The Mariner's Mirror

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A Statement of Hopes? The effectiveness of US and

British naval war plans against Japan, 1920–1941

Douglas Ford

To cite this article: Douglas Ford (2015) A Statement of Hopes? The effectiveness of US and
British naval war plans against Japan, 1920–1941, The Mariner's Mirror, 101:1, 63-80, DOI:
10.1080/00253359.2015.994875

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00253359.2015.994875

Published online: 03 Feb 2015.

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 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00253359.2015.994875
© The Society for Nautical Research

The Mariner’s Mirror 101:1 (February 2015), 63–80

A Statement of Hopes?
The effectiveness of US and British naval war plans against
Japan, 1920–1941

Douglas Ford

This article reconsiders the traditional claim that the setbacks which the US and British naval
forces faced during the opening stages of the war against Japan in 1941–2 were the result of
poor strategic planning. It illustrates how, during the decades leading up to the outbreak of the
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Pacific War, naval staffs drew up a detailed course of action which paid due attention to many
of the moves that needed to be undertaken to defeat the Imperial Japanese Navy, including the
establishment of a clear line of communication to the western Pacific region, the development of
advanced bases, and the imposition of a maritime blockade to undermine Japan’s war effort. The
main cause for the failure to provide an adequate defence against the Japanese onslaught was the
various obstacles which the US and British governments faced in allocating sufficient money
towards naval expansion during the interwar period, which meant that by the time hostilities
broke out in December 1941, neither power was able to deploy an adequate force to safeguard
their interests in Asia.

Key words: Second World War, Asia–Pacific theatre, US Navy, Royal Navy, strategy, war
planning, Imperial Japanese Navy

T he defeats which the US and British navies suffered during the opening stages of
the Pacific War in 1941 to 1942 largely resulted from their inadequate preparations
to counter the scale of attack which the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) brought to
bear. Indeed, if strategic effectiveness is measured by whether the armed forces attain
their objectives, the failure to prevent Japan from securing complete control over
Southeast Asia and the western Pacific regions indicates that the Allied powers had
developed an ineffective war plan. Nevertheless by assessing strategic effectiveness
solely on how military organizations perform in particular phases during wartime,
scholars run the risk of producing a one-sided conclusion that overlooks some
important features, including the extent to which defence planners foresee the tasks
that are necessary to overcome their opponents in the long run.
The following analysis argues that prior to December 1941 the US and British
naval establishments did develop a realistic idea of the moves they needed to pursue
in a Far Eastern conflict. With the rise of Japan as a threat to the regional status quo
after the conclusion of the First World War, both navies started to devise ambitious
strategies to protect their interests against encroachment. Strategists also understood
that in order to defeat Japan, the navy needed to deploy a sizeable fleet composed
of ships with sufficient firepower, and fight a prolonged series of intensified battles.
The key task was to establish control over the western Pacific and the areas within
proximity of the Japanese mainland. Such moves were necessary to secure the means
to victory, namely to wear down the IJN in a campaign of attrition and thereafter

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 64 The Mariner’s Mirror

impose a maritime blockade to undermine the enemy’s war effort. Furthermore,

Britain had traditionally pursued a policy of forming alliances with strong allies
who held similar aims. By 1940–1, when it became clear that the navy could not
dispatch a large fleet to Asia, owing to more pressing commitments in the Atlantic
and Mediterranean theatres, defence officials began to make a concerted effort to
secure US support to undertake a joint effort to contain Japan.
The main factors which prevented the US and Great Britain from making
adequate preparations were the various obstacles which their national governments
faced in allocating sufficient money towards defence spending. During the 1920s,
world leaders were wary about risking a repetition of the human and economic
losses which had been incurred during the First World War. The accepted practice
was to refrain from using military force to resolve disputes with foreign powers.
The financial turmoil which arose from the worldwide recession of 1929 to 1933
compelled governments to introduce further cuts in defence expenditure. The
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shortage of funds in turn curtailed the forces which could be deployed to counter
potential enemies. When rearmament commenced in earnest during the late 1930s
the western powers were more concerned with combating the threat posed by Nazi
Germany. As a result they could not allocate substantial resources to counter Japan.
Historiography
The underlying reasons for the debacles which the Allied navies faced during the
opening days of the Pacific War, including the destruction of a large portion of the
US fleet at Pearl Harbor and the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse off
the coast of Malaya, has been the focus of a long-standing debate. According to the
traditional view, the US and Britain overlooked the need to curb the rising power of
the aggressor states, including Japan, and consequently failed to safeguard their key
strongholds such as Singapore and the Philippines.
In regard to Great Britain, its war plans for the Far East allegedly did not
prescribe any long-term courses of action that could counter the Japanese threat.1
Naval strategists were over-confident in their capacity to fight a large-scale conflict
and remained fixated on the idea of sending a main fleet to Singapore.2 Even after the
outbreak of the European conflict in 1939 acutely limited the Royal Navy’s ability
to operate in Asia, the British downplayed the fact that they lacked the resources to
defend their overseas empire. The sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse was
the culmination of an erroneous line of thinking, which Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, along with some of his naval advisors adopted by the eve of the conflict,
namely that a numerically inferior force could intercept an advance against Malaya.
Among scholars of US policy during the interwar period, a widely accepted
hypothesis is that the government chose to abide by its isolationist stand and
remained reluctant to take positive action against threats from abroad.3 Within the
defence establishment, war plans were drawn up without fully comprehending the

1 Murfett, ‘ “Are We Ready?” ’, 214–42.

2 Haggie, Britannia at Bay, 211; Murfett, ‘Living in the Past’, 97; Hamill, The Strategic Illusion,
310; Louis, British Strategy, 211–12; Grenfell, Main Fleet to Singapore, 210–13; Gow, ‘The Royal
Navy and Japan’, 109–26.
3 Tuleja, Statesmen and Admirals, 29–31; Lowenthal, Leadership and Indecision, 107–8, 117–20,
171–82; Brune, American National Security Policy, 59–60.

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 A Statement of Hopes? US and British naval war plans against Japan, 1920–1941 65

US Navy’s lack of strength to operate in areas removed from its home territory.
Louis Morton’s official history described the Orange plans of the 1920s as ‘more a
statement of hopes than a realistic appraisal of what could be done’.4 As the interwar
years progressed, the gap between America’s commitment to defend the Pacific
areas and its ability to provide the necessary forces grew wider.5 Only in 1940, when
Hitler’s conquest of western Europe and the commencement of direct attacks on
the British Isles rendered America’s entry into the war a likely scenario, did naval
officials concede that they could not fight Germany and Japan simultaneously.6
Given the strategic importance of the Atlantic theatre, the Americans decided to
follow a defensive strategy in the Pacific. By doing so they ceded control of the
region to the Japanese.
Such arguments, while valid, downplay a key fact, namely that in the long run,
the Allies subjected the Japanese empire to a total defeat. Was this because they
drastically improved their capacity to fight a campaign in the Asia–Pacific theatre in
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the aftermath of their overwhelming setbacks? If the US and Great Britain prevailed,
one needs to consider the possibility that they were doing something right while
preparing for the eventual showdown.
In recent decades a number of scholars have presented a less critical evaluation of
Allied pre-war strategy. Historians of British defence policy have focused on how the
shortage of financial resources, coupled with the nation’s stagnant industrial output,
limited defence spending and hindered the Admiralty’s moves to create a fleet that
could defend its global empire.7 Most recently, Christopher Bell has challenged
the notion that the Admiralty stubbornly clung to the idea of sending a fleet to
Singapore even after the difficulties of implementing such moves became obvious.8
The ‘Singapore strategy’ was merely the opening phase of what defence planners
envisaged being a prolonged war of attrition. The Admiralty did not dispatch an
adequate fleet in 1941 because it viewed its Far Eastern problems from the wider
perspective of its grand strategic concerns, namely the need to protect the British
Isles and surrounding waters. Under the circumstances, the British could safeguard
their Asiatic empire only with a minimal force.
On the subject of US pre-war strategy, academics have credited the navy for
showing good insight. The most substantial reappraisal has been produced by Edward
Miller, who explained how naval planners recognized that a maritime strategy aimed
at destroying the IJN and its lines of communication offered the most effective way
of defeating an island nation such as Japan.9 The Americans forecast many of the
moves they had to undertake, namely to establish a chain of island bases across the

4 Morton, Strategy and Command, 30.

5 Morton, ‘War Plan Orange’, 231. Orange was the colour code used to denote Japanese forces.
Also see Tuleja, Statesmen and Admirals, 33–4; Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, 55–9.
6 Heinrichs, ‘The Role of the US Navy’, 219–23
7 Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, 322–47; Roskill, Naval Policy; Baugh, ‘Confusions and
Restraints’, 101–19; also see Peden, British Rearmament; Shay, British Rearmament; Ferris, Men,
Money and Diplomacy, 187.
8 Bell, The Royal Navy, 59–98
9 Miller, War Plan Orange, 1–6; also see Cohen, ‘The Strategy of Innocence?’, 441–2, 462;
Friedman, US Maritime Strategy, 213, 235; also see Baer, Sea Power, 127; Weigley, The American
Way of War, 246–7; James, ‘American and Japanese Strategies’, 710–12.

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 66 The Mariner’s Mirror

Pacific Ocean and thus permit the fleet’s safe passage to areas within proximity of
the Japanese home islands, including the Philippines. Once the conflict broke out,
the Americans simply had to improvise the plans they had developed in peacetime.
During more recent years, scholars have re-examined the reasons why the US
and Britain failed to defend their Far Eastern possessions, by focusing on their
intelligence activities.10 Defence planners did identify the features which rendered
Japan an emerging threat, such as the manner in which its leaders were seeking to
carve out an Asiatic empire and simultaneously develop a naval force that could
challenge western interests. Nevertheless, there were a number of flaws in the
intelligence network, including an inadequate apparatus for collecting accurate
data. Intelligence officials also relied on a mistaken method of assessment which
assumed that if the Japanese were faced with the choice of either resorting to war
in an effort to diminish the western powers’ presence in the Far East, or avoiding a
confrontation, they were likely to choose the peaceful course of action, since their
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nation had yet to develop the economic and military capacity to defeat the Allied
powers in a prolonged war of attrition. Efforts to obtain reliable data were also
hampered by the fact that Japan’s leaders shrouded their policies with a high level
of secrecy. Under the circumstances, US and British naval officials could predict the
timing and scale of Japanese aggression only with difficulty. Poor intelligence did not
directly affect the development of Anglo-American war plans, but nevertheless, by
1941 the assumption that Japan would move cautiously led both powers to conclude
that they did not need to significantly bolster their defences in the Pacific regions.
The following sections demonstrate how the Allied defeats during the opening
stages of the Pacific War did not result from flaws in their strategic thinking. On the
contrary, the US and Great Britain identified the basic tasks that their navies had
to undertake, and subsequently developed a detailed plan of action to defeat Japan.
Defence planners did show a tendency to set up objectives which were beyond their
capacity to achieve. Nevertheless such errors overshadow the fact that ultimately the
Allies entered the conflict with a strategy that could be put into practice once they
were able to deploy sufficient strengths to conduct an offensive war in the Asia–
Pacific theatre.
Development of US and British Naval War Plans against Japan, 1920–1938
US and British war plans were based on the premise that any effort to defeat Japan
required a substantial investment of time and resources. The initial aim was to deploy
a numerically superior fleet that could counter the IJN and establish a secure line of
communication to the main theatre of operations. Strategists also recognized how
Japan’s ability to support its war effort depended largely on whether it could maintain
its maritime trade routes and thus procure the necessary raw materials. For this reason,
the ultimate objective was to blockade the enemy’s lifelines. Nevertheless naval staffs
were aware that during the opening phases, they could not provide a substantial force.
For this reason, both powers had to follow a defensive strategy to secure their forward
positions at Singapore and Hawaii. The possibility that the Japanese could occupy
important bases such as Hong Kong and the Philippines was acknowledged, in which
case counter-offensive operations to recapture them were necessary.
10 Aldrich, Intelligence and the War against Japan; Best, British Intelligence; Ford, Britain’s
Secret War, Ford, The Elusive Enemy; Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War.

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 A Statement of Hopes? US and British naval war plans against Japan, 1920–1941 67

The creation of a viable strategy against Japan was treated as a crucial measure for
safeguarding national interests. The US Navy in particular viewed the Pacific as the
area where it had a vested interest in protecting American commerce and trade. The
preparation of war plans commenced from as early as 1906, after the IJN crushed the
Russian fleet at Tsushima and confirmed its status as the strongest maritime force in
the region. Further apprehensions surfaced at the end of the First World War, when
the IJN emerged with the third largest fleet in the world. In its campaign to help
the Allies defeat the Central Powers, Japan also acquired the island colonies that
had previously been held by Germany, including Micronesia and the Carolines. By
doing so the Japanese secured a network of bases which lay astride the transpacific
lanes. The emergence of an identified threat in Asia was officially confirmed in 1921
when the Joint Board’s planning committee labelled Japan as ‘the most probable
enemy’.11
The British in contrast did not actively prepare for a possible confrontation
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until the early 1920s. Prior to the First World War, the Anglo-Japanese alliance had
alleviated rivalry between the two powers. When war broke out against Germany
in 1914, Britain’s position was significantly eased when Japan agreed to fight on
the Allied side. The solidarity however was quickly offset when Tokyo started
to demand economic and territorial concessions in key areas of Asia, including
China, as a reward for its co-operation. Such moves raised doubts in London as to
whether Japan could be trusted to respect the integrity of Britain’s empire. Amid
the atmosphere of deteriorating relations, British naval strategists began to consider
what measures they needed to pursue in the event of a conflict against their former
ally and emerging rival.
In an attempt to protect the status quo in Asia and lessen the danger of an
emerging naval arms race, the leaders of the US, Great Britain and Japan convened
the Washington Conference of 1921–2. The naval limitation agreement restricted the
American, British and Japanese capital ship fleets to a 5:5:3 ratio. Nevertheless the
treaty did not convince western defence officials to discard their anxieties regarding
Japan’s expansionist moves. On the contrary, the naval limitations gave rise to doubts
whether the US and Britain had sufficient strength to take proper action in the event
of hostilities.
Anglo-American strategic planning also had to operate amidst a political climate
where statesmen, along with their constituents, had become disillusioned about
the utility of using armed force to protect national interests. In America, officials
within the White House and the State Department reverted to the traditional view
which dictated that the US was to remain uninvolved in conflicts that took place
beyond the Western Hemisphere. As far as politicians were concerned, international
accords such as the Washington treaty acted as guarantors of a lasting peace.
Under the circumstances, drawing up war plans was considered an unnecessary
exercise. Likewise within the British government, the financial damage left behind
by the global conflict made statesmen in Whitehall sceptical about the wisdom of
maintaining large armed forces in peacetime. The Ten Year Rule, introduced in 1919,
stipulated that defence spending was to be based on the assumption that Britain
would not engage in a major conflict for the foreseeable decade.

11 Morton, Strategy and Command, 27.

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 68 The Mariner’s Mirror

Nevertheless defence officials, particularly those involved with naval affairs,

maintained that they needed to take precautionary measures. Although Japan
was unlikely to provoke hostilities in the near future, its ambition for achieving
a hegemonic position in Asia was a development that could eventually result in a
clash. In the US, the development of strategy was the responsibility of the Joint
Board, which provided a forum for members of the army and navy planning staffs,
including the Chief of Naval Operations, to discuss what types of actions the armed
services could pursue against hostile nations. Within the Navy Department, the
General Board was the main body that formulated overall policy, although its work
was concerned primarily with matters related to ship construction and weapons
procurement. Officers at the US Naval War College also contributed to the process
by conducting war games to determine what moves the fleet had to conduct in order
to deal with the various contingencies that could arise in a conflict against Japan.
The development of British naval war plans was primarily the responsibility of
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the Naval Staff, which was headed by the First Sea Lord along with the Deputy
Chief of Naval Staff. The staff was aided by various directors who handled key
matters such as plans, operations and intelligence. Although the First Sea Lord
had ultimate power, the usual practice was to allow the Plans Division to draw up
strategies with final approval being issued by the First Sea Lord. At the highest levels
of the defence establishment, the chiefs of staff (CoS) and the Committee of Imperial
Defence (CID) co-ordinated the strategies of the various branches, including the
Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and the army.
Western naval officials also managed to identify the main elements of the IJN’s
strategy and the challenges it was likely to pose. Throughout the decades prior to
the Pacific War, as well as the wartime period, Japanese naval policy was geared
towards preparing for an eventual showdown against the US Navy and the Royal
Navy. Victory was to be achieved by securing control over key areas such as the
China Sea and western Pacific, thereby denying enemy forces access to positions that
could be used to launch attacks on the home islands.12 However, Japanese admirals
realized that their numerically inferior fleet could not win a decisive battle at the
onset of a conflict. The initial aim was therefore to reduce their opponent’s strength
by conducting raids against bases located in the Philippines, Hong Kong and Guam.
After enemy strengths were sufficiently reduced, Allied bases were to be occupied in
order to establish a defensive barrier against task forces which attempted to approach
the home waters. As the interwar years progressed, naval officials sought to utilize
the benefits afforded by air power, and pushed their front line to areas further afield,
including the mandated islands of the Carolines.13
Although neither the Navy Department nor the Admiralty were able to obtain
firm intelligence regarding the IJN’s strategy, they were able to deduce the objectives
it was likely to pursue. The Admiralty concluded that in the event of hostilities, the
Japanese would seek to prevent British forces from operating in areas where they
could threaten the home waters, either by seizing the Royal Navy’s bases at Singapore
and Hong Kong or rendering them unusable through bombardment.14 Likewise, the
12 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 187–8, 194–201, 205–12, 238–9.
13 Ozawa, ‘Development of the Japanese Navy’, 73.
14 The National Archives, Kew (TNA), ADM 116/3124 M.00351/23, Director of Plans, Revision
of Naval War Memorandum, 12 December 1922 (hereafter, War Memorandum, 1922)

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 A Statement of Hopes? US and British naval war plans against Japan, 1920–1941 69

Joint Board surmised that the most logical course of action for Orange forces was
to create a strategic perimeter that included the mandated islands, since such moves
could obstruct the US Navy’s efforts to establish a position in the Philippines.15

Addressing the strategic requirements: establishing a strong naval presence in

the Asia–Pacific areas
In order to reconstitute US and British interests in Asia and thus curb Japan’s moves
to secure its conquests in the region, the first challenge which faced naval planners
was to project their forces over extended distances and ensure a safe passage to the
main theatre of operations. American strategists were mainly preoccupied with the
question of how the navy was going to move from Hawaii to the Philippines without
facing excessive attrition.16 The solution was to conduct a gradual push through the
chain of islands that lay along the route, including the Marshalls, Carolines and
Marianas archipelagos, and eject the Japanese from the key positions that lay along
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the trans-Pacific crossing. If on the other hand, Orange remained in control of the
mandates, US forces needed to either make a detour via the South Pacific, or commit
a substantial escort to protect the convoys.17
British war plans during the 1920s similarly concentrated almost exclusively on
the opening stages or the ‘period before relief’, during which time the objective was
to dispatch the fleet to Singapore.18 Although the Royal Navy’s fleet of capital ships
and aircraft carriers was larger than what the IJN could deploy, the superiority was
‘largely discounted’ by several factors inherent in conducting a campaign in areas
far removed from home territory.19 Britain’s main naval units were stationed in the
Mediterranean and Atlantic regions, which meant that the squadrons operating under
the commands of the China Station and East Indies Station could not forestall a large-
scale attack. The key problem was concentrating the fleet before the Japanese could
significantly damage Britain’s main base. Yet during the early half of the interwar
period, the task of dispatching a fleet to the Far East was relatively straightforward,
since the Royal Navy did not face any significant rivals aside from the IJN. It was
only in the 1930s, with the rise of the German and Italian navies, that the Admiralty
was faced with the complicated problem of allocating sufficient strength in several
different theatres.

Developing forward bases

The Americans began to address the issue of developing bases in Asia-Pacific region
during the 1900s. The first Orange plan written by the Naval War College in 1906
stated that the initial objective was to secure the Philippines as a staging post for

15 United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
(NARA 2), RG 225, Records of the Joint Board, JB 325, War Plans Division, Roll 9, Serial No.280,
Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan – Orange: Estimate of the Situation, 11 January 1929
(hereafter, Orange: Estimate of the Situation, 1929). All documents referred to hereafter, unless
otherwise stated, were consulted at NARA 2.
16 Miller, War Plan Orange, 33–36
17 RG 38, Strategic Plans Division Records, Miscellaneous Subject File, Box 64, Commander-in-
Chief US Fleet, US Joint Asiatic Force Operating Plan Orange, 1 July 1934
18 Bell, The Royal Navy, 67
19 War Memorandum, 1922

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 70 The Mariner’s Mirror

attacks against mainland Japan, and the conclusion became the basis of all war plans
in the Pacific.20 However Article XIX of the Washington treaty forbade the further
development of facilities to the west of Hawaii, and the Philippines could not be
fortified to the extent where the archipelago had a realistic prospect of surviving a
determined attack.21 Pearl Harbor thus became the main base, but the Philippines
remained vital in strategic planning. In their first post-war assessment of the situation
in the Pacific, the Joint Board stipulated that before the navy could conduct offensive
operations, it needed to secure the anchorage at Manila.22
For the British, the initial plan for developing an advanced Far Eastern facility
emerged in 1919, after John Jellicoe, who served as the commander of the Grand Fleet
and as First Sea Lord during the Great War, proposed that the Royal Navy station
a permanent fleet in Asia that could equal the IJN’s strength.23 Jellicoe’s proposal
did not receive a warm welcome either within Whitehall or the Admiralty, owing
to the costs it entailed. Admiral David Beatty, who had taken the position as First
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Sea Lord, suggested a more economical strategy whereby the fleet was maintained
in home waters and then dispatched to a prepared base at Singapore in the event of
hostilities.
The delays that the Admiralty faced in completing the base were largely due to
decisions made by the British government, whose finances were chafing as a result of
the nation’s sluggish economic performance after the First World War. Naturally the
Cabinet’s decision to suspend work on the base in 1924 raised criticism. The Naval
Staff argued that as long as the Singapore base remained unfinished, the Royal Navy
was unable to deploy its capital ships to the Far East.24 Beatty stated that if a hostile
fleet occupied the base, Britain’s communications with all parts of its empire in the
Pacific and Indian Ocean areas would be exposed.25 Far from being complacent
about the dangers which the IJN was able to pose, Britain’s defence planners were
fully aware of the risks involved in holding off the work required to construct the
Singapore base.
US and British naval staffs also made allowance for circumstances where the
Japanese had occupied the bases at Manila and Hong Kong, in which case considerable
efforts were needed to recapture the positions. American defence officials conceded
that, owing to the time required to build a strong force in the western Pacific, the
navy could not expect to operate within proximity of the home islands during the
early stages.26 By the 1930s, naval planners started to realize that the Philippines
could not be held during the initial phase.27 The ‘Royal Road’ strategy envisaged

20 Vlahos, ‘The Naval War College’, 29–30.

21 Miller, War Plan Orange, 54–5.
22 RG 225, Records of the Joint Board, JB 325, War Plans Division, Roll 9, Serial No.207,
Memorandum for Chief of Staff, Synopsis of Joint Army and Navy Estimates of the Orange
Situation, 7 July 1923 (hereafter, Estimates of Orange Situation, 1923).
23 Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base, 28–31.
24 TNA, ADM 1/8666/151 M.0702/24, First Lord of Admiralty, International Agreement
foreshadowed in government statement on suspension of Singapore base, 30 Apr. 1924, Enclosure:
Notes by the Naval Staff.
25 Ranft, The Beatty Papers, 344.
26 Orange: Estimate of the Situation, 1929.
27 RG 225, Records of the Joint Board, JB 305, roll 6, serial 574, Memorandum by navy members

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 A Statement of Hopes? US and British naval war plans against Japan, 1920–1941 71

a gradual push to capture the key positions that lay between Hawaii and Manila.28
Strategists also explicitly stated that a campaign against Japan required inter-service
co-operation. If the Philippines had fallen into enemy hands, the navy needed to
secure co-operation from the army and marine corps in order to secure its forward
position. The 1931 version of the Orange plan stated that among the army’s missions
was to support the navy’s efforts to gain command of the sea.29 By 1938 the Joint
Board specified that the army was to make available a force of 20,000 troops to be
deployed alongside the US fleet by 35 days following the outbreak of hostilities,
with a total of 750,000 being ready for eventual use.30
British naval staff likewise began to contemplate the moves necessary to retake
Hong Kong. From the outset, the defence of Singapore took precedence.31 Hong
Kong was a staging post for attacks against Japan’s supply lines, and its possession was
not necessary until the middle stages of a conflict. The 1932 revision of the Eastern
war memorandum specified that during phase 2, or the ‘period of consolidation’, the
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main fleet was to establish itself in the vicinity of Hong Kong.32 However the chief
of staff (CoS) became increasingly doubtful on the question of whether Hong Kong
could survive a Japanese attack. Owing to the weak state of its defences and the
Royal Navy’s inability to dispatch a large force in a reasonable time frame, the base
was likely to be rendered unusable either through damage or outright occupation.33
British forces therefore had to recapture Hong Kong and such operations required
the help of ground forces, coupled with air support. The 1933 war memorandum
stipulated that retaking Hong Kong called for an extensive campaign in which all of
the fighting services had to make a substantial contribution.34 US and British strategy
were therefore drawn up with due attention paid to the scale of effort required to
establish bases within striking distance of Japan.

Ultimate objective: undermining Japan’s war effort by attacking its economic

infrastructure
The naval strategies of America and Great Britain were geared to fight a prolonged
campaign where victory was to be attained by severing Japan’s oceanic trade routes
and thereby destroying the economic foundations of its war effort. The first step was
to diminish the IJN’s strength to the point where it could no longer protect Japan’s
supply lines.
Naval staff were quick to realize the damage that could be inflicted by severing

of the Joint Planning Committee, on military position in the Far East, 6 Feb. 1936.
28 Miller, War Plan Orange, 186–90, 199–201.
29 RG 38, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Strategic Plans Division, box 15,
WPL–13, Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange, 31 Jan. 1931.
30 RG 225, JB 325, Joint Board, War Plans Division, roll 10, JB 325, serial no. 618, Joint Army
and Navy Basic War Plan Orange, 1938 (hereafter, Basic War Plan Orange, 1938)
31 TNA, ADM 116/3125 M.00370/24, Director of Plans, War Memorandum (Eastern), 29 Jul.
1924
32 TNA, ADM 116/3118 M.00480/32, Plans Division, War Memorandum (Eastern), Jan. 1932
(hereafter, War Memorandum, 1932)
33 Bell, ‘Our Most Exposed Outpost’
34 TNA, ADM 116/3475 M.00518/33, Plans Division, War Memorandum (Eastern), October
1933 (hereafter, War Memorandum, 1933)

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 72 The Mariner’s Mirror

Japan’s trade routes. In America the Joint Board specified that the general concept
of a naval conflict in the Pacific was an offensive war directed toward isolating
the enemy.35 By collating statistics obtained from open sources such as Japanese
government publications on overseas trade, along with records of companies which
sold goods to Japan, US planners concluded that the nation was almost entirely
dependent on imports for most key raw materials, including petroleum, iron
ore, aluminium, and rubber.36 If the traffic was curtailed, Japan’s economy, and
subsequently its ability to sustain its military activities, would face great dislocation.
Under the circumstances, the best course of action was to apply pressure by seizing
the areas where the enemy’s trade passed through, including the China Sea.
For the British the idea of attacking enemy trade was an integral part of the
Admiralty’s thinking. Control of the seas allowed the navy to curtail the economic
activities of nations which were dependent on sea-borne trade.37 Yet for much of the
1920s, the Admiralty was more concerned about protecting British trade in the Far
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East, and did not elaborate on the damage which economic warfare could inflict on
the Japanese. By 1933, however, with data supplied by the Industrial Intelligence
Centre, planning staffs presented some powerful arguments which suggested that
blockade offered lucrative opportunities to exploit Japan’s weaknesses. A loss of
supplies from the British Empire was likely to subject the enemy’s main industries
to a ‘grave shortage of raw materials’, while a stoppage of traffic between the home
islands and China, coupled with interference of the trade routes with the US via the
Pacific, could have ‘decisive effects’.38
At the same time the complexities of implementing an economic blockade
were recognized. In order to execute such strategies successfully, friendly forces
had to secure control over the expanses of the western Pacific areas. The Joint
Board estimated that up to eighteen months were needed to establish a base in the
Philippines and thereafter supremacy in the waters surrounding Japan.39 Substantial
time was likely to elapse before the Japanese could be coerced to surrender as a result
of irreparable damage to their war effort.
The problem was further complicated because as long as the IJN had enough
strength to move beyond home waters, the US fleet faced the danger of counter-
attacks. Even after US forces captured the Philippines and secured control over the
South China Sea, traffic between Japan and the Asiatic mainland, which provided a
large portion of its economic livelihood, was likely to remain uninterrupted.40 The
navy needed to establish bases within proximity to the enemy’s home territory, in
areas such as Formosa and the Ryukyus so that the blockade could be tightened. Yet,
before commencing large-scale attacks on Japanese shipping, the Americans had to
build up an armada that could counter the enemy fleet. Ideally a decisive engagement

35 Estimates of Orange Situation, 1923.

36 RG 38, Strategic Plans Division Records, Miscellaneous Subject File, box 37, Course at the
Army War College, 1924–5, Enclosure: Draft of Joint Army and Navy War Plan, Orange, and
Study of Strategic Estimate, Orange–Blue.
37 National Maritime Museum, London (NMM), BTY/8/5 Board of Admiralty, Empire Naval
Policy and Cooperation, part 1: General Considerations, 2 Dec. 1920.
38 War Memorandum, 1933.
39 Orange: Estimate of the Situation, 1929.
40 Miller, War Plan Orange, 162–4.

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 A Statement of Hopes? US and British naval war plans against Japan, 1920–1941 73

was to be sought, whereby the IJN could be decimated in a quick blow. Such scenarios
were not likely to materialize in a way that naval commanders wished. Japanese
admirals were in a position to choose the time and place to engage their opponents
and thus inclined to seek action in advantageous circumstances. Furthermore, the
IJN could be supported with relative ease, given its proximity to its main bases.41
The more realistic course of action was to gradually deplete the opponent’s navy
and merchant fleet. The concept of a protracted campaign became an integral part
of America’s strategy, as evidenced by the 1938 revision of the Orange plan, which
stipulated that Japan was to be defeated through military and economic pressure,
made ‘progressively more severe’ until the goal was attained’.42
British naval staff also conceded that economic pressure had to be applied over a
prolonged period, and acknowledged the range of unpredictable factors with which
they had to contend. During Phase 3, or the ‘period of advance’, the main fleet was
expected to incapacitate Japan’s war effort by destroying the IJN and thus create the
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conditions necessary to impose a blockade. However when dealing with the question
concerning the conditions under which the Japanese were likely to seek a main fleet
action, planners refrained from specifying the time and location at which it could
occur.43 The only conclusion that could be made with any certainty was that efforts
to strangulate Japan’s economy needed to be carried out in gradual stages. Decisive
effects could be attained only by halting the movement of enemy merchant vessels
beyond the immediate vicinity of the home islands.44 The first step was to impose a
distant blockade at the choke points which Japanese trade passed through, including
the Suez Canal, Cape of Good Hope, and East Indian archipelago. The 1938 naval
memorandum laid out a detailed plan for interdicting Japan’s long-haul commerce
by setting up patrols along the key choke points. Nevertheless the complete isolation
of Japan was unlikely to materialize until the closing stages of the war, when the
Royal Navy was expected to gain control over the short sea routes between Japan
and the Asiatic mainland.45
Build-up to war, 1938–41: what went wrong?
Despite their sound understanding of the moves they had to undertake in order
to defeat Japan, the US Navy and Royal Navy failed to deploy adequate forces
to defend their positions in Asia. The main reason was the shortage of financial
resources to procure the necessary resources and manpower. The cutbacks in defence
expenditure during the aftermath of the First World War, followed by the financial
repercussions of the worldwide recession of 1929 to 1933, restricted all efforts to
enlarge the available forces. By the time rearmament commenced during the late
1930s in response to the growing threat posed by the Axis powers, defence planners
needed to devote their efforts to combating the German threat in the Atlantic
theatre, and were thus unable to deploy a substantial force to fight the IJN. Japan
had to be contained by means other than military action, and in the end, the western

41 United States Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, RG 4, Publications, box 75,
Operations Problem I–1936–SR, Blue Solution by Member of Staff.
42 Basic War Plan Orange, 1938.
43 War Memorandum, 1932.
44 TNA, CAB 53/31 COS 590, Far East Appreciation, 1937: Report by COS, May 1937.
45 TNA, ADM 116/4393 M.00625/37, Naval War Memorandum (Eastern), October 1938.

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 74 The Mariner’s Mirror

powers relied on a strategy aimed at deterring the leadership in Tokyo. The threat
of possible military retaliation was intended to prevent further encroachments. The
plan proved inadequate, since the Japanese commenced an all-out war in December
1941. Nevertheless the failure did not necessarily reflect flawed strategic thinking.
Because strategic priorities compelled the US and Britain to focus their efforts on
other areas, deterrence offered the most realistic option for dealing with Japan.

Available naval forces inadequate to fight all potential enemies simultaneously

By the late 1930s American defence policy began to consider the need to contain
German aggression, especially after the autumn 1938 Czech crisis, when Hitler’s quest
for territorial expansion threatened to trigger a general European war. The purpose
of the Rainbow war plans drawn up during 1939–41 was to determine what actions
could be taken in the event of hostilities against a combination of enemies including
Japan, Germany and Italy. The first version prepared in July 1939 predicted a joint
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incursion against the Western Hemisphere and explicitly stated that the protection of
the western Pacific was not provided for, since such moves were unfeasible without
a dramatic increase of the available forces.46 Nor could the Americans contain their
enemies without co-operation from their allies, including Great Britain. Rainbow
2, which envisaged a Japanese conquest of the western Pacific, was based on the
assumption that America could take full advantage of the help afforded by Britain,
France and the Netherlands.47 However, the German conquest of France and
Holland in spring 1940 fundamentally undermined the premise of the plan. Britain
remained the sole power which was actively fighting Hitler, and the prospect of an
invasion against the British isles meant that its capacity to oppose Japan had been
reduced to the point where the US stood ‘practically alone’ as the upholder of the
status quo. The greatest danger was that the Atlantic Ocean area was exposed to
attacks by German naval and air forces. If the region fell, the Axis powers could
acquire positions from which to infiltrate the western hemisphere and eventually
assault the continental United States.
British naval officials likewise began to recognize how their strategy for defending
their Far Eastern empire was not viable. Any such moves entailed drawing resources
away from Europe, which constituted a more vital area for national security. The
Royal Navy did not possess the resources to fight all of its potential enemies, nor
was it able to secure funding to construct a fleet that could simultaneously engage
Germany and Japan.48 The outbreak of the European war in September 1939
further complicated the situation and by the following summer, with the Germans
threatening the home waters, the navy could not spare any capital ships for the Far
East.49 Without a fleet to protect Singapore, the air forces needed to bear the brunt
of the task. However the number of aircraft and their accompanying crews was

46 RG 225, JB 325, Joint Board, War Plans Division, roll 11, JB 325, serial no. 642–1, Joint Army
and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow no. 1, 27 Jul. 1939.
47 Ibid., serial no. 642–2, Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow no. 2, Jul. 1940.
48 Howard, Continental Commitment, 102–3; Gibbs, Grand Strategy, 336–41; for a more recent
account, see Maiolo, Royal Navy and Nazi Germany.
49 TNA, CAB 80/16 COS (40) 592, The Situation in the Far East in the Event of Japanese
Intervention against us, report by COS, 15 Aug. 1940; also see Kirby, War Against Japan, 33;
Marder, Old Friends, 85.

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 A Statement of Hopes? US and British naval war plans against Japan, 1920–1941 75

inadequate and the necessary resources could not be provided in the near future.
The Americans similarly adjusted their war plans to meet the increasingly clear
reality that they had to focus on containing Germany. During autumn 1940, in a
move to clarify the strategic options, Admiral Harold Stark, the Chief of Naval
Operations, drew up a memorandum which laid out possible courses of action in the
event of the US entering the war.50 Stark concluded that an offensive in the Atlantic
while remaining on the defensive against Japan, or Plan D (Dog) was the wisest
choice.51 The central argument was that Great Britain constituted America’s first line
of defence. If the British lost their fight in the Atlantic, the US was most likely to
see its worldwide interests jeopardized. In regard to the Pacific, Stark warned that a
major commitment involved an all-out effort that would divert resources away from
the Atlantic.52 The Joint Board approved Stark’s memorandum in December.

Anglo-American strategy focused on Atlantic theatre; Pacific relegated to

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secondary importance
The plan which the US and British defence staffs agreed upon during the ABC-1
staff conversations held at Washington in early 1941 amounted to an admission that
the Associated Powers did not have sufficient resources for concurrent action against
Germany and Japan. The British did place hopes on the possibility that an effort to
deter Japan with subtle hints of joint military reprisals could delay the outbreak of
a war, at least until the situation in Europe stabilized to the point where an adequate
force could be sent to the Far East. In December 1940, after the Admiralty received
confirmation that President Roosevelt had allowed the US defence staffs to hold
conversations with their British counterparts, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the First
Sea Lord, recommended that while the defeat of Germany was paramount, Singapore
had to be held ‘at all costs’.53 The Americans were requested to send nine capital
ships accompanied by carriers and cruisers to the base, in order to protect key areas
including Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines.54
However, the Americans maintained that their strength needed to be concentrated
in the North Atlantic. During the ABC-1 conversations, the British representatives
were naturally pleased with the accord which the US was demonstrating on the
importance of defending the British isles, but at the same time, they pressed for an
additional commitment to defend Singapore.55 The US defence chiefs replied that the
most which the Pacific Fleet could do was to protect US and British interests east of
the 180 meridian, which included Hawaii.56
Because Germany was the predominant member of the Axis coalition, the available
forces were to be concentrated on bringing about its defeat. Operations in the Pacific
were to be conducted in ‘such a manner to facilitate the main effort’, meaning that

50 Lowenthal, Leadership and Indecision, 411–19.

51 Morton, Strategy and Command, 81–4.
52 Utley, Going to War, 113–14.
53 Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, 206.
54 TNA, CAB 79/5 COS (40) 383rd meeting, 8 Nov. 1940.
55 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 34–6.
56 Watson, Chief of Staff, 397–98; Kirby, War Against Japan, 63; Leutze, Bargaining for
Supremacy, 225–7, 231.

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 76 The Mariner’s Mirror

a defensive posture was to be assumed.57 Rainbow 5, the last version drawn up

before the US entry into the war, became the outline of America’s initial strategy.
The German threat was so grave that the US needed to be prepared to conduct a
large-scale war effort in the eastern Atlantic and mainland Europe.58 Insofar as the
Asia–Pacific theatre was concerned, even if the Japanese were to intervene, the level
of commitment was limited to diversionary attacks on islands in the Pacific in an
effort to draw enemy forces away from the Malay barrier.
The relative lack of attention paid to the Japanese threat was logical in light of
the fact that the Atlantic was the area where matters seemed to be coming to a
head, and strategy in the Pacific had to be tailored to fit with this pre-occupation.59
Furthermore defence officials began to conclude that Japan was unlikely to declare
war on the western powers, owing to the economic costs and military complications
that such actions could entail. The US Joint Board concluded that in order to occupy
key areas such as Malaya and the East Indies, Japan’s forces needed to operate at a
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great distance from their home base.60 If they encountered prolonged resistance, their
ability to sustain their offensives was ‘problematical’, owing to the lack of industrial
facilities to replace losses. Likewise within the top tiers of Britain’s leadership, the
Cabinet-level Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) qualified the growing indications
of Japanese bellicosity by stating that, because the Imperial navy needed to defend
the areas adjacent to the home islands against attacks by the US Navy, it was unable
to dispatch sufficient capital ships to support an operation against Malaya.61
Defence planners attempted to capitalize on indications of Japan’s strategic
weaknesses by demonstrating a show of force. Within the US naval establishment,
Stark was not in favour of imposing economic sanctions, on the grounds that
they could provoke Tokyo.62 The solution was to play for time so that further
reinforcements could be sent to the Philippines. During autumn 1941, the Army Air
Forces commenced the transfer of B-17 bomber squadrons to the western Pacific.
On 5 November, Stark suggested to President Roosevelt that by the middle of
December, US air and submarine strength in the Philippines were likely to become a
‘positive threat’ to any Japanese operations against areas south of Formosa.63
British officials also concluded that a nominal increase of their naval strength in
Asiatic waters could deter Japan. Despite the lukewarm support which the US was
showing in regard to protecting the European powers’ colonies in Asia, co-operation
was deemed essential. With the US Navy gearing up for mobilization at Pearl Harbor,
the dispatch of a token contingent of vessels to Singapore was considered likely to

57 Morton, Strategy and Command, 88–9.

58 RG 225, JB 325, Joint Board, War Plans Division, roll 11, JB 325, serial no. 642–5, Joint Army
and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow no. 5, Apr. 1941; also see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning,
43–4.
59 Lowenthal, Leadership and Indecision, 694.
60 RG 38, Office of the CNO, Strategic Plans Division Records, Miscellaneous Subject File, box
52, Joint Board Estimate of United States Overall Production Requirements, 11 Sep. 1941
61 TNA, CAB 81/99 JIC (41) 11 Sea, Land and Air Forces Which Japan Might Make Available
for Attack on Malaya: Report by JIC, 6 Jan. 1941; CAB 81/105 JIC (41) 449 Possible Japanese
Action: Report by JIC, 28 Nov. 1941.
62 Simpson, ‘Harold Raynsford Stark’, 126–128; Dallek, Roosevelt, 242.
63 Dallek, Roosevelt, 304–5; Baer, Sea Power, 173.

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 A Statement of Hopes? US and British naval war plans against Japan, 1920–1941 77

negate whatever optimism the Japanese had in their ability to wage war against an
Allied coalition. At a Defence Committee meeting held in October, the decision was
made to dispatch Force Z to Singapore, consisting of the modern battleship, Prince
of Wales and vintage battle-cruiser Repulse.64 Nobody in Churchill’s Cabinet or the
Admiralty believed that a token force could resist a Japanese attack. The intention
was to show that Britain still had a presence in the Far East. Given that war was
likely to result in an ultimate defeat for Japan, US and British officials were inclined
to adhere to their belief that they could avert hostilities. It took the speed and scale
of Japan’s victories in Southeast Asia to convince the western powers that their
adversary could not be dissuaded.
Conclusion: Anglo-American pre-war plans form the basis for wartime
strategy
The setbacks which the Allied naval forces suffered following the outbreak of the
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Pacific War on 7 December 1941, including the sinking of Force Z off the coast of
Malaya and the failure to prevent the Japanese from conquering the Philippines and
Dutch East Indies, resulted from a combination of factors. Careful planning on the
IJN’s part enabled it to achieve supremacy over the waters and airspace of Southeast
Asia, thereby facilitating the movement of troops. The Allies were also hindered
because a large portion of their warships and aircraft were committed to the Atlantic
theatre. Under the circumstances, the US and British navies were hard pressed to
provide an adequate defence.
Nevertheless the poor state of the Allied forces tends to obscure the fact that
throughout the interwar period, their naval staffs had drawn up a strategy that
incorporated many of the moves that were necessary to neutralize Japan’s capacity
to fight. The successive revisions of the Admiralty’s naval war memorandum,
along with the US Navy’s Orange plan, demonstrated a firm understanding of how
Japan’s position as an insular nation offered ideal opportunities to undermine its war
effort by attacking the oceanic supply lines which were necessary for its economic
livelihood. At the same time, any effort to strangulate the Japanese economy
entailed a prolonged campaign. The Americans and the British developed plans
which envisaged the war effort being carried out in three distinct phases. During
the first phase, the objective was to establish a presence in the Asia-Pacific regions.
The main tasks were to muster a large armada of warships, and thereafter facilitate
their movement to the Far East by developing bases that could provide re-supply
and repair facilities. The second phase entailed moves to capture a forward base that
could be used to support operations against Japan’s supply lines between the home
islands and the Asiatic mainland. During the third and final phase, the objective was
to destroy the IJN and thereby pave the way for conducting a close blockade of the
Japanese mainland.
The losses which the US and Great Britain suffered between December 1941
and the early part of 1942 therefore must be treated as a temporary setback. The
effectiveness of their strategies is further demonstrated by the fact that, after the tide
of the campaign turned against Japan, following its defeats at Midway in June and
the Solomon islands during the autumn, the Allies drew up a course of action that

64 TNA, CAB 69/2 Cabinet Defence Committee (Operations) 65th meeting, 17 Oct. 1941.

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 78 The Mariner’s Mirror

reflected many of the principles that had shaped their pre-war plans. In June 1943,
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff articulated the measures they had to carry out in order
destroy Japan’s war effort.65 The US Navy needed to extend its presence into the
far reaches of the western Pacific regions and secure a line of communication. The
overall plan for the Pacific campaign, drawn up by the Anglo-American combined
staff planners in December, stated that the ultimate aim was to establish bases in the
Formosa–Philippines area from which to conduct a blockade and aerial bombardment
of the home islands.66 US wartime strategy thus amounted to an improvisation of the
key tenets that had been laid out in the Orange plans. Britain’s strategy on the other
hand was constrained by commitments in the European theatre until the closing
stages of the conflict. Nevertheless the plan drawn up by the Chiefs of Staff reflected
a principle that became a cornerstone of British strategy just prior to the outbreak of
the Pacific War, namely that close co-operation with the United States was essential.
Churchill’s defence advisors insisted that the Royal Navy needed to make a significant
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contribution to the Allied war effort by fighting alongside the US Pacific fleet. Only
by participating in the main effort directed at Japan’s home islands, could Britain
stake a claim to being a reliable ally and thereby secure US approval for maintaining
its influence in Asia. In the end, Churchill concurred, and at the September 1944
Allied summit meeting at Quebec, the prime minister offered Roosevelt a British
naval commitment for the final attack against the Japanese mainland.
The success which the Allied naval forces achieved in attaining their wartime
objective of securing control over the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean, and
destroying a large portion of the IJN and Japan’s maritime communications in the
process, can therefore be traced back to the meticulous planning they had undertaken
during the interwar period, and the resulting good knowledge they developed in
regard to the moves which had to be carried out to vanquish their enemy.

Douglas Ford has taught military history and war studies at Aberystwyth, Salford,
and Birmingham universities, and he is the author of three books and over a dozen
articles on the US and British conduct of the Second World War in the Asia–Pacific
theatres.
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