The Royal African Society

Eight Years of Transition in Ghana

Author(s): Charles Arden-Clarke
Source: African Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 226 (Jan., 1958), pp. 29-37
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/719064 .
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 29

EightYearsof Transitionin Ghana

By SIR CHARLES ARDEN-CLARKE
Sir Charles Arden-Clarke,G.C.M.G., forrswrlyGovernor-General of
Ghana,gavetheaddresswhichfoUowsat a joint meetingof the RoyaZAfrican
SocieGy
and the Royal EmpireSocietyon Nouember 21, 1957. Miss Margery
Perham,C.B.E., presided.
T WILL TRY to tell you something of what has happened in Ghana.
1 I see that the Speaker of the House of Commonsis reported having said
recently that brerrityis the one attribute of a good speech that is within the
ability and power of all of us. That is the one attribute that I feel is within
my compass, but it has been denied me today as I have been asked to speak
for about 40 utes. I must crave your indulgence, therefore, for any
deficiencies in what I say.
In speaking this afternoon of the eight years during which I presided over
the translation of the Gold Coast from a dependent Colony-cum-Protectorate
into an independent member of the Commonwealth under the nalme of
Ghana, I propose to corlcentrate on the political and constitutional aspects
of the problems that presented themselves, not because the economic and
social problems were or are insignificaIlt but because those were the problems
that were most difficult, which engaged the greater part of one's time and
attention and attracted the most publicity.
Ghana is a comparatively small country with a population of only some
4i million, nearly all Africans, and without any significant non-African racial
or immigrant problem, for the few thousand non-Africalls in Ghana are
practically all temporary sojourners who return to their own homelaIlds
when their period of work there is over.
Ghana is not regarded as a vital stral:egicbase Like most of the rest of
Africa, it is under-developed and requires a large infusion of capital and
skills from overseas if the living conditions of the people are to be improved
within the next few decades. As elsewhere in Africa, its economy is mainly
agrlcultllral and needs to be diversified, but it is fortunate in that its main
export cropocoan which the country's prosperity depends has during
the last few years been most lucrative and enabled it to finance a large-scale
development programmeout of its own resources. It is in the political sphere
that GhanaJschief importance lies as the spearhead of politically emergent
Black Africa.
During my eight years in Ghana, it was a matter of some astonishment
to me how often I was asked two questions. The first was: Is not the grant
of independence to an African texritory a new concept of British Colonial
policy ? The second and more difficult to answer was: Are you not going
too fast along the road to independence ? I should like to deal with those
two questions this afternoon.

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30 AFR1C PFAIRS

As regardsthe fat, it is usefulto rememberthat it was in 1864,nearly

100 years ago, that a Select Comrnitteeof the House of Commons(lealing
with West Afncan affairs resolved:
" The object of our policy shouldbe to encouragein the natives de
exerciseof those qualititieswhichmay makeit possiblefor us moread
more to transferto them the administrationof all the governments."
To come to more recent times and strike a more personalnote, when I
went to NorthernNigeriain 1920as an AdministrativeCadet,having been
inspiredto go there by seeing the name of Lord Lugardon my old school
notice board, it is true that X had never heard of the Select Committee's
resolutionwhich I have jllst quoted,but I and my fellow Cadetswere told
in morecolioquiallanguagethat our job was to teach the peopleto stand
on their own feet and managetheir own affairs. That is what a host of
administrativeofficers,educationistsand others, both in and out of the
ColonialSexvlce,have been tryingto do since WorldWarI and even before
then.
Bew, if any, of us ever dreamedforty or thirty, or even twenty}years ago
that withirlour vwn workinglife-timewe would see the translationof an
AfricanColonialTerritoxyirstoa freeand independentState standingon its
own feet in the comity of nations and managingits own affairs. I think
that most of us realised,howearer,, that that was our ultimate objective.
In the light of all that has trspired since WorldWar I, we can see now
much more clearlywhat was then very nebulousto us, that we were, and
still are, engagedin the tak of transfog an old-styledependetltEmpire
into a snodemCommonweS-th, into a voluntaryassociation,to their own
matual benefit, of free and independentStates imbuedurithsimilarideals
of freedom,justice,the ruleof law and detnocraticgovemment.
To inculcate those ideals upon the people committed to their charge
and to teach the peoplehow to make them work in practicehas been the
task imposedupon the ColonialServiceby British Colonialpolicy dunng
my 37 yearsin the Serarice, and to the manin the fieldthe politicalcomplexion
of the Govemmentthat happenedto be in powerin the United Kingdom
has made little or no difference.
The grant of independenceto dependentterntoriescapableof starlding
on their own ket economicallyand maintainingreasonablestdards of
administrationseems to me to be the natural and inevitable outcomeof
BritishColonialpolicy dunng the past century,althoughI agreewith you,
MadamChairrnan, that it was not VeIypracticallyor lucidly plned.
The second question which I have SQ often been asked were we not
travellingthe road to independencetoo fastsn best be axlsweredif I
briefly describewhat happenediD Ghana tduringthe eight years of lay
Governorship.Early in 1948 there had beeIlseriousriots not seriousby
Indian standardsbut senous by Gold Coast standards- irl the pnncipal
towns of the GoldCoast,and the countrywas in turmoil. After orderhad
been restored, a Cortlmissionthe Watson Commission was appointed
by the United KingdomGovernmentto inquireinto the causesof the dis-

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 EIGIIT YEARS OF TRANSITION IN GHANt 1

turbaces and to makerecommendationsk It duly did so and includedin its

recommendationssome far-reachingreforrnsin the constitutionalspheres
giving the Africana muchbiggersay in the managementof his own affairs--
a much biggersafirthall more cautious-mirlded peoplethoughtdesirableor
practicable.
The Commission,like a good many other CommissionsJ was of course
accusedof havirlgexceededits termsof referenee.Be that as it mayS some-

thing had to be done about its recommendatiotlst d an all-AfneanCom-

mittee, widely but not fully representatisre of the peopleof the Gold(5oast,
was appointedunder the thairrzship of Mr. Justice (now Sir Hesley)
Xussey to considerand advise on the question*ofconstitutionalreform
I say that the Gomrrlitteewasnot ?ullyrepresentativebecauseits membership
did not take accouIltof a split in the ranks of the NatiorlalistParty, the
United GoldCoastCvnvention,afterthe 1948nots.
KwameNkramah,summonedfromhis studiesin the United Kingdomto
icome generalsecretaryof the U.G.C.C.,decidedto establishhis own more
militar3tNationalistParty, to be krtownas the ConventiollPeople'sParty-
the C.P.P. The party was launchedin June, 1949,with its slogarlof " Fu11
Self-Government Now," " Now " beingprintedill capitallettersandusllally
repeatedthreetimes in place of the U*G.C.C.'s slog o? ' Full seli-govern-
ment within the shortestpossibletime.'t The C.P.P. attracteda rery large
following. Launchedsomesix monthsafterthe appoin^rnent of the Coussey
Committeesit was not representedon that Committee.
It was two monthsafterthe laurlchingof the C..P.P.that I was appointed
GcivernoI. X gatheredin Londorithat the country was regardedas being

orsthe edge of revolutionand that I was expectedto go and do somethtng

about it The situationwas certainlytricky and difficultwhen I arrivedin
Accrain August, 1949. The CousseyG,minitteehad not yet finalisedits
Report (it was presentedsome two morlthslater d published)but it WE3LS

krlownthat it wouldnot recommendthe immediategrantof full self-gorre:n;-

ment; while the C.P.P. had made it abundantlvclear that it was not pre
paredto acceptanythingless than ' Full Self-Goverrlment Novf,"that any
constitutioIl embodyingless than that would be regardedas " bogus and
fraudulent" to use their own words- and that it would resortto what it
called " positive action" to achiesTe its ends.
Strippedof the high-soundingverbiagewith which it was surrolmded}
" positiveaction" appearedto meanrecourseto the callitlgof illegalstrikes
forpoliticalends,the subversionof lawfulauthontyandthe creationof chaos
to compelthe Bntish Gosesnmentto handoverpowerXMuchlip servicewas
paid to the pnnciple of non-violence,but giverl the corlditionsthat then
obtairledand the volatile temperof the people,it was perfectlyclear that
violexlcewouldmost certainlyensue.
Aftermy arrival,I lost no time in goingroundthe countIy. Exceptin the
largertownsawhere the C.P.P. was most active and most strongly repre-
sented,I didnot find muchsupportfor unconstitutiorlal action. Onthe con
trary, there seemed to be a general feeling opposingit. But there was

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32 APRICANAIRS

undoubtedlya strongfeeling in favourof nndeperkdence asld freedomfrom

alien doPliration, except possibly in the Protectorateof the Northern
Territones, comprisingabout oneffluarterof the people of the country,
where the people were more backwardeducationallyand less politically
ded, were mistrustfulof their neighboursthe Ashantisand the people
of the Ckast and seemed on the whole to preferthat Bntish protection
shouldcontinuefor a wEilelonger. Even irl the North,however,therewere
few leadersasldspokesmenwho werepreparedopenlyto resist the (lemand
for independence,althoughthey wanted its attainmentdeferred.
The Reportof the CousseyCottee was duly publishedand generally
accled, except in extremenationalistand anti-perialist circles, as a
reasonableand progressivedocument. It advocatedfar-reachingadvances
towards selfsovernmentJrncludinga general electionand an Executive
Councilwith an ovetwhelmingunofficialAfrican majority, but not full
selfsovernment. The C*P.P.would have none of it and party propaganda
to preparethe people for " positive action)' was intensified.
The party leaders had been officially informedaI}d were well aware
that they had a perfectlyconstitutionalway of achienngpowerand gxuning
theirobjectives,if theircdidates at the forthcog electionwereretumed.
I have good reasonto believethat sott2eat least of the party leaderswould
have preferrednot to resortto " positive action" but to await the results
of the generalelectionJof the outcomeof which they were fairly conEdent.
But they foundthemselvesenmeshedin the coils of their own propaganda.
The tail wagged the dog, and " positive action" was duly declaredin
Jalluary}1950.
The Governmenthad had plentyof te to preparefor it snd my response
was to declaiea state of emergency.A generalstrikewas calledbut did not
receive the supportof the workersto the extent expected by the C.P.P.
Therewas some noting. Promptand firm actionwas taken to restorethe
situationand to maintainlaw alld order. Within threeweeks,the countxy
was almost back to normal aad those chiefly responsiblefor the trouble
were ln prlson.
Thereis one featureof this emergencywhich I shouldlike to emphasise:
we maslagedto avoidmakingany politicalmartyrs. Althoughtwo policemen
were killed in a not and this speakswell of the disciplineof the police-
there were no fatal casualtiesamongthe rioters-plenty of " bloody cox-
combs,"but no bodies. Thepolicehadthe strictestinjunctionsto use batons,
not bullets,and they obeyeddespitethe gravestprovocation.
No extraordinarypowerssuchas banishmentor specialcourtswereusedto
deal with the leaders. They had been warnedbeforehandthat if they broke
the law, the law wouldtake its course. They weretriedin the usualway irl
the ordmarycriminalcourtsand had the normalrightsof appeal,of which
some availedthemselves. This did muchto lessenany sense of grievanceor
unfairtreatmentwhichmighthave embitteredthe personalrelationshipson
which the courseof subsequentevents dependedSQ much. It was, indeed,
unnervingat timesto observeas we workedourway fromone Constitutionto

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 YEARS OF TENSINON
EIGHT IN GHANA
33

betweena few
thenext, howmuchdependeduponthe personalrelatioIlshipsleadersof his
elected
leaingpersonalitiesobetweenthe Govemoraa}dthethe AfricanMinisters.
Government, between one or two senior officials and
The C.P*P.was in
After " positive action,"there was a breathingspace. Otherpolitical
its leadersin prisonand
eclipse, there was a political vacuum.
to fill that vacuum. As the leaders of the C.P.P.com-
leadersprovedunable about resuscita-
theirshortsentencesand cameout of pnson, they set
pleted end of the yearthe
theirpartyorganisation,withmarked success. By the
ting stronger than ever.
party,veth its sloganof " Self-Government Now," wa6
was
Meanwhile,a Constitutionbased on the Cousseyreconendations structure made in
hammered out alldextensivechallgesin the administrative in its place
for it. Theold Central Secretariat was abolished and
preparation a civil servantstyled
someten or moreMinistneswereestablished,eachwith Ministers.It was a
new
apermanentsecretaryat its headto be readyfor the was obviously;ng to
cumbersome structure,whichin the matter of staff Law ";
provide somenotablygoodexamplesof the workingof " Parkinson's
itcreakedbut it worked. promulgated and
TheConstitutionbasedon the Cousseyproposalswasdulyelectionwas held,
earlyin 1951,in accordancewith its pronsions} a general
electionwasa sweep
thefirstin the historyof the country.Theresultof that party'sleader,Kwame
ingtnctoryfor the ConventionPeople'sParty. The the leadersbad served
Nkrumah,was, however,still in prison; the rest of
lhere werepros
theirsentencesandwereout. I decidedto releaseNkrumah. a course, md plenty
alldcons aplentyto be considered before adopting such
that the C.P.P.
of pressureswere being appliedo It was, however,obvious without their leader.
wouldrefuseto cooperate in workingthe Constitution
mass of the people behind them and there
Nkrumahandhis partyhad the one could tum.
which
wasno otherpartywith appreciablepublicsupportto andif nothingcameof
WithoutNkrumah,the Constitutionwouldbe stillbotn measureof self-
all the hopes,aspirationsandconcreteproposalsfor a greater good intentions of the
government,therewouldno longer be any faith in the
into disorders,
British Governmentalld the Gold Coastwould be plunged withoutthe
effectively
nolence and bloodshed.Afterall, one cannotgovem of the govemed,
consentr, at least, the acquiescence-of the majority
was out of the questlon and it was clear that that
except by force. Force was released.
acquiescencewouldnot be forthcoming.So Nknlmah onlyby reputation
Nkrumahand I hadnot then met. Wekneweachother his was to me. I serlt
andmy reputationwas, I think,as obnoxiousto him as inuted him to forma
for him. He aved with someof his colleaguesaxldIsuspicionand mistmst.
Government.That meetingwas redolent of mutual
aroundeach other
We werelike two dogsmeetingfor the first timeysniffing or to wag ourtails.
wth hackleshalf raised,tryingto decidewhetherto bite and we were able to
Soon afterwards,Nkrumahcame to see me alone
time the hackles were down, and beforethe
get to know each other. This we both under-
end the tails werewagging. Althoughmuchwas left unsaid, Constitution and the
stood that there were two men who could break the

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 AFRICAN 'i'AIRS

whoseexperetlt in flve utes-Nkrunffi and I and that that would

adlrante n9 one. We beliearedthat we had the same objective,the attain-
mexltof fuS self-gourernment for the country, asld though we might differ
as to the how and the wherd we did differ-we both felt, I think that
it wouldbe m the best interestsof the colmtryand of ourselvesif we worked
wth and not againsteach other. That was the beginningof a elose,ftiendly
wdwif I may say so, aot unfruit?ulpartnership
I have dwelt at some length on those early days because they set the
patternof what followed,and I have left myselfveIy little tlme for the rest
I do not proposeto iIlflict on you the details of the variousconstitutional
chmges that were made. Brsadly speaking,the Constitutionof 1951-the
CousseyConstitvation-stablishedat the Cerstrean ExeclltiveCouncilof
eleven Ministers,eight o:f whom were selected from among the elected
membersc;f the legislative Assembly md three of wllom were officiSs.
The Chief Minister}an Africanelected Minister,was styled the Leaderof
GvsernmerltBusiness. The (iovernorwas reguiredto presideat a11meetings
Ofthe ExecutiveCourlcilalld was vested with eomprellensive reservepowers
to veto or enforcelegislationas he deemedfit, subjectof course,to certain
safeguardseDef^nceandsternal affairswerereserredto the Govemorin his
discretion.
The Constitutio.nprovidedbr anothergerleralelectiorlwithirlfour years
arld it was taken for granted in the Gold Coast that that election would
coincideW<tXl furtherconstitutionalchangesgiving a largermeasureof self-
government)if not the fuM. thtngvWe wereunderno illuslonsthat we could
marktirneNvrvery lox1gon the CousseyConstitution.Wehadset out to dnve
alonga deeplycowuvted roadand}as all who have driventheir ceLrs along
such roads,vrhicllare COmmOI2 in Africa,know, there is only one safe pace
md that is dictatedby the weightasldpowerof the car and the depth of the
cormgatiolls. If one goes too fast, one is liable to bourseeintQthe ditch;
too slow, aJldthe car shakesitself to pieces. We had to find the right pace
for our GoldCoastcart Somethoughtthat 60 milesan houror morewas the
rightpace,otherswouldhave preferredto travelat 20 milesall hour. In the
event, we compromisedat 40* The car stayed on the roadand arrivedirstact
at its journey'send.
As miglltbe expectedJthe first few meetiIlgsof the new ExecutiereCouncils
a strangelyassortedgroupof individualsS wereas redolentof mutualsuspicion
and mistrustas my E1rstmeetingwith Nkrumahand his colleagues. The
officialsweresuspiciousof the politiciansandthe AfricanMinistersmistrusted
the " Europeanagents of Imperialism"as they were said to regardthem.
But the membersof the Councilwere all reasonablemen} and this soon
passed as we got to know each other better. Therewere wide differences
of opinion as to the best pace.and the best means of achievingfull self-
government,but no dif?erences that fullself-governmentwithinthe Common-
wealth was our objectiveand that it shouldbe achievedJif at all possible,
th goodwill on both side.Rv
Ourmeetingsgraduallybecamemorelike fanily affairs,membersarguing

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 EIGHT YEARS OF TRANSITION IN GHANA
35

and quaxTelling happilyand sometimesnolently with

but showing a united front to the outside world. each otherin pnvate
the principleof collectiveresponsibilityhad been Within three months,
acceptedand
established,and the Executive Council,later to be known as was firmly
wereworkingas a team towardsa commonobjective. the Cabinet,
That CousseyConstitutionlastedthreeanda half
we lived in an atmosphereof peIpetualcrisis. In years. Duringthat timeJ
we become to that atmospherethat I had occasion fact, so accustomeddid
one of my most senior officialsfor trying to invent a to remonstratewith
none for a fortnight,and he felt like a fish out of water crisis. We had had
! He
extenuationthat like the housemaid'sbaby, his crisiswas only a pleadedin
We learnta goodmanylessonsduringthat penod. We little one.
how effectivethe device of changingnamescouldbe. It leaxnt, for example,
that '?a roseby any othernamewouldsmellas sweet," is, I suppose,true
we changedthe name of Leaderof Government but we learntthat if
andExecutiveCouncilto Cabinet,withoutin any way Business to PrimeMislister
and powers, or the name of Chief Commissionerto altering theirfunctions
District Commissionerto GolrernmentAgent, they all Regional Officer,or
muchsweeteritIthe publicnose. That devicecertainly seemed to smell
somedifficultperiods. helped to get us over
I have no time to go throughthe list of the lessons
we
learningthem every day. Thereare,however,two points leamt; we were
tomake. We sufferedthe consequeneesof our failure that I shouldlike
to Africanisethe Civil
Serviceand to trainAfricansto occupythe seniorposts in
longbefore. It i? anathema,and understandablyso, to the CivilService
oncominginto powerfor the Ministersto find a NationalistParty
themselvessurroundedby a
phalanxof seniorcivil servants,all of whomcome from
fromtheir own country: this tends to make noIlsense overseasand none
theyareobtairlingindependence. of their claim that
We sufferedalso the consequencesof not having
foreseenin time and not
startingsufficiently early to reorganiseour local
Ifyou are to have a parliamentarydemocratic government system.
itis unwiseto wait too long beforetrying to makeGovernment at the centre,
your local government
system moredemocraticby establishinglocalelected
ingso entirelyon the traditionalauthonties. It is, councilsandnot depend-
however,easy to be wise
afterthe event, and none of us, I think, ever dreamed
solittle time in whichto preparethese countnesfor that we wouldhave
the independencethey
were seeking.
In 1955came the next Constitution,giving the
ofself-governmentshort of completeindependence largest possiblemeasure
to the countiy.
Assembly consistedof membersall electedundera systemof universal The
franchise: there were no nominatedor otherwiseselected members adult
Assembly. The Cabinetconsistedentirelyof AfricanMinisters in the
byan AfricanPrime Minister: the Governorno presided over
longer
Meetings.But the GoveInor'sreservepowerswere still attended Cabinet
in being, powers
thatI had no occasionto use duringmy eight yearsin
Ghana. Defenceand
3Vol.57

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36 Al?RICAN APFAIRS

external affairswere still reservedsubjects that lay within the discretion

of the Governor,but duringthose last two years beforeiIldependence,my
powersin relationto these two subjectswereexercisedin full consultation
with the Ministersand our task in the Governor'sofficewas to establishthe
embryosof the futureMinistryof Defenceand MinistIyof ExternalAffairs.
My time is up and I must stop. In Marchthis year Ghallaachievedits
independence.To revertto the questionof whetherwe went too fast, the
" Now, now, now" of the C.P.P. lasted for some seven years beforeself-
govetomentwasachieved,andachievedunthgoodwillon bothsides. I do not
know whetherit would have been possibleto slow things down and still
retainthat gd will; andif that goodwillhad beenlost, I wonderwhether
Ghanawouldstill be a memberof the Commonwealth ? That is as far as I
will go in answeringmy ownquestion.

. -

Lnscusslon
A MEMBERof the audience, who recalledthe lecturer'sremarksthat but for inviting
Kwame Nkrumah to become Chief Ministerthe Constitution would have becoxneun-
workable,with very seriousconsequences,said that a rathersimilarsituation was arising
in Kenya. Although Africax were refusing to work the Constitution, the Kenya
Governmenthad had the courageof its convictions to say that &overnmentcould go on
periectly well without them, because the African elected mexnberswere not, in fact
representingthe Africanpeople. As faras Nkrumah'sparty wasconcerned,the numberof
Ghanaiansparticipatingin the last general election in Ghana was only one-sixth of the
population, and it seemed an appalling betrayal of responsibility to the remaining
five-sixths that for the sake of friendly relationswith a small clique, the country should
have been handed over in the way that it was.
Sir Charles ARDEN-CLARKE, in reply, contented himself with saying that the
conditions in Ghana and those in Kenya were entirely different.
A MEMBER, who had stayed in Kumasi in 1954, said that she had experienced a
great sense of resentmentand hatred towardsthe British and hoped that it had now died
down.
Sir CharlesARDEN-CLARKEreplied that the membermust have been unfortunate
in her contacts. There was certainly some fairly bad inter-racialfeeling in the early
stages immediately after the 1948 riots and until the emergency cleared the air, but
subsequentlyone was surprisedand enormouslypleased at the lack of racial feeling that
existed among the people. Their aim was not so much to get the European out as to
stop him being the alien dominating power. Subject to this, Sir CharlesArden^Clarke
thought that if Europeanswere preparedto stay and help, they would be welcomed.
A MEMBER asked whether it would be safe to assume that the tendency to take
dictatorial power was but a laudable effort to maintain the integrity and unity of the
country and to prevent it from going, as it was feared Nigeria might go, into different
sections.
Sir CharlesARDEN-CLARKErepliedthat that would be a quite good assumptionto
make, but whetherit was entirely safe he was not preparedto say. He did not, howevert
think that there was any desirefor a real dictatorshipin Ghana,or that there was anyone
there who would, or could, make an effective dictator.
A MEMBERpointed out that one of the great problemsapparentlyfacing the presen
Governmentwas the fact that there was only one party on a truly zational basis. This
presumablyarose duringthe colonial periodfrom the fact that there was only one party
basingitself on the one negative aim of excluding British power. Was there any way in
which, during that period, more than one nationally-based party could have been

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 EIGHT YEARS OF T>NSITION IN GHANA 37

eneouragedto gronvup, and was there any way of applying lessons to other parts ot
Africato encouragea multi-partysystem beforethe handirlg^over
of power A
Sir Charies AR1)EN-CLARKE, in reply, recalled that an American journalist who
onee asked Nkrumah when he thought an effective Oppostion would emerge was
given the answer " Until independenee, there is only one political platform-that is
indepetldeneand I happen to be occupying it." It was probably not peculiar to
Ghana that there was a monolithic nationalist party and that an Opposition wm slow
tcxemerge. An effective Qpposition was, howearer,now emerpng, and possibly more
effectively than in India, which had had many years of independenee.
A MEMBERasked whetherthere was mllch contact between the people in the South
and those in the North and whether arly attempt was made to get the two to mix by
fcr example, encouragingpeople in the South to sperldtheir holidays in the North.
Sir CharlesARDEN-CLARKErepliedthat he did not krlowof any deliberateGovern-
ment action to encouragethe people to mix, and it was difficult to see what the Govern-
ment nuld do; but the general development of commumcations,edlKation and trade
and commerceitl the country wm acting as an excellent mixing machine.
A MEMBER asked whether the lecturercould add one detail to his very human and
dramatic story by saying whether he sought authority in London before inviting
Nkrumahto come to GovernmentHollse.
Sir CharlesARDEN-CLARKErepliedthat he could not remember.
A MEM13ERasked whetherthe Volta scheme was making progress.
Sir CharlesARI)EN-CLARKE replied that it was not. It was still a scheme which
requireda very large amollnt of money. The search for the money was continuing, but
it did not seem to have been very successfuls{)far.
Miss S{argeryPERHAM, in closing the discussion, said that as a student of colonial
history she felt that the lecturerhad made a real axldimportant contnbution to a chapter
cf history which was half colonial and the other hawlfof which relatedto the achievenzent
of independence. What he had said had soundeddisarminglysimple, but nobody would
be deceived into thinking that it was quite as simple as that. The fact that underalmost
xntolerablestrainsand complicationshe had so managedto retairlthe good will of people
whom he had ruled and who had claimed their independencethat they had aked for their
Govemor to remain was a fairly good comment on the way that he had handled the
wituatior..
Althollgh it might sound easy, it shollld not be forgotten what tremendous strairLs
these situations threw not only upon the Governor,but upon his staff. These strans
were now being taken in other countries and would be taken elsewhere. Those who
representedBritain in these places and who were taking the strala requiredfromthose at
hotne, not sympathy, but a very intelligent undentanding of what was happening. An
address such as that to which members had listened today would help to bring about
that urlderstandingfor the men who representedthe nation in the present very diffi&ult
tinles.

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