Chapter 3

The 1622 Campaign:

The Battle of Wimpfen

After White Mountain, the Imperials assumed that, aside from a little mopping
up, the war was overo Unfortunately, they had entirely misunderstood the
character of Elector Friedrich, would-be king and champion of the Protestant
cause. Throughout his inglorious career, this gentleman was to prove remarkably
impervious to reality; now he obstinately refused to sue for peace. The emperor
was both amazed by his defiance and uninterested in his demands-he
considered the elector a fool.
Nevertheless, things seemed to be going welI enough as 1621 began. A few
garrisons stilI held out in Bohemia) but they were contained by smalI forces. The
Upper Palatinate surrendered almost without a fight. The bulk of the Imperial
army was ordered to Hungary to deal with Bethlen Gabor, while TilIy and his
League troops marched west to finish off the Lower Palatinate.
It was at this point that things began to sour. Mansfeld, now Friedrich's
commander-in-chief, had abandoned his original bases of Pilsen and the Upper
Palatinate to fall back on the Lower, looting, burning, and recruiting/ as he
passed. By the time he reached the Rhine, his refugee army had more than
doubled. Furtherrnore, Duke Christian of Brunswick, Administrator of the
Protestant-held bishopric of Halberstadt, had declared for Friedrich and was
raising an army of his own. TilIy decided to divide his forces, dispatching a
corps under Anholt to deal with Brunswick, while he combined with the Spanish
forces already in the Lower Palatinate to crush Mansfeld. Disappointingly, when
they finalIy confronted the notorious merc, the Spanish leader, Cordoba, refused
to risk an attack. 1621 ended with alI three armies separating into winter
quarters.

1622 STRA TEGY

The war resumed in March 1622, with a preliminary phase of reconnaissance-
84 Battles of the Thirty Years War

looting-skirmishing. Tilly seized an initial advantage by winning the minor

action of Weingarterr' (Apr 4), but things quickly heated up as both sides
concentrated and consolidated their positions. On April 25, the Margrave of
Baden-Durlach declared for Friedrich-and he had raised yet another army
during the winter. On the same day, Mansfeld challenged TilIy's possession of
the central juncture Wiesloch-Bruchsal.
The basic premises of pre-Gustavan strategy are sufficiently unfamiliar as to
render activities incomprehensible; even historians (who should know better)
too often condemning apparent incompetence, overcaution, and cowardice.
Actually, these strange maneuvers feIl within the constraints of then-
contemporary strategy, which was very different from that of Frederick the
Great, Napoleon, or even Marlborough.
B~tween Ravenna (1512) and Rocroi (1643), the Spanish tercios enjoyed a
ruE of victory unequalled since the Roman legion, over such opponents as the
French, Germans, Italians, Dutch, and Turks. The response of Maurice of
Nassau was to avoid battles as such. The Dutch relied on maneuver,
entrenchments, sieges, and small actions to weaken the Spanish through attrition
and make incremental gains. This was a perfect counter to traditional Hapsburg
strategy, which involved massing an overwhelming superiority and going for a
quick win. Maurice himself retained a sense of balance; he would risk battle
when and if he could load the dice sufficiently in his own favor. But his less-
gifted imitators tended to err on the side of caution. By 1610, both Catholic and
Protestant orthodoxy preached victory by siege and skirmish. TilIy was
considered a maverick because he believed that in a comparatively wide-open
theater (Germany, as opposed to Flanders), decisive results could be achieved
from a single victory, and that such battles would be worth the risk, provided
that a necessary superiority in quality or numbers was available. To so me extent,
he was reverting to the old, pre-Maurice, approach. To those seeped in Gustavus
or Frederick, this seems axiomatic, even cautious, but to 1622 thinkers like
Cordoba, Baden, or Mansfeld, it was recklessly radical.
Logistical considerations equally constrained strategic freedom. These armies
relied almost exclusively on foraging; therefore concentration was a strain on
both men and resources. It was common for armies as small as 15,000 to divide
into smaller, more easily supported corps. This was done even during active
campaigning, as long as immediate battle was not foreseen. The idea was to
move and forage divided, but concentrate to fight.
This worked as well as it did because of the difficulty involved in bringing a
reluctant opponent to battle. In Napoleon's day, such weak detachments would
have been overrun and destroyed in detail by a concentrated army. But in 1620,
there was an inverse relationship between size and speed. An alert and cautious
enemy could be forced to battle only if he were surprised, cornered, or made a
mistake. If the detachments were reasonably close together, they could
concentrate quickly.
th
These armies did not maintain permanent mobile cavalry screens as in the 19
century, but relied on static outposts surrounding the main body. A company or
two of horse or dragoons would be quartered in some conveniently sited village;
they would have both scouting and foraging capacity. More aggressive
reconnaissance was obtained by large groups of 1000 or more horse4 detached
The 1622 Campaign 85

on independent missions. Small patrols, often led by senior officers, were used
when in close contact with the enemy. Even then, it was more cornmon to use
whole companies or a regiment.' Pillagers and Croats often operated in smaJl
parties, but their reconnaissance value was limited. To obtain reliable
information, it was necessary to send a senior officer or the commander himself.
Skirmishes, foraging parties, and outpost raids were important parts of the
strategy of attrition, and quite small actions could change the course of a
campaign. The moral impact was often disproportionate to the military. These
minor actions emphasized musketeers, arkebusiers, and dragoons, in contrast to
pitched battles, where cuirassiers and pikemen were dominant. •

THE ACTION OF MINGOLSHEIM, APRIL 27,1622

On April 26, Tilly deployed to block Mansfeld's advance, choosing a very
favorable position on the lower slopes of the Weinberg, near Wiesloch. He had a
paper strength of almost 20,000, but his real numbers did not exceed 15,000.
Mansfeld was moving north from Bruchsal; he had 16 infantry and 10 cavalry
regiments, for a pay strength of 16,000 foot and 7000 horse, and a real one of
about 18,000.6 However, this edge in numbers was counterbalanced by TiJly's
superior quality. Mansfeld judged the Catholic position too strong to assault, so
he decided to fall back to Bruchsal. To his frustration, Tilly could not interfere
without abandoning his own defenses. He suspected that Mansfeld was merely
trying to lure him out with a feigned retreat. In the open, the Protestant numbers
might pro ve decisive. He had already sent word of the enemy thrust to Cordoba,
but the Spaniard did not appear.
TilIy was crediting Mansfeld with more aggressiveness than he possessed.
Actually, he had already decided to link up with Baden before risking a serious
engagement. He retired southward via the bridge at Mingolsheim, which proved
a bottleneck. At dawn on the rr: half of his army was still north of the bridge.
It rained heavily that morning, swelling the stream in question, the Kleinbach,
enough to make fording dangerous. On the plus side, the wet converted the soft
ground around Mingolsheim village into an impenetrable marsh, protecting the
Mansfelders from flank attack. Mansfeld relied on his rear-guard under Col
Obentraut to protect the crossing point. This consisted of the Neu-English
Infantry Regiment and the Sax-Weirnar and Obentraut cavalry regiments. Some
detached musketeers held the bridge itself and patrolled the stream.
Tilly deterrnined to try and cut off the rearguard. Between his speed and the
Mingolsheim bottleneck, he was able to catch them still crossing. Tilly engaged
Obentraut with a superior body of horse supported by Schmidt Infantry
Regiment; they were driven back with 45 killed. The rearmost portion of Sax-
Weimar plus the tail of the Protestant baggage train were caught on the north
bank, and were overrun by Eynatten Cavalry Regiment with the loss of 25 horse.
Mansfeld, seeing that the rearguard was beaten, directed Bund Infantry
Regiment to hold the south end of the bridge with their pikes, while two
demicannon opened fire across the stream. Tilly pulled back out of range and
directed that his own guns be brought up.
At this point, Mansfeld realized that he'd made a mistake. The rearguard was
battered but safe, however the demicannons were so heavy and slow that he'd
never get them safely away, given the rain. He was faced with an unpalatable
86 Battles of the Thirty Years War

choice: fight or abandon the guns.

After so me delay, Tilly had brought up four light guns (two falconets and two
"scharfedinls"). Mansfeld had set the village afire and a southwest wind sent the
bilJowing smoke into Tilly's face. Between the smoke and the rain, Tilly couldn't
make out what Mansfeld was doing, but he seemed to have abandoned the
bridge. Tilly followed him across, his pursuit led by five cavalry regiments in
two large squadrons, then three battalions, the Schmidt, Mortaigne, and
Furstenberg infantry regiments, some 2000 horse and 5000 foot in all.
Unseen, Mansfeld had prepared an ambush. He had sent his baggage train off
to Bruchsal, while forming his troops for action. About half of thern, 48 cavalry
companies and seven infantry regiments, were drawn up for battle; so me of the
others were held in reserve, while the rest accompanied the wagons. As Schmidt
and the Catholic horse emerged from the burning village, he fired on them, a
single can non shot.
It was, in fact, a signal. Instantly, Mansfeld's 1sI echelon of cavalry, the Leib,
Obentraut, and Linistow regiments, swept forward to strike the surprised
Leaguers. After a brief resistance, the lead squadron was broken and driven back
on the second, routing it in turno Harried by the victorious Protestants, they fled
around and through Schmidt and into the village ruins. Finally, they overran the
two battalions at the bridge, throwing them into disorder.
The worst was averted only by the heroism of Schmidt Infantry Regiment.
Despite heavy casualties, it held together, repelling the surrounding
Mansfelders, and made its way back to the stream. Mansfeld decided not to
escalate the action, merely sending musketeers to support the original three
cavalry regiments. Tilly tried, without much success, to reorganize the mob at
the bridge. Schmidt had drawn off most of the pursuit, but the rest assaulted the
helpless mass, Tilly himself being wounded. The bridge being blocked, the
Catholic reserves could only watch helplessly from the north bank. The four
guns were lost. The entrapped Catholics suddenly discovered that it was possible
to ford the Kleinbach. They escaped to the safety of the other side, while
Schmidt resecured the bridge. The Protestant cavalry broke off the pursuit. Tilly
lost almost 2000 men, half of them horse. Mansfeld captured four guns, eight
flags, and Col Herzelles. This unexpected success gave him the initiative; Tilly
abandoned Wiesloch and retired eastward.

TOWIMPFEN
Tilly immediately sent word to Cardaba, "Come at once, or all is lostl'"
Meanwhile, Mansfeld and Baden were able to unite unhindered (May 1), for a
total of 25-30,000 men. They attempted to prevent Cardaba from joining Tilly,
but did not succeed (May 3). The Catholics, 18,000 strong, assumed a defensive
position at the Wimpfen bridgehead. After a probe, Mansfeld-as usual-
determined that they were too strong to attack. His next move is difficult for us
to understand: he hoped to force the two Catholic armies to separate by dividing
his own force. He, with the larger body, would draw off Cordoba by threatening
the Spanish outpost at Ladenburg. Baden would remain at Wimpfen, fixing Tilly
in place. The plan was the more appealing in that the two Protestant
commanders had disliked each other on sight and each desired to win on his
own. Mansfeld marched off on the 4th.
The 1622 Campaign 87

This strategy seerned as suicidal to Tilly as to uso Baden had prepared a strong
defense, but Tilly believed it could be carried. Once Mansfeld was well away-
the Spanish had feared it was all a feint to draw thern out of their works-
Cordoba was persuaded to agree to an irnrnediate joint attack.

THE COMMANDERS
Don Gonsalvo Fernandez de Cordoba y Figueroa, Duke of Sesa (1585-1635)
was a descendent of the farnous Gonsalvo de Cordoba ("El Gran Capitan") and a
veteran soldier in his own right. Cornpetent, experienced, but unenterprising, he
had been Spinola's second-in-cornrnand in Flanders, and had been appointed to
hold the Palatinate in 1621. Seerningly, 1622 was Cordoba's year of battles:
Wirnpfen against Baden, Hochst against Brunswick, and Fleurus against
Mansfeld and Brunswick. Cordoba later helped lose the war for Spain by
misrnanaging the Mantua War (1628) and the relief of Maastricht (1632).
Georg Friedrich, Margrave of Baden-Durlach (1573-1630) was an irnportant
Lutheran prince and Protestant zealot. Lacking experience, he was a well-read
military theorist and had been chief of cavalry for the Protestant Union. After
the Union folded, he raised his own arrny to support the cause. Later, he ser ved
as general for King Christian of Denrnark, and was court-rnartialed for losing
the action of Heiligenhafen. Having lost his throne, his arrny, and his reputation,
he retired frorn the war.
There were four noteworthy officers in Baden's arrny, Duke Wilhelrn Sax-
Weimar, his brother Bernhard, the Rhinegrave, and Duke Magnus of
Wurternberg. The Sax-Weirnars both later becarne generals in the Swedish
army-they rnust be distinguished frorn their brothers Johann Ernst (at White
Mountain) and Friedrich (a Mansfelder colonel). Wilhelrn acted as Baden's
deputy, but was not a true second-in-cornrnand. The Sax-Weirnars were to
remain prorninent well into the 1630s, rising to arrny cornrnand. Magnus, the
younger brother of the duke of Wurternberg, had two regirnents. The Rhinegrave
was later to serve as general for Denrnark and Sweden.

THEARMIES
Spanish-League Arrny-Tilly & Cordoba (see Appendix C)
Right Wing-Cordoba: 2100 cavalry, 4000 infantry, 4 guns
UNIT DATE COY STR NOTES:
Nap1esTercio 1567 16 1400 Spanish vets; Cordoba IR
Emden IR 1620 8-10 1400 North German
BauerIR 1620 8 1200 German
BerenguerCava1ry 22 2100 Mixed; 10 sqd
Artillery: 2 heavy & 2 light guns

Left Wing- Tilly: 2900 cavalry, 9000 infantry, 6 guns

SchmidtIR 1620 10 1800 8avarian
MortaigneIR 1620 10 1400
HairnhausenIR 1620 8 1800 8avarian
Furstenberg8n 1621 10 1200 Combined w Her1iberg
Buningen8n 1621 7 1800 Combined batta1ion
Hohenzollern8n 1622 6 1000 High German
HerzellesCR 1620 6 300 LtCo1 Schonberg; Wurzburg
88 Battles of the Thirty Years War

Eynatten KUR 1620 5 250 Cologne

Maestro CR 1620 13 1200 Mixed; 2 sqd
Alt-Herbersdorf 1622 7 350 Montigni; 4 KUR+3 ARK coy
Neu-Herbersdorf 1622 6 600 LtCol Held; ARK
Croats 1622 2 200
Artillery: 4 heavy & 2 light guns
Total: 13,000 infantry in 9 bns; 5000 cavalry in 16 sqds; 10 guns = 18,000

The Catholic infantry was of good quality. Nearly all of Tilly's foot had seen
action=-the League army was already assuming a veteran character. Naples
Tercio was one of the famous Spanish elite. Emden and Bauer were relatively
inexperienced.
The cavalry was not up lo the same standard as the foot. There were 100 many
recruits in Tilly's regiments. Similarly, of Cordoba's horse, only four companies
of 22 were prewar regulars. Tilly's six large squadrons were formed from solid
regirnents, but Cordoba's ten smaller ones were ad hoc formations, assembled
from independent companies.
The Spanish received the place of honor on the right, as they ser ved a king,
whereas TilIy's master was merely a duke.

Baden Army-Margrave of Baden (see Appendix D)

UNIT DATE COY STR NOTES:
Leibgarde Coy 1622 1 200 Foot
Baden IR 1622 10 2000 LtCol Hunoltstein
Wurtemberg IR 1622 8 1600 Magnus was with the CR
W. Sax-Weimar IR 1622 10 2000 LtCol Uslar
Goldstein IR 1622 10 2000
He1mstadtIR 1622 8-10 1600 White Regiment; 2 bns
Leib CR 1622 2 200 Lt Stein
Rhinegrave CR 1622 7 700 Rhinegrave & LtCol Yeldenz
Wurtemberg CR 1622 5 500 Duke Magnus
W. Sax-Weimar CR 1622 4 400 Bernhard a captain
Goldstein CR 1622 3 300
Streiff CR 1622 10 900 LtCol Streiff (Mansfelder)
Lorraine Coys 1622 4 300+ Mansfelders under Streiff
Artillery (Col Bocklin): 2 can non, 6 demicannon, 2 falcons & 70 battlewagons
Total: 9400 infantry in 6 bns; 3300 cavalry in 8 sqds; 80 guns =12,700

Baden's brand-new army was of good material,-well paid, well-equipped, and

fairly well-trained, with a cadre of experienced men. Unfortunately, the units
themselves were only a couple of months old and not yet fully cohesive, also
they were, aside from Streiffs Mansfelders, untried in action. To this extent,
they resembled Tilly's levy two years before, but Tilly had had ten months lo
whip them into shape; Baden had had two.
Baden had organized his men according to the latest Dutch theories, with 200
man companies and two shot to each pike. Each regiment was a single battalion
of 1400, 140 wide by 10 deep, equally divided between pike and shot (the White
Infantry Regiment formed two smaller battalions). The 3000 extra musketeers
were detached as skirmishers and forlorn hopes. The cavalry fought in
squadrons of 3-600, 6 deep. Baden relied heavily on the 70 "battlewagons" of
The 1622 Campaign 89

his own invention. These were not simple carts, but heavy, shielded wagons
defended by projecting spears. Each mounted a short, mortar-like "grape-
shooter" to be\ch smallshot. Drawing from Dutch, Hussite, and East European
practice, Baden theorized that unsupported muskets protected by his
battlewagons could beat off an attacking tercio, attriting the enemy by fire, while
the spears and grapeshot would disorder them as they closed. The idea was not
necessarily bad but the execution was faulty. The wagon s were awkward, and
the "gun," being inconveniently placed above the spears on the outside, would
be difficult to reload.

THE BATTLE OF WIMPFEN, MAY 6, 1622

Although outnumbered by 3-2, Baden was pleased when he saw Tilly and
Cordoba deploying against him late on May 5. Confident in his defenses, he
expected to repel them, even hoped to inflict a serious defeat-thus proving to
the "experienced" Mansfeld who was the real genius!
Baden's chosen position was one with both strengths and weaknesses. His
battlewagons, supplemented by carts and baggage wagons, were deployed in a
shallow semicircle not quite two kilometers long, the left resting on the village
of Biberach, the right on open ground. To the west, around Biberach, his left
flank was covered by a spur of light woods. About 250 meters to his right lay
the village of Ober-Eisesheim, and east of it, the marshy bank of the Neckar
River. His rear was covered by the equally marshy Bollinger Bach, a deep, but
fordable stream. By deploying so close to the bach, Baden conceded the high
ground further north to Tilly. Also, the cramped, close in position would hamper
Baden's own movements, particularly those of the cavalry. Nevertheless, it was a
strong, defensible line, and Cordoba may be excused any doubts.
The 5th ended with minor cavalry skirmishing and a few cannon shots frorn
Baden. Both sides used the night to complete their dispositions, the troops
encamping in place. At dawn, each line could view the other.
Baden's defense was, of course, based on the wagonburg. About 2000 of the
detached musketeers were deployed behind the wagons, plus the six
demicannons and two fa\cons. The rest of the shot were posted on the left, in the
wood and down to Biberach and the Bollinger. Five of the six battalions were
drawn up 50 meters behind the wagons. The 2nd battalion of Helmstadt was
placed as a flankguard in Ober-Eisesheim. Finally, he posted one or two cavalry
squadrons on each flank, holding the bulk of the horse in reserve.
The defense of the wagonburg rested with the musketeers and guns. The main
infantry line lay behind, protected by the wagons, but ready to counterattack if
the Catholics broke into the defenses.
TilIy and Cordoba deployed on the hill crowned by the Dornet Wald "two
musket shots'' (at least 500 meters) from the wagonburg. Tilly placed four
battalions in his 1SI echelon and two in the 2nd• Cordoba put his foot in a single
line, Emden Infantry Regiment closest to Tilly, Bauer next, and the Spaniards On
the far right. His ten squadrons were on his flank and behind the foot. Tilly's
horse went in three echelons of two squadrons each, Maestro in front, then
Eynatten and Schonberg, with Herbersdorf in reserve. The six heavy guns were
positioned on the highest ground above and behind the infantry, while the four
light guns were in front as close support.
90 Battles of the Thirty Years War

Tilly was in no hurry to begin the battle, but waited until after morning Mass
and the men's breakfast. The day promised to be a scorcher, and he wished to
husband his men. The first two or three hours fighting was desultory, with
Spanish arkebusiers, Croats, and individual companies of Maestro Cavalry
Regiment skirmishing with similar parties of Baden's. The main punctuation was
the "duel" between the six heavy guns on each side. Baden had expected to
outshoot the Catholics, but discovered that his superior defenses were offset by
the higher ground. Both sides directed their fire against the infantry, heavy balls
tearing bloody rows through the deep formations.
Around 11:00 A.M., Tilly was ready to test the defenses more directIy,
advancing his 1st echelon of foot. Cordoba and the 2nd echelon followed in
support. The Catholics cIosed to within 100 meters, where they were greeted by
such a storm of musketry and gunfire, that they hastily retired; the mounted
skirmishers acting as a screen for the retreat. By noon, they were back where
they'd started.
While Tilly was reorganizing his battalions, Cordoba received word that
Mansfeld had suddenly returned and was approaching the west flank. He
immediately pulled back his arkebusiers and dispatched Scherrich's squadron to
investigate. Fortunately, the dust cloud the Spanish had spotted was not
Mansfeld at all; the mercenary was at Ladenburg, so me 30 miles away. It was
becoming cIear-not only to Cordoba, but to Baden's people as well-that
Mansfeld would not be joining them that day.
By this time (12:30), it was proving every bit as hot and dry as Tilly had
anticipated. He decided to "break for lunch," pulling his men back into the shady
Dornet Wald to issue food and drink. Baden's men, kept in formation, could only
watch enviously; the long (over 600 meters) shots from their demicannon did
not bother the Catholics resting in the woods. Around 1:00, Baden decided to
give his musketeers a similar breather, and pulled the flankers holding the
woods back inside the wagonburg. This proved a mistake; not only were his men
discouraged by this unexpected "retreat," the cunning Cordoba at once detached
so me of his own shot to secure the wood.
Baden impatiently directed his musketeers to retake the wood, while he
personally undertook the maneuver that he thought would decide the battIe. The
morning's skirmishing had given him an unfavorable opinion of the League
cavalry-Maestro was an ill-assorted unit with too many recruits. So, he had
decided to mass his own horse for an all-out strike on his right. Unseen by the
enemy-the movement was screened by the wagons and the Ober-Eisesheim
outpost-he concentrated six squadrons east of the wagonburg, leaving only six
companies under LtCol Veldenz to safeguard the left. Rhinegrave, Sax-Weimar,
and Goldstein formed the 1st echelon, Streiff and the Lorrainers the 2nd•
Meanwhile, his infantry tried to cIear the left. The Spanish had not only
occupied the woods, but had pressed forward to the marsh and brush
surrounding the bach. Thus they were turning Baden's flank and even
threatening his rear. The Protestants attempted to dislodge them with frontal
assaults, the musketeers being supported by elements of Sax-Weimar Infantry
Regiment. But the Spanish veterans, proud to call themselves the best foot in the
world, beat off two attacks. Finally, the Badeners split off half of Sax-Weirnar,
and this battalion managed to drive them from the broken ground.
 4

The 1622 Campaign 91

By 2:00, Tilly and Cordoba had reformed their infantry for a second assault
on the wagonburg. Just as they finished, fate intervened. Not later than 2: 15,
Baden's charge began.
Baden had succeeded in concentrating his 2700 horse and funneling it
unnoticed between the end of the wagonburg and Ober-Eisesheirn. His tightly
packed ranks (250 wide, 6 deef) drove to the attack "Iike a wall," Baden leading
the 1st echelon, Streiff the 2" . They swept aside the skirmishers and took the
Maestro Regiment unawares; it was broken and driven back on Eynatten and
Schonberg. In moments, the wing had dissolved; some of the League horse fled
the battlefield altogether. The victors pressed their advantage, Streiffs echelon
spreading laterally to the left. The League infantry, their protecting horse
stripped away, found themselves suddenly assaulted to front and flank. They fell
back in disorder, individual s melting away from their units.
As earlier at Mingolsheim, Schmidt Infantry Regiment rose to the occasion.
Quickly forming into a crown," the regiment became a bulwark behind which
the army could regroup.
The League battalions had more or less halted when their supporting cavalry
decamped, but Cordoba's did not. Despite repeated artillery discharges, the
Spanish foot carne up to pointblank range of the wagonburg muskets. They were
swept by punishing fire. Under this pressure, the two German regiments broke9
Cordoba's own Spaniards, the legendary Naples Tercio, lived up to their
reputation, forming a bulwark on the right to match Schmidt on the left.
By this time, Baden's cavalry had become rather spread out, extending the
length of the field. Scattered parties fought uncoordinated skirmishes. The
leftmost of the League batteries (two heavy guns) was overrun. On the Catholic
right, Cordoba, grasping the opportunity, swung into action with most of his
cuirassiers. Himself at their head, he led them against Streiffs two westmost
squadrons. The results were disappointing; his Walloons refused contact, and
Cordoba, to his utter dismay, found himself charging the enemy singlehanded!
Miraculously, he passed through their ranks unharrned'" and was able to make it
safely back to his own side. The Protestants pro ved equally unaggressive, and
contented themselves with so me casual pistol fire.
. By this time, Baden's charge had petered out, his disorganized horse strewn
from Cordoba's front to the Neckar. Isolated parties skirmished with similar
groups of Spanish, Eynatten, or Schonberg cavalry. Others harassed the tercio or
Schmidt. The captured guns could not be turned against Tilly because they had
no infantry; Baden's foot were still back in the wagonburg.
On the other hand, the Catholics were in such disarray that one more thrust
might have finished them. If the five Badener battalions had attacked out of the
wagonburg the Catholics could have broken. Unfortunately, all the senior
commanders, Sax-Weimar, Streiff, Baden himself, were caught up in the
confusion on the right. No orders were issued, and the subordinate officers,
entranced by the seeming invulnerability of their defenses, failed to seize the
opportunity. In any case, the solid wall of wagons was as much an obstacle to
their advance as to TilIy's. The only support the horse received were a few
musketeers from Ober-Eisesheim. The courageous stand s of Schmidt and Naples
had saved the battle. Under their protection, Tilly, Schonberg, Cordoba, and
Bauer were able to reform the disordered units. By 3:30, the chance had passed.
92 Battles ofthe Thirty Years War

Judging his moment to a nicety, Tilly launched his counterpush. Spearheaded

by the fresh Neu-Herbersdorf Cavalry Regiment, the reorganized League
cavalry pressed back Baden, while some of Cordoba's squadrons did the same to
Streiff. The rest of the Spanish horse, plus the Bauer and Emden Infantry fell on
Veldenz and the musketeers on the west flank. Baden's exhausted troopers, 2500
to Tilly's 3000+, gave ground slowly-it was less a grand cavalry meIee than an
aggregation of skirmishes-over the next hour and a half (4:00-5:30). But they
gave. Schmidt retook the two lost guns, while the rest of the League battalions,
Buningen at the lead, moved against the wagonburg. Despite the courage of their
officers, the Protestant horse had lost heart. Young Duke Magnus fell, pierced
by two pistol shots. The Lorrainers broke, followed by Streiff Cavalry
Regiment, then the rest.
Now only the wagonburg remained. Tilly directed some of his horse to harry
Baden, othersto isolate Ober-Eisesheim, while the rest pinned the right flank of
the Baden line. Cordoba did the same on the left. The Catholic foot, Spanish and
League, fell on the face of the wagonburg. They moved in unison, a giant pair of
nutcrackers. For a third time, Protestant fire ripped into the so lid tercios. But this
time, the outcome was different. A fluke shot from one of the Catholic guns
landed in a powder wagon foolishly close to the front. The wagon exploded,
detonating two others too close together. The resultant blast made a massive
hole right in the middle of the wagonburg defenses 11and unnerved the infantry
behind. The Catholics, just reaching the wagons, stormed into them with
redoubled fury.12 The Buningen battalion led the attack, capturing two field guns
(7:00).
The Goldstein and Helmstadt regiments on the two ends formed hedgehogs
against the enveloping cavalry. Nevertheless, the infantry were hardly fresh
reserves. They had been standing in formation for almost twelve hours without
food or break in the grueling heat and dust. They had watched horrified as their
cavalry abandoned thern, as the impregnable wagonburg was blasted apart.l ' In
any event, the moment Tilly turned their own artillery against them, they simply
dissolved. Goldstein Infantry Regiment and the Helmstadt Battalion continued
to resist while the others fled, but 2000 foot were no match for 12,000. By 8:00,
the last holdouts were dead or taken. Fortunately for them, the Badeners found
the Bollinger fordable; otherwise they would have been annihilated. At 9:00, the
four companies of Helmstadt Regiment trapped in Ober-Eisesheim surrendered.
The battle was over.
As at White Mountain, Tilly's daring had been vindicated. As many as 2000
Protestants were dead and 1100 captured, plus ten ensigns, ten guns, three
mortars, 70 battlewagons, all the baggage, and 100,000 talers in cash-Baden's
warchest. Tilly and Cordoba lost 600 dead and 1200 wounded, mostly in the
assaults on the wagonburg. Cordoba had had a few unpleasant moments, but
forgot his doubts in the glory of victory, and pro ved receptive to Tilly's
subsequent plans.
Although some two-thirds of Baden's people managed to rejoin Mansfeld,
they were a pathetic, demoralized lot-none more so than Baden himself-and
quickly melted away; Mansfeld succeeded in salvaging no more than 3000.
The 1622 Campaign 93

LATER OPERA TIONS

Having overrun Ladenburg, Mansfeld next threatened the main Spanish base
at Oppenheim. However, upon the approach of Tilly and Cordoba, he hastily
decamped for AIsace. There Bishop Leopold of Strassburg was leading a small
Imperial force against Mansfelder outposts; he, in turn, fled from Mansfeld.
To the north, a new confrontation was brewing. Anholt had undertaken his
mission in Westphalia with characteristic competence and caution. From mid-
1621, he had skirmished with the young Christian of Brunswick, inflicted
several shrewd blows, and in general hampered his operations, but overall, he
failed. Brunswick successfully raised a sizable army, looted much of the area,
and amassed a warchest of over a million talers. Now, he thought, he was ready
to rescue Friedrich. On May 29, he set off to join Mansfeld in the Palatinate.
Tilly was confronted with an interesting problem in strategy as his principal
enemies moved to juncture. His response was energetic. First, he combined with
Anholt's corps, which had outraced Brunswick south, then he turned on the
northward moving Mansfeld. The mercenary suffered a sharp check in the action
of Lorsch (June 10). Rebuffed, Mansfeld retired to Mannheim. Tilly next added
the Spanish corps of Cordoba and Carraciolo.14 He had now concentrated some
30,000 men. Brunswick lay passive at Hochst, one of the chief crossings of the
Main River. He had expected to meet Mansfeld there, and was baffled by the
other's failure to appear. Brunswick wasted three days waiting. On the fourth,
Tilly arrived instead.
Brunswick was outnumbered roughly 2_1,15 moreover, he had his back to the
river, with no easy way to refuse batt1e. In general, Duke Christian was an
enthusiastic rather than thoughtfu1 commander, but in this case, he made the
right move. He would fight a delaying action, while his main body escaped.
Tilly advanced with great caution; he was expecting a battle not a pursuit. It all
seemed too easy, too much like Mingo1sheim. Brunswick's army was roughed
treated, with the loss of 2000 men and three guns, but he got away otherwise
intact, inc1uding baggage and loot. The immediate results of Tilly's
concentration were disappointing. 16
Nevertheless, the war was won. After joining Brunswick, Mansfeld had some
25,000 men to Tilly's 30,000. Few of the Protestant troops were as well trained
or equipped as their Catholic counterparts, and over half of them were
demoralized refugees from Wimpfen or Hochst. Moreover, Tilly and Cordoba
were a much better team than the Protestant quartet: the brainless Friedrich; the
beaten, deflated Baden; the reck1ess, braggart Brunswick, and the hard-bitten,
embittered Mansfeld. When Tilly laid siege to Friedrich's capital of Heidelberg,
the elector requested that it be rescued. Mansfeld could only tell him that he
lacked the capacity. Neither Heidelberg, nor Mannheim, nor any other place that
Tilly chose to besiege could be relieved. Mutually disenchanted, Friedrich and
his genera1s agreed to part company. On July 13, the contract was cancelled and
Mansfeld and Brunswick marched off to join the Dutch.17
Once they were gone, Tilly quickly reduced Heide1berg, Mannheim, and
Friedrich's other strongholds. The last resistance now crushed, it was widely
assumed-as in 1620-that the war was over.
As in 1620, this was quite wrong.
94 Battles of the Thirty Years War

1622 CHRONOLOGY
March 31 Streiffs raid on Wurzburg CR
April 4 Action of Weingarten
12 Tilly at Wiesloch
25 Baden declares war
27 Action of Mingolsheim
May 3 Cordoba joins Tilly; Baden joins Mansfeld at Wimpfen
4 Mansfeld separates frorn Baden
6 Battle ofWimpfen
8 Mansfeld takes Ladenburg..Cordoba & Tilly separate
17-22 Mansfeld in Alsace
29 Brunswick moves south
June 5 Anholt joins TilIy at Aschaffenburg
6 Cordoba's cavalry join Tilly
8 Baden rejoins Mansfeld
10 Action of Lorsch
11 Cordoba rejoins Tilly at Lorsch
16 Carraciolo joins Tilly at Aschaffenburg; Brunswick reaches Hochst
20 Battle of Hochst
22 Brunswick joins Mansfeld at Mannheim
27 Tilly and Cordoba separate
July 4 Tilly besieges Heidelberg
13 Mansfeld and Brunswick dismissed
August 29 Battle of Fleurus
Sept 19 Heidelberg surrenders
Nov 5 Mannheim surrenders

SOURCES
English accounts of Wimpfen and Hochst are limited to Gindely and Dodge.
The principal German so urce is Wertheim, however Heilmann and Villermont
are worth a look.

APPENDIX A: THE WEINGARTEN ACTION

On March 30, 1622, Mansfeld dispatched much of his cavalry on an independent
offensive mission: partially foraging, partially scouting. He had 16 cavalry companies
(1200 horse) of the Obentraut and W. Sax-Weimar regiments push east frorn Heidelberg,
while 28 cavalry companies & 500 musketeers under LtGen Streiff struck south into the
Bruchsal area. Streiff discovered three companies of Catholic League Herzelles Cavalry
Regiment quartered in the village of Meckesheim. Just after dark on March 31, he
attempted to surprise the outpost-this sort of operation was called "beating up quarters."
The vigilance of LtCol Schonberg, the outpost commander, thwarted the scheme; Streiff
was repelled with Iight loss.
Tilly dispatched a pursuit force under Eynatten and Pappenheim. Unaware of their
approach, Streiff wasted too much time attempting to extort 30,000 talers frorn the
Bruchsal Catholics.
On April 4, after nightfall (again), Eynatten surprised Streiff in the. villages of
Weingarten and Grornbach. The Mansfelders were badly cut up, losing 70 killed and
captured, all their baggage and money, plus a large number of horses. Streiff pulled back
to join Baden at Durlach.
Streiff had 2500-2800 horse and 500+ foot, Schonberg had 2-300 horse in three
companies. Eynatten and Pappenheim had 1800-2000 horse and 250-500 musketeers.
The 1622 Campaign 95

APPENDIX B: MINGOLSHEIM (OR WIESLOCH)

Mansfeld's rearguard consisted of four regiments; Tilly's vanguard had elements of five
cavalry and five infantry regiments.
Unit Date ~ EstStr Loss Notes:
Schmidt IR 1620 10 1-2000 500+ Not all present
Mortaigne IR 1620 10 1800 100 Not all present
Wurzburg IR 1620?? ? Det: cmbd w Furstenberg
Hairnhausen IR 1620 500 zoov Musketeer detachment
Furstenberg IR 1621 6 750 150
Eynatten KUR 1620 5 450 150
Maestro CR 1620 4 400 100 Detachment; "new" coys
Herzelles CR 1620 6 650 350 Wurzburg; badly cut up
Pappenheim CR 1621 7 435 85 Herbersdorf-Pappenheirn
Croats 1622 2 150 50 Capt Juritzsch
The 2 "scharfendinls" had been acquired in Wiesloch and were probably obsolete.
Mansfeld had 80-90 cavalry companies and 13-18 infantry regiments of which 48 and
7, respectively, took parto Two cavalry regiments joined Obentraut for the counterattack.

APPENDIX C: TILLY AND CORDOBA AT WIMPFEN

Cordoba had 4000 foot of which Cordoba Infantry Regiment mustered 1400. In 1620,
Emden mustered 2999 and Bauer 2400. His 22 cavalry companies were described as
being "at full strength," a nominal 2200. In the absence of Cavalry General de Sylva, the
horse were led by senior captains Berenguer, Losada, and Scherrich. There were no
regiments; the companies were all "free" and assembled into ad hoc squadrons as needed.
At Wimpfen, they formed ten squadrons of 2-3 companies each. Spanish doctrine called
for "pure" cuirassiers and arkebusiers squadrons, but Cordoba may have preferred using
arkebusiers to fill out the rear ranks of cuirassiers. Cordoba personally led the largest
squadron.
Unit Date ~ EstStr Notes:
Naples Tercio 1567? 16 1400 Spanish vets; Cordoba IR
Emden IR 1620 8-10 1400 North German
Bauer IR 1620 8 1200 German
"Old" Cavalry 1600? 4 400 Prewar; all K UR
"New" Cavalry 1620 9 900 4 KUR+5 ARK
Other Cavalry 1621 9 900 AII KUR
Artillery 2 heavy & 2 Iight guns

Tilly is more controversial then Cordoba or Baden; most place him at 12,000 , but
Heilmann, following the July muster, says 15,380, and Wertheim estimates 13,300.
Unit Date ~ EstStr Notes:
Schmidt IR 1620 10 1800 Bavarian
Mortaigne IR 1620 10 1400
Hairnhausen IR 1620 8 1800 Bavarian
Herliberg IR 1620 4 600 Only a det; to Furstenberg Bn
Anholt IR 1620 3 600 Only a det; to Bunigen Bn
Herbersdorf IR 1621 4 1200 Only a det; to Bunigen Bn
Furstenberg IR 1621 6 600 South German
Hohenzollem IR 1622 4 800 South German
Free Coy 1622 2 200 Salzburg; to Hohenzollem Bn
An ad hoc battalion under LtCol Bunigen was formed from the Anholt-Herbersdorf detachments.
Herzelles CR 1620 6 300 Schonberg; Wurzburg CR
Eynatten KUR 1620 5 250 Cologne
Maestro CR 1620 13 1200 3 veteran KUR+1O new coy
96 Battles of the Thirty Years War

Alt-Herbersdorf 1622 7 350 LtCol Montigni;4 KUR+3 ARK

Neu-Herbersdorf 1622 6 600 LtCol Held; ARK
Croats 1622 2 200
These cavalry formed six squadrons of 250-600 each, Maestro being divided into two.
The Croats acted as tlankers and skirmishers. Maestro was mostly composed of green
recruits and Herbersdorf had been heavily reorganized: the original regiment (1620) had
been disbanded, then reformed, then split into three (Alt, Neu, and Herbersdorf-
Pappenheim).

APPENDIX D: THE BADEN ARMY

Unit Date QQy EstStr Notes:
Leibgarde Coy 1622 1 200 Foot
Baden IR 1622 10 2000 LtCol Hunoltstein
Wurtemberg IR 1622 8 1600 Magnus was with the. CR
W. Sax-Weimar IR 1622 10 2000 LtCol Uslar
Goldstein IR 1622 10 2000
Helmstadt IR 1622 8-10 1600 White Regiment; 2 bns
Leib CR 1622 2 200 Lt Stein
Rhinegrave CR 1622 7 700 Rhinegrave & Yeldenz
Wurtemberg CR 1622 5 500 Duke Magnus
W. Sax-WeimarCR 1622 4 400 Bernhard a captain
Goldstein CR 1622 3 300
StreiffCR 1621 10 1200+ Mansfelder
Lorraine Coys 1620 4 Mansfelder w Streiff
The artillery, under Col von Bocklin, comprised two 45 pdr cannon, six 23 pdr
demicannon, two falcons, one "great" mortar, two lesser mortars, and the 70
battlewagons.
The cavalry were apparently divided into eight squadrons, of which Baden commanded
three, Streiff three, and LtCol Yeldenz two (six companies). Baden's were probably
Goldstein (+Leib=5OO), Rhinegrave-Wurtemberg (600), and Sax-Weimar (400). Yeldenz
probably had three companies of Rhinegrave Cavalry Regiment and three of Wurtemberg
under Hohenlohe.
The "Lorrainers," were refugees from a French Protestant uprising.

APPENDIX E: THE BATTLE OF HOCHST, JUNE 20, 1622

Christian of Brunswick's Army
Unit Date QQy On Paper Notes:
Brunswick IR 1621 10 2000 Leib; LtCol Franking
Knyphausen IR 1621 10 2000 East Frisia; LtCol Limburg
Isenburg IR 1622 12 2000+ North German; LtCol Budingen
F. K. Sax-Lauenburg 1622 10 2000 Brandenburg; LtCol Meyen
Lowenstein IR 1622 10 2000 Mecklenburg & Holland
Carpzo IR 1622 10-12 2000 AKA Neu-Carpzo
Kochler IR 1622 5 1000 Mansfeld #7; LtCol Kochler
Leib CR 1621 5 500 Holland; Nell; 1 KUR+4 ARK
Styrum ARK 1622 6-7 6-700 AKA Stirum; split from Leib
Eschwey CR 1622 8 800 Holland; LtCol Piper
Ptlug CR 1622 5-6 5-600 German
Mengersheim CR 1622 6 600 AKA Mengersen
Jason CR 1622 5 500 Holland
WinterCR 1622 5-6 5-600
Carpzo CR 1622 8 800 Westphalia
Lowenstein CR 1622 6-7 6-700 Mecklenburg & Holland
The 1622 Campaign 97

Fleckenstein CR 1622 10 1000 Westphalia

Ve1mede CR 1622 5 500 Westpha1ia & Holland
Us1ar CR 1622 6 600 Thuringia AKA W. Sax-Weirnar
Vitzthum CR 1622 5 500 Holland; AKA F. Sax-Weimar
Artillery: 3 demicannons & 2 "light guns" (fa1cons?)
Paper Total: 13,000 infantry, 8300 cava1ry, 5 guns
Need1ess to say, these paper strengths are too high; 15,000 wou1d be a more realistic
total. The inexperienced Brunswick relied heavi1y on his chief-of-staff, Knyphausen.

Cordoba's Corps
Unit Date kQY EstStr Notes:
Nap1es Tercio 1567? 16 1200 Spanish veterans; Cordoba IR
Campo1attaro Coy 1600? 1 100 From veteran Italian Capua Tercio
Berenguer-Losada 23 3-4000 17 KUR+5 ARK; at Wimpfen
"New" Cava1ry 1622 20 12 KUR+8 ARK
Disenchanted by the poor showing of his Germans, Cordoba rep1aced them with
Campo1attaro, "the best company in the Oppenheim garrison."

Caracciolo's Corps
Bucquoy Tercio 161O? 15 1000 Walloon; LtCol Hennin
Spinelli Tercio 1620 31 1700 Nap1es; part left in Moravia
Verdugo Tercio 1620 15 1600 Walloon
Fugger IR 1620 7 1600 German
Fourdin Coys 1620 4 800 Spanish-Gerrnan; ex-Creange IR
Gauchier ARK 161O? 10 4-600 Walloon; LtCol Inchy
These were veterans of the Bohemian campaign.

Tilly's Army (including AnhoIt)

Schmidt IR 1620 10 1800 1S1 Bn (1000+)
Herliberg IR 1620 10 2400 2nd Bn (2000+)
Wurzburg IR 1620 8 1500 Col Truchsess; to 2nd Bn
Hairnhausen IR 1620 9 1800 3,d Bn (3000+)
Anholt IR 1620 13 3000 LtCol Gallas; to 3,d Bn
Furstenberg IR 1621 6 500 Capt Senfft; to 3,d Bn
HohenzoIlern IR 1622 8 1800 To 3,d Bn
Herbersdorf IR 1621 5 1200 LtCol Buningen; to baggage
Free Coy s 1622 3 200 Capt Tranquillini; to baggage
Wurzburg CR 1620 6 400 LtCol Schonberg
Eynatten KUR 1620 7 550 Includes 2 Croat coys (200)
Erwitte CR 1620 4 350 Or 504; AKA Erfitte, Erfft
Maestro CR 1620 8 5-700
Furstenberg CR 1620 6 350 Or 610; ex-Cratz
Lindelo CR 1620 5 350 AKA Lintelo, Lindlo
Virmond CR 1620 7 450 Cologne; AKA Firmont, Nersen
Pappenheim CR 1620/2 15 1100+ Includes both Herbersdorf CRs
Desfurs CR 1622 6 500 AKA Des Fours
Neu-Cratz CR 1622 5 400 Or 150
Nivenheim CR 1622 7 450 Cologne
Free Coys 1622 3 280 Capt Maban; baggage guard
Artillery: 12 heavy & 7 light guns (including guns captured at Wimpfen)
Wertheim estimates the Catholic total at 22,000 foot and 12,000 horse, but no more
than 18,000 and 10,000 were actually engaged.
98 Battles of the Thirty Years War

The Action
Brunswick and Knyphausen deployed their Iimited forces soundly. The Sulzbach
stream, fordable but difficult, was the forward defense line. The village of Sossenheim,
commanding the bridge and the easiest ford, was protected with five successive Iines of
entrenchments. South of the crossing, they added two redoubts, one larger, one smaller,
connected by a sapo They failed to bum the bridge itself. Several scattered outposts north
of the village were held by 300 musketeers, while another 350 plus Eschwey Cavalry
Regiment were posted to hold the castle and bridge at Hochst, to the south and rear. A
pontoon bridge was being built, but it was not yet ready. Brunswick intended the
Sulzbach merely to delay Tilly until the baggage train was safely south of the Main. Then
the infantry would be gradually withdrawn, the cavalry acting as rearguard.
To this end, he placed Kochler Infantry Regiment, 1000 strong, in Sossenheim and
over 1000 detached musketeers in the two redoubts. The line was drawn up on the rising
ground south of the Sulzbach (that is, between the Sulzbach and the Main). Brunswick's
troops were organized Iike Baden's, but were comparatively poorly equipped. Also,
detaching so many musketeers deprived them of 2650 of their best men. Thus the six
battalions of the line mustered less than 1000 each, less than half muskets. Too many of
the "pike" were armed with "Danish clubs." The infantry was deployed, west to east,
Carpzo, Isenburg, Lowenstein, Sax-Lauenburg, Knyphausen, and Leib. Lowenstein and
Knyphausen (but not Carpzo) were a bit forward, standard "checkerboard" style. The
three demicannon were placed in front of Leib Infantry Regiment, while the two falcons
were evacuated with the train. The eleven cavalry regiments, each a squadron, were
placed behind and to the right-they averaged about 500 each, 6 deep. A twelfth
squadron, supported by 1000 more shot, defended the Nidda Marsh southeast of
Sossenheim.
After gobbling up the outposts, Tilly deployed north and east of Brunswick's defenses.
As before, the Leaguers were drawn up on the left, the Spanish on the right. Cordoba
placed his foot in two solid tercios: nearest Tilly were 3000 men under Carraciolo
(Naples, Campolattaro, Bucquoy, Verdugo, and Spinelli); and on the far right 2400
Germans (Fugger and Fourdin). In front of them advanced three forloms, each of 500
musketeers, drawn from Bucquoy and Verdugo. The flank was protected by 3-4000 horse
in two echelons. The 1SI consisted of two squadrons (Sylva and Inchy), while the 2nd, the
Wimpfen veterans, were in three (Berenguer, Losada, and Cordoba). It would appear that
Cordoba, leaming from his mishap at Wimpfen, was imitating Tilly's outsized squadrons.
Tilly also massed his infantry into large battalions one (Schrnidt) of 1000+, one
(Herliberg and Wurzburg) of 2000+, and the third of over 3000. The first two were the
main line, while the third acted as reserve. Two large forloms of 1000 musketeers each
had been drawn from all seven infantry regiments. Commanded by Maj de Magni of
Schmidt, they would lead the assault. The League horse were to the left and rear of the
foot, ten cavalry regiments in eleven squadrons (Pappenheim formed two); they were
supported by over 500 more musketeers. Eynatten Cavalry Regiment had been detached
with instructions to circumvent the whole Protestant line and strike at the key bottleneck,
the bridge at Hochst.
By combining forlom hopes with massive battalions, Tilly would have both the
flexibility to engage the enemy earthworks and the power to shatter resistance. With so
many shot detached, the battalions had a higher pike ratio than usual. He may have used
such formations to simplify handling of so many troops. In any case, this was the last
battle in which old-style tercios of 3000+ men were used in numbers.
The action opened slightly after noon, with a bombardment by the twelve guns of
Tilly's main battery. Brunswick tried to reply with his three demicannon, but his luck was
out. One burst, while a second was struck by a fluke shot from Tilly. The third was left to
carry on alone. The cannonfire inflicting heavy damage to Brunswick's foot, both
physical and moral, he withdrew them to the reverse slope of the Schaferberg. Kochler
The 1622 Campaign 99

had to face Tilly unsupported.

De Magni's 2000 musketeers pressed toward Sossenheim, with Schmidt behind. At the
same time, the Walloon forloms were crossing the Sulzbach to the west, while the
League' horse pushed into the Nidda Marsh on the east. AII five of the village defense
lines were quickly overrun, one after the other; the defenders must have been discouraged
by Brunswick's desertion. In general, Brunswick's troops showed less spirit than Baden's.
De Magni secured the bridge and established himself south of the stream; Tilly sent him
five light guns, which opened fire on the smaller redoubt.
At this point, Brunswick counterattacked with a mixed force of several thousand horse
and musketeers. They achieved initial success, shoving De Magni back across the stream
and regaining the south bank, but the intervention of the battalions of Schmidt and
Herliberg-Truchsess reversed the situation. AIso, the 1500 Walloon shot were now
flanking them on the left. Brunswick disengaged and pulled back, leaving Sossenheim to
its fate.
Tilly has been criticized for overcaution at this point. Despite his superior numbers and
quality, he decided to reduce the redoubts before continuing the advance. He would not
risk another Mingolsheim.
Kochler held out in Sossenheim until 7:00. Brunswick used the time to withdraw his
main body, personally covering their retreat. Things did not go well at the bridge. When
the infantry arrived, they found it blocked, with much of the baggage train still on the
wrong side. These wagons had to be abandoned, along with the remaining demicannon.
The foot fell into disorder trying to force their way onto the bridge. Brunswick, following
with the cavalry, found his way blocked by the mob. He directed the horse to escape by
swimming the Main; many drowned, incJuding Lowenstein. Things nearly took a nastier
tum as Eynatten with four companies of League cuirassiers tried to cut off the bridge; this
attempt was checked by Piper with Eschwey Cavalry Regiment.
Styrum, with the rearmost of Brunswick's cavalry, was pushed onto the bridge by
Eynatten and Inchy. Once informed of the enemy's escape, Tilly advanced with his main
body. But it was already too late. Although the mob was thrown into chaos by Tilly's
guns and a false report of Brunswick's death, the garrison in the castle was able to hold
off the pursuit until most of the troops had crossed. Tilly, never very daring in the pursuit,
elected not to try chasing them across a bridge in the night. The surrender of the castle
(10:00 P.M.) marked the end of the action.
Brunswick's army was scattered, but not destroyed. It took days for him and
Knyphausen to reassembJe their forces and to dispel the persistent rumor of his death.
Losses were heavy. Tilly, with uncharacteristic optimism, set them at 5000, incJuding
1500 horse supposedly drowned in the Main. Knyphausen, with equal and opposite
optimism, estimated only 2000-this figure would incJude dead and captured, but not
wounded or deserters. Much valuable material had been lost, incJuding all three
demicannon and 400 wagons. Lowenstein and Kochler were killed, Franking taken, the
Leib and Kochler regiments effectively destroyed. At least the warchest had been saved.
However, the whole force had been beaten, routed, disorganized, and demoralized.
Mansfeld decJared these survivors a rabble.

APPENDIX F: CATHOLIC FORCES, 1622

Not all the Catholic forces took part in the fighting. In
that did not get into action, there was also the smaJl army
Cordoba never quite grasped the difference between
and the more open style applying to Germany and Italy.
he never fielded more than three at a time.
addition to several League units
of Leopold of Strassburg.
the siege-oriented Flanders war
Of his eight infantry regiments,

APPENDIX G: MANSFELD'S ARMY

Although he managed to avoid Wimpfen and Hochst, Mansfeld was nevertheless
100 Battles of the Thirty Years War

TilIy's principal opponent in the Palatinate campaign.

Unit Date Coy EstStr Notes:
AIt-Mansfeld IR 1618 107 2000 LtCol Golstein; White IR; Garde
Neu-English IR 1620 107 2000 English volunteers
AIt-Oberpfalz IR 1620 107 3000 Ex-garrison Upper Palatinate
Mansfeld IR #3 1621 107 2000 LtCol Ferentz; Red IR
Mansfeld IR #5 1621 97 1-2000 Limbach; Yellow; ex-Sax-Weimar
Saxon IR 1621 10 2000 F. K. Sax-Lauenburg
Lowenstein IR 1621 10 1-1500
Alt-Carpzo IR 1621 10 2000 LtCol Schlammersdorf (brother 00
Neu-Mansfeld IR 1622 107 2000 #2; B1ue & White; Schlammersdorf
Mansfeld IR #4 1622 107 2000 LtCol Lipp; Blue IR
Mansfeld IR #6 1622 107 2000 LtCol Peblis; Green IR
Bund IR 1622 1-1200 Graubunden mercs; Col Beck
Bonnecourt IR 1622 7 20007 "Lorraine" or French Regiments
Beauvais IR 1622 7 20007
Rubecourt IR 1622 7 20007
Wurmbrand IR 1622 7 1000 Kuon-Weissenburg IR (garrison)
Roge IR 1622 7 1-2000 Spires garrison
Neu-Lowenstein 1 1622 7 2000 Ex-Baden
LukarIR 1622 7 1000
Schon IR 1622 7 1-2000
Kochler IR 1622 5 1000 Mansfeld #7, see Brunswick
Mansfeld Leib CR 1620 10 7-1000 AKA Garde; LtCol Ortenburg
AIt-Mansfeld CR 1620 10 1000 LtCol Linistow
StreiffCR 1621 10 1000 LtGen of Horse
F.W. Sax-WeimarCR 1621 12 1200 LtCol Vitzthum
W. Sax-WeimarCR 1621 6 5-600
Duke of Saxony CR 1621 4-5 400 F. K. Sax-Lauenburg
GiffCR 1621 10 3-500
Obentraut CR 1621 10 9-1000
Alt-Lowenstein C 1622 10 5-1000 Ex-Baden7
Alt-Carpzo CR 1622 5 500 Ex-Brunswick?
Lorrainers 1622 4 400 Free coys attached to French IRs
When Mansfeld arrived in the Palatinate, he found "Vere's Corps"-actually local
garrisons-under attack.
Alt-English IR 1620 7 2000 English; Col Vere; Mannheim gar
Holland IR 1620 7 2000 Dutch; van der Merven; Heidelberg
Schonberg IR 1621 7 2000
Waldmanhausen IR 1621 7 2000 German
Landshad IR 1621 7 1-1500 German; von Steinach
Megant CR 16207 6 600 German
Land-Reiter 400 Palatinate militia cavalry
Although this implies that Mansfeld had over 50,000 men under arms, his field force
never reached 20,000.

APPENDIX H: BATTLE OF FLEURUS, AUGUST 29,1622

The unemployed armies of Mansfeld and Brunswick were hired by the Dutch, as
Spinola was besieging their fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom. Unfortunately, the Protestant
forces started to melt away the moment they left the Palatinate. The 47-day march
reduced them from 25,000 to 14,000.
Spinola had directed Cordoba to intercept the approaching Protestants; he assumed a
blocking position at Fleurus. The Protestant commanders resolved to break through,
The 1622 Campaign 101

whatever the costo Cordoba's corps consisted of 6000 foot and 2000 horse; Spaniards,
Italians, Walloons, French, Germans and Burgundians, a microcosm of the heterogeneous
Spanish army:
Unit Qn: EstStr Notes:
Spanish Tercio 16 1000 1st Bn; Naples IR under Ibarra.
Burgundy Tercio ? 200 "" Balanzon IR; detachment
Walloon Tercio 15 1000 "" Verdugo IR
Isenburg IR 10 1000 2nd Bn; Lower Rhine Germans
Emden IR 1 100 '''' German (detachment)
Free Coys 4 400 "" French
Italian Tercio 14 1200 3rd Bn; Campolattaro; Capua IR
Fugger IR 7 1100 4th Bn; German; LtCol Comargo
Cavalry 53 2000 Mostly Walloon; mixed; De Sylva
Artillery: 4+ guns
The foot were formed into four battalions, Ibarra- Verdugo on the right, Isenburg next,
Campolattaro third, and Comargo on the left. Sylva commanded 800 cavalry on the right
and Gauchier 1200 (inc1uding his own arkebusiers) on the left.
Mansfeld and Brunswick had 7-8000 infantry, up to 6000 cavalry, (60 companies), ten
guns and a mortar. The foot, under Mansfeld, formed eight or more composite battalions
in the center, Streiff had 1000 horse on the left, Brunswick 5000 on the right.
Cordoba relied on his infantry and artillery; the Protestants on their cavalry. The battle
became a five hour bloodbath, as the Spanish mowed down the Germans by hundreds On
his fifth caracole, Brunswick dislodged the Spanish horse and opened the way. The
surviving Protestants poured past, abandoning everyone and everything that could not
keep up.
Cordoba c1aimed over 5000 enemy casualties (mostly infantry) plus 18 flags and
eleven guns taken; Brunswick himself lost an armo The Spanish loss was slight, 300 dead
and 900 wounded. Strategically, they had failed; the siege was lifted.
Map 3-1
The Battle of Wimpfen, May 6, 1622

l'
N
I

l ... ...
Unter
Ei~s.heU:r1·

7
~;;:;;---.."
/ "~tI"~. 3 • ,',,', .~
P!Jf ~ 2 Baden 4 ~ ~ P!J P!J
Biberach P!J ~ ~
~6~
":'.":.:.:::::
:::::::::::::.
~ollíng~i:':
:~::;:;:
::::..:.:.:.:........
.. :.... ,:,:,:,:::.:.:.:,:::,:::::;:;:,:::,:,:,:-::::-:-:::::-:~~iú:
Baden catholics e 500 1000 2000
1 - Goldstein IR A - Cordoba Tercio G - Neu-Herbersdorf CR I I I I
2 - Sax-Weimar IR B - Bauer IR H - A1t-Herbersdorf CR Meters
l- Baden IR C - Emden IR I - Eynatten CR
4 - Wurtemberg IR O - league Infantry J - Schonberg CR
5 - Helmstadt IR E - Schmidt IR K - Maestro CR
6 - Cavalry Reserve F - Spanish Cavalry
7 - Wagonburg

Map3-2
The Action ofHochst, June 20,1622

[ZJF[ZJ A
B
- Fugger
- Caracciolo
G H [ZJI[ZJ C - Herliberg
eim
[ZJ [ZJ I8I
D -Anholt
L E - Schmiclt
181 F - Cordoba
J
G -Inchy
H - Sylva
I - Leagüe Cavalry
J - Eynatten
.~ K -Walloons
L - De Magni

1 - Carpzo
2 -Isenburg
3 - Lowenstein
4 - Sax-Lauenburg
5 - Knyphausen
6 - Leib
7 - Redoubts
Te Hochst 8 - Kochler
9 - Piper
~
The 1622 Campaign 103

NOTES
1. One into 1622.
2. "Whose house doth bum, must soldier tum!"
3. See Appendix A.
4. Like Streiffs force at Weingarten or Pappenheim's 2000 at Breitenfeld.
5. Such as Scherrich's squadron at Wimpfen or Morschauser at Nordlingen.
6. See Appendix B.
7. Villermont, Tilly, p. 72.
8. Or pike hedgehog; similar to the later square.
9. HeroicaJly, Col Bauer tried to hold his men together; entirely deserted, he was
nearly captured.
10. He was not even attacked, although one trooper relieved him of his gold chain!
11. Col Bocklin, Baden's artillery chief and commander of the wagonburg, was among
the casualties.
12. They mistook the explosion cloud for a heavenly vision!
13. Perhaps they even saw the "vision."
14. Spinelli's old brigade, recently engaged in mopping up operations in Bohemia.
15. See Appendix E.
16. Tilly now had Brunswick's measure, as he was to prove in 1623.
17. See Appendix H