CHINA BANKING CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
This Rule 45 Petition1 requires this Court to address the
question of prescription of the government’s right to collect
taxes. Petitioner China Banking Corporation (CBC) assails the
Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En
Banc in CTA En Banc Case No. 109. The CTA En
Banc affirmed the Decision4 in CTA Case No. 6379 of the CTA
Second Division, which had also affirmed the validity of
Assessment No. FAS-5-82/85-89-000586 and FAS-5-86-89-
00587. The Assessment required petitioner CBC to pay the
amount of P11,383,165.50, plus increments accruing thereto, as
deficiency documentary stamp tax (DST) for the taxable years
1982 to 1986.
FACTS
Petitioner CBC is a universal bank duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines. For the taxable years 1982 to
1986, CBC was engaged in transactions involving sales of
foreign exchange to the Central Bank of the Philippines
(now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas), commonly known as SWAP
transactions.5 Petitioner did not file tax returns or pay tax on the
SWAP transactions for those taxable years.
On 19 April 1989, petitioner CBC received an assessment from
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) finding CBC liable for
deficiency DST on the sales of foreign bills of exchange to the
Central Bank. The deficiency DST was computed as follows:
Deficiency Documentary Stamp
Tax
Amount
For the years 1982 to P 8,280,696.00
1985
For calendar year 1986 P 2,481 ,975.60
Add : Surcharge P 620,493.90 P 3,102.469.50
P11 ,383,165.506
On 8 May 1989, petitioner CBC, through its vice-president, sent
a letter of protest to the BIR. CBC raised the following defenses:
(1) double taxation, as the bank had previously paid the DST on
all its transactions involving sales of foreign bills of exchange to
the Central Bank; (2) absence of liability, as the liability for the
DST in a sale of foreign exchange through telegraphic transfers
to the Central Bank falls on the buyer ? in this case, the Central
Bank; (3) due process violation, as the bank’s records were
never formally examined by the BIR examiners; (4) validity of
the assessment, as it did not include the factual basis therefore;
(5) exemption, as neither the tax-exempt entity nor the other
party was liable for the payment of DST before the effectivity of
Presidential Decree Nos. (PD) 1177 and 1931 for the years 1982
to 1986.7 In the protest, the taxpayer requested a reinvestigation
so as to substantiate its
assertions.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On 6 December 2001, more than 12 years after the filing of
the protest, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)
rendered a decision reiterating the deficiency DST assessment
and ordered the payment thereof plus increments within 30 days
from receipt of the Decision.9chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On 18 January 2002, CBC filed a Petition for Review with the
CTA. On 11 March 2002, the CIR filed an Answer with a
demand for CBC to pay the assessed DST. 1
On 23 February 2005, and after trial on the merits, the CTA
Second Division denied the Petition of CBC. The CTA ruled that
a SWAP arrangement should be treated as a telegraphic
transfer subject to documentary stamp
tax.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On 30 March 2005, petitioner CBC filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was denied in a Resolution dated 14 July
2005.
On 5 August 2005, petitioner appealed to the CTA En Banc. The
appellate tax court, however, dismissed the Petition for Review
in a Decision dated 1 December 2005. CBC filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on 21 December 2005, but it was denied in a
20 March 2006 Resolution.
The taxpayer now comes to this Court with a Rule 45 Petition,
reiterating the arguments it raised at the CTA level and invoking
for the first time the argument of prescription. Petitioner CBC
states that the government has three years from 19 April 1989,
the date the former received the assessment of the CIR, to
collect the tax. Within that time frame, however, neither a
warrant of distraint or levy was issued, nor a collection case filed
in court.
On 17 October 2006, respondent CIR submitted its Comment in
compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated 26 June
2006.12 The Comment did not have any discussion on the
question of prescription.
On 21 February 2007, the Court issued a Resolution directing
the parties to file their respective Memoranda. Petitioner CBC
filed its Memorandum13 on 26 April 2007. The CIR, on the other
hand, filed on 17 April 2007 a Manifestation stating that it was
adopting the allegations and authorities in its Comment in lieu of
the required Memorandum.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ISSUE
Given the facts and the arguments raised in this case, the
resolution of this case hinges on this issue: whether the right of
the BIR to collect the assessed DST from CBC is barred by
prescription.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RULING OF THE COURT
We grant the Petition on the ground that the right of the BIR to
collect the assessed DST is barred by the statute of limitations.
Prescription Has Set In.
To recall, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued the
assessment for deficiency DST on 19 April 1989, when the
applicable rule was Section 319(c) of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1977, as amended.16 In that provision, the
time limit for the government to collect the assessed tax is set at
three years, to be reckoned from the date when the BIR
mails/releases/sends the assessment notice to the taxpayer.
Further, Section 319(c) states that the assessed tax must be
collected by distraint or levy and/or court proceeding within the
three-year period.
With these rules in mind, we shall now determine whether the
claim of the BIR is barred by time.
In this case, the records do not show when the assessment
notice was mailed, released or sent to CBC. Nevertheless, the
latest possible date that the BIR could have released, mailed or
sent the assessment notice was on the same date that CBC
received it, 19 April 1989. Assuming therefore that 19 April 1989
is the reckoning date, the BIR had three years to collect the
assessed DST. However, the records of this case show that
there was neither a warrant of distraint or levy served on CBC's
properties nor a collection case filed in court by the BIR within
the three-year period.
The attempt of the BIR to collect the tax through its Answer with
a demand for CBC to pay the assessed DST in the CTA on 11
March 2002 did not comply with Section 319(c) of the 1977 Tax
Code, as amended. The demand was made almost thirteen
years from the date from which the prescriptive period is to be
reckoned. Thus, the attempt to collect the tax was made way
beyond the three-year prescriptive period.
The BIR’s Answer in the case filed before the CTA could not, by
any means, have qualified as a collection case as required by
law. Under the rule prevailing at the time the BIR filed its Answer,
the regular courts, and not the CTA, had jurisdiction over judicial
actions for collection of internal revenue taxes. It was only on 23
April 2004, when Republic Act Number 9282 took effect,17 that
the jurisdiction of the CTA was expanded to include, among
others, original jurisdiction over collection cases in which the
principal amount involved is one million pesos or more.
Consequently, the claim of the CIR for deficiency DST from
petitioner is forever lost, as it is now barred by time. This Court
has no other option but to dismiss the present case.
The running of the statute of
limitations was not suspended
by the request for reinvestigation.
The fact that the taxpayer in this case may have requested a
reinvestigation did not toll the running of the three-year
prescriptive period. Section 320 of the 1977 Tax Code states:
Sec. 320. Suspension of running of statute.—The running of the
statute of limitations provided in Sections 318 or 319 on the
making of assessment and the beginning of distraint or levy or a
proceeding in court for collection, in respect of any deficiency,
shall be suspended for the period during which the
Commissioner is prohibited from making the assessment or
beginning distraint or levy or a proceeding in court and for sixty
days thereafter; when the taxpayer requests for a re-
investigation which is granted by the Commissioner; when
the taxpayer cannot be located in the address given by him in
the return filed upon which a tax is being assessed or
collected: Provided, That if the taxpayer informs the
Commissioner of any change in address, the running of the
statute of limitations will not be suspended; when the warrant of
distraint and levy is duly served upon the taxpayer, his
authorized representative, or a member of his household with
sufficient discretion, and no property could be located; and when
the taxpayer is out of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
The provision is clear. A request for reinvestigation alone will
not suspend the statute of limitations. Two things must concur:
there must be a request for reinvestigation and the CIR must
have granted it. BPI v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue18 emphasized this rule by stating:
In the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Gancayco, taxpayer
Gancayco requested for a thorough reinvestigation of the
assessment against him and placed at the disposal of the
Collector of Internal Revenue all the [evidence] he had for such
purpose; yet, the Collector ignored the request, and the records
and documents were not at all examined. Considering the given
facts, this Court pronounced that—
x x x. The act of requesting a reinvestigation alone does not
suspend the period. The request should first be granted, in
order to effect suspension. (Collector v. Suyoc Consolidated,
supra; also Republic v. Ablaza, supra). Moreover, the Collector
gave appellee until April 1, 1949, within which to submit his
evidence, which the latter did one day before. There were no
impediments on the part of the Collector to file the collection
case from April 1, 1949 x x x.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Acebedo, this Court similarly
found that —
. . . [T]he defendant, after receiving the assessment notice of
September 24, 1949, asked for a reinvestigation thereof on
October 11, 1949 (Exh. “A”). There is no evidence that this
request was considered or acted upon. In fact, on October 23,
1950 the then Collector of Internal Revenue issued a warrant of
distraint and levy for the full amount of the assessment (Exh.
“D”), but there was follow-up of this warrant. Consequently, the
request for reinvestigation did not suspend the running of the
period for filing an action for collection. (Emphasis in the
original)
The Court went on to declare that the burden of proof that the
request for reinvestigation had been actually granted shall be on
the CIR. Such grant may be expressed in its communications
with the taxpayer or implied from the action of the CIR or his
authorized representative in response to the request for
reinvestigation.
There is nothing in the records of this case which indicates,
expressly or impliedly, that the CIR had granted the request for
reinvestigation filed by BPI. What is reflected in the records is
the piercing silence and inaction of the CIR on the request for
reinvestigation, as he considered BPI's letters of protest to be.
In the present case, there is no showing from the records that
the CIR ever granted the request for reinvestigation filed by
CBC. That being the case, it cannot be said that the running of
the three-year prescriptive period was effectively suspended.
Failure to raise prescription at the
administrative level/lower court as a
defense is of no moment. When the pleadings or the
evidence on record show that the claim is barred by
prescription, the court must dismiss the claim even if
prescription is not raised as a defense.
We note that petitioner has raised the issue of prescription for
the first time only before this Court. While we are mindful of the
established rule of remedial law that the defense of prescription
must be raised at the trial court that has also been applied for
tax cases.19 Thus, as a rule, the failure to raise the defense of
prescription at the administrative level prevents the taxpayer
from raising it at the appeal stage.
This rule, however, is not absolute.
The facts of the present case are substantially identical to those
in the 2014 case, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.20 In that case, petitioner
received an assessment notice from the BIR for deficiency DST
based on petitioner’s SWAP transactions for the year 1985 on
16 June 1989. On 23 June 1989, BPI, through its counsel, filed
a protest requesting the reinvestigation and/or reconsideration
of the assessment for lack of legal or factual bases. Almost ten
years later, the CIR, in a letter dated 4 August 1998, denied the
protest. On 4 January 1999, BPI filed a Petition for Review with
the CTA. On 23 February 1999, the CIR filed an Answer with a
demand for BPI to pay the assessed DST. It was only when the
case ultimately reached this Court that the issue of prescription
was brought up. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the CIR could
no longer collect the assessed tax due to prescription. Basing
its ruling on Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and on
jurisprudence, the Court held as follows:
In a Resolution dated 5 August 2013, the Court, through the
Third Division, found that the assailed tax assessment may be
invalidated because the statute of limitations on the collection of
the alleged deficiency DST had already expired, conformably
with Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and the Bank of the
Philippine Islands v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
decision. However, to afford due process, the Court required
both BPI and CIR to submit their respective comments on the
issue of prescription.
Only the CIR filed his comment on 9 December 2013. In his
Comment, the CIR argues that the issue of prescription cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal. The CIR further alleges
that even assuming that the issue of prescription can be raised,
the protest letter interrupted the prescriptive period to collect the
assessed DST, unlike in the Bank of the Philippine Islands case.
x x x x
We deny the right of the BIR to collect the assessed DST on the
ground of prescription.
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from
the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that
the action is barred by prior judgment or by the statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
If the pleadings or the evidence on record show that the
claim is barred by prescription, the court is mandated to
dismiss the claim even if prescription is not raised as a
defense. In Heirs of Valientes v. Ramas, we ruled that the CA
may motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of prescription
despite failure to raise this ground on appeal. The court is
imbued with sufficient discretion to review matters, not otherwise
assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration
is necessary in arriving at a complete and just resolution of the
case. More so, when the provisions on prescription were
enacted to benefit and protect taxpayers from investigation after
a reasonable period of time.
Thus, we proceed to determine whether the period to collect the
assessed DST for the year 1985 has prescribed.
To determine prescription, what is essential only is that the facts
demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period were
sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record either in the
allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint, or otherwise established
by the evidence. Under the then applicable Section 319(c) [now,
222(c)] of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1977,
as amended, any internal revenue tax which has been assessed
within the period of limitation may be collected by distraint or
levy, and/or court proceeding within three years following the
assessment of the tax. The assessment of the tax is deemed
made and the three-year period for collection of the assessed
tax begins to run on the date the assessment notice had been
released, mailed or sent by the BIR to the taxpayer.
In the present case, although there was no allegation as to when
the assessment notice had been released, mailed or sent to BPI,
still, the latest date that the BIR could have released, mailed or
sent the assessment notice was on the date BPI received the
same on 16 June 1989. Counting the three-year prescriptive
period from 16 June 1989, the BIR had until 15 June 1992 to
collect the assessed DST. But despite the lapse of 15 June
1992, the evidence established that there was no warrant of
distraint or levy served on BPI’s properties, or any judicial
proceedings initiated by the BIR.
The earliest attempt of the BIR to collect the tax was when it filed
its answer in the CTA on 23 February 1999, which was several
years beyond the three-year prescriptive period. However, the
BIR’s answer in the CTA was not the collection case
contemplated by the law. Before 2004 or the year Republic Act
No. 9282 took effect, the judicial action to collect internal
revenue taxes fell under the jurisdiction of the regular trial courts,
and not the CTA. Evidently, prescription has set in to bar the
collection of the assessed DST. (Emphasis supplied)
BPI thus provides an exception to the rule against raising the
defense of prescription for the first time on appeal: the exception
arises when the pleadings or the evidence on record show
that the claim is barred by prescription.
sleep on its rights. The analogy fosters inequality between the
taxpayer and the government, with the balance tilting in favor of
the latter. This concept finds justification in the theory and reality
that government is necessary, and it must therefore collect taxes
if it is to survive. Thus, the mistake or negligence of government
officials should not bind the state, lest it bring harm to the
government and ultimately the people, in whom sovereignty
resides.
Republic v. Ker & Co. Ltd.23 involved a collection case for a final
and executory assessment. The taxpayer nevertheless raised
the prescription of the right to assess the tax as a defense before
the Court of First Instance. The Republic, instead of objecting to
the invocation of prescription as a defense by the taxpayer,
litigated on the issue and thereafter submitted it for resolution.
The Supreme Court ruled for the taxpayer, treating the
actuations of the government as a waiver of the right to invoke
the defense of prescription. Ker effectively applied to the
government the rule of estoppel. Indeed, the no-estoppel rule is
not absolute.
The same ingredients in Ker - procedural matter and injustice -
obtain in this case. The procedural matter consists in the failure
to raise the issue of prescription at the trial court/administrative
level, and injustice in the fact that the BIR has unduly delayed
the assessment and collection of the DST in this case. The fact
is that it took more than 12 years for it to take steps to collect
the assessed tax. The BIR definitely caused untold prejudice to
petitioner, keeping the latter in the dark for so long, as to whether
it is liable for DST and, if so, for how much.
CONCLUSION: Inasmuch as the government’s claim for
deficiency DST is barred by prescription, it is no longer
necessary to dwell on the validity of the as
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Tax
Appeals En Banc Decision dated 1 December 2005 and its
Resolution dated 20 March 2006 in CTA EB Case No. 109 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new ruling is entered
DENYING respondent’s claim for deficiency DST in the amount
of P11,383,165.50. SO ORDERED

In this case, the fact that the claim of the government is time-
barred is a matter of record. As can be seen from the previous
discussion on the determination of the prescription of the right
of the government to claim deficiency DST, the conclusion that
prescription has set in was arrived at using the evidence on
record. The date of receipt of the assessment notice was not
disputed, and the date of the attempt to collect was determined
by merely checking the records as to when the Answer of the
CIR containing the demand to pay the tax was filed.

Estoppel or waiver prevents the government from invoking

the rule against raising the issue of prescription for the first
time on appeal.

In this case, petitioner may have raised the question of

prescription only on appeal to this Court. The BIR could have
crushed the defense by the mere invocation of the rule against
setting up the defense of prescription only at the appeal stage.
The government, however, failed to do so.

On the contrary, the BIR was silent despite having the

opportunity to invoke the bar against the issue of prescription. It
is worthy of note that the Court ordered the BIR to file a
Comment. The government, however, did not offer any
argument in its Comment about the issue of prescription, even
if petitioner raised it in the latter’s Petition. It merely fell silent on
the issue. It was given another opportunity to meet the challenge
when this Court ordered both parties to file their respective
memoranda. The CIR, however, merely filed a Manifestation
that it would no longer be filing a Memorandum and, in lieu
thereof, it would be merely adopting the arguments raised in its
Comment. Its silence spoke loudly of its intent to waive its right
to object to the argument of prescription.

We are mindful of the rule in taxation that estoppel does not

prevent the government from collecting taxes; it is not bound by
the mistake or negligence of its agents. The rule is based on the
political law concept “the king can do no wrong,” 21 which likens
a state to a king: it does not commit mistakes, and it does not

DIAZ V SECRETARY OF FINANCE
May toll fees collected by tollway operators be subjected to
value- added tax?
The Facts and the Case
Petitioners Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbol
(petitioners) filed this petition for declaratory relief [1] assailing the
validity of the impending imposition of value-added tax (VAT) by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on the collections of
tollway operators.
Petitioners claim that, since the VAT would result in
increased toll fees, they have an interest as regular users of
tollways in stopping the BIR action. Additionally, Diaz claims that
he sponsored the approval of Republic Act 7716 (the 1994
Expanded VAT Law or EVAT Law) and Republic Act 8424 (the
1997 National Internal Revenue Code or the NIRC) at the House
of Representatives. Timbol, on the other hand, claims that she
served as Assistant Secretary of the Department of Trade and
Industry and consultant of the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) in
the past administration.
Petitioners allege that the BIR attempted during the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to impose
VAT on toll fees. The imposition was deferred, however, in view
of the consistent opposition of Diaz and other sectors to such
move. But, upon President Benigno C. Aquino IIIs assumption
of office in 2010, the BIR revived the idea and would impose the
challenged tax on toll fees beginning August 16, 2010 unless
judicially enjoined.
Petitioners hold the view that Congress did not, when
it enacted the NIRC, intend to include toll fees within the
meaning of sale of services that are subject to VAT; that a toll
fee is a users tax, not a sale of services; that to impose VAT on
toll fees would amount to a tax on public service; and that, since
VAT was never factored into the formula for computing toll fees,
its imposition would violate the non-impairment clause of the
constitution.
On August 13, 2010 the Court issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO), enjoining the implementation of the
VAT. The Court required the government, represented by
respondents Cesar V. Purisima, Secretary of the Department of
Finance, and Kim S. Jacinto-Henares, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, to comment on the petition within 10 days from
notice.[2] Later, the Court issued another resolution treating the
petition as one for prohibition.[3]
On August 23, 2010 the Office of the Solicitor General filed the
governments comment.[4] The government avers that the NIRC
imposes VAT on all kinds of services of franchise grantees,
including tollway operations, except where the law provides
otherwise; that the Court should seek the meaning and intent of
the law from the words used in the statute; and that the
imposition of VAT on tollway operations has been the subject as
early as 2003 of several BIR rulings and circulars. [5]
The government also argues that petitioners have no
right to invoke the non-impairment of contracts clause since they
clearly have no personal interest in existing toll operating
agreements (TOAs) between the government and tollway
operators. At any rate, the non-impairment clause cannot limit
the States sovereign taxing power which is generally read into
contracts.
Finally, the government contends that the non-inclusion of VAT
in the parametric formula for computing toll rates cannot exempt
tollway operators from VAT. In any event, it cannot be claimed
that the rights of tollway operators to a reasonable rate of return
will be impaired by the VAT since this is imposed on top of the
toll rate. Further, the imposition of VAT on toll fees would have
very minimal effect on motorists using the tollways.
In their reply[6] to the governments comment,
petitioners point out that tollway operators cannot be regarded
as franchise grantees under the NIRC since they do not hold
legislative franchises. Further, the BIR intends to collect the VAT
by rounding off the toll rate and putting any excess collection in
an escrow account. But this would be illegal since only the
Congress can modify VAT rates and authorize its
disbursement. Finally, BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular 63-
2010 (BIR RMC 63-2010), which directs toll companies to record
an accumulated input VAT of zero balance in their books as of
August 16, 2010, contravenes Section 111 of the NIRC which
grants entities that first become liable to VAT a transitional input
tax credit of 2% on beginning inventory. For this reason, the VAT
on toll fees cannot be implemented.
The Issues Presented
The case presents two procedural issues:
1. Whether or not the Court may treat the petition for
declaratory relief as one for prohibition; and
2. Whether or not petitioners Diaz and Timbol have
legal standing to file the action.
The case also presents two substantive issues:
1. Whether or not the government is unlawfully
expanding VAT coverage by including tollway operators and
tollway operations in the terms franchise grantees and sale of
services under Section 108 of the Code; and
2. Whether or not the imposition of VAT on tollway
operators a) amounts to a tax on tax and not a tax on services;
b) will impair the tollway operators right to a reasonable return
of investment under their TOAs; and c) is not administratively
feasible and cannot be implemented.
The Courts Rulings
A. On the Procedural Issues:
On August 24, 2010 the Court issued a resolution,
treating the petition as one for prohibition rather than one for
declaratory relief, the characterization that petitioners Diaz and
Timbol gave their action. The government has sought
reconsideration of the Courts resolution,[7] however, arguing that
petitioners allegations clearly made out a case for declaratory
relief, an action over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. The government adds, moreover, that the petition
does not meet the requirements of Rule 65 for actions for
prohibition since the BIR did not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial,
or ministerial functions when it sought to impose VAT on toll
fees. Besides, petitioners Diaz and Timbol has a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the
BIR action in the form of an appeal to the Secretary of Finance.
But there are precedents for treating a petition for declaratory
relief as one for prohibition if the case has far-reaching
implications and raises questions that need to be resolved for
the public good.[8] The Court has also held that a petition for
prohibition is a proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of
executive officials that amount to usurpation of legislative
authority.[9]
Here, the imposition of VAT on toll fees has far-
reaching implications. Its imposition would impact, not only on
the more than half a million motorists who use the tollways
everyday, but more so on the governments effort to raise
revenue for funding various projects and for reducing budgetary
deficits.
To dismiss the petition and resolve the issues later,
after the challenged VAT has been imposed, could cause more
mischief both to the tax-paying public and the government. A
belated declaration of nullity of the BIR action would make any
attempt to refund to the motorists what they paid an
administrative nightmare with no solution.Consequently, it is not
only the right, but the duty of the Court to take cognizance of
and resolve the issues that the petition raises.
Although the petition does not strictly comply with the
requirements of Rule 65, the Court has ample power to waive
such technical requirements when the legal questions to be
resolved are of great importance to the public. The same may
be said of the requirement of locus standi which is a mere
procedural requisite.[10]
B. On the Substantive Issues:
 One. The relevant law in this case is Section 108 of the
NIRC, as amended. VAT is levied, assessed, and collected,
according to Section 108, on the gross receipts derived from the
sale or exchange of services as well as from the use or lease of
properties. The third paragraph of Section 108 defines sale or
exchange of services as follows:
The phrase sale or exchange of services means the
performance of all kinds of services in the Philippines for
others for a fee, remuneration or consideration, including
those performed or rendered by construction and service
contractors; stock, real estate, commercial, customs and
immigration brokers; lessors of property, whether personal
or real; warehousing services; lessors or distributors of
cinematographic films; persons engaged in milling,
processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for others;
proprietors, operators or keepers of hotels, motels,
resthouses, pension houses, inns, resorts; proprietors or
operators of restaurants, refreshment parlors, cafes and
other eating places, including clubs and caterers; dealers in
securities; lending investors; transportation contractors on
their transport of goods or cargoes, including persons who
transport goods or cargoes for hire and other domestic
common carriers by land relative to their transport of goods
or cargoes; common carriers by air and sea relative to their
transport of passengers, goods or cargoes from one place
in the Philippines to another place in the Philippines; sales
of electricity by generation companies, transmission, and
distribution companies; services of franchise grantees of
electric utilities, telephone and telegraph, radio and
television broadcasting and all other franchise grantees
except those under Section 119 of this Code and non-life
insurance companies (except their crop insurances),
including surety, fidelity, indemnity and bonding companies;
and similar services regardless of whether or not the
performance thereof calls for the exercise or use of the
physical or mental faculties. (Underscoring supplied)
It is plain from the above that the law imposes VAT on
all kinds of services rendered in the Philippines for a fee,
including those specified in the list. The enumeration of affected
services is not exclusive.[11] By qualifying services with the
words all kinds, Congress has given the term services an all-
encompassing meaning. The listing of specific services are
intended to illustrate how pervasive and broad is the VATs reach
rather than establish concrete limits to its application. Thus,
every activity that can be imagined as a form of service rendered
for a fee should be deemed included unless some provision of
law especially excludes it.
Now, do tollway operators render services for a
fee? Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1112 or the Toll Operation
Decree establishes the legal basis for the services that tollway
operators render. Essentially, tollway operators construct,
maintain, and operate expressways, also called tollways, at the
operators expense. Tollways serve as alternatives to regular
public highways that meander through populated areas and
branch out to local roads. Traffic in the regular public highways
is for this reason slow-moving. In consideration for constructing
tollways at their expense, the operators are allowed to collect
government-approved fees from motorists using the tollways
until such operators could fully recover their expenses and earn
reasonable returns from their investments.
When a tollway operator takes a toll fee from a motorist, the fee
is in effect for the latters use of the tollway facilities over which
the operator enjoys private proprietary rights [12]that its contract
and the law recognize. In this sense, the tollway operator is no
different from the following service providers under Section 108
who allow others to use their properties or facilities for a fee:
1. Lessors of property, whether personal or real;
2. Warehousing service operators;
3. Lessors or distributors of cinematographic films;
4. Proprietors, operators or keepers of hotels, motels,
resthouses, pension houses, inns, resorts;
5. Lending investors (for use of money);
6. Transportation contractors on their transport of goods or
cargoes, including persons who transport goods or cargoes for
hire and other domestic common carriers by land relative to their
transport of goods or cargoes; and
7. Common carriers by air and sea relative to their transport of
passengers, goods or cargoes from one place in
the Philippines to another place in the Philippines.
It does not help petitioners cause that Section 108
subjects to VAT all kinds of services rendered for a fee
regardless of whether or not the performance thereof calls for
the exercise or use of the physical or mental faculties. This
means that services to be subject to VAT need not fall under the
traditional concept of services, the personal or professional
kinds that require the use of human knowledge and skills.
And not only do tollway operators come under the broad term all
kinds of services, they also come under the specific class
described in Section 108 as all other franchise grantees who are
subject to VAT, except those under Section 119 of this Code.
Tollway operators are franchise grantees and they do
not belong to exceptions (the low-income radio and/or television
broadcasting companies with gross annual incomes of less
than P10 million and gas and water utilities) that Section
119[13] spares from the payment of VAT. The word franchise
broadly covers government grants of a special right to do an act
or series of acts of public concern.[14]
Petitioners of course contend that tollway operators
cannot be considered franchise grantees under Section 108
since they do not hold legislative franchises. But nothing in
Section 108 indicates that the franchise grantees it speaks of
are those who hold legislative franchises. Petitioners give no
reason, and the Court cannot surmise any, for making a
distinction between franchises granted by Congress and
franchises granted by some other government agency. The
latter, properly constituted, may grant franchises. Indeed,
franchises conferred or granted by local authorities, as agents
of the state, constitute as much a legislative franchise as though
the grant had been made by Congress itself. [15] The term
franchise has been broadly construed as referring, not only to
authorizations that Congress directly issues in the form of a
special law, but also to those granted by administrative agencies
to which the power to grant franchises has been delegated by
Congress.[16]
Tollway operators are, owing to the nature and object of their
business, franchise grantees. The construction, operation, and
maintenance of toll facilities on public improvements are
activities of public consequence that necessarily require a
special grant of authority from the state. Indeed, Congress
granted special franchise for the operation of tollways to the
Philippine National Construction Company, the former tollway
concessionaire for the North and South Luzon
Expressways. Apart from Congress, tollway franchises may also
be granted by the TRB, pursuant to the exercise of its delegated
powers under P.D. 1112.[17] The franchise in this case is
evidenced by a Toll Operation Certificate.[18]
Petitioners contend that the public nature of the
services rendered by tollway operators excludes such services
from the term sale of services under Section 108 of the
Code.But, again, nothing in Section 108 supports this
contention. The reverse is true. In specifically including by way
of example electric utilities, telephone, telegraph, and
broadcasting companies in its list of VAT-covered businesses,
Section 108 opens other companies rendering public service for
a fee to the imposition of VAT. Businesses of a public nature
such as public utilities and the collection of tolls or charges for
its use or service is a franchise.[19]
Nor can petitioners cite as binding on the Court
statements made by certain lawmakers in the course of
congressional deliberations of the would-be law. As the Court
said in South African Airways v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,[20] statements made by individual members of
Congress in the consideration of a bill do not necessarily reflect
the sense of that body and are, consequently, not controlling in
the interpretation of law. The congressional will is ultimately
determined by the language of the law that the lawmakers voted
on. Consequently, the meaning and intention of the law must
first be sought in the words of the statute itself, read and
considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly accepted and
most obvious significations, according to good and approved
usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction.
Two. Petitioners argue that a toll fee is a users tax and
to impose VAT on toll fees is tantamount to taxing a
tax.[21] Actually, petitioners base this argument on the following
discussion in Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) v.
Court of Appeals:[22]
No one can dispute that properties of public dominion
mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State,are owned by the State. The term ports includes
seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and
Buildings constitute a port constructed by the State. Under
Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and
Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus
owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.
x x x The operation by the government of a tollway does not
change the character of the road as one for public use.
Someone must pay for the maintenance of the road, either
the public indirectly through the taxes they pay the
government, or only those among the public who actually
use the road through the toll fees they pay upon using the
road. The tollway system is even a more efficient and
equitable manner of taxing the public for the maintenance
of public roads.
The charging of fees to the public does not determine the
character of the property whether it is for public dominion
or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of
public dominion as one intended for public use. Even if the
government collects toll fees, the road is still intended for
public use if anyone can use the road under the same terms
and conditions as the rest of the public. The charging of
fees, the limitation on the kind of vehicles that can use the
road, the speed restrictions and other conditions for the
use of the road do not affect the public character of the
road.
The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as
the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the
bulk of the income that maintains the operations of
MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the
character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees
are often termed users tax. This means taxing those among
the public who actually use a public facility instead of
taxing all the public including those who never use the
particular public facility. A users tax is more equitable a
principle of taxation mandated in the 1987
Constitution.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners assume that what the Court said above,
equating terminal fees to a users tax must also pertain to tollway
fees. But the main issue in the MIAA case was whether or
not Paraaque City could sell airport lands and buildings under
MIAA administration at public auction to satisfy unpaid real
estate taxes. Since local governments have no power to tax the
national government, the Court held that the City could not
proceed with the auction sale. MIAA forms part of the national
government although not integrated in the department
framework.[24] Thus, its airport lands and buildings are
properties of public dominion beyond the commerce of man
under Article 420(1)[25] of the Civil Code and could not be sold
at public auction.
As can be seen, the discussion in the MIAA case on
toll roads and toll fees was made, not to establish a rule that
tollway fees are users tax, but to make the point that airport
lands and buildings are properties of public dominion and that
the collection of terminal fees for their use does not make them
private properties. Tollway fees are not taxes.Indeed, they are
not assessed and collected by the BIR and do not go to the
general coffers of the government.
It would of course be another matter if Congress enacts
a law imposing a users tax, collectible from motorists, for the
construction and maintenance of certain roadways.The tax in
such a case goes directly to the government for the
replenishment of resources it spends for the roadways. This is
not the case here. What the government seeks to tax here are
fees collected from tollways that are constructed, maintained,
and operated by private tollway operators at their own expense
under the build, operate, and transfer scheme that the
government has adopted for expressways.[26] Except for a
fraction given to the government, the toll fees essentially end up
as earnings of the tollway operators.
In sum, fees paid by the public to tollway operators for use of the
tollways, are not taxes in any sense. A tax is imposed under the
taxing power of the government principally for the purpose of
raising revenues to fund public expenditures.[27] Toll fees, on the
other hand, are collected by private tollway operators as
reimbursement for the costs and expenses incurred in the
construction, maintenance and operation of the tollways, as well
as to assure them a reasonable margin of income. Although toll
fees are charged for the use of public facilities, therefore, they
are not government exactions that can be properly treated as a
tax. Taxes may be imposed only by the government under its
sovereign authority, toll fees may be demanded by either the
government or private individuals or entities, as an attribute of
ownership.[28]
Parenthetically, VAT on tollway operations cannot be deemed a
tax on tax due to the nature of VAT as an indirect tax. In indirect
taxation, a distinction is made between the liability for the tax
and burden of the tax. The seller who is liable for the VAT may
shift or pass on the amount of VAT it paid on goods, properties
or services to the buyer. In such a case, what is transferred is
not the sellers liability but merely the burden of the VAT. [29]
Thus, the seller remains directly and legally liable for
payment of the VAT, but the buyer bears its burden since the
amount of VAT paid by the former is added to the selling price.
Once shifted, the VAT ceases to be a tax[30] and simply becomes
part of the cost that the buyer must pay in order to purchase the
good, property or service.
Consequently, VAT on tollway operations is not really
a tax on the tollway user, but on the tollway operator. Under
Section 105 of the Code, [31] VAT is imposed on any person who,
in the course of trade or business, sells or renders services for
a fee. In other words, the seller of services, who in this case is
the tollway operator, is the person liable for VAT. The latter
merely shifts the burden of VAT to the tollway user as part of the
toll fees.
For this reason, VAT on tollway operations cannot be
a tax on tax even if toll fees were deemed as a users tax. VAT
is assessed against the tollway operators gross receipts and not
necessarily on the toll fees. Although the tollway operator may
shift the VAT burden to the tollway user, it will not make the latter
directly liable for the VAT. The shifted VAT burden simply
becomes part of the toll fees that one has to pay in order to use
the tollways.[32]
Three. Petitioner Timbol has no personality to invoke the non-
impairment of contract clause on behalf of private investors in
the tollway projects. She will neither be prejudiced by nor be
affected by the alleged diminution in return of investments that
may result from the VAT imposition. She has no interest at all in
the profits to be earned under the TOAs. The interest in and right
to recover investments solely belongs to the private tollway
investors.
Besides, her allegation that the private investors rate of
recovery will be adversely affected by imposing VAT on tollway
operations is purely speculative. Equally presumptuous is her
assertion that a stipulation in the TOAs known as the Material
Adverse Grantor Action will be activated if VAT is thus imposed.
The Court cannot rule on matters that are manifestly conjectural.
Neither can it prohibit the State from exercising its sovereign
taxing power based on uncertain, prophetic grounds.
Four. Finally, petitioners assert that the substantiation
requirements for claiming input VAT make the VAT on tollway
operations impractical and incapable of implementation. They
cite the fact that, in order to claim input VAT, the name, address
and tax identification number of the tollway user must be
indicated in the VAT receipt or invoice. The manner by which the
BIR intends to implement the VAT by rounding off the toll rate
and putting any excess collection in an escrow account is also
illegal, while the alternative of giving change to thousands of
motorists in order to meet the exact toll rate would be a logistical
nightmare. Thus, according to them, the VAT on tollway
operations is not administratively feasible.[33]
 Administrative feasibility is one of the canons of a deal with the immediate and practical consequences of the VAT
sound tax system. It simply means that the tax system should imposition.
be capable of being effectively administered and enforced with
the least inconvenience to the taxpayer. Non-observance of the WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES respondents
canon, however, will not render a tax imposition invalid except Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenues
to the extent that specific constitutional or statutory limitations motion for reconsideration of its August 24, 2010
are impaired.[34] Thus, even if the imposition of VAT on tollway resolution, DISMISSES the petitioners Renato V. Diaz and
operations may seem burdensome to implement, it is not Aurora Ma. F. Timbols petition for lack of merit, and SETS
necessarily invalid unless some aspect of it is shown to violate ASIDE the Courts temporary restraining order dated August 13,
any law or the Constitution. 2010.
SO ORDERED.
Here, it remains to be seen how the taxing authority will
actually implement the VAT on tollway operations. Any
declaration by the Court that the manner of its implementation is
illegal or unconstitutional would be premature. Although the
transcript of the August 12, 2010 Senate hearing provides some
clue as to how the BIR intends to go about it, [35] the facts
pertaining to the matter are not sufficiently established for the
Court to pass judgment on. Besides, any concern about how the
VAT on tollway operations will be enforced must first be
addressed to the BIR on whom the task of implementing tax laws
primarily and exclusively rests. The Court cannot preempt the
BIRs discretion on the matter, absent any clear violation of law
or the Constitution.

For the same reason, the Court cannot prematurely

declare as illegal, BIR RMC 63-2010 which directs toll
companies to record an accumulated input VAT of zero balance
in their books as of August 16, 2010, the date when the VAT
imposition was supposed to take effect. The issuance allegedly
violates Section 111(A)[36] of the Code which grants first time
VAT payers a transitional input VAT of 2% on beginning
inventory.

In this connection, the BIR explained that BIR RMC 63-

2010 is actually the product of negotiations with tollway
operators who have been assessed VAT as early as 2005, but
failed to charge VAT-inclusive toll fees which by now can no
longer be collected. The tollway operators agreed to waive the
2% transitional input VAT, in exchange for cancellation of their
past due VAT liabilities. Notably, the right to claim the 2%
transitional input VAT belongs to the tollway operators who have
not questioned the circulars validity. They are thus the ones who
have a right to challenge the circular in a direct and proper action
brought for the purpose.

Conclusion

In fine, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue did not

usurp legislative prerogative or expand the VAT laws coverage
when she sought to impose VAT on tollway operations. Section
108(A) of the Code clearly states that services of all other
franchise grantees are subject to VAT, except as may be
provided under Section 119 of the Code.Tollway operators are
not among the franchise grantees subject to franchise tax under
the latter provision. Neither are their services among the VAT-
exempt transactions under Section 109 of the Code.

If the legislative intent was to exempt tollway

operations from VAT, as petitioners so strongly allege, then it
would have been well for the law to clearly say so. Tax
exemptions must be justified by clear statutory grant and based
on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. [37] But as the
law is written, no such exemption obtains for tollway
operators. The Court is thus duty-bound to simply apply the law
as it is found.

Lastly, the grant of tax exemption is a matter of

legislative policy that is within the exclusive prerogative of
Congress. The Courts role is to merely uphold this legislative
policy, as reflected first and foremost in the language of the tax
statute. Thus, any unwarranted burden that may be perceived
to result from enforcing such policy must be properly referred to
Congress. The Court has no discretion on the matter but simply
applies the law.

The VAT on franchise grantees has been in the statute

books since 1994 when R.A. 7716 or the Expanded Value-
Added Tax law was passed. It is only now, however, that the
executive has earnestly pursued the VAT imposition against
tollway operators. The executive exercises exclusive discretion
in matters pertaining to the implementation and execution of tax
laws. Consequently, the executive is more properly suited to