BALBINA MENDOZA vs. PACIANO DIZON (1946) REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP. vs.

SENDINO (1994)

FACTS: It covers the file on the application filed on the request submitted originally before FACTS: Private respondent Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with Realty
the Court by Balbina Mendoza, appellant, in which the Assembly requested that, under the Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a house and lot in a subdivision. She paid a partial
faculty which confers on us the rule 45 of the Rules of the Courts. In 1932 Cuevas married reservation fee and paid the full down payment. However, for alleged non-compliance with
Florence Cocadiz. This marriage was definitively dissolved on March 21, 1944 by virtue of a the requirement of submission of the appropriate documents, REVI, informed respondent of
decree divorce issued by the Court of First Instance in Batangas on that date. There was no the cancellation of the contract. Sendino filed a complaint for Specific Performance against
off spring. In December 7, 1945 the President of the Philippines of Commonwealth issued REVI with the Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use
Administrative Order No. 27 in which under certain conditions is available to the bonuses or Regulatory Board (HLURB). The HLURB, whose authority to hear and decide the complaint
gratuities to officials and employees of the Government National who had been in active was challenged by REVI, rendered its judgment in favor of private respondent and ordered
service in December 8, 1941, have been or not called to return to their jobs after the REVI to continue with the sale of the house and lot. An appeal from this decision was taken
liberation. Later - 12 March 1946 - the Auditor General Delegate, making use of course to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The decision of the
powers conferred on it by article 262 of the Administrative Code, solved the substance of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the President, herein public respondent. Appeal
instance of Balbina Mendoza, dictating the following judgment: As the gratuity of the late dismissed.
Juan M. Cuevas under Administrative Order No. 27, dated December 7,1945, corresponds to ISSUE: Whether or not the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions, notwithstanding absence of
his salary for the months of January and February, 1942, during which his marriage with express grant by Executive Order No. 90 which created it.
Florencia Cocadiz in 1932 was not yet dissolved, the decree of their divorce having been
issued by the Court of First Instance of Batangas only on March 21, 1944, the said gratuity RULING: Yes. While E.O. 85 abolished the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS), it is
should be deemed to be a part of their conjugal estate. Only one-half thereof may, therefore, patently clear from a reading of its provisions that the said executive order did not abolish the
be paid to his surviving mother, the herein claimant, who is hereby designated as his next of Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) which continued to exercise its powers
kin, the other half being payable to his divorced wife as her share. and functions. In spite of the Aquino Government's stated intention of eradicating what it
considered the vestiges of the previous regime, it was not its intention to create a vacuum by
ISSUE: Whether such gratuity should be considered as goods belonging to the acquisitions abolishing those juridical agencies which performed vital administrative functions.
of the deceased and his wife divorced.
The President subsequently issued Executive Order No. 90, series of 1986, recognizing the
RULING: Bonuses or gratuities should governed the concerned that the law provides, that Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (renamed the HLURB) as one of the principal
is, by Order No.27 administrator had character and strength under the emergency powers housing agencies of the government. Prior to this, Executive Order No. 648 in 1981
granted by the Legislature to the President of the Philippines in the wake of war, according to transferred all the functions of the National Housing Authority to the Human Settlements
the Constitution. Regulatory Commission (HSRC) consolidating all regulatory functions relating to land use
and housing development in a single entity. Being the sole regulatory body for housing and
However, the said Order Management uses the word gratuity that has a meaning known, land development, the renamed body, the HLURB, would have been reduced to a
categorical and conclusive on the law and jurisprudence. Provide for a rapid authority of functionally sterile entity if, as the petitioner contends, it lacked the powers exercised by its
gratuity as an equivalent and not salary, wages or other remuneration. It means gift, award, predecessor which included the power to settle disputes concerning land use and housing
and present, something that is given and received by lucrative title. In this case the difference development and acquisition.
accentuate the two concepts when one considers that Congress, in its Joint Resolution No. 5
adopted on July 28,1945, recommended the study of "ways and means to pay the back Moreover, this Court, in United Housing Corporation vs. Hon. Dayrit, has had the occasion to
salaries, gratuities, bonuses or other emoluments of the loyal and deserving employees of definitively rule that the HLURB could exercise the same quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial
the Commonwealth On merits of the above, amending appeal subject to the opinion and powers possessed by the HSRC under the MHS in the exercise of its regulatory functions.
states that the appellant has received the total amount of the gratuity belongs to the Section 1 of PD 1344: the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
deceased John M. Cuevas, subject of course to any valid claim against the property of the and decide cases of the following nature: (c) Cases involving specific performance of
deceased under the laws on good of the dead. No charge. contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
This is reinforced by section 8 of EO 648: Transfer of Functions. — The Regulatory functions Tanada vs Tuvera which states that all statues including those of local application and
of the NHA are hereby transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. . . . private laws shall be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days
Among the regulatory functions are . . . (11) Hear and decide cases of unsound real estate after publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless a
business practices, claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO under consideration is one of
brokers, or salesmen and cases of specific performance. There is no question that a statute those issuances which should be published for its effectivity since it is punitive in character.
may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and
controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. In general, the quantum of judicial CRISOSTOMO vs COURT OF APPEALS (1996)
or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the
agency's enabling act. Going to petitioners' contention that the decision of the OAALA FACTS: Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine College of Commerce
should have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners sitting en banc, instead of by a (PCC), having been appointed to that position by the President of the Philippines on July 17,
division of three: Under Section 5 of E.O. 648 which defines the powers and duties of the 1974. During his incumbency as president of the PCC, two administrative cases were filed
Commission, the Board is specifically mandated to "(a)dopt rules of procedure for the
against petitioner, which were filed with the Office of the President, and were subsequently
conduct of its business" and perform such functions necessary for the effective
accomplishment of (its) above mentioned functions." referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. On October 22, 1976,
petitioner was preventively suspended from office pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, as amended. In
Nothing in the provisions of either E.O. 90 or E.O. 648 denies or withholds the power or his place Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer-in-charge on November 10, 1976,
authority to delegate adjudicatory functions to a division. We cannot see how the Board, for and then as Acting President on May 13, 1977. On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued
the purpose of effectively carrying out its administrative responsibilities and quasi-judicial by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF
powers as a regulatory body should be denied the power, as a matter of practical COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES,
administrative procedure, to constitute its adjudicatory boards into various divisions. After all,
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS
the power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations necessary
to carry out its functions has been held "to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a CURRICULAR OFFERINGS. Mateo continued as the head of the new University. On April 3,
particular function, unless by express provision of the Act or by implication it has been 1979, he was appointed Acting President and on March 28, 1980, as President for a term of
withheld." six (6)years. On July 11, 1980, the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment
acquitting petitioner of the charges against him. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 13,
PHILIPPINES INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATIOON vs. ANGELES R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
and under which the accused has been suspended by this Court in an Order dated October
FACTS: PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which applications
to the PITC for importation from the People’s Republic of China must be accompanied by a 22, 1976, said accused was ordered reinstated to the position of President of the Philippine
viable and confirmed export program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and College of Commerce, now known as the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, from
Firestone from importing products from China on the ground that they were not able to which he has been suspended. By virtue of said reinstatement, he is entitled to receive the
comply with the requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
for prohibition and mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. The bail bonds filed by
and declared to be null and void for being unconstitutional. The court contends further the accused for his provisional liberty in these cases are hereby cancelled and released.
authority to process and approve applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and
regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February On February 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for execution of
27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of the said decision.
the judgment, particularly the part ordering his reinstatement to the position of president of
ISSUE: Whether or not PITC’s Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid. the PUP and the payment of his salaries and other benefits during the period of suspension.
The motion was granted and a partial writ of execution was issued by the trial court on March
HELD: The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, 6, 1992. On March 26, 1992, however, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime
the said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Gellor as acting president of the PUP, following the expiration of the term of office of Dr.
Nemesio Prudente, who had succeeded Dr. Mateo. Petitioner was one of the five nominees
considered by the President of the Philippines for the position. The sheriff stated that he had
executed the writ by installing petitioner as President of the PUP, although Dr. Gellor did not
vacate the office as he wanted to consult with the President of the Philippines first. This led
to a contempt citation against Dr. Gellor. Petitioner assumed the office of president of the
PUP.
On May 18, 1992, therefore, the People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, assailing the orders and the writs of execution issued by the trial court. It also
asked for a temporary restraining order. On June 25, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a
temporary restraining order, enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from acting as president
of the PUP pursuant to the reinstatement orders of the trial court. On July 15, 1992, the
Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a decision to set aside the orders and writ
of reinstatement issued by the trial court. The payment of salaries and benefits to petitioner
accruing after the conversion of the PCC to the PUP was disallowed. Recovery of salaries
and benefits was limited to those accruing from the time of petitioner’s suspension until the
conversion of the PCC to the PUP.
The case was remanded to the trial court for a determination of the amounts due and
payable to petitioner. Hence this petition. Petitioner argues that P.D. No. 1341, which
converted the PCC into the PUP, did not abolish the PCC. He contends that if the law had
intended the PCC to lose its existence, it would have specified that the PCC was being
"abolished" rather than "converted" and that if the PUP was intended to be a new institution,
the law would have said it was being "created." Petitioner claims that the PUP is merely a
continuation of the existence of the PCC, and, hence, he could be reinstated to his former
position as president.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conversion of the PCC into PUP abolished the PCC
RULING: No. In part the contention is well taken, but, as will presently be explained,
reinstatement is no longer possible because of the promulgation of P.D. No. 1437 by the
President of the Philippines on June 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only
changed, the former Philippine College of Commerce into what is now the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, in the same way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had
converted what was then the Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine College of
Commerce. What took place was a change in academic status of the educational institution,
not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its name, the expansion of its curricular
offerings, and the changes in its structure and organization. As petitioner correctly points out,
when the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to replace it
with another one, the lawmaking authority says so. But the reinstatement of petitioner to the
position of president of the PUP could not be ordered by the trial court because on June 10,
1978, P.D. No. 1437 had been promulgated fixing the term of office of presidents of state
universities and colleges at six (6) years, renewable for another term of six (6) years, and
authorizing the President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of incumbents who were
not reappointed. RATIO: When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an
organization and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so. What took
place was a change in academic status of the educational institution, not in its corporate life.
Hence the change in its name, the expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its
structure and organization.
VIOLA vs ALUNAN III (1997)
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition challenging the validity of Art. III, 1-2 of the Revised
Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay
Officers so far as they provide for the election of first, second and third vice presidents and
for auditors for the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters. Petitioner Cesar G.
Viola brought this action as barangay chairman of Bgy. 167, Zone 15, District II, Manila
against then Secretary of Interior and Local Government Rafael M. Alunan III, Alex L. David,
president/secretary general of the National Liga ng mga Barangay, and Leonardo L. Angat,
president of the City of Manila Liga ng mga Barangay, to restrain them from carrying out the
elections for the questioned positions on July 3, 1994. Petitioners contention is that the
positions in question are in excess of those provided in the Local Government Code (R.A.
No. 7160), 493 of which mentions as elective positions only those of president, vice
president, and five members of the board of directors in each chapter at the municipal, city,
provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels. Petitioner argues that, in
providing for the positions of first, second and third vice presidents and auditor for each
chapter, 1-2 of the Implementing Rules expand the number of positions authorized in 493 of
the Local Government Code in violation of the principle that implementing rules and
regulations cannot add or detract from the provisions of the law they are designed to
implement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the additional positions in question have been created without
authority of law.
RULING: No. Petitioners contention that the additional positions in question have been
created without authority of law is untenable. To begin with, the creation of these positions
was actually made in the Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng Mga Barangay, which was
adopted by the First Barangay National Assembly on January 11, 1994. The post of
executive vice president is in reality that of the vice president in 493 of the LGC, so that the
only additional positions created for each chapter in the Constitution and By-laws are those
of first, second and third vice presidents and auditor. Contrary to petitioners contention, the
creation of the additional positions is authorized by the LGC which provides as follows: 493.
Organization. The liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and
national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5) members of the board
of directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer and create such other
positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter. A secretary-general
shall be elected from among the members of the national liga and shall be charged with the
overall operation of the liga on the national level. The board shall coordinate the activities of
the chapters of the liga. This provision in fact requires and not merely authorizes the board of
directors to create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the
chapter and belies petitioners claim that said provision (493) limits the officers of a chapter to
the president, vice president, five members of the board of directors, secretary, and
treasurer. That Congress can delegate the power to create positions such as these has been
settled by our decisions upholding the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the
President of the Philippines to create, abolish or merge offices in the executive department.
The question is whether, in making a delegation of this power to the board of directors of
each chapter of the Liga ng Mga Barangay, Congress provided a sufficient standard so that,
in the phrase of Justice Cardozo, administrative discretion may be canalized within proper
banks that keep it from overflowing. We hold that 493 of the Local Government Code, in
directing the board of directors of the liga to create such other positions as may be deemed
necessary for the management of the chapters, embodies a fairly intelligible standard. There
is no undue delegation of power by Congress. RATIO: Congress can delegate the power to
create positions such as these has been settled by decisions upholding the validity of
reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the Philippines to create, abolish or
merge offices in the executive department.
DARIO vs MISON (1989)
FACTS: On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3,
"DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY
THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL
CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A
GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION. Among other things, Proclamation No. 3
provided: SECTION 1. The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate
of the people to: (a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive
structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime. Actually, the reorganization
process started as early as February 25, 1986, when the President, in her first act in office,
called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignations beginning with
the members of the Supreme Court." Later on, she abolished the Batasang Pambansa and
the positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet under the 1973 Constitution. On May 28, 1986, ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 127, which provided for the reorganization of the
the President enacted Executive Order No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES AND Bureau of Customs is valid
REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE
FREEDOM CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety
and demoralization among the deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government
reorganization had generated, and prescribed several grounds for the
separation/replacement of personnel. Specifically, she said on May 28, 1986: WHEREAS, in
order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the deserving officials and
employees, particularly in the career civil service, it is necessary to prescribe the rules and
regulations for implementing the said constitutional provision to protect career civil servants
whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of service demanded by the New
Government, and to ensure that only those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are
separated from the government service. Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the
Executive Order that dismissals should be made on the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft,
and unfitness to render public service. The President’s Memorandum of October 14, 1987
should furthermore be considered. We quote, in part: Further to the Memorandum dated
October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have ordered that there will be no further lay-offs this
year of personnel as a result of the government reorganization. On January 30, 1987, the
President promulgated Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF
FINANCE." Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the reorganization of
the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor. Three days later, on
February 2, 1987, the Filipino people adopted the new Constitution. On January 6, 1988,
incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in the nature
of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," prescribing the
procedure in personnel placement. On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a
Reorganization Appeals Board charged with adjudicating appeals from removals under the
above Memorandum. On January 26, 1988, Commissioner Mison addressed several notices
to various Customs officials. As far as the records will likewise reveal, a total of 394 officials
and employees of the Bureau of Customs were given individual notices of separation. A
number supposedly sought reinstatement with the Reorganization Appeals Board while
others went to the Civil Service Commission. The first thirty one mentioned above came
directly to this Court. The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about
394 Customs personnel but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988. On June 30,
1988, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement of the
279 employees. On July 15, 1988, Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor
General, filed a motion for reconsideration. Acting on the motion, the Civil Service
Commission, on September 20, 1988, denied reconsideration. On October 20, 1988,
Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari proceedings with this Court. On November 16,
1988, the Civil Service Commission further disposed the appeal (from the resolution of the
Reorganization Appeals Board) of five more employees. On January 6, 1989, Commissioner
Mison challenged the Civil Service Commission’s Resolution in this Court.
 reorganization in good faith is still removal "not for cause," if by "cause" we refer to "grounds"
RULING: Yes. There is no question that the administration may validly carry out a or conditions that call for disciplinary action. Good faith, as a component of a reorganization
government reorganization — insofar as these cases are concerned, the reorganization of under a constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of each case. The records indeed
the Bureau of Customs — by mandate not only of the Provisional Constitution, supra, but show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel but replaced them
also of the various Executive Orders decreed by the Chief Executive in her capacity as sole with 522 as of August 18, 1988. This betrays a clear intent to "pack" the Bureau of Customs.
lawmaking authority under the 1986-1987 revolutionary government. It should also be noted He did so, furthermore, in defiance of the President’s directive to halt further lay-offs as a
that under the present Constitution, there is a recognition, albeit implied, that a government consequence of reorganization. Finally, he was aware that lay-offs should observe the
reorganization may be legitimately undertaken, subject to certain conditions. The core procedure laid down by Executive Order No. 17. We are not, of course, striking down
provision of law involved is Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution. Sec. 16. Career Executive Order No. 127 for repugnancy to the Constitution. While the act is valid, still and
civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result of the all, the means with which it was implemented is not. It can be seen that the Act, insofar as it
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization provides for reinstatement of employees separated without "a valid cause and after due
following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay notice and hearing" is not contrary to the transitory provisions of the new Constitution. The
and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application in Court reiterates that although the Charter’s transitory provisions mention separations "not for
force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may cause," separations thereunder must nevertheless be on account of a valid reorganization
be considered for employment in the Government or in any of its subdivisions, and which do not come about automatically. Otherwise, security of tenure may be invoked.
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and Moreover, it can be seen that the statute itself recognizes removals without cause. However,
their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered it also acknowledges the possibility of the leadership using the artifice of reorganization to
in line with the existing policy, had been accepted. It is also to be observed that unlike the frustrate security of tenure. For this reason, it has installed safeguards. There is nothing
grants of power to effect reorganizations under the past Constitutions, the above provision unconstitutional about the Act. RATIO: Reorganizations have been regarded as valid
comes as a mere recognition of the right of the Government to reorganize its offices, provided they are pursued in good faith. ---
bureaus, and instrumentalities. Other than references to "reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution," there is no provision for "automatic" vacancies under the
1987 Constitution. Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for
"automatic" vacancies. They are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to
the new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process and security of tenure. At this
point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of office (not by
virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to
remove redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the Government is obliged to prove good
faith. In case of removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit constitutional
mandates, the Government is not hard put to prove anything, plainly and simply because the
Constitution allows it. Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid
provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in
"good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that
event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the
position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese
wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is
done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good
faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There
is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or
where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. It is to be stressed that
by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good faith, we are not, as a
consequence, imposing a "cause" for restructuring. Retrenchment in the course of a