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(ACTION)
STATE
love
understand
perceive
ACTIVITY PERFORMANCE
run
enjoy
live in Rome
push a cart
_______________ -~
ACCOMPLISHMENT ACHIEVEMENT
run a mile reachthe summit
draw a circle findsomething
win a race
1
DIAGRAM
II
I shall faceAckrill'sobjectionby examiningthe list of exampleswhich
Aristotlegivesat 1048b18-35:
(IIPAEI2)
ENEPrEIA KINHEI2
see
opaov reduce
Loavacvevv
cppovevbe wise becomehealthy
uyLc00eaOL
voeZvunderstand learn
ZcavvO&avev
be happy
?u8aoxLioveZv 3ocaSeiv walk
itv live well
e5 build a house
otxoSotpeZv
(a8C0oaLbe pleased) move
xLVeZv
It is crucialhere to attend not only to the sense of the verbs but to the
verbtypesin question. The firstevepyeacverb,opav,variesin an interesting
way fromall the xivmarc verbs. Its English equivalent,the verb 'see', is
prima facie, as Kenny noticed,a state verb. This featureneitherAckrill
nor Pennerobserved. But the featureis important.When we employthe
verb 'see' in Englishin an activitypredication,we are commonlynottalking
about visionat all. The sentence'I am seeingabout an importantmatter'
and 'I am seeinga lot of her' do not treat primarilyof visual perception.
Furthermore, if a sentencelike 'I am seeingthe ball' means anything,it
mustmean 'I am lookingat the ball'. Greekmakeseven moresubtledistinc-
tionsbetweenseeingand "visual gestures"-activitiesassociatedwithseeing
-than does English. (See Bruno Snell, 1960: 1-5.) And in general,all
verbs of perceptionare primafacie state verbs12as can be recognizedby
theirpreference forthe simplepresent,used non-iteratively: 'I hear a loud
noise', 'I smell a skunk'. Likewise, verbs of intellectualperceptionare
commonly used in statepredications:'I understandyou', 'I findthisdifficult',
'I thinkhe is wrong'.
Now both cppoveZv and voezvare verbs of intellectualperception.Both
have at some time been translatedby 'think',whichused absolutelytakes
an activitypredicationand passes Kenny's test for activities. But the
equivalencebetween'think'in its guise as an activityverb and the Greek
verbsis a questionableone. voeivis, in bothits Homericorigins13 and in its
predominant classical usages,l4a verb of intellectual
perception.v67atqis
both types represent states and both types involve a result. For some suggested cor-
rectionsto Chantraine,see K. L. McKay (1965). McKay would give even more emphasis
to the state perfect.
21Standardexamples of difficultiesare given in Smyth (1956, ? 1946); and R. Kfihner
and B. Gerth (1904:148) point out a similar difficultywith respect to German. See also
Comrie (1976:57).
22Kiihner-Gerth(1904:147). E.g., EL5 AiAouq i58 n6noToaO'*xou;-KOal
ca ye.
'Have you ever been to Delphi before?-Twice in fact' (Xenophon, Memorabilia 4.2.24).
Note that the resultative perfect logically precludes repeatable, and hence countable,
occurrences, and conversely. 'Bill has gone to America threetimes' no longer entails
that Bill is in America. A handful of examples of adverbs of cardinal count with a
perfect occur. They are discussed by Chantraine as rhetorical usages (1927:165, 179).
23E.g., Plato, Rep. 6, 493c: TrE.icopaxq ?eL'),'Te &X(c,p uvaoct6 ?iat, 'neither
knowing [sc. for himself] nor able to explain to another'; Aristophanes, Birds, 1572-3:
a' pyo o6pcaxaTavcov oapapoTarov Oecv, 'I know you are the most uncouth of all
the gods'; Plato, Laws 5, 737e: 86E . . . TOaoov
uO avra &v8pa vooOso5vTOur vevo7x6vat,
'every lawmaker must know at least this much'. A more dramatic, although later,
illustrationof the forceof 6cdpaxaoccurs in the New Testament, John 1:33-34. (McKay,
1965, argues contra Chantraine that the Greek perfectretains its force down to New
Testament times.) John the Baptist tells his disciples concerningthe Christ,xayC oux
MjetvocT6v. But he saw the Spirit descend upon Jesus: xay' &ocpaxa, xocate?oapT'5pxoc
6
6?L o50r6q ialV uO(V OG
T Oeo5. The parallel with the pluperfect of *eet8v (j8eLv) is
instructive. The sense is 'and now I am an eye-witness'.
24The perfects of ?u?6aatovetvand Qv appear to have been coined by Aristotle. In
classical times PepLcoxewvserved as a suppletive perfect for Qtv. This perfect can
have a sense similar to the one I have used in translating9}xev. See Chantraine (1927:
163). The perfectof 4poveZvis rare. It appears firstin Empedocles fr. 103, where it
is a state perfect, meaning 'have sense, intelligence'. (Although rCep6vwqxehas been
And it seems equally true that one's chain of explanationsends when one
reachesa state. One cannot (in any normalsense) give motivesforseeing,
understanding, being happy, or living well (i.e., the state). Rather, one
looks in orderto see, reducesto be slender,considersin orderto be wise,
becomes healthyto be healthy,learns in order to understand,walks in
orderto be somewhere,builds a house to have a house,and in generalacts
in orderto be happy. (Cf. Physics194b32 ff.) In this sense certainkinds
of states are finalcauses of the firstorder:one acts in orderto realize or
actualizethem,but neverhas themforthe sake of anythingelse. The per-
fectofresult,by emphasizingthe outcomeof actions,is apt forrepresenting
the attainmentof ends. Its applicationto state verbs showsthat the end
is attainedby the veryact itself. The act does not,as it were,pointbeyond
itselfto anotheract.
I have arguedthat Aristotle'sevepyeLoc as determinedby the complete-
ness test are states, and that this test is a test for state verbs. I have
attemptedto showthat myinterpretation of the completenesstest is philo-
logicallysoundand that the view I have attributedto Aristotleis supported
by good reasons. My thesis suggeststhat a re-evaluationof the relation
betweenevepyLocin the realm of r;paiX;and Ev6pyeaxin its broadermeta-
physicalsenseis needed. The recognition ofa closertie betweenthelinguistic
propertiesof state verbs and the metaphysicalvalue of ivepyeo promises
to provideanotherchapterin the Platonismof Aristotle.30
The University
of Texas at Austin
hit him?'. It appears that one can ask why questions of achievements only when the
verb is not inherentlya state verb. Dowty's proposal provides an interestingparallel
to some of Aristotle's observations. For in N.E. 1173a 34ff. (mentioned already),
Aristotle recognizes that an bv6pyELa verb predicated in the aorist can yield a x?v7aq
(in particular an achievement in our terms). This recognitionentails treating &v6pyeLa
verbs as inherentlystate verbs, i.e., as potentiallyrepresentingstates, but only actually
doing so when predicated in certain ways (as, e.g., in the present system). Aristotle
was not, however, concernedwith the grammarper se, but with the ontological relation-
ships it clarified.
One class of state verbs does admit of purpose clauses: verbs of wanting and willing.
But in utterances made with these verbs there is somethingunusual about the purpose
clause. If one asks 'Why do you want to go to Athens?', the answer 'Because . . .'
gives a reason forgoingto Athens. The verb of wanting is in a certain sense transparent
and dispensable. The complement of the verb of wanting or willing may be a state
verb, e.g., 'Why do you want to be rich?' (although even here an answer to the question
explains 'Why get rich?'). This indicates that verbs of wanting are useful in allowing
us to frame whyquestions for states as well as non-states. Aristotle seems to be aware
of such a phenomenon when he exploits the propertyof desirability(strictly,he speaks
of the "pursuable" or "choosable", 8tcoxr6v,aOper6v)in coming to a hierarchy of ends
(N.E. 1097a 26 ff.). The ends under consideration being states (having honour, having
virtue, having wealth), they can be subordinated to the state of happiness only by
means of why-do-you-want (or why-do-you-pursue) questions, i.e., by using some auxiliary
expression of desire.
3"A version of this paper was read at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American
Philosophical Association, March 24 1979. I am grateful to the following for help,
encouragement,and constructivecriticism:R. David Armstrong;James Wm. Forrester,
who presented comments at the APA meeting; E. David Francis; Diana Graham;
Alexander P. D. Mourelatos; Terry Penner; Paul Woodruff. I acknowledge a special
debt to ProfessorMourelatos, from whom I have learned a great deal on this subject.
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