MERRITT vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
FACTS: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre
Faura Street when he was bumped by the ambulance of
the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries
rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature
later enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit
against the Government in order to fix the responsibility
for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the
amount of the damages, if any, to which he is entitled.
After trial, the lower court held that the collision was
due to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It
then determined the amount of damages and ordered the
government to pay the same.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply
waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its
liability to the plaintiff?
2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the
driver of the ambulance?
HELD:
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction
of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense.
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts
through a special agent, but not when the damage should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it
pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one
who receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official. This concept does not apply to any
executive agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own responsibility
performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by
law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of
the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the
Government is not liable. (Merritt vs Government of the
Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-11154, March 21 1916,
34 Phil. 311)
through a special agent; but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains. (Art. 2180 par. 6, Civil Code)
■ The state is not responsible for the damages suffered
by private individuals in consequence of acts performed
by its employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in
the organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents. (Merritt vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands)
■ The State is not liable for the torts committed by its
officers or agents whom it employs, except when
expressly made so by legislative enactment. The
government does not undertake to guarantee to any
person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it
employs since that would involve it in all its operations
in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which
would be subversive of the public interest. (Merritt vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands)
PNR vs. IAC
FACTS: The passenger express train of Philippine
National Railways (PNR) and a passenger bus of
Baliwag Transit Inc. collided at the railroad crossing at
Barrio Balungao, Calumpit Bulacan at 1:30 in the
afternoon of August 10, 1947 causing damage to the bus
and its passengers, 18 of whom died and 53 suffered
physical injuries. Plaintiff alleges that the collision was
due to the negligence and imprudence of PNR and its
engineer Honorio Cirbado in operating in a busy
intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal lights,
flagman or switchman.
ISSUE: 1) Who between the petitioner and respondent
was negligent? 2) Is PNR immune from suit?
HELD: There is no admissible evidence to show that the
bus driver did not take necessary precaution in traversing
the track. Contributory negligence may not be ascribed
to the bus driver for he had taken necessary precautions
before passing over the railway track. The failure of
PNR, on the other hand, to put a cross bar, or signal
light, flagman, or switchman or semaphores is evidence
of negligence on their part. By the doctrine of implied
powers, the power to sue and be sued is implicit from the
faculty to transact private business. PNR is not
exercising governmental powers, as such it is not
immune from suit.
GUILATCO vs CITY OF DAGUPAN
FACTS:
Florentina Guilatco was about to board a tricycle at a
sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a national road) when
she accidentally fell into an open manhole. Her right leg
was fractured, resulting in her hospitalization and
continuing difficulty in locomotion. Because of her
accident, Guilatco was unable to go to work, thereby
losing her income. She also lost weight, and she is now
no longer her former jovial self since she is unable to
perform her religious, social, and other activities. She
filed an action for damages against the City of Dagupan.
The City of Dagupan denied liability on the ground that
the manhole was located on a national road, which was
not under the control or supervision of the City of
Dagupan.
ISSUE: Whether the City of Dagupan is liable to
Guilatco.
HELD: Yes, the City of Dagupan is liable. For Article
2189 to apply, it is not necessary for the defective road
or street to belong to the province, city or municipality.
The article only requires that either control or
supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
In this case, this control or supervision is provided for in
the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City
Engineer, whose duties include the care and custody of
the public system of waterworks and sewers. The charter
of Dagupan provides that the laying out, construction,
and improvement of streets, avenues, and alleys and
sidewalks and the regulation of the use thereof may be
legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus, the charter
clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and
control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole
is located.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN vs CA
GARCIA, J.:
In this appeal by way of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Municipality of San Juan urges us to annul and set aside
the decision dated 08 September 1995[1] of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38906, affirming with
modification an earlier decision of the Regional Trial
Court at Pasig City in an action for damages thereat
commenced by private respondent Laura Biglang-awa
against, among others, the herein petitioner.
The material facts are not at all disputed:
Under a Contract For Water Service
Connections[2] entered into by and between the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS) and Kwok Cheung as sole proprietor of K.C.
Waterworks System Construction (KC, for short), the
former engaged the services of the latter to install water
service connections. Article 11 (Scope of Work),
paragraph 2.01 of the agreement provides:
2.01 The CONTRACTOR agrees to
install water service connections,
transfer location of tapping to the
nearest main, undertake separation of
service connection, change rusted
connections, within the service area of
the MWSS specified in each job order
covered by this Contract, from the water
main up to the installation of the
verticals. Tapping of the service pipe
connection and mounting of water meter
shall be undertaken exclusively or solely
by the MWSS;
On 20 May 1988, KC was given a Job Order by
the South Sector Office of MWSS to conduct and effect
excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan
Road, San Juan, Metro Manila, a national road, for the
laying of water pipes and tapping of water to the
respective houses of water concessionaires.
That same day, KC dispatched five (5) of its
workers under Project Engineer Ernesto Battad, Jr. to
conduct the digging operations in the specified place.
The workers installed four (4) barricades made up of
two-inch thick GI pipes welded together, 1.3 meters
wide and 1.2 meters high, at the area where the digging
is to take place. The digging operations started at 9
oclock in the morning and ended at about 3 oclock in the
afternoon. The workers dug a hole one (1) meter wide
and 1.5 meters deep, after which they refilled the
excavated portion of the road with the same gravel and
stone excavated from the area. At that time, only of the
job was finished in view of the fact that the workers
were still required to re-excavate that particular portion
for the tapping of pipes for the water connections to the
concessionaires.
Meanwhile, between 10 oclock and 11 oclock in
the evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla Chan was driving
her Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK 991 at a
speed of thirty (30) kilometers per hour on the right side
of Santolan Road towards the direction of Pinaglabanan,
San Juan, Metro Manila. With her on board the car and
seated on the right front seat was Assistant City
Prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa. The road was flooded as
it was then raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel
of the car fell on a manhole where the workers of KC
had earlier made excavations. As a result, the humerus
on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was
fractured. Thereupon, Priscilla Chan contacted Biglang-
awas husband who immediately arrived at the scene and
brought his wife to the Cardinal Santos Hospital.
Dispatched to the scene of the accident to
conduct an investigation thereof, Pfc. Felix Ramos of the
Traffic Division of the San Juan Police Station, upon
arriving thereat, saw Priscilla Chans car already
extracted from the manhole and placed beside the
excavated portion of the road. According to this police
officer, he did not see any barricades at the scene when
he arrived less than an hour later. A Traffic Accident
Investigation Report[3] was thereafter prepared and
signed by Pfc. Ramos.
At the hospital, the attending physician, after
having performed a close reduction and application of
abduction splint on Biglang-awa, placed a plastic cast on
her right arm. Barring complications, the injury she
suffered was expected to heal in four (4) to six (6)
weeks, although she must revisit her doctor from time to
time for check-up and rehabilitation. After some time,
the plastic cast was removed. Biglang-awa sustained no
deformity and no tenderness of the area of the injury but
she could not sleep on her right side because she still felt
pain in that portion of her body. A Medical
Certificate[4] on her injuries was issued by Dr. Antonio
Rivera.
Consequent to the foregoing incident, Biglang-
awa filed before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro
Manila a complaint for damages against MWSS, the
Municipality of San Juan and a number of San Juan
municipal officials.
Later, Biglang-awa amended her complaint
twice. In her second amended complaint, she included
KC as one of the defendants.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment
in favor of Biglang-awa adjudging MWSS and the
Municipality of San Juan jointly and severally liable to
her. Dated 29 February 1992, the decision[5]
dispositively reads in full, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment
is hereby rendered declaring the Municipality of San
Juan, Metro Manila and the Metropolitan Waterworks
and Sewerage System jointly and severally liable to the
plaintiff [Biglang-awa]. Both defendants are ordered to
pay plaintiff the amounts of:
(a) P18,389.55, for actual damages
suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) P15,000.00, for moral damages;
(c) P10,000.00, for exemplary
damages;
(d) P5,000.00, for attorneys fees; and
 (e) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Unable to accept the judgment, both Biglang-awa and
the Municipality of San Juan went to the Court of
Appeals via ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court, which appeal was thereat docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 38906.
As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in a
decision dated 08 September 1995, affirmed with
modification that of the trial court, to wit:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the Decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED but modified as
follows:
1. The Appellees KC
and MWSS and the Appellant San Juan
are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, to [Biglang-awa] the amounts
of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages,
P50,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages and P5,000.00 by way of
attorneys fees, without prejudice to the
right of the Appellee MWSS for
reimbursement from the Appellee KC
under the Contract, Exhibit 3-MWSS:
2. The counterclaims of
the Appellees and Appellant San Juan
and the cross-claim of the latter are
DISMISSED. Without pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket
supplied).
Therefrom, petitioner Municipality of San Juan came to
this Court thru the present recourse, on its submissions
that:
I.
THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE
COURT HAS DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT
HEREFORE DECIDED BY THE
SUPREME COURT.
II.
THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE
COURT HAS DECIDED A
QUESTION PROBABLY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
With no similar recourse having been taken by the other
parties, the Court shall limit itself to the liability or non-
liability of petitioner municipality for the injury
sustained by Biglang-awa.
In denying liability for the subject accident, petitioner
essentially anchored its defense on two provisions of
laws, namely: (1) Section 149, [1][z] of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1983; and (2) Section 8, Ordinance 82-01, of the
Metropolitan Manila Commission.
Petitioner maintains that under Section 149, [1][z] of the
Local Government Code,[6] it is obliged to provide for
the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance
of only municipal streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks,
bridges, parks and other public places. Ergo, since
Santolan Road is concededly a national and not a
municipal road, it cannot be held liable for the injuries
suffered by Biglang-awa on account of the accident that
occurred on said road.
Additionally, petitioner contends that under Section 8,
Ordinance No. 82-01, of the Metropolitan Manila
Commission, which reads:
In the event of death, injury and/or
damages caused by the non-completion
of such works and/or failure of one
undertaking the work to adopt the
required precautionary measures for the
protection of the general public or
violation of any of the terms or
conditions of the permit, the
permittee/excavator shall assume fully
all liabilities for such death, injury or
damage arising therefrom. For this
purpose, the excavator/permittee shall
purchase insurance coverage to answer
for third party liability, only the Project
Engineer of KC and MWSS can be held
liable for the same accident.
The petition must have to be denied.
Jurisprudence[7] teaches that for liability to arise under
Article 2189[8] of the Civil Code, ownership of the
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public
works, is not a controlling factor, it being sufficient that
a province, city or municipality has control or
supervision thereof. This, we made clear in City of
Manila vs. Teotico, et al[9]:
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the
Civil Code, it is not necessary for the
liability therein established to attach that
the defective roads or streets belong to
the province, city or municipality from
which responsibility is exacted. What
said article requires is that the province,
city or municipality have either "control
or supervision" over said street or road.
xxx
It is argued, however, that under Section 149, [1][z] of
the Local Government Code, petitioner has control or
supervision only over municipal and not national roads,
like Santolan Road.
Sadly, petitioner failed to take note of the other
provisions of Section 149 of the same Code, more
particularly the following:
Section 149. Powers and Duties. (1) The
sangguniang bayan shall:
(bb) Regulate the drilling and excavation of the
ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and
other pipes; the building and repair of tunnels,
sewers, drains and other similar structures;
erecting of poles and the use of crosswalks,
curbs and gutters therein, and adopt measures to
ensure public safety against open canals,
manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to
life and property, and provide just compensation
or relief for persons suffering from them;
(Underscoring supplied)
Clear it is from the above that the Municipality of San
Juan can regulate the drilling and excavation of the
ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other
pipes within its territorial jurisdiction.
Doubtless, the term regulate found in the aforequoted
provision of Section 149 can only mean that petitioner
municipality exercises the power of control, or, at the
very least, supervision over all excavations for the laying
of gas, water, sewer and other pipes within its territory.
We must emphasize that under paragraph [1][bb] of
Section 149, supra, of the Local Government Code, the
phrases regulate the drilling and excavation of the
ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other
pipes, and adopt measures to ensure public safety against
open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar
hazards to life and property, are not modified by the term
municipal road. And neither can it be fairly inferred
from the same provision of Section 149 that petitioners
power of regulation vis--vis the activities therein
mentioned applies only in cases where such activities are
to be performed in municipal roads. To our mind, the
municipalitys liability for injuries caused by its failure to
regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the
laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches
regardless of whether the drilling or excavation is made
on a national or municipal road, for as long as the same
is within its territorial jurisdiction.
We are thus in full accord with the following
pronouncements of the appellate court in the decision
under review:
While it may be true that the
Department of Public Works and
Highways may have issued the requisite
permit to the Appellee KC and/or
concessionaires for the excavation on
said road, the Appellant San Juan is not
thereby relieved of its liability to
[Biglang-awa] for its own gross
negligence. Indeed, Evangeline Alfonso,
the witness for the Appellant San Juan
unabashedly [sic] admitted, when she
testified in the Court a quo, that even if
the Department of Public Works and
Highways failed to effect the requisite
refilling, the Appellant San Juan was
mandated to undertake the necessary
precautionary measures to avert
accidents and insure the safety of
pedestrians and commuters:
xxx
The [petitioner] cannot validly shirk
from its obligation to maintain and
insure the safe condition of the road
merely because the permit for the
excavation may have been issued by a
government entity or unit other than the
Appellant San Juan or that the
excavation may have been done by a
contractor under contract with a public
entity like the Appellee MWSS.
Neither is the [petitioner] relieved of
liability based on its purported lack of
 knowledge of the excavation and the
condition of the road during the period
from May 20, 1988 up to May 30, 1988
when the accident occurred. It must be
borne in mind that the obligation of the
[petitioner] to maintain the safe
condition of the road within its territory
is a continuing one which is not
suspended while a street is being
repaired (Corpus Juris Secundum,
Municipal Corporations, page 120).
Knowledge of the condition of the road
and the defects and/or obstructions on
the road may be actual or constructive.
It is enough that the authorities should
have known of the aforesaid
circumstances in the exercise of
ordinary care (City of Louiseville versus
Harris, 180 Southwestern Reporter. page
65). In the present recourse, Santolan
Road and the Greenhills area coming
from Ortigas Avenue going to
Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila
is a busy thoroughfare. The gaping hole
in the middle of the road of Santolan
Road could not have been missed by the
authorities concerned. After all, the
[petitioner] San Juan is mandated to
effect a constant and unabated
monitoring of the conditions of the
roads to insure the safety of motorists.
Persuasive authority has it that:
It is the duty of the
municipal authorities to
exercise an active
vigilance over the
streets; to see that they
are kept in a reasonably
safe condition for public
travel. They cannot fold
their arms and shut their
eyes and say they have
no notice. (Todd versus
City of Troy, 61 New
York 506). (Words in
bracket supplied).
Nor can petitioner seek shelter on Section 8 of
Ordinance 82-01 of the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.
Concededly, Section 8 of the Ordinance makes the
permittee/excavator liable for death, injury and/or
damages caused by the non-completion of works and/or
failure of the one undertaking the works to adopt the
required precautionary measures for the protection of the
general public. Significantly, however, nowhere can it be
found in said Ordinance any provision exempting
municipalities in Metro Manila from liabilities caused by
their own negligent acts. Afortiori, nothing prevents this
Court from applying other relevant laws concerning
petitioners liability for the injuries sustained by Biglang-
awa on that fateful rainy evening of 31 May 1988.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the
assailed decision of the appellate court AFFIRMED.
For liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil
Code, ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings and other public works is not a controlling
factor, it being sufficient that a province, city or
municipality has control or supervision thereof. On the
other hand, a municipality’s liability under Section 149
of the Local Government Code of 1983 for injuries
caused by its failure to regulate the drilling and
excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water,
sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of whether
the drilling or excavation is made on a national or
municipal road, for as long as the same is within its
territorial jurisdiction
.
Liability for breach of contract
QUEZON CITY vs DACARA
FACTS: Sometime on February 28, 1988, Dacara Jr’s
car turned turtle after it rammed against a pile of earth/
street diggings at Matahimik Street, Quezon City, which
was then repaired by the Quezon City Government. As a
result, Dacara Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and
his vehicle was extensively damaged. Fulgencio Dacara
Sr, in behalf of his minor son, filed a claim for damages
against the Local Government of Quezon City and Engr.
Ramir J. Thompson before the RTC. The LGU
contended that the fault is on the driver, since the LGU
have out up warning signs. The trial court ruled that the
LGU is liable. The petitioners appealed to the higher
court but the Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings of
the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Engr Ramir Thompson and
the Quezon City Government be held liable for
damages due to the injuries suffered by Dacara Jr?
HELD:
Yes. The negligence of Engr Ramir J Thompson as an
instrumentality of the Quezon City Government is the
proximate cause of the injuries and damage to property
suffered by Fulgencio Dacara’s (respondent) son, which
make the LGU subsidiarily liable for the damage
incurred. The petitioner’s claim that they were not
negligent insisting that they placed all the necessary
precautionary signs to alert the public of the roadside
construction, but none were presented , gave a more
substantial support to the report of the policeman who
responded to the scene of incident that no precautionary
signs were found on the said place of incident. Thus, the
LGU and Engr Ramir J Thompson as its instrumentality
were held negligent in the execise of their functions
where as capsulized under Article 2189 of the New Civil
Code that Local Government and its employees should
be responsible not only for the maintenance roads/
streets but also for the safety of the public. Hence,
compensatory damages was awarded to the respondent.
GENSON vs ADARLE
FACTS
Arbatin was the successful bidder in a public auction of
junk and other unserviceable government property in the
Highway District Engineer’s Office of Roxas City.
Arbatin then employed Adarle to help him haul the junk.
On a non-working day, when Adarle and Buensalido, the
driver of the payloader, were at the site continuing to
gather the junk, a bucket from the payloader fell and
injured Adarle to the point of paralyzing his lower
extremities. Adarle instituted an action against Arbatin,
Buensalido, Marcelino (Civil Engineer), and Genson
(Highway District Engineer). RTC ruled in favor of
Adarle. IAC modified the previous ruling, absolving
Marcelino from liability, and averring that the liability of
Genson is based on fault, by allowing Arbatin and his
men to work on the premises on a non-working day, in
contravention of his office’s policy. Petitioner Genson
then appealed the decision to the SC, stating that the
facts upon which the IAC declared that his liability is
based on fault by allowing the men to work on a non-
working holiday is without basis. Furthermore, he
contends that by filing a suit against him, Adarle is then
filing a suit against the Republic, which violates the non-
suability of the State.
ISSUE
Whether or not Genson should be held liable, personally
or officially?
HELD
NO. With regard to the non-suability contention, Adarle
filed a suit against Genson personally, in his capacity as
the Highway District Engineer, and not the State or his
office. As for the main issue, there was no evidence to
prove Genson’s presence when the accident occurred,
nor was there any basis for the lower courts to hold that
Genson was at fault by authorizing Arbatin and his men
to work on a non-working day. It might even be proven
that working on a Saturday for the specific purpose of
hauling junk would be the time when the most work can
be done, as it has less traffic. The Master-Servant
doctrine in tort law cannot apply either, since despite the
fact that Buensalido, Genson’s employee, was
“moonlighting” on a non-working holiday, Buensalido’s
arrangement with Arbatin was purely private in nature,
and had nothing to do with his being employed under
Genson. Thus, absent the showing of malice, bad faith or
gross negligence on the part of Genson, he cannot be
held liable for the acts committed by Buensalido and
Arbatin.
BELIZAR vs BRAZAS
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Samar dated June 6, 1959, dismissing the
complaint filed before it.
On April 21, 1959, Pedro Ty Belizar filed a complaint
against Florencio Brazas, Felix Hilario, Lucio
Baldonido, alleging that he is operating the Samar
Express Transit; that defendants are being sued in their
capacity as employees (of the Bureau of Public
Highways); that due to their gross negligence in not
providing the ferry boat with safety devices, one of his
auto-trucks, while being transported from one bank of
the Taft River, Taft, Samar, to the other, fell into the
river and was submerged in water for over 30 hours; that
as a consequence thereof, he suffered actual and moral
damages and had to hire counsel to prosecute this action.
He therefore prays for payment to him by the defendants
of said damages and attorney's fees.
On May 14, 1959, defendant Felix Hilario, on his own
behalf, filed his answer, denying the material allegations
of the complaint and alleging as special defense that he
is working only under the instructions of his superiors.
On May 19, 1959, defendants Lucio Baldonido, Felix
Balato, Teodoro Balato and Todesco Cebuano filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint
states no cause of action and that they are not the real
parties in interest. After an opposition thereto was filed
by the plaintiff, the remaining defendant Florencio
Brazas filed another motion to dismiss on May 20, 1959,
claiming that the plaintiff has no cause of action against
the defendants because they are being sued in their
official capacities and therefore the claim for damages
should be directed against the State.
Acting upon the motions to dismiss, the lower court on
June 6, 1959, dismissed the complaint, and against this
order, the plaintiff has prosecuted this appeal directly to
this Court.
The only issue before this Court is the correctness of the
order appealed from.
It is apparent from the records that although the
Government is the one operating the ferry boat, from
which plaintiff's truck fell, because of the absence of
safety devices, the plaintiff has elected to sue the
defendant employees personally for their negligent acts
under the doctrine of quasi-delict. Article 2180 of the
Civil Code provides for the liability of an employer for
the tortious acts of his employees. This, however, does
not exempt the employees from personal liability,
especially if there are no persons having direct
supervision over them, or if there is proof of the
existence of negligence on their part. So the injured
party can bring an action directly against the author of
the negligent act or omission, although he may sue as
joint defendants such author and the person responsible
for him (7 Salvat 80, quoted in V Tolentino,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Philippines, 1959 edition, p. 520). The provisions of
Article 1733 of the Civil Code and the decision in the
case of the Manila Railroad Co. vs. La Compaña
Trasatlantica and Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 38 Phil.,
875, cited in the order appealed from refer to an action
based upon a contract of transportation. The present
action being based on torts, said authorities are not
applicable thereto.
The fact that the duties and positions of the defendants
are indicated does not mean that they are being sued in
their official capacities, especially as the present action
is not one against the Government.
In view of the foregoing we find that the dismissal of the
complaint is not justified, and for his reason, we hereby
set aside the order of dismissal appealed from and
remand the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings. With costs against the defendants-
appellees.
VARELA vs REVALEZ
Petitioner Eduardo G. Varela (Varela) was the mayor of
Cadiz City. He created a reorganization committee. On
22 September 1998, he submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cadiz City the committee's "Proposed
Reorganizational Structure and Staffing Pattern of Cadiz
City." On the same day, 22 September 1998, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod approved without modification
and without hearing the proposal. The Sangguniang
Panlungsod passed Resolution No. 98-112 authorizing
and appropriating funds for the reorganization of the city
government. Resolution No. 98-112 declared all
positions in the city government vacant, except elective
positions and positions in the city and assistant city
treasurer. On 15 October 1998, Varela signed
Resolution No. 98-112.
On 10 November 1998, Varela gave notices of
termination to the city government employees,
informing them that their employment would end at the
close of business hours on 31 December 1998. The
employees opposed and questioned the legality of
Resolution No. 98-112. Varela ignored them.
Varela created a placement committee with City
Administrator Philip G. Zamora, "Delina, Negosa,
Jimmy Navarro, Jerry Batislaon and Napud" as
members. The committee allegedly met three times.
On 31 December 1998, Varela again gave notices of
termination to the city government employees,
informing them that their employment would end at the
close of business hours on 31 December 1998. On 4
January 1999, the employees tried to report for work but
were barred from entering their offices.
Among those laid off was Community Affairs Officer IV
Ramon Borromeo (Borromeo). His department, the
special services department, was replaced by the
community and barangay affairs division. The head of
the community and barangay affairs division performed
the same functions as the head of the special services
department. Three new positions were created in the
community and barangay affairs division. The three new
positions were given to Oscar Magbanua (Magbanua),
Moises Señoren (Señoren), and Santos Ortega (Ortega).
Magbanua, Señoren and Ortega were political supporters
of Varela and defeated barangay captain candidates.
Around half of the 101 employees of the city health
department were laid off. Those laid off were the same
ones who filed a case, involving the magna carta for
health workers, against Varela. They were also perceived
not to have voted for Varela as mayor.
On 12 January 1999, Ma. Daisy G. Revalez and 40 other
city government employees filed with the RTC a
complaint[4] against Varela for the declaration of nullity
of Resolution No. 98-112 and for damages. In a
motion[5] dated 29 January 1999, 47 other city
government employees intervened. In the complaint, the
employees stated that, "due to the illegal acts of the
Defendant, Plaintiffs suffered mental torture and
anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings, besmirched
reputation and social humiliation."[6]
The RTC's Ruling

In its 20 June 2001 Decision, the RTC declared
Resolution No. 98-112 void and ordered Varela to pay
the government employees P10,000 each for moral
damages, P200,000 attorney's fees, P20,000 litigation
expenses, and court appearance fees at P3,000 per
hearing. The RTC found that Varela acted in bad
faith. The Court held:
There is no question that the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cadiz City is the legislative arm of the local government
unit and as such it possesses the power to enact the
questioned resolution. Plaintiffs however challenge the
manner Res. 98-112 was enacted, and the "indecent
haste" that accompanied its passage. The proposal
emanated from the office of defendant mayor and in a
short time after its submission the measure was passed.
The requisite deliberations, if at all there was one, could
hardly be considered adequate and could best be
described as perfunctory. The minutes of the SP say it
all. The deliberations reflected a lackluster effort and a
wimpish attempt by the members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to justify the grant to the mayor of
legislative authority to carry out the
reorganization. There absolutely was no public
hearing. The proposal coming as it did from the
mayor, was a fait accompli, a done deal in a manner
of speaking. x x x
xxxx
Careful examination of the evidence submitted by the
defendant, however, would reveal a systematic effort
to purge the city government of personnel who
opposed the mayor politically, or disagreed with him
in his policies. Furthermore, perusal of the minutes of
the deliberations of the Sangguniang Panlungsod reveals
that the City of Cadiz was not in dire financial straits
necessitating radical measures like mass lay-off of
personnel. x x x
x x x The City of Cadiz as of 1998, was not in
financial extremis. It had the money, the resources to
fund the salaries of personnel. x x x [Varela] even
ignored the concern of a city councilor who said that
at that time (1998) the City already lacked the
required personnel, and so why abolish certain
positions? The defendant mayor simply gave the
assurance that they can create any position when the
need arises and the city has the money. This
statement betrayed the real intentions of the
defendant insofar as the reorganization is concerned.
x x x The Mayor did not even explain what basic
services would be affected. As a matter of fact, the
office hardest hit and greatly affected by the mass layoff
was the health services department where 50 or so of the
101 personnel complement were laid off. Does it mean
that the delivery of health services is the least of the
priorities of Cadiz City? Or does it mean that health
service from the point of view of the defendant city
mayor is not a basic service? The truth of the matter is
that the health workers of Cadiz filed a case against
the mayor for his refusal to implement provisions of
the Magna Carta for Health Workers. Talk of
vindictiveness. The poor health workers laid off were
on the receiving end of the ire of the defendant
mayor. There seemed to be no rhyme or reason to
the reorganization scheme.
xxxx
Was the reorganization of the Cadiz City government
under Res. 98-112, done in good faith? The testimony
of Ramon Borromeo, which is uncontradicted, will show
the true intent of the reorganization, and whether or not
it was done in good faith:
(Atty. Lobrido) - What about your position, Mr.
"Q
Witness?
My position as Community Affairs Officer was
abolished but instead an Executive Assistant IV
A was made under the Division Head of the
Community and Barangay Affairs Division.
What is the function of the Community and
Q
Barangay Affairs Unit?
It performs the same function as that of the
Community Affairs Unit of which I am the
A
Division Head as Community Affairs Officer IV.
Considering that you were laid off who took over
Q
your function?
The Executive Assistant IV, but considering that
the position is coterminous with that of the mayor,
the appointment of Executive Assistant IV was
disapproved by the Civil Service Commission as
A head of the Community Affairs Unit and the
present situation as of now is that the community
Affairs and Barangay Unit is without a division
head and that three new positions were created.
Who were appointed to the three new positions you
Q
mentioned a while ago?
Those appointed are Oscar Magbanua, Moises
A Señoren, and Santos Ortega.
Q Why do you know these three persons?
Because they are supporters of the defendant city
mayor and also because they are barangay captains
A
who were defeated in the last barangay elections.
(TSN-Cerbo, pp. 8-10, May 3, 2000).
From the afore-quoted testimony it is clear that the
abolition of the office of Mr. Borromeo in the guise of
reorganization was not done in good faith. The
abolition was done for "political reasons," (Arao vs.
Luspo, L-23982, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 722). As
stated in Urgello, if the abolition merely resulted in
placing another person or appointee with a different
designation or name but substantially the same duties,
then it will be considered a device to unseat the
incumbent. Clearly the reorganization is not genuine and
it is nothing but a ruse to defeat the constitutionally
protected right of security of tenure.
xxxx
Since all the offices of the personnel of Cadiz City were
declared vacant, and notices of initial termination sent on
November 10, 1998, the placement Committee barely
had twenty (20) days to submit a final report to
defendant mayor. With 741 personnel to be reevaluated
and screened, plus other new applicants, the committee
did not have enough time to do their work as
envisioned. The Committee had to screen and evaluate
all applications to about 649 positions included in the
new plantilla. Notwithstanding time constraints, the
Committee did not meet until November 17, barely two
(2) weeks from their deadline. Subsequently they met
three (3) times. On their first meeting, the report states,
the placement Committee merely agreed to ask the
defendant mayor to turn over to the Committee all the
application letters. Nothing by way of screening or
evaluation was done that day. On the second meeting
November 18, the applications were "lumped" in
bundles or files, and segregated by department. Then
they suggested to borrow the qualification standards
from the Human Resource Management Office. Due to
time constraints, it was suggested that the screening
should start immediately, and they agreed to meet
November 19, 1998. As of the second meeting the
screening and evaluation had barely began. On
November 19, 1998 the committee met with Mr. Zamora
suggesting that qualification standards be used mainly
eligibility performance rating, education and attainment,
experience and awards and training received. Mr.
Napud suggested that the department heads be
interviewed. As of November 19, the committee had not
started its deliberations and screening, but lo and behold
Mr. Zamora came up with a complete list in time for the
last meeting. On November 29, 1998, Mr. Zamora
presented to the members of the committee the list of
employees selected by the Placement Committee. Then
the list was submitted to the mayor. These were
reflected in Minutes of the meeting of the Placement
Committee.
On the other hand, what did Mr. Zamora say about the
deliberations of the Placement Committee in his capacity
as chairman. His testimony is very instructive.
Q (Atty. Lobrido) And when was the first meeting?
I think November 17, 1998.
A
Q What transpired during the first meeting?
I cannot remember.
A
xxx xxx
After November 18, 1998 meeting, was there other
Q
meeting of the placement committee?
Yes, sir.
A
Q When was that?
On November 19, 1998.
A
And what transpired during that meeting on
Q
November 19, 1998?
A I cannot remember.
It seems incredulous that Mr. Philip Zamora, designated
to represent defendant mayor, would not be able to recall
what transpired during the deliberations of the placement
committee. Unless it is shown that Mr. Zamora suffered
severe bouts of amnesia, it would be the height of
tomfoolery to accept that he would not be able to recall
the significant highlights of the meetings. Which can
only lead this Court to the inescapable conclusion that
the minutes (Exhibits 15 to 15-C) were fabricated and
contrived, and done after the fact. x x x
x x x Why would Philip Zamora present a list of
employees selected to members of the Placement
Committee and tell them this is the result of their
evaluation? Were not the members of the committee the
ones who evaluated and selected the employees? The
logical manner that should have taken place would be
that the committee members themselves would submit
the list to the chairman telling him that this was the
result of their evaluation and screening and they were
ready to submit the list to the mayor. As it appears the
list was a done deal, a fait accompli, and the members
were merely told to put their imprimatur to it. The truth
of matter however, as can be gleaned from Mr. Zamora's
testimony, is that no meetings were ever conducted by
the placement committee. Which explains Mr. Zamora's
memory lapses. Nothing of the sort happened. What
happened was that the minutes were hastily produced as
an afterthought and later passed on as the real
thing. The entire proceedings was [sic] a sham, a
rigmarole intended to put a stamp of legitimacy to
what otherwise was a well calculated, well planned
scheme to rid Cadiz City of employees who were the
political opponents of the defendant mayor. The ploy
was to use the law as a subterfuge to defeat the security
of tenure clause of the constitution. On top of this
masquerade, the defendant city mayor did not show
any compunction or any hesitation to ram the
reorganization down the throats of plaintiffs who
resisted the move and they actually complained. He
did not give them the benefit of the doubt, nor
listened to their plea for justice. He simply ran
roughshod over all of them discarding any pretense
to uphold due process of law. It was shocking no less
to the 166 plaintiffs who become [sic] sacrificial
lambs in the altar of political convenience and
expediency. This is anathema in a democratic system
where the rule of law reigns supreme.[7] (Emphasis
supplied)
Cadiz City Chief Executive Salvador G. Escalante, Jr.,
through the Office of the City Legal Officer, filed with
the RTC a motion[8] to clarify who between Varela, in
his personal capacity, and Cadiz City was liable for the
payment of moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and court appearance fees. In its 26 July 2001
Order,[9] the RTC held that, "it is the municipal
corporation which is liable for the acts of its officers
committed while in the performance of official
duties."[10]
Cadiz City, through the Office of the City Legal Officer,
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
In its 17 August 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the RTC's 20 June 2001
Decision. The Court of Appeals held that Varela was
personally liable for the payment of moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and court appearance
fees. It reduced the amounts of attorney's fees and
litigation expenses from P200,000 to P100,000 and from
P20,000 to P10,000, respectively, and deleted the award
of court appearance fees. The Court of Appeals held
that:
OUR jurisprudence is replete with cases involving the
issue of whether or not a public officer may be held
liable for damages in the performance of their [sic]
duties, to quote:
"A public official is by law not immune from damages in
his personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which,
being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer
protected by the mantle of immunity for official
actions."
"Settled is the principle that a public official may be
liable in his personal capacity for whatever damage he
may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad
faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction."
In addition, Book I, Chapter 9 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 provides, to quote:
"Section 38. Liability of Superior Officers. -- (1) A
public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in
the performance of his official duties, unless there is a
clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross
negligence. x x x"
In the case at bar, the court a quo found that bad faith
attended the performance of the official acts of the
original defendant, Eduardo G. Varela. x x x
WE find no reason to disturb the finding of bad faith by
the court a quo considering that the same was amply
supported by evidence.[11]
Hence, the present petition.
The Issue
Varela raises as issue that, "THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THE
PETITIONER PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE
PAYMENT OF DAMAGES, ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND LITIGATION EXPENSES AS THE
PETITIONER WAS SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL, AND
NOT IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY."[12] Varela
states that:
All the proceedings in the lower court show beyond
question that the petitioner was charged in his official
capacity as then mayor of the real party-defendant, the
respondent City of Capiz.
This is expressly shown by the very title, caption and
allegations of private respondents' complaint dated
January 12, 1999. The fact that petitioner was sued in
his representative and official capacity was not
contested, and, in fact, admitted by the parties.[13]
The Court's Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Varela was sued in his personal capacity, not in his
official capacity. In the complaint, the employees stated
that, "due to the illegal acts of the Defendant, Plaintiffs
suffered mental torture and anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings, besmirched reputation and social
humiliation." The State can never be the author of
illegal acts.
The complaint merely identified Varela as the mayor of
Cadiz City. It did not categorically state that Varela was
being sued in his official capacity. The identification
and mention of Varela as the mayor of Cadiz City did
not automatically transform the action into one against
Varela in his official capacity. The allegations in the
complaint determine the nature of the cause of action.
In Pascual v. Beltran,[14] the Court held that:
[I]n the case at bar, petitioner is actually sued in his
personal capacity inasmuch as his principal, the
State, can never be the author of any wrongful
act. The Complaint filed by the private respondent
with the RTC merely identified petitioner as Director
of the Telecommunications Office, but did not
categorically state that he was being sued in his
official capacity. The mere mention in the Complaint
of the petitioner's position as Regional Director of the
Telecommunications Office does not transform the
action into one against petitioner in his official
capacity. What is determinative of the nature of the
cause of action are the allegations in the complaint. It
is settled that the nature of a cause of action is
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an
action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined
not by the claim of the party filling [sic] the action, made
in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint
itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.[15] (Emphasis
supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The
Court AFFIRMS the 17 August 2005 Decision and 27
February 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 73212.
CADIZ vs HON. PRESIDING JUDGE
On February 23, 2003 the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors, then composed of
petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Leonard S. De Vera,
Romulo A. Rivera, Dante G. Ilaya, Pura Angelica Y.
Santiago, Rosario T. Setias-Reyes, Jose Vicente B.
Salazar, Manuel M. Monzon, Immanuel L. Sodusta, and
Carlos L. Valdez, Jr. (the IBP Board), received an
administrative complaint1[1] filed by Lilia T. Ventura
and Concepcion Tabang against respondent Atty. Glenn
C. Gacott for gross misconduct, deceit, and gross
dishonesty. The IBP Board designated petitioner Lydia
A. Navarro (Navarro) as Commissioner to investigate
the case.
Commissioner Navarro summoned the parties to
a mandatory conference and required them afterwards to
submit their position papers. Based on these, Navarro
submitted her Report and Recommendation to the IBP
Board for its approval. Commissioner Navarro was
herself a member of the IBP Board. After deliberation,
the IBP Board adopted Commissioner Navarros findings
but increased the recommended penalty of six months
suspension from the practice of law to disbarment. The
IBP Board then transmitted their report to this Court.
On September 29, 2004, however, the Court
remanded the case to the IBP Board for further
proceedings in order to give the parties the chance to
fully present their case.2[2] The Court said the
investigating commissioner should have subpoenaed and
examined the witnesses of the parties considering the
gravity of the charge against Atty. Gacott. Navarro
rendered her report based solely on the position papers
and affidavits of the witnesses.
While the IBP Board was complying with the
Courts directive, Atty. Gacott filed a complaint for
damages against the boards sitting members before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan.3[3] Answering the complaint, the IBP Board
raised the affirmative defense of failure of the complaint
to state a cause of action and filed a motion to dismiss
the case on that ground. On March 9, 2006 the trial court
denied the motion,4[4] prompting the IBP Board to
elevate the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) on special
civil action for certiorari.5[5]
On December 29, 2006 the CA denied the
petition, pointing out that the RTC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion. The IBP Board had other plain and
speedy remedy, like proceeding to trial in the case and
appealing in the event of failure of the RTC to dismiss
the action. The CA denied in its Resolution dated July
12, 2007 the IBP Boards motion for reconsideration,
thus causing them to file the present petition.
The Issue Presented
The key issue in this case is whether or not the
CA erred in failing to rule that the Supreme Courts
remand of the disbarment case to the IBP Board for
examination of the witnesses, considering the gravity of
the charge against Atty. Gacott, cannot serve as basis for
the latters complaint for damages against the members of
that board.
Ruling of the Court
Atty. Gacott states in his complaint for damages
before the RTC that Supreme Courts remand of his case
to the IBP Board is an affirmation of the latters arbitrary
abuse of its investigatory power. The IBP Board
recommended his disbarment based on the
Commissioners report rendered to it without the benefit
of exhaustive hearing. This made its members personally
liable for actual, moral, and corrective damages.
Essentially, therefore, Atty. Gacott anchored his
complaint for damages on the result of the Courts
assessment of the IBP Boards report and
recommendation and its remand of the case against him
for further proceedings.
The petitioner IBP Board members are correct in
claiming that Atty. Gacotts complaint states no cause of
action. The IBP Commissioner and Board of Governors
in this case merely exercised delegated powers to
investigate the complaint against Atty. Gacott and
submit their report and recommendation to the Court.
They cannot be charged for honest errors committed in
the performance of their quasi-judicial function. And
that was what it was in the absence of any allegation of
specific factual circumstances indicating that they acted
maliciously or upon illicit consideration. If the rule were
otherwise, a great number of lower court justices and
judges whose acts the appellate courts have annulled on
ground of grave abuse of discretion would be open
targets for damage suits.
Parenthetically, Atty. Gacott submitted the
disbarment case against him for resolution based on the
position papers that he and the complainants presented,
without reservation, to the IBP along with the affidavits
of their witnesses. The IBP Board prepared its report and
recommendation to the Court based on these papers and
documents.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the
petition, SETS ASIDE the decision dated December 29,
2006 and resolution dated July 12, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 94692, and ORDERS the
complaint for damages filed by respondent Glenn C.
Gacott against petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz,
Leonard S. De Vera, Romulo A. Rivera, Dante G. Ilaya,
Pura Angelica Y. Santiago, Rosario T. Setias-Reyes,
Jose Vicente B. Salazar, Manuel M. Monzon, Immanuel
L. Sodusta, Carlos L. Valdez, Jr., and Lydia A. Navarro
in Civil Case 4095 of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan, DISMISSED for failure to state
a cause of action.
MARIKINA AUTOLINE TRANSPORT vs.
PEOPLE
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door
commercial apartment located at No. 31 Kamias Road,
Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line Transport
Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-operator of a
passenger bus, its employee, was assigned as the regular
driver of the bus.
At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was
driving the passenger bus along Kamias Road,
Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards EDSA. The bus
suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of
the commercial apartment owned by Valdellon. Upon
Valdellon’s request, the court ordered Sergio Pontiveros,
the Senior Building Inspection Officer of the City
Engineer’s Office, to inspect the damaged terrace.
He recommended that since the structural members
made of concrete had been displaced, the terrace would
have to be demolished "to keep its monolithicness, and
to insure the safety and stability of the building."
In a letter addressed to the bus company and Suelto,
Valdellon demanded payment of P148,440.00, within 10
days from receipt thereof, to cover the cost of the
damage to the terrace. The bus company and Suelto
offered a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon
refused.
Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property against
Suelto. After the requisite preliminary investigation, an
Information was filed with the RTC of Quezon City.
Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against
Suelto and the bus company for damages. She prayed
that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her
favor.
ISSUE(S)
W/N Suelto is guilty of reckless imprudence which
resulted in the damage of Valdellon’s property

HELD
Yes. Respondent People of the Philippines was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Suelto
swerved the bus to the right with recklessness, thereby
causing damage to the terrace of private respondent’s
apartment.
Although she did not testify to seeing the incident as it
happened, petitioner Suelto himself admitted this in his
answer to the complaint and when he testified in the trial
court. Suelto narrated that he suddenly swerved the bus
to the right of the road causing it to hit the column of the
terrace of private respondent. Petitioners were burdened
to prove that the damage to the terrace of private
respondent was not the fault of petitioner Suelto. We
have reviewed the evidence on record and find that
petitioners failed to prove that petitioner acted on an
emergency caused by the sudden intrusion of a
passenger jeepney into the lane of the bus he was
driving.
It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner
Suelto’s defense that he acted on an emergency, that is,
he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding
with a passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had
overtaken another vehicle and intruded into the lane of
the bus. It is clear from the photographs submitted by the
prosecution that the commercial apartment of Dr.
Valdellon sustained heavy damage caused by the bus
being driven by Suelto. "It seems highly improbable that
the said damages were not caused by a strong impact.
And, it is quite reasonable to conclude that, at the time
of the impact, the bus was traveling at a high speed when
Suelto tried to avoid the passenger jeepney."
PLEYTO vs LOMBOY
FACTS:
A head-on collision between a bus and a car along
McArthur Highway in Gerona, Tarlac happened on May
16, 1995 at around 11:30am.
Petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc (PRBL),
bound for Vigan, Ilocos Sur at the time of the
accident, is engaged in carrying passengers and goods
for a fare servicing various routes in Central and
Northern Luzon. Its driver was Ernesto Pleyto.
Ricardo Lomboy was a passenger to a Mitsubishi Lancer
car driven by Arnulfo Asuncion, Ricardo’s brother-in-
law. Carmela, the daughter of Ricardo, also a passenger
to said car, suffered injuries requiring hospitalization.
But her father Ricardo Lomboy died.
Ricardo’s heirs filed an action for damages against
Pleyto and PRBL.
A witness and one of the bus passengers, Rolly Orpilla,
testified that Pleyto tried to overtake a tricycle but hit it
instead. Pleyto then swerved in to the left opposite lane
and smashed the Manila-bound car killing Arnulfo and
Ricardo Lomboy while the other passengers, Carmela
and friend Rhino Daba suffered injuries.
According to Pleyto, the tricycle suddenly stopped
without warning to which Pleyto stepped on the brakes
and bus lost speed but swerved to the other lane to avoid
hitting the tricycle. Unfortunately, it collided with the
Manila-bound Mitsubishi car.
The trial court rendered decision in favor of the plaintiffs
awarding P1,642,521.00 for lost earnings of Ricardo
Lomboy. It found that Pleyto is negligent and lacked
precaution when he overtook the tricycle disregarding
completely the approaching car in the other lane. Pleyto
should have been more prudent in overtaking
considering the slippery road. The court held that Pleyto
violated traffic rules and regulations and was negligent
under Article 2185 of the Civil Code and PRBL liable as
owner of the bus and as employer of Pleyto under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code for its failure to observe
the required diligence in its supervision of its employees
and the safe maintenance of its buses.
CA affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification
in the award of damages reducing the award for loss of
earning capacity to P1,152,000.00 and took note of the
amounts that were duly supported by receipts only.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the appellate
court denied it. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in pegging the monthly
living expenses at 50% of gross earnings considering
that no substantial proof was presented to prove
Lomboy’s gross income
HELD: No reversible error may be attributed to the
court in fixing the loss of earning capacity at the amount
P1,152,000.00.
In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an
element of damages, the net earnings, which is computed
by deducting necessary expenses from the gross
earnings, and not the gross earnings, is to be utilized in
the computation. The amount of net earnings was
arrived at after deducting the necessary expenses
(pegged at 50% of gross income) from the gross annual
income. This computation is in accord with settled
jurisprudence. (Villa Rey case)
The testimony of the wife, Maria Lomboy, that her
husband was earning a monthly income of P8,000.00 is
sufficient to establish a basis for an estimate of damages
for loss of earning capacity.
Jurisprudence provides that the factors that should be
taken into account in determining the compensable
amount of lost earnings are:
 the number of years for which the victim
would otherwise have lived; and,
 the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the
deceased.
Factor No. 1
Life expectancy is computed by applying the formula
(2/3 x [80-age at death]) adopted from the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial
Combined Experience Table of Mortality.
Factor No. 2
Multiply the life expectancy by the net earnings of the
deceased, i.e, the total earnings less expenses necessary
in the creation of such earnings or income and less living
and other incidental expenses. The net earning is
ordinarily computed at fifty percent of the gross
earnings.
Thus, in the given case, the formula used by this Court
in computing loss of earning capacity is:
Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party
to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has
undergone, by reason of the defendant’s culpable action.
Its award is aimed at restoration of the spiritual
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
Thus, moral damages of P500,000 is reduced to
P100,000 in keeping with the purpose of the law and
jurisprudence in allowing moral damages.
HEIRS OF COMPLETO vs ALBAYDA JR.
Albayda is a Master Sergeant of the PH Air Force, and
Completo was the taxi driver of a Toyota Corolla which
was owned by Abiad. Albayda was riding a bike on his
way to the office, when Completo’s taxi bumped and
sideswept him, causing serious physical injuries. He
[Albayda] was brought to the PH Air Force General
Hospital, but he was transferred to the AFP Medical
Center because he sustained a fracture and there was no
orthopedic doctor available in the first hospital. He was
confined from 27 Aug 1997 to 11 Feb 1998, and again in
23 Feb to 22 Mar 1998 [approx. 7 months].
Conciliation before the barangay failed, so Albayda filed
a complaint for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence against Completo before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasay. Completo filed a counter-
charge of damage to property through reckless
imprudence against Albayda. The Office of the City
Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for
Albayda’s complaint, and Completo’s complaint [against
Albayda] was dismissed. Albayda manifested his
reservation to file a separate civil action for damages
against Completo and Abiad.
Albayda alleged that Completo’s negligence is the
proximate cause of the incident. He demanded the
following damages and their respective amounts: Actual
damages – 276,550; Moral damages –
600,000; Exemplary damages – 200,000; Attorney’s fees
– 25,000 + 1,000 per court appearance.
On the other hand, Completo alleged that he was
carefully driving the taxicab when he heard a strange
sound from the taxicab’s rear right side. He found
Albayda lying on the road, holding his left leg, so he
brought Albayda to PH Air Force General Hospital.
Completo asserted that he was an experienced driver,
and that he already reduced his speed to 20km even
before reaching the intersection. In contrast, Albayda
rode his bicycle at high speed, causing him to lose
control of the bicycle. Completo said that Albayda had
no cause of action.
Several people testified for each side, but here are some
notes on the testimony of the owner of the taxi driver,
Abiad. Abiad said that aside from being a soldier, he
also held franchises of taxicabs and passenger jeepneys,
and being a taxicab operator, he would wake up early to
personally check the taxicabs. When Completo applied
as a taxicab driver, Abiad required him to show his bio-
data, NBI clearance, and driver’s license. Completo
never figured in a vehicular accident since he was
employed, and according to Abiad, he [Completo] was a
good driver and good man.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Albayda, and the
defendants are ordered to pay actual [46k] and moral
[400k] damages, and attorney’s fees [25k]. Upon appeal
at the CA, the court affirmed RTC’s decision with
modifications [no more actual damages; awarded
temperate damages [40k]; moral damages only 200k;
Completo and Abiad are solidarily liable to pay
Albayda; added legal interest].
Issues and Holding
 1. WON CA erred in finding that Completo was
the one who caused the collision. NO
2. WON Abiad failed to prove that he observed the
diligence of a good father of the family. YES
3. WON the award of moral and temperate
damages and attorney’s fees for Albayda had no
basis. NO / NO / YES
Ratio
On Negligence
It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence the
motorist’s breach in his duty of care owed to the
plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in failing to
exercise the diligence required to avoid injury to the
plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury suffered. NCC 2176 quoted, and said
that the question of the motorist’s negligence is a
question of fact. Usually, more will be required of a
motorist [25mi/hr = 37ft/sec] than a bicyclist [10mi/hr =
15ft/sec] in discharging the duty of care because of the
physical advantages the former has over the latter.
It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that
Completo failed to exercise reasonable diligence.
 He was overspeeding at the time he hit
Albayda’s bicycle; he did not slow down even
when he approached the intersection
 Such negligence was the sole and proximate
cause of the injuries sustained by Albayda
 It was proven that Albayda had the right of way
since he reached the intersection ahead of
Completo
NCC 2180 cited – obligation imposed by NCC 2176 is
demandable also for those persons for whom one is
responsible. Employers are liable for damage caused by
employees, but the responsibility ceases upon proof that
employers observed the diligence of the good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of
employees. The burden of proof is on the employer. The
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for
QD is solidary. The employer’s civil liability for his
employee’s negligent acts is also primary and direct,
owing to his own negligence in selecting and supervising
them, and this liability attaches even if the employer is
not in the vehicle at the time of collision.
In the selection of employees, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and
service records. With respect to supervision, employers
should formulate SOPs and monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for
breaches. To establish these factors in a trial involving
the issue of vicarious [secondary] liability, employers
must submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.
ABIAD’S EVIDENCE CONSISTED ENTIRELY OF
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, AND THIS IS
INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL
PRESUMPTION THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT IN
THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF
COMPLETO.
On Damages
CA rightfully deleted the award of actual damages
because Albayda failed to present documentary evidence
to establish the amount incurred. Temperate damages
may be recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot
be proved with certainty. Moral damages are awarded in
QDs causing physical injuries, so the award is proper.
The award of attorney’s fees is deleted for failure to
prove that petitioners acted in bad faith in refusing to
satisfy respondent’s just and valid claim.
GUILLANG vs BEDANIA
One afternoon of October 1994, Guillang was driving
his Corolla along Aguinaldo Highway in Cavite when it
was hit by a turning 10-wheeler truck driven by Rodolfo
Bedania and owned by Rodolfo de Silva. The passengers
of the car were rushed to the Medical Center in
Dasmariñas, Cavite for treatment. Because of severe
injuries, Antero, one of the passengers, was later
transferred to the Philippine General Hospital. However,
on 3 November1994, Antero died due to the injuries he
sustained from the collision. The car was a total wreck
while the truck sustained minor damage. On 24 April
1995, petitioners Genaro, Llanillo, Dignadice, and the
heirs of Antero instituted a complaint for damages based
on quasi-delict against respondents Bedania and de
Silva.On 5 December 2000, the trial court rendered a
decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court found
Bedania grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering
the truck by making a sudden U-turn in the highway
without dueregard to traffic rules and the safety of other
motorists. The trial court also declared de Silva grossly
negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver,
Bedania.On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the
lower court and dismissed the civil case for lack of
merit. Petitioners then filed a MR but to no avail. Hence
this case.
Issue:
Who is liable for the damages suffered by petitioners?
Held:
The trial court held Bedania and de Silva, as Bedania’s
employer, liable because the proximate cause of the
collision was the sudden U-turn executed by Bedania
without any signal lights. On the other hand, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and held
Genaro liable because the proximate cause of the
collision was Genaro’s failure to stop the car despite
seeing that Bedania was making a U-turn.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interest of another person that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
In Picart v. Smith, we held that the test of negligence is
whether the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
person would have used in the same situation.
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Genaro was
negligent is not supported by the evidence on record.
Videna’s testimony was inconsistent with the police
records and report that he made on the day of the
collision. First, Videna testified that the car was running
fast and overtook another vehicle that already gave way
to the truck. But this was not indicated in either the
report or the police records. Moreover, if the car was
speeding, thereshould have been skid marks on the road
when Genaro stepped on the brakes to avoid the
collision. But the sketch of the accident showed no skid
marks made by the car. Second, Videna testified that the
petitioners came from a drinking spree because he was
able to smell liquor. But in the report, Videna indicated
that the condition of Genaro was "normal." Videna did
not indicate in the report that Genaro "had been drinking
liquor" or that Genaro "was obviously drunk." Third,
Videna testified that when he arrived at the scene,
Bedania was inside his truck. This contradicts the police
records where Videna stated that after the collision
Bedania escaped and abandoned the victims. The police
records also showed that Bedania was arrested by the
police at his barracks in Anabu, Imus, Cavite and was
turned over to the police only on 26 October 1994.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is
proof to the contrary, a person driving a vehicle is
presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.
In this case, the report showed that the truck, while
making the U-turn, failed to signal, a violation of traffic
rules. The police records also stated that, after the
collision, Bedania escaped and abandoned the petitioners
and his truck. This is another violation of a traffic
regulation. Therefore, the presumption arises that
Bedania was negligent at the time of the mishap.
The evidence presented in this case also does not support
the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the truck had
already executed the U-turn before the impact occurred.
If the truck had fully made the U-turn, it should have
been hit on its rear .If the truck had already negotiated
even half of the turn and is almost on the other side of
the highway, then the truck should have been hit in the
middle portion of the trailer or cargo compartment. But
the evidence clearly shows, and the Court of Appeals
even declared, that the car hit the truck’s gas tank,
located at the truck’s right middle portion, which
disproves the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the
truck had already executed the U-turn when it was hit by
the car.
Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the
sheer size of the truck does not make it improbable for
the truck to execute a sudden U-turn. The trial court’s
decision did not state that the truck was traveling at a
fast speed when it made the U-turn. The trial court said
the truck made a "sudden" U-turn, meaning the U-turn
was made unexpectedly and with no warning, as shown
by the fact that the truck’s signal lights were not turned
on.
Clearly, Bedania’s negligence was the proximate cause
of the collision which claimed the life of Antero and
injured the petitioners. Proximate cause is that which, in
the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would nothave occurred. The
cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act
of Bedania for if the U-turn was executed with the
proper precaution, the mishap in all probability would
not have happened. The sudden U-turn of the truck
without signal lights posed a serious risk to oncoming
motorists. Bedania failed to prevent or minimize that
risk. The truck’s sudden U-turn triggered a series of
events that led to the collision and, ultimately, to the
death of Antero and the injuries of petitioners.
RAMOS vs COL REALTY
Petitioner Ramos is the employer of Rodel Ilustrisimo.
While Rodel was driving the Ford Expedition of
petitioner an accident ensued, wherein it bumped with a
Corrolla Altis driven by Aquilino Larin and owned by
Respondent COL Realty. Due to the impact of the
vehicular mishap, the passenger of the sedan was
injured.
A case was filed against Ramos making him solidarily
liable with his driver. Ramos in his opposition argued
that he cannot be held solidarily liable since it is
Aquilnio's negligence that is the proximate cause of the
accident. He further argued that when the accident
happened, Aquilino violated an MMDA order, i.e.
prohibiting the crossing is the place where the accident
happened.
Issue:
Whether or not Ramos may be held liable since the
proximate cause of the accident is his employee's
negligence.
Ruling:
No. There is no doubt that Aquilino’s violation of the
MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue
from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of
the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. And
more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against
crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the
accident would not have happened. This specific
untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition
was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person
who resides within the vicinity where the accident
occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that
the accident would be a natural and probable result if he
crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is
considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of
the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the
Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest
error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the
principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code,
that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages.
As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence- the
court finds it unnecessary to delve into it, since it cannot
overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodel’s
contributory negligence has relevance only in the event
that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever
damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it
will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages
in his favor.
PESTANO vs SUMAYANG
Facts: Sumayang, accompanied by another person, was
riding a motor vehicle on a highway in Cebu. While
turning left at a junction, Sumayang was violently hit by
a speeding bus driven by Pestano. Sumayang and his
companion died due to the accident. The heirs of
Sumayang filed a civil action against Pestano and Metro
Cebu Bus Company, the owner of the Bus driven by
Pestano. A witness named Neis accounts that before
Sumayang turned left, the former had raised his left arm
as a signal but was run over by the bus and was thrown
14 meters away. Pestano alleges the victims were
negligent because 15-20 meters away, he had already
blown the bus’ horn and even blew it a second time
when he got near but could only step on the brake after
the bus had hid the motor vehicle. RTC and CA held
Pestano liable and also held Metro Cebu Bus liable for
negligence.
Issue: W/N Metro Cebu Bus may be held liable for the
acts of Pestano
Held: There were factual findings that the bus had a
defective speedometer and the Company was held to
have shown laxity in the conduct of its operations and
supervision of employees. Under Articles 2180 and 2176
of the Civil Code, owners and managers are responsible
for damages caused by their employees. When an injury
is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee,
the master or employer is presumed to be negligent
either in the selection or in the supervision of that
employee. This presumption may be overcome only by
satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the
care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and the supervision of its employee. The CA
said that allowing Pestaño to ply his route with a
defective speedometer showed laxity on the part of
Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and in the
supervision of its employees. The negligence alluded to
here is in its supervision over its driver, not in that which
directly caused the accident. The fact that Pestaño was
able to use a bus with a faulty speedometer shows that
Metro Cebu was remiss in the supervision of its
employees and in the proper care of its vehicles. It had
thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence
required by law.
ANONUEVO vs CA
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his
bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the opposite
lane was driving a Lancer car owned by Procter
and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’ s
brother. Añonuevo was in the course of making
a left turn towards Libertad Street when the
collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious
injuries and had to undergo four operations.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages
against P&G Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the
RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint against
Añonuevo before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently
acquitted of the criminal charge. Añonuevo
claims that Villagracia violated traffic
regulations when he failed to register his bicycle
or install safety gadgets. He posits that Article
2185 of the Civil Code applies by analogy. Article
2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the mishap he
was violating any traffic regulation.
ISSUES AND RULING:
1. W/N Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code should
apply to non-motorized vehicles, making
Villagracia presumptively negligent --> There
is pertinent basis for segregating between
motorized and non-motorized vehicles. A
motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the l imitations
in physical exertion, is capable of greater speeds
and acceleration than non -motorized vehicles.
At the same time, motorized vehicles are more
capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in
the event of an accident or collision. This is due
to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor
vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative
greater bulk of mass, and greater combustibili ty
due to the use of fuel.
2. W/N Villagracia was negligent for failure to
comply with traffic regulations --> N The
existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by the personal judgment of the actor in
a given situation, but rather, it is the law which
determines what would be reckless or negligent.
Añonuevo asserts that Villagracia was negligent
as the latter had transgressed traffic regulations.
However, Añonuevo was speeding as he made
the left turn, and such negligent act was the
proximate cause of the accident. Even assuming
that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia
because the bicycle was not equipped with
headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part
would not have acquitted the driver of his duty
to slow down as he proceeded to make the left
turn.
3. W/N Villagracia is guilty of contributory
negligence --> As between Añonuevo and
Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Añonuevo as
solely responsible for the accident. The petition
does not demonstrate why this finding should be
reversed. It is hard to imagine that the same
result would not have occurred even if
Villagracia’s bicycle had been equi pped with
safety equipment.
CAEDO vs YU KHE THAI
FACTS:
Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about
5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 along E. de los
Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San LorenzoVillage
bound for the airport. Several members of his family
were in the car. Coming from the opposite direction was
the Cadillac car of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his
driver Rafael Bernardo. The two cars were traveling at a
moderate speed with their headlights on. Ahead of the
Cadillac was a caretela. Defendant’s driver did not
notice it until he was about eight (8) meters away.
Instead of slowing down behind the caretela defendant’s
driver veered to the left with the intention of passing by
the caretela but in doing so its rear bumper caught the
ream of thecaretela’s left wheel wrenching it off.
Defendant’s car skidded obliquely to the other end and
collided with the on-coming vehicle of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff on his part, slackened his speed and tried to
avoid the collision by veering to the right but the
collision occurred just the same injuring the plaintiff and
members of his family. Plaintiff brought an action for
damages against both the driver and owner of the
Cadillac car. There was no question that defendant’s
driver was negligent and liable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant Yu Khe Thai, owner of the
car, who was in the car, was solidarily liable with the
driver under Art. 2184, of the Civil Code.
RULING:
The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code.
Under the said provision, if the causative factor was the
driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was
present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented
the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The basis of
the master’s liability in civil law is not respondent
superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The
theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if
known to the master and susceptible of timely correction
by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct
it in order to prevent injury or damage.

Negligence on the part of the owner, if any, must be

sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the
accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from
pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice
of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We
do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The
car, as has been stated, was not running at an
unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and
devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason
for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He
had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his
driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela
when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then
his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence,
for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he
did see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated
his driver’s sudden decision to pass the carretela on its
left side in spite of the fact that another car was
approaching from the opposite direction. The time
element was such that there was no reasonable
opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved
and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that
entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a
sudden warning it might only make the other man
nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought
that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due
diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.
Under the facts the owner of the car was not liable.