II.
JURISDICTION and "F," that defendant has obligation to the plaintiff in the amount
4. RA 7691
G.R. No. 164594 April 22, 2015
MICHAEL SEBASTIAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ANNABEL LAGMAY NG, represented by her Attorney-in-fact,
ANGELITA LAGMAY, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,1 filed by petitioner
Michael Sebastian (Michael), assailing the March 31, 2004
Decision,2 and the July 15, 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 65450.
The CA decision reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Palayan City, Branch 40, in SP. Proc. Case No.
0096-P.
Factual Background
Sometime in 1997, Angelita Lagmay (Angelita), acting as
representative and attorney-in-fact of her daµghter Annabel
Lagmay Ng (Annabel), filed a complaint before the Barangay
Justice of Siclong, Laur, Nueva Ecija. She sought to collect from
Michael the sum of ₱350,000.00 that Annabel sent to Michael. She
claimed that Annabel and Michael were once sweethearts, and that
they agreed to jointly invest their financial resources to buy a truck.
She alleged that while Annabel was working in Hongkong, Annabel
sent Michael the amount of ₱350,000.00 to purchase the truck.
However, after Annabel and Michael’s relationship has ended,
Michael allegedly refused to return the money to Annabel,
prompting the latter to bring the matter before the Barangay
Justice.
On July 9, 1997, the parties entered into an amicable settlement,
evidenced by a document denominated as "kasunduan"4 wherein
Michael agreed to pay Annabel the amount of ₱250,000.00 on
specific dates. The kasunduan was signed by Angelita (on behalf of
Annabel), Michael, and the members of the pangkat ng
tagapagkasundo. The kasunduanreads: KASUNDUAN
Nagkasundo ang dalawang panig napagkayari ng labing apat na
buwan (14 months) simula ngayong July 9, 1997 hanggang
September 1998 ay kailangan ng maibigay ni Mr. Sebastian ang
pera ni Ms. Anabelle Lagmay.
At napagkasunduan ay dalawang hulog ang halagang
₱250,000.00 na pera ni Ms.Lagmay at simula ng pagbibigay ni
Mr. Sebastian ay sa buwan ng September 1998.
At upang may katunayan ang lahat ng napag usapan ay lumagda
sa ibaba nito at sa harap ng mga saksi ngayong ika-9 ng Hulyo,
1997
Mrs. Angelita Lagmay – (Lagda)
Mr. Michael Sebastian – (Lagda)
Saksi: Kagawad Rolando Mendizabal – (Lagda)
Hepe Quirino Sapon – (Lagda)
Benjamin Sebastian – (Lagda)
Jun Roxas - (Lagda)
Angelita alleged that the kasunduan was not repudiated within a
period of ten (10) days from the settlement, in accordance with the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law embodied in the Local
Government Code of 1991 [Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160], and
Section 14 of its Implementing Rules. When Michael failed to honor
the kasunduan, Angelita brought the matter back to the Barangay,
but the Barangay Captain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and
instead, issued a Certification to File Action.
After about one and a half years from the date of the execution of
the kasunduan or on January 15, 1999, Angelita filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laur and Gabaldon, Nueva
Ecija, a Motion for Execution of the kasunduan.
Michael moved for the dismissal of the Motion for Execution, citing
as a ground Angelita’s alleged violation of Section 15, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On January 17, 2000, the MCTC rendered a decision5 in favor of
Annabel, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff through counsel has satisfactorily proven
by preponderance of evidence based on Exhibits "A," "B," "C," "D,"
of ₱250,000.00.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Execution filed by
the plaintiff is hereby granted based on Sec. 2, Rule 7 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7160, and
therefore, defendant is hereby ordered within 15 days upon
receipt of this decision to pay the plaintiff the amount of
₱250,000.00 as evidenced by the Kasunduan (Exhibit "C") with
legal interests from July 9, 1997 until said obligation is fully paid,
and to pay attorney’s fees for the plaintiff’s counsel in the amount
of ₱15,000.00 and to pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
Michael filed an appeal with the RTC arguing that the MCTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in prematurely deciding the
case. Michael also pointed out that a hearing was necessary for the
petitioner to establish the genuineness and due execution of the
kasunduan. The Regional Trial Court’s Ruling
In its November 13, 2000 Decision,6 the RTC, Branch 40 of Palayan
City upheld the MCTC decision, finding Michael liable to pay
Annabel the sum of ₱250,000.00. It held that Michael failed to
assail the validity of the kasunduan, or to adduce any evidence to
dispute Annabel’s claims or the applicability of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7160. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Order of the lower court is
hereby MODIFIED in that the appellant is ordered to pay the
appellee the amount of Two hundred Fifty Thousand pesos
(₱250,000.00) plus twelve percent interest(12%) per annum from
September,1998 up to the time it is actually paid and fifty
Thousand Pesos(₱50,000.00) representing attorney's fees.
Michael filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that: (i) an
amicable settlement or arbitration award can be enforced by the
Lupon within six (6) months from date of settlement or after the
lapse of six (6) months, by ordinary civil action in the appropriate
City or Municipal Trial Court and not by a mere Motion for
execution; and (ii) the MCTC does not have jurisdiction over the case
since the amount of ₱250,000.00 (as the subject matter of the
kasunduan) is in excess of MCTC’s jurisdictional amount of
₱200,000.00.7
In its March 13, 2001 Order, the RTC granted Michael’s Motion for
Reconsideration, and ruled that there is merit in the jurisdictional
issue he raised. It dismissed Angelita’s Motion for Execution, and set
aside the MCTC Decision. The dispositive portion of the said Order
reads: WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court dated November 13, 2000 is hereby SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Laur, Nueva Ecija
dated January 17, 2000 is likewise SET ASIDE and the Motion for
Execution of Kasunduan is DISMISSED, the said court having had no
jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter.8
Angelita moved for the reconsideration of the March 13, 2001
Order, but the motion was subsequently denied. Aggrieved, she
filed a Petition for Review 9with the CA.
The Court of Appeal’s Ruling
On August 2, 2001, the CA initially dismissed the petition for review
on a mere technical ground of failure to attach the Affidavit of
Service. Angelita moved for reconsideration, attaching in her motion
the Affidavit of Service. The CA granted the motion.
On March 31, 2004, the CA rendered its decision granting the
petition, and reversing the RTC’s decision. The CA declared that the
"appropriate local trial court" stated in Section 2, Rule VII of the
Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 7160 refers to the municipal trial
courts. Thus, contrary to Michael’s contention, the MCTC has
jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or arbitration award,
regardless of the amount involved.
The CA also ruled that Michael’s failure to repudiate the kasunduan
in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the
Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 7160, rendered the kasunduan final.
Hence, Michael can no longer assail the kasunduan on the ground
of forgery.
Michael moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his
motion in its resolution dated July 15, 2004. Hence, this petition.
The Petition
In the present petition for review on certiorari, Michael alleges that
the kasunduan cannot be given the force and effect of a final
judgment because it did not conform to the provisions of the
Katarungang Pambarangay law embodied in Book III, Title One,
Chapter 7 of R.A. No. 7160. He points out the following
irregularities in the kasunduan’s execution, and claims that the
agreement forged between him and Angelita was fictitious and
simulated:
(1) there was no record of the complaint in the Barangay;
(2) there was no notice of mediation sent to him;
(3) there was no constitution of the Pangkat Ng
Tagapagasundo;
(4) the parties were never called upon to choose the three
(3) members from among the Lupon members;
(5) he had no participation in the execution of the
kasunduan;
(6) his signature in the kasunduan was forged;
(7) he did not personally appear before the Barangay;
(8) there was no attestation clause;
(9) the kasunduan was neither reported nor filed before
the MCTC; and
(10) Annabel, the real party in interest, did not personally
appear before the Barangay as required by the law.
Michael additionally claims that the kasunduan is merely in the
nature of a private document. He also reiterates that since the
amount of ₱250,000.00 – the subject matter of the kasunduan – is
in excess of MCTC’s jurisdictional amount of ₱200,000.00, the
kasunduan is beyond the MCTC’s jurisdiction to hear and to resolve.
Accordingly, the proceedings in the Barangay are all nullity.
The Issues
The issues to be resolved in the present petition are:
1. Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and
jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan regardless of the
amount involved;
2. Whether or not the kasunduan could be given the force
and effect of a final judgment; and
3. Whether or not the kasunduan can be enforced.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the petition.
A perusal of the body of the motion for
execution shows that it is actually in the
nature of an action for execution; hence, it
was a proper remedy;
We note at the outset that Michael raised – in his brief before the
CA – the issue of wrong remedy. He alleged that Angelita’s
recourse should have been to file a civil action, not a mere motion
for execution, in a regular court. However, the CA failed to address
this issue and only ruled on the issues of the kasunduan’s
irregularities and the MCTC’s jurisdiction.
A simple reading of Section 417 of the Local Government Code
readily discloses the two-tiered mode of enforcement of an
amicable settlement. The provision reads:
Section 417. Execution.- The amicable settlement or arbitration
award may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6)
months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time,
the settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city
or municipal court. [Emphasis ours.]
Under this provision, an amicable settlement or arbitration award
that is not repudiated within a period of ten (10) days from the
settlement may be enforced by: first, execution by the Lupon within
six (6) months from the date of the settlement; or second, by an
action in the appropriate city or municipal trial court if more than
six (6) months from the date of settlement has already elapsed.
Under the first mode of enforcement, the execution of an amicable
settlement could be done on mere motion of the party entitled
thereto before the Punong Barangay.10 The proceedings in this case
are summary in nature and are governed by the Local Government
Code and the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
The second mode of enforcement, on the other hand, is judicial in
nature and could only be resortedto through the institution of an
action in a regular form before the proper City/Municipal Trial
Court.11 The proceedings shall be governed by the provisions of the
Rules of Court. Indisputably, Angelita chose to enforce the
kasunduan under the second mode and filed a motion for execution,
which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 45-99. The
question for our resolution is: Whether the MCTC, through Angelita’s
motion for execution, is expressly authorized to enforce the
kasunduan under Section 417 of the Local Government Code?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
It is undisputed that what Angelita filed before the MCTC was
captioned "motion for execution," rather than a petition/complaint
for execution.
A perusal of the motion for execution, however, shows that it
contains the material requirements of an initiatory action.
First, the motion is sufficient in form12 and substance.13 It is complete
with allegations of the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action;
the names and residences of the plaintiff and the defendant; it
contains the prayer for the MCTC to order the execution of the
kasunduan; and there was also a verification and certification
against forum shopping.
Furthermore, attached to the motion are: 1) the authenticated
special power of attorney of Annabel, authorizing Angelita to file
the present action on her behalf; and 2) the copy of the kasunduan
whose contents were quoted in the body of the motion for execution.
It is well-settled that what are controlling in determining the nature
of the pleading are the allegations in the body and not the
caption.14
Thus, the motion for execution that Angelita filed was intended to
be an initiatory pleading or an original action that is compliant with
the requirement under Section 3, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court that
the complaint should allege the plaintiff’s cause of action and the
names and residences of the plaintiff and the defendant.
Angelita’s motion could therefore be treated as an original action,
and not merely as a motion/special proceeding. For this reason,
Annabel has filed the proper remedy prescribed under Section 417
of the Local Government Code.
However, Angelita should pay the proper docket fees
corresponding to the filing of an action for execution. The docket
fees shall be computed by the Clerk of Court of the MCTC, with due
consideration, of course, of what Angelita had already paid when
her motion for execution was docketed as a special proceeding.
The kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment.
Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable
settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of
a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days
from the date of its execution, unless the settlement or award has
been repudiated or a petition to nullify the award has been filed
before the proper city or municipal court.
Moreover, Section 14, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay
Implementing Rules states that the party’s failure to repudiate the
settlement within the period of ten (10) days shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to challenge the settlement on the ground that
his/her consent was vitiated by fraud, violence or intimidation.
In the present case, the records reveal that Michael never
repudiated the kasunduan within the period prescribed by the
law.1âwphi1 Hence, the CA correctly ruled that the kasunduan has
the force and effect of a final judgment that is ripe for execution.
Furthermore, the irregularities in the kasunduan’s execution, and the
claim of forgery are deemed waived since Michael never raised
these defenses in accordance with the procedure prescribed under
the Local Government Code. Thus, we see no reason to discuss these
issues in the present case.
The MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction
to enforce the kasunduan regardless of the amount involved.
The Court also finds that the CA correctly upheld the MCTC’s
jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or arbitration award issued by
the Lupon.
We again draw attention to the provision of Section 417 of the
Local Government Code that after the lapse of the six (6) month
period from the date of the settlement, the agreement may be
enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.
The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the "appropriate city
or municipal court" as the forum for the execution of the settlement
or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly
conferring authority over these courts, Section 417 made no
distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature of the
issue involved. Thus, there can be no question that the law’s
intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of
settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal courts the
regardless of the amount. A basic principle of interpretation is that
words must be given their literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation where the words of a statute are clear,
plain and free from ambiguity.15
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the
petitioner's petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRM the March
31, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
65450.
Angelita Lagmay is ORDERED to pay the proper docket fees to be
computed by the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Laur and Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, with due consideration of what
she had paid when her motion for execution was docketed as a
special proceeding.
SO ORDERED.
6. RA 8369
G.R. No. 159374 July 12, 2007
FELIPE N. MADRIÑAN, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCA R. MADRIÑAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When a family breaks up, the children are always the victims. The
ensuing battle for custody of the minor children is not only a thorny
issue but also a highly sensitive and heart-rending affair. Such is the
case here. Even the usually technical subject of jurisdiction became
emotionally charged.
Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R.
Madriñan were married on July 7, 1993 in Parañaque City. They
resided in San Agustin Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Parañaque City.
Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick,
born on January 30, 1994; Phillip, born on November 19, 1996;
Francis Angelo, born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann, born on
December 12, 2000.
After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left
their conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Ligao
City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent
sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things
up between her and petitioner to no avail. She then brought the
matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too
proved futile.
Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip
and Francis Angelo in the Court of Appeals, alleging that
petitioner’s act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay
and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and
deprived them of their mother’s care. She prayed that petitioner be
ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court and to
explain why they should not be returned to her custody.
Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on September
17, 2002. They initially agreed that petitioner would return the
custody of their three sons to respondent. Petitioner, however, had
a change of heart1 and decided to file a memorandum.
On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum2 alleging
that respondent was unfit to take custody of their three sons because
she was habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night or in
the wee hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer
house and neglected her duties as a mother. He claimed that, after
their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was respondent who left, taking
their daughter with her. It was only then that he went to Sta. Rosa,
Laguna where he worked as a tricycle driver. He submitted a
certification from the principal of the Dila Elementary School in Sta.
Rosa, Laguna that Ronnick and Phillip were enrolled there. He also
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that
under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the "Family
Courts Act of 1997") family courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed
by respondent.3
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home
on May 18, 2002 but was driven out by petitioner. She alleged
that it was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug
addict. Petitioner’s alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his
mental faculties, causing him to commit acts of violence against her
and their children. The situation was aggravated by the fact that
their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently
meddled in their personal problems.4
On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals5 rendered a decision6
asserting its authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling
that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent was entitled
to the custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo who were at that time
aged six and four, respectively, subject to the visitation rights of
petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then eight years old,
the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper
family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule
99 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
decision but it was denied. Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over
the petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the
case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369. He invokes
Section 5(b) of RA 8369:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in
relation to the latter;
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner is wrong.
In Thornton v. Thornton,7 this Court resolved the issue of the Court of
Appeals’ jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving
family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions:
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since
there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
xxx xxx xxx
We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs
of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot
be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding
the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely incompatible since RA
8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the
custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in
harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 – that family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody
of minors is at issue.8 (emphases supplied)
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas
corpus was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22,
2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus
in Relation to Custody of Minors:
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled
with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody
of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition
for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed
with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial
region to which the Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may
be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within
the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be
found for hearing and decision on the merits.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family
courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is
involved.9 (emphases supplied)1avvphi1
We note that after petitioner moved out of their Parañaque
residence on May 18, 2002, he twice transferred his sons to
provinces covered by different judicial regions. This situation is what
the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369’s provision on jurisdiction
precisely addressed:
[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction
over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended them to be the
sole courts which can issue writs of habeas corpus] will result in an
iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like [respondent] without
legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who
do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would
be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose
writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another,
which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus
case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could
not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed
[RA 8369].10
Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals
that family courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in
custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus
which may be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b)
of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed
of in conjunction with a petition for custody of minors under Rule 99
of the Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance of the writ is
merely ancillary to the custody case pending before the family
court. The writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of
jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court
and judicial instability.
The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court
or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
officer.11 Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all other courts, including
related incidents and ancillary matters.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
8. s.c a.m no 01-2-04-sc
G.R. No. 202664, November 20, 2015
MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES AND FRANCIS MARTIN D.
GONZALES, Petitioners, v. GJH LAND, INC. (FORMERLY KNOWN
AS S.J. LAND, INC.), CHANG HWAN JANG A.K.A. STEVE JANG,
SANG RAK KIM, MARIECHU N. YAP, AND ATTY. ROBERTO P.
MALLARI II, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court, via a petition for review on
certiorari,1 from the Orders dated April 17, 20122 and July 9,
20123 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch
276 (Branch 276) dismissing Civil Case No. 11-077 for lack of
jurisdiction.
The Facts
On August 4, 2011, petitioners Manuel Luis C. Gonzales 4 and
Francis Martin D. Gonzales (petitioners) filed a Complaint 5 for
"Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Status Quo Order, Three (3)
and Twenty (20)-Day Temporary Restraining Orders, and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with Damages" against respondents GJH
Land, Inc. (formerly known as S.J. Land, Inc.), Chang Hwan Jang,
Sang Rak Kim, Mariechu N. Yap, and Atty. Roberto P. Mallari II 6
(respondents) before the RTC of Muntinlupa City seeking to enjoin
the sale of S.J. Land, Inc.'s shares which they purportedly bought
from S.J. Global, Inc. on February 1, 2010. Essentially, petitioners
alleged that the subscriptions for the said shares were already paid
by them in full in the books of S.J. Land, Inc.,7 but were nonetheless
offered for sale on July 29, 2011 to the corporation's stockholders, 8
hence, their plea for injunction.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 11-077 and raffled to
Branch 276, which is not a Special Commercial Court. On August
9, 2011, said branch issued a temporary restraining order, 9 and
later, in an Order10 dated August 24, 2011, granted the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
After filing their respective answers11 to the complaint, respondents
filed a motion to dismiss12 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, pointing out that the case involves an intra-
corporate dispute and should, thus, be heard by the designated
Special Commercial Court of Muntinlupa City.13
The RTC Ruling
In an Order14 dated April 17, 2012, Branch 276 granted the
motion to dismiss filed by respondents. It found that the case involves
an intra-corporate dispute that is within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTCs designated as Special Commercial Courts. It
pointed out that the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 (Branch
256) was specifically designated by the Court as the Special
Commercial Court, hence, Branch 276 had no jurisdiction over the
case and cannot lawfully exercise jurisdiction on the matter,
including the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.15
Accordingly, it dismissed the case.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, 16 arguing
that they filed the case with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
RTC of Muntinlupa City which assigned the same to Branch 276 by
raffle.17 As the raffle was beyond their control, they should not be
made to suffer the consequences of the wrong assignment of the
case, especially after paying the filing fees in the amount of
P235,825.00 that would be for naught if the dismissal is upheld. 18
They further maintained that the RTC has jurisdiction over intra-
corporate disputes under Republic Act No. (RA) 8799, 19 but since
the Court selected specific branches to hear and decide such suits,
the case must, at most, be transferred or raffled off to the proper
branch.20
In an Order21 dated July 9, 2012, Branch 276 denied the motion
for reconsideration, holding that it has no authority or power to
order the transfer of the case to the proper Special Commercial
Court, citing Calleja v. Panday22 (Calleja); hence, the present
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Branch
276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City erred in dismissing the case for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, the Court finds Branch 276 to have correctly
categorized Civil Case No. 11-077 as a commercial case, more
particularly, an intra-corporate dispute,23 considering that it relates
to petitioners' averred rights over the shares of stock offered for
sale to other stockholders, having paid the same in full. Applying
the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test, the suit
between the parties is clearly rooted in the existence of an intra-
corporate relationship and pertains to the enforcement of their
correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and
the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the
corporation,24 hence, intra-corporate, which should be heard by the
designated Special Commercial Court as provided under A.M. No.
03-03-03-SC25 dated June 17, 2003 in relation to Item 5.2, Section phrase "the appropriate Regional Trial Court." In other words, the
5 of RA 8799. jurisdiction of the SEC over the cases enumerated under Section 5
of PD 902-A was transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction,
The present controversy lies, however, in the procedure to be that is to say (or, otherwise known as), the proper Regional Trial
followed when a commercial case - such as the instant intra- Courts. This interpretation is supported by San Miguel Corp. v.
corporate dispute -has been properly filed in the official station Municipal Council,33 wherein the Court held
of the designated Special Commercial Court but is, however, that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
later wrongly assigned by raffle to a regular branch of that [T]he word "or" may be used as the equivalent of "that is to say"
station. and gives that which precedes it the same significance as that which
follows it. It is not always disjunctive and is sometimes interpretative
As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that a court's acquisition or expository of the preceding word.34cralawlawlibrary
of jurisdiction over a particular case's subject matter is different
from incidents pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Further, as may be gleaned from the following excerpt of the
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law, Congressional deliberations:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
whereas a court's exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided by the Senator [Raul S.] Roco: x x x.
law itself, is governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued
from time to time by the Court.26 In Lozada v. Bracewell,27 it was x x x x
recently held that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue
in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited x x x. The first major departure is as regards the Securities and
jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and Exchange Commission. The Securities and Exchange Commission has
has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction. been authorized under this proposal to reorganize itself. As an
administrative agency, we strengthened it and at the same time we
Pertinent to this case is RA 8799 which took effect on August 8, take away the quasi-judicial functions. The quasi-judicial functions
2000. By virtue of said law, jurisdiction over cases enumerated in are now given back to the courts of general jurisdiction - the
Section 528 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A29 was transferred Regional Trial Court, except for two categories of cases.
from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the RTCs,
being courts of general jurisdiction. Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799 In the case of corporate disputes, only those that are now submitted
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary for final determination of the SEC will remain with the SEC. So, all
SEC. 5. Powers and Functionsof the Commission. - x x x those cases, both memos of the plaintiff and the defendant, that
have been submitted for resolution will continue. At the same time,
x x x x cases involving rehabilitation, bankruptcy, suspension of payments
and receiverships that were filed before June 30, 2000 will
5.2 The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated continue with the SEC. in other words, we are avoiding the
under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby possibility, upon approval of this bill, of people filing cases with the
transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate SEC, in manner of speaking, to select their court. 35
Regional Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court x x x x (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary
branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases. The
Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving Therefore, one must be disabused of the notion that the transfer of
intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should jurisdiction was made only in favor of particular RTC branches, and
be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. not the RTCs in general.
The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of
payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally Consistent with the foregoing, history depicts that when the transfer
disposed. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary of SEC cases to the RTCs was first implemented, they were
transmitted to the Executive Judges of the RTCs for raffle between
The legal attribution of Regional Trial Courts as courts of general or among its different branches, unless a specific branch has been
jurisdiction stems from Section 19 (6), Chapter II of Batas designated as a Special Commercial Court, in which instance, the
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,30 known as "The Judiciary cases were transmitted to said branch.36 It was only on November
Reorganization Act of 1980":chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 21, 2000 that the Court designated certain RTC branches to try and
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.- Regional Trial Courts shall decide said SEC cases37 without, however, providing for the transfer
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary of the cases already distributed to or filed with the regular
branches thereof. Thus, on January 23, 2001, the Court issued SC
x x x x Administrative Circular No. 08-200138 directing the transfer of said
cases to the designated courts (commercial SEC courts). Later, or on
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, June 17, 2003, the Court issued A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, consolidating the commercial SEC courts and the intellectual
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; x x x property courts39 in one RTC branch in a particular locality, i.e., the
x Special Commercial Court, to streamline the court structure and to
cralawlawlibrary promote expediency.40 Accordingly, the RTC branch so designated
was mandated to try and decide SEC cases, as well as those
As enunciated in Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. involving violations of intellectual property rights, which were,
CA:31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary thereupon, required to be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court
The regional trial court, formerly the court of first instance, is a court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial
of general jurisdiction. All cases, the jurisdiction over which is not Courts, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
specifically provided for by law to be within the jurisdiction of any 1. The Regional Courts previously designated as SEC Courts through
other court, fall under the jurisdiction of the regional trial the: (a) Resolutions of this Court dated 21 November 2000, 4 July
court.32ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary 2001, 12 November 2002, and 9 July 2002 all issued in A.M. No.
cralawlawlibrary 00-11-03-SC; (b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M. No. 01-
5-298-RTC; and (c) Resolution dated 8 July 2002 in A.M. No. 01-
To clarify, the word "or" in Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799 was 12-656-RTC are hereby DESIGNATED and shall be CALLED as
intentionally used by the legislature to particularize the fact that the Special Commercial Courts to try and decide cases involving
phrase "the Courts of general jurisdiction" is equivalent to the violations of Intellectual Property Rights which fall within their
jurisdiction and those cases formerly cognizable by the Securities 17.1 A copy of the undated Offer Letter is attached hereto and
and Exchange Commission:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary made and made an integral part hereof as Annex "L".
18. The letter of GJH Land, Inc. through Yap, is totally without legal
x x x x and factual basis because as evidenced by the Deeds of Assignment
signed and certified by Yap herself, all the S.J. Land, Inc. shares
4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have jurisdiction over cases acquired by MLCG and FMDG have been fully paid in the books
arising within their respective territorial jurisdiction with respect to of S.J. Land, Inc.
the National Capital Judicial Region and within the respective
provinces with respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial Regions. Thus, 19. With the impending sale of the alleged unpaid subscriptions on
cases shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official 10 August 2011, there is now a clear danger that MLCG and
station of the designated Special Commercial Court;41 FMDG would be deprived of these shares without legal and
factual basis.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)cralawlawlibrary
20. Furthermore, if they are deprived of these shares through the
It is important to mention that the Court's designation of Special scheduled sale, both MLCG and FMDG would suffer grave and
Commercial Courts was made in line with its constitutional authority irreparable damage incapable of pecuniary estimation.
to supervise the administration of all courts as provided under
Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 21. For this reason, plaintiffs now come to the Honorable Court for
Constitution:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary injunctive relief so that after trial on the merits, a permanent
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision injunction should be issued against the defendants preventing them
over all courts and the personnel thereof.cralawlawlibrary from selling the shares of the plaintiffs, there being no basis for such
sale.46cralawlawlibrary
The objective behind the designation of such specialized courts is to
promote expediency and efficiency in the exercise of the RTCs' According to jurisprudence, "it is not the caption but the allegations
jurisdiction over the cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902- in the complaint or other initiatory pleading which give meaning to
A. Such designation has nothing to do with the statutory conferment the pleading and on the basis of which such pleading may be
of jurisdiction to all RTCs under RA 8799 since in the first place, the legally characterized."47 However, so as to avert any future
Court cannot enlarge, diminish, or dictate when jurisdiction shall be confusion, the Court requires henceforth, that all initiatory pleadings
removed, given that the power to define, prescribe, and state the action's nature both in its caption and the body, which
apportion jurisdiction is, as a general rule, a matter of legislative parameters are defined in the dispositive portion of this Decision.
prerogative.42 Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Going back to the case at bar, the Court nonetheless deems that
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, the erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a Special
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure - that is, an incident
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated related to the exercise of jurisdiction - and, thus, should not negate
in Section 5 hereof. the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already
acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not for
x x x x the commercial case to be dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should
cralawlawlibrary have first referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-
docketing as a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge
Here, petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intra-corporate should then assign said case to the only designated Special
dispute, with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC of Commercial Court in the station, i.e., Branch 256.
Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of the designated Special
Commercial Court, in accordance with A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. It is, Note that the procedure would be different where the RTC
therefore, from the time of such filing that the RTC of Muntinlupa acquiring jurisdiction over the case has multiple special
City acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of commercial court branches; in such a scenario, the Executive Judge,
the action.43 Unfortunately, the commercial case was wrongly after re-docketing the same as a commercial case, should proceed
raffled to a regular branch, e.g., Branch 276, instead of being to order its re-raffling among the said special branches.
assigned44to the sole Special Commercial Court in the RTC of
Muntinlupa City, which is Branch 256. This error may have been Meanwhile, if the RTC acquiring jurisdiction has no branch
caused by a reliance on the complaint's caption, i.e., "Civil Case for designated as a Special Commercial Court, then it should refer the
Injunction with prayer for Status Quo Order, TRO and Damages,"45 case to the nearest RTC with a designated Special Commercial
which, however, contradicts and more importantly, cannot prevail Court branch within the judicial region.48 Upon referral, the RTC to
over its actual allegations that clearly make out an intra-corporate which the case was referred to should re-docket the case as a
dispute:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch
16. To the surprise of MLCG and FMDG, however, in two identical designated as a Special Commercial Court, assign the case to the
letters both dated 13 May 2011, under the letterhead of GJH sole special branch; or (b) if the said RTC has multiple branches
Land, Inc., Yap, now acting as its President, Jang and Kim designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case
demanded payment of supposed unpaid subscriptions of MLCG among those special branches.
and FMDG amounting to P10,899,854.30 and P2,625,249.41,
respectively. In all the above-mentioned scenarios, any difference regarding the
16.1 Copies of the letters dated 13 May 2011 are attached hereto applicable docket fees should be duly accounted for. On the other
and made integral parts hereof as Annexes "J" and "K", hand, all docket fees already paid shall be duly credited, and any
repectively. excess, refunded.
17. On 29 July 2011, MLCG and FMDG received an Offer Letter
addressed to stockholders of GJH Land, Inc. from Yap informing all At this juncture, the Court finds it fitting to clarify that the RTC
stockholders that GJH Land, Inc. is now offering for sale the unpaid mistakenly relied on the Calleja case to support its ruling. In Calleja,
shares of stock of MLCG and FMDG. The same letter states that the an intra-corporate dispute49 among officers of a private
offers to purchase these shares will be opened on 10 August 2011 corporation with principal address at Goa, Camarines Sur, was
with payments to be arranged by deposit to the depository bank filed with the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 58 instead of
of GJH Land, Inc. the RTC of Naga City, which is the official station of the designated
Special Commercial Court for Camarines Sur. Consequently, the
Court set aside the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur's order to
transfer the case to the RTC of Naga City and dismissed the
complaint considering that it was filed before a court which, having
no internal branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, had
no jurisdiction over those kinds of actions, i.e., intra-corporate
disputes. Calleja involved two different RTCs, i.e., the RTC of San
Jose, Camarines Sur and the RTC of Naga City, whereas the instant
case only involves one RTC, i.e., the RTC of Muntinlupa City, albeit
involving two different branches of the same court, i.e., Branches
256 and 276. Hence, owing to the variance in the facts attending,
it was then improper for the RTC to rely on the Calleja ruling.
Besides, the Court observes that the fine line that distinguishes
subject matter jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction had been
clearly blurred in Calleja. Harkening back to the statute that had
conferred subject matter jurisdiction, two things are apparently
clear: (a) that the SEC's subject matter jurisdiction over intra-
corporate cases under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A
was transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction, i.e., the
appropriate Regional Trial Courts; and (b) the designated branches
of the Regional Trial Court, as per the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court, shall exercise jurisdiction over such cases. Item 5.2,
Section 5 of RA 8799 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 5. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - x x x
x x x x
5.2 The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated
under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby
transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate
Regional Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court
branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases, x x
x.cralawlawlibrary
In contrast, the appropriate jurisprudential reference to this case
would be Tan v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,50 which involves a criminal
complaint for violation of intellectual property rights filed before
the RTC of Cebu City but was raffled to a regular branch thereof
(Branch 21), and not to a Special Commercial Court. As it turned
out, the regular branch subsequently denied the private
complainant's motion to transfer the case to the designated special
court of the same RTC, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The CA
reversed the regular branch and, consequently, ordered the
transfer of the case to the designated special court at that time
(Branch 9). The Court, affirming the CA, declared that the RTC had
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter. In view, however, of
the designation of another court as the Special Commercial Court in
the interim (Branch 11 of the same Cebu City RTC), the Court
accordingly ordered the transfer of the case and the transmittal of
the records to said Special Commercial Court instead. 51Similarly,
the transfer of the present intra-corporate dispute from Branch
276 to Branch 256 of the same RTC of Muntinlupa City, subject
to the parameters above-discussed is proper and will further the
purposes stated in A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC of attaining a speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
For further guidance, the Court finds it apt to point out that the same Special Commercial Court, assign the case to the sole special
principles apply to the inverse situation of ordinary civil cases
filed before the proper RTCs but wrongly raffled to its branches
designated as Special Commercial Courts. In such a scenario, the
ordinary civil case should then be referred to the Executive Judge
for re-docketing as an ordinary civil case; thereafter, the
Executive Judge should then order the raffling of the case to all
branches of the same RTC, subject to limitations under existing
internal rules, and the payment of the correct docket fees in case
of any difference. Unlike the limited assignment/raffling of a
commercial case only to branches designated as Special
Commercial Courts in the scenarios stated above, the re-raffling of
an ordinary civil case in this instance to all courts is permissible due
to the fact that a particular branch which has been designated as 3. All transfer/raffle of cases is subject to the payment of the
a Special Commercial Court does not shed the RTC's general appropriate docket fees in case of any difference. On the other
jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases under the imprimatur of
statutory law, i.e., Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129.52 To restate,
the designation of Special Commercial Courts was merely intended
as a procedural tool to expedite the resolution of commercial cases
in line with the court's exercise of jurisdiction. This designation was
not made by statute but only by an internal Supreme Court rule
under its authority to promulgate rules governing matters of
procedure and its constitutional mandate to supervise the
administration of all courts and the personnel thereof. 53 Certainly,
an internal rule promulgated by the Court cannot go beyond the
commanding statute. But as a more fundamental reason, the
designation of Special Commercial Courts is, to stress, merely an
incident related to the court's exercise of jurisdiction, which, as first
discussed, is distinct from the concept of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. The RTC's general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases is
therefore not abdicated by an internal rule streamlining court
procedure.
In fine, Branch 276's dismissal of Civil Case No. 11-077 is set aside
and the transfer of said case to Branch 256, the designated Special
Commercial Court of the same RTC of Muntinlupa City, under the
parameters above-explained, is hereby ordered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated April 17,
2012 and July 9, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 in Civil Case No. 11-077 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 11-077 is REFERRED to
the Executive Judge of the RTC of Muntinlupa City for re-docketing
as a commercial case. Thereafter, the Executive Judge shall ASSIGN
said case to Branch 256, the sole designated Special Commercial
Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is ORDERED to resolve
the case with reasonable dispatch. In this regard, the Clerk of Court
of said RTC shall DETERMINE the appropriate amount of docket
fees and, in so doing, ORDER the payment of any difference or, on
the other hand, refund any excess.
Furthermore, the Court hereby RESOLVES that henceforth, the
following guidelines shall be observed:
1. If a commercial case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly
raffled to its regular branch, the proper courses of action are as
follows:
1.1 If the RTC has only one branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the Executive
Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter,
assigned to the sole special branch;
1.2 If the RTC has multiple branches designated as Special
Commercial Courts, then the case shall be referred to the Executive
Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter,
raffled off among those special branches; and
1.3 If the RTC has no internal branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the nearest
RTC with a designated Special Commercial Court branch within the
judicial region. Upon referral, the RTC to which the case was
referred to should re- docket the case as a commercial case, and
then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch designated as a
branch; or (b) if the said RTC has multiple branches designated as
Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case among those special
branches.
2. If an ordinary civil case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly
raffled to its branch designated as a Special Commercial Court,
then the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-
docketing as an ordinary civil case. Thereafter, it shall be raffled
off to all courts of the same RTC (including its designated special
branches which, by statute, are equally capable of exercising
general jurisdiction same as regular branches), as provided for
under existing rules.
hand, all docket fees already paid shall be duly credited, and any exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
excess, refunded. land by itself and its predecessors-in-interest even before the
outbreak of World War II.16
4. Finally, to avert any future confusion, the Court requires that all Dissatisfied with the CA’s ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instant
initiatory pleadings state the action's nature both in its caption and Rule 45 Petition and raised the following arguments in support of
body. Otherwise, the initiatory pleading may, upon motion or by its appeal:
order of the court motu proprio, be dismissed without prejudice to I.
its re-filing after due rectification. This last procedural rule is THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM
prospective in application. QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
5. All existing rules inconsistent with the foregoing are deemed REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE EVEN FOR THE FIRST TIME
superseded.cralawlawlibrary ON APPEAL
II.
SO ORDERED. THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
B. BASIC PRINCIPLES REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE.17
JURISDICTION CONFERRED BY LAW NOT BY AGREEMENT OF The Court’s Ruling
THE PARTIES We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the case to the
G. R. No. 162322 March 14, 2012 court a quo for further proceedings in order to determine if the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable
vs. land of the public domain.
BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. I
DECISION The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in
SERENO, J.: this case.
This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the issue of the At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from
proper scope of the delegated jurisdiction of municipal trial courts questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court, even if the former
in land registration cases. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled
(Republic) assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) 1 in CA- that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at
G.R. CV No. 70349, which affirmed the Decision of the Municipal any stage of the proceedings.18 Jurisdiction over the subject matter
Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan, Batangas2 in LRC Case No. N-98-20, is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. 19 It cannot be
LRA Record No. 68329, granting respondent Bantigue Point acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the
Development Corporation’s (Corporation) application for original parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. 20
registration of a parcel of land. Since only questions of law have Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if
been raised, petitioner need not have filed a Motion for raised for the first time on appeal.21
Reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision before filing this The ruling of the Court of Appeals that "a party may be estopped
Petition for Review. from raising such [jurisdictional] question if he has actively taken
The Facts part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting
On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development to the court’s jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order
Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, subsequently rendered is adverse to him"22 is based on the doctrine
Batangas an application for original registration of title over a of estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first
parcel of land with an assessed value of ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and enunciated by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.23 In Tijam, the
₱8,670, or a total assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the
property, more particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter,
San Juan Cadastre, with an area of more or less 10,732 square and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the
meters, located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas. 3 appellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower court’s
On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, we held that
hearing on 22 October 1997.4 On 7 August 1997, it issued a estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-litigant from
second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997. 5 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v.
Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for People,24 we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception
registration on 8 January 1998 while the records were still with the to the general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases
RTC.6 whose factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case.
On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu The facts are starkly different in this case, making the exceptional
proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San Juan, because rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner Republic filed its
the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than Opposition to the application for registration when the records
₱100,000.7 were still with the RTC.25 At that point, petitioner could not have
Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default 8 and questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because
commenced with the reception of evidence.9 Among the documents the case was not yet with that court. When the records were
presented by respondent in support of its application are Tax transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings nor
Declarations,10 a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor,11 and a requested affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner
Certification from the Department of Environment and Natural immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its Brief. 26 Clearly,
Resources (DENR) Community Environment and Natural Resources the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the
Office (CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is within instant appeal.
the alienable and disposable zone.12 Thereafter, it awarded the Laches has been defined as the "failure or neglect, for an
land to respondent Corporation.13 unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic, the CA ruled that since exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it
14

the former had actively participated in the proceedings before the is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
petitioner is thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of has abandoned or declined to assert it."27 In this case, petitioner
the lower court on appeal.15 The CA further found that respondent Republic has not displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect that
Corporation had sufficiently established the latter’s registrable title would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or declined to
over the subject property after having proven open, continuous, assert its right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.
II
The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the
case.
In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic
raised two points of contention: (a) the period for setting the date
and hour of the initial hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be
registered.
First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the application, because the RTC set the date and
hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day period provided
under the Property Registration Decree.28
We disagree.
The Property Registration Decree provides:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall,
within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting
the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier
than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the
order. x x x.
In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17
July 1997.29 On 18 July 1997, or a day after the filing of the
application, the RTC immediately issued an Order setting the case
for initial hearing on 22 October 1997, which was 96 days from
the Order.30 While the date set by the RTC was beyond the 90-day
period provided for in Section 23, this fact did not affect the
jurisdiction of the trial court. In Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc.,31
petitioner Republic therein contended that there was failure to
comply with the jurisdictional requirements for original registration,
because there were 125 days between the Order setting the date
of the initial hearing and the initial hearing itself. We ruled that the
lapse of time between the issuance of the Order setting the date of
initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself was not fatal
to the application. Thus, we held:
x x x [A] party to an action has no control over the Administrator or
the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle
unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his
duties. A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive
power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the
trial court errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish
an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has
neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has
complied with all the requirements of the law.32
Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize respondent
Corporation by dismissing its application for registration on account
of events beyond its control.
Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7 August 1997
setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997,33 within the 90-day
period provided by law, petitioner Republic argued that the
jurisdictional defect was still not cured, as the second Order was
issued more than five days from the filing of the application, again
contrary to the prescribed period under the Property Registration
Decree.34
Petitioner is incorrect.
The RTC’s failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the
initial hearing within five days from the filing of the application for
registration, as provided in the Property Registration Decree, did
not affect the court’s its jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day
period was merely directory, and failure to issue the Order within
that period did not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case.
To rule that compliance with the five-day period is mandatory
would make jurisdiction over the subject matter dependent upon the
trial court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by
the Constitution or the law.35 It cannot be contingent upon the action
or inaction of the court.
This does not mean that courts may disregard the statutory periods
with impunity. We cannot assume that the law deliberately meant
the provision "to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead
letter."36 However, the records of this case do not show such blatant
disregard for the law. In fact, the RTC immediately set the case for
initial hearing a day after the filing of the application for
registration,37 except that it had to issue a second Order because
the initial hearing had been set beyond the 90-day period
provided by law.
Second, petitioner contended38 that since the selling price of the
property based on the Deed of Sale annexed to respondent’s
application for original registration was ₱160,000,39 the MTC did
not have jurisdiction over the case. Under Section 34 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended,40 the MTC’s delegated jurisdiction
to try cadastral and land registration cases is limited to lands, the
value of which should not exceed ₱100,000.
We are not persuaded.
The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land
registration cases is indeed set forth in the Judiciary Reorganization
Act, which provides:
Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration
Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme
Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases
covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or
contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One
hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00), such value to be
ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the
respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the
corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decision
in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions
of the Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691)
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land
registration cases in two instances: first, where there is no
controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value
of which does not exceed ₱100,000.
The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because
petitioner opposed respondent Corporation’s application for
registration on 8 January 1998.41
However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance,
because the value of the lot in this case does not exceed ₱100,000.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the value of the land should not
be determined with reference to its selling price. Rather, Section 34
of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the
property sought to be registered may be ascertained in three ways:
first, by the affidavit of the claimant; second, by agreement of the
respective claimants, if there are more than one; or, third, from the
corresponding tax declaration of the real property. 42
In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using
the first method, because the records are bereft of any affidavit
executed by respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise,
valuation cannot be done through the second method, because this
method finds application only where there are multiple claimants
who agree on and make a joint submission as to the value of the
property. Here, only respondent Bantigue Point Development
Corporation claims the property.
The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with
reference to the corresponding Tax Declarations submitted by
respondent Corporation together with its application for
registration. From the records, we find that the assessed value of
the property is ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total assessed
value of ₱14,920 for the entire property.43 Based on these Tax
Declarations, it is evident that the total value of the land in question
does not exceed ₱100,000. Clearly, the MTC may exercise its
delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as
amended.
III
A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the
property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTC’s exercise of its
delegated jurisdiction, we find that the lower court erred in granting
respondent Corporation’s application for original registration in the
absence of sufficient proof that the property in question was
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State.44 The applicant for land registration has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership by
establishing through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought
to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act
of the government.45 We held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and
disposable character of the land sought to be registered. 46 The
applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary
has approved the land classification and released the land in
question as alienable and disposable.47
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration
must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO 48 Certification;
and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records.49
Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO
certification in support of its application.50 Clearly, this falls short of
the requirements for original registration.1âwphi1
We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for reception of
further evidence to prove that the property in question forms part
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. If
respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation presents a
certified true copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary, the application for original registration should be
granted. If it fails to present sufficient proof that the land in question
is alienable and disposable based on a positive act of the
government, the application should be denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review
is DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court
of San Juan, Batangas, for reception of evidence to prove that the
property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable land
of the public domain.
SO ORDERED.
DETERMINED BY THE LAW IN FORCE AT THE TIME OF
COMMENCEMENT
G.R. No. L-65192 April 27, 1988
RODOLFO DELA CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. FELIX L. MOYA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Davao, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Rolando C. Rama for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Involving as it does a purely legal question, the present petition for
certiorari and mandamus was certified to this Court by the then
Intermediate Appellate Court in its resolution dated August 30,
1983.
On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines assigned to the Intelligence and Operations
Section of the 432nd PC Company, together with other PC men,
received a mission order to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco, Sto.
Tomas, Davao for the purpose of verifying and apprehending
persons who were allegedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. In
compliance with said mission order, Dela Cruz and company
proceeded to Maco, Davao del Norte and caught in flagrante the
operators of said illegal cockfighting, but said operators resisted
arrest. The soldiers left the place but they brought with them to the
PC Headquarters the evidence of the crime, such as gaffs and
fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal cockfights, including the
deceased Eusebio Cabilto, followed the soldiers on their way back
to the PC Headquarters, catching up with them on the Tagum-Mati
National Highway. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz
shot Cabilto.
On August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged with homicide in the
Court of First Instance of Davao, in an information filed by the
Provincial Fiscal. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
40080.
While the case was pending trial, Presidential Decree Nos. 1822
and 1822-A were promulgated by the President of the Philippines
on January 16, 1981, vesting in courts-martial jurisdiction over
crimes committed by members of the Armed Forces or of the
Philippine Constabulary in performance of their duties.
Claiming that the crime for which he was charged was committed in
relation to the performance of his duties, Dela Cruz filed with the
Court of First Instance of Davao a motion to transfer the case to the
military authorities so he could be tried by court martial. The motion
was denied. Hence, the present petition.
At issue is whether the civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Criminal Case No. 40080.
One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that
the court hearing the case must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. If the court is acting without jurisdiction, then the
entire proceedings are null and void.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action. [Silvestre v.
Military Commission, L-48366, March 8, 1978, 82 SCRA 10; People
v. Romualdo, 90 Phil. 739 (1952); Rilloraza v. Arciaga, 128 Phil.
799 (1967), 21 SCRA 717.] And once jurisdiction is vested in the
court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation. [Pamintuan v.
Tiglao, 53 Phil. 1, (1929); Phil. Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU),
Inc. v. CIR, 93 Phil. 747 (1953); Tuvera v. De Guzman, 121 Phil.
706 (1965),13 SCRA 729; Rilloraza v. Arciaga, supra: Rizal Surety
and Insurance Co. v. Manila Railroad Co., et al., 123 Phil. 766
(1966),16 SCRA908).
In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979. On
such date, by virtue of General Order No. 59, dated June 24,
1977, published in 73 Official Gazette (Supplement) #28, pages
6373-1 to 6373-3. (July 11, 1977), military tribunals created
under General Order No. 8 exercised exclusive jurisdiction over
"(a)ll offenses committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines while in the performance of their official duty or
which arose out of any act or omission done in the performance of
their official duty; Provided, that for the purpose of determining
whether an offense was committed while in the performance of
official duty or whether it arose out of an act or omission done in
the performance of official duty, a certificate issued by the
Secretary of National Defense to that effect shall be conclusive
unless modified or revoked by the President. . . " (Section 1.) As no
amendatory law was ever published in the Official Gazette
between the time G.R. No. 59 was published until the information in
Criminal Case No. 40080 was filed on August 2,1979, then said
General Order No. 59 remained in force on said date.
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that at the time of the commission
of the alleged offense, petitioner Dela Cruz was a member of the
Philippine Constabulary, and that the shooting of the deceased
Cabilto was committed while petitioner was executing the Mission
Order.
But what is the significance of the proviso regarding the certificate
to be issued by the Secretary of National Defense?
The proviso merely states that the certificate issued by the Secretary
of National Defense is conclusive for the purpose of determining
whether an offense was committed while in the performance of
official duty, or arose out of an act or omission done in the
performance of official duty. It does not in any way preclude the
courts from making any finding as to whether an offense is duty-
connected. Nor does it make the certificate a condition precedent
for the exercise by either civilian courts or military tribunals of their
jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the AFP.
In the instant case, even as no certificate issued by the Secretary of
National Defense was presented in court, the record contains a copy
of Mission Order No. 7, signed by a certain Lieutenant Huerta,
directing Dela Cruz, among others, to proceed to Barangay Pangi,
Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao to verify and apprehend persons
reportedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. The evidence of the
prosecution presented in court likewise shows that Cabilto was shot
while petitioner was executing the mission order. These undisputed
facts compel this Court to declare that respondent court was without
jurisdiction to try the case against petitioner Dela Cruz.
The Solicitor General points out that at the time the information was
filed, Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822 and 1822-A which vest in the
courts-martial jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of
the AFP in the performance of their duties were not yet in effect,
the same having been promulgated only in 1981.
Truly, PD 1822 and 1822-A are inapplicable to the case at bar.
However, General Order No. 59 cited above applies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The in Criminal Case No.
4008 are declared null and void but without prejudice to the filing
of another action in the proper forum. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Judge Advocate of the Philippine Constabulary, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, for appropriate action.
G.R. No. 154557 February 13, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 12th DIVISION, RICO
LIPAO, and RICKSON LIPAO, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Where a court acquired jurisdiction over an action, its jurisdiction
continues to the final conclusion of the case. Such jurisdiction is not
affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such dispute in
another court or tribunal unless the statute provides for
retroactivity.1
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, seeking to nullify
the June 13, 2002 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 17275 which set aside the July 25, 1994 Judgment 3
of the Surigao City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 and
dismissed Criminal Case No. 551 entitled People of the Philippines
v. Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao for violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 705,4 as amended by Executive Order
No. (EO) 277.5
On February 24, 1992, private respondents Rico and Rickson Lipao
were indicted for and pleaded not guilty to violation of Sec. 68 of
PD 705, as amended by EO 277. The Information in Criminal Case
No. 551 reads:
That on or about the 21st day of October 1991 in
Cagdianao, Surigao del Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Rico Lipao
and Rickson Lipao without legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess without
license eight (8) pieces of round timbers and 160 bundles
of firewood with a market value of P3,100.00, said forest
products not covered with legal transport document, and
willfully and unlawfully load these forest products in the
pumpboat "Rickjoy" owned by Rico Lipao, nor the accused
Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao holders of a license issued
by the DENR, to the prejudice of the government in the sum
of P3,100.00.
Contrary to law. The offense is punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, as provided under Section 68 of PD No. 705.6
The offense charged is punishable under Art. 309 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides:
Art. 309. Penalties.—Any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by:
xxxx
2. The penalty of prisiόn correccional in its medium and
maximum period, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
Prisiόn correccional in its medium period is imprisonment from 2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months while prisiόn
correccional in its maximum period is imprisonment from 4 years, 2
months and 1 day to 6 years.
Parenthetically, during the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 551
and before the RTC rendered its Judgment, Republic Act No. (RA)
76917 took effect on April 15, 1994 or 15 days after its publication
on March 30, 1994. RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial
Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) in criminal
cases to cover all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six years irrespective of the amount of fine and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including civil penalties arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof.
Before the amendments of RA 7691, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
entitled The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provided that the
MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding
four years and two months, or a fine of not more than PhP 4,000,
or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from
such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature,
value, or amount thereof.
On July 25, 1994, the RTC rendered its Judgment, finding private
respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
accused Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao both guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the Violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive
Order No. 277, Series of 1987, in relation to Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences
each of them to an indeterminate penalty of from four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum; and each
to pay one-half of the costs.
The posts and firewood in question, or the proceeds
thereof if sold at public auction are hereby forfeited in
favor of the Government.
SO ORDERED.8
Private respondents seasonably interposed their appeal before the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17275. They argued that private
respondent Rickson was subjected to an illegal search and seizure
of the round posts and firewood which cannot be used as evidence
against him. They insisted that the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) personnel together with some Philippine
National Police personnel who stopped private respondent Rickson
did not have a search warrant. They also opined that the "plain
sight" or "open review" doctrine is inapplicable as the posts and
firewood are not incriminatory, more so as firewood is available
and sold in public markets without the requirement of any permit
from the DENR.
Moreover, private respondents argued that the prosecution failed
to prove their lack of license to possess timber. They contended that
since private respondent Rico is merely the owner of the pumpboat
and was not present when the posts and firewood were seized, he
could never be held liable for illegal possession of timber as he was
never in possession of the round posts. Relying on People v.
Macagaling,9 private respondents asserted that constructive
possession of forest products is no longer the rule in successfully
prosecuting offenses for violation of the Forestry Code.
On June 13, 2002, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, granting
the appeal of private respondents and dismissing the case before
it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC. The decretal
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the Decision appealed
from is SET ASIDE. The instant criminal case is DISMISSED
for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.10
In sustaining the appeal of private respondents, the CA did not rule
on the assigned errors or on the merits of the case. It anchored its
dismissal of the criminal case on the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC
to hear and decide it.
Thus, People of the Philippines filed the instant petition, raising the
sole assignment of error that:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARBITRARILY AND
WHIMSICALLY DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ON THE GROUND THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE IN VIEW OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7691 WHICH
BECAME EFFECTIVE ON APRIL 15, 1994.11
Petitioner People posits that the passage of RA 7691 did not ipso
facto take jurisdiction away from the RTC to hear and decide the
instant criminal case instituted prior to the passage of said law
expanding the jurisdiction of the MTCs.
On the other hand, in their Comment and Memorandum, private
respondents do not meet head on the sole issue raised by petitioner
on jurisdiction but instead argue that the instant petition should have
been outrightly dismissed on the grounds of noncompliance with the
requirements for a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
and the requisites for a valid verification. Private respondents
asseverate that the instant petition cannot be entertained as no
motion for reconsideration has been filed before the CA, which is a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to petitioner and
an indispensable and jurisdictional requirement for the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, relying on Labudahon v.
NLRC.12 Moreover, they contend that an action for certiorari under
Rule 65 is the wrong remedy as the dismissal by the CA on lack of
jurisdiction did not constitute double jeopardy and, thus, an appeal
through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the
proper remedy. They maintain that the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), while undoubtedly the counsel for the State and its
agencies, cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to execute in its
name the certificate of non-forum shopping for a client office, which
in the instant case is the DENR.
The arguments of private respondents are unmeritorious.
On the issue of the propriety of the resort to a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition under Rule 45, we
find that Rule 65 is the proper remedy. The CA ruled that the RTC
was ousted of its jurisdiction as a result of the enactment of RA
7691. While the defense of lack of jurisdiction was never raised by
private respondents before the RTC and the CA, the CA
nevertheless proceeded to acquit private respondents based on the
new law. It is quite glaring from Sec. 7 of RA 7691 that said law
has limited retroactivity only to civil cases. As such, the CA indeed
committed grave abuse of discretion as it acted in an arbitrary and
patently erroneous exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Hence, the use of Rule 65 is proper.
On other procedural issues, we also find for petitioner. First, we
reiterate our holding in Santiago and City Warden of the Manila
City Jail that the signature by the Solicitor General on the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping in a petition
before the CA or with this
Court is substantial compliance of the requirement under Sec. 4,13
Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, considering that the
OSG is the legal representative of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines and its agencies and instrumentalities, more so in
a criminal case where the People or the State is the real party-in-
interest and is the aggrieved party.
Second, while it is true that petitioner did not file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision which normally is a
ground for dismissal for being premature14 and to accord
respondent CA opportunity to correct itself,15 yet the rule admits of
exceptions, such as where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless,16 and where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government.17
In the instant case, these exceptions are present; thus, the propriety
of the instant petition. The assailed CA Decision rendered on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction clearly bespeaks that any motion for
reconsideration is useless. For one, the issue of lack of jurisdiction
was never raised by private respondents in their Brief for the
Accused-Appellants,18 but was considered motu proprio by the CA.
For another, the issues and errors raised by private respondents
were not considered and much less touched upon by the CA in its
assailed Decision.
But of more importance, as this Court held in Vivo v. Cloribel,19 a
motion for reconsideration is not necessary before a petition for
certiorari can be filed when the respondent court took almost eight
years to the day to resolve private respondents’ appeal. It is not
only the accused who has a right to a speedy disposition of his case,
but the prosecution or the State representing the People also has
and must be accorded the same right. Thus, any further delay would
prejudice the interest of the Government to prosecute and bring
closure to a criminal case filed way back in early 1992.
On the main issue of whether the RTC retained jurisdiction over the
criminal case, we agree with petitioner. The passage of RA 7691
did not ipso facto relieve the RTC of the jurisdiction to hear and
decide the criminal case against private respondents.
This issue has been laid to rest in People v. Velasco, where this Court
emphatically held:
As to the issue of whether or not R.A. 7691 operated to
divest the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over
appellant’s case, we rule in the negative. It has been
consistently held as a general rule that the jurisdiction
of a court to try a criminal action is to be determined by
the law in force at the time of the institution of the
action. Where a court has already obtained and is
exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the
cause is not affected by new legislation placing
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal.
The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended
to operate as to actions pending before its enactment.
Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has
no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that
was pending prior to the enactment of a statute.
A perusal of R.A. 7691 will show that its retroactive
provisions apply only to civil cases that have not yet
reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express
proviso nor by implication can it be understood as
having retroactive application to criminal cases pending
or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its
effectivity. Thus, the general rule enunciated above is the
controlling doctrine in the case at bar. At the time the case
against the appellant was commenced by the filing of the
information on July 3, 1991, the Regional Trial Court had
jurisdiction over the offense charged, inasmuch as Section
39 of R.A. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 prior
to the amendments introduced by R.A. 7659 and R.A.
7691), provided that:
Sec. 39. Jurisdiction. - The Court of First Instance,
Circuit Criminal Court, and Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court shall have concurrent original
jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses
punishable under this Act: Provided, That in cities
or provinces where there are Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, the said courts shall
take exclusive cognizance of cases where the
offenders are under sixteen years of age.
xxxx
It must be stressed that the abovementioned provision
vested concurrent jurisdiction upon the said courts
regardless of the imposable penalty. In fine, the
jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case of the
appellant was conferred by the aforecited law then in
force (R.A. 6425 before amendment) when the information
was filed. Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement
of the action and could not be ousted by the passage of
R.A. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior
courts, the application of which to criminal cases is, to
stress, prospective in nature.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court categorically reiterated the above ruling in the 2003
case of Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals,21 in the 2004 case of Alonto v.
People,22 and in the 2005 case of Lee v. Court of Appeals.23
Thus, where private respondents had been charged with illegal
logging punishable under Articles 30924 and 31025 of the Revised
Penal Code with imprisonment ranging from four (4) years, two (2)
months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine
(9) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction at the inception of the
criminal case. Since jurisdiction over the criminal case attached upon
the filing of the information, then the RTC is empowered and
mandated to try and decide said case notwithstanding a
subsequent change in the jurisdiction over criminal cases of the same
nature under a new statute. The rule is settled that jurisdiction
continues until the court has done all that it can do to exercise that
jurisdiction unless the law provides otherwise.26
While jurisdiction can be challenged at any stage of the
proceedings, private respondents did not bother to raise the issue
of jurisdiction in their appeal before the CA. In addition, private
respondents did not lift a finger to reinforce the CA decision relying
on lack of jurisdiction as ground for the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 551 in their submissions before this Court. Indeed, it appears
that even respondents are not convinced of the correctness of the
CA ruling on the issue of jurisdiction.
Lastly, the CA committed reversible error in making use of the values
adduced during the hearing to determine jurisdiction. It is basic that
the jurisdiction of a court is determined both by the law in force at
the time of the commencement of the action and by the allegations
in the Complaint or Information.
Thus, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction when it heard and decided
Criminal Case No. 551. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the RTC
was divested of jurisdiction by reason of the enactment of RA 7691.
However, considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, we
remand the case to the CA to resolve the appeal in CA-G.R. CR No.
17275 on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed June 13,
2002 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 17275 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The CA is directed to resolve the appeal of private
respondents on the merits and with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
9. Rules of procedure for small claims
G.R. No. 200804 January 22, 2014
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her husband, EFREN
MONDEJAR, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse1 to the Court from the Decision2 dated
November 23, 2011and Order3 dated February 16, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 (RTC) in RTC Case
No. 11-13833 which dismissed, on the ground of improper remedy,
petitioner A.L. Ang Network, Inc.'s (petitioner) petition for certiorari
from the Decision4 dated June 10, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities of Bacolod City, Branch 4 (MTCC) in Civil Case No. SCC-
1436, a small claims case for sum of money against respondent
Emma Mondejar (respondent).
The Facts
On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint5 for sum of money
under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases 6 before the
MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of
₱23,111.71 which represented her unpaid water bills for the
period June 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005.7
Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to
and collect payment therefor from the homeowners of Regent Pearl
Subdivision, one of whom is respondent who owns and occupies Lot
8, Block 3 of said subdivision. From June 1, 2002 until September
30, 2005, respondent and her family consumed a total of 1,150
cubic meters (cu. m.) of water, which upon application of the agreed
rate of ₱113.00 for every 10 cu. m. of water, plus an additional
charge of ₱11.60 for every additional cu. m. of water, amounted
to ₱28,580.09.8 However, respondent only paid the amount of
₱5,468.38, thus, leaving a balance of ₱23,111.71 which was left
unpaid despite petitioner’s repeated demands.9
In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to
February 2003, she religiously paid petitioner the agreed monthly
flat rate of ₱75.00 for her water consumption. Notwithstanding
their agreement that the same would be adjusted only upon prior
notice to the homeowners, petitioner unilaterally charged her
unreasonable and excessive adjustments (at the average of 40 cu.
m. of water per month or 1.3 cu. m. of water a day) far above the
average daily water consumption for a household of only 3 persons.
She also questioned the propriety and/or basis of the aforesaid
₱23,111.71 claim.10
In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondent’s water line for
not paying the adjusted water charges since March 2003 up to
August 2005.11
The MTCC Ruling
On June 10, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision12 holding that
since petitioner was issued a Certificate of Public Convenience
(CPC)13 by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) only on
August 7, 2003, then, it can only charge respondent the agreed flat
rate of ₱75.00 per month prior thereto or the sum of ₱1,050.00
for the period June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003. Thus, given that
respondent had made total payments equivalent to ₱1,685.99 for
the same period, she should be considered to have fully paid
petitioner.14
The MTCC disregarded petitioner’s reliance on the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board’s (HLURB) Decision15 dated August 17,
2000 in HLURB Case No. REM C6-00-001 entitled Nollie B. Apura,
et al. v. Dona Carmen I Subdivision, et al., as source of its authority
to impose new water consumption rates for water consumed from
June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003 in the absence of proof (a) that
petitioner complied with the directive to inform the HLURB of the
result of its consultation with the concerned homeowners as regards
the rates to be charged, and (b) that the HLURB approved of the
same.16
Moreover, the MTCC noted that petitioner failed to submit evidence
showing (a) the exact date when it actually began imposing the
NWRB approved rates; and (b) that the parties had a formal
agreement containing the terms and conditions thereof, without
which it cannot establish with certainty respondent’s obligation. 17
Accordingly, it ruled that the earlier agreed rate of ₱75.00 per
month should still be the basis for respondent’s water consumption
charges for the period August 8, 2003 to September 30, 2005. 18
Based on petitioner’s computation, respondent had only paid
₱300.00 of her ₱1,500.00 obligation for said period. Thus, it
ordered respondent to pay petitioner the balance thereof,
equivalent to ₱1,200.00 with legal interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from date of receipt of the extrajudicial demand on October
14, 2010 until fully paid.19
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari20 under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court before the RTC, ascribing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the MTCC in finding that it (petitioner)
failed to establish with certainty respondent’s obligation, and in not
ordering the latter to pay the full amount sought to be collected.
The RTC Ruling
On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision21 dismissing the
petition for certiorari, finding that the said petition was only filed
to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as
provided under Section 2322 of the Rule of Procedure on Small
Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled that it cannot supplant the
decision of the MTCC with another decision directing respondent to
pay petitioner a bigger sum than that which has been awarded.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration23 but was denied in an
Order24 dated February 16, 2012, hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the RTC erred in
dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small
claims case.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states
that:
SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its
decision on the same day, based on the facts established by the
evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered
by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy
thereof forthwith served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under
the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and
the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its
execution.25 Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small
claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an
available remedy,26 does not preclude the aggrieved party from
filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
This general rule has been enunciated in the case of Okada v.
Security Pacific Assurance Corporation,27 wherein it was held that:
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the
extraordinary writ of certiorari is always available where there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law." In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court
ruled:
x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that
the special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when "there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
course of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of
the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground
to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally
beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the mere
absence – of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of
justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of
certiorari.
This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of Appeals:
Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary
remedies under the Rules is an absence of an appeal nor any "plain,
speedy and adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of law, one
which has been so defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be)
beneficial, speedy and sufficient not merely a remedy which at
some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment x
x x complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which
will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that
judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal" concerned. x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTC’s
apprehension that respondent’s recourse before it (was only filed
to circumvent the non-appealable nature of [small claims cases],
because it asks [the court] to supplant the decision of the lower
[c]ourt with another decision directing the private respondent to pay
the petitioner a bigger sum than what has been awarded."28 Verily,
a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action29
designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment.
Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to
establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The
RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an
evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion
by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence
that is material to the controversy.30
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly
availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of the
MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC’s
ruling.
Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before
the proper forum (i.e., the RTC).1âwphi1 To be sure, the Court, the
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari.31 Such concurrence of
jurisdiction, however, does not give a party unbridled freedom to
choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial
hierarchy dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari
against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial
Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals,
before resort may be had before the Court.32 This procedure is also
in consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.33
Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,34
certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before
their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied
with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which,
as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the
RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was
an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must
be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 23, 2011 and Resolution dated February 16, 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. RTC Case No. 11-13833 is hereby REINSTATED and
the court a quo is ordered to resolve the same with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
10. SHARIA COURTS
G.R. No. 188832 April 23, 2014
VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA, Petitioner,
vs.
FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA,
represented by his father Hadji Kalam T. Mala, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Shari' a District Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions where
one of the parties is not a Muslim.
This is a petition for certiorari with application for issuance of
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to set
aside the Fifth (5th) Shari'a District Court's decision1 dated June 11,
2008 and order2 dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special Proceedings
Case No. 07-200.
The facts as established from the pleadings of the parties are as
follows:
On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-
meter parcel of land located in Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao,
now Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres Cañete. On March 3, 1996,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15633 covering the parcel of
land was issued in Roldan’s name.3 At the time of the purchase,
Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of land.4
By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg.
P-60192 issued by the Land Registration Authority allegedly
covering the same parcel of land.5
On October 30, 2006, Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed. In
a report, Geodetic Engineer Dennis P. Dacup found that Vivencio
occupied the parcel of land covered by Roldan’s certificate of title.6
To settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio, Roldan initiated
barangay conciliation proceedings before the Office of the
Barangay Chairman of Poblacion II, Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan.
Failing to settle with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed
an action to recover the possession of the parcel of land with
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court.7
In his petition, Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim; that he is
the registered owner of the lot covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15633; and that Vivencio occupied his property, depriving
him of the right to use, possess, and enjoy it. He prayed that
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court order Vivencio to vacate his
property.8
Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused service
of summons on Vivencio. However, despite service of summons,
Vivencio failed to file his answer. Thus, Roldan moved that he be
allowed to present evidence ex parte, which motion respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court granted in its order 9 dated January 30,
2008.10
In its decision11 dated June 11, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court ruled that Roldan, as registered owner, had the better
right to possess the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate
the property, turn it over to Roldan, and pay ₱10,000.00 as
moderate damages and ₱5,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
On December 15, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a Distict Court
issued the notice of writ of execution12 to Vivencio, giving him 30
days from receipt of the notice to comply with the decision. He
received a copy of the notice on December 16, 2008.13
On January 13, 2009, Vivencio filed a petition for relief from
judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.14
In his petition for relief from judgment, Vivencio cited Article 155,
paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines15 and argued that Shari’a District Courts may only hear
civil actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims.
Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio argued that respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land. He
prayed that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court set aside the
decision dated June 11, 2008 on the ground of mistake.16
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Vivencio
"intentionally [waived] his right to defend himself."17 It noted that
he was duly served with summons and had notice of the following:
Roldan’s motion to present evidence ex parte, respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court’s decision dated June 11, 2008, and the writ
of execution. However, Vivencio only went to court "when he lost his
right to assail the decision via certiorari."18
According to respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, Vivencio cited
the wrong provision of law. Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines refers to the jurisdiction
of Shari’a Circuit Courts, not of Shari’a District Courts.19 It ruled that
it had jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession.
Regardless of Vivencio being a non-Muslim, his rights were not
prejudiced since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court decided the
case applying the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.20
Thus, in its order21 dated May 29, 2009, respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court denied Vivencio’s petition for relief from judgment for
lack of merit. It reiterated its order directing the issuance of a writ
of execution of the decision dated June 11, 2008.
Vivencio received a copy of the order denying his petition for relief
from judgment on June 17, 2009.22
On August 6, 2009, Vivencio filed the petition for certiorari with
prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order with this court.23
In his petition for certiorari, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court acted without jurisdiction in rendering the
decision dated June 11, 2008. Under Article 143, paragraph (2)(b)
of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, 24 Shari’a
District Courts may only take cognizance of real actions where the
parties involved are Muslims. Reiterating that he is not a Muslim,
Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Roldan’s action. Thus, all the
proceedings before respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, including
the decision dated June 11, 2008, are void.25
In the resolution26 dated August 19, 2009, this court ordered Roldan
to comment on Vivencio’s petition for certiorari. This court
subsequently issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of the writ of execution against Vivencio.27
On September 21, 2011, Roldan filed his comment28 on the petition
for certiorari. He allegedly filed the action for recovery of
possession with the Shari’a District Court where "a more speedy
disposition of the case would be obtained":29
1. That SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200 (Quieting of Title…)
was duly filed with the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court,
Cotabato City at the option of herein private respondent
(petitioner below) who believed that a more speedy
disposition of the case would be obtained when the action
is filed with the Shariah District Court than in the Regional
Trial Courts considering the voluminous pending cases at
the Regional Trial Courts[.]30
On Vivencio’s claim that respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court had no jurisdiction to decide the action for recovery
of possession because he is a non-Muslim, Roldan argued
that no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines prohibited non-Muslims from participating
in Shari’a court proceedings, especially in actions where
the Shari’a court applied the provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. Thus, respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court validly took cognizance of his action:
2. That the Shariah District Court is not a court exclusively
for muslim litigants. No provision in the Code on Muslim
Personal Laws which expressly prohibits non-muslim to
participate in the proceedings in the Shariah Courts,
especially in actions which applies the civil code and not
the Code on Muslim Personal Laws;
3. The Shariah District Courts has jurisdiction over action
for quieting of title filed by a muslim litigant since the
nature of the action involved mere removal of cloud of
doubt upon one’s Certificate of Title. The laws applied in
this case is the Civil Code and other related laws, and not
the Code on Muslim Personal Laws[.]31
Since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had jurisdiction
to decide the action for recovery of possession, Roldan
argued that the proceedings before it were valid.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Vivencio upon service on him of
summons. When Vivencio failed to file his answer, he
"effectively waived his right to participate in the
proceedings [before the Fifth Shari’a District Court]"32 and
he cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced:
4. That it is not disputed that herein petitioner (respondent
below) was properly served with summons, notices and
other court processes when the SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200
was filed and heard in the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court,
Cotabato City, but petitioner (respondent below)
intentionally or without known reason, ignore the
proceedings;
5. That the main issue in the instant action for certiorari is
whether or not herein petitioner (respondent below) has
effectively waived his right to participate in the
proceedings below and had lost his right to appeal via
Certiorari; and the issue on whether or not the Fifth (5th)
Shariah District Court has jurisdiction over an action where
one of the parties is a non-muslim;
6. That the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City
acquired jurisdiction over the case and that the same Court
had correctly ruled that herein petitioner (respondent)
intentionally waived his right to defend himself including
his right to appeal via certiorari;
7. That it is humbly submitted that when the Shariah District
Court took cognizance of an action under its concurrent
jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court, the law rules
applied is not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws but the
Civil Code of the Philippines and the Revised Rules of
Procedure, hence the same would not prejudice the right
of herein petitioner (respondent below)[.] 33
In the resolution dated November 21, 2011, this court ordered
Vivencio to reply to Roldan’s comment. On February 3, 2012,
Vivencio filed his manifestation,34 stating that he would no longer
file a reply to the comment as he had "exhaustively discussed the
issue presented for resolution in [his petition for certiorari]."35
The principal issue for our resolution is whether a Shari’a District
Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of the parties is
not a Muslim.
We also resolve the following issues:
1. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try,
and decide a real action where one of the parties is a non-
Muslim if the District Court decides the action applying the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines; and
2. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try,
and decide a real action filed by a Muslim against a non-
Muslim if the non-Muslim defendant was served with
summons.
We rule for petitioner Vivencio.
I
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try,
and decide Roldan’s action for
recovery of possession
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong."36 This power is conferred by law,37 which may
either be the Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter
jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose, consent to, or
agree as to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes. 38 If
a court hears, tries, and decides an action in which it has no
jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the judgment rendered, are
void.39
To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action, the material allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are examined.40
The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the
Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Under Article
143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent
original jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not
arising from customary contracts41 wherein the parties involved are
Muslims:
ART 143. Original jurisdiction. – x x x x
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court
shall have original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph
1(d)42 wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and
xxxx
When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the owner
has the right to possess and enjoy it.43 If the owner is dispossessed
of his or her property, he or she has a right of action to recover its
possession from the dispossessor.44 When the property involved is
real,45 such as land, the action to recover it is a real action; 46
otherwise, the action is a personal action.47 In such actions, the
parties involved must be Muslims for Shari’a District Courts to validly
take cognizance of them.
In this case, the allegations in Roldan’s petition for recovery of
possession did not state that Vivencio is a Muslim. When Vivencio
stated in his petition for relief from judgment that he is not a Muslim,
Roldan did not dispute this claim.
When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court should have motu proprio dismissed the
case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
based on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the court shall
dismiss the claim:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings
or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a
prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the
claim.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority under the
law to decide Roldan’s action because not all of the parties involved
in the action are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over Roldan’s
action for recovery of possession. All its proceedings in SDC Special
Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are void.
Roldan chose to file his action with the Shari’a District Court, instead
of filing the action with the regular courts, to obtain "a more speedy
disposition of the case."48 This would have been a valid argument
had all the parties involved in this case been Muslims. Under Article
143 of the Muslim Code, the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts
over real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent
with that of existing civil courts. However, this concurrent jurisdiction
over real actions "is applicable solely when both parties are
Muslims"49 as this court ruled in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong.50 When
one of the parties is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before
the regular courts.
The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines
by respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court does not validate the
proceedings before the court. Under Article 175 of the Muslim
Code, customary contracts are construed in accordance with Muslim
law.51 Hence, Shari’a District Courts apply Muslim law when
resolving real actions arising from customary contracts.
In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there
is no reason for Shari’a District Courts to apply Muslim law. In such
real actions, Shari’a District Courts will necessarily apply the laws
of general application, which in this case is the Civil Code of the
Philippines, regardless of the court taking cognizance of the action.
This is the reason why the original jurisdiction of Shari’a District
Courts over real actions not arising from customary contracts is
concurrent with that of regular courts.
However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction arises only if the
parties involved are Muslims. Considering that Vivencio is not a
Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction
over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of real property.
The proceedings before it are void, regardless of the fact that it
applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines in
resolving the action.
True, no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines expressly prohibits non-Muslims from participating in
Shari’a court proceedings. In fact, there are instances when
provisions in the Muslim Code apply to non-Muslims. Under Article
13 of the Muslim Code,52 provisions of the Code on marriage and
divorce apply to the female party in a marriage solemnized
according to Muslim law, even if the female is non-Muslim.53 Under
Article 93, paragraph (c) of the Muslim Code,54 a person of a
different religion is disqualified from inheriting from a Muslim
decedent.55 However, by operation of law and regardless of
Muslim law to the contrary, the decedent’s parent or spouse who is
a non-Muslim "shall be entitled to one-third of what he or she would
have received without such disqualification."56 In these instances,
non-Muslims may participate in Shari’a court proceedings.57
Nonetheless, this case does not involve any of the previously cited
instances. This case involves an action for recovery of possession of
real property. As a matter of law, Shari’a District Courts may only
take cognizance of a real action "wherein the parties involved are
Muslims."58 Considering that one of the parties involved in this case
is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no
jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the action for recovery of
possession of real property. The judgment against Vivencio is void
for respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action.
That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter only after respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had
rendered judgment is immaterial. A party may assail the jurisdiction
of a court or tribunal over a subject matter at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal.59 The reason is that "jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the
court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action."60
In Figueroa v. People of the Philippines,61 Venancio Figueroa was
charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide before the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The trial court convicted Figueroa
as charged. On appeal with the Court of Appeals, Figueroa raised
for the first time the issue of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
to decide the case. Ruling that the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the crime charged, this court dismissed the criminal
case despite the fact that Figueroa objected to the trial court’s
jurisdiction only on appeal.
In Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,62 Johnny Pastorin
filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against Metromedia
Times Corporation. Metromedia Times Corporation actively
participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. When the
Labor Arbiter ruled against Metromedia Times, it appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission, arguing for the first time that
the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint. According
to Metromedia Times, the case involved a grievance issue "properly
cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator."63 This court set aside the
decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter despite the fact that the issue of jurisdiction
was raised only on appeal.
There are exceptional circumstances when a party may be barred
from assailing the jurisdiction of the court to decide a case. In the
1968 case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,64 the Spouses Tijam sued the
Spouses Sibonghanoy on July 19, 1948 before the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to recover ₱1,908.00. At that time, the court with
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear civil actions in which the amount
demanded does not exceed ₱2,000.00 was the court of justices of
the peace and municipal courts in chartered cities under Section 88
of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
As prayed for by the Spouses Tijam in their complaint, the Court of
First Instance issued a writ of attachment against the Spouses
Sibonghanoy. However, the latter filed a counter-bond issued by
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. Thus, the Court of First Instance
dissolved the writ of attachment.
After trial, the Court of First Instance decided in favor of the
Spouses Tijam. When the writ of execution returned unsatisfied, the
Spouses Tijam moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.’s bond. The Court of First
Instance granted the motion. Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
moved to quash the writ of execution, which motion the Court of First
Instance denied. Thus, the surety company appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals sustained the Court of First Instance’s decision.
Five days after receiving the Court of Appeals’ decision, Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss, arguing for
the first time that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals forwarded the
case to this court for resolution.
This court ruled that the surety company could no longer assail the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance on the ground of estoppel
by laches. Parties may be barred from assailing the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter of the action if it took them an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to object to the court’s
jurisdiction.65 This is to discourage the deliberate practice of parties
in invoking the jurisdiction of a court to seek affirmative relief, only
to repudiate the court’s jurisdiction after failing to obtain the relief
sought.66 In such cases, the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter is overlooked in favor of the public policy of discouraging
such inequitable and unfair conduct.67
In Tijam, it took Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. 15 years before
assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. As early as
1948, the surety company became a party to the case when it
issued the counter-bond to the writ of attachment. During trial, it
invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance by seeking
several affirmative reliefs, including a motion to quash the writ of
execution. The surety company only assailed the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance in 1963 when the Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court’s decision. This court said:
x x x x Were we to sanction such conduct on [Manila Surety and
Fidelity, Co. Inc.’s] part, We would in effect be declaring as useless
all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced
on July 19, 1948 and compel [the spouses Tijam] to go up their
Calvary once more.
The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting. 68
After this court had rendered the decision in Tijam, this court
observed that the "non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction"69 has
been ignored, and the Tijam doctrine has become more the general
rule than the exception.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez,70 this court said:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and
upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a
court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and
may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by
recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in
the cited case of [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy]. It is to be regretted,
however, that the holding in said case had been applied to
situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. x x x. 71
Thus, the court reiterated the "unquestionably accepted"72 rule that
objections to a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This is
because jurisdiction over the subject matter is a "matter of law" 73
and "may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the
parties."74
In Figueroa,75 this court ruled that the Tijam doctrine "must be
applied with great care;"76 otherwise, the doctrine "may be a most
effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice":77
x x x estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored
by law. It is to be applied rarely — only from necessity, and only
in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with
great care and the equity must be strong in its favor. When
misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective
weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. x x x a judgment
rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. x x x.
No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for
want of jurisdiction x x x.78
In this case, the exceptional circumstances similar to Tijam do not
exist. Vivencio never invoked respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court’s jurisdiction to seek affirmative relief. He filed the petition
for relief from judgment precisely to assail the jurisdiction of
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court over Roldan’s petition for
recovery of possession.
Thus, the general rule holds. Vivencio validly assailed the jurisdiction
of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court over the action for
recovery of possession for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of Roldan’s action.
II
That respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court served summons on
petitioner Vivencio did not vest it
with jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner Vivencio
Roldan argued that the proceedings before respondent Shari’a
District Court were valid since the latter acquired jurisdiction over
the person of Vivencio. When Vivencio was served with summons,
he failed to file his answer and waived his right to participate in
the proceedings before respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court. Since
Vivencio waived his right to participate in the proceedings, he
cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced.
Jurisdiction over the person is "the power of [a] court to render a
personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to
the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action."79 A court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff once he or she
files the initiatory pleading.80 As for the defendant, the court
acquires jurisdiction over his or her person either by his or her
voluntary appearance in court81 or a valid service on him or her of
summons.82
Jurisdiction over the person is required in actions in personam 83 or
actions based on a party’s personal liability.84 Since actions in
personam "are directed against specific persons and seek personal
judgments,"85 it is necessary that the parties to the action "are
properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be
heard."86 With respect to the defendant, he or she must have been
duly served with summons to be considered properly impleaded;
otherwise, the proceedings in personam, including the judgment
rendered, are void.87
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person is not necessary for
a court to validly try and decide actions in rem.88 Actions in rem are
"directed against the thing or property or status of a person and
seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world." 89
In actions in rem, the court trying the case must have jurisdiction over
the res, or the thing under litigation, to validly try and decide the
case. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either "by the seizure of
the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law; or as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and
made effective."90 In actions in rem, summons must still be served on
the defendant but only to satisfy due process requirements. 91
Unlike objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter which may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, objections to jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; otherwise, the objection to the court’s
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is deemed waived.
Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, "defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived."
In this case, Roldan sought to enforce a personal obligation on
Vivencio to vacate his property, restore to him the possession of his
property, and pay damages for the unauthorized use of his
property.92 Thus, Roldan’s action for recovery of possession is an
action in personam. As this court explained in Ang Lam v. Rosillosa
and Santiago,93 an action to recover the title to or possession of a
parcel of land "is an action in personam, for it binds a particular in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200, including the
individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing."94 judgment rendered, are void.
Also, in Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr.,95 this court said that "a judgment WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Respondent
directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision dated June 11, 2008 and
in personam. It is binding only against the parties and their order dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special Proceedings Case No.
successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of 07-200 are SET ASIDE without prejudice to the filing of respondent
the action."96 Roldan E. Mala of an action with the proper court.
This action being in personam, service of summons on Vivencio was SO ORDERED.
necessary for respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court to acquire
jurisdiction over Vivencio’s person.
However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, with Vivencio
not being a Muslim. Therefore, all the proceedings before
respondent Shari’a District Court, including the service of summons
on Vivencio, are void.
III
The Shari’a Appellate Court and the
Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic
law must now be organized to
effectively enforce the Muslim legal
system in the Philippines
We note that Vivencio filed directly with this court his petition for
certiorari of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision. Under
the judicial system in Republic Act No. 9054,97 the Shari’a Appellate
Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
of decisions of the Shari’a District Courts. He should have filed his
petition for certiorari before the Shari’a Appellate Court.
However, the Shari’a Appellate Court is yet to be
organized.1âwphi1 Thus, we call for the organization of the court
system created under Republic Act No. 9054 to effectively enforce
the Muslim legal system in our country. After all, the Muslim legal
system – a legal system complete with its own civil, criminal,
commercial, political, international, and religious laws98 – is part of
the law of the land,99 and Shari’a courts are part of the Philippine
judicial system.100
Shari’a Circuit Courts and Shari’a District Courts created under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines shall continue to
discharge their duties.101 All cases tried in Shari’a Circuit Courts shall
be appealable to Shari’a District Courts.[[102]
The Shari’a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054
shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the
Shari’a District Courts.103 It shall also exercise original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus,
and other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.104 The decisions of the Shari’a Appellate Court shall be
final and executory, without prejudice to the original and appellate
jurisdiction of this court.105
This court held in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong106 that "until such time
that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall have been organized,"107
decisions of the Shari’a District Court shall be appealable to the
Court of Appeals and "shall be referred to a Special Division to be
organized in any of the [Court of Appeals] stations preferably
composed of Muslim [Court of Appeals] Justices."108 However,
considering that To m a w i s was not yet promulgated when
Vivencio filed his petition for certiorari on August 6, 2009, we take
cognizance of Vivencio’s petition for certiorari in the exercise of our
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari.109
Moreover, priority should be given in organizing the Office of the
Jurisconsult in Islamic law. A Jurisconsult in Islamic law or "Mufti" is
an officer with authority to render legal opinions or "fatawa" 110 on
any questions relating to Muslim law.111 These legal opinions should
be based on recognized authorities112 and "must be rendered in
precise accordance with precedent."113 In the Philippines where only
Muslim personal laws are codified, a legal officer learned in the
Qur’an and Hadiths is necessary to assist this court as well as Shari’a
court judges in resolving disputes not involving Muslim personal laws.
All told, Shari’a District Courts have jurisdiction over a real action
only when the parties involved are Muslims. Respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
Roldan E. Mala’s action for recovery of possession considering that
Vivencio B. Villagracia is not a Muslim. Accordingly, the proceedings