
my academic consciousness awoke. Just
to be on the safe side I will end by reveal-
ing that I would prefer, choose and select
Ainslie over Sartre any day, all week - with
no preference reversal all year.
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