1 SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.

MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY

and LUCIA BAGUIO (CASE DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April 15, 1968

FACTS:

The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00,
exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July
19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect
depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive
of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding the
appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse
decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which
jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court
along with the records of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons.
Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for
the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a
mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the
rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter
of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but
for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs.
McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is
not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of
Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a
party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking
it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591,
September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young
Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and
Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it
could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law
then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at
several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the
merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke
up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect
be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July
19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become
persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered by
the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety x x x

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

2 Chegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998

Per Curiam

Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-
old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said
crime.

He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions.

In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH
BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY
SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.

The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the
grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a
violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation of
legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate,
and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.

In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground. The Office of the Solicitor
General stated that this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and
has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment;
execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is
constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and
easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177
properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power
to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of
Corrections.

The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as
Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged
similarly with Echegaray’s arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass
constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation
of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.

Issue:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?

Held:
No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.

Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out
lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said
drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of
the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties
cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or
mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.

Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.

Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death;
but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It
implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection
render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons discussed, the
implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and
expertise of administrative officials.

Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time and
date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner
already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the
accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and
10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the
judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of
notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in
conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death
sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the
time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the
exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in
effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became
final and executor wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual
affairs.

Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in the
intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the
choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading
and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated.

First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise
only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or
ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection
allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence
whatsoever.

Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all
personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of
such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death
penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death
penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since
punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But
of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished."
The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of
punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.

What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for
the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime
and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final
judgment rendered by a competent court."

The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes". Included
with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on
December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.

3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map
out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the
death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the
lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient
to cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel
involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task."
The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The
question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out
the penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the
exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, canalized within banks that keep it
from overflowing.

However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that
could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of the
implementing rules which provides a manual for the execution procedure. It was supposed to be
confidential.

The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a vacuum. The Secretary
of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and approval. Being a
mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a
manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as
the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental
responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.

4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent
Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be
suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal
injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the
sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter
case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an
invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17
amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the
death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after
delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.

While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659,
suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year
after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as
an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no
longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve
after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based
discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of the
applicable law.

Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain
consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.

3 DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)

FACTS:

Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order,
the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.
Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day
thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court
issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22,
1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on
August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.
This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this
too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under
Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court,
petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received
the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period
for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to
appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998
order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the “final order”
appealable under the Rules.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglmentary period to
appeal, the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order
dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration.

(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.

HELD:
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as the final
order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner non-
suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed
an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day
period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing
his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for
having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within
15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable
under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final
 order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the
more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC again considered the order
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the
issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners’
view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final
order contemplated in the Rules.

(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall
also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make
the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15
days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which
states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from
another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of
“or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final order,” which we already determined to
refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal
period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this
case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh
period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another
opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While
we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite
time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
RTC’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”) denying his motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if
either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.

NOTE:
The “FRESH PERIOD RULE” do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of Judgments and Final Orders or
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is derived
from the Constitution. It is likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.

4 ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND
BIENVENIDO ARCAYOS
G.R. NO. 130866
SEPTEMBER 16, 1998

Facts: Respondent (Arcayos) was summarily dismissed by St. Martin Funeral Homes for
misappropriating funds worth Php 38,000 which was supposed to be taxes paid to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging that the dismissal was illegal, respondent filed a case against St.
Martin Funeral Homes in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Petitioner’s (St. Martin Funeral Homes) contention is that the respondent is not an employee due to the
lack of an employer-employee contract. In addition, respondent is not listed on St. Martin’s monthly
payroll.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, confirming that indeed, there was no employer-employee
relationship between the two and hence, there could be no illegal dismissal in such a situation.
The respondent appealed to the secretary of NLRC who set aside the decision and remanded the case
to the labor arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the NLRC. Now,
petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court – alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s appeal/petition for certiorari was properly filed in the Supreme
Court.

Held: No.

Historically, decisions from the NLRC were appealable to the Secretary of Labor, whose decisions are
then appealable to the Office of the President. However, the new rules do not anymore provide
provisions regarding appellate review for decisions rendered by the NLRC.

However in this case, the Supreme Court took it upon themselves to review such decisions from the
NLRC by virtue of their role under the check and balance system and the perceived intention of the
legislative body who enacted the new rules.

“It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on
questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of
judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial
rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of
powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.”

The petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the appeal or certiorari should have
been filed initially to the Court of Appeals – as consistent with the principle of hierarchy of courts. As
such, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.

5 G.R. No. 160719

CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari,[1] petitioner Emilio Gonzales La'O seeks to reverse the June 27,
2003[2] decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 62580, affirming in toto the
decision[3] of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and the CA's November 10, 2003
resolution[4] denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The factual antecedents follow.

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) is the registered owner of three parcels of land with
an area of around 821 square meters,[5] with a five-storey building and the other improvements
thereon.[6] The property is situated at the corner of Mabini and Arquiza streets in Ermita, Manila and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 108252.[7]

On June 22, 1978, the GSIS and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC), entered into a "lease-purchase" agreement (first contract). GSIS agreed to
transfer the property to the OGCC for a consideration of P1.5 million, payable in equal yearly
amortization-lease rentals of P100,000 for a period of 15 years. [8]

On December 22, 1980, petitioner offered to purchase the property. [9]

On May 10, 1982, GSIS and petitioner executed a "lease-purchase" agreement (second contract).
GSIS agreed to sell the same property to petitioner for P2,000,000, with a down payment of P200,000
and the balance payable within a period of 15 years at 12% interest per annum, compounded yearly.[10]

Under the second contract, GSIS obligated itself to construct for the OGCC a three-storey building on
the Manila Bay reclaimed area or to make available another property acceptable to the OGCC, to be
conveyed to the Republic under the same or mutually acceptable terms and conditions as those of the
first contract. In the meantime, the OGCC was allowed to continue occupying the second to the fifth
floors of the building at an annual rental of P100,000, payable to petitioner. [11] Furthermore, petitioner
was entitled to lease out the ground floor and collect the corresponding rentals. [12]
It appears that on April 11, 1982, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos approved the second contract by
scribbling on the right upper hand corner "11 April 1982 Approved Ferdinand E. Marcos."[13] On April
23, 1982, the GSIS Board of Trustees approved the same.[14]

In 1989, after the overthrow of Marcos (in 1986), respondents filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch
41 a complaint against petitioner alleging that:

xxx xxx xxx

9. Upon [petitioner's] behest and representations, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos directed
then GSIS General Manager Roman A. Cruz, Jr. to arrange the transfer of [the property] to
[petitioner].

10. On April 11, 1982, at a time when no action was yet taken by the GSIS Board of Trustees on the
transfer of [the property], then President Marcos indicated his approval of the second Lease-
Purchase Agreement which had been prepared pursuant to the instructions and orders of then
President Marcos who exercised total and absolute power[.]

11. By reason of such insidious machinations engineered by [petitioner] and upon instructions or
orders of then President Marcos, the Republic, through the OGCC, was forced, intimidated and
coerced to execute a waiver of its rights and interests to the property, and the Board of Trustees
of the GSIS was likewise constrained to approve [the] offer of [petitioner] and to execute [the
second Lease-Purchase Agreement] of May 10, 1982.

12. [The second Lease-Purchase Agreement] is burdensome and grossly disadvantageous to the
Republic, through the OGCC and the GSIS. Notwithstanding that [the property was] already
valued then at or about Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00), they were sold to [petitioner] for
only Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00), and, worse yet, payable on a fifteen-year installment
basis. Furthermore, the agreement obligated the GSIS to provide the Republic, through the
OGCC, an office and parking space equivalent to a three-storey office building at its new
building located at the Reclamation site in the Manila Bay Area or some other acquired
properties to house its offices, on or before June 1989. The value of this obligation of the GSIS
to the Republic, at the moment is worth at least Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00).

13. Since the terms of [the] second agreement are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government and to the GSIS and its members, the contract is contrary to law, being violative of
RA 3019, and the public officers responsible thereof are liable under Section 3(g) of [RA 3019].
Considering that the cause or consideration of the second contract is contrary to law, the same
is void (Art. 1352, Civil Code).

xxx xxx xxx

15. Also, the second agreement has not yet become effective. Number 18, Page 10 thereof provides
that the same shall become effective upon its approval by the President of the Republic of the
Philippines. This notwithstanding, neither the former President of the Philippines nor the
incumbent President has given his/her approval to the said agreement after its execution.

xxx xxx xxx

17. Upon execution of the second Lease-Purchase Agreement, [petitioner] took possession of one
(1) commercial space of the five-storey building of the subject premises and leased out the rest
of the ground floor thereof to other persons, thus, realizing a monthly rental income in the sum of
[P25,000], more or less, apart from the [P100.000] yearly rental he receives from the Republic,
through the OGCC.

18. Considering the circumstances attendant to the negotiation and execution of the second Lease-
Purchase Agreement, the same is null and void, and [petitioner] should be made to pay for the
office space he had been occupying thereunder and to account for and to return to the Republic,
though the OGCC, all moneys he unjustly received, including those received from such tenant-
lessees by way of rentals beginning May, 1982, with interest thereon at the legal rate until fully
paid.[15]
Respondents prayed for the nullification of the second contract and the forfeiture of all payments made
by petitioner to the GSIS in favor of the Republic, through the OGCC, which payments were to be
deemed payments by the Republic to the GSIS under the first contract. They also prayed for the
payment by petitioner to the Republic, through the OGCC, of: (a) a reasonable amount as rental for his
occupancy of one commercial space in the ground floor from May, 1982 until he vacated the same; (b)
all sums of money received as rentals from the tenant-lessees of the building at the rate of P25,000 per
month, plus legal interest, and (c) all sums of money received from the Republic, through the OGCC,
by way of rentals at the annual rate of P100,000 from May, 1982, with legal interest thereon until fully
paid. Respondents further prayed for the payment of actual damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, exemplary damages and costs of suit. [16]

On September 14, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision. It ruled in favor of respondents and
declared the May 10, 1982 lease-purchase agreement between GSIS and petitioner null and void. It
also ordered the forfeiture in favor of respondents of the purchase price paid by petitioner to GSIS as
well as the rentals received by petitioner.[17]

As stated earlier, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.[18]

Hence this petition.[19]

The issues raised by petitioner are actually anchored to one main issue: Was the second contract valid
as claimed by petitioner or null and void as decided by the courts below?

Before we delve into the merits, we shall first dispose of the question of jurisdiction. Petitioner asserts
that it is the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over this "ill-gotten wealth" case
because the complaint involved the annulment of a fraudulent conveyance of government property to a
Marcos crony and the recovery of such "ill-gotten wealth" by the government.[20] Furthermore, for failure
to consolidate this civil case with the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan [charging petitioner with
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019], this case should be considered abandoned.[21]

Petitioner's contention has no merit.

Petitioner argued and discussed this particular issue for the first time in his memorandum before this
Court.[22] While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings since it is conferred by law, it is nevertheless settled that a party may be barred from
raising it on the ground of estoppel.[23] After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is improper and too late for the losing party to question the jurisdiction
of the court.[24] A party who has invoked the jurisdiction of a court over a particular matter to secure
affirmative relief cannot be permitted to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape
liability.[25] Thus petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the courts below.

Now, the merits of the petition.

We agree with the conclusion of the CA[26] and the RTC that the second contract was null and void ab
initio.

The second contract was null and void ab initio for being in contravention of Section 3(e) and (g) of RA
3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act".[27] Both the trial and appellate
courts found that the second contract gave petitioner unwarranted benefits and was grossly
disadvantageous to the government.[28] Under Article 1409(7) of the Civil Code,[29] the contract was null
and void from the beginning.

We quote the discussion of the CA with approval:

The inquiry that must be settled is Whether or not the subject Agreement had been grossly
disadvantageous to the economic interests of the Republic.

xxx xxx xxx

x x x prior to the subject Agreement, there was a subsisting lease-purchase Agreement between GSIS
and the Republic, thru the OGCC, whereby the latter undertakes to pay the former the total amount of
[P1,500,000], payable within [15] years and the payment of the yearly amortization of [P100,000] shall
be made in equal quarterly installments of [P25,000]. Under the same Agreement, the Republic, thru
the OGCC shall manage and administer the leased premises as if it were the absolute owner thereof.
As of August 1982, the Republic, thru the OGCC had been collecting an average monthly rental of
[P10,000] from [various tenants of the premises].

The foregoing figures [leads] to the conclusion that the Republic, thru the OGCC, had been earning an
average annual rental income of [P120,000], an amount which is more than enough to cover its yearly
amortization-rental to the GSIS which is only [P100,000].

The economic benefit which the Republic, thru the OGCC, enjoys during the subsistence of the prior
Agreement is shown by its being able to liquidate its yearly amortization-rental from the rental income
of the subject property without any need for the Republic to appropriate additional funds for such
disbursement and further, by the transfer of absolute ownership of the subject property to the Republic,
thru the OGCC, at the termination of the [15] year lease-purchase Agreement.

In the subject Agreement with [petitioner], the consideration was increased to [P2,000,000] with a down
payment of [P200,000] and the balance payable within a period of [15] years at [12%] per annum
interest thereon, compounded yearly, with a yearly amortization of [P264,278.37], including principal
and interest. Under the same Agreement, the OGCC was likewise allowed to continue occupying its
offices from the second to the fifth floors of the premises, at the rental rate of [P100,000] annually.

The Agreement between [petitioner] and the GSIS which is the subject of the instant case had in fact
transferred the economic benefits which the Republic used to enjoy to [petitioner]. At the end of [15]
years, [petitioner] shall become the absolute owner of the subject property upon full payment of the [15]
yearly amortizations. At bottom, however, is the fact that, at least for the first [five] years of the
[Agreement], [petitioner] shall not be shelling out of his own pocket the yearly amortization since the
same shall be covered by the annual rental coming from the OGCC and the other tenants thereof. In
the meantime, the Republic, thru the OGCC, shall not only be appropriating additional funds for its
annual rental but worse, it was stripped of the opportunity to become the absolute owner of the subject
property.

The Court cannot also ignore the marked differences between the consideration of TWO MILLION
PESOS (P2,000,000.00) and the valuations of the subject property in 1982 as appraised by Mr. Narlito
Mari'o to the effect that the fair market value of the subject property from FIVE MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,575,000.00) as the minimum and SEVEN
MILLION EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P7,083,300.00) as the maximum
and Cuervo Appraisers, Inc. to the effect that the fair market value of the subject property is EIGHT
MILLION FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P8,005,500.00). While concededly the
foregoing property appraisal was conducted in 1989 and 1996 respectively, the Court is not unmindful
of the fact that the valuations were arrived at by taking into consideration all the parameters that, by
practice, could provide reasonable statistical indication of the value of the subject property in 1982.

On this respect, [respondents'] assertion that the subject Agreement is at the behest of [petitioner] and
is grossly disadvantageous to the Republic had become self-evident since it certainly bewilders the
mind why the GSIS would enter into an Agreement which smacks of disturbing economic implications,
i.e. the Republic would need to appropriate additional funds to pay for its rentals and abandon the
chance of becoming the owner of the subject property which it uses for governmental purposes and the
fact that the subject property was negotiated by the government via a losing proposition.

xxx xxx xxx

... [I]n view of GSIS' undertaking to construct another building for the OGCC ... what was revealed is
the fact that if only to accommodate the subject Agreement with the [petitioner], the GSIS had
undertaken to build another building for the OGCC or to make available for OGCC's use any other
acquired property and to grant the same terms and conditions as that of the previous agreement.
Necessarily so, the GSIS had imposed additional economic burden upon itself, at the expense of
government funds, in order to meet the terms and conditions of the subject Agreement when the same
was not necessary during the subsistence of the prior agreement.[30] (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing clearly shows that the second contract caused undue injury to the government, gave
petitioner unwarranted benefits and was grossly disadvantageous to the government. The disquisition
of the CA is sufficiently exhaustive and convincing considering that in civil cases like this one, the party
with the burden of proof (in this case, the respondents) needs only to establish its case by a
preponderance of evidence.[31]

The act of entering into the second contract was a corrupt practice and was therefore unlawful. It was a
contract expressly prohibited by RA 3019. As a result, it was null and void from the beginning under Art.
1409(7) of the Civil Code.[32]

As for the forfeiture of the payments made by petitioner, the latter did not raise any substantial
argument against it. He merely stated that "there should be no reason why the amounts paid by
petitioner should be forfeited in favor of the Republic" since the property was owned by GSIS and the
Republic, through the OGCC, was merely a lessee.

The RTC decision was clear. The amount forfeited was in favor of GSIS as owner of the property.

Having disposed of the main issue and ruling that the second contract was void ab initio for being
prohibited by law, a discussion of the other ancillary issues raised by petitioner is no longer necessary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the June 27, 2003 decision and November 10, 2003
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62580 AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

6 People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee VS Gregorio Perfecto, defendant-appellant

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee VS

Gregorio Perfecto, defendant-appellant

Facts:
On August 20 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate Fernando M. Guerrero discovered
that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the
investigation of oil companies had disappeared from the office. On Sept. 20, 1920, the newspaper LA
Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto published an article about it to the effect that, “the author or
author’s of the robbery of the records from the iron safe of the senate have, perhaps, but followed the
example of certain senators who secured their re-election through fraud and robbery.”
On Sept 25, 1920, the Senate adopted a resolution authorizing the President of Senate to
indorse to the Attorney-General, for his study and corresponding action to the case of the Newspaper
LA Nacion and its editor Gregorio Perfecto. The editorial in question alleged that it constituted a
violation of Art. 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in
the Municipal Courts and again in the Court of First Instance.

Issue:
Whether or not defendant guilty for violation of Art. 256 of Spanish Penal Code.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court acquitted Gregorio Perfecto holding that Art 256 of the SPC had been
abrogated being political in nature, upon advent of American sovereignty.
In public law, it is a principle that upon acquisition of territory, the previous political relations
of the ceded region is totally abrogated. “Political” being used to denominate the laws regulating the
relations sustained by the inhabitants.

Art 256 was enacted by the government of Spain to protect Spanish Officials who were
representative of the King. However, with the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new
theory of government was set-up in the Philippines. No longer is there a minister of crown or a person
in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath.
Said article is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character
and system of government. It was crowded out by implications as soon as the United States
established its authority.

7 Raymundo v CA (Civil Procedure)

G.R. No. 97805, September 02, 1992

NILO H. RAYMUNDO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTEENTH DIVISION, HON.
JUDGE, RTC, BR. 133, MAKATI, METRO MANILA AND GALERIA DE MAGALLANES ASSOCIATION,
INC., RESPONDENTS.

D EC I S I O N
NOCON, J.:

FACTS:
on July 5, 1989, the administrator of the Galleria de Magallanes Condominium discovered that
petitioner Nilo Raymundo, who was an owner/occupant of Unit AB-122 of said condominium, made an
unauthorized installation of glasses at the balcony of his unit in violation of Article IV, Section 3
paragraph (d) of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions of the Association, which states that:
“d. Nothing shall be done or placed in any unit or in the common areas which is beyond or will impair
the structural strength of the buildings or alter the original architecture, appearance and specifications
of the building, including the external facade thereof.”

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE ASSOCIATION

Thereafter, the administrator of said condominium reported said violation to the Board of Directors of
the private respondent Galleria de Magallanes Association, Inc. in a special meeting held on July
8,1989 and the former sent a letter dated July 12, 1989 to the petitioner demanding the latter to remove
the illegal and unauthorized installation of glasses at his unit.
Petitioner refused, consequently, private respondent filed a complaint for mandatory injunction against
petitioner on February 21, 1990 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133 in Civil Case No.
90-490.
on March 23, 1990, instead of an Answer, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss with the trial court on the
ground that said court has no jurisdiction over the present case since a complaint for mandatory
injunction is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

*Regional Trial Court - Makati: denied the Motion to Dismiss on account of lack of jurisdiction, citing
Section 21 of BP 129:
"Original jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; and
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls."
*RTC -Makati (Motion for reconsideration): denied.
*Court of Appeals: dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari and prohibition
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order and preliminary injunction to annul
and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 11, 1991.

ISSUE:
Which court has jurisdiction over the case considering that private respondent's sole pecuniary claim of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees in Civil Case No. 90-490 is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Metropolitan Trial Court as provided for under Section 33 of B.P. 129?

RULING:
1. The RTC has jurisdiction since Sec 19 and 21 of BP 129 applies:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;”
“Sec. 21. Original Jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions;”
Private respondent's complaint is an action to compel the petitioner to remove the illegal and
unauthorized installation of glasses at Unit AB-122 of the condominium which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation and falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

2. ATTORNEY'S FEES IS ONLY INCIDENTAL TO THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF ACTION -- removal of

the illegal & unauthorized installation of the glasses made by the petitioner. the question for resolution
is whether or not the petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and Declaration of
Restriction of the corporation, and if so, to remove the illegal and unauthorized installation of glasses at
Unit AB-122 of the Condominium. Clearly, the issue is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

In the instant case, the claim of attorney's fees by the private respondent in the amount of P10,000.00
is only incidental to its principal cause of action which is for the removal of the illegal and unauthorized
installation of the glasses made by the petitioner and therefore, said amount is not determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court.

3. THE COMPLAINT IS NOT MANDATORY INJUNCTION, IT IS MERELY A PROVISIONAL REMEDY.

Note should be taken, however, that the trial court had erroneously considered the complaint as one for
mandatory injunction, misled perhaps by the caption of the complaint.
A writ for mandatory injunction is a provisional remedy. It is provisional because it constitutes a
temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the main action and it is ancillary because it is a
mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action.

DISPOSITIVE:
Petition for certiorari & prohibition dismissed.

NOTE:
“In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts [now municipal trial courts] or in
the courts of first instance [now regional trial courts] would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance [now regional trial courts].”

8) 493 Phil. 616

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated July 23 1999 and
Resolution[2] dated November 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38453, entitled
"Standard Insurance Company, Inc., and Martina Gicale vs. PANTRANCO North Express, Inc., and
Alexander Buncan."

In the afternoon of October 28, 1984, Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his
mother Martina Gicale, respondent herein. It was then raining. While driving north bound along the
National Highway in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, a passenger bus, owned by Pantranco North Express,
Inc., petitioner, driven by Alexander Buncan, also a petitioner, was trailing behind. When the two
vehicles were negotiating a curve along the highway, the passenger bus overtook the jeepney. In so
doing, the passenger bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.

Crispin reported the incident to the Talavera Police Station and respondent Standard Insurance Co.,
Inc. (Standard), insurer of the jeepney. The total cost of the repair was P21,415.00, but respondent
Standard paid only P8,000.00. Martina Gicale shouldered the balance of P13,415.00.

Thereafter, Standard and Martina, respondents, demanded reimbursement from petitioners Pantranco
and its driver Alexander Buncan, but they refused. This prompted respondents to file with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Manila, a complaint for sum of money.

In their answer, both petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and averred that it is
the Metropolitan Trial Court, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.On June 5, 1992, the
trial court rendered a Decision[3] in favor of respondents Standard and Martina, thus:
"WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs, Standard Insurance Company and Martina Gicale, and against defendants Pantranco Bus
Company and Alexander Buncan, ordering the latter to pay as follows:

(1) to pay plaintiff Standard Insurance the amount of P8,000.00 with interest due thereon from
November 27, 1984 until fully paid;

(2) to pay plaintiff Martina Gicale the amount of P13,415.00 with interest due thereon from October
22, 1984 until fully paid;

(3) to pay the sum of P10,000.00 for attorney's fees;

(4) to pay the expenses of litigation and the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision [4] dated July 23, 1999, affirmed the trial court's ruling,
holding that:
"The appellants argue that appellee Gicale's claim of P13,415.00 and appellee insurance company's
claim of P8,000.00 individually fell under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal trial
court. This is not correct because under the Totality Rule provided for under Sec. 19, Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129, it is the sum of the two claims that determines the jurisdictional amount.

xxx

In the case at bench, the total of the two claims is definitely more than P20,000.00 which at the time of
the incident in question was the jurisdictional amount of the Regional Trial Court.

Appellants contend that there was a misjoinder of parties. Assuming that there was, under the Rules of
Court (Sec. 11, Rule 7) as well as under the Rules of Civil Procedure (ditto), the same does not affect
the jurisdiction of the court nor is it a ground to dismiss the complaint.

xxx

It does not need perspicacity in logic to see that appellees Gicale's and insurance company's individual
claims against appellees (sic) arose from the same vehicular accident on October 28, 1984 involving
appellant Pantranco's bus and appellee Gicale's jeepney. That being the case, there was a question of
fact common to all the parties: Whose fault or negligence caused the damage to the jeepney?

Appellants submit that they were denied their day in court because the case was deemed submitted for
decision "without even declaring defendants in default or to have waived the presentation of
evidence." This is incorrect. Of course, the court did not declare defendants in default because that is
done only when the defendant fails to tender an answer within the reglementary period. When the
lower court ordered that the case is deemed submitted for decision that meant that the defendants
were deemed to have waived their right to present evidence. If they failed to adduce their evidence,
they should blame nobody but themselves. They failed to be present during the scheduled hearing
for the reception of their evidence despite notice and without any motion or explanation. They did not
even file any motion for reconsideration of the order considering the case submitted for decision.

Finally, contrary to the assertion of the defendant-appellants, the evidence preponderantly established
their liability for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code."
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court in a Resolution
dated November 4, 1999.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the following assignments of error:
"I

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT OF THE
ACTION CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENTS' RESPECTIVE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
PETITIONERS DID NOT ARISE OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION NOR ARE THERE
QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACTS COMMON TO BOTH PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS.

II

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE TO RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT BASED

ON THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND LAW APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR, RESPONDENTS
HAVE NOT SHOWN ANY RIGHT TO THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR.

III

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE DEPRIVED OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS."

For their part, respondents contend that their individual claims arose out of the same vehicular accident
and involve a common question of fact and law. Hence, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioners insist that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case since the cause of action of each
respondent did not arise from the same transaction and that there are no common questions of law and
fact common to both parties. Section 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court,[5] provides:
"Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect
to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be
joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs
or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to
prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any
proceedings in which he may have no interest."
Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or
series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants;
and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and
venue.[6]

In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco's bus hitting the rear side of
the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There
being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of
action against petitioners.

To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is
necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in
the first.[7] Here, had respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence would
have been presented to sustain the same cause of action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the
complaint with the court below is in order. Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures
the convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.

Corollarily, Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the same Rules provides:

"Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise,
as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following
conditions:

xxx

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction."
The above provision presupposes that the different causes of action which are joined accrue in favor of
the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties is
involved.[8] The issue of whether respondents' claims shall be lumped together is determined by
paragraph (d) of the above provision. This paragraph embodies the "totality rule" as exemplified by
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129[9] which states, among others, that "where there are several claims or
causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of
the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions."

As previously stated, respondents' cause of action against petitioners arose out of the same
transaction. Thus, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims.

Respondent Standard's claim is P8,000.00, while that of respondent Martina Gicale is P13,415.00, or a
total of P21,415.00. Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that the RTC has "exclusive original
jurisdiction over all other cases, in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the
property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)." Clearly, it is the
RTC that has jurisdiction over the instant case. It bears emphasis that when the complaint was filed,
R.A. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
had not yet taken effect. It became effective on April 15, 1994.

II

The finding of the trial court, affirmed by the Appellate Court, that petitioners are negligent and thus
liable to respondents, is a factual finding which is binding upon us, a rule well-established in our
jurisprudence. It has been repeatedly held that the trial court's factual findings, when affirmed by the
Appellate Court, are conclusive and binding upon this Court, if they are not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and influence. Petitioners have not presented
sufficient ground to warrant a deviation from this rule. [10]

III

There is no merit in petitioners' contention that they were denied due process. Records show that
during the hearing, petitioner Pantranco's counsel filed two motions for resetting of trial which were
granted by the trial court. Subsequently, said counsel filed a notice to withdraw. After respondents had
presented their evidence, the trial court, upon petitioners' motion, reset the hearing to another date. On
this date, Pantranco failed to appear. Thus, the trial court warned Pantranco that should it fail to
appear during the next hearing, the case will be submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence
presented. Subsequently, Pantranco's new counsel manifested that his client is willing to settle the
case amicably and moved for another postponement. The trial court granted the motion. On the date
of the hearing, the new counsel manifested that Pantranco's employees are on strike and moved for
another postponement. On the next hearing, said counsel still failed to appear. Hence, the trial court
considered the case submitted for decision.

We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.[11]

Petitioner Pantranco filed an answer and participated during the trial and presentation of respondents'
evidence. It was apprised of the notices of hearing issued by the trial court. Indeed, it was afforded fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain its side of the controversy. Clearly, it was not denied of its right
to due process. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice and hearing which is not present
here.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 23 1999 and Resolution
dated November 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38453 are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

9 MARCIANA SERDONCILLO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FIDEL and EVELYN BENOLIRAO,

MELITON CARISIMA, and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:

This petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 14, 1994 in CA G.R.
CV No. 39251[1] which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, (Branch 108) in
Civil Case No. 7785, dated June 30, 1992 directing herein petitioner to demolish and remove all illegal
structures which she constructed in front of the subject lots, to vacate the said property and right of
way, and return possession thereof to the respondents.
The antecedent facts:
The subject premises was formerly part of the estate of H. V. Ongsiako, comprising of 1,806
square meters, more or less, located at the corner of Pilapil and N. Domingo Streets, Pasay City. The
legal heirs of H.V. Ongsiako organized the United Complex Realty and Trading Corporation
(UCRTC) which subdivided the property into fourteen (14) lots, Lots 555-A to 666-N.The subdivided
lots were then offered for sale with first priority to each of the tenants, including the private respondents
and petitioner.[2] Lot 666-H has an area of 248 square meters, consisting of two (2) parts. One part is
the residential portion with an area of 112 square meters purchased by private respondents-spouses
Benolirao[3] while the second part is the right of way for Lot 666-I and the aforesaid residential
portion.[4] Private respondent Carisima purchased Lot 666-I. Petitioner, who was occupying the western
end and front portions of the aforesaid lots declined the offer to purchase any of the lots offered for sale
by UCRTC.[5]
Petitioner continued paying rentals to H.V. Ongsiakos wife, Mrs. Rosario de Jesus. Thereafter, the
collection of rentals was stopped prompting petitioner to file on June 30, 1987, Civil Case No. 5456
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City for consignation of rentals against UCRTC, Rosario
de Jesus and the spouses Carisima. The consignation was granted by the trial court and was
eventually affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 on October 25,
1989.[6]
 On May 5, 1989, UCRTC executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of private respondents-spouses
Benolirao for Lot 666-H.[7] This sale was annotated at the back of UCRTCs title on Lot 666-H .[8]
On June 2, 1989, after unsuccessful oral and written demands were made upon petitioner, UCRTC
instituted an action against her for recovery of possession of the subject premises before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 docketed as Civil Case No 6652. [9] On July 15, 1990, the trial
court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint of UCRTC, stating in part, to wit:
It is clear, therefore, that plaintiff, not having been authorized in writing for the purpose, may not
validly bring an action to enforce a perceived easement of right of way pertaining to the owners
of Lots 666-H and 666-I or the Benolirao and Carisima families. while Benjamin Ongsiako
possessed the authority to institute the case (Exhibit G), plaintiff is not the real party in
interest. Furthermore, the situation obtaining does not call for the enforcement of an easement
of right of way. Defendant Serdoncillo is not the owner of and has never claimed ownership
over the portion of Lot 666-H on which her house is erected. A servitude is an encumbrance
imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different
owner (Article 613, New Civil Code). In the present case, the ejectment of defendant
Serdoncillo from the portion of Lot 666-H occupied by the house at the instance of the proper
party (Renato Bolinaraos family ) would remove the obstruction.
xxxxxxxxx
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the complaint against the defendant
Marciana Serdoncillo, as well as defendants counterclaim, is dismissed for lack of
merit. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."[10]
UCRTC did not appeal the aforesaid decision of the Regional Trial Court, hence, the same became
final.
On November 20, 1989, Serdoncillo instituted Civil Case No. 7749 for the Exercise of Preferential
Rights of First Refusal against UCRTC and private respondents-spouses Fidel and Evelyn Benolirao
praying for the annulment of sale of a portion of lot 666-H sold to the Benolirao spouses on the ground
that said transfer or conveyance is illegal. She claimed that she has the preferred right to buy the said
property and that the same was not offered to her under the same terms and conditions, hence, it is
null and void. UCRTC and private respondents prevailed and this case was dismissed. On appeal to
the Court of Appeals, the same was dismissed on July 9, 1992.[11]
On November 20, 1990, private respondents made their final demand on petitioner reiterating their
previous demands to vacate the property.[12] On December 13, 1990, private respondents filed their
complaint for recovery of possession of the subject premises against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108, docketed as Civil Case No. 7785, which complaint alleges these
material facts:
5. That plaintiffs, being then registered owners of the properties designated as lot 666-H and
666-I, are likewise the owners/grantees of the right of way granted by United Complex Realty
and Trading Corporation which was correspondingly annotated in its title (Annex B-3) under
Entry No. 205154/T-172291 of the Register of Deeds of Pasay City;
6. That since 1982 the defendant has built and constructed a residence and pig pen on the
plaintiffs right of way as well as on the front portions of the latters properties leaving them
virtually obstructed with no ingress or egress from the main road;
7. That verbal and written demands made upon the defendant by the plaintiffs to remove and
demolish her structures had been ignored, the last of which was on November 20, 1990, xerox
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex C and taken as an integral part hereof, but despite
such demands, the defendant failed and refused and still fails and refuses to remove and
vacate her illegal structures on the portion of the properties as well as on the right of way of
plaintiffs;
8. That plaintiffs in compliance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law lodged a complaint
before the Barangay Captain, Barangay 84, Zone 10 of Pasay City, which certified filing of the
same in court, xerox copy of said certification is hereto attached as Annex D and taken as
integral part hereof;
9. That due to the unjustified refusal of the defendant, the plaintiffs are suffering the
unnecessary inconvenience of the absence of decent and sufficient ingress and egress on
their properties, and will continue to suffer the same unless the illegal structures are finally
demolished and/or removed by the defendants;[13]
 Petitioner, in her Answer, put up the defense that she is the legitimate tenant of said lots in
question since 1956, pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder, thus:
13. That Lot 666-H and Lot 666-I mentioned in the complaint are formerly portions of a big
track(sic) of land consisting of 1,806 square meters then owned by H.V. Ongsiako;
14. That since 1956 and before the 1,806 square meters of lot owned by H.V. Ongsiako was
subdivided into fourteen (14) lots in 1982, defendant is (sic) already a legitimate tenant and
occupant family of around 400 square meters of the 1,806 square meters of the said land then
owned by H.V. Ongsiako by erecting her residential house thereon at the agreed monthly
rental of P15.00 and increased to P100.00;
"15. That upon the death of H. V. Ongsiako his heirs continued collecting the monthly rental of
the premises from the defendants;
"16. That the heirs of H. V. Ongsiako formed a corporation known as UNITED COMPLEX
REALTY AND TRADING CORPORATION and the big parcel of land consisting of 1,806
square meters was transferred to the said corporation and subdivided in 1982 into fourteen
(14) lots, two (2) of which lots are the very same lots leased by the defendant from H.V.
Ongsiako and later from his heirs and then from United Complex Realty and Trading
Corporation as alleged in the preceding pars. 13, 14, and 15;[14]
The issues having been joined, trial on the merits ensued. On June 30, 1992, the trial court
rendered its decision in favor of private respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW of the foregoing, and finding preponderance of evidence in plaintiffs
favor, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"1) Ordering the defendant to demolish and remove all illegal structures she
constructed on the front portions of the subject lots and on the right of way of the
plaintiffs;
"2) Ordering the defendant to vacate the property and right of way and return
possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
"3) Ordering the defendant to pay the cost of suit.
As to the damages (actual and moral) no award is given. In the absence of proof of fraud and
bad faith by defendants, the latter are(sic) not liable for damages (Escritor Jr. vs. IAC, 155
SCRA 577).
"Actual and compensatory damages require substantial proof. In the absence of malice and
bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded (Capco vs. Macasaet, 189 SCRA 561).
"As to the attorneys fees, each party should shoulder his/her expenses.

SO ORDERED."[15]

Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that: 1)
the lower court should have dismissed the complaint of private respondents considering that based on
the letter of demand dated November 20, 1990, the action filed should have been unlawful detainer and
not an action for recovery of possession; 2) the action filed by private respondents is barred by res
judicata considering that the present action is identical with that of Civil Case No. 6652; 3) the lower
court erred in not dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action with respect to enforcement of
right of way vis a vis defendant; and 4) the lower court erred in ordering that defendants vacate the
properties in question since the lease of defendants thereon was still in existence and had not yet been
terminated.[16]
On July 14, 1994, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision sustaining the findings of
the trial court and dismissed the appeal of petitioner, stating in part as follows:
The issue as to the proper action has been resolved by the respondent court, to wit:
`The defense that what should have been filed is an ejectment case and not recovery
of possession, is not also correct. The filing of this case for recovery of possession,
instead of an ejectment case, is not altogether unjustified. The Benoliraos and
Carisima became the owners as early as May, 1989. Verbal and written demands had
been ignored. There is an immediate need for plaintiffs to use the right of way, which
up to the present time is obstructed,. At most, what surfaced is a technicality which
should be abandoned.'
 "A plain reading of the complaint shows that plaintiff-appellees cause of action is for recovery
of possession of their property which was encroached upon by defendant-appellant.[17]
A motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision filed by petitioner on August 8, 1994 [18] was
denied by the respondent on September 23, 1994.[19]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner ascribes one single error committed by the respondent court, to wit:
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS (Sp.
Fifteenth Division) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION IN DECIDING AS AN
ACCION PUBLICIANA AN EJECTMENT OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE (THE
JURISDICTION OF WHICH CLEARLY PERTAINS TO THE INFERIOR COURT), A CASE
BASICALLY INVOLVING AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY.
Petitioner asserts that the respondent court erred in sustaining the trial courts finding that the
complaint filed by private respondents for recovery of possession of the subject premises is an accion
publiciana notwithstanding the fact that the action was filed within one (1) year from
demand. Petitioner contends that private respondents should have filed an action for unlawful detainer
and not an action for recovery of possession against petitioner. Consequently, the trial court is without
jurisdiction to hear and determine Civil Case No. 7785. In support of her contention, petitioner cited the
cases of Bernabe vs. Luna[20] and Medina vs. Court of Appeals,[21] which she states is strikingly
similar to the facts of this case. Consequently, the rulings of this Court in these two cases are squarely
applicable and controlling in the case at bar.
Private respondents, however, aver that they were merely successors-in-interest of UCRTC and
therefore step into the shoes of the latter. They claim that the demand to vacate required by law should
at the very least be reckoned from June 2, 1989, the date of the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No.
6652 considering that their demands are simply a reiteration of UCRTCs demands against
petitioner. Private respondents further contend that the allegations in the complaint determine the
jurisdiction of the court. Thus, the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 specifically alleged that private
respondents are the owners of lots 666-I and 666-H as evidenced by transfer certificates of title and
prayed for recovery of possession of a portionthereof including its right of way illegally and unlawfully
possessed by petitioner.
Petitioners position is without merit.
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction
of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to
dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendant.[22] What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief
sought are the ones to be consulted.[23] Accordingly, the issues in the instant case can only be properly
resolved by an examination and evaluation of the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785.[24]
In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on
the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring
the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to
parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. [25] In short, the jurisdictional facts must
appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry
or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.[26]
In the case of Javier vs. Veridiano II[27] this Court held that the doctrine in Emilia v.
Bado,[28] decided more than twenty-five years ago, is still good law. It preserved the age-old remedies
available under existing laws and jurisprudence to recover possession of real property, namely:
(1) accion interdictal, which is the summary action for either forcible entry or detentacion, where the
defendants possession of the property is illegal ab initio; or for unlawful detainer or desahucio, where
the defendants possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to
possess, both of which must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in
case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan court; (2) accion publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery
of the right to possess and which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, (3) accion reivindicatoria or accion de
reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus possidendi brought in the
proper regional trial court.
 Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges
ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different from accion
interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess
without claim of title. In Banayos vs. Susana Realty, Inc.,[29] this Court held that:
We have consistently held that a complaint for forcible entry, as distinguished from that of
unlawful detainer, in order to vest jurisdiction upon the inferior court, must allege plaintiffs prior
physical possession of the property, as well as the fact that he was deprived of such
possession by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely:
force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth, for if the dispossession did not take place by
any of these means, the courts of first instance, not the municipal courts, have jurisdiction.
xxxxxxxxx
The aforesaid Rule 70 does not, however, cover all of the cases of dispossession of
lands. Thus, whenever the owner is dispossessed by any other means than those mentioned
he may maintain his action in the Court of First Instance, and it is not necessary for him to wait
until the expiration of twelve months before commencing an action to be repossessed or
declared to be owner of the land. Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over actions to
recover possession of real property illegally detained, together with rents due and damages,
even though one (1) year has not expired from the beginning of such illegal detention,
provided the question of ownership of such property is also involved. In other words, if the
party illegally dispossessed desires to raise the question of illegal dispossession as well as
that of the ownership over the property, he may commence such action in the Court of First
Instance immediately or at any time after such illegal dispossession. If he decides to raise the
question of illegal dispossession only, and the action is filed more than one (1) year after such
deprivation or withholding of possession, then the Court of First Instance will have original
jurisdiction over the case. The former is an accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery
of ownership as well as possession, while the latter refers to an accion publiciana, which is the
recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary proceeding in the Court
of First Instance.
A reading of the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 undisputably show that plaintiffs
(private respondents herein) clearly set up title to themselves as being the absolute owner of the
disputed premises by virtue of their transfer certificates of title and pray that petitioner Serdoncillo be
ejected therefrom. There is nothing in the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 alleging any of the means of
dispossession that would constitute forcible entry under Section (1) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, nor
is there any assertion of defendants possession which was originally lawful but ceased to be so upon
the expiration of the right to possess. It does not characterize petitioners alleged entry into the land,
that is, whether the same was legal or illegal nor the manner in which petitioner was able to construct
the house and the pig pens thereon. The complaint merely avers that a portion of the lot owned by
private respondents and its right of way have been occupied by petitioner and that she should
vacate. The action therefore is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially
involves a dispute relative to the ownership of 4.1 square meters of land allegedly encroached upon by
petitioner and its adjoining right of way. Indeed, the Ocular Inspection Report of the Branch Clerk of
Court, states that:
"xxx (T)he right of way hit directly the defendant Serdoncillos property consisting of a two-
storey residential house made of wood and GI sheets and occupying the entire width of the
rear portion of the right of way. A coconut tree stands on the middle of the road, at the back of
which is a shanty made of rotten G.I. sheets around it which is used as pigpens and place of
washing clothes extended from defendants house. To gain access to plaintiffs property, the
group turned right and passed between an aratiris tree and cemented firewall owned by Mr.
Belarmino making only one person at a time to pass. This passageway has only a width of 0.5
meter which is being used by the defendant and her members of the family aside from the
plaintiffs.
xxx Two (2) monuments of the lot boundary of the plaintiffs property are existing, but the rest
are nowhere to be found. According to Mrs. Benolirao, they are located within the premises of
the defendants house. At the back of Benolirao is a private property gutted by fire.
xxx Upon request, the group was granted permission by the relatives of the defendant to
inspect the place. The group further noticed that defendants improvements were even
encroaching on the plaintiffs lot by approximately 4.1 meters, more or less. The house of the
defendant is facing the plaintiffs property; there is a small chicken house and there is also a
dog house standing near it.[30]
 It is noted that at the time of the filing of said complaint, Civil Case No. 7749, an action for
annulment of the sale between UCRTC and private respondents Benolirao of Lot 666-H initiated by
petitioner was likewise pending in another court. This case puts in issue the validity of private
respondents acquisition of the subject lots and ultimately their ownership of Lot 666-H.
Thus, what is noticeable in the complaint is that private respondents definitely gave
petitioner notice of their claim of exclusive and absolute ownership, including their right to possess
which is an elemental attribute of ownership.[31] It is immaterial whether or not private respondents
instituted their complaint one month from date of last demand or a year thereafter. What is of
paramount importance is that the allegations in the complaint are of the nature of either an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.
Petitioners reliance on the Bernabe and Medina cases, which she claims to be squarely applicable
under the circumstances herein, is entirely misplaced. While it is true that in these two cases the
complaints were filed before the one-year period had expired from date of last demand, the allegations
in the complaint failed to state material facts which are indicative of a case of either an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Thus, the Court in Bernabe stated that:
"In their complaint, plaintiffs (petitioners herein) allege that they are the owners of a parcel of
land with an area of 199.4 square meters more or less, located in Tondo, Manila, that
defendant (private respondent herein) constructed a house on said lot without plaintiffs
permission; that on November 14, 1980, plaintiffs thru counsel made a written demand for the
removal of said house as well as for the recovery of damages for the reasonable use and
occupation thereof; and that defendant refused and failed to comply despite repeated
demands.
xxxxxxxxx
We have noted that while petitioners allege in their complaint that they are the owners of the
lot on which the house of the private respondent is constructed, their attached TCT shows that
the lot is still in the name of Fejosera Investment Incorporated. Private respondent and said
company entered into a contract of lease in l950 for the use and occupation of said
lot. Petitioners allegedly bought the lot in question in 1973, and they must have been fully
aware of the occupancy of the private respondent of the premises in question. Yet, they did not
take any action to remove the house of the private respondent or to inform the respondent that
they had become the new owners of the lot in question. It is clear therefore that the lease was
allowed to continue.
xxxxxxxxx
"Consequently, the possession of private respondent over the lot in question became illegal
only on November 14, 1980, when the formal demand to pay and vacate the premises was
sent to him.[32]
The allegations in the complaint clearly show that plaintiffs were already the owners of the
property when defendant constructed a house on the disputed lot without their permission.That despite
formal demand defendant failed to vacate and surrender possession of the property to them. Indeed,
the averments in plaintiffs complaint present jurisdictional facts which do not illustrate plaintiffs action
as either an action publiciana or accion reivindicatoria but that of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs complaint, pertinent portion of which is
quoted hereunder:
It is clear on the face of the complaint that at the time of the filing of this case on February 19,
1981, the defendant was in possession, as tenant, of the premises. When plaintiffs counsel,
therefore sent a written notice on November 4, 1980 requiring defendant to vacate the
premises when this action was brought, the one (1) year period after the unlawful deprivation
or withholding of possession has not yet set in. It is clear that this is an ejectment case within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Manila.
SO ORDERED.[33]
We likewise find the Medina case, relied upon by petitioner, to be inappropriate. The facts distinctly
show that the complaint filed by the owners of the property before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 47, was for unlawful detainer. It was the action resorted to by the plaintiffs after advising
the defendant (the lessee of the premises in question) that a member of the family, Dr. Igama, urgently
needed the house and after repeated demands to vacate made on the lessee proved to be
unsuccessful. All these incidents, from notification to the filing of the complaint dated May 16, 1985,
transpired within a period of six (6) months. Indeed, the factual background of this case is a classic
illustration of an action for unlawful detainer. Verily, the facts are therefore diametrically opposite to the
facts of the case at bar.
Petitioner has therefore no legal basis to insist that the present case is similar to the Bernabe and
Medina cases and from which this Court should base its findings and conclusions. The doctrine laid
down in Tenorio vs. Gomba is still controlling. In that case the Court ruled that courts of first instance
have jurisdiction over all actions involving possession of land except forcible entry and illegal detainer,
and therefore the lower court has jurisdiction over the action alleged in the appellants complaint
because it is neither of illegal detainer nor of forcible entry.[34]
Petitioner maintains that her leasehold right as a tenant of the subject premises had been settled in
Civil Case No. 5456, an action for consignation, which she won before the Metropolitan Trial Court and
affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109. Said court ruled that the
latter is a tenant of the site or premises in question and that she cannot be ejected therefrom, even on
the assumption that her house and pig pen are allegedly standing on a right of way. She claims that
pursuant to Section 49 (b) (now Section 47) Rule 39, Rules of Court, the issue of tenancy in said case
is now conclusive between her and private respondents with respect to the subject premises in
question.
Petitioners contention is devoid of merit.
Section 49 (now Section 47), provides that:
Section 49. Effects of Judgments.- the effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court
or judge of the Philippines having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as
follows:
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged
or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive
between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity;
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that when the right or fact has been judicially
determined, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.[35]
Thus, for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the following requisites must
concur: (l) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and, (4) there
must be between the first and second actions; (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of subject matter; and
(c) identity of cause of action.[36]
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first three (3) requirements and the identity of the
subject matter. The only issues remaining are whether as between Civil Case No. 5456 and Civil Case
No. 7785, there is identity of parties and of causes of action in Civil Case No. 5456 to bar the institution
of Civil Case No. 7785.
There is identity of parties. The record shows that the parties in Civil Case No. 5456 are petitioner
as plaintiff while the defendants were UCRTC, the spouses Meliton and Efremia Carisima and Rosario
de Jesus. Private respondents-spouses Fidel and Evelyn Benolirao acquired lot 666-H from UCRTC
and are therefore the successors-in-interest of UCRTC by title subsequent to the commencement and
termination of the first action. As such, private respondents merely stepped into the shoes of UCRTC
and acquired whatever capacity and title the former had over the same property or subject matter of the
action. Indeed, there is actual, if not substantial, identity of parties between the two actions. [37]
There is however, no identity of causes of action in both cases. In the case of Garcia vs. Court of
Appeals,[38] this Court held that the test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action
but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of
action. Petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 5456 is an action for consignation of rentals while Civil
Case No. 7785 is an action for recovery of possession.
In other words, the issue in Civil Case No. 5456 is whether or not consignation of rentals is proper
under the circumstances obtaining in that case. Private respondents action for recovery of possession
requires them to present evidence of their claim or title to the subject premises and their right to
possess the same from petitioner. Stated conversely, the evidence in Civil Case No. 5456 is entirely
different to that in Civil Case No. 7785. Thus, the decision in Civil Case No. 5456 does not in any way
affect nor bar Civil Case No. 7785.
Indeed, the Court noted that the parties had been at odds since 1987 when petitioner initiated Civil
Case No. 5456, and then Civil Case No. 7749. Private respondents predecessor UCRTC likewise
initiated Civil Case No. 6652 and the present case under appeal, Civil Case No. 7785, all because of
the use of a right of way and an encroachment of only 4.1 meters of the subject premises. At some
point in time, all these squabbles must end. Thus, the respondent court stated that:
It is true that it is the purpose and intention of the law that courts should decide all questions
submitted to them as truth and justice require, and that it is greatly to be desired that all
judgments should be so decided; but controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of
sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of the
courts determining controversies submitted to them should become final at some definite time
fixed by law.[39]
In passing, We reiterate the time-honored doctrine that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court, and the Court will not normally disturb such factual
findings unless the findings of the court are palpably unsupported by the evidence or unless the
judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts. [40] In this case, We find the said decision to be
totally supported by the evidence on record.
Based on the foregoing premises, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised in the
petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV NO. 39251 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

10 PACITA DAVID-CHAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES,
INC., respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In pleading for an easement of right of way, petitioner correctly cites the requirements of law but
fails to provide factual support to show her entitlement thereto. Since findings of facts by the Court of
Appeals affirming those of the trial court are binding on the Supreme Court, the petition must thus
fail. Even petitioners plea for equity becomes unavailing because resort to equity is possible only in the
absence, and never in contravention, of statutory law.
The petition assails the Decision[1] of respondent Court[2] promulgated on April 30, 1992. The
Decision of respondent Court affirmed the decision dated July 26, 1989, of the Regional Trial Court of
San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. 8049. The dispositive portion of the affirmed
decision of the trial court reads:[3]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, and finding plaintiffs petition to be without merit,
the same is, as it is hereby ordered dismissed with costs against plaintiff.

On defendants (Singian) counterclaim, the same is, as it is hereby dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.

The Facts

On September 29, 1987, petitioner filed with the trial court an amended petition with prayer for
preliminary prohibitory injunction, seeking to stop private respondent from fencing its property and
depriving her of access to the highway. Petitioner alleged that her property, consisting of around 635
square meters, situated in Del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga and covered by TCT No. 57596-R, was
delineated on its northern and western sides by various business establishments. Adjoining her
property along its southern boundary was the land of the Pineda family, while along the east-
northeastern boundary, and lying between her property and the MacArthur Highway, was another lot
with an area of approximately 161 square meters owned by private respondent. In short, petitioners lot
was almost completely surrounded by other immovables and cut off from the highway. Her only access
to the highway was a very small opening measuring two feet four inches wide through the
aforementioned property of private respondent. Petitioner believed she was entitled to a wider
compulsory easement of right of way through the said property of private respondent. The prospective
subservient estate was a portion of a bigger lot consisting of 7,239 square meters and covered by TCT
No. 163033-R, which was formerly owned by the Singian Brothers Corporation (hereinafter referred to
as Singian Brothers) and was sold to private respondent without the knowledge and consent of
petitioner, who was thereby allegedly prevented from exercising her right of pre-emption or right of
redemption. Petitioner alleged that private respondent was about to complete the construction of its
concrete fence on the said lot which would result in depriving petitioner of the only available right of
way, and that therefore, she was constrained to petition the trial court to enjoin private respondent from
fencing said lot. The petition likewise prayed that judgment be rendered ordering private respondent to
sell to petitioner the subject lot and to pay the damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
Private respondent denied the allegations of petitioner. The parents and relatives of petitioner were
never tenants or lessees of the former owner, Singian Brothers; rather, they were found to be illegally
occupying the property as ruled by the MTC-San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 1, in Civil Case No.
4865. The dispositive portion of the judgment of ejectment reads:[4]

WHEREFORE, defendants Eduardo Mangune, Pacita David-Chan and Primo David including their
agents/representatives and, any and all persons given access by them to the disputed premises
claiming any right under them, are hereby ordered to immediately vacate the area in question, remove
all the improvements that they have constructed thereon; to pay the plaintiff corporation jointly and
severally the sum of P2,000.00 pesos - as Attorneys fees and the costs of this suit.

The case against defendants Loida Makabali and Helen Hermidia is hereby dismissed as the action
has become moot.

The defendants counterclaim, Pacita David-Chan and Eduardo Mangune is hereby dismissed for lack
of merit.

Hence the former owners were not obliged to inform petitioner of the sale. The land sold by the
Singian Brothers was free from all liens and encumbrances as stated in the Deed of Absolute
Sale. Private respondent was not selling the 161 square-meter lot because it needed the
property. Also, petitioner had another access to the highway without passing through the lot in
question.

The Singian Brothers were impleaded in the trial court. In their answer, they alleged that they did not
authorize anyone to receive rentals for the disputed lot. As their affirmative and special defenses,
Defendant Singian Brothers averred that the complaint of petitioner stated no cause of action because,
being apparent and discontinuous, the right of way cannot be acquired by prescription. Petitioner was
not a tenant of the Singian Brothers; therefore she was not entitled to a right of pre-emption or right of
redemption. Finally, petitioner had another access to the National Highway which, however, she closed
during the pendency of the case at the trial court when she extended the construction of her fence. [5]

The Issues

Failing to obtain relief at both the trial and respondent courts, petitioner now submits the following
issues for consideration of this Court:
I. In its reaffirmation of the lower courts decision, the Court of Appeals missed to temper with
human compassion of the Art. 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code of the Phil. which
requires the presence of four requisites for a compulsory easement of way. [6]
II. (The) Court (of Appeals) had used in its decision all technical and legal niceties to favor
respondents, violating time-honored and deeply-rooted Filipino values.[7]
III. With due respect, the Court (of Appeals) erred in deciding this case in favor of the
respondent despite the facts existing at the background.[8]
IV. The Court (of Appeals) erred in stating that petitioner had an outlet measuring two (2) feet
and four (4) inches to the national highway without passing through respondent's
property as per the commissioners report.[9]
In her Memorandum[10] dated February 26, 1993, petitioner alleges only one issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a legal easement of right of way over that portion of the property
of respondent Rabbit?

On the other hand, private respondent raises two issues:[11]

1. Is the petitioner entitled to an easement of right of way from the private respondents?

2. Should she be granted her desire for a right of way by way of `pakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-
tao?

After deliberating on the various submissions of the parties, the Court holds that the issues can be
condensed into two, as follows:

(1) Is petitioner legally entitled to a right of way through private respondents property?

(2) In any event, is she entitled to such easement through the recognition and application of the Filipino
values of pakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-tao?

The Courts Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit.

First Issue: Requisites of an Easement of Right of Way

Citing Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code,[12] petitioner submits that the owner of an estate may
claim a compulsory right of way only after he (or she) has established the existence of four requisites,
namely: (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) proper indemnity is paid; (3) the isolation is not due to the proprietors own acts; and (4)
the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. [13]
While petitioner may be correct in her theoretical reading of Articles 649 and 650, she nevertheless
failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy their requirements. Evaluating her evidence,
respondent Court ruled that petitioner is not without adequate outlet to a public highway as follows: [14]

1. Let it be stressed that it was plaintiff who built a concrete fence on the southern boundary of her
property to separate it from the property of the Pineda family. Worse, during the pendency of the case,
she closed the 28-inch clearance which she could use as a means to reach the National Highway
without passing through the property of defendant. If plaintiff wants a bigger opening, then she can
always destroy a portion of the concrete fence which she erected and pass through the property of the
Pineda family which, as shown on the attached sketch on the Commissioners Report, has an open
space on the southern boundary of plaintiffs land.

2. Plaintiff maintains that once the Pineda family (fences) off their lot, plaintiff has no more way to the
National Highway.

Plaintiffs apprehensions are without basis. The Pineda family could no longer fence off their property
because plaintiff (had) already constructed a fence to separate the two properties. And even granting
that the Pineda family would eventually fence off their land, then plaintiff could ask for an easement of
right of way from the Pineda family.

The appellate court likewise found that petitioner failed to satisfy the third requirement because she
caused her own isolation by closing her access through the Pineda property, thus: [15]

1. Worthy of note is the fact that it was plaintiff who built a fence to separate her property from that of
the Pineda family on the southern boundary. And she even closed the small opening causing her
property to be isolated and losing one access to the National Highway. Plaintiff thus failed to meet the
third requisite for the grant of an easement of right of way. As held by the Hon. Supreme Court in the
case of Francisco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 527, 534-535:
The evidence is, therefore, persuasively to the effect that the private respondent had been granted an
adequate access to the public highway (Parada Road) through the adjacent estate of Epifania Dila
even as he was trying to negotiate a satisfactory agreement with petitioner Francisco for another
passageway through the latters property. If at the time he filed suit against the petitioner, such access
(through the property of Epifania Dila) could no longer be used, it was because he himself had closed it
off by erecting a stone wall on his lot at the point where the passageway began for no reason to which
the record can attest except to demonstrate the isolation of his property alleged in his complaint. But
the law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his
property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. The
third of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not himself procured the isolation of
his property had not been met-indeed the respondent had actually brought about the contrary condition
and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will not do to assert that use of the passageway
through Lot 860-B was difficult or inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and that it was wide
enough to be traversable by even a truck, and also because it has been held that mere inconvenience
attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify a claim for a similar easement in an
alternative location. (Underscoring ours)

The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner failed to prove she made a valid tender of the proper
indemnity, to wit:[16]

2. The second requisite - that there was payment of the proper indemnity was likewise not met by the
plaintiff. Plaintiffs complaint contained no averment that demand for the easement of right of way had
been made after payment of the proper indemnity. There was no showing that plaintiff ever made a
tender of payment of the proper indemnity for the right of way. As the lower court said, The fact that
plaintiff prays that defendant Rabbit be ordered to sell to her the disputed premises hardly satisfies the
requisite regarding the payment of the proper indemnity.

The questions of whether (1) petitioner has another adequate outlet to the public highway, or (2)
she caused her own isolation, or (3) she made, in fact, a tender of the proper indemnity are all issues of
facts which this Court has no authority to rule upon.[17] The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.[18]
It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial court are
binding upon this Court.[19] While there are exceptions to this rule,[20] petitioner has not convinced us
that this case falls under one of them.

Second Issue: Application of Traditional Filipino Values

Perhaps sensing the inadequacy of her legal arguments, petitioner who claims to be an ordinary
housewife (with) x x x meager resources pleads that those who have less in life should have more in
law and that the Court should apply the Filipino values of pakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-tao in
resolving the case.
Such appeal of petitioner is based on equity which has been aptly described as justice outside
legality. However, equity is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
rules of procedure.[21] As found by respondent Court, petitioner is not legally entitled to a right of way on
the property of private respondent. Thus, such equitable arguments cannot prevail over the legal
findings.
There are rigorous standards to be complied with by owners of the dominant estate before they
may be granted with easement of right of way. These standards must be strictly complied with because
easement is a burden on the property of another. Before such inconvenience may be imposed by the
Court, applicants must prove that they deserve judicial intervention on the basis of law, and certainly
not when their isolation is caused by their own acts. In the latter case, they decide their detachment
and must bear the consequences of such choice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April 30,
1992, of the respondent Court is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

11 QUESADA
vs
.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE G.R. No. 150325 August 31, 2006 500 SCRA 454
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.:
Facts:

Respondent Teruel filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor in Mandaluyong City an affidavit-
complaint against petitioner, Camacho, Jr., and Corgado with the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2)
and (3) of the Revised Penal Code, which in turn was opposed by petitioner who filed a counter-
affidavit thereto. Thereafter, an Information for estafa was filed with the RTC upon the recommendation
of Assistant City Prosecutor Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. after the latter’s issuance of a Resolution finding
probable cause. In the meantime, petitioner filed with the Department of Justice a Petition for Review
challenging the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, but was however, dismissed. Pending the
criminal case at the RTC, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari alleging that
the Secretary of Justice, in dismissing his Petition for Review, acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the present petition directly with the Supreme Court constitutes an utter
violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not
be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the
so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious
and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to
actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where
the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s
procurement must be presented. The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-
crowding of the Court’s docket