1st Batch [1-25] seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's "near
descendants."
1. ---
2. ---
3. ---
4. LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN, GR No.L-44837,
November 23, 1938 66 PHIL 547
FACTS
1. Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant
Mclachlin and her children as heirs.
2. Plaintiff Ana Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child
of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued to
declare her as compulsory heir which the court
however denied.
3. Two years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio died,
and because he left some personal and real
properties without a will, an intestate proceeding
was instituted and a court order declaring his
compulsory heirs did not of course include Ana as
one.
4. Following such court action, the plaintiff
proceeded to collect the sum payable on a
promissory note then issued in favor of her by
Lorenzo by filing a claim in the intestate
proceedings of Eusebio's Estate claiming that the
sum be paid out of the properties inherited by the
defendants represents that of the successional
rights of Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of his
father Eusebio.
ISSUE
Has plaintiff the right collect the sum promised by
her father from her grandfather's estate?
HELD
No. The properties inherited by the defendants from
their deceased grandfather by representation are not
subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their
deceased father, who died without leaving any property.
While it is true that under the provisions of Articles 924
to 927 of the Civil Code, a child presents his father or
mother who died before him in the properties of his
grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation
does not make the said child answerable for the
obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother,
because, as may be seen from the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of
inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit
of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the
properties received from their predecessor.
The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in
representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not
bound to pay the indebtedness of their father from whom
they did not inherit anything.
5.
6. JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA 2
COSCOLLUELA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, G.R. No. 113725, June 29,
2000
FACTS
In a codicil of Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was
instituted devisee of Lot No. 1392 with an area of
511,855 square meters with the obligation to deliver 100
piculs of sugar to private respondent, Maria Belleza,
every year during the latter's lifetime. The codicil
provided that the obligation is imposed not only on the
instituted heir but also to his successors-in-interest and
that in case of failure to deliver, Maria Belleza shall
Dr. Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife and
children, one of whom is herein petitioner, Johnny
Rabadilla. Maria Belleza, alleging failure of the heirs to
comply with their obligation, filed a complaint with the
RTC praying for the reconveyance of the subject
property to the surviving heirs of the testatrix. She also
alleged that Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the
Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters
Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to
sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants
and sister of the testatrix. During the pre-trial, a
compromise agreement was concluded between the
parties wherein the lessee of the property assumed the
delivery of 100 piculs of sugar to Maria Belleza.
However, only partial delivery was made.
The Regional trial court dismissed the complaint for lack
of cause of action. The Court of Appeals, on appeal,
reversed the decision and held that the institution of Dr.
Rabadilla is in the nature of a modal institution and a
cause of action in favor of Maria Belleza arose when
Johnny Rabadilla failed to comply with their obligation
under the codicil, and in ordering the reversion of Lot
1392 to the estate of testatrix.
ISSUE 1
WON the Regional Trial Court properly dismissed
the case due to lack of cause of action.
HELD
NO. Successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death and compulsory heirs succeed the
decedent not only to all the property but also to his rights
and obligations. Hence, the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla are
also obliged under the codicil to deliver 100 piculs of
sugar to private respondent every year.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot
No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition
that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein
private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his
rights and title over said property, and they also
assumed his or his decedent's obligation to deliver the
fruits of the lot involved to Maria Belleza. Such obligation
of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right
of Maria Belleza over the usufruct, the fulfillment or
performance of which is now being demanded by her
through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore,
Maria Belleza has a cause of action against petitioner
and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint
below.
There is no substitution of heir where no substitute was
provided by the testatrix in case the instituted heir
predeceases her or in case of the latter's incapacity or
renunciation nor was the instituted heir mandated to
preserve the property and to transmit it to the second
heir.
ISSUE 2
WON a Will may be a subject of a Compromise
Agreement.
HELD
NO. A Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act
by which a person disposes of his property, to take
effect after his death. Since the Will expresses the
manner in which a person intends how his properties be
disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be
strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a
1|Succession 1st Batch
compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the
very purpose of making a Will.
7. SPEED DISTRIBUTING CORP., LITA
MARCELO, IRENEO MARCELO and
PEDRO AQUINO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and RUFINA LIM, respondents
FACTS
Pastor Y. Lim married private respondent RufinaLuy
Lim.3 During the early part of their marriage, Pastor
organized some family corporations using their conjugal
funds. Among these corporations was Skyline
International Corporation (Skyline, for brevity) which was
engaged in the importation and sale of Hankook Brand
Korean Tires and the acquisition of real estate. The
couple were incorporators and major stockholders of the
corporation and were also employed therein.
Pastor and the private respondent did not have a child.
They decided to "adopt" Leonard Lim and petitioner Lita
Lim Marcelo. There was, however, no formal court
adoption. Sometime thereafter, marital problems arose,
as a result of which the private respondent stopped
working at Skyline. As the domestic problems remained
unresolved, Pastor and the private respondent jointly
filed on August 13, 1968 a Petition before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City, for
voluntary dissolution of conjugal properties. As their
differences worsened, the private respondent filed on
January 27, 1971 a petition for legal separation against
Pastor on the ground of infidelity
On February 17, 1972, the court rendered a decision,
awarding P3,000 monthly support to the private
respondent and the children. the private respondent filed
a motion for execution. The court issued an order
granting the motion and the sheriff levied on the
properties of Skyline. The Skyline filed, on December
19, 1975, a third-party claim, alleging that the properties
levied were its personal properties and not those of
Pastor, who was only one of its stockholders.
During the life time, or on August 21, 1987, the Speed
Distributing Corporation (Speed, for brevity), was
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, with Pastor Lim as one of the
incorporators.
Also, Leslim Corporation (Leslim, for brevity), was
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission with a capital stock of P12,000,000.00,
divided into 120,000 shares at par value of P100.00 per
share. Pastor Lim subscribed to 95,700 shares valued at
P9,570,000.00.
Leslim Corporation executed a deed of absolute sale in
favor of the Speed, represented by its Vice-President,
petitioner Ireneo Marcelo, over the parcel of lot located
at Diliman Quezon City
On June 11, 1994, Pastor Lim died intestate and was
survived by his wife, the private respondent. On March
17, 1995, the private respondent, through her nephew
and attorney-in-fact George Luy, filed a petition for the
administration of the estate of her deceased husband.
The private respondent filed a motion praying for the
annotation of a notice of lispendens at the dorsal portion
of all titles over the properties in the name of Pastor.
Included in the said properties were those registered in
the name of other corporations of which Pastor was a
stockholder, including that parcel of land covered by
TCT No. T-116717 registered under the name of Speed.
the private respondent filed a complaint against Speed,
and the petitioners with the RTC of Quezon City, for the
nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Leslim in favor of Speed over the property. The private
respondent alleged, inter alia, that:
Plaintiff is the surviving spouse of the late Pastor Y. Lim
who died intestate on June 11, 1994, but leaving several
properties, real and personal
In their answer with compulsory counterclaim, the
petitioners specifically denied the material allegations of
the complaint, and by way of special and affirmative
defenses, alleged that the private respondent (the
plaintiff therein), was not privy to the deed of sale
executed by Leslim and Speed. As such, she was not
the real party-in-interest and had no cause of action
against the defendants.
In her reply, the private respondent alleged that even if
she was not privy to the deed of sale over the subject
property, she was entitled to its income, and her right
accrued at the time of Pastor’s death on June 11, 1994
ISSUE 1
WON the respondent herein or the surviving spouse
is a real party-in-interest in the case.
HELD
YES. The Private Respondent is a Real Party-in-Interest
as Plaintiff.
SEC. 2. Parties in interest.— A real party in interest is
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest.
The private respondent filed the complaint as one of the
heirs of Pastor Lim, who died intestate on June 11,
1994. She was, in fact, the surviving spouse of the
deceased, a compulsory heir by operation of law. The
general rule under the law on succession is that
successional rights are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called
upon to succeed by operation of law to the inheritance
without the need of further proceedings. Under Article
776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the
properties, rights and obligations of a party, not
extinguished by his death.35 Although the private
respondent was appointed by the probate court as a
special administratrix of the estate of Pastor Lim, she
had the right, apart from her being a special
administratrix, to file the complaint against the
petitioners for the nullification of the deed of absolute
sale
ISSUE 2
WON there is a need first for an order for
administration of the estate?
HELD
NO. On the second issue, petitioner asserts that the
surviving spouse has no legal capacity to sue since she
was never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his
estate. Petitioner’s objection in this regard is misplaced.
The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as
executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can
file the action. She and her children are complainants in
their own right as successors. From the very moment
ofdeath, his rights insofar as the partnership was
concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of
the decedent.Whatever claims and rights against the
2|Succession 1st Batch
partnership and petitioner were transmitted to
respondents by operation of law, more particularly by
succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of
which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of
the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted
8.
9. GENEROSA TEVES DE JAKOSALEM, vs.
NICOLASA RAFOLS, ET ALS., (G.R. No. L-
48372 July 24, 1942)
FACTS
 The land in dispute originally belonged to Juan
Melgar (Juan). Juan died at the judicial
administration of his estate which commenced in
1915 and came to a close on December 2, 1924,
only.
 During the pendency of the said administration, that
is, on July 5, 1917, Susana (Susana) Melgar,
daughter of Juan sold the land with the right of
repurchase to Pedro Cui (Pedro), subject to the
stipulation that during the period for the repurchase
she would continue in possession of the land as
lessee of the purchaser.
 On December 12, 1920, the partition of the estate of
Juan Melgar was made, and the land in question
was adjudicated to Susana.
 In 1921, she conveyed, in payment of professional
fees, one-half of the land in favor of the Nicolasa
Rafols (Rafols), who, entered upon the portion thus
conveyed and has been in possession thereof up to
the present.
 On July 23, 1921, Pedro brought an action to
recover said half of the land from Nicolas Rafols
and the other half from the other defendants, and
while that case was pending, or about August 4,
1925, Pedro Cui donated the whole land in question
to Generosa Teves (Teves).
 The lower court rendered a decision absolving
Nicolas Rafols as to the one-half of the land
conveyed to him by Susana Melgar upon the theory
that Susana Melgar could not have anything to
Pedro Cui because the a land was then in custodia
legis, that is, under judicial administration., and
declaring Teves owner of the other half but express
acknowlegment of the other defendants.
 Teves appealed the part of the judgment which is
favorable to Nicolas Rafols.
ISSUE
WON the sale by Susana to pedro cui was valid
despite the land being under judicial
administration.
HELD: YES
 That the land could not ordinarily be levied upon
while in custodia legis, does not mean that one of
the heirs may not sell the right, interest or
participation which he has or might have in the
lands under administration.
 The ordinary execution of property in custodia
legis is prohibited in order to avoid interference with
the possession by the court. But the sale made by
an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the
result of the pending administration, in no wise
stands in the way of such administration.
 Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the
possession of hereditary property is deemed to be
transmitted to the heir without interruption from the
instant of the death of the decedent, in case the
inheritance be accepted."
 And Manresa with reason states upon the death of
a person, each of his heirs "becomes the undivided
owner of the whole estate left with respect to the
part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a
community of ownership being thus formed among
the co-owners of the estate while it remains
undivided."
 And according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every
part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the
common property, and the effect of such
assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the
portion which may be alloted him in the partition
upon the dissolution of the community.
 Therefore the sale made by Susana in favor of
Pedro was valid, but it would be effective only as to
the portion to be adjudicated to the vendor upon the
partition of the property left by her deceased father.
 And as on December 12, 1920, upon the partition of
said property, the land in question was adjudicated
to Susana Melgar, the sale of the whole land which
the latter made in favor of Pedro Cui was entirely
confirmed.
 Upon the confirmation of the sale of December 12,
1920 in favor of Pedro Cui, the conveyance by
Susana Melgar in favor of Nicolasa Rafols in 1921
could no longer be done. And even in the case of a
double sale, where neither of the purchasers has
registered the sale, the first in possession namely,
Pedro Cui, should be referred. When the sale made
in the latter's favor was confirmed on December 12,
1920, Susana Melgar was in possession of the land
as lessee, and this possession should be
considered as that of Pedro Cui. The possession of
Nicolas Rafols commenced in 1921 only, wherefore,
it is subsequent to that of Pedro Cui.
10. IBARLE V. PO
FACTS
Leonard j. Winstanley and Catalina Navarro were
husband and wife. The husband died on June 6, 1946
leaving heir the surviving spouse and some minor
children.
Upon the death of L.J. Winstanley, he left a parcel of
land described under Transfer Certificate of title No.
2391 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu.
The property was a conjugal property.
On April 15, 1946, the surviving spouse Catalina
Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel of
land to the spouses Maria Canoy, alleging among other
things, that she needed money for the support of her
children. On May 24, 1947, the spouses Maria Canoy
and Roberto Canoy sold the same parcel of land to the
plaintiff in this case named Bienvenido A. Ebarle. The
two deeds of sale referred to above were not registered
and have never been registered up to the date.
On January 17, 1948 surviving spouse Catalina Navarro
Vda. de Winstanley, after her appointment as guardian
of her children by this court (Special proceeding no. 212-
R) sold one-half of the land mentioned above to
Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant case, which
portion belongs to the children of the above named
spouses.
ISSUE
Whether the sale to Esperanza M. Po, the last
purchaser, is valid
3|Succession 1st Batch

HELD
YES. This question in turn depends upon the validity of
the prior ale to Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy.
Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to
the succession of a person are transmitted from the
moment of his death." in a slightly different language,
this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as
article 777.
Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code
of Spain, says:
The moment of death is the determining factor when the
heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance, whether
such right be pure or contingent. It is immaterial whether
a short or long period of time lapses between the death
of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the
property of the inheritance because the right is always
deemed to be retroactive from the moment of death. (5
Manresa, 317.)
The above provision and comment make it clear that
when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the
entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already
belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial
declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it
follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it
included the children's share.
The sale to the defendant having been made by
authority of the competent court was undeniably legal
and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of
no consequence. If registration were necessary, still the
non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it
was due to no other cause than his own opposition.
The decision will be affirmed subject to the reservation,
made in said decision, of the right of the plaintitff and/or
the Canoy spouses to bring such action against Catalina
Navarro Vda. de Winstanley as may be appropriate for
such damages as they may have incurred by reason of
the voiding of the sale in their favor.
11. LORENZO vs. POSADAS JR. G.R. No. L-
43082 June 18, 1937
FACTS
Thomas Hanley died, leaving a will and a considerable
amount of real and personal properties. Proceedings for
the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution
of his estate were begun in the CFI of Zamboanga. The
will was admitted to probate.
The CFI considered it proper for the best interests of the
estate to appoint a trustee to administer the real
properties which, under the will, were to pass to nephew
Matthew ten years after the two executors named in the
will was appointed trustee. Moore acted as trustee until
he resigned and the plaintiff Lorenzo herein was
appointed in his stead.
During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the
defendant Collector of Internal Revenue (Posadas)
assessed against the estate an inheritance tax, together
with the penalties for deliquency in payment. Lorenzo
paid said amount under protest, notifying Posadas at the
same time that unless the amount was promptly
refunded suit would be brought for its recovery. Posadas
overruled Lorenzo’s protest and refused to refund the
said amount. Plaintiff went to court. The CFI dismissed
Lorenzo’s complaint and Posadas’ counterclaim. Both
parties appealed to this court.
ISSUE
Has there been delinquency in the payment of the
inheritance tax?
HELD
YES. The defendant maintains that it was the duty of the
executor to pay the inheritance tax before the delivery of
the decedent’s property to the trustee. Stated otherwise,
the defendant contends that delivery to the trustee was
delivery to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in this
case, within the meaning of the first paragraph of
subsection (b) of section 1544 of the Revised
Administrative Code. This contention is well taken and is
sustained. A trustee is but an instrument or agent for the
cestui que trust
The appointment of Moore as trustee was made by the
trial court in conformity with the wishes of the testator as
expressed in his will. It is true that the word “trust” is not
mentioned or used in the will but the intention to create
one is clear. No particular or technical words are
required to create a testamentary trust. The words “trust”
and “trustee”, though apt for the purpose, are not
necessary. In fact, the use of these two words is not
conclusive on the question that a trust is created. ” To
constitute a valid testamentary trust there must be a
concurrence of three circumstances:
1) Sufficient words to raise a trust;
2) a definite subject;
3) a certain or ascertain object; statutes in some
jurisdictions expressly or in effect so providing.”
There is no doubt that the testator intended to create a
trust. He ordered in his will that certain of his properties
be kept together undisposed during a fixed period, for a
stated purpose. The probate court certainly exercised
sound judgment in appointmening a trustee to carry into
effect the provisions of the will
As the existence of the trust was already proven, it
results that the estate which plaintiff represents has
been delinquent in the payment of inheritance tax and,
therefore, liable for the payment of interest and
surcharge provided by law in such cases.
The delinquency in payment occurred on March 10,
1924, the date when Moore became trustee. On that
date trust estate vested in him. The interest due should
be computed from that date.
NOTES: Other issues:
(a) When does the inheritance tax accrue and when
must it be satisfied?
The accrual of the inheritance tax is distinct from the
obligation to pay the same.
Acording to article 657 of the Civil Code, “the rights to
the succession of a person are transmitted from the
4|Succession 1st Batch
moment of his death.” “In other words”, said Arellano, C.
J., “. . . the heirs succeed immediately to all of the
property of the deceased ancestor. The property
belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed
and delivered to them a deed for the same before his
death.”
Whatever may be the time when actual transmission of
the inheritance takes place, succession takes place in
any event at the moment of the decedent’s death. The
time when the heirs legally succeed to the inheritance
may differ from the time when the heirs actually receive
such inheritance. ” Thomas Hanley having died on May
27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of the date.
From the fact, however, that Thomas Hanley died on
May 27, 1922, it does not follow that the obligation to
pay the tax arose as of the date. The time for the
payment on inheritance tax is clearly fixed by section
1544 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended
by Act No. 3031, in relation to section 1543 of the same
Code. The two sections follow:
SEC. 1543. Exemption of certain acquisitions and
transmissions. — The following shall not be taxed:
a) The merger of the usufruct in the owner of the
naked title.
b) The transmission or delivery of the inheritance or
legacy by the fiduciary heir or legatee to the
trustees.
c) The transmission from the first heir, legatee, or
donee in favor of another beneficiary, in
accordance with the desire of the predecessor. xx
SEC. 1544. When tax to be paid. — The tax fixed in this
article shall be paid:
(a) In the second and third cases of the next preceding
section, before entrance into possession of the property.
(b) In other cases, within the six months subsequent to
the death of the predecessor; but if judicial testamentary
or intestate proceedings shall be instituted prior to the
expiration of said period, the payment shall be made by
the executor or administrator before delivering to each
beneficiary his share.
The instant case does[not] fall under subsection (a), but
under subsection (b), of section 1544 above-quoted, as
there is here no fiduciary heirs, first heirs, legatee or
donee. Under the subsection, the tax should have been
paid before the delivery of the properties in question to
Moore as trustee.
(b) Should the inheritance tax be computed on the basis
of the value of the estate at the time of the testator’s
death, or on its value ten years later?
If death is the generating source from which the power
of the estate to impose inheritance taxes takes its being
and if, upon the death of the decedent, succession takes
place and the right of the estate to tax vests instantly,
the tax should be measured by the value of the estate
as it stood at the time of the decedent’s death,
regardless of any subsequent contingency value of any
subsequent increase or decrease in value
(c) In determining the net value of the estate subject to
tax, is it proper to deduct the compensation due to
trustees?
A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair
compensation for his services. But from this it does not
follow that the compensation due him may lawfully be
deducted in arriving at the net value of the estate subject
to tax. There is no statute in the Philippines which
requires trustees’ commissions to be deducted in
determining the net value of the estate subject to
inheritance tax
(d) What law governs the case at bar? Should the
provisions of Act No. 3606 favorable to the tax-payer be
given retroactive effect?
A statute should be considered as prospective in its
operation, whether it enacts, amends, or repeals an
inheritance tax, unless the language of the statute
clearly demands or expresses that it shall have a
retroactive effect, . . . .” Act No. 3606 itself contains no
provisions indicating legislative intent to give it
retroactive effect. No such effect can be given the
statute by this court.
12. ---
13. FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA,
DOMINADOR CALPATURA and TOMAS
CALPATURA, JR., Heirs of TOMAS
CALPATURA, SR., versus ROBERTO,
ERLINDA, DANIEL, GLORIA, PATRICIO, JR.
and EDNA, all surnamed PRADO and
NARCISA PRADO
FACTS
The property under litigation is the northern half
portion of a residential land consisting of 552.20 square
meters, more or less, registered in the name of the
respondents Narcisa Prado and her children by her first
husband, Patricio Prado, Sr.
When Patricio Prado, Sr. died. Narcisa
subsequently married Bonifacio Calpatura. In order to
support her minor children with her first husband,
Narcisa sold to Tomas, her brother-in-law, the subject
land in controversy for the sum of P10,500.00.
Consequently, Narcisa executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of the latter.
Tomas’ daughter, Flordeliza, built a two-storey
duplex with firewall on the northern half portion of the
property. Respondents, who occupied the southern half
portion of the land, did not object to the
construction. Flordeliza declared the property for
taxation purposes and paid the corresponding taxes
thereon. Likewise, Maximo, the son of Tomas cousin,
built a small house on the northern portion of the
property.
Respondents filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of sale and delivery of possession of the northern
half portion of the subject property against petitioners.
They alleged that the transaction between Narcisa and
Tomas was one of mortgage and not of sale; that
5|Succession 1st Batch
Narcisas children tried to redeem the mortgaged
property but they learned that the blank document which
their mother had signed was transformed into a Deed of
Absolute Sale; that Narcisa, as natural guardian of her
children, had no authority to sell the northern half portion
of the property which she and her children co-owned;
and that only P5,000.00 out of the consideration of
P10,500.00 was paid by Tomas.
The court a quo dismissed the complaint. It found
that the sale was valid; that the Agreement to Purchase
and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale were duly
executed; that the sum of P10,500.00 as selling price for
the subject property was fully paid there being no
demand for the payment of the remaining balance; that
the introduction of improvements thereon by the
petitioners was without objection from the respondents;
and that Roberto and Erlinda failed to contest the
transaction within four years after the discovery of the
alleged fraud and reaching the majority age in violation
of Article 1391 of the Civil Code.
The Court of Appeals declared that respondents
were co-owners of the subject property, thus the sale
was valid only insofar as Narcisas 1/7 undivided share
thereon was concerned.
ISSUES
(1) Is the subject property conjugal or paraphernal?
(2) Is the transaction a sale or a mortgage?
(3) Assuming that the transaction is a sale, what was
the area of the land subject of the sale?
HELD
1. THE PROPERTY IS CONJUGAL. Article 160
of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale
was entered into, provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife. Proof of acquisition during
the marriage is a condition sine qua non in order for the
presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to operate.
In the instant case, while Narcisa testified during cross-
examination that she bought the subject property from
Peoples Homesite Housing Corporation with her own
funds,[17] she, however admitted in the Agreement of
Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale that
the property was her conjugal share with her first
husband, Patricio, Sr.[18] A verbal assertion that she
bought the land with her own funds is inadmissible to
qualify the terms of a written agreement under the
parole evidence rule.
2. SALE. The Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Narcisa in favor of Tomas is contained in a
notarized[21] document. A public document executed and
attested through the intervention of a notary public is
evidence of the facts in a clear, unequivocal manner
therein expressed. Otherwise stated, public or notarial
documents, or those instruments duly acknowledged or
proved and certified as provided by law, may be
presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgment being prima
facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or
document involved. In order to contradict the
presumption of regularity of a public document, evidence
must be clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant.
3. 8/14 (1/2+1/7 (But the case says 9/14). The
property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio
Prado, Sr., one-half of the subject property was
automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Narcisa,
as her share in the conjugal partnership. Particios rights
to the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death
to his heirs, which includes his widow Narcisa, who is
entitled to the same share as that of each of the
legitimate children. Thus, as a result of the death of
Patricio, a regime of co-ownership arose between
Narcisa and the other heirs in relation to the
property. The remaining one-half was transmitted to his
heirs by intestate succession. By the law on intestate
succession, his six children and Narcisa Prado inherited
the same at one-seventh (1/7) each pro
indiviso. Inasmuch as Narcisa inherited one-seventh
(1/7) of her husband's conjugal share in the said
property and is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her
conjugal share, she owns a total of 9/14 of the subject
property. Hence, Narcisa could validly convey her total
undivided share in the entire property to Tomas.
Finally, no particular portion of the property could be
identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale
considering that the property had not yet been
partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court. While
Narcisa could validly sell one half of the subject
property, her share being 9/14 of the same, she could
not have particularly conveyed the northern portion
thereof before the partition, the terms of which was still
to be determined by the parties before the trial court.
14. SUAREZ vs. CA
FACTS
Petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died
and since then his estate has not been partitioned.
Petitioners’ widowed mother and Rizal Realty lost in a
case, and were ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
herein respondents. The judgment having become final
and executory, five parcels of land were levied and sold
on execution. Before the expiration of the redemption
period, petitioners filed an action to annul the auction
sale and recover the property, alleging that being
strangers to the case decided against their mother, they
cannot be held liable and that parcels of land, of which
they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on
execution.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners have proprietary rights
over levied and auctioned property.
HELD
Only 1/2 of the 5 parcels of land should have been the
subject of the auction sale. The legitime of the surviving
spouse is equal to the legitime of each child. The
proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and
auctioned property is different from and adverse to that
of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the
property not because of their mother but through their
own right as children of their deceased father.
Therefore, petitioners are not barred from instituting the
action to annul the auction sale to protect their own
interest.
15. BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, et. al,
petitioners, vs. JOSELITO P. DELA
MERCED[G.R. No. 126707. February 25,
1999]
FACTS
6|Succession 1st Batch
  Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without
issue.
 She left five (5) parcels of land situated in Orambo,
Pasig City.
 At the time of her death, Evarista was survived by
three sets of heirs, viz: (1) Francisco M. dela
Merced, her legitimate brother ; (2) Teresita P.
Rupisan, her niece who is the only daughter of
Rosa de la Merced-Platon (a sister who died in
1943) ; and (3) the legitimate children of Eugenia
dela Merced-Adriano (another sister of Evarista who
died in 1965), namely: Herminio, Ruben, Joselito,
Rogelio, Wilfredo, Victor and Constantino, all
surnamed Adriano, Corazon Adriano-Ongoco and
Jasmin Adriano-Mendoza.
 Almost a year later or on March 19, 1988, to be
precise, Francisco (Evaristas brother) died. He was
survived by his wife Blanquita Errea dela Merced
and their three legitimate children, namely, Luisito
E. dela Merced, Blanquita M. Macatangay and Ma.
Olivia M. Paredes.
 The three sets of heirs of the decedent, Evarista M.
dela Merced, referring to (1) the abovenamed heirs
of Francisco; (2) Teresita P. Rupisan and (3) the
nine [9] legitimate children of Eugenia, executed an
extrajudicial settlement.
 Respondent Joselito P. Dela Merced , illegitimate
son of the late Francisco de la Merced, filed a
Petition for Annulment of the Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Evarista
M. Dela Merced.
 Petitioners insist that being an illegitimate child,
private respondent Joselito is barred from inheriting
from Evarista because of the provision of Article
992 of the New Civil Code, which lays down an
impassable barrier between the legitimate and
illegitimate families.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent Joselito may
participate in the intestate estate of the late Evarista
M. Dela Merced in his capacity as representative of
his alleged father, Francisdo Dela Merced, brother of
the deceased, whose succession is under
consideration
HELD: YES.
 Article 992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable
because involved here is not a situation where an
illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a
legitimate sister of his father, which is prohibited by
the aforesaid provision of law.
 Rather, it is a scenario where an illegitimate child
inherits from his father, the latter’s share in or
portion of, what the latter already inherited from the
deceased sister, Evarista.
 As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point
in the present case is Article 777 of the New Civil
Code, which provides that the rights to succession
are transmitted from the moment of death of
the decedent.
 Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco,
the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the
former as one of her heirs.
 Subsequently, when Francisco died, his heirs,
namely: his spouse, legitimate children, and the
private respondent, Joselito, an illegitimate
child, inherited his (Franciscos) share in the estate
of Evarista.
 It bears stressing that Joselito does not claim to be
an heir of Evarista by right of representation
but participates in his own right, as an heir of the
late Francisco, in the latter’s share (or portion
thereof) in the estate of Evarista.
 The relates to the rightful and undisputed right of an
heir to the share of his late father in the estate of
the decedent Evarista, ownership of which had
been transmitted to his father upon the death of
Evarista.
 There is no legal obstacle for private respondent
Joselito, admittedly the son of the late Francisco, to
inherit in his own right as an heir to his father’s
estate, which estate includes a 1/3 undivided share
in the estate of Evarista.
16. RIOFERIO VS CA GR NO 129008
FACTS
 Alfonso Orfinada Jr. died intestate leaving several
properties in various places
 He left a widow respondent Esperanza Orfinada
with whom he had children ( the herein
Respondents) and a paramour, Teodora Rioferio,
with whom he also had children (the Petitioners)
 Respondents discovered that the Petitioners
Teodora and her children executed an EXTRA
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF A
DECEASED PERSON WITH QUIT CLAIM involving
the properties of Alfonso’s estate in Dagupan City
 They also found out that petitioners where able to
obtain a loan (700k) from Rural Bank of Mangaldan
by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the
properties subject of the Extra Judicial Settlement
 The petitioners as the legal heirs of Alfonso, filed an
action to annul/rescind the said settlement as well
as a petition for Letters of Administration upon
learning of the Extra Judicial Settlement
 petitioner file a motion to set affirmative defense,
and raised that respondents are anot the real
parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso
Orfinada Jr., in view of the pendency of the
Administrative proceedings
 The lower court denied the motion on the ground
that respondents are the real parties-in-interest,
especially in the absence of an administrator who is
not yet appointed.
ISSUE
WON the heirs may bring a suit to recover the
property of the estate pending the appointment of
an administrator
HELD
 YES
 Pending the filing of the administration proceedings,
the heirs without doubt have legal personality to
bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in
accordance with ART. 777,NCC
``THAT THE RIGHTS TO SUCCESION ARE
TRANSMITTED FROM THE MOMENT OF THE
DEATH OF THE DECEDENT``
 The provision is the foundation of the principle that
the property right and obligations to the extent and
value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others by his will or
by operation of law.
 Even if administration proceedings have already
commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an
administrator has not yet been appointed.
7|Succession 1st Batch
 This is proper modality despite the total lack of
advertence to the heirs in the rules on party
representation, namely section3, rule 3 and section 2,
rule 87 of the Rules of Court.
In the case of Gochan vs. Youngthe SC recognize the
legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights
and properties of the decedent under administration
pending appointment of an administrator.
EXCEPTIONS:
However even if there is an appointed administrator,
juris prudence recognizes (2) two EXCEPTIONS:
 If the executor/administrator is unwilling or refuses
to bring suit; and
 When the administrator is alleged to have
participated in the act complained of and he is
made party defendant. Evidently, the necessity for
the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of
the estate is compelling when there is no appointed
administrator, if not more, as where there is an
appointed administrator but he is either disciplined
to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
Therefore, the rule that “THE HEIRS HAVE NO
LEGAL STANDING TO SUE FOR THE
RECOVERY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE
ESTATE DURING THE PENDENCY OF
ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS” has (3)
three exceptions
 When there is no appointed administrator such as in
this case.
17. ---
18. MONICA BONA versus HOSPICIO BRIONES,
ET AL.
NOTE: The law that governs this case is Section 618 of
Act No. 190. Hence, the requirement under Act No.
2645 amending said section which was promulgated on
February 24, 1916 requiring 3 witnesses apart from the
lawyer cannot apply here.
Gist of the case: there were only 3 witnesses of the will
including the notary public, contrary to the provision of
the latter law, under Act No. 2645, which took effect way
after the death of the testator.
FACTS
Monica Bona, the widow by the second
marriage of the deceased Francisco Briones who died
on 1913, applied for the probate of the will which the
said deceased executed during his lifetime; for the fixing
of a day for the hearing and presentation of evidence
after all the interested parties had been cited; and then
for the approval of the partition had been cited; and then
for the approval of the partition property made by the
testator in the said will. Consequently, Monica Bona's
petition was granted and a date set for the trial and other
necessary proceedings for the probate of said will.
Respondents, the legitimate children by the first
marriage of the testator, opposed the probate of the will
presented by the widow of the deceased Briones,
alleging that the said will was executed before two
witnesses only and under unlawful and undue pressure
or influence exercised upon the person of the testator
who thus signed through fraud and deceit; and he
prayed that for that reason the said will be declared null
and of no value.
Gregorio Bustilla, one of the witnesses of the
said will, was examined and he stated under oath: That
he as well as Sixto Barrameda and Domingo de la
Fuente, was actually present as attesting witness when
Francisco Briones executed his will in his (Bustilla's)
house; that Francisco Briones knowing of the presence
of notary Domingo de la Fuente in the house, he went
upstairs and announced himself; that on being asked
what he wanted, Briones stated that he wanted to
execute his will; that after Briones and the notary had
talked with each other, the former left and after a while
returned bringing with him some paper; that then
Domingo de la Fuente, under the direction of Francisco
Briones, began to draft the will, which when finished was
signed by the latter in the presence of the notary, of the
declarant, and of another witness, Sixto Barrameda; that
then the three witnesses — the declarant, de la Fuente,
and Barrameda — signed in the presence of each other.
The declarant identified the signature placed on the will
by the testator Briones and those of the other witnesses
Sixto Barrameda and Domingo dela Fuente, who all
signed in the presence of the testator himself. He stated
further that the testator at that moment was in his sound
judgment and not forced to execute the will. He
identified the document Exhibit A as the will executed by
Francisco Briones and the signature of the latter as the
one placed by the testator. By agreement of both parties
it was made to appear in the record that, if the witnesses
Sixto Barrameda and Domingo de la Fuente were
called, they would have testified in the same terms as
witness Gregorio Bustilla.
In view of the above, the judge rendered
judgment denying probate to the will Exhibit A as
executed by Francisco Briones.
ISSUE
Whether or not the execution of the will in question
is in accord with the solemnities prescribed law.
HELD
Before proceeding further, it is indispensable to note that
the will in question was executed by Francisco Briones
on September 16, 1911, and the order denying probate
was rendered on March 27, 1915, both dated being prior
to that of Act No. 2645 amending said section 618 and
promulgated on February 24, 1916, which took effect
only from July first of the last named year: so that, in
order to explain whether or not the above-mentioned will
was executed in accordance with the law then in force,
the last named law cannot be applied and the will in
question should be examined in accordance with, and
under the rules of, the law in force at the time of its
execution.
Section 618 of Act No. 190 says:
No will, except as provided in the preceding
section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real
or personal, nor charge or affect the same,
unless it be in writing and signed by the
testator, or by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more
8|Succession 1st Batch
 credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of each other. But the absence of
such form of attestation shall not render the will
invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact
signed and attested as in this section provided.
A mere reading of the last four paragraphs or parts of
the will Exhibit A shows in a clear manner that the said
will in its form and contents expresses without shadow
of doubt the will of the testator; and that in its execution
the solemnities prescribed by the above-mentioned
section 618 of Act No. 190 have been observed.
Even though Domingo de la Fuente drafted the will and
intervened in its preparation as a notary, by the order
and under the express direction of the testator, it is
nevertheless true that he did it as a witness to the
execution of the said will with positive and concrete acts,
while the two other witnesses Gregorio Bustilla and
Sixto Barrameda merely attested all that appeared in the
second of the four paragraphs mentioned.
The name of Domingo de la Fuente appears as that of a
notary who certifies as to the certainty of the will made
by Francisco Briones and of the signatures of the
testator as well as of the witnesses at its end; and as the
law does not require that one of the witnesses must
necessarily be a notary, and it cannot be denied that
Domingo de la Fuente attested the execution and the
signing of the will not only by the testator but also by the
attesting witnesses, it cannot but be admitted that
Domingo de la Fuente intervened, attested, and signed
the testament as a witness.
This is a case in which the judicial criterion should be
inspired in the sense that it is not defeated, and if the
wish of the testator is so manifest and express as in the
instant case, it is not proper nor just to invalidate the will
of Francisco Briones merely because of some small
defect in form which is not essential nor of great
importance, such as the failure to state therein that
Domingo de la Fuente was also a witness to the said will
when he signed it twice. As a matter of act, he
understood the contents of the will better than the two
other attesting witnesses, for he really was a witness
and he attested the execution of the will during its
making until it was terminated and signed by the
testator, by the witnesses, and by himself, even though
he did it in the capacity of a notary.
The last paragraph of section 618 of Act No. 190
supplies a legal basis to support the validity of the will in
question with the conditions for its probate because,
notwithstanding the existence of such defect merely in
the form and not in the substance, the certification of
authenticity and the very text of the will show in a clear
and indubitable manner that the will Exhibit A contains
the last will of the testator, and that it was signed by the
latter and attested as being true and legitimate not only
the two witnesses Bustilla and Barrameda but also by
the one who wrote it, Domingo de la Fuente, who was
also a truthful and reliable witness, even though he be
called a notary public.
The requisites established by Act No. 2645, which
amended the oft-repeated section 618 cannot be
required in the probate of the will here, inasmuch as this
document was executed in September, 1911, five years
before said amendatory law began to take effect (July 1,
1916), while the testator died on August 14, 1913, two
years and some months before the enforcement of the
said law; and so, the only law applicable to the present
case is the provision contained in section 618 of Act No.
190, and in accordance with the provisions of this
section, the said will should be probated; for it has been
presented to the court many months before the
amendatory act went into effect.
It is well-known that the principle that a new law shall not
have retroactive effect only governs the rights arising
from acts done under the rule of the former law; but if
the right be declared for the first time by a subsequent
law it shall take effect from that time even though it has
arisen from acts subject to the former laws, provided
that it does not prejudice another acquired right of the
same origin.
It is well-known that hereditary rights are not born nor
does the will produce any effect until the moment of the
death of the person whose inheritance is concerned.
In view of these facts, it follows that the judgment
appealed from should be reversed and it should be
declared as we hereby declare that the will Exhibit A has
been executed in due form by Francisco Briones on
September 16, 1911, and that the said will contains and
expresses the last will and testamentary wishes of the
deceased testator.
19.
20. ---
21. Juliana Bagtas (widow of the
decedent/executrix) vs. Isidro paguio, et. Al.,
FACTS
The defendants in this case opposed the probation of
the will of the late PioquintoPaguio y Pizarro on the
ground that the testator was not in the full enjoyment
and use of his mental faculties because the latter, for 15
years prior to the time of his death suffered from a
paralysis of the left side of his body. Thus,he is without
the mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.
The record shows, however, that through the medium of
signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and
to other members of his family.
ISSUE
Whether or not the testator was of sound mind when
the will was executed.
HELD
YES. In this jurisdiction, there is a presumption in favor
of mental capacity of the testator. Since the testator in
this case was never adjudged as insane by the court of
competent jurisdiction, the presumption that he has
mental capacity continues. It is therefore incumbent
upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption
by proper evidence. The opponents in the case at bar
failed to do this. The courts have repeatedly held that
mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and
disease does not render a person incapable of making a
will. Pursuant to Article 799 of the New Civil Code, it is
not necessary that the testator be in full possession
of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered bydisease, injury
or other cause to be able to be considered of sound
mind.It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the
time of making the will to know the natureof the estate to
9|Succession 1st Batch
be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of thetestamentary act.
22. SANTIAGO GALVEZ vs. CANUTA GALVEZ
G.R. No. L-6650 December 5, 1913
On August 12, 1910, two wills were executed by the
testator, Victor Galvez. The purpose of the execution of
the second will was to correct an error contained in the
first one. This second will is the one exhibited for
probate.
Santiago Galvez petitioned for the probate of the will
(second) alleging that Victor Galvez executed in the
dialect of the province, on August 12, 1910, in presence
of witnesses. And, as the testator was no longer able to
sign on account of his sickness, Lorenzo Galvez
(nephew), at his (testator) request, affixed his own
signature to the instrument, for him and below his written
name.
However, Canuta Galvez, the testator's daughter,
opposed the petition, alleging that her father, owing to
his very serious sickness with cholera, lacked the
intellectual capacity and clear judgment requisite for
making a will.
ISSUE
WON it was duly proven in the proceedings that the
testator on account of his serious sickness, was
rendered incapable to execute a will.
HELD
NO. In order to hold that Victor Galvez, on account of
serious sickness, was not then of sound mind and did
not have full knowledge of his acts and, therefore, was
incapable to execute a will, it is necessary that the
proceedings disclose CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF HIS
MENTAL INCAPACITY and of his EVIDENT LACK OF
REASON AND JUDGMENT AT THE TIME HE
EXECUTED HIS WILL in the presence of the witnesses
whose signatures appear at the foot thereof.
[Supporting Facts] The subscribing witnesses
affirmed under oath that they were present
when Victor Galvez, then sick in his house,
stated to them that the document read before
them by Lorenzo Galvez contained his last will
and testament, and that, as the testator was no
longer able to sign, he charged his nephew
Lorenzo to do so in his stead; he talked
intelligently and with perfect knowledge of what
was taking place. The physician Dr. Vicente de
Jesus, in his testimony, referred to the effects
and results of cholera on a patient in ordinary
cases and in the regular course of this disease;
but his statements, taken in general, cannot,
serve as a ground upon which to predicate
incapacity, for the reason that he did not
examine Victor Galvez, nor did he even see
him during the execution of the will. Besides
the attestation of the aforesaid subscribing
witnesses, the contents of the will and the
testator's positive determination to rectify the
error he incurred in the execution of his first
will, show that Victor Galvez was in his sound
mind and was perfectly aware of his duties in
respect to the legal, inviolable rights of his
daughter and sole heir, Canuta Galvez.
Inasmuch as, in the drafting and execution of the second
will, the formalities prescribed by section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure were observed, for the
testator's name appears written at the foot of the will and
under this name Lorenzo Galvez signed by direction of
the testator himself, and the instrument was also signed
by the attesting witnesses before mentioned who
affirmed that they heard and attested the dispositions
made by the testator and witnessed the reading of the
will, that they were present when the said Lorenzo
Galvez signed the will in the name of the testator and
that they signed it in the presence of all the persons
assembled in the latter's house, the conclusion is
inevitable that Victor Galvez, in executing his will, did so
with a sound mind and the full use of his mental
faculties; therefore, the will must be admitted to probate.
23. TORRES VS. LOPEZ
FACTS
The case involves a controversy over the estate of
Tomas Rodriguez who died on January 1924. Prior to
his demise he executed his last will and testament
leaving all of his properties to his cousin Vicente F.
Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez Bueno as his
universal and only heirs. However, Vicente Lopez had
not presented his final accounts as guardian and no
such accounts had been presented by him at the time of
his death. On the other hand, appellant, Margarita Lopez
was the nearest relative of the decedent who also claims
to be an heir of Rodriguez.
ISSUE
Whether or not Luz Lopez Bueno will inherit the
remaining estate of Tomas Rodriguez.
HELD
YES, when one of the two joint heirs called by will to an
inheritance without special designation of shares dies
before the testator, the part pertaining to such heir will,
upon the subsequent death of the testator, go by
accretion to the coheir; and the additional circumstance
that the predeceasing heir was, at the time of the
making of the will, disqualified to take, by reason of his
being then the legal guardian of the testator with
accounts unsettled, does not make a case for intestate
succession as to his part of the estate.
24. Estate of the deceased Isidra Abquilan.
ATANASIO ABQUILAN,
vs. FELICIANA ABQUILAN G.R. No. L-24665
October 13, 1926
FACTS
Court of First Instance of the Province of Occidental
Negros, refusing to legalize an instrument purporting to
be the last will and testament of Isidra Abquilan,
deceased.
It appears that the deceased left no forced heirs, and
her only heirs, in case of intestacy, are her brother,
Atanasio Abquilan, the proponent of the will, and
Feliciana Abquilan, a sister, who is the opponent.
10 | S u c c e s s i o n 1 s t B a t c h
The trial court found that the document propounded as
the will of the deceased is apocryphal, that the purported
signatures of the deceased to the supposed will are
forgeries, and that the instrument in question was not
executed by the deceased. He therefore denied probate,
and the proponent appealed.
ISSUE
WON the last will be accepted for probate
HELD
NO. A clear preponderance of the evidence shows that
on November 6, 1924, the date when the will purports to
have been executed, the supposed testatrix was not in a
condition such as to enable her to have participated in
the act, she being in fact at that time suffering from
paralysis to celebral hemorrhage in such degree as
completely to discapacitate her for intelligent
participation in the act of making a will.
A careful comparison of the name of the testatrix as
signed in two places to the last will presented, with many
of her authentic signatures leads to the conclusion that
the signatures to the supposed will were made by some
other person.
Furthermore, the combined testimony of Juan Serato
and Alejandro Genito completely demonstrate in our
opinion that no will at all was made on November 6, the
date attributed to the questioned document, and that,
instead an attempt was made on the night of that day to
fabricate another will, which failed of completion
because of the refusal of Alejandro Genito to be party to
the making of a will in which the testatrix took no part.
The instrument before us was undoubtedly fabricated
later, probably on November 7, at a time when the
condition of the deceased was such as to make rational
participation on her part in the act of making a will
impossible.
25. Estate of the deceased VictorinaVillaranda
EUSEBIA LIM, vs. JULIANA CHINCO G.R.
No. L-33592 March 31, 1931
FACTS
This is a contest over the probate of a paper writing
purporting to be the will of VictorinaVillaranda y Diaz, a
resident of the municipality of Meycauayan,Bulacan,
who died in the Hospital of San Juan de Dios, on June
9, 1929. The instrument was offered for probate by
Eusebia Lim, named in the instrument as executrix
Opposition was made by Juliana Chinco, a full sister of
the deceased. The trial court sustained the opposition
and disallowed the will on the ground that the testatrix
did not have testamentary capacity at the time the
instrument purports to have been executed
On the morning of June 2, 1929, she was stricken with
apoplexy, incident to cerebral hemorrhage, and was
taken in an unconscious condition, seated in a chair, to
her room. Doctor Geronimo Z. Gaanan, a local physician
of Meycauayan, visited the old lady. Upon examining the
patient, he found her insensible and incapable of talking
or controlling her movements. Doctor Isidoro Lim, of
Manila, was also called upon to visit the patient and he
came to see her two or three times. With his approval, it
was decided to take the woman to the hospital of San
Juan de Dios in Manila, and on the morning of June 5,
1929, the ambulance arrived, in charge was Doctor
Guillermo Lopez del Castillo, a resident physician of the
hospital. At about 11 c'clock a.m. on that day she was
taken to the hospital, where she died four days later.
The purported will, which is the subject of this
proceeding, was prepared by Perfecto Gabriel, a
practicing attorney of Manila. This gentleman arrived
upon the scene at 9 o'clock on the forenoon of June 5,
1929. After knowing the condition of the testatrix, he
took a sheet from an exercise book and wrote the
instrument in question. He then took it into the sick room
for execution. Gabriel suggested to Doctor Lopez del
Castillo that he would be pleased to have Doctor Castillo
sign as a witness, but the latter excused himself for the
reason that he considered the old lady to be lacking in
testamentary capacity. Another person present was
Marcos Ira, attorney Gabriel then asked him whether or
not he was willing to sign as one of the witnesses. Ira
replied in a discouraging tone. In the end three persons
served as witnesses. The intended testatrix was not able
to affix her signature to the document, and it was signed
for her by the attorney.
ISSUE
WON deceased had testamentary capacity at the
time so as to execute a valid will.
HELD
NO! We are of the opinion, that the deceased, on the
morning of June 5, 1929, was in a comatose condition
and incapable of performing any conscious and valid
act. The testimony of Doctor Gaanan and Doctor Lopez
del Castillo is sufficient upon this point, and this
testimony is well corroborated by Paciana Diaz and
Irene Ahorro. The first of these witnesses was the one
who chiefly cared for the deceased during her last
illness in Meycauayan until she was carried away to the
hospital in Manila; and the second was a neighbor, who
was called in when the stroke of apoplexy first occurred
and who visited the patient daily until she was removed
from Meycauayan.
The testimony of these witnesses is convincing to the
effect that the patient was in a continuous state of coma
during the entire period of her stay in Meycauayan,
subsequent to the attack, and that on the afternoon of
June 5, 1929, she did not have sufficient command of
her faculties to enable her to do any valid act. The
attorney testified that he was able to communicate with
the deceased when the will was made and that he read
the instrument over to her clause by clause and asked
her whether it expressed her wishes. He says that she
made signs that enabled him to understand that she
concurred in what was written. But it is clear, even upon
the statement of this witness, that the patient was
unable to utter intelligent speech. Upon the authority
of Perry vs. Elio (29 Phil., 134), the paper offered for
probate was properly disallowed.
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