Republic of the Philippines presumption of law is, in our opinion, simply to say that it amounts to a statute of limitations;
SUPREME COURT and for a court to hold that the statute of limitations does not run against the Government as to
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906
MATEO CARIÑO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
Coudert Brothers for appellant.
Attorney-General Wilfley for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
The appellant, on the 23d of June, 1903, by his attorney in fact, Metcalf A. Clarke, filed a
petition in the Court of Land Registration asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a tract of
land in the municipality of Baguio, in the province of Benguet, containing 146 hectares. The
Government of the Philippine Islands, appeared in the Court of Land Registration and opposed
the petition. The Government of the United States that the land was part of the military
reservation of Baguio. Judgment was entered in the Court of Land Registration in favor of the
petitioner, from which judgment the respondents appealed in accordance with the law then in
force to the Court of First Instance of the province of Benguet. The case was therein tried de
novo, and judgment was entered dismissing the petition. The petitioner has brought the case
here by bill of exceptions.
The petitioner presented no documentary evidence of title, except a possessory information
obtained in 1901. By the provisions of the Mortgage Law, under which this possessory
information was obtained (art. 394), it produced only those effects which the laws give to
mere possession.
The petition not having shown any title from the Government, and the land being agricultural,
the case is governed by the decisions of this court in the cases of Valenton et al. vs.
Murciano 1 (2 Off. Gaz., 434); Cansino et al. vs. Valdez et al. 2 (4 Off. Gaz., 488);
and Tiglao vs. The Insular Government 3 (4 Off. Gaz., 747). In these cases it was held that
the mere possession of land such as that in controversy in this case would give the
possessor and title thereto as against the Government; in other words, that the statute of
limitations did not run against the State in reference to its agricultural lands.lawphil.net
The petitioner, however, insists that although the statute of limitations as such did not run
against the Government of Spain in the Philippine Islands, yet a grant is to be conclusively
presumed from immemorial use and occupation. To say that the presumption of a grant is
its public agricultural lands, and at the same time to hold that if a person has been in
possession of such lands for thirty years it is conclusively presumed that the Government has
given him a deed therefor, would be to make two rulings directly inconsistent with each other.
Considered as a presumption of fact, the contention could not be sustained in this particular
case. Here the surrounding circumstances are incompatible with the existence of a grant, It is
known that for nearly three hundred years all attempts to convert the Igorots of the Province of
Benguet to the Christian religion completely failed, and that during that time they remained
practically in the same condition as they were when the Islands were first occupied by the
Spaniards. To presume as a matter of fact that during that time, and down to at least 1880, the
provisions of the laws relating to the grant, adjustment, and sale of public were taken
advantage of by these deeds from the Government for these lands would be to presume
something which did not exist. The appellant says in his brief (p.10):
The Igorot, no less than the American Indian, is an aborigine, and is equally ignorant
of the forms of law and procedure necessary to protect his interests.
There is, moreover, in the case evidence that in 1894 the petitioner sought to obtain title from
the Government in accordance with the laws then in force. In 1901 he made a contract with
Metalcalf A. Clarke, by the terms of which he agreed to sell the land to Clarke for 6,000 pesos
when he obtained title thereto from the Government, and this contract he does not say that he
is the owner, but simply that he is in possession thereof. The court below found that the land is
now worth upwards of P50,000.
The possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a
grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of
animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has
apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.
The petitioner relies upon the case of the United States vs. Chaves (159 U.S., 452) and the
case of The United States vs. Chaves (175 U.S., 509). In the case of Hays vs. The United
States (175 U.S. 248) the court said at page 261;
But this presumption is subject to the limitation that where title is claimed from a
deed which is shown to be void, it will not be presumed that there was an
independent grant (Smith vs. Highbee, 12 Vermont,. 113), or where surrounding
circumstances are inconsistent with the theory of a grant. (Townsend vs. Downer, 32
Vermont, 183).
The substance of this doctrine is that lapse of time any be treated as helping out the
presumption of a grant, but where a void grant is shown, it affords no presumption
that another valid grant was made. Nor does such presumption arise if the
surrounding circumstances are incompatible with the existence of a grant. In this
case under consideration we can not find any evidence which justifies us in
believing that a legal grant can have been made, and under those circumstances we
can not consider possession since the date of the treaty as dispensing with the
requirement that the title, if not perfect at that time, was one which the claimant
 would have a lawful right to make perfect had the territory not been acquired by the
United States.
In the case of Chaves vs. The United States (175 U.S., 552) the court made the following
statement at page 562:
Finally, it distinctly appears that the possession of the parties is insufficient in length
of time to prove a valid title. In United States vs. Chaves (159 U.S., 452) the
possession was under the claim of a grant made by the governor of New Mexico to
the alleged grantees. The grant had been lost, but it had been seen and read by
witnesses, and its existence had been proved by evidence sufficient, as we stated in
the opinion (p. 460), to warrant 'the finding of the court below that the complainant's
title was derived from the Republic of Mexico, and was complete and perfect at the
date when the United States acquired sovereignty in the territory of New Mexico,
within which the land was situated. We do not question the correctness to the
remarks made by Mr. Justice Shiras in regard to evidence of possession and the
presumptions which may under certain circumstances drawn as to the existence of a
grant.
We do not deny the right of the duty of a court to presume its existence in a proper
case, in order to quiet a title and to give to long continued possession the quality of a
rightful possession under a legal right. We recognized and enforced such a rule in
the case of United States vs. Chaves decided at this term. in which the question is
involved. We simply say in this case that the possession was not a duration long
enough to justify any such inference.
There is no proof of any valid grant, but on the contrary the evidence offered by the
plaintiff himself and upon which the bases the title that he asks the court to confirm,
shows the existence of a grant from a body which had no legal power to make it, and
which, therefore, conveyed no title whatever to its grantee, and the evidence is, as
given by the plaintiff himself, that it was under this grant alone that possession of
the lands was taken. We can not presume (within the time involved in this case) that
any other and valid grant was ever made. The possession of the plaintiff and of his
grantors up to the time of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848, had not been
long enough to presume a grant. (Crispin vs. United States, 168 U.S., 208;
Hayes vs. United States, 170 U.S., 637, 649, 653; Hays vs. The United States, ante
248.) The possession subsequently existing, we can not notice. Same authorities.
As we understand it, it is well settled in the United States that prescription does not run against
the Government as to its public lands — in other words, that if a person desires to obtain title
to the public lands of the United States situated within the boundaries of the States, he must do
so in the way pointed out by the law. We do not understand that a person in possession of
unsurveyed public lands in the State of Minnesota, for example, whose ancestors had occupied
that the land for fortyh years, could maintain in court a claim that he was the legal owner of
the lands by granted the land to his ancestors, a presumption founded not upon any
proceedings taken in the General Land Office to acquire a patent thereto, but upon the mere
possession for that length of time.
The same is true of the public lands of Spain in the Philippine Islands. In the case of Valenton
et al. vs. Marciano it was said:
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he
proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he
must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from
them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner.
But in any event, and whatever the law may be elsewhere, it seems clear that this doctrine of
presumptive grant can not apply to the Philippines in view of the Spanish legislation for the
Indies. From time to time there were promulgated laws which required the person in
possession of public lands to exhibit their titles or grants thereto. If these titles or grants were
found to be good, they were confirmed, but if they were not, or if the persons had no grants or
titles at all, they were evicted from the land.
For example, in Law 14, title 12, 4, Recompilation of the Laws of the Indies, it is stated:
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretrial courts
designate, at such times as shall to them most expedient, a suitable period within
which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them
and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose their title deeds thereto.
And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts or by virtue
of just prescriptive rights shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to
be disposed of at our will.
In the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754, it was provided —
that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of promulgation
and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not the
same shall be cultivated or tenanted, may, either in person or through their attorneys
or representatives, appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by
virtue of which said lands are occupied. Said subdelegates will designate as the
period within which documents must be presented a term sufficient in length and
proportionate to the distance the interested party may have to travel for the purpose
of making the presentation. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties
interested that in term designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they will
be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to others.
In the regulations of June 25, 1880, it was provided as follows:
ART. 8. If the interested parties shall not ask an adjustment of the lands whose
possession they are unlawfully enjoining within the time of one year, or, the
adjustment having been granted by the authorities, they shall fail to fulfill their
obligation in connection with the compromise, by paying the proper sum into the
treasury, the latter will, by virtue of the authority vested in it, reassert the ownership
of the Stated over the lands, and will, after fixing the whole thereof, proceed to sell
at public auction that part of the same which, either because it may have been
reduced to cultivation or is not located within the forest zone, is not deemed
advisable to preserve as State forest reservations. 4
In the royal decree of the 13th of February, 1894, published in the Official Gazzette of Manila
of the 17th of April, 01894, it is provided in article 4 as follows:
 ART. 4. The title to all agricultural lands which were capable of adjustment
(composicion) under the royal decree of the 25th of June, 1880, but the adjustments
of which decree in the Gaceta de Manila, will revert to the State. Any claim to such
lands by those who might have applied for the adjustment of the same, but who have
not done so as the above mentioned date, will not avail them in any way or at any
time.

In view of these provisions of the law, it seems to us impossible to say that as to the public
agricultural lands in the Philippines there existed a conclusive presumption after a lapse of
thirty or any other number of years that the Government of Spain had granted to the possessor
thereof a legal title thereto.

The plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, the
Public Land Act, for the reason that act is not applicable to the Province of Benguet. The
judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered accordingly and ten days thereafter
the case be returned to the court below for execution. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Mapa, J., concurs in the result.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 171056 March 13, 2009
DINAH C. CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN, AQUILINA A. MISTAS, MARIETTA L. LINATOC, AND
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by petitioner Dinah C. Castillo seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
Decision,2 dated 18 October 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90533, as well
as the Resolution,3 dated 11 January 2006 of the same court denying reconsideration of its
afore-mentioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the Joint
Resolution4 dated 28 April 2004 and Joint Order5 dated 20 June 2005 of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F,
dismissing petitioner Dinah C. Castillo’s complaint for grave misconduct and violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended,
against respondent public officers Antonio M. Escutin (Escutin), Aquilina A. Mistas (Mistas)
and Marietta L. Linatoc (Linatoc), together with private individuals Lauro S. Leviste II
(Leviste) and Benedicto L. Orense (Orense).
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel), married to Roel
Buenaventura. In the course of her search for properties to satisfy the judgment in her favor,
petitioner discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister Perla K.
Moratilla (Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square meters,
situated at Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and covered by Tax Declaration No.
00449.
Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was able to secure an
Order6 dated 4 March 1999 issued by Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) approving the application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club,
Inc. for conversion of several agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713 owned by "Perla
K. Mortilla, et al." and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449, to residential, commercial, and
recreational uses. She was also able to get from the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, a
Certification7 stating that Lot 13713, covered by Tax Declaration No. 00554-A, was in the
name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla; and a certified true copy of Tax Declaration
No. 00554-A itself.8 Lastly, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City issued a Certification9 attesting
that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla, was not covered by a
certificate of title, whether judicial or patent, or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award or patent under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, and the public auction
sale of the same was scheduled on 14 May 2002. Sometime in May 2002, before the scheduled
public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the Summit Point Golf and
Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation
(Summit Realty). She immediately went to the Makati City office of Summit Realty to meet
with its Vice President, Orense. However, she claimed that Orense did not show her any
document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty, and even threatened her that
the owners of Summit Realty, the Leviste family, was too powerful and influential for
petitioner to tangle with.
The public auction sale pushed through on 14 May 2002, and petitioner bought Raquel’s 1/3
pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713.
On 4 June 2002, petitioner had the following documents, on her acquisition of Raquel’s 1/3
pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713, recorded in the Primary Entry Book and Registration Book of
the Register of Deeds of Lipa City in accordance with Act No. 334410: (a) Notice of
Levy;11 (b) Certificate of Sale;12 (c) Affidavit of Publication;13 and (d) Writ of Execution.14
Subsequently, petitioner was issued by the City Assessor of Lipa City Tax Declaration No.
00942-A,15 indicating that she owned 5,000 square meters of Lot 13713, while Urbana and
Perla owned the other 10,000 square meters.
When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes for her 5,000-square-meter share in Lot
13713, she was shocked to find out that, without giving her notice, her Tax Declaration No.
00942-A was cancelled. Lot 13713 was said to be encompassed in and overlapping with the
105,648 square meter parcel of land known as Lot 1-B, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 12964216 and Tax Declaration No. 00949-A,17 both in the name of Francisco
Catigbac (Catigbac). The reverse side of TCT No. 129642 bore three entries, reflecting the
supposed sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty, to wit:
ENTRY NO. 184894: SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY: In favor of
LEONARDO YAGIN: For purposes more particularly stipulated in the contract
ratified before Atty. Ernesto M. Vergara of Lipa City as per Doc. No. 639; Page No.
29; Book No. LXXVI; Series of 1976.
Date of instrument – 2-6-1976
Date of inscription – 6-26-2002 at 11:20 a.m.
ENTRY NO. 185833: SALE IN FAVOR OF SUMMIT POINT REALTY &
DEVELOPMENT CORP: –
ENTRY NO. 185834: BIR CLEARANCE: – Of the parcel of land described in this
cert. of title is hereby sold and cancelled TCT No. 134609(SN-6672938) Vol. 671-
A, having been issued by virtue of the aforesaid instrument ratified before Perfecto
L. Dimayuga, Notary Public for Makati City as per Doc. No. 148; Page 31, Book
No. LXVII, Series of 2002.
 Date of instrument: July 22, 2002
Date of inscription: July 25, 2002 at 2:30 P.M.18
On 25 July 2002, at 2:30 p.m., TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was cancelled and
TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty was issued in its place.
The foregoing incidents prompted petitioner to file a Complaint Affidavit19 before the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon charging several public officers and private individuals
as follows:
32. I respectfully charge that on or about the months of June 2002 and July 2002 and onwards
in Lipa City, Atty. Antonio M. [Escutin], the Register of Deeds of Lipa City[;] Aquilina A.
Mistas, the Local Assessment Operations Officer III of the City Assessor’s Office of Lipa
City[;] Marietta Linatoc, Records Clerk, Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City, who are
public officers and acting in concert and conspiring with Lauro S. Leviste II and Benedicto L.
Orense, Executive Vice-President and Vice-President, respectively[,] of Summit Point Realty
and Development Corporation x x x while in the discharge of their administrative functions
did then and there unlawfully, through evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence and
with manifest partiality towards Summit caused me injury in the sum of P20,000,000.00 by
cancelling my TD #00942-A in the Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City and instead
issuing in the name of Francisco Catigbac TC #00949-A when aforesaid personalities well
knew that TCT No. 129642 was already cancelled and therefore not legally entitled to a new
tax declaration thereby manifestly favoring Summit Point Realty and Development
Corporation who now appears to be the successor-in-interest of Francisco Catigbac, all to my
damage and prejudice.20 (Emphasis ours.)
Petitioner’s Complaint Affidavit gave rise to simultaneous administrative and preliminary
(criminal) investigations, docketed as OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F,
respectively.
Petitioner pointed out several irregularities in the circumstances surrounding the alleged sale
of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty and in the documents evidencing the same.
The supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Summit Realty executed on 22 July 2002 by
Leonardo Yagin (Yagin), as Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact, appeared to be a "one-way street." It
did not express the desire of Summit Realty, as vendee, to purchase Lot 1-B or indicate its
consent and conformity to the terms of the Deed. No representative of Summit Realty signed
the left margin of each and every page of said Deed. It also did not appear from the Deed that
a representative of Summit Realty presented himself before the Notary Public who notarized
the said document. The Tax Identification Numbers of Yagin, as vendor, and Summit Realty,
as vendee, were not stated in the Deed.
Petitioner also averred that, being a corporation, Summit Realty could only act through its
Board of Directors. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot 1-B was presented for
recording before the Register of Deeds, it was not accompanied by a Secretary’s Certificate
attesting to the existence of a Board Resolution which authorized said purchase by Summit
Realty. There was no entry regarding such a Secretary’s Certificate and/or Board Resolution,
whether on TCT No. 129642 or TCT No. T-134609. A Secretary’s Certificate eventually
surfaced, but it was executed only on 30 July 2002, five days after TCT No. T-134609 in the
name of Summit Realty was already issued.
The Deed of Absolute Sale was presented before and recorded by the Register of Deeds of
Lipa City on 25 July 2002 at 2:30 p.m., at exactly the same date and time TCT No. T-134609
was issued to Summit Realty. Petitioner theorizes that for this to happen, TCT No. T-134609
was already prepared and ready even before the presentation for recording of the Deed of
Absolute Sale before the Register of Deeds.
Moreover, Catigbac had long been dead and buried. The agency Catigbac supposedly executed
in favor of Yagin was extinguished by Catigbac’s death. Thus, petitioner argued, Yagin no
longer had authority to execute on 22 July 2002 the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot 1-B in favor
of Summit Realty, making the said Deed null and void ab initio.
Petitioner asserted that Summit Realty was well-aware of Catigbac’s death, having
acknowledged the same in LRC Case No. 00-0376, the Petition for Issuance of New Owner’s
Duplicate of TCT No. 181 In Lieu of Lost One, filed by Summit Realty before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City. During the ex parte presentation of evidence in the latter part
of 2000, Orense testified on behalf of Summit Realty that Catigbac’s property used to form
part of a bigger parcel of land, Lot 1 of Plan Psu-12014, measuring 132,975 square meters,
covered by TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac; after Catigbac’s death, Lot 1 was
informally subdivided into several parts among his heirs and/or successors-in-interest, some of
whom again transferred their shares to other persons; Summit Realty separately bought
subdivided parts of Lot 181 from their respective owners, with a consolidated area of 105,648
square meters, and identified as Lot 1-B after survey; despite the subdivision and transfer of
ownership of Lot 1, TCT No. 181 covering the same was never cancelled; and the owner’s
duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost and the fact of such loss was annotated at the back of the
original copy of TCT No. 181 with the Registry of Deeds. Subsequently, in an Order21 dated 3
January 2001, the RTC granted the Petition in LRC Case No. 00-0376 and directed the
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac, under the same
terms and condition as in its original form.
Petitioner further cast doubt on the acts undertaken by Summit Realty in connection with
Catigbac’s property, purportedly without legal personality and capacity. The Special Power of
Attorney dated 6 February 1976 granted Yagin the right to sue on behalf of Catigbac, yet it
was Summit Realty which instituted LRC Case No. 00-0376, and Yagin had no participation
at all in said case. Likewise, it was not Yagin, but Orense, who, through a letter22dated 27 June
2001, requested the cancellation of TCT No. 181 covering Lot 1 and the issuance of a new
certificate of title for Lot 1-B. Hence, it was Orense’s request which resulted in the issuance of
TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac, later cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609
in the name of Summit Realty.
Lastly, petitioner questioned why, despite the cancellation of TCT No. 129642 in the name of
Catigbac and the issuance in its place of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty, it
was the former cancelled title which was used as basis for canceling petitioner’s Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A. Tax Declaration No. 00949-A was thus still issued in the name of
Catigbac, instead of Summit Realty.
Piecing everything together, petitioner recounted in her Complaint Affidavit the alleged
scheme perpetrated against her and the involvement therein of each of the conspirators:
28. Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation went into action right after I paid
Orense a visit sometime May 2002. Summit resurrected from the grave. (sic) Francisco
Catigbac whom they knew to be long dead to face possible litigation. This is the height of
malice and bad faith on the part of Summit through its Lauro Leviste II, the Executive Vice
President and Benedicto Orense, the Vice President. I had only in my favor a tax declaration to
show my interest and ownership over the 5, 000 sq.m. of the subject parcel of land. Evidently,
Leviste and Orense came to the desperate conclusion that they needed a TCT which is a far
better title than any tax declaration.
Both then methodically commenced their evil and illegal scheme by causing on June 26, 2002
at 11:20 a.m. the inscription with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City of a purported Special
Power of Attorney in favor of Leonardo Yagin (Annex "I"). Next, the Deed of Absolute Sale
(Annex "J") was made the following month in order to make it appear that
Yagin unilaterally sold to Summit the subject parcel of land purportedly belonging to
Francisco Catigbac. Since the latter was already dead and realizing that the agency was
already extinguished, Annex "J" was not signed or executed by Leviste or Orense. This fact
however did not deter the two from securing a BIR clearance on July 25, 2002. Also, on this
same day, July 25, 2002, Annex "J" was presented to Atty. [Escutin] at 2:30 p.m.
simultaneously, at exactly the same time of 2:30 p.m. TCT No. T-134609 in Summit’s name
was issued by Atty. [Escutin] WITHOUT benefit of the submission of the necessary
documentation such as the Board Resolution, DAR Clearance, Revenue Tax Receipts for
documentary stamps, real property tax clearance, proof of payment of transfer tax, tax
declaration, articles of incorporation, SEC certification, license to sell and/or certificate of
registration by HLURB, etc. Without the total and lightning speed cooperation of Atty.
[Escutin] to close his eyes to the total absence of said vital documents, the desperately needed
TCT to erase my interest and ownership would not have come into existence. Atty. [Escutin]
had indeed acted in concert and in conspiracy with Leviste and Orense in producing Annex
"H" and Annex "K".
29. Thereafter, Leviste and Orense utilized the already cancelled TCT No. 129642 in the name
of Francisco Catigbac to be the basis in seeking the cancellation of TD #00942A in my name
(Annex "F"). The Tax Mapping Division of the Office of City Assessor of Lipa City opined
that my 5,000 sq.m. was (sic) part and parcel of the 105,648 sq.m. covered by TCT No.
129642. A photocopy of the Certification from said division is hereto marked and attached as
Annex "P", hereof. Aquilina Mistas, the Local Assessment Operations Officer III of the Office
of the City Assessor of Lipa City then conveniently caused the disappearance of my Notice of
Levy and other supporting documents which she had personally received from me on March
13, 2002. For her part of the conspiracy likewise, Marietta Linatoc, Records Clerk, forthwith
cancelled by TD#00942-A and in lieu thereof she issued TD #00949-A in the name of
Francisco Catigbac. I dare say so because Mistas and Linatoc were presented a cancelled TCT
as basis for obliterating my 5,000 sq.m. The fact of cancellation is clearly stated on the
posterior side of TCT No. 129642. Both can read. But the two nevertheless proceeded with
dispatch in canceling my TD, though they had ample time and opportunity to reject the request
of Summit who is not even the registered owner appearing on TCT No. 129642. Francisco
Catigbac could not have been in front of Mistas and Linatoc because he was already six feet
below the ground. Mistas and Linatoc could have demanded presentation of the document
authorizing Summit in requesting for the cancellation of my TD. Also, they could have
demanded from Summit any document transferring my interest and ownership in favor of a
third party. Or, at least, they could have annotated in Tax Declaration No. 00949-A the fact
that I bought my 5,000 sq.m. from a public auction sale duly conducted by the court sheriff.
Alternatively, Linatoc and Mistas should have advised Summit to the effect that since they
already appear to be the owners of the subject parcel of land, the new tax declaration should
bear their name instead. Mistas and Linatoc indeed conspired with Summit in the illegal and
unwarranted cancellation of my TD and in covering up the behind-the-scenes activities of
Summit by making it appear that it was Francisco Catigbac who caused the cancellation. Even
Leonardo Yagin, the alleged attorney-in-fact did not appear before Mistas and Linatoc. Yagin
could not have appeared because he is rumored to be long dead. The aforementioned acts of
the two benefitted (sic) Summit through their manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or
gross inexcusable negligence. Perhaps, there is some truth to the rumor that Yagin is dead
because he does not even have a TIN in the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale. If indeed Yagin
is already dead or inexistent[,] the allged payment of the purchase price of P5,282,400.00 on
July 25, 2002 is a mere product of the fertile imagination of Orense and
Leviste.1avvphi1.zw+ To dispute this assertion[,] the live body of Leonardo Yagin must be
presented by Orense and Leviste.23
After filing her Affidavit Complaint, petitioner attempted to have the Sheriff’s Deed of Final
Sale/Conveyance of her 5,000 square meter pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713 registered with
the Register of Deeds of Lipa City. She also sought the annotation of her Affidavit of Adverse
Claim on the said 5,000 square meters on TCT No. T-134609 of Summit Realty.
Escutin, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, relying on the finding of Examiner Juanita H. Sta.
Ana (Sta. Ana), refused to have the Sheriff’s Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance registered, since:
The Sheriff’s Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance is a Mode of Transfers (sic) ownership in favor
of the Plaintiff, [Dinah] C. Castillo, (sic) However[,] it happen (sic) that the presented Tax
Declaration [No.] 00942-A is already transfer (sic) in the name of the said [Dinah] C. Castillo,
therefore[,] the registration of Sheriff (sic) Final Sale is no longer necessary.24
Escutin likewise denied petitioner’s request to have her Affidavit of Adverse Claim annotated
on TCT No. T-134609 on the following grounds:
1. The claimants (sic) rights or interest is not adverse to the registered owner. The
registered owner is Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-134609 of the Registry of Deeds for Lipa City.
2. The records of the Registry reveals that the source of the rights or interest of the
adverse claimant is by virtue of a Levy on Execution by the Regional Trial Court
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 30, San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP-4489
(1996), [Dinah] C. Castillo vs. Raquel Buenaventura. The registered owner, Summit
Point Realty and Development Corporation nor its predecessor-in-interest are not the
judgment debtor or a party in the said case. Simply stated, there is no privity of
contract between them (Consulta No. 1044 and 1119). If ever, her adverse claim is
against Raquel Buenaventura, the judgment debtor who holds no title over the
property.25
Escutin did mention, however, that petitioner may elevate en consulta to the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) the denial of her request for registration of the Sheriff’s Deed of Final
Sale/Conveyance and annotation of her adverse claim on TCT No. T-134609. This petitioner
did on 3 July 2003.
While her Consulta was pending before the LRA, petitioner filed a Supplemental Complaint
Affidavit26 and a Second Supplemental Complaint Affidavit27 with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, bringing to its attention the aforementioned developments. In her
Second Supplemental Complaint Affidavit, petitioner prayed that Sta. Ana be included as a
co-respondent in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, averring that the latter’s
actuation deprived petitioner of a factual basis for securing a new title in her favor over her
5,000 square meter pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713, because the public auction sale of the said
property to her could never become final without the registration of the Sheriff’s Deed.
The persons charged in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F filed their respective
Counter-Affidavits.
Respondent Escutin clarified in his Counter Affidavit that TCT No. T-134609 reflected the
same date and time of entry of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Yagin (as Catigbac’s
attorney-in-fact) and Summit Realty, i.e., 25 July 2002 at 2:30 p.m., in accordance with
Section 5628 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree. He emphasized that his duty as Register of Deeds to register the Deed of Absolute
Sale presented before him was purely ministerial. If the document was legal and in due form,
and there was nothing mutilated or irregular on its face, the Register of Deeds had no authority
to inquire into its intrinsic validity based upon proofs aliunde. It was not true that he allowed
the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale notwithstanding the absence of the required
documents supporting the application for registration thereof. On the contrary, all the required
documents such as the DAR Clearance, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Certificate
Authorizing Registration (CAR), Real Property Tax, Transfer Tax, Secretary’s Certificate and
Articles of Incorporation of Summit Realty were submitted. While it was true that the
Secretary’s Certificate did not accompany the Deed of Absolute Sale upon the presentation of
the latter for registration, Section 117 of the Property Registration Decree gives the party
seeking registration five days to comply with the rest of the requirements; and only if the party
should still fail to submit the same would it result in the denial of the registration. The License
to Sell and the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Registration of Summit Realty are
only required when a subdivision project is presented for registration. The use of TINs in
certain documents is a BIR requirement. The BIR itself did not require from Yagin as vendor
his TIN in the Deed of Absolute Sale, and issued the CAR even in the absence thereof. The
Register of Deeds, therefore, was only bound by the CAR. As to the Certification earlier
issued by the Register of Deeds of Lipa City attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners
Raquel, Urbana, and Perla, was not covered by any certificate of title, Escutin explained that
the Register of Deeds was not technically equipped to determine whether a cadastral lot
number was within a titled property or not. Lastly, Escutin denied conspiring or participating
in the cancellation of petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-A for, as Register of Deeds, he
was not concerned with the issuance (or cancellation) of tax declarations.
Respondent Mistas, the Assistant City Assessor for Administration of the Office of the City
Assessor, Lipa City, disputed petitioner’s allegations that she personally received from
petitioner copies of the Notice of Levy and other supporting documents, and that she caused
the disappearance thereof. Although she admitted that said documents were shown to her by
petitioner, she referred petitioner to the Receiving Clerk, Lynie Reyes, who accordingly
received the same. Mistas maintained that she was not the custodian of records of the Office
and she should not be held responsible for the missing documents. She opined that petitioner’s
documents could have been among those misplaced or destroyed when the Office of the City
Assessor was flooded with water leaking from the toilet of the Office of the City Mayor. As
Assistant City Assessor for Administration, Mistas identified her main function to be the
control and management of all phases of administrative matters and support. She had no hand
in the cancellation of petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-A, and the issuance of
Catigbac’s Tax Declaration No. 00949-A for such function pertained to another division over
which she did not exercise authority. Thus, it was also not within her function or authority to
demand the presentation of certain documents to support the cancellation of petitioner’s Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A or to cause the annotation of petitioner’s interest on Catigbac’s Tax
Declaration No. 00949-A.
Respondent Linatoc averred that as Local Assessment Operation Officer II of the Office of the
City Assessor, Lipa City, she was in charge of safekeeping and updating the North District
Records. With respect to the transfer of a tax declaration from one name to another, her duty
was limited only to the act of preparing the new tax declaration and assigning it a number, in
lieu of the cancelled tax declaration. It was a purely ministerial duty. She had no authority to
demand the presentation of any document or question the validity of the transfer. Neither was
it within her jurisdiction to determine whether petitioner’s interest should have been annotated
on Catigbac’s Tax Declaration No. 00949-A. Examining the documents presented in support
of the transfer of the tax declaration to another’s name was a function belonging to other
divisions of the Office of the City Assessors. The flow of work, the same as in any other
ordinary transaction, mandated her to cancel petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-A, and to
prepare and release Catigbac’s Tax Declaration No. 00949-A after the transfer had been
reviewed and approved by other divisions of the Office. It was also not true that TCT No.
129642 in the name of Catigbac was already cancelled when it was presented before the
Office of the City Assessors; the photocopy of said certificate of title with the Office bore no
mark of cancellation.
Leviste and Orense, the private individuals charged with the respondent public officers,
admitted that they were corporate officers of Summit Realty. They related that Summit Realty
bought a parcel of land measuring 105,648 square meters, later identified as Lot 1-B,
previously included in TCT No. 181, then specifically covered by TCT No. 129642, both in
the name of Catigbac. As a result of such purchase, ownership of Lot 1-B was transferred from
Catigbac to Summit Realty. Summit Realty had every reason to believe in good faith that said
property was indeed owned by Catigbac on the basis of the latter’s certificate of title over the
same. Catigbac’s right as registered owner of Lot 1-B under TCT No. 181/No. 129642, was
superior to petitioner’s, which was based on a mere tax declaration. Leviste and Orense
rebutted petitioner’s assertion that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Yagin, as Catigbac’s
attorney-in-fact, and Summit Realty was a "one-way street." The Deed was actually signed on
the left margin by both Yagin and the representative of Summit Realty. The inadvertent failure
of the representative of Summit Realty to sign the last page of the Deed and of both parties to
indicate their TINs therein did not invalidate the sale, especially since the Deed was signed by
witnesses attesting to its due execution. Questions as regards the scope of Catigbac’s Special
Power of Attorney in favor of Yagin and the effectivity of the same after Catigbac’s death can
only be raised in an action directly attacking the title of Summit Realty over Lot 1-B, and not
in an administrative case and/or preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman, which
constituted a collateral attack against said title. Leviste and Orense further explained that since
the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost and was judicially ordered replaced only on 3
January 2001, entries/inscriptions were necessarily made thereon after said date. As to
Orense’s failure to show petitioner any document proving ownership of Lot 1-B by Summit
Realty when the latter paid him a visit, it was not due to the lack of such documents, but
because of petitioner’s failure to establish her right to peruse the same. Orense also denied
ever threatening petitioner during their meeting. Finally, according to Leviste and Orense,
petitioner’s allegations were based on mere conjectures and unsupported by evidence. That
particular acts were done or not done by certain public officials was already beyond the
control of Leviste and Orense, and just because they benefited from these acts did not mean
that they had a hand in the commission or omission of said public officials.
After more exchange of pleadings, OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F were
finally submitted for resolution.
In a Joint Resolution29 dated 28 April 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
gave more credence to respondent Escutin’s defenses, as opposed to petitioner’s charges
against him:
Going to the charges against respondent Escutin, he convincingly explained that he allowed
the registration of the allegedly defective Deed of Sale because he, as Register of Deeds, has
no power to look into the intrinsic validity [of] the contract presented to him for registration,
owing to the ministerial character of his function. Moreover, as sufficiently explained by said
respondent, all the documents required for the registration of the Deed of Sale were submitted
by the applicant.
We likewise find said respondent’s explanation satisfactory that Section 56 of P.D. 1529
mandates that the TCT bear the date of registration of the instrument on which the said TCT’s
issuance was based. It is for this reason that TCT 134609 bears the same date and time as the
registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale, which deed served as basis for its issuance.
As to his denial to register [herein petitioner’s] Affidavit of Adverse Claim and Sheriff’s
Certificate of Final Sale, through the issuance by the Registry of Deeds Examiner Juanita H.
Sta. Ana, of the 29 June 2003 Order denying registration thereof, such matter had been raised
by herein [petitioner] in a letter-consulta to the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) on 03 July 2003. As the criminal and administrative charges respecting this
issue is premised, in part, on a matter still pending with the LRA, we find it premature to make
a finding on the same.
It is for the same reason that we deny the motion contained in the Second Supplemental
Complaint Affidavit praying for the inclusion, as additional respondent, of Juanita H. Sta.
Ana, who is impleaded solely on the basis of having signed, by authority of Escutin, the 29
July 2003 Order of denial of [petitioner’s] application for registration.
Finally, respondent Escutin was able to successfully demonstrate, through Consulta 2103
dated 25 July 1994, wherein the denial of registration by the Examiner of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City was upheld by the LRA Administrator, that the (sic) it was practice in
the different Registries that Examiners are given authority by the Register to sign letters of
denial.30
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon declared in the same Joint Resolution that
there was no basis to hold respondents Mistas and Linatoc administratively or criminally
liable:
In this respect, this Office notes that while [herein petitioner] alleges that Aquilina Mistas
caused the disappearance of the Notice of Levy and other supporting documents received from
[petitioner] on 13 March 2003 when she applied for the issuance of a Tax Declaration in her
favor, she did not present her receiving copy thereof showing that it was Mistas who received
said documents from her. Neither did she show that Mistas is the employee responsible for
record safekeeping.
Next, we find, as convincingly answered, the allegation that respondent Marietta Linatoc
cancelled Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and issued Tax Declaration 00949-Q (sic) on the basis
of a cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title upon the behest of Summit [Realty], which was not
the registered owner of the property.
Respondent Linatoc, meeting squarely [petitioner’s] allegation, admits having physically
cancelled Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and having prepared a new declaration covering the
same property in Catigbac’s [name], as mandated by the flow of work in the City Assessor’s
Office. However, she denies having the authority or discretion to evaluate the correctness and
sufficiency of the documents supporting the application for the issuance of the Tax
Declaration, arguing that her official function is limited to the physical preparation of a new
tax declaration, the assignment of a new tax declaration number and the cancellation of the old
tax declaration, after the application had passed the other divisions of the City Assessor’s
Office.
Verily, [petitioner] failed to establish that respondent Mistas and Linatoc, are the ones
officially designated to receive applications for issuance of Tax Declaration, evaluate the
sufficiency of the documents supporting such applications, and on the basis of the foregoing
recommend or order the cancellation of an existing Tax Declaration and direct the annotation
of any fact affecting the property and direct the issuance of a new tax declaration covering the
same property.
In fact, there is even a discrepancy as to the official designation of said respondents. While
[petitioner] impleads Mistas, in her capacity as Local Assessment Officer, and Linatoc, in her
capacity as Records Clerk, Mistas, in her counter-affidavit, alleges a different designation, i.e.,
Assistant City Assessor for Administration, while Linatoc claims to be the Local Assessment
Operation Officer II of the City Assessor’s Office.
With the scope of work of said respondents not having been neatly defined by [petitioner], this
Office cannot make a definitive determination of their liability for Grave Misconduct and
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which charges both relate to the performance or
discharge of Mistas’ and Linatoc’s official duties.31
Neither did the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon find any probable cause to
criminally charge private individuals Leviste and Orense for the following reasons:
Anent private respondents, with the alleged conspiracy to unlawfully cause the transfer of the
title of [herein petitioner’s] property to Summit sufficiently explained by respondent Register
of Deeds, such allegation against private respondents loses a legal leg to stand on.1avvphi.zw+
Inasmuch as [petitioner] was not able to sufficiently outline the official functions of
respondents Mistas and Linatoc to pin down their specific accountabilities, the imputation that
private respondent (sic) conspired with said public respondents respecting the cancellation of
Tax Declaration No. 00942-A is likewise stripped of any factual and legal bases.32
As to whether petitioner was indeed unlawfully deprived of her 5,000 square meter property,
which issue comprised the very premise of OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F,
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon ruled that such matter was not within its
jurisdiction and should be raised in a civil action before the courts of justice.
In the end, the Office of the Ombudsman decreed:
WHEREFORE premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that : (1) the
administrative case against public respondents ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN, AQUILINA A.
MISTAS and MARIETA L. LINATOC be DISMISSED, for lack of substantial evidence; and
(2) the criminal case against the same respondents including private respondent LAURO S.
LEVISTE II and BENEDICTO L. ORENSE, be DISMISSED, for lack of probable cause.33
In a Joint Order34 dated 20 June 2005, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in its Joint Order, took notice of the
Resolution dated 17 December 2002 of the LRA in Consulta No. 3483, which involved
circumstances similar to those in petitioner’s case. The LRA distinguished between two
systems of land registration: one is the Torrens system for registered lands under the Property
Registration Decree, and the other is the system of registration for unregistered land under Act
No. 3344 (now Section 113 of the Property Registration Decree). These systems are separate
and distinct from each other. For documents involving registered lands, the same should be
recorded under the Property Registration Decree. The registration, therefore, of an instrument
under the wrong system produces no legal effect. Since it appeared that in Consulta No. 3483,
the registration of the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan, the Certificate of Sale and the Affidavit of
Consolidation was made under Act No. 3344, it did not produce any legal effect on the
disputed property, because the said property was already titled when the aforementioned
documents were executed and presented for registration, and their registration should have
been made under the Property Registration Decree.
Furthermore, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in the same Joint Order, took
into account petitioner’s withdrawal of her appeal en consulta before the LRA of the denial by
the Register of Deeds of her request for registration of the Sheriff’s Deed of Final
Sale/Conveyance and Affidavit of Adverse Claim, which prompted the LRA Administrator to
declare the consulta moot and academic. For want of a categorical declaration on the
registerability of petitioner’s documents from the LRA, the competent authority to rule on the
said matter, there could be no basis for a finding that respondent public officers could be held
administratively or criminally liable for the acts imputed to them.
Petitioner sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court challenging the 28 April 2004 Joint Resolution and 20 June
2005 Joint Order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.35 The appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90533.1avvphi1
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision36 on 18 October 2005, also finding no reason
to administratively or criminally charge respondents. Essentially, the appellate court adjudged
that petitioner can not impute corrupt motives to respondents’ acts:
Without evidence showing that respondents received any gift, money or other pay-off or that
they were induced by offers of such, the Court cannot impute any taint of direct corruption in
the questioned acts of respondents. Thus, any indication of intent to violate the laws or of
flagrant disregard of established rule may be negated by respondents’ honest belief that their
acts were sanctioned under the provisions of existing law and regulations. Such is the situation
in the case at bar. Respondent Register of Deeds acted in the honest belief that the agency
recognized by the court in LRC Case No. 00-0376 between the registered owner Francisco
Catigbac and Leonardo Yagin subsisted with respect to the conveyance or sale of Lot 1 to
Summit as the vendee, and that the Special Power of Attorney and Deed of Absolute Sale
presented as evidence during said proceedings are valid and binding. Hence, respondent
Escutin was justified in believing that there is no legal infirmity or defect in registering the
documents and proceeding with the transfer of title of Lot 1 in the name of the new owner
Summit. On the other hand, respondent Linatoc could not be held administratively liable for
effecting the cancellation in the course of ordinary flow of work in the City Assessor’s Office
after the documents have undergone the necessary evaluation and verification by her
superiors.37
The Court of Appeals referred to the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to interfere
with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his investigatory power. If the Ombudsman, using
professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless
clothed with grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court pronounced that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in
dismissing petitioner’s Complaint Affidavit against respondents.
Hence, the dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The challenged Joint Resolution dated April 28, 2004 and Joint Order dated June 20,
2005 in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F are hereby AFFIRMED.38
In its Resolution dated 11 January 2006, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for failing to present new matter which the appellate court had not already
considered in its earlier Decision.
Petitioner now comes before this Court via the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, with
the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
CANCELLATION OF THE TAX DECLARATION 00942 OF PETITIONER IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION ACT (sic);
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENTS COULD NOT BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR
UNDULY FAVORING SUMMIT TO THE DAMAGE AND PREJUDICE OF
PETITIONER.39
The Petition at bar is without merit.
As to the first issue, petitioner invokes Section 109 of the Property, Registration Decree which
provides:
SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. – In case of loss or theft of an
owner’s duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by
someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as
soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the
registration of any new instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction
may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after
notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a
memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in
all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be
regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
Petitioner argues that the RTC, in LRC Case No. 00-0376, only ordered the issuance of a new
owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 in lieu of the lost one. However, respondents did not only
issue a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181, but also cancelled petitioner’s Tax Declaration
No. 00942-A and issued in its place Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of Catigbac.
Respondents did not even annotate petitioner’s existing right over 5,000 square meters of Lot
1-B or notify petitioner of the cancellation of her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A. Petitioner
maintains that a new owner’s duplicate of title is not a mode of acquiring ownership, nor is it a
mode of losing one. Under Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree, the new duplicate
of title was issued only to replace the old; it cannot cancel existing titles.
Petitioner’s position on this issue rests on extremely tenuous arguments and befuddled
reasoning.
Before anything else, the Court must clarify that a title is different from a certificate of title.
Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. It is
that which is the foundation of ownership of property, real or personal.40 Title, therefore, may
be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is
the foundation of ownership of property.41 Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere
evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself.42 Under the Torrens system, a
certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title, which constitutes a true copy of the
decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title, issued subsequent to the original
registration.
Summit Realty acquired its title to Lot 1-B, not from the issuance of the new owner’s
duplicate of TCT No. 181, but from its purchase of the same from Yagin, the attorney-in-fact
of Catigbac, the registered owner of the said property. Summit Realty merely sought the
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac so that it could
accordingly register thereon the sale in its favor of a substantial portion of Lot 1 covered by
said certificate, later identified as Lot 1-B. Catigbac’s title to Lot 1-B passed on by sale to
Summit Realty, giving the latter the right to seek the separation of the said portion from the
rest of Lot 1 and the issuance of a certificate of title specifically covering the same. This
resulted in the issuance of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac, covering Lot 1-B, which
was subsequently cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit
Realty.
Petitioner’s reliance on Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree is totally misplaced. It
provides for the requirements for the issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title. It cannot,
in any way, be related to the cancellation of petitioner’s tax declaration.
The cancellation of petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was not because of the issuance
of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181, but of the fact that Lot 1-B, which encompassed
the 5,000 square meters petitioner lays claim to, was already covered by TCT No. 181 (and
subsequently by TCT No. 129642) in the name of Catigbac. A certificate of title issued is an
absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole world.43 All persons must
take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.44 Therefore, upon presentation
of TCT No. 129642, the Office of the City Assessor must recognize the ownership of Lot 1-B
by Catigbac and issue in his name a tax declaration for the said property. And since Lot 1-B is
already covered by a tax declaration in the name of Catigbac, accordingly, any other tax
declaration for the same property or portion thereof in the name of another person, not
supported by any certificate of title, such that of petitioner, must be cancelled; otherwise, the
City Assessor would be twice collecting a realty tax from different persons on one and the
same property.
As between Catigbac’s title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioner’s title, evidenced
only by a tax declaration, the former is evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any
other certificate of title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to Catigbac’s
ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbac’s certificate of title is binding upon the whole world,
including respondent public officers and even petitioner herself. Time and again, the Court has
ruled that tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to prove title to or
ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of the
same.45 Petitioner acquired her title to the 5,000 square meter property from Raquel, her
judgment debtor who, it is important to note, likewise only had a tax declaration to evidence
her title. In addition, the Court of Appeals aptly observed that, "[c]uriously, as to how and
when petitioner’s alleged predecessor-in-interest, Raquel K. Moratilla and her supposed co-
owners acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot 13713 stated in TD No. 00449, petitioner
had so far remained utterly silent."46
Petitioner’s allegations of defects or irregularities in the sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty by
Yagin, as Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact, are beyond the jurisdiction of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon to consider. It must be remembered that Summit Realty had already
acquired a certificate of title, TCT No. T-134609, in its name over Lot 1-B, which constitutes
conclusive and indefeasible evidence of its ownership of the said property and, thus, cannot be
collaterally attacked in the administrative and preliminary investigations conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree
categorically provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
For this same reason, the Court has no jurisdiction to grant petitioner’s prayer in the instant
Petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty.
Which now brings the Court to the second issue raised by petitioner on the administrative
liability of respondents.
Before the Court proceeds to tackle this issue, it establishes that petitioner’s Complaint
Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon gave rise to two charges: (1) OMB-
L-A-03-0573-F involved the administrative charge for Gross Misconduct against respondent
public officers; and (2) OMB-L-C-03-0728-F concerned the criminal charge for violation of
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act47 against respondent public officers
and private individuals Leviste and Orense. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, dismissed both charges. In the Petition at bar, petitioner
only assails the dismissal of the administrative charge for grave misconduct against respondent
public officers. Since petitioner did not raise as an issue herein the dismissal by the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, of the criminal charge
against respondent public officers for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, the same became final and executory.48
In Domingo v. Quimson,49 the Court adopted the well-written report and recommendation of
its Clerk of Court on the administrative matter then pending and involving the charge of gross
or serious misconduct:
"Under Section 36, par. (b) [1] of PD No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of
the Philippines, 'misconduct' is a ground for disciplinary action. And under MC No. 8, S.
1970, issued by the Civil Service Commission on July 28, 1970, which sets the 'Guidelines in
the Application of Penalties in Administrative Cases and other Matters Relative Thereto,' the
administrative offense of 'grave misconduct' carries with it the maximum penalty of dismissal
from the service (Sec. IV-C[3], MC No. 8, S. 1970). But the term 'misconduct' as an
administrative offense has a well defined meaning. It was defined in Amosco vs. Judge
Magno, Adm. Mat. No. 439-MJ, Res. September 30, 1976, as referring 'to a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer.' It is a misconduct 'such as affects the performance of his
duties as an officer and not such only as effects his character as a private individual.' In the
recent case of Oao vs. Pabato, etc., Adm. Mat. No. 782-MJ, Res. July 29, 1977, the Court
defined 'serious misconduct' as follows:
‘Hence, even assuming that the dismissal of the case is erroneous, this would be merely an
error of judgment and not serious misconduct. The term `serious misconduct’ is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action more particularly, unlawful
behavior of gross negligence by the magistrate. It implies a wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment. For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing
that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by intention to violate the law, or
were a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. We have previously ruled that
negligence and ignorance on the part of a judge are inexcusable if they imply a manifest
injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. This is not so in the case at
bar.’" (Italics supplied.)
To reiterate, for grave misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the
acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were a
persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. Both the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon and the Court of Appeals found that there was no sufficient evidence to substantiate
petitioner’s charge of grave misconduct against respondents. For this Court to reverse the
rulings of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals, it must
necessarily review the evidence presented by the parties and decide on a question of fact. Once
it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of
fact.50
Factual issues are not cognizable by this Court in a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. In order to resolve this issue, the Court would necessarily have to look into the
probative value of the evidence presented in the proceedings below. It is not the function of
the Court to reexamine or reevaluate the evidence all over again. This Court is not a trier of
facts, its jurisdiction in these cases being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have
been committed by the lower courts or administrative bodies performing quasi-judicial
functions. It should be emphasized that findings made by an administrative body, which has
acquired expertise, are accorded not only respect but even finality by the Court. In
administrative proceedings, the quantum of evidence required is only substantial.51
Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court shall not disturb findings of
fact. The Court cannot weigh once more the evidence submitted, not only before the
Ombudsman, but also before the Court of Appeals. Under Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770, findings of fact by the Ombudsman are conclusive, as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence.52 Substantial evidence is the amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.53
The Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon and the Court of Appeals that respondents did not commit gross misconduct. Evident
from the 28 April 2004 Joint Resolution of the former and the 18 October 2005 Decision of
the latter is that they arrived at such findings only after a meticulous consideration of the
evidence submitted by the parties.
Respondents were able to clearly describe their official functions and to convincingly explain
that they had only acted in accordance therewith in their dealings with petitioner and/or her
documents. Respondents also enjoy in their favor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their official duty. The burden of proving otherwise by substantial evidence
falls on petitioner, who failed to discharge the same.
From the very beginning, petitioner was unable to identify correctly the positions held by
respondents Mistas and Linatoc at the Office of the City Assessor. How then could she even
assert that a particular action was within or without their jurisdiction to perform? While it may
be true that petitioner should have at least been notified that her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A
was being cancelled, she was not able to establish that such would be the responsibility of
respondents Mistas or Linatoc. Moreover, petitioner did not present statutory, regulatory, or
procedural basis for her insistence that respondents should have done or not done a particular
act. A perfect example was her assertion that respondents Mistas and Linatoc should have
annotated her interest on Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of Catigbac. However, she
failed to cite any law or rule which authorizes or recognizes the annotation of an adverse
interest on a tax declaration. Finally, absent any reliable evidence, petitioner’s charge that
respondents conspired with one another and with corporate officers of Summit Realty is
nothing more than speculation, surmise, or conjecture. Just because the acts of respondents
were consistently favorable to Summit Realty does not mean that there was a concerted effort
to cause petitioner prejudice. Respondents’ actions were only consistent with the recognition
of the title of Catigbac over Lot 1-B, transferred by sale to Summit Realty, registered under
the Torrens system, and accordingly evidenced by certificates of title.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated 18 October 2005 and Resolution dated 11 January 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90533 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner
Dinah C. Castillo.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and
a temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority
("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari
Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of
Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with
AMARI involving such reclamation.
The Facts
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways,
signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The
contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road.
CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total
reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged
areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."1 On
the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA
the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"2 under the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend
its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and
owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated
December 29, 1981, which stated:
"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in the
MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to progress of
works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be agreed upon, subject to
price escalation, retention and other terms and conditions provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing required for such works shall be
provided by PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede
and transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation of
CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of
December 30, 1981 which have not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise disposed
of by CDCP as of said date, which areas consist of approximately Ninety-Nine
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in the Financial
Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and approximately Three Million Three
Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square
meters of reclaimed areas at varying elevations above Mean Low Water Level
located outside the Financial Center Area and the First Neighborhood Unit."3
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517,
granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine
hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently,
on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three
reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area of
One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441)
square meters or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with
AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the
reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to
complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation
Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public
bidding.4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245,
confirmed the JVA.5On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in
the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The
Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No.
560 dated September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed
lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which
the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these
lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA
itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative
Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in
view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the
Secretary of Justice,8 the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,9 and the Government Corporate
Counsel.10 The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there
were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then
President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA
Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel
of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the
petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of
the case before the proper court."12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the
instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to
lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays
that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28,
Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the
public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Finally,
petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State
that are of public dominion.
After several motions for extension of time,13 PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on
October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28, 1998,
petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the renegotiated
PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case
for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO
dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and required
the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement
("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the
administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays
that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and
void."14
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15 and AMARI16 are as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION
ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO
OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION
INCLUDES OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS
BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS,
RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS
GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.
The Court's Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic
because of subsequent events.
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the on-going
negotiations for a new agreement." The petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA from
"privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any new agreement with AMARI."
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI furnished
petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed Amended JVA containing the terms and
conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a
public disclosure of the renegotiations. Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the signing of
the Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and AMARI have already signed the Amended
JVA on March 30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the Amended
JVA on May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply fast-
tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on the
issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from the
ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the
President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and
AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the
Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if
in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution.
Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of Section
3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating lands of the
public domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it
is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already implemented, to annul the
effects of such unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer
title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila
Bay to a single private corporation. It now becomes more compelling for the Court to resolve
the issue to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution
intended to safeguard the national patrimony. Supervening events, whether intended or
accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of
the Constitution. In the instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter to the Constitution, the
Court can still prevent the transfer of title and ownership of alienable lands of the public
domain in the name of AMARI. Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases
moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public.17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the Court
involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the
1973 Constitution,18 covered agricultural landssold to private corporations which acquired
the lands from private parties. The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could
claim the right to judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles19 under Title II of
Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to
acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and submerged areas for non-
agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA
No. 141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the
consideration for the purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of
their titles because the lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be
reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain for at least thirty years since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing applications for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title expired on December 31, 1987.20
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition
because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to
portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to
AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the
reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time
the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project.21
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the principle
governing the hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly
from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving
factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual
issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to
the public.22 The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to
the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to
exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to disclose publicly
certain information without first asking PEA the needed information. PEA claims petitioner's
direct resort to the Court violates the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It
also violates the rule that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Tañada v. Tuvera23 where the Court granted the
petition for mandamus even if the petitioners there did not initially demand from the Office of
the President the publication of the presidential decrees. PEA points out that in Tañada, the
Executive Department had an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil
Code24 and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63825 to publish the presidential decrees.
There was, therefore, no need for the petitioners in Tañada to make an initial demand from the
Office of the President. In the instant case, PEA claims it has no affirmative statutory duty to
disclose publicly information about its renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that the
Court must apply the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to the instant case in
view of the failure of petitioner here to demand initially from PEA the needed information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government
corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code,26 the disposition of
government lands to private parties requires public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal
duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law
obligated PEA to make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from
anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended
JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA
had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this
legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or
constitutional question.27 The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to
acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands
of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his
constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an
affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has not
shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or implementation of the
Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of
judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel
PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved
here. First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the
application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of
alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to
compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions of
pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The
thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable
lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a
constitutional duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In Chavez v.
PCGG,28 the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters of
transcendental importance to the public, thus -
"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses is an issue of 'transcendental importance to the public.' He asserts that
ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the
validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues
raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social,
economic and moral well being of the people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this
case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which have set aside the procedural
matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case involved public interest.
xxx
In Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right
and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people
are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner
is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid
case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in
connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for
the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be
enforced 'is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the
land.'
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Tañada, further declared that
'when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a
citizen and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which possesses the right.'
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not
have been involved under the questioned contract for the development, management
and operation of the Manila International Container Terminal, 'public interest [was]
definitely involved considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the
economic development of the country and the magnitude of the financial
consideration involved.' We concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure
provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the
petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information
and access to official records, documents and papers — a right guaranteed under
Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general,
is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down
by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a
public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should
be allowed."
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of
constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources -
matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters
of public concern in this manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the
people's right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest." (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and
in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to
exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the
exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts,
transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any
restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to
hold public officials "at all times x x x accountable to the people,"29 for unless citizens have
the proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. Armed with
the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation
of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential
to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As explained by the Court
in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30 –
"An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to
the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.
Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is
informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants
in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating
thereto can such bear fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31 that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to
information is limited to "definite propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right
does not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications
during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in
the 'exploratory stage'."
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or
before the closing of the transaction. To support its contention, AMARI cites the following
discussion in the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished from
contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps
leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it can
cover both steps leading to a contract and already a consummated contract, Mr.
Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you."32 (Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the
right. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage
will degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies. Government officials
will hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public
dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to
disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to
release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and
without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its
property. These include the size, location, technical description and nature of the property
being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the
minimum price and similar information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to
the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract,
because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make this
disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding
process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being
undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right
to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts,
transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes
its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the
government. From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can
access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition. In Chavez v.
PCGG,33 the Court ruled as follows:
"Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is
incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement
they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten
wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the
government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of
being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is need, of course, to
observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed
earlier – such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign
relations, intelligence and other classified information." (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to
the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a
requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never
exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late
for the public to expose its defects.1âwphi1.nêt
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which
may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli.
This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation
which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will
prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposedcontract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an
emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public concern,"
namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions
and decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The first
category refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of government
agencies or officials. The second category refers to documents and papers recording,
evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts,
transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category refers to
research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in
formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes
evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of
reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA.
However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries
and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA.34 The right only affords access to records,
documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who
exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise
of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public
records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and
how to conduct the inspection and copying.35
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged
information under the separation of powers.36 The right does not also apply to information on
military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on
investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused,
which courts have long recognized as confidential.37 The right may also be subject to other
limitations that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged
information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which,
like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive
sessions of either house of Congress,38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of
information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of
exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested
parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.39This is not the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information
on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to
information in several legislations.41
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the
Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.
Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and
possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.42The King, as the sovereign ruler
and representative of the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in the
Philippines except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however,
the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. The
Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all
lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
the public domain."43 Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the
Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the ownership and
disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. On May 18, 1907, the Philippine
Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the lease, but not the sale, of
reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. Later, on November 29,
1919, the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which
authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations
and individuals. On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act
No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of
reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. CA No. 141 continues to
this day as the general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters within
the maritime zone of the Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public use.44 The
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the reclamation of the sea under Article 5, which
provided as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by
the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission,
shall become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise
provided by the terms of the grant of authority."
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party
undertaking the reclamation, provided the government issued the necessary permit and did not
reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is –
 1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar
character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public
use, is employed in some public service, or in the development of the national
wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and
mines, until granted to private individuals."
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast,
property devoted to public service referred to property used for some specific public service
and open only to those authorized to use the property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to
property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property
constituted property of public dominion although employed for some economic or commercial
activity to increase the national wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of public
dominion into private property, to wit:
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to
the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of the State."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department
pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use or territorial
defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to private parties.45
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the lease
of reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions of this law were as follows:
"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing law,
and the title to all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the
Government by dredging or filling or otherwise throughout the Philippine
Islands, shall be retained by the Government without prejudice to vested rights and
without prejudice to rights conceded to the City of Manila in the Luneta Extension.
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or public
lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise to
be divided into lots or blocks, with the necessary streets and alleyways located
thereon, and shall cause plats and plans of such surveys to be prepared and filed with
the Bureau of Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall give notice
to the public that such parts of the lands so made or reclaimed as are not needed
for public purposes will be leased for commercial and business purposes, x x x.
xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and best
bidder therefore, subject to such regulations and safeguards as the Governor-General
may by executive order prescribe." (Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed by the
government. The Act also vested in the government control and disposition of foreshore lands.
Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the government only if these lands were no
longer needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandated public bidding in the lease of
government reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made government reclaimed lands sui generis in
that unlike other public lands which the government could sell to private parties, these
reclaimed lands were available only for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Act
No. 1654 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea under Section 5 of
the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with government
permission remained private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public Land
Act.46 The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:
"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of
the public domain into –
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare
what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which
have been officially delimited or classified x x x.
xxx
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor
mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for
commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural
 purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under
the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other
means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores
or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall be
disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the
Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public
service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class
(d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of the public
domain into x x x alienable or disposable"47 lands. Section 7 of the Act empowered the
Governor-General to "declare what lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of
the Act limited alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially
delimited and classified."
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title48 shall be classified" as
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands, as well as other lands. All these lands,
however, must be suitable for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive non-
agricultural purposes. These provisions vested upon the Governor-General the power to
classify inalienable lands of the public domain into disposable lands of the public domain.
These provisions also empowered the Governor-General to classify further such disposable
lands of the public domain into government reclaimed, foreshore or marshy lands of the public
domain, as well as other non-agricultural lands.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public domain
classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands "shall be disposed of to
private parties by lease only and not otherwise." The Governor-General, before allowing the
lease of these lands to private parties, must formally declare that the lands were "not necessary
for the public service." Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and not to sell
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, a policy first
enunciated in 1907 in Act No. 1654. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands
remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain that the
government could not sell to private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for
public service. This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the
lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these lands for some future
public service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 56 (d). Lands falling under
Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural purposes the government could sell to
private parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874, the government could not sell government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to private parties, unless the legislature passed a law
allowing their sale.49
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to
Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private
parties with government permission remained private lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the Filipino
people. The 1935 Constitution, in adopting the Regalian doctrine, declared in Section 1,
Article XIII, that –
"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital
of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except
as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure
and limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural
lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate. Thus, foreshore lands,
considered part of the State's natural resources, became inalienable by constitutional fiat,
available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The government could
alienate foreshore lands only after these lands were reclaimed and classified as alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain. Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain, being neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under the classification of public
agricultural lands.50 However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to
classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to
private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could
therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and
corporations from acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain that
were classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws. Section 2, Article XIII of
the 1935 Constitution provided as follows:
"Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold
public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and twenty four hectares, nor
may any individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one hundred and
forty hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, or
by homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not
exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private
corporation, or association." (Emphasis supplied)
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section 58 of
Act No. 2874 to open for sale to private parties government reclaimed and marshy lands of the
public domain. On the contrary, the legislature continued the long established State policy of
retaining for the government title and ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands
of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No. 141, also
known as the Public Land Act, which compiled the then existing laws on lands of the public
domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral
lands.51
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into
"alienable or disposable"52 lands of the public domain, which prior to such classification are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the
President to "declare what lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of CA No.
141 states that the government can declare open for disposition or concession only lands that
are "officially delimited and classified." Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as follows:
"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain
into –
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another,53 for the purpose of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which
have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and
which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by
the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a
private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be
claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x
x."
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the
President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare
them open to disposition or concession. There must be no law reserving these lands for public
or quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands
of the public domain, are as follows:
"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor
mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or for commercial,
industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural, and is open to
disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter
and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other
means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores
or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the
case may be, to any person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or
lease public lands for agricultural purposes. x x x.
 Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine shall
be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture, shall declare that
the same are not necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under
this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease
under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, Section 58
of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain. All these lands are intended for residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed only
the lease of such lands to private parties. The government could sell to private parties only
lands falling under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-agricultural purposes
not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public
domain. Foreshore lands, however, became inalienable under the 1935 Constitution which
only allowed the lease of these lands to qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public domain intended
for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than agricultural
"shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise." Under Section
10 of CA No. 141, the term "disposition" includes lease of the land. Any disposition of
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes
must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141,54 unless a subsequent law amended or
repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate Corporation v. Court
of Appeals,55Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized succinctly the law on this matter, as
follows:
"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are
lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654
mandated that the control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under water
remained in the national government. Said law allowed only the 'leasing' of
reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919 and 1936 also declared that the
foreshore and lands reclaimed by the government were to be "disposed of to private
parties by lease only and not otherwise." Before leasing, however, the Governor-
General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, had first to determine that the land reclaimed was not necessary for the
public service. This requisite must have been met before the land could be disposed
of. But even then, the foreshore and lands under water were not to be alienated
and sold to private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land was only by lease.
The land remained property of the State." (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act No. 141 has
remained in effect at present."
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in
CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect. The prohibition on the sale of foreshore
lands, however, became a constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution. Foreshore lands
became inalienable as natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the government and
classified as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they would fall under the
classification of government reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable
lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties.56 These
lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the
government could not sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties government
reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law
authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not authorize the President to reclassify government
reclaimed and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands
classified under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural
purposes that the government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority before lands
under Section 59 that the government previously transferred to government units or entities
could be sold to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 declares that –
"Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the judgment of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be reasonably necessary for the
purposes for which such sale or lease is requested, and shall not exceed one hundred
and forty-four hectares: Provided, however, That this limitation shall not apply to
grants, donations, or transfers made to a province, municipality or branch or
subdivision of the Government for the purposes deemed by said entities conducive
to the public interest;but the land so granted, donated, or transferred to a province,
municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated,
encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative
authority required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted
government units and entities from the maximum area of public lands that could be acquired
from the State. These government units and entities should not just turn around and sell these
lands to private parties in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the
transfer of lands for non-agricultural purposes to government units and entities could be used
to circumvent constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain. In the same manner, such transfers could also be used to evade the statutory
prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes by operation of law a lien on
these lands.57
In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under Section 59 of
CA No. 141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public bidding. Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141
provide as follows:
 "Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not needed
for public purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce (now the Secretary of Natural Resources) for authority to dispose of the
same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director of Lands shall give notice by
public advertisement in the same manner as in the case of leases or sales of
agricultural public land, x x x.
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and adjudication shall be
made to the highest bidder. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases or sales of
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.58
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still reclaim portions of the sea with
government permission. However, thereclaimed land could become private land only if
classified as alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to disposition under CA
No. 141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except public
agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of public dominion
found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code of 1950 state that –
"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no longer
needed for public use or public service, before the same could be classified as patrimonial
property of the State.59 In the case of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain, the declaration of their being disposable, as well as the manner of their disposition, is
governed by the applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of public dominion
those properties of the State which, without being for public use, are intended for public
service or the "development of the national wealth." Thus, government reclaimed and marshy
lands of the State, even if not employed for public use or public service, if developed to
enhance the national wealth, are classified as property of public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted the Regalian
doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that –
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain,
natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis
supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the exception of
"agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public
domain." In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources
except "public agricultural lands." However, the term "public agricultural lands" in the 1935
Constitution encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the
public domain.60 If the land of public domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it would
fall under the classification of agricultural land of the public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, therefore, prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except
agricultural lands of the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to
individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned
by Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain
unlike in the 1935 Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution declared that
–
"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological, and
development requirements of the natural resources, shall determine by law the size
of land of the public domain which may be developed, held or acquired by, or leased
to, any qualified individual, corporation, or association, and the conditions
therefor. No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area nor may
any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares or acquire by
purchase, homestead or grant, in excess of twenty-four hectares. No private
corporation or association may hold by lease, concession, license or permit, timber
or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in excess of one hundred
thousand hectares. However, such area may be increased by the Batasang Pambansa
upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority."
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of the
public domain only through lease. Only individuals could now acquire alienable lands of the
public domain, and private corporations became absolutely barred from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain. The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of
alienable lands of the public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only
to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating PEA, a wholly government owned and controlled corporation with a special charter.
Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA with the following purposes and powers:
"Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging, filling
or other means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and
sell any and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and other forms of real property,
owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for the
efficient, economical and beneficial utilization of the above properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying out
the purposes for which it is created, have the following powers and functions:
(a)To prescribe its by-laws.
xxx
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to private
corporations by statute.
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream,
watercourse, canal, ditch, flume x x x.
xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for the
attainment of the purposes and objectives herein specified." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the public
domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the
tide.61 Submerged areas are those permanently under water regardless of the ebb and flow of
the tide.62 Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong to the public domain63 and are
inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition, and further
declared no longer needed for public service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain did not apply to PEA since it was then, and until today, a fully owned
government corporation. The constitutional ban applied then, as it still applies now, only to
"private corporations and associations." PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to hold
lands of the public domain" even "in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by
statute." Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of the public
domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public
domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. This
legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No.141, which states –
"Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated,
encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress; x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore
and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority
granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to
the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain. Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted the
Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are "owned by the
State," and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources
cannot be alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that –
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State. x x x.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain
may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
 hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead,
or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development,
and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by
law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held,
or leased and the conditions therefor." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private
corporations fromacquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the
public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law
governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands
of the public domain is still CA No. 141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except through
lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well understood. During the deliberations of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the commissioners probed the rationale behind this ban,
thus:
"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line 5
which says:
`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.'
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this was
introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private corporations from
acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not been very clear in jurisprudence
what the reason for this is. In some of the cases decided in 1982 and 1983, it was
indicated that the purpose of this is to prevent large landholdings. Is that the intent
of this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were
instances where the Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-square
meter land where a chapel stood because the Supreme Court said it would be in
violation of this." (Emphasis supplied)
In Ayog v. Cusi,64 the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban in this way:
"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public
agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to
encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm' and to prevent a
recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or
private persons had spawned social unrest."
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could
have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could
acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could
acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973
Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the
name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the
farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs
would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This
would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one
generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of
alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable
public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him.
An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as
stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of
only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This
constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent
is removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an
ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this
constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals.
This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause, consists of
three properties, namely:
1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio
Aguinaldo Boulevard in Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro Manila, with a combined
titled area of 1,578,441 square meters;"
2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands;" and
3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or
less to regularize the configuration of the reclaimed area."65
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the Freedom Islands and
further reclamation of about 250 hectares x x x," plus an option "granted to AMARI to
subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x."66
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares
of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15
hectares are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for
PEA's "actual cost" in partially reclaiming the Freedom Islands. AMARI will also complete, at
its own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the
reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI
and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net
usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less 30 percent
earmarked for common areas. Title to AMARI's share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5
hectares, will be issued in the name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA provides
that –
"x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of
transfer or conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARI's Land share based on the
Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall then
cause the issuance and delivery of the proper certificates of title covering
AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI, x x x; provided, that if more than
seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at any given time pertains to AMARI, PEA
shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the titles pertaining to
AMARI, until such time when a corresponding proportionate area of additional land
pertaining to PEA has been titled." (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5
hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint
venture PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged
areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA states that –
"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform
Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well as own the Reclamation
Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full and exclusive right, authority and
privilege to undertake the Project in accordance with the Master Development Plan."
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated April 25, 1995
and its supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the
Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in
view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which state that:
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
x x x.
xxx
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease, x x x."(Emphasis supplied)
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay
are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In its Memorandum,67 PEA admits that
–
"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified
as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain:
'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as
follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other
means;
x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force68 constituted under Presidential Administrative Order No. 365
admitted in its Report and Recommendation to then President Fidel V. Ramos, "[R]eclaimed
lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain."69 The Legal
Task Force concluded that –
"D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory authority,
the rights of ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands have been transferred
to PEA, by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may validly convey the same to any
qualified person without violating the Constitution or any statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding public
land, except by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,70 1987 Constitution), does not apply to
reclaimed lands whose ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory grant."
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of
Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural
resources" and consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas
"shall not be alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain.
The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural
resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a
law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or
disposable and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be
classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-
public use.71
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to disposition
or concession which have been officially delimited and classified."72 The President has the
authority to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia,73 the
Executive Department attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was
acquired by the Philippine Government for use as the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy.
Although the Chancery had transferred to another location thirteen years earlier, the Court still
ruled that, under Article 42274of the Civil Code, a property of public dominion retains such
character until formally declared otherwise. The Court ruled that –
"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such
conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen
and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A property continues to be
part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership
'until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it
from being such'(Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]." (Emphasis
supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land patents for
lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay. On January
19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of
PEA for the 157.84 hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands.
Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paranaque issued
TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and 7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529
authorizing the issuance of certificates of title corresponding to land patents. To this day, these
certificates of title are still in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the
Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's
issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer
needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already reclaimed
the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were partial erosions on some areas. The
government had also completed the necessary surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom
Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks." Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the
reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the
public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the
only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other natural
resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters x x x owned by the State" forming part of the
public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a private
corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated November 20, 1973 with the
Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, argues that "if the ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the party constructing
the works, then it cannot be said that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which the
State may not alienate."75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by
the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission,
shall become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise
provided by the terms of the grant of authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim from the
sea only with "proper permission" from the State. Private parties could own the reclaimed land
only if not "otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." This clearly meant that
no one could reclaim from the sea without permission from the State because the sea is
property of public dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or withhold ownership of
the reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the sea from which it emerged, belonged
to the State. Thus, a private person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the State
could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land which would remain property of public
dominion like the sea it replaced.76 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 adopted
the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."77
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently enacted
on the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of the public
domain must first be classified as alienable or disposable before the government can alienate
them. These lands must not be reserved for public or quasi-public purposes.78 Moreover, the
contract between CDCP and the government was executed after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution which barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. This contract could not have converted the Freedom Islands into private
lands of a private corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws authorizing the
reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the National Government the power to
reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared that –
"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of
areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National
Government or any person authorized by it under a proper contract. (Emphasis
supplied)
x x x."
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation of
areas under water could now be undertaken only by the National Government or by a person
contracted by the National Government. Private parties may reclaim from the sea only under a
contract with the National Government, and no longer by grant or permission as provided in
Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the National
Government's implementing arm to undertake "all reclamation projects of the government,"
which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any
person or entity." Under such contract, a private party receives compensation for reclamation
services rendered to PEA. Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of
portions of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment in
kind only if the reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or disposable land open to
disposition, and then declared no longer needed for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15
hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or
Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or
certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public
domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until
reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x
owned by the State," forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable. Only
when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public
agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the State
may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government
may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition.
Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only
then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain and within the commerce of man.
The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is tasked under its charter to
undertake public services that require the use of lands of the public domain. Under Section 5
of PD No. 1084, the functions of PEA include the following: "[T]o own or operate railroads,
tramways and other kinds of land transportation, x x x; [T]o construct, maintain and operate
such systems of sanitary sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and operate
such storm drains as may be necessary." PEA is empowered to issue "rules and regulations as
may be necessary for the proper use by private parties of any or all of the highways, roads,
utilities, buildings and/or any of its properties and to impose or collect fees or tolls for their
use." Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held by the PEA would
actually be needed for public use or service since many of the functions imposed on PEA by
its charter constitute essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on
behalf of the National Government." The same section also states that "[A]ll reclamation
projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be
undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; x
x x." Thus, under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No.1084, PEA became the
primary implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and
submerged lands of the public domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as the government entity
"to undertake the reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting
public welfare and interests."79 Since large portions of these reclaimed lands would obviously
be needed for public service, there must be a formal declaration segregating reclaimed lands
no longer needed for public service from those still needed for public service.1âwphi1.nêt
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be
owned by the PEA," could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and
submerged lands of the public domain would automatically become alienable once reclaimed
by PEA, whether or not classified as alienable or disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO No.
525, vests in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) the
following powers and functions:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1) x x x
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable
public lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising such control,
impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy and
collect such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of
such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of licenses,
permits, concessions, lease agreements and such other privileges concerning the
development, exploration and utilization of the country's marine, freshwater, and
brackish water and over all aquatic resources of the country and shall continue to
oversee, supervise and police our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel such
privileges upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and
for all other causes which are in furtherance of the conservation of natural resources
and supportive of the national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all
lands of the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for
classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with
appropriate agencies."80 (Emphasis supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR exercises
"supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands." DENR also exercises
"exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain."
Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila
Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR before
PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public
domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified as
alienable under Sections 681 and 782 of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides that the reclaimed
lands should be so classified, it then recommends to the President the issuance of a
proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open
to disposition. We note that then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned
Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance with the Revised Administrative Code and Sections 6
and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water,
while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under
water, whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify
lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the
President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not
make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less
patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of
the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open
to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands
reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only such an official
classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III83of
CA No. 141 and other applicable laws.84
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance with CA No. 141, the Public
Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that reclaimed lands transferred to a
branch or subdivision of the government "shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise
disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x
x."85 (Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1987, which states that –
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of
the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall
be executed in behalf of the government by the following: x x x."
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property belonging to the
Government. The Court declared that -
"It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or her
own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law
enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence."
(Emphasis supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority allowing
PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, provides that –
"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to
the contract for the reclamation and construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
Project between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines dated November 20, 1973 and/or any
other contract or reclamation covering the same area is hereby transferred,
conveyed and assigned to the ownership and administration of the Public Estates
Authority established pursuant to PD No. 1084; Provided, however, That the rights
and interests of the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
pursuant to the aforesaid contract shall be recognized and respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public Highways)
arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates
Authority shall issue in favor of the Republic of the Philippines the corresponding
shares of stock in said entity with an issued value of said shares of stock (which)
shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates
Authority shall execute such contracts or agreements, including appropriate
agreements with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines,
as may be necessary to implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources
in favor of the Public Estates Authority without prejudice to the subsequent
transfer to the contractor or his assignees of such portion or portions of the land
reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided for in the above-mentioned contract. On
the basis of such patents, the Land Registration Commission shall issue the
corresponding certificate of title." (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides that -
"Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which
shall be responsible for its administration, development, utilization or disposition in
accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084. Any and all income
 that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands shall be used
in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084."
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its
reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands
reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA
"shall belong to or be owned by PEA." EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose
of its reclaimed lands "in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084," the
charter of PEA.
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal
in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x owned, managed,
controlled and/or operated by the government."87 (Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore,
legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands
of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties itspatrimonial properties in accordance
with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of
PEA's patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition
against such sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to individuals. PEA, however,
cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations
since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The
legislative authority benefits only individuals. Private corporations remain barred from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain, including government reclaimed
lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be transferred
by PEA to the "contractor or his assignees" (Emphasis supplied) would not apply to private
corporations but only to individuals because of the constitutional ban. Otherwise, the
provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service, PEA would have to
conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these lands. PEA must observe the provisions of
Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law exempting
PEA from holding a public auction.88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent
is issued by authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084, "supplemented by Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended." This is an acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141
apply to the disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise
provided by law. Executive Order No. 654,89 which authorizes PEA "to determine the kind
and manner of payment for the transfer" of its assets and properties, does not exempt PEA
from the requirement of public auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the
mode of payment, whether in kind and in installment, but does not authorize PEA to dispense
with public auction.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing
Code, the government is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding.
Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that –
"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any cause, or
is no longer needed, it shall, upon application of the officer accountable therefor, be
inspected by the head of the agency or his duly authorized representative in the
presence of the auditor concerned and, if found to be valueless or unsaleable, it may
be destroyed in their presence. If found to be valuable, it may be sold at public
auction to the highest bidder under the supervision of the proper committee on
award or similar body in the presence of the auditor concerned or other authorized
representative of the Commission, after advertising by printed notice in the Official
Gazette, or for not less than three consecutive days in any newspaper of general
circulation, or where the value of the property does not warrant the expense of
publication, by notices posted for a like period in at least three public places in the
locality where the property is to be sold. In the event that the public auction fails,
the property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same
committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission."
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the
Commission on Audit must approve the selling price.90 The Commission on Audit implements
Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code through Circular No. 89-29691 dated January 27,
1989. This circular emphasizes that government assets must be disposed of only through
public auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to only in case of "failure of public
auction."
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's reclaimed
foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Private corporations are barred
from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10, 1991.
PEA imposed a condition that the winning bidder should reclaim another 250 hectares of
submerged areas to regularize the shape of the Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the
additional reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder.92 No one, however, submitted a bid.
On December 23, 1994, the Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the
Freedom Islands through negotiation, without need of another public bidding, because of the
failure of the public bidding on December 10, 1991.93
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the
additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim
another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area
to 750 hectares.94 The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84
hectares,95 is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the
area publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding happened on December 10,
1991, more than three years before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The
economic situation in the country had greatly improved during the intervening period.
Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code
The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is absolute
and clear: "Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, x x x." Even Republic Act No. 6957 ("BOT Law," for brevity), cited
by PEA and AMARI as legislative authority to sell reclaimed lands to private parties,
recognizes the constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957 states –
"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and
maintenance of any infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-operate-
and-transfer arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the provisions of this
Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the
revenue of the project or other non-monetary payments, such as, but not limited to,
the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject to the
constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership of the land: x x x."
(Emphasis supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government
BOT project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the
constitutional ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and AMARI, authorizes
local governments in land reclamation projects to pay the contractor or developer in kind
consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit:
"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and Management of
Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector. x x x
xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment plan
may consist of the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or the
industrial estate constructed."
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso similar to
that of the BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on land ownership automatically apply
even though not expressly mentioned in the Local Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or developer,
if a corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land. If the
contractor or developer is an individual, portions of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12
hectares96 of non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in view of the
legislative authority allowing such conveyance. This is the only way these provisions of the
BOT Law and the Local Government Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands to
public respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to private lands." This
theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains that the "issuance of the special patent leading to
the eventual issuance of title takes the subject land away from the land of public domain and
converts the property into patrimonial or private property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend
that with the issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles,
the 157.84 hectares comprising the Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In
support of their theory, PEA and AMARI cite the following rulings of the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,97 where the Court held –
"Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was issued,
the land ceased to be part of the public domain and became private property over
which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,98 where the Court declared -
"After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title
based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under
the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided
therein."3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas,99 where the Court
ruled -
"While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do
so only so long as the land remains part of the public domain and continues to be
under his exclusive control; but once the patent is registered and a certificate of title
is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private
property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,100 where the Court held –
"When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free
patents were issued covering the same in favor of the private respondents, the said
lots ceased to be part of the public domain and, therefore, the Director of Lands lost
jurisdiction over the same."
5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,101 where the Court stated –
"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally
effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services,
Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly sufficient for initial registration
under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a 'fee simple' title
or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122
of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public
lands, provides that 'Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to
the Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippines are
alienated, granted or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the
same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act (Land Registration
Act, Act 496) and shall become registered lands.'"
The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the corresponding
certificates of titlesissued to private parties. These four cases uniformly hold that the Director
of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or that upon issuance of the certificate of title
the land automatically comes under the Torrens System. The fifth case cited involves the
registration under the Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the National
Government to Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under the Department of Health.
The National Government transferred the 12.8-hectare public land to serve as the site for the
hospital buildings and other facilities of Mindanao Medical Center, which performed a public
service. The Court affirmed the registration of the 12.8-hectare public land in the name of
Mindanao Medical Center under Section 122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is an example of
a public land being registered under Act No. 496 without the land losing its character as a
property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of PEA,
a wholly government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions.
No patent or certificate of title has been issued to any private party. No one is asking the
Director of Lands to cancel PEA's patent or certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of the instant
petition is that PEA's certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land covered by
these certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold to a private
corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private
or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is
merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of
acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the
registrant had prior to the registration.102 The registration of lands of the public domain under
the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands.103
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the
alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to
government units and entities like PEA. The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made
subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517 issued
by then President Aquino, to wit:
"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the
Philippines and in conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084,
supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are hereby
granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land
containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred
ninety four (1,915,894) square meters; the technical description of which are hereto
attached and made an integral part hereof." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered by
PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except when authorized by Congress," the
sale of alienable lands of the public domain that are transferred to government units or entities.
Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien
affecting title" of the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of
title.104 Alienable lands of the public domain held by government entities under Section 60 of
CA No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless
Congress passes a law authorizing their disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the
sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of the
constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No.
141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or
patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified
private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these
lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become
illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in
the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow private
corporations to acquire directly from government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior
to such law, are concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Thus, EO No.
525 declares that –
"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible for
all Reclamation Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being
proposed to be undertaken in various parts of the country which need to be evaluated
for consistency with national programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the Government's
declared policy to provide for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of
lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas shall be
limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it under proper
contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National
Government which shall ensure a coordinated and integrated approach in the
reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates Authority as a
government corporation to undertake reclamation of lands and ensure their
maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and interests; and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing
authority to reorganize the national government including the transfer, abolition, or
merger of functions and offices.
 NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1416, do hereby order and direct the following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf
of the National Government. All reclamation projects shall be approved by the
President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or
through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that,
reclamation projects of any national government agency or entity authorized under
its charter shall be undertaken in consultation with the PEA upon approval of the
President.
x x x ."
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with
authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency
charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands
being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it
disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the
public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become
private lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of
alienable of disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private
lands.
Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the public domain"
as well as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and
private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom
Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name
does not automatically make such lands private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn
around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of
hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in
only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of
alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain since PEA can "acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands." This will open the
floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds of hectares of alienable
lands of the public domain under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are private
lands. This will result in corporations amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this
country - creating the very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will
completely reverse the clear direction of constitutional development in this country. The 1935
Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of public
lands.105 The 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring any kind of
public land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act No. 496 or
PD No. 1529, automatically become private lands is contrary to existing laws. Several laws
authorize lands of the public domain to be registered under the Torrens System or Act No.
496, now PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public lands. Section 122 of Act No.
496, and Section 103 of PD No. 1529, respectively, provide as follows:
Act No. 496
"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x x x
Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons
or the public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Act and shall become registered lands."
PD No. 1529
"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the
Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree." (Emphasis supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in Section 103 of PD No.
1529 includes conveyances of public lands to public corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government," as provided in Section 60 of CA
No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens System pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529.
Such registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141
that the land "shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress." This provision refers to government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain that have been titled but still
cannot be alienated or encumbered unless expressly authorized by Congress. The need for
legislative authority prevents the registered land of the public domain from becoming private
land that can be disposed of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public domain may
be registered under the Torrens System. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Code states –
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of
the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall
be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) x x x
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in the
name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality,
by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a public wharf
may be titled in the name of a government corporation regulating port operations in the
country. Private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of an airport
may also be titled in the name of the government agency tasked to administer the airport.
Private property donated to a municipality for use as a town plaza or public school site may
likewise be titled in the name of the municipality.106 All these properties become properties of
the public domain, and if already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain
registered land. There is no requirement or provision in any existing law for the de-registration
of land from the Torrens System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent domain
become unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529
authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National Government new
certificates of title covering such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states –
"Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or interest
therein, is expropriated or taken by eminent domain, the National Government,
province, city or municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising
such right shall file for registration in the proper Registry a certified copy of the
judgment which shall state definitely by an adequate description, the particular
property or interest expropriated, the number of the certificate of title, and the nature
of the public use. A memorandum of the right or interest taken shall be made on
each certificate of title by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee simple is taken, a
new certificate shall be issued in favor of the National Government, province, city,
municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right for the
land so taken. The legal expenses incident to the memorandum of registration or
issuance of a new certificate of title shall be for the account of the authority taking
the land or interest therein." (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively private
or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also be registered pursuant to existing
laws.
AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the Freedom
Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas of Manila Bay. In the words of
AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint venture with a stipulation for
reimbursement of the original cost incurred by PEA for the earlier reclamation and
construction works performed by the CDCP under its 1973 contract with the Republic."
Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA
requires PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title conveying
AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI."107
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that private corporations "shall not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease." The transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly means that AMARI
will "hold" the reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a
"disposition" of the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA
No. 141,108 the Government Auditing Code,109 and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas
form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and
submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted
pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands
reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike
other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public
use or public service. Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce
natural resources, are to be distributed equitably among our ever-growing population. To
insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Those who
attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources of the State, or seek to circumvent the
constitutional ban on alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations, do so at
their own risk.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open
to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can
make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the
public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In
their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify
the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer
needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409112 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is
contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void
from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution,
and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the
Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on
this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a
determination of factual matters.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal
Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the
Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-59731 January 11, 1990
ALFREDO CHING, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO ASEDILLO, respondents.
Joaquin E. Chipeco & Lorenzo D. Fuggan for petitioners.
Edgardo Salandanan for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals (penned by Hon. Rodolfo A. Nocon with the concurrence of Hon. Crisolito
Pascual and Juan A. Sison) in CA-G.R. No. 12358-SP entitled Alfredo Ching v. Hon. M. V.
Romillo, et al. which in effect affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
now Regional Trial Court (penned by Judge Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. then District Judge,
Branch XXVII Pasay City) granting ex-parte the cancellation of title registered in the name of
Ching Leng in favor of Pedro Asedillo in Civil Case No. 6888-P entitled Pedro Asedillo v.
Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng.
The facts as culled from the records disclose that:
In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga
Lumandan in Land Registration Case No. N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and
Original Certificate of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal covering a parcel of land situated at Sitio of Kay-Biga Barrio of San
Dionisio, Municipality of Paranaque, Province of Rizal, with an area of 51,852 square meters
(Exhibit "7", p. 80, CA, Rollo).
In August 1960, 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said spouses to Francisco,
Regina, Perfects, Constancio and Matilde all surnamed Nofuente and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 78633 was issued on August 10, 1960 accordingly (Exhibit "8", pp. 81 and
82, Ibid.).
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91137 was issued on September 18, 1961 and T.C.T. No.
78633 was deemed cancelled. (Exhibit "5-2", pp. 76-77 and 83, Ibid.).
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America.
His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC)
Branch III, Pasay City a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1956-P. Notice of hearing on the petition was duly published in the
"Daily Mirror", a newspaper of general circulation on November 23 and 30 and December 7,
1965. No oppositors appeared at the hearing on December 16, 1965, consequently after
presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo Ching was appointed administrator of Ching
Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and letters of administration issued on January 3, 1966
(pp. 51-53, Rollo). The land covered by T.C.T. No. 91137 was among those included in the
inventory submitted to the court (p. 75, Ibid.).
Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on December
27, 1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now
RTC), Branch XXVII, Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the
abovesaid property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession (p.
33, Ibid.). Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City which
appears on the face of T.C.T. No. 91137 (not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in
private respondent's complaint). (Order dated May 29, 1980, p. 55, Ibid.). An amended
complaint was filed by private respondent against Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng on
January 30, 1979 alleging "That on account of the fact that the defendant has been residing
abroad up to the present, and it is not known whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he or
his estate may be served by summons and other processes only by publication;" (p. 38, Ibid.).
Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed by the trial court in its
order dated February 7, 1979. The summons and the complaint were published in the
"Economic Monitor", a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Rizal including
Pasay City on March 5, 12 and 19, 1979. Despite the lapse of the sixty (60) day period within
which to answer defendant failed to file a responsive pleading and on motion of counsel for
the private respondent, the court a quo in its order dated May 25, 1979, allowed the
presentation of evidence ex-parte. A judgment by default was rendered on June 15, 1979, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding plaintiffs causes of action in the complaint to be
duly substantiated by the evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant declaring the former (Pedro
Asedillo) to be the true and absolute owner of the property covered by
T.C.T. No. 91137; ordering the defendant to reconvey the said property in
favor of the plaintiff; sentencing the defendant Ching Leng and/or the
administrator of his estate to surrender to the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal the owner's copy of T.C.T. No. 91137 so that the same
may be cancelled failing in which the said T.C.T. No. 91137 is hereby
cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is hereby
ordered to issue, in lieu thereof, a new transfer certificate of title over the
said property in the name of the plaintiff Pedro Asedillo of legal age, and a
resident of Estrella Street, Makati, Metro Manila, upon payment of the
fees that may be required therefor, including the realty taxes due the
Government.
 IT IS SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-44, Ibid.) WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF
PROPERTY AND CANCELLATION OF TITLE IS IN PERSONAM,
Said decision was likewise served by publication on July 2, 9 and 16, 1979 pursuant to Section AND IF SO, WOULD A DEAD MAN AND/OR HIS ESTATE BE
7 of Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court (CA Decision, pp. 83-84, Ibid.). The title over the BOUND BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND DECISION BY
property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was PUBLICATION.
issued in favor of Pedro Asedillo (p. 77, CA Rollo) who subsequently sold the property to
Villa Esperanza Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979 (pp. 125-126, Ibid.). III

On October 29, 1979 petitioner Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He filed a WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS FOR RECONVEYANCE
verified petition on November 10, 1979 to set it aside as null and void for lack of jurisdiction AND CANCELLATION OF TITLE CAN BE HELD EX-PARTE.
which was granted by the court on May 29, 1980 (penned by Hon. Florentino de la Pena,
Vacation Judge, pp. 54-59, Rollo). IV

On motion of counsel for private respondent the said order of May 29, 1980 was reconsidered WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED
and set aside, the decision dated June 15, 1979 aforequoted reinstated in the order dated JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE PARTIES.
September 2, 1980. (pp. 60-63, Ibid.)
V
On October 30, 1980, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said latter order but
the same was denied by the trial court on April 12, 1981 (pp. 77-79, Ibid.)
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF
LACHES IN INSTITUTING THE ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE
Petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same was AFTER THE LAPSE OF 19 YEARS FROM THE TIME THE DECREE
dismissed on September 30, 1981. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on OF REGISTRATION WAS ISSUED.
February 10, 1982 (pp. 81-90, Ibid.)
Petitioner's appeal hinges on whether or not the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
Private respondent Pedro Asedillo died on June 7, 1981 at Makati, Metro Manila during the substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the
pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals (p. 106, CA Rollo). Supreme Court.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner avers that an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam and
the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over the deceased Ching Leng and/or his estate by
Private respondent's comment was filed on June 1, 1982 (p. 117, Ibid.) in compliance with the means of service of summons by publication in accordance with the ruling laid down in Ang
resolution dated April 26, 1982 (p. 109, Ibid.) Petitioner filed a reply to comment on June 18, Lam v. Rosillosa et al., 86 Phil. 448 [1950].
1982 (p. 159, Ibid ), and the Court gave due course to the petition in the resolution of June 28,
1982 (p. 191, Ibid.) On the other hand, private respondent argues that an action for cancellation of title is quasi in
rem, for while the judgment that may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in in rem, it
Petitioner raised the following: fixes and settles the title to the property in controversy and to that extent partakes of the nature
of the judgment in rem, hence, service of summons by publication may be allowed unto Ching
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Leng who on the face of the complaint was a non-resident of the Philippines in line with the
doctrine enunciated in Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186 [1939].
I
The petition is impressed with merit.

WHETHER OR NOT A DEAD MAN CHING LENG AND/OR HIS

ESTATE MAY BE VALIDLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS AND An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in
DECISION BY PUBLICATION. rem or an action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of
a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the
parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in
II personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and
seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of
a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to
recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular
individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing (Ang Lam v.
Rosillosa, supra).
Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the
judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased
defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter's
death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475
[1976]) the decision of the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of
jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been validly served with
summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to be
subject of legal relations, was lost through death (Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code).
The same conclusion would still inevitably be reached notwithstanding joinder of Ching
Leng's estate as co-defendant. it is a well-settled rule that an estate can sue or be sued through
an executor or administrator in his representative capacity (21 Am. Jr. 872). Contrary to
private respondent's claims, deceased Ching Leng is a resident of 44 Libertad Street, Pasay
City as shown in his death certificate and T. C. T. No. 91137 and there is an on-going intestate
proceedings in the same court, Branch III commenced in 1965, and notice of hearing thereof
duly published in the same year. Such misleading and misstatement of facts demonstrate lack
of candor on the part of private respondent and his counsel, which is censurable.
The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original land
registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in accordance with
Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI Pasay City in
connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114
SCRA 748 [1982]).
Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng was
already in the other world when the summons was published he could not have been notified
at all and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parte proceedings
for cancellation of title could not have been held (Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).
The cited case of Perkins v. Dizon, supra is inapplicable to the case at bar since petitioner
Perkins was a non-resident defendant sued in Philippine courts and sought to be excluded from
whatever interest she has in 52,874 shares of stocks with Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company. The action being a quasi in rem summons by publication satisfied the constitutional
requirement of due process.
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value (Sy, Sr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 66742; Teoville Development Corporation v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75011, June 16, 1988).
Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for 19 years from the date of
registration of title is fatal to the private respondent's cause of action on the ground of laches.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done, earlier; it is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988; Villamor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41508, June 27,
1988).
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question
as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility
of losing his land (National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]).
A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to
therein (Section 49, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly
issued and that they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any "information
possessoria" or title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title (Salamat
Vda. de Medina v. Cruz, G.R. No. 39272, May 4, 1988).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; (2) the appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (3) the trial court's
decision dated June 15, 1979 and the Order dated September 2, 1980 reinstating the same are
hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction and (4) the complaint in Civil Case
No. 6888-P is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

The petition to set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction should have been granted and the
amended complaint of private respondent based on possession and filed only in 1978
dismissed outrightly. Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by the evidence
adduced in his behalf by petitioner herein, tracing back the roots of his title since 1960, from
the time the decree of registration was issued.

The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name—after one year from the date of the decree—is not to set aside
the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring
an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has passed unto
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA,
EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM
TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M.
COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE
MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D.
LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU
EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY
JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING,
DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI
NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI
TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L.
SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D.
AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA
GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE
CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S.
BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN,
VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G.
ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG,
OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T.
SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO
ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE
SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S.
LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY,
LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO
APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG
AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO
MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON,
SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO
SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING
MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S.
TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her
father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father
MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID,
ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA,
EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL
FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN
FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA),
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its
provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view
that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the
authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et.
al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the
constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to
Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of
the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee
the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it
prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the
Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a
motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and
Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed
their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier
pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas
claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a
period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop,
protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas,
forest cover or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral
domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes
involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the
due process clause of the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition
of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following
officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of
Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area
terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt
or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous
peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to
resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that
said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive departments under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and
other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and
Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and
Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
 4
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows: Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief the equal protection of the laws."
Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
5
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all Rollo, pp. 25-27.
challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the 6
Id. at 27-28.
IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, 7
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13, 1999, pp. 5-6.
petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do
not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of
Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific
cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a SEPARATE OPINION
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the PUNO, J.:
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
PRECIS
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the
case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled
DISMISSED. "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge
Richard Posner1 wrote:2
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban. "Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most
'past-dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom,
ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority,
SO ORDERED. gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is
suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares- youth. These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a more
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. pragmatic direction. But, by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion with history."

When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it

introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with
settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other natural resources.
Footnotes The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without considering its distinct
sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by
1
discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by
Rollo, p. 114. Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural
communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical
2
Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23. injustice to our indigenous people.

3
Id. at 23-25. This Opinion discusses the following:
I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.
A. The Laws of the Indies
B. Valenton v. Murciano
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
D. The Philippine Constitutions
II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
A. Indigenous Peoples
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
2. Their Concept of Land
III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.
A. Legislative History
IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous
peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the public domain.
1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired
2. The concept of native title
(a) Cariño v. Insular Government
(b) Indian Title to land
(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains
is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine
enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands
2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the
ancestral domains does not deprive the State of ownership over the natural
resources, control and supervision in their development and exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes
beyond the parameters of Section 7(a) of the law on ownership
of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7
(b) of the IPRA is allowed under Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Consitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57
of the IPRA may be harmonized with Paragraphs 1 and 4,
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous
Movement.
DISCUSSION
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL
SYSTEM.
A. The Laws of the Indies
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium.3 This
was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia.
The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regaliais a Western legal concept that was first introduced
by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas.
The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the Spanish Crown with respect to the
Philippine Islands in the following manner:
"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and
possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name,
still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held
without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in order that after
reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem
necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled,
taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their
probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and
pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the
rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designate
at such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all
possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court
officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those who are in
possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall
be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to be disposed of at our will."4
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all
lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish
Government took charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to
Spaniards, both military and civilian.5 Private land titles could only be acquired from the
government either by purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the Crown.6
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of
1893.7 The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds
as well as possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the Royal
Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an amendment of
the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the Indies, as already amended by previous orders
and decrees.8 This was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required
the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the
state.
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the
government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of
the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the Philippine
Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act.
B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. Murciano.9
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time
occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in
1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land from the
provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the
ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not objecting to the administrative sale.
Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year adverse possession, as an
extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to
the land as against everyone, including the State; and that the State, not owning the land, could
not validly transmit it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those special
laws which from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the
colonies."10 The question posed by the Court was: "Did these special laws recognize any right
of prescription as against the State as to these lands; and if so, to what extent was it
recognized?"
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition of
land in the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence of any special law to
govern a specific colony, the Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal
Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that until regulations on the subject could be prepared,
the authorities of the Philippine Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies,
theOrdenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754.11
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias,
the court interpreted it as follows:
"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong
to the Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who
preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that there might be lands not so granted,
that did not belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner
of all ungranted lands, because some private person had been in the adverse occupation of
them. By the mandatory part of the law all the occupants of the public lands are required to
produce before the authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers.
And those who had good title or showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It
is apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession for a length of time
should make the possessors the owners of the land possessed by them without any action on
the part of the authorities."12
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his name,
or by the kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown.13 For those lands granted by the
king, the decree provided for a system of assignment of such lands. It also ordered that all
possessors of agricultural land should exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land would be
restored to the Crown.14
The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the
Crown's principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication of the Crown's
instructions:
"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the
promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not x
x x cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and
patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will at the same
time warn the parties interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within
the term designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and
evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to others."15
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully
occupied" by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these
regulations together with contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of the law,
and concluded that plaintiffs' case fared no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which
followed it, than it did under the earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a
possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that
proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until
he did that the State remained the absolute owner."16
In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in
these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription,
without any action by the State."17Valenton had no rights other than those which accrued to
mere possession. Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the owner of the land by
virtue of the grant by the provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept
of state ownership of public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish
Government from earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title
deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by the American Government in Act
No. 926."18
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of
patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and
sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act
operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government;19 and that the government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris
and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States.20 The term "public land"
referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are
thrown open to private appropriation and settlement,21 and excluded the patrimonial property
of the government and the friar lands.22
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This new
law was passed under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited the
exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries
which gave Filipinos the same privileges.23 After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act
2874 was amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth Act No. 141
remains the present Public Land Law and it is essentially the same as Act 2874. The main
difference between the two relates to the transitory provisions on the rights of American
citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth period at par with Filipino citizens and
corporations.24
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under Act
496, or the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496
placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. The law is said
to be almost a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898,25 which, in
turn, followed the principles and procedure of the Torrens system of registration formulated by
Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The
Torrens system requires that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the
fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens
and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves.26 The certificate of title is
indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance
of said certificate. This system highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation.27
D. The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and
dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and
conservation of the natural resources of the country.28 There was an overwhelming
sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural
resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine.29 State ownership of natural resources
was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's power to control their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization.30 The delegates to the Constitutional
Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources
was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and
applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the
Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.31
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of
Natural Resources," reads as follows:
"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or
to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the
"National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources
of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration,
development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted
for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and
the limit of the grant."
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on
"National Economy and Patrimony," to wit:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as
may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure
and limit of the grant.
x x x."
Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated
therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of State
ownership that petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor,
and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997" or the IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous
peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the
ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the
extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of
ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
- the right to develop lands and natural resources;
- the right to stay in the territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean air and water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
- the right to resolve conflict;32
- the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same
ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community
concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of
transfer, if the transfer is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by
vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an unconscionable
consideration.33
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-
governance and empowerment,34 social justice and human rights,35 the right to preserve and
protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to
develop their own sciences and technologies.36
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the President and is
composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic
areas- Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including
Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western
Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao.37 The NCIP took over the
functions of the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern
Cultural Communities created by former President Corazon Aquino which were merged under
a revitalized structure.38
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and
practices. When still unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted
quasi-judicial powers.39 The NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a
petition for review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to,
unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be punished in
accordance with customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years and/or fined
from P100,000.00 to P500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages.40
A. Indigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987
Constitution while that of "IPs" is the contemporary international language in the International
Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 16941 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.42
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a group of people
or homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have
continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory,
and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and
utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other
distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and cultural
inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically
differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are
regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the
country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous
religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or all
of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been
displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral
domains."
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or
homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on
communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actually
occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time
immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive
cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of
colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from
the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the
country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been displaced from their
traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon,
Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands. They
are composed of 110 tribes and are as follows:
1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or
Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte
and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya;
Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta of
Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.
2. In Region III- Aetas.
3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon;
Alangan or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and
Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon,
Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.
4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog,
and Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of
Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.
5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat
of Negros Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.
6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.
7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga
del Sur; the Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.
8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon,
Bukidnon, Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island;
the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis
Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and and Misamis
Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan
and Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the
Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and
Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the
Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the
Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and
Del Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del
sur and South Cotabato.
10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal,
and Iranon.43
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as early as
25,000 to 30,000 B.C.
Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by the
Negritos, Indonesians and Malays.44 The strains from these groups eventually gave rise to
common cultural features which became the dominant influence in ethnic reformulation in the
archipelago. Influences from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth
millenium B.C. augmented these ethnic strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural
influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and traders. Indian influence found their
way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society.45
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering became
supplementary activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the cultivation of the
soil.46 From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities, our ancestors evolved an
essentially homogeneous culture, a basically common way of life where nature was a
primary factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was influenced by, and
responded to, common ecology. The generally benign tropical climate and the largely uniform
flora and fauna favored similarities, not differences.47 Life was essentially subsistence but not
harsh.48
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They had
languages that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them not only as
media of daily communication but also as vehicles for the expression of their literary
moods.49 They fashioned concepts and beliefs about the world that they could not see, but
which they sensed to be part of their lives.50 They had their own religion and religious beliefs.
They believed in the immortality of the soul and life after death. Their rituals were based on
beliefs in a ranking deity whom they called Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in
the environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the
animals and birds, for they seemed to consider the objects of Nature as something to be
respected. They venerated almost any object that was close to their daily life, indicating the
importance of the relationship between man and the object of nature.51
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Malay
word "balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores.52 The barangay
was basically a family-based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred families. Each
barangay was different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's duty to
rule and govern his subjects and promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide
powers for he exercised all the functions of government. He was the executive, legislator and
judge and was the supreme commander in time of war.53
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally from
generation to generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They were
preserved in songs and chants and in the memory of the elder persons in the community.54 The
written laws were those that the chieftain and his elders promulgated from time to time as the
necessity arose.55 The oldest known written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu
Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D. Other old codes are the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the
Principal Code of Sulu.56 Whether customary or written, the laws dealt with various subjects,
such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and punishment, property rights,
family relations and adoption. Whenever disputes arose, these were decided peacefully
through a court composed by the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as "jury."
Conflicts arising between subjects of different barangays were resolved by arbitration in which
a board composed of elders from neutral barangays acted as arbiters.57
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in
land. The chiefs merely administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The social order
was an extension of the family with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the community.
Each individual, therefore, participated in the community ownership of the soil and the
instruments of production as a member of the barangay.58 This ancient communalism was
practiced in accordance with the concept of mutual sharing of resources so that no individual,
regardless of status, was without sustenance. Ownership of land was non-existent or
unimportant and the right of usufruct was what regulated the development of
lands.59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal communities
depended for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing concept similar to those in
land communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains and elders, by virtue of their
positions of importance, enjoyed some economic privileges and benefits. But their rights,
related to either land and sea, were subject to their responsibility to protect the communities
from danger and to provide them with the leadership and means of survival.61
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in
Maguindanao. The Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over territorial
areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga. Four ethnic
groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan and Subanon.62 The Sultanate of
Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and
Lanao del Sur.63
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in
common but was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of Luwaran.
The Code contains a provision on the lease of cultivated lands. It, however, has no provision
for the acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land.64
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive economies
where most production was geared to the use of the producers and to the fulfillment of kinship
obligations. They were not economies geared to exchange and profit.65 Moreover, the family
basis of barangay membership as well as of leadership and governance worked to splinter the
population of the islands into numerous small and separate communities.66
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the
Filipinos living in barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river
banks. One of the first tasks imposed on the missionaries and the encomenderos was to collect
all scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion.67 As early as 1551, the Spanish government
assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards the natives.68 The Spaniards regarded it a
sacred "duty to conscience and humanity to civilize these less fortunate people living in the
obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and material advantages" of community
life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws."69
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and convent
would be constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to construct their houses
around the church and the unbaptized were invited to do the same.70 With the reduccion, the
Spaniards attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using
the convento/casa real/plaza complex as focal point. Thereduccion, to the Spaniards, was a
"civilizing" device to make the Filipinos law-abiding citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the
long run, to make them ultimately adopt Hispanic culture and civilization.71
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all
lands not assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands
or realengas, belonging to the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land grants
were made to non-Filipinos.72
The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the
concept of public domain were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish
colonial theory and law.73 The concept that the Spanish king was the owner of everything
of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the natives, and the natives were
stripped of their ancestral rights to land.74
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious,
classified the Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs, and divided them into
three types . First were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who generally came from the
lowland populations. Second, were the Moros or the Muslim communities, and third, were
the infieles or the indigenous communities.75
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the
Spaniards and was allowed certain status although below the Spaniards.
The Moros and infieles were regarded as the lowest classes.76
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven
from Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands. The
Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep interior. The upland societies were naturally
outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands
were difficult and inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative security.77 Thus,
the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial administration, were not only able to preserve
their own culture but also thwarted the Christianization process, separating themselves from
the newly evolved Christian community.78Their own political, economic and social systems
were kept constantly alive and vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual
feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the non-
Christians on the other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally and
historically related populace through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues and
vices of the Filipinos.79
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900,
addressed the existence of the infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the
same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American
Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under which many of
those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they
are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to
wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort
should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs."80
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of
civilization, the American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as one more in
accord with humanity and with the national conscience."81
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-
Christian Filipinos. The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a
geographical area, and more directly, "to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities."82
Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they passed
Act No. 253 creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the
Department of the Interior, the BNCT's primary task was to conduct ethnographic research
among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to
determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization
and prosperity." The BNCT was modeled after the bureau dealing with American
Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in Philippine cultural minorities and
produced a wealth of valuable materials about them.83
The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The
raging issue then was the conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more rapid
and complete manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the non-
Christian Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and permanent
the integration of all said national cultural minorities into the body politic, creating
the Commission on National Integration charged with said functions." The law called for
a policy of integration of indigenous peoples into the Philippine mainstream and for this
purpose created theCommission on National Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was given, more
or less, the same task as the BNCT during the American regime. The post-independence
policy of integration was like the colonial policy of assimilation understood in the context
of a guardian-ward relationship.85
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the Spaniards
and Americans, government attempts at integration met with fierce resistance. Since
World War II, a tidal wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of Luzon and the Visayas
swamped the highlands and wide open spaces in Mindanao.86 Knowledge by the settlers of
the Public Land Acts and the Torrens system resulted in the titling of several ancestral
lands in the settlers' names. With government initiative and participation, this titling
displaced several indigenous peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples were also
displaced by projects undertaken by the national government in the name of national
development.87
It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural
communities in the formulation and implementation of State policies."88
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural
minorities" were addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to
as "cultural communities." More importantly this time, their "uncivilized" culture was given
some recognition and their "customs, traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be considered
by the State in the formulation and implementation of State policies.President
Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its functions to the Presidential Adviser on
National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the ethnic groups
that sought full integration into the larger community, and at the same time "protect the rights
of those who wish to preserve their original lifeways beside the larger community."89 In short,
while still adopting the integration policy, the decree recognized the right of tribal
Filipinos to preserve their way of life.90
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the Ancestral
Lands Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land occupancy certificates to
members of the national cultural communities who were given up to 1984 to register their
claims.91 In 1979, the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems was created under
E.O. No. 561 which provided a mechanism for the expeditious resolution of land problems
involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal Filipinos.92
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000 Kalingas
and Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam project of the
National Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed by
the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National
Development Company was authorized by law in 1979 to take approximately 40,550 hectares
of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie plantation in Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was
possessed by the Agusan natives.93 Timber concessions, water projects, plantations, mining,
and cattle ranching and other projects of the national government led not only to the eviction
of the indigenous peoples from their land but also to the reduction and destruction of their
natural environment.94
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of
preservation.Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created
the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office
for Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the President.95
The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal
Filipinos to preserve their way of life.96 This Constitution goes further than the 1973
Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and
domains, the State has effectively upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their
own.
2. Their Concept of Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream.
They are non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They
have a system of self-government not dependent upon the laws of the central administration of
the Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as
different from those of the rest of the population.97 The kind of response the indigenous
peoples chose to deal with colonial threat worked well to their advantage by making it difficult
for Western concepts and religion to erode their customs and traditions. The "infieles
societies" which had become peripheral to colonial administration, represented, from a cultural
perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture. The political systems were still
structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of power and authority. The
economic activities were governed by the concepts of an ancient communalism and mutual
help. The social structure which emphasized division of labor and distinction of functions, not
status, was maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties of social
courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant.98
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no traditional
concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more
accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The people are the
secondary owners or stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he
loses his claim of ownership, and the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its
true and primary owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does
not only belong to the present generation but the future ones as well.99
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the
gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere stewards.100 Customary law
has a strong preference for communal ownership, which could either be ownership by a
group of individuals or families who are related by blood or by marriage,101 or ownership by
residents of the same locality who may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of
communal ownership under customary laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and
highly collectivized mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who are
engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and swidden farming
found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture and burial grounds should
be communally-owned.102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a common right to a common
economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land are shared in common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions
individual ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a limited
system of individual ownership. It is limited because while the individual owner has the right
to use and dispose of the property, he does not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full
owner as defined under our Civil Code.103 Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of
individually-owned land is strongly discouraged except in marriage and succession and except
to meet sudden financial needs due to sickness, death in the family, or loss of
crops.104Moreover, and to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member before any
village-member can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-member of the ili.105
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The
concept of individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently
colonial in origin, our national land laws and governmental policies frown upon
indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if
not inexistent.106
III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.
A. The Legislative History of the IPRA
It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the
Tenth Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371,
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two
Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a
consolidation of four proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural Communities,
Environment and Natural Resources, Ways and Means, as well as Finance. It adopted almost
en toto the comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which was a result of six
regional consultations and one national consultation with indigenous peoples
nationwide.108 At the Second Regular Session of the Tenth Congress, Senator Flavier, in his
sponsorship speech, gave a background on the situation of indigenous peoples in the
Philippines, to wit:
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered from
the dominance and neglect of government controlled by the majority. Massive migration of
their Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory and many of the tribal
Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed of their
ancestral land and with the massive exploitation of their natural resources by the elite among
the migrant population, they became marginalized. And the government has been an
indispensable party to this insidious conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural Communities
(ICCs). It organized and supported the resettlement of people to their ancestral land, which
was massive during the Commonwealth and early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant
to the Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our system by Spain through the Royal Decree of
13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government passed laws to legitimize the wholesale
landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of lands to migrant homesteaders within the
traditional areas of the ICCs."109
Senator Flavier further declared:
"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for the
land long before any central government was established. Their ancestors had territories over
which they ruled themselves and related with other tribes. These territories- the land- include
people, their dwelling, the mountains, the water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is
their environment in its totality. Their existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their
own lives through political, economic, socio-cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is
the living and irrefutable proof to this.
Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it; and
depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples."110
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill
based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens
patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine
reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional laws" and
jurisprudence passed by the State have "made exception to the doctrine." This exception
was first laid down in the case of Cariño v. Insular Governmentwhere:
"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the
cultural communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed "native
title." This ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent cases."111
Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705, P.D.
410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized
"native title" or "private right" and the existence of ancestral lands and domains. Despite the
passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier continued:
"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has not
implemented the policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its observance, its
wanton disregard shown during the period unto the Commonwealth and the early years of the
Philippine Republic when government organized and supported massive resettlement of the
people to the land of the ICCs."
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their
ancestral land. The bill was prepared also under the principle of parens patriae inherent in the
supreme power of the State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This principle
mandates that persons suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, which places them in
a position of actual inequality in their relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the
protection of the State.
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators voting in
favor and none against, with no abstention.112
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on Cultural
Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented and defended on the floor
by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.113
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:
"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications that
would promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework
of national unity and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure and
ascertain that these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the
indigenous laws that remained long before this Republic was established shall be preserved
and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters seriously and early
approval of the substitute bill shall bring into reality the aspirations, the hope and the dreams
of more than 12 million Filipinos that they be considered in the mainstream of the Philippine
society as we fashion for the year 2000." 114
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as mandated
in the Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land was enunciated
in Cariño v. Insular Government which recognized the fact that they had vested rights prior
to the establishment of the Spanish and American regimes.115
After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding amendments,
was approved on Second Reading with no objections.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE
CONSTITUTION.
A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous
Peoples and Do Not Constitute Part of the Land of the Public Domain.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and
ancestral lands.Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are defined in
Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources
therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or
through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to
the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit,
stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered
into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure
their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable
or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and
other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs
but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities,
particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and
utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time
immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted
by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of
government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies,
private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership,
occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted
by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings with government and/or private
individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal
areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable or not,
hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other
natural resources. They also include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by
ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional
activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting
cultivators.116
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral
domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and
possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership. These lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies,
private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.117
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures
embodied in Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel
Alcala.118 DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of ancestral domains by special task forces and
ensured the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and Certificates of
Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.
The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power conferred
by the IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).119 The guiding
principle in identification and delineation is self-delineation.120 This means that the ICCs/IPs
have a decisive role in determining the boundaries of their domains and in all the activities
pertinent thereto.121
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in
Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification of ancestral
lands is in Section 53 of said law.
Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and upon
finding by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community concerned.122 The allocation
of lands within the ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous corporate (family or
clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with customs and
traditions.123 With respect to ancestral lands outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a
Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT).124
CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the
Register of Deeds in the place where the property is situated.125
(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in
two modes: (1) bynative title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens
title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral
lands only.
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:
"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back
as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have
never been public lands and are thusindisputably presumed to have been held that way since
before the Spanish Conquest."126
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of
private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been
public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the
Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include
ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected.127 Formal
recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs
over the territories identified and delineated.128
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native
title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their
ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains
held by native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands held under native
title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are private.
 (a) Cariño v. Insular Government129
The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v. Insular
Government.130Cariño firmly established a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court 146
hectares of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land had been
possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial; that his grandfather built
fences around the property for the holding of cattle and that his father cultivated some parts of
the land. Cariño inherited the land in accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land
adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no document issued from the Spanish Crown.131 In
1901, Cariño obtained a possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage Law.132 The
North American colonial government, however, ignored his possessory title and built a public
road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land registration
court. While his petition was pending, a U.S. military reservation133 was proclaimed over his
land and, shortly thereafter, a military detachment was detailed on the property with orders to
keep cattle and trespassers, including Cariño, off the land.134
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño's application for absolute ownership to the
land. Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the
C.F.I. of Benguet which reversed the land registration court and dismissed Cariño's
application. The Philippine Supreme Court135 affirmed the C.F.I. by applying
the Valenton ruling. Cariño took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.136 On one hand, the
Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine and contended that Cariño failed to
comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which required registration
of land claims within a limited period of time. Cariño, on the other, asserted that he was the
absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land never formed part of the public
domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme Court
held:
"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands
were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward
people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of
civilization with themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and
that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute
power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United
States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a
question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the
theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual
facts, are matters for it to decide."137
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice was with
the new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S. law.
The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept of "due
process" as well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives."138 It was based on the
strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No law shall be
enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." The court
declared:
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United
States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the
dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy land. It is obvious that, however
stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would
deny that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal
administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for
private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at
Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be
administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose that the
attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own is
also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of
rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those
safeguards to all. It provides that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person
therein the equal protection of the laws.' In the light of the declaration that we have quoted
from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready to declare in the next
breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by
"property" only that which had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part
of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by
native custom and by long association,- of the profoundest factors in human thought,-
regarded as their own."139
The Court went further:
"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It
might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or
memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership,
it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest,
and never to have been public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or
ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt."140
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as testimony
or memory went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this title is
presumed to "never have been public land."
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld in the
1904 decision ofValenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof that the
Spanish decrees did not honor native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed
in Valenton appeared to recognize that the natives owned some land, irrespective of any royal
grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the preamble of the Recopilacion was all "theory and
discourse" and it was observed that titles were admitted to exist beyond the powers of the
Crown, viz:
"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear
proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin
with, the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to
indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands,
irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native
inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book
4, title 12, Law 14 of the the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary
conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys and others,
when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who
hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic
assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King or his
predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles were admitted to
exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their
books." (Emphasis supplied).141
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over
unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as to
convey to the natives that failure to register what to them has always been their own would
mean loss of such land. The registration requirement was "not to confer title, but simply to
establish it;" it was "not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that
ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it."
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It was
frank enough, however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been deprived of
his land under Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees and
concomitantly, the various interpretations which may be given them. But precisely because of
the ambiguity and of the strong "due process mandate" of the Constitution, the court
validated this kind of title.142 This title was sufficient, even without government
administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes
explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem
not without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that
account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress
establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the
whole case we are of the opinion that law and justice require that the applicant should be
granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those
among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost
forgotten law of Spain."143
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the 148 hectares
in Baguio Municipality in his name.144
Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it
upheld as "native title." It simply said:
"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his
argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or
military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the
Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration to
which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish Laws, and which would have
made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical position of
Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a
mere trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument to that effect
seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an important part of the Island of Luzon,
at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not
the power to enforce."145
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire length
of the Cariñodecision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term "native title" may be
traced to Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the University of the
Philippines College of Law from the Yale University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch
published an article in the Philippine Law Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and
Tribal Land Law.146 This article was made after Professor Lynch visited over thirty tribal
communities throughout the country and studied the origin and development of Philippine
land laws.147 He discussed Cariñoextensively and used the term "native title" to refer to
Cariño's title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case.
(b) Indian Title
In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title" as
defined by Justice Holmes in Cariño "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the
American Indians.148 This is not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that during
the American regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in reference
to native Americans.149 This was clearly demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board
of Mindoro.150
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial
governor to remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them in a permanent
reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to comply was to be
imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who was imprisoned for trying to escape
from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus claiming deprivation of liberty under the Board
Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the ground of police power. It upheld
government policy promoting the idea that a permanent settlement was the only successful
method for educating the Mangyans, introducing civilized customs, improving their health and
morals, and protecting the public forests in which they roamed.151 Speaking through Justice
Malcolm, the court said:
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted
by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the
Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument,
to be practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings
with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the
American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in
a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and
the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine
when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the
plenary authority of the United States.152
x x x.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly
identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations
do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country
and placed on these reservations, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes,
and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their
own good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian
policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and
executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should
not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful
reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the segregation
of the different Indian tribes in the United States."153
Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An Indian
reservation is a part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for the use and
occupation of a tribe or tribes of Indians.154 It may be set apart by an act of Congress, by
treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be established by custom and prescription.155
Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also covers
the "aboriginal right of possession or occupancy."156 The aboriginal right of possession
depends on the actual occupancy of the lands in question by the tribe or nation as their
ancestral home, in the sense that such lands constitute definable territory occupied exclusively
by the particular tribe or nation.157 It is a right which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or
other governmental action, although in numerous instances treaties have been negotiated with
Indian tribes, recognizing their aboriginal possession and delimiting their occupancy rights or
settling and adjusting their boundaries.158
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to land they
have held and occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas by the Europeans. The
earliest definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme Court on the nature of aboriginal title
was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh.159
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the chiefs
of two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this conveyance, the
plaintiffs being private persons. The only conveyance that was recognized was that made by
the Indians to the government of the European discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief
Justice Marshall pointed out that the potentates of the old world believed that they had made
ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new world by bestowing civilization and
Christianity upon them; but in addition, said the court, they found it necessary, in order to
avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war, to establish the principle that discovery
gives title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery was
made, against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by
possession.160 The exclusion of all other Europeans gave to the nation making the discovery
the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing settlements upon it. As
regards the natives, the court further stated that:
"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be
regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could
interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no
instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They
were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to
retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to
dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the
fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants,
they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a
consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession
of the natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees,
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy."161
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to
acquire Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer- whether to England,
France, Spain or Holland- did this right belong and not to any other nation or private person.
The mere acquisition of the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather,
until the discoverer, by purchase or conquest, exercised its right, the concerned Indians were
recognized as the "rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain
possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer to her subjects of lands occupied by the
Indians were held to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of
occupancy. Once the discoverer purchased the land from the Indians or conquered them, it was
only then that the discoverer gained an absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey a
title paramount to the title of the United States itself to other parties, saying:
"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of
possession has never been questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete
ultimate title, charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of
acquiring that right."162
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves the
universal recognition of this principle.163
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native lands
without having to invalidate conveyances made by the government to many U.S. citizens.164
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the State of
Georgia enacted a law requiring all white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to
obtain a license or permit from the Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was
deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were white missionaries, did not obtain said
license and were thus charged with a violation of the Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the treaties
established between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as the Acts of Congress
regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the relationship between the United States
government and the Indians as:
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign
potentate for the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection from lawless and
injurious intrusions into their country. That power was naturally termed their protector. They
had been arranged under the protection of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of the British
power in their neighborhood, and the establishment of that of the United States in its place, led
naturally to the declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they were under the protection
of the United States, and of no other power. They assumed the relation with the United States
which had before subsisted with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful,
not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the
laws of a master."166
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct territorial
boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands within their domains.
Thus:
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade and
intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a
firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially
that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct
political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is
exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only
acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.
x x x.
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the
soil from time immemorial,with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power,
which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first
discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those
European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very term
"nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from others." x x x.167
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which
the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves
or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between
the United States and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of
the United States."168
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer as
against all other European governments. Designated as the naked fee,169 this title was to be
consummated by possession and was subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The discoverer
acknowledged the Indians' legal and just claim to retain possession of the land, the Indians
being the original inhabitants of the land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive
right to acquire the Indians' land- either by purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession- and in
so doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only the discoverer could extinguish Indian title because
it alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the different nations of Europe
respected the rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted the ultimate dominion and
title to be in themselves.170
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to the
lands occupied by the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign-
first the discovering European nation and later the original 13 States and the United
States- a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. The Federal
Government continued the policy of respecting the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes
called Indian title, which it accorded the protection of complete ownership.171 But this
aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes "permission" from the whites to occupy the land,
and means mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by Congress.172 It is clear
that this right of occupancy based upon aboriginal possession is not a property right.173 It is
vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal government who, as sovereign, possessed
exclusive power to extinguish the right of occupancy at will.174 Thus, aboriginal title is not
the same as legal title. Aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive and continuous use and
occupancy for a long time.175 It entails that land owned by Indian title must be used within the
tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot be sold to another sovereign government nor
to any citizen.176 Such title as Indians have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not
in the individual Indian; the right of individual Indians to share in the tribal property usually
depends upon tribal membership, the property of the tribe generally being held in communal
ownership.177
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily used to
designate such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws.178 Indian land
which has been abandoned is deemed to fall into the public domain.179 On the other hand, an
Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart for the use and occupation of a tribe
of Indians.180 Once set apart by proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and
until the Indian title is extinguished, no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on,
or restrict the nation's power to dispose of, them.181
The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land claims
of indigenous Americans.182 And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is
recognized. Second, indigenous property systems are also recognized. From a legal point of
view, certain benefits can be drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to native
Americans.183 Despite the similarities between native title and aboriginal title, however, there
are at present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on American Indians may be cited
authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights of the Indians
over their land; title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the U.S. as successor of
the discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically recognized as ownership by
action authorized by Congress.184 The protection of aboriginal title merely guards against
encroachment by persons other than the Federal Government.185 Although there are criticisms
against the refusal to recognize the native Americans' ownership of these lands,186 the power
of the State to extinguish these titles has remained firmly entrenched.187
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the
ancestral domains and ancestral lands.188 The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any
similarities between its application in the Philippines vis-à-vis American Jurisprudence on
aboriginal title will depend on the peculiar facts of each case.
(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined in the IPRA
grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that
the land is private and was never public. Cariño is the only case that specifically and
categorically recognizes native title. The long line of cases citing Cariño did not touch on
native title and the private character of ancestral domains and lands. Cariño was cited by
the succeeding cases to support the concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public
Land Act which is a different matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought to
be registered must be public agricultural land. When the conditions specified in Section 48
[b] of the Public Land Act are complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the land.189 The land ceases to be part of the
public domain,190 ipso jure,191 and is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of the prescribed statutory period.
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared that the rule
that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or grant, belong
to the public domain has an exception. This exception would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time
immemorial. It is this kind of possession that would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the
Spanish conquest.193 Oh Cho, however, was decided under the provisions of the Public Land
Act and Cariñowas cited to support the applicant's claim of acquisitive prescription under the
said Act.
All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous,
open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this long,
continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of thirty years both for
ordinary citizens194 and members of the national cultural minorities195 that converts the land
from public into private and entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate of title.
(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the Land
is Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is
further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned
ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public agricultural
land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is thatancestral
land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural land simply for
registration purposes. To wit:
"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or
the Land Registration Act 496- Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to
their individually-owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of
owner since time immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the approval of this Act and uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall
have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands under the provisions of Commonwealth
Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character
and actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including
those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural lands.
The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the
approval of this Act."196
ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their individually-
owned ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not domains, and such
lands must be individually, not communally, owned.
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of
the same in the concept of owner since time immemorial 197 or for a period of not less than 30
years, which claims are uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered
under C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration
Act. For purposes of registration, the individually-owned ancestral lands are classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, provided, they are
agricultural in character and are actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture and tree
farming purposes. These lands shall be classified as public agricultural lands regardless of
whether they have a slope of 18% or more.
The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the
requirements of the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public Land
Act, deals specifically with lands of the public domain.198 Its provisions apply to those lands
"declared open to disposition or concession" x x x "which have not been reserved for public or
quasi-public purposes, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become
private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or
any other valid law x x x or which having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be
so."199 Act 496, the Land Registration Act, allows registration only of private lands and public
agricultural lands. Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to
avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his ancestral land,
regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or over,200 from
private to public agricultural land for proper disposition.
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has
nonetheless a limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from
October 29, 1997, the date of approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on National
Economy and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into
four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national
parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral lands and ancestral domains but it
does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To classify them as public lands
under any one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of
the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA
addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital
concern in terms of sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs.201
The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for the applicability of
customary laws x x x in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain."202 It
is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral
domains and lands that breathes life into this constitutional mandate.
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of
ownership under thecivil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified
period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free
patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Thus:
"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than
twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously
occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or
tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate
tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the
provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such
land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of
land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted
in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free
patent application he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under
the provision of the Public Land Law.203
x x x.
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this Chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership
for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b)
hereof."204
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public
agricultural land but because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at least
thirty years (judicial confirmation), the land has become private. Open, adverse, public and
continuous possession is sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper application therefor.
The possession has to be confirmed judicially or administratively after which a torrens title is
issued.
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to all the
rights of ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines ownership
in Articles 427, 428 and 429. This concept is based on Roman Law which the Spaniards
introduced to the Philippines through the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under Roman Law,
may be exercised over things or rights. It primarily includes the right of the owner to enjoy
and dispose of the thing owned. And the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing includes the
right to receive from the thing what it produces,205 the right to consume the thing by its
use,206 the right to alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy the thing owned,207 and the
right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned by any other person to whom the
owner has not transmitted such thing.208
1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.
Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title but
to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes
the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. Thus:
"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view
that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their
cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains
are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all generations and
therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional
resource rights."
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held
under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that
ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private simply
because it is not part of the public domain. But its private character ends there. The
ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular
person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral domains, whether delineated
or not, are presumed to be communally held.209 These communal rights, however, are not
exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil Code.210 Co-ownership gives any
co-owner the right to demand partition of the property held in common. The Civil Code
expressly provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." Each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.211 To allow such a right over ancestral domains may be destructive not only of
customary law of the community but of the very community itself.212
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property,
much less corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist only for a maximum of
fifty (50) years subject to an extension of another fifty years in any single instance.213 Every
stockholder has the right to disassociate himself from the corporation.214 Moreover, the
corporation itself may be dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily.215
Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land but
extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the domain. This is
the reason why the ancestral domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The
domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as
a community.
Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands are
communal. These lands, however, may be transferred subject to the following limitations: (a)
only to the members of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary laws and traditions;
and (c) subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land
was transferred to a non-member of the ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or relations
in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains,"216 the IPRA, by legislative
fiat, introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a concept that has long existed under
customary law.217
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as
a source of law.218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be
applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable.219 In other words, in the absence of
any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven, can define rights and
liabilities.220
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely
applies to ICCs/IPs.Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision
in the civil law. The indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is specifically
acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land
titling and land registration.221
To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. The
CADT is merely a "formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from Section 11 of the
IPRA, to wit:
"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when
solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title,
which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and
delineated."
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to the
land, being people of the land- by sheer force of having sprung from the land since time
beyond recall, and the faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of one's brow. This is fidelity
of usufructuary relation to the land- the possession of stewardship through perduring, intimate
tillage, and the mutuality of blessings between man and land; from man, care for land; from
the land, sustenance for man.222
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine
Enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral lands.
Section 7 provides for the rights over ancestral domains:
"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights include:
a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains;
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof,
the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the
territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and
share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found
therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national
and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the
formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will
affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and
the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with,
alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not to be
removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior
informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. x x x;
d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of natural
catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable
areas where they can have temporary life support systems: x x x;
e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of migrant
settlers and organizations into their domains;
 f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have
access to integrated systems for the management of their inland waters and air
space;
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the ancestral
domains which have been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and
intended for common and public welfare and service;
h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with
customary laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default thereof
shall the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice
whenever necessary."
Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:
"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.
a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to transfer land
or property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary
laws and traditions of the community concerned.
b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property
rights by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned
ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an
unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to
redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of
transfer."
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains which
covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c)
sacred places, (d) traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by
them at any time within the domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights:
(1) the right to develop lands and natural resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c)
the right to resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry of migrants;
(e) the right to safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains
as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in accordance with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral domains,
Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property rights to members of
the same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in keeping with the option given to
ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the ancestrallands, but not to domains.
2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral
Domains Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and Control
and Supervision in their Development and Exploitation.
The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources is
declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or, it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as
may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use
may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the state shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution."223
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources- are owned by the State. The Constitution provides
that in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources, the State
exercises full control and supervision, and may undertake the same in four (4) modes:
1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or
2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations;
3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens;
 4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and
responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources.
The State may directly undertake the exploitation and development by itself, or, it may allow
participation by the private sector through co-production,224 joint venture,225 or production-
sharing agreements.226 These agreements may be for a period of 25 years, renewable for
another 25 years. The State, through Congress, may allow the small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale exploration of these resources, specifically
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the State, through the President, may enter into
technical and financial assistance agreements with foreign-owned corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint venture or
production-sharing, may apply to both large-scale227 and small-scale mining.228 "Small-scale
mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple
implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment."229
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership
over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their
ancestral domains includesownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and
limited in Section 7 (a) as:
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing
grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally
and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and
all improvements made by them at any time within the domains." It will be noted that this
enumeration does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in
the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other natural
resources found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section
7 (a) does not cover "waters,minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests ortimber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other
natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as
belonging to the State.
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a)
complies with the Regalian doctrine.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters of
Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.
The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:
"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters, and
natural resources and all improvements made by them at any time within the ancestral
domains/ lands. These rights shall include, but not limited to, the right over the fruits, the right
to possess, the right to use, right to consume, right to exclude and right to recover ownership,
and the rights or interests over land and natural resources. The right to recover shall be
particularly applied to lands lost through fraud or any form or vitiated consent or transferred
for an unconscionable price."
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over "lands,
waters and natural resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of those expressly
mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and jurisprudence clearly declare that
the right to claim ownership over land does not necessarily include the right to claim
ownership over the natural resources found on or under the land.231 The IPRA itself makes a
distinction between land and natural resources. Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of
ownership only over the land within the ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of
the law that speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be discussed later,
do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over these resources.
The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not
specifically and categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the
constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in general.232Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion
in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of "natural
resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the
parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is Allowed
Under Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b) merely
grants the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:
"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, right
to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to
manage and conserve natural resourceswithin the territories and uphold the responsibilities for
future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural
resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection
and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an
informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project,
government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just
and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;
and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with,
alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA
enumerates the following rights:
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;
 b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and
uphold the responsibilities for future generations;
c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of
the natural resources found therein;
d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural
resources for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws;
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact
upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;
f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference
with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights.233
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State
and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for
future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their allocation and utilization,
and "negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of
"ensuring ecological and environmental protection and conservation measures." It must
be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural resources covers
only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental
protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to the
exploitation and development of natural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of
management or stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the
profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the same time,
however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within their ancestral domains
are conserved for future generations and that the "utilization" of these resources must not harm
the ecology and environment pursuant to national and customary laws.234
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to
contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-scale.
Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in the third paragraph of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of the plight of forest dwellers,
gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly situated who exploit our natural
resources for their daily sustenance and survival."235 Section 7 (b) also expressly mandates the
ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and ensure environmental and ecological
protection within the domains, which duties, by their very nature, necessarily reject utilization
in a large-scale.
(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is
Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 57 of the IPRA provides:
"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall have priority
rights in theharvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources
within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to
take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not
exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25)
years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs
concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-making process, has agreed to
allow such operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take
appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract."
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of natural
resources within ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The
terms "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation" of any natural resources
within the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is utilization not
merely for subsistence but for commercial or other extensive use that require technology other
than manual labor.236 The law recognizes the probability of requiring a non-member of the
ICCs/IPs to participate in the development and utilization of the natural resources and thereby
allows such participation for a period of not more than 25 years, renewable for another 25
years. This may be done on condition that a formal written agreement be entered into by the
non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the
natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the
development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority rights
over the natural resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of priority
rights implies that there is a superior entity that owns these resources and this entity has the
power to grant preferential rights over the resources to whosoever itself chooses.
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said
doctrine that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It
incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in
the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution237 in relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of
these natural resources, may directly undertake the development and exploitation of the
natural resources by itself, or in the alternative, it may recognize the priority rights of
the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the natural resources are found by entering
into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with them. The
State may likewise enter into any of said agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs,
whether natural or juridical, or enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for the large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow such
non-member to participate in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter
into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the agreement shall be
protected. The agreement shall be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral domains, the
State, as owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by itself, directly
undertake the development and exploitation of the natural resources; or (2) it may recognize
the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them for such
development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an agreement with a non-member of the
ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may allow such non-member
to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on
which the resources are found, the right to the small-scale utilization of these resources,
and at the same time, a priority in their large-scale development and
exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically give priority to the
ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it is within its discretion to choose which
option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to
solely undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources within their domains.
The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour alwaysunder State supervision or control. This
indicates that the State does not lose control and ownership over the resources even in their
exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as
actual occupants of the land where the natural resources lie, have traditionally utilized these
resources for their subsistence and survival.
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the following
provision:
"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental agencies
shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession,
license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement. without prior certification
from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such
certification shall only be issued after a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral
Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the
NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs
concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government agency or government-owned
or -controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing
agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the
ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that
has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process."
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of natural
resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and government agencies
without prior certification from the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not
overlap with any ancestral domain. The NCIP certification shall be issued only after a field-
based investigation shall have been conducted and the free and prior informed written consent
of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-compliance with the consultation requirement gives the
ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend any project granted by any department or government
agency.
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any
concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the
NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie within any ancestral domain. The
provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to
determine whether to grant or deny any concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the
NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and that
their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the certification applies to agreements over
natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that are
found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.
V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE
INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.
The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism stretching
back to prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus during the 1960's from
two sources. First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into the limelight the
possibility of peoples controlling their own destinies. Second, the right of self-determination
was enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human Rights.238 The rise of the civil rights
movement and anti-racism brought to the attention of North American Indians, Aborigines in
Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the possibility of fighting for fundamental rights and
freedoms.
In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded,239 and during the
1980's, indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people of the Philippine
Cordillera were the first Asians to take part in the international indigenous movement. It was
the Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out successful campaigns against the building of
the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and they have since become one of the best-organized
indigenous bodies in the world.240
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This
came as a result of the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous
human rights and the destruction of the indigenous peoples' environment, together with the
national governments' inability to deal with the situation.241Indigenous rights came as a result
of both human rights and environmental protection, and have become a part of today's
priorities for the international agenda.242
International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies, programs
and specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for example, first adopted
a policy on IPs as a result of the dismal experience of projects in Latin America.243 The World
Bank now seeks to apply its current policy on IPs to some of its projects in Asia. This policy
has provided an influential model for the projects of the Asian Development Bank.244
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and declares as
a State policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of national unity and
development.245 The IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with the international
category of IPs,246 and is heavily influenced by both the International Labor Organization
(ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.247
ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries"248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and many other
international instruments on the prevention of discrimination.249 ILO Convention No. 169
revised the "Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other
Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on June
26, 1957. Developments in international law made it appropriate to adopt new international
standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to removing the assimilationist orientation of
the earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of these peoples to exercise control over
their own institutions, ways of life and economic development."250

CONCLUSION

The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and
religious differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine
government through the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly foreign in origin or
derivation.251 Largely unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the alienation of a
large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the
indigenes are relevant to the evolution of Philippine culture and are vital to the understanding
of contemporary problems.252 It is through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our
legislators to understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but through
common experiences in the course of history. The Philippines became a democracy a
centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the Filipino
people into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a
whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization,253 it is this Court's
duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm
their co-existence with the land laws in our national legal system.

With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who
both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the
Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not
established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay
Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of
71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased
the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the
property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the
property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and
adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to
the judicial confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang
Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite
containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is
verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,
1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s
application for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places
under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing
an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as
supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition
to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino,
widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto
(Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any
period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.
Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared
alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15,
1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the
CA’s decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5
(Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural
land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its
declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of
possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the
Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the
declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and disposable
should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that
the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack
of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their
argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an
alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was
essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property through prescription
at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered
was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to
establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on
the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the
land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial
property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v.
Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the
land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that
Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that
Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to
validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed
by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration
on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years
reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the
State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference
to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by
implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through
judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when
the land subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different
classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the
Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of
private ownership.11Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for
public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that
is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or
for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than
part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the
country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all
lands of the public domain belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the
State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural,
timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the
public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law
might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the
1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national
parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which
they may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is
done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the
public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial
lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the
Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not
susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive
act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department,
not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service
or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the
ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its
prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the
State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of
national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows,
and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation
to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino
citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise
classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it
excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the
coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the
Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his
application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in
possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or
earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public
domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to
classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the
application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public
domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already
classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and
overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the
classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or
reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and
disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no
legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or
glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted
that the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which
should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period
of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the
fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and
literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress
prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified
as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete
title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This
means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the
ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue
of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the
lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of
satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this
reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the
requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to
dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at
which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being
confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are
complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government,
because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be
sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet
titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation
and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed,
we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative
development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in
order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable
public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby
converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision
concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but
the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As
such, prescription can now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or
lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under
private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not
be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and
disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section
11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural
land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant’s
possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and
the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or
incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of
the public domain and has become private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no
longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth
are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered
converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be
alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether
ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted
to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is
a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil
Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be
the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without
satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be
considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it
as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the
land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a
proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the
respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103727 December 18, 1996
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN,
represented by its HEIR-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN
PEDRO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division) AURELIO OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D.
BUHAIN, TERESA C. DELA CRUZ, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. 106496 December 18, 1996
ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON, VICENTE
PANTALEON, ELEUTERIO PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN PEDRO, RODRIGO
SAN PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS, FELISA NICOLAS, and LEONA SAN
PEDRO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p
The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of controversy in
these two consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim
and have been laying claim to the ownership of, against third persons and the Government
itself, a total land area of approximately 173,000 hectares or "214,047 quiniones," 1 on the
basis of a Spanish title, entitled "Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136" dated April 25, 1894.
The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the provinces of Nueva
Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon City,
Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands
extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between
Dingalan Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in the south. 2
Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up and land
swindles and rackets proliferated resulting in tedious litigation in various trial courts, in the
appellate court and in the Supreme Court, 3in connection therewith.
We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Muñoz, 23
SCRA 1183 [1968];Antonio, et al. v. Barroga, et al., 23 SCRA 357 [1968]; Carabot, et
al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 368 [1986]; Republic v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., 186 SCRA 88 [1990]; Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (WIDORA)
v. Court of Appeals, et al., 212 SCRA 360 [1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, et al., 144
SCRA 318 [1986]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; and Director
of lands v. Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336 [1994] 4 terminated the controversy as to ownership of
lands covered by Spanish Land Titles, for it is the rule that, once this Court, as the highest
Tribunal of the land, has spoken, there the matter must rest:
It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point,
litigation must end, Hence, after the procedures and processes for lawsuits
have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been
exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter
is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties,
continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions therein
embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not
their will, but the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy
demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the
court's dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality. 5 [Cited cases
omitted]
It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the Government that we render judgment
herein writing finisto these controversies by laying to rest the issue of validity of the basis of
the estate's claim of ownership over this vast expanse of real property.
The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long drawn-out cases:
G.R. NO. 103727
G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint 6 for recovery of possession
and/or damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. This was dismissed by the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 104, Quezon City in its
decision 7 dated July 7, 1989, the dispositive portion 8 of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint
against the defendants Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador Buhain and Teresa
dela Cruz and ordering plaintiff to pay each of the herein defendants, the
sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as and for attorney's fees,
and to pay the costs of suit.
The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance with
damages and with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 by
Engracio San Pedro as heir-judicial administrator of the "Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban" against Jose G. De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio
Noguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz, Gaudencio R Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco,
Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay, Manuel
Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment & Development Corporation), Capitol
Hills Realty Corporation and Jose F. Castro. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
88-447 in Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro discovered that the
aforenamed defendants were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles
to portions of the subject estate, particularly Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982,
951975-951977, 313624, 279067, 1412, 353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all
emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. 614 9 and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
255544 and 264124, both derivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that the
aforesaid defendants were able to acquire exclusive ownership and possession of certain
portions of the subject estate in their names through deceit, fraud, bad faith and
misrepresentation; (3) that Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and 333 had been cancelled
by and through a final and executory decision dated March 21, 1988 in relation to letter
recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest Development and the Office of
the Solicitor General and also in relation to Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April
23, 1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence,
validity and genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers the
subject estate had been resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a decision dated April 25,
1978 by the defunct Court of First Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a case
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 312-B. 10
Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants, namely, Aurelio
Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz, Dominador Buhain and Manuel Chung and
Victoria Chung Tiu. 11
On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against Mareco,
Inc. for improper service of summons and against Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu for
lack of cause of action considering that the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 86404 is El Mavic Investment and Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and
Victoria Chung Tiu. 12
Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint based on the
following grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz are already the registered owners of the
parcels of land covered by Torrens titles which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title,
Titulo Propriedad No. 4136, covering the subject estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban" specifically stated in its dispositive portion that all lands which have
already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System by private persons shall be
excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. 13
The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied, 14 and so, the petitioner estate interposed
an appeal with the Court of Appeals. On January 20, 1992, the appeal was dismissed 15 for
being unmeritorious and the lower court's decision was affirmed with costs against the
petitioner estate. The appellate court ratiocinated:
(1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof was
presented in the proceeding below;
(2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in court was not registered
under the Torrens system hence, it cannot be used as evidence of land
ownership;
(3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in its favor expressly
excluded from the Titulo titled lands of private individuals;
(4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered titles of Ocampo, Buhain
and Dela Cruz as correctly ruled by the lower court;
(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614 from which titles of
Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz originated was already cancelled, hence,
the lower court did not err in not declaring the same as null and
void. 16
Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the petitioner estate, on March 16, 1992,
filed the present petition 17 docketed as G.R. No. 103727.
G.R. NO. 106496
G.R. No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a
petition 18 for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban which eventually resulted to an Order 19 dated November 17, 1978 declaring inter
alia, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect.
The dispositive portion 20 of the said Order reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that:
1) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is reconsidered and set aside.
2) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and of no legal
force and effect and that therefore no rights could be derived therefrom.
3) All orders approving the sales, conveyances, donations or any other
transactions involving the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
are declared invalidated, void and of no force and effect.
4) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from
the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
5) The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate
of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are enjoined from representing or
exercising any acts of possession or ownership or from disposing in any
manner portions of all the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
and to immediately vacate the same.
6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co-administrators submit in
Court within twenty days their final accounting and inventory of all real
and personal properties of the estate which had come into their possession
or knowledge under oath.
 7) This case is hereby re-opened, to allow movants-intervenors to continue
with the presentation of their evidence in order to rest their case.
The consideration and approval of the administrator's final accounting and
inventory of the presentation of movants-intervenors' evidence as well as
the consideration of all other incidents are hereby set on December 22,
1978 at 8:30 a.m.
The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban was filed on December 29, 1971 with the defunct Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan. The petition
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 312-B was initiated by Engracio San Pedro and Justino Z. Benito
who sought to be appointed as administrator and co-administrator, respectively.
On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were established, evidence for the
petitioners was received by the lower court without any opposition. 21
On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued an Order appointing
Engracio San Pedro as Administrator of the subject estate. 22
On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration in favor of Engracio San Pedro
upon posting of a bond in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). 23
On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was ordered to furnish copies of the
letters of administration and other pertinent orders approving certain dispositions of the
properties of the estate to the following entities:
(a) The Commanding General
Philippine Constabulary
Camp Crame, Quezon City
(b) The Solicitor General
Manila
(c) The Government Corporate Counsel
A. Mabini St., Manila
(d) The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan
(e) The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan
(f) The City Treasurers of Quezon City and Caloocan
(g) The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacan and Rizal
(h) The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City
(i) The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City
(j) The Municipal Treasurers of the various municipalities in which
properties of the estate are located; and
(k) Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, Quezon City and Camp
Aguinaldo, Quezon City. 24
The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public from any confusion brought
about by various persons who had been misrepresenting themselves as having been legally
authorized to act for the subject estate and to sell its properties by virtue thereof.
On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an Opposition to the Petition was filed by
the Republic of the Philippines alleging, inter alia:
4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated February 16, 1976,
Spanish titles like the TITULO is absolutely inadmissible and ineffective
as proof of ownership in court proceedings, except where the holder
thereof applies for land registration under Act 496, which is not true in the
proceedings at bar;
5. That no less than the Supreme Court had declared TITULO DE
PROPIEDAD NO. 4136 as invalid;
6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and/or his
supposed heirs have lost whatever rights of ownership they might have
had to the so-called Estate on the ground of inaction, laches and/or
prescription;
7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property to be administered for
purposes of inventory, settlement or distribution in accordance with law,
and all the inventories so far submitted, insofar as they embraced lands
within the TITULO, are deemed ineffective and cannot be legally
considered; and
8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal interest in the land
subject matter of the petition considering that, except such portions thereof
had been (sic) already the subject of valid adjudication or disposition in
accordance with law, the same belong in State ownership. 25
On February 15, 1977, the Republic filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings. 26
On February 16, 1977, the Republic's Opposition to the Petition for Letters of Administration
was dismissed by means of the following Order issued by Judge Benigno Puno:
 WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine the legal issues
raised, the Court hereby DISMISSES the "Opposition" dated August 30,
1976, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General; likewise, for lack of
merit, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated February 15, 1977, filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General is DENIED.
The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the Co-administrator Justino Z.
Benito are ordered to furnish the office of the Solicitor General all copies
of inventories already filed in Court within ten (10) days from notice
hereof. 27
On March 9, 1977, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the
Republic. 28
On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, rendered
a 52-page decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, issued on April
29, 1984, in the name of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban,
covering a total area of approximately 214,047 quiniones or 173,000
hectares, situated in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, Quezon City
and Caloocan City;
(b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido Gener, Santiago Gener, Rosa
Pantaleon, Vicente Pantaleon, Eleuterio Pantaleon, Trinidad San Pedro,
Rodrigo San Pedro, Ricardo Nicolas, and Teresa Nicolas, as the true and
lawful heirs of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and
entitled to inherit the intestate estate left by the said deceased, consisting
of the above-mentioned tract of private land covered and described by said
above-mentioned Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds
of Bulacan, excluding therefrom: (a) all lands which have already been
legally and validly titled under the Torrens System, by private persons, or
the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its instrumentalities or agencies;
(b) all lands declared by the government as reservations for public use and
purposes; (c) all lands belonging to the public domain; and, (d) all portions
thereof which had been sold, quitclaimed and/or previously excluded by
the Administrator and duly approved by a final order of the Court, except
those which may hereafter be set aside, after due consideration on a case
to case basis, of various motions to set aside the said Court order which
approved the said sales, quit-claims, and/or exclusions;
(c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as co- administrator, is
hereby revoked to take effect immediately, to obviate any confusion in the
administration of the Estate, and to fix the responsibilities of
administration to the co-heir Administrator, Engracio San Pedro, whose
appointment as such is hereby confirmed. The said co-administrator
Justino Z. Benito is hereby ordered to render his final accounting of his
co-administration of the Estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of
copy hereof;
(d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San Pedro is hereby ordered to
amass, collate, consolidate and take possession of all the net estate of the
deceased Don Marino San Pedro y Esteban, as well as all other sets and
credits lawfully belonging to the estate and/or to take appropriate legal
action to recover the same in the proper Courts of Justice, government
offices or any appropriate forum; and to pay all taxes or charges due from
the estate to the Government, and all indebtedness of the estate, and
thereafter, to submit a project of partition of the estate among the lawful
heirs as herein recognized and declared.
It is, however, strongly recommended to His Excellency, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos that, to avoid the concentration of too much land to a
few persons and in line with the projected urban land reform program of
the government, corollary to the agricultural land reform program of the
New Society, the above intestate estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban should be expropriated or purchased by negotiated sale by the
government to be used in its human settlements and low cost housing
projects.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED. 29
On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of the above decision. 30
On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a Manifestation and Petition for the
Inhibition of the then newly appointed Presiding Judge Oscar Fernandez. On July 12, 1978,
after the Republic filed its Reply to the Petition for Inhibition, Judge Fernandez denied the
said petition. 31
After hearings were conducted on the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration, Judge
Fernandez issued the aforestated Order 32 dated November 17, 1978 which, in essence, set
aside Judge Bagasao's decision dated April 25, 1978 by declaring Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect, thus, excluding all lands covered by
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban.
The petitioners-heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban appealed to the Court of
Appeals and alleged that the lower court did not act with impartiality when it granted the
Republic's motion for reconsideration which was merely pro forma, thereby overturning a
prior declaration by the same court of the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro. 33
On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the petitioners-heirs. 34 In
affirming the assailed Order dated November 17, 1978, the appellate court focused its
discussion solely on the issue of whether or not the lower court erred in declaring Titulo de
Priopriedad No. 4136 null and void. The appellate court ruled that the petitioners-heirs failed
to controvert the Republic's claim that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is invalid on the
following bases; (a) non-production of the original of the subject title; (b) inadmissibility of
the photostat copies of the said title; and (c) non-registration of the subject Spanish title under
Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) as required by Presidential Decree No. 892
(Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of Spanish
Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings).
The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision by
invoking certain cases wherein the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 had been
allegedly recognized. The Court of Appeals refused to be swayed and denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. 35
Hence, the herein petition, 36 docketed as G. R. No. 106496, was filed on September 18, 1992.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, this Court
resolved to consolidate both cases on September 15,
1994. 37
While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed separate motions for
intervention which we denied on different occasions for lack of merit.
In G.R No. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of the petition are as follows:
I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-88-447, RTC,
Branch 104 was denied due process of law due to gross negligence of
lawyer, which respondent court grossly failed to take cognizance of.
II. That the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in not remanding the case for trial and in
affirming the lower court's null and void judgment. 38
In G.R No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following assignment of errors, to wit:
First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed order which
resolved a question of title or ownership over which the lower court as an
intestate court has no jurisdiction and over the vigorous and repeated
objections of the petitioners. 39
Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the order of
Judge Fernandez setting aside the order and decision of Judge Puno and
Bagasao; Judge Fernandez thereby acted as an appellate court reviewing,
revising, amending or setting aside the order and decision of Judges of
equal rank. 40
Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to uphold the
order of Judge Fernandez who without jurisdiction, set aside the order of
Judge Puno and the decision of Judge Bagasao, both of which were
already final. 41
Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was unmindful of the fact that Judge
Fernandez was appointed by President Marcos to reverse Judge Bagasao,
regardless of the evidence, thereby unmindful that petitioners were denied
the cold neutrality of an impartial tribunal. 42
Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the evidence
presented before Judges Echiverri, Puno and Bagasao and merely adopted
the order of Judge Fernandez who never received a single piece of
evidence, notwithstanding the 1906 Guide title over Hacienda Angono in
Binangonan, Rizal, the boundary owner stated therein being Don Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban, and the November 1991 en banc decision of the
Supreme Court upholding the Guido title. 43
Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of the probative value of the
petitioners' Spanish title in these cases is the propriety of the lower court's resolution of the
question of ownership of the subject San Pedro estate in the special proceedings case. Thus,
before we address ourselves to the issue of whether or not petitioners' Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 is null and void and of no legal force and effect, it is best that we first determine
whether or not the lower court, acting as a probate court, in the petition for letters of
administration, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
settling the issue of ownership of the San Pedro estate covered by Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.
Petitioners-heirs, in G.R No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that the lower court, then CFI,
Bulacan, Branch IV, had no jurisdiction as an "intestate court" 44 to resolve the question of
title or ownership raised by the public respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban. 45
The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign capacity as parens patriae,
argues that petitioners' contention is misplaced considering that when the Republic questioned
the existence of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the lower court became duty-
bound to rule on the genuineness and validity of Titulo de Propriedad 4136 which purportedly
covers the said estate, otherwise, the lower court in the intestate proceedings would be
mistakenly dealing with properties that are proven to be part of the State's patrimony or
improperly included as belonging to the estate of the deceased. 46
A probate court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what
shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person. Neither is it confined to the
issue of the validity of wills. We held in the case of Maniñgat v. Castillo, 47 that "the main
function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either
summarily or through the process of administration." Thus, its function necessarily includes
theexamination of the properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule on whether
or not the inventory of the estate properly included them for purposes of distribution of the net
assets of the estate of the deceased to the lawful heirs.
In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, 48 we stated, thus:
 . . . questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate of
the deceased maybe passed upon in the Probate Court, with the consent of
all the parties, without prejudice to third persons . . .
Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of whether
certain properties ought to be included or excluded from the inventory and accounting of the
estate subject of a petition for letters of administration, as in the intestate proceedings of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, maybe resolved by the probate court. In this
light, we echo our pronouncement in the case of Garcia v. Garcia 49 that:
. . . The court which acquired jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased
person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings, has
supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said power,
it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the
administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits
which the law requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In
compliance with this duty, the court has also inherent power to determine
what properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or
excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the
properties of a deceased person duly call the court's attention to the fact
that certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory,
it is likewise the court's duty to hear the observations, with power to
determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the
properties referred to therein belong prima facieto the intestate, but no
such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of
the said properties. 50 [Emphasis Supplied]
In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court did not commit any
reversible error when it issued the Order dated November 17, 1978 which set aside Judge
Bagasao's decision dated April 25, 1978 and declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null
and void, consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title from the inventory of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs as regards the assailed Order
of November 17, 1978 is the impropriety of Judge Fernandez' act of granting the motion for
reconsideration filed by the public respondent Republic since, Judge Fernandez did not
personally hear the intestate case. Petitioners thus dubbed him as a "reviewing judge." By
setting aside the Decision dated April 25, 1978 of his predecessors in CFI, Branch IV,
Baliuag, Bulacan, namely, Judge Benigno Puno and Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, respectively,
Judge Fernandez, acting as a "reviewing judge," proceeded without authority and/or
jurisdiction. 51
There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to whether the decision arrived at is fair
and just, a newly appointed judge who did not try the case can decide the same as long as the
record and the evidence are all available to him and that the same were taken into
consideration and thoroughly studied. The "reviewing judge" argument of the petitioners-heirs
has no leg to stand on considering that "the fact that the judge who penned the decision did not
hear a certain case in its entirety is not a compelling reason to jettison his findings and
conclusion inasmuch as the full record was available to him for his perusal." 52 In the case at
bar, it is evident that the 41-page Order dated November 17, 1978 of Judge Fernandez
bespeaks of a knowledgeable and analytical discussion of the rationale for reconsidering and
setting aside Judge Bagasao's Decision dated April 25, 1978.
Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the correctness of Judge Fernandez'
disposition of the case, i.e., the issuance by the lower court of the assailed Order of November
17, 1978, we now focus on the core issue of whether or not the lower court in G.R No. 106496
committed reversible error in excluding from the inventory of the estate of the deceased
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 primarily on
the ground that the said title is null and void and of no legal force and effect. Juxtaposed with
this is the issue of whether or not the appellate court, in both cases, G.R. Nos. 103727 and
106496, erred in not recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as evidence to prove
ownership by the Late Mariano San Pedro of the lands covered thereby.
It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on February 16,
1976, the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all
holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered
under the Land Registration Act 53 within six (6) months from the date of effectivity of the
said Decree or until August 16, 1976. 54 Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in a
re-classification of their lands. 55 Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable
evidence of land ownership. 56
Section 1 of the said Decree provides:
Sec. 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is
discontinued, and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet
covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their
lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter,
Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any
registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the
Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act. 3344.
The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the underlying policies for its passage, to
wit:
WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances of
large tracts of public and private lands to unsuspecting and unwary buyers
appear to have been perpetrated by unscrupulous persons claiming
ownership under Spanish titles or grants of dubious origin;
WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in
conflicting claims and litigations between legitimate title holders, bona
fide occupants or applicants of public lands, on the one hand, and the
holders of, or person claiming rights under the said Spanish titles or
 grants, on the other, thus creating confusion and instability in property
ownership and threatening the peace and order renditions in the areas
affected;
WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration Commission show that
recording in the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is
practically nil and that this system has become obsolete;
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under
the operation of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now
ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual
possession;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the System of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law and the use of Spanish titles
as evidence in registration proceedings under the Torrens system;
In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al., 57 we took cognizance of
this Decree and thus held that caution and care must be exercised in the acceptance and
admission of Spanish titles taking into account the numerous fake titles that have been
discovered after their supposed reconstitution subsequent to World War II.
In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad
4136 was brought under the operation of P.D. 892 despite their allegation that they did so on
August 13, 1976. 58 Time and again we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence and
the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. 59 Proof of compliance with P.D. 892
should be the Certificate of Title covering the land registered.
In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error on the part of Judge Bagasao
who rendered the reconsidered Decision dated April 25, 1978 to have declared the existence,
genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban despite the effectivity of P.D. No. 892. Judge Fernandez, in
setting aside Judge Bagasao's decision, emphasized that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under
P.D. 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private ownership in the special
proceedings case. He made the following observations as regards the Titulo, to wit:
The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire consequences of
recognizing the nebulous titulo as an evidence of ownership underscored
the fact that during the pendency of this case, smart speculators and wise
alecks had inveigled innocent parties into buying portions of the so-called
estate with considerations running into millions of pesos.
Some, under the guise of being benign heroes even feigned donations to
charitable and religious organizations, including veterans' organizations as
smoke screen to the gargantuan fraud they have committed and to hood
wink further other gullible and unsuspecting victims. 60
In the same light, it does not escape this Court's onomatopoeic observation that the then heir-
judicial administrator Engracio San Pedro who filed the complaint for recovery of possession
and/or reconveyance with damages in G.R No. 103727 on August 15, 1988 invoked Judge
Bagasao's Decision of April 25, 1978 in support of the Titulo's validity notwithstanding the
fact that, by then, the said Decision had already been set aside by Judge Fernandez' Order of
November 17, 1978. We are in accord with the appellate courts' holding in G.R No. 103727
insofar as it concludes that since the Titulo was not registered under Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered titles of the private
respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of the Titulo under the
Torrens system is the lack of the necessary documents to be presented in order to comply with
the provisions of P.D. 892. We do not discount the possibility that the Spanish title in question
is not genuine, especially since its genuineness and due execution have not been proven. In
both cases, the petitioners heirs were not able to present the original of Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof. In the special proceedings case, the petitioners-heirs
failed to produce the Titulo despite a subpoena duces tecum (Exh. "Q-RP") to produce it as
requested by the Republic from the then administrators of the subject intestate estate, Engracio
San Pedro and Justino Benito, and the other interested parties. As an alternative to prove their
claim of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners referred to a document known as
"hypoteca" (the Spanish term is 'hipoteca') allegedly appended to the Titulo. However, the said
hypoteca was neither properly identified nor presented as evidence. Likewise, in the action for
recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages, the petitioners-heirs did not submit
the Titulo as part of their evidence. Instead, only an alleged illegible copy of the Titulo was
presented. (Exhs. "C-9" to "C-19").
The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the Rules of Court is stated
in unequivocal terms. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule read:
Sec. 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no
evidence of a writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other
than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
xxx xxx xxx
Sections 3 and 4 of the same Rule further read:
Sec 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed — When the
original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction or unavailability, its
contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses.
 Sec. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in adverse party's custody. — COURT:
If the writing be in the custody of the adverse party, he must have
reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory Would you comment on that Solicitor Agcaoili?
proof of its existence, he fails to produce the writing, the contents thereof
may be proved as in the case of its loss. But the notice to produce it is not
necessary where the writing is itself a notice, or where it has been ATTY. AGCAOILI:
wrongfully obtained or withheld by the adverse party.
We are precisely impugning the titulo and I think the
Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its question of counsel is already answered by witness.
nature, such as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. In the The parties have not yet established the due existence
absence of a clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or of the titulo.
cannot be produced in court, the photocopy submitted, in lieu thereof, must be
disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible piece ATTY. BRINGAS:
of evidence. 61
We are constrained to ask this matter in order to be
Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by competent proof the existence candid about the question. The witness is a witness for
and due execution of the Titulo. Their explanation as to why the original copy of the Titulo the government, so with the testimony of this witness
could not be produced was not satisfactory. The alleged contents thereof which should have for the government to the effect that there is actually
resolved the issue as to the exact extent of the subject intestate estate of the late Mariano San in existence titulo propiedad 4136; we are asking the
Pedro were not distinctly proved. In the case of Ong Ching Po v.Court of Appeals, 62 we question candidly to the government counsel whether
pointed out that: he is prepared to state that there is really in existence
such titulo propiedad 4136.
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were
actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary ATTY. AGCAOILI:
evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the
document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution;
loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of We are now stating before this court that there was
such a document examined by the NBI insofar as the
the court. 63
signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Manuel Lopez
Delgado are concerned and they are found to be
In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, Judge authentic. 64
Bagasao, in his decision, relied on: (1) the testimony of the NBI expert, Mr. Segundo
Tabayoyong, pertaining to a report dated January 28, 1963 denominated as "Questioned
The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further lend credence to our
Documents Report No. 230-163"; (2) a photostat copy of the original of the Titulo duly
pronouncement that the Titulo is of dubious validity:
certified by the then Clerk of Court of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila; and (3)
the hipotecaRegistered in the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on December 4, 1894.
. . . the NBI in its Questioned Document Report No. 448-977 dated
September 2, 1977 (Exhibit "O-RP") concluded that the document
Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside Judge Bagasao's April 1978
contained material alterations as follows:
decision correctly clarified that the NBI report aforementioned was limited to the genuineness
of the two signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Mariano Lopez Delgado appearing on the last
page of the Titulo, not the Titulo itself. When asked by the counsel of the petitioners-heirs to a) On line 15 of "p, 1, Title" and on line 5 of "p. 2, Title," the word
admit the existence and due execution of the Titulo, the handling Solicitor testified: "Pinagcamaligan" was written after "Pulo;"

xxx xxx xxx b) On line 16, "p. 1, Title," "un" was converted to "mil;"

ATTY. BRINGAS:
With the testimony of this witness, I would like to call
the distinguished counsel for the government whether
he admits that there is actually a titulo propiedad 4136.
c) On Line 18, "p. 1, Title," "mil" was written at the end of "tres" in "tres
mil;"
d) On line 19 of "p. 1, Title," a semblance of "mil" was written after
"setentay tres;"
 e) On line 6, "p. 2, Title," "un" was formed to a semblance of "uni;" and
f) On line 8, "p. 2, Title," "un" was formed to "mil."
The plain and evident purpose was definitely to enlarge the area of the
titulo. According to Mr. Tabayoyong of the NBI, there are still "pieces of
black ashes around the rings of the portions which are indications of
burnings". The burnings were made on the very portions where there were
previous erasures, alterations and intercalations. Understandably, the
burnings were done to erase traces of the criminal act. 65
In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et a1. 66 Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera, in reinstating the trial court's judgment therein, sustained the finding that:
. . . The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost original) of the Spanish title in
the name of Mariano San Pedro shows obvious alterations and
intercalations in an attempt to vastly increase the area and change the
location of the land described in the original title . . .
Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of the Titulo, we sustain the lower
court's analysis, as affirmed by the appellate court, viz:
To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 was never
presented in Court. Upon request of the Government, a subpoena duces
tecum (Exhibit "Q-RP") was issued to the two administrators, Engracio
San Pedro and Justino Benito as well as to other interested parties to
produce the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. But no one
produced the titulo. What the parties did was to pass the buck to one
another.
Without any plausible explanation at all on as to why the original could
not be produced, the Court cannot take cognizance of any secondary
evidence.
It was explained that the titulo after changing hands, finally fell into the
hands of a certain Moon Park of Korea but who later disappeared and that
his present whereabouts could not be known.
Strangely enough, despite the significance of the titulo, no serious efforts
on the part of the claimants-heirs were exerted to retrieve this document of
vital importance despite the Court order to produce it in order to determine
its authenticity.
It would not be enough to simply say that Moon Park's whereabouts are
unknown or that there are not enough funds to locate him. The only logical
conclusion would be that the original would be adverse if
produced. 67
As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and bounds of the subject intestate
estate, the petitioners-heirs have not established the conditions required by law for their
admissibility as secondary evidence to prove that there exists a document designated as Titulo
de Propriedad No. 4136. Hence, the same acquires no probative value. 68
At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of Forestry, et
al. v. Hon. Emmanuel M. Muñoz, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch
I, et al. 69 is enlightening. In said case, private respondent, Pinaycamaligan Indo-Agro
Development Corporation, Inc., (PIADECO), claimed to be the owner of some 72,000
hectares of land located in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte,
province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. To prove its
ownership Piadeco relied on Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 28, 1894. Scholarly
opining that the Titulo is of doubtful validity, 70 Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, speaking for the
Court, stated that:
But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two
undisputed facts. First. The Title embraces land "located in the Provinces
of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon City." Second. The title was
signed only by the provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only in
the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation, indeed, cries
desperately for a plausible answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private
ownership of land must be proved not only through the genuineness of
title but also with a clear identity of the land claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17
Phil. 494, 496; Villa Abrille v. Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1, 8, citing Sison v.
Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51
Phil. 51, 54-56; Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in a
case involving a Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land must be
concretely measured per hectare or per quinon, not in mass (cuerpos
ciertos), (Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The fact that the
Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for
classifying lands strongly suggests that the land applied for must be
measured per hectare.
Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In
Piadeco's "Rejoinder to Opposition" dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil
Case 3035-M, it specified that area covered by its Titulo de Propiedad as
74,000 hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its "Opposition" of May 13,
1964 in the same case, it described the land as containing 72,000 hectares
(Id., p. 48). Which is which? This but accentuates the nebulous identity of
Piadeco's land, Piadeco's ownership thereof then equally suffers from
vagueness, fatal at least in these proceedings.
Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner
appearing on the title, acquired his rights over the property by prescription
under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-
24796, p. 184) the basic decree that authorized adjustment of lands. By
this decree, applications for adjustment — showing the location,
boundaries and area of land applied for — were to be filed with
the Direccion General de Administration Civil, which then ordered
theclassification and survey of the land with the assistance of the
interested party or his legal representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing
applications for adjustment at one year from the date of publication of the
decree in the Gaceta de Manila on September 10, 1880, extended for
another year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881 (Ibid.). If Don Mariano
sought adjustment within the time prescribed, as he should have, then,
seriously to be considered here are the Royal Orders of November 25,
1880 and of October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares
of arids lands, 500 hectares of land with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable
lands (See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil. 146, 154; Bayot v. Director of
Lands, 98 Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of the Royal Decree of January 26,
1889 limited the area that may be acquired by purchase to 2,500 hectares,
with allowable error up to 5%. Ponce, op cit., p. 19). And, at the risk of
repetition, it should be stated again that Piadeco's Titulo is held out to
embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of land.
But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894), published in the Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894
(Ibid., p. 26; Venture, op. cit., p. 28). That decree required a second
petition for adjustment within six months from publication, for those who
had not yet secured their titles at the time of the publication of the law
(Ibid.). Said law also abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment of
lands established by Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and confirmed
by Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, which boards were directed to
deliver to their successors, the provincial boards established by Decree on
Municipal Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records and
documents which they may hold in their possession (Ramirez v. Director
of Land, supra, at p. 124).
Doubt on Piadeco's title here supervenes when we come to consider that
title was either dated April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days after
the publication of the Maura Law.
Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco
exactly acquired its rights under the Titulo. The original owner appearing
thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. From
Piadeco's explanation — not its evidence (Rollo of L-24796, pp. 179-188)
we cull the following: On December 3, 1894, Don Mariano mortgaged the
land under pacto de retro, redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to
one Don Ignacio Conrado. This transaction was said to have been
registered or inscribed on December 4, 1894. Don Mariano Ignacio died,
his daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only heir, adjudicated the land to
herself. At about the same time, Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of
registration was issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on
June 27, 1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became a
shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the land to Piadeco's treasurer
and an incorporator, Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration of a certain
amount of Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada assigned the
land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain Fabian Castillo,
appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the land.
Castillo also executed an affidavit of adjudication to himself over the same
land, and then sold the same to Piadeco. Consideration therefor was paid
partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the land under Act 496.
The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the
consideration to Fabian Castillo made to depend on the registration of the
land under the Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of the validity of Titulo
de Propiedad 4136? This, and other factors herein pointed out, cast great
clouds of doubt that hang most conspicuously over Piadeco's title.
Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 71 we
categorically enunciated that the alleged Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, had
become bereft of any probative value as evidence of land ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as
contained in our Resolution dated February 6, 1985 in a related case entitled Benito and
WIDORA v. Ortigas docketed as G.R No. 69343. On March 29, 1985, an entry of final
judgment was made respecting G.R. No. 69343.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations by this Court relating
to the issue of the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from adjudicating
otherwise. In the Muñoz case, we had cast doubt on the Titulo's validity. In the WIDORA case,
the Titulo's nullification was definitive. In both cases, the Republic and the estate of Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban were on opposite ends before this bench. In the case en banc of Calalang
v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 72 the Court explained the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment, viz:
. . . conclusiveness of judgment — states that a fact or question which was
in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by
the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in
privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future
action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other
court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of
action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has
been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as
to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their
privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or
question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on
the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment
between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the
second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the
first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of
cause of action is not required by merely identity of issues.
The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now be laid
to rest. The Titulo cannot be relied upon by the petitioners-heirs or their privies as
evidence of ownership. In the petition for letters of administration the inventory
submitted before the probate court consisted solely of lands covered by the Titulo.
 Hence, there can be no "net estate" to speak of after the Titulo's exclusion from the
intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.
In G.R No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of private respondents
Buhain, Ocampo and Dela Cruz, namely TCT No. 372592 (Exh. "2", Buhain), TCT No. 8982
(Exh. "2" — De Ocampo) and TCT No. 269707 (Exh. "2" — Dela Cruz). 73 Under the Torrens
system of registration, the titles of private respondents became indefeasible and
incontrovertible one year from its final decree. 74 More importantly, TCT Nos. 372592, 8982,
269707, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoy the conclusive presumption of
validity. 75 As a last hurrah to champion their claim to the vast estate covered by the subject
Spanish title, the petitioners-heirs imputed fraud and bad faith which they failed to prove on
the part of the private respondents as regards their Torrens titles and accused their own
counsel of gross negligence for having failed to call the proper witnesses from the Bureau of
Forestry to substantiate the petitioners-heirs' claim that OCT No. 614 from which private
respondents were derived is null and void. It is an elementary legal principle that the
negligence of counsel binds the client. 76 The records show that the petitioners-heirs were not
at all prejudiced by the non-presentation of evidence to prove that OCT No. 614 is a nullity
considering that their ownership itself of the lands being claimed was not duly proved. In the
case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. Dela Cruz, et al., 77 we held:
It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his
responsibilities to his client. This negligence ultimately resulted in a
judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such mistake binds the
client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by the
mistakes of his counsel. (Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980]
Only when the application of the general rule would result in serious
injustice should an exception thereto be called for. Under the
circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue prejudice against the
petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an
unsupported claim that the petitioner bad been prejudiced by the
negligence of its counsel, without an explanation to that effect.
Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention that the petitioners-
heirs were denied due process on account of the negligence of their counsel, the writ
of certiorari is unavailing.
It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are
not without recourse. Presidential Decree No. 892, quoted hereinabove, grants all holders of
Spanish Titles the right to apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of the Decree.
Thereafter, however, any Spanish Title, if utilized as evidence of possession, cannot be used as
evidence of ownership in any land registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be
recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344.
In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the Solicitor General to be more
vigilant in handling land registration cases and intestate proceedings involving portions of the
subject estate. It is not too late in the day for the Office of the Solicitor General to contest the
Torrens titles of those who have acquired ownership of such portions of land that rightfully
belong to the State.
In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds issued in favor of Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban on August 13, 1968 sought by one Catalino San Pedro, alleged heir, legal
holder and owner of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is a matter not ripe for adjudication in
these cases. Firstly, Catalino San Pedro is not a party in any of the two cases before us for
review, hence, this Court in a Resolution dated May 10, 1993, 78 denied Catalino's motion for
leave to reopen and/or new trial. And, secondly, the aforementioned bonds were not included
in the inventory of the subject estate submitted by then administrators, Engracio San Pedro
and Justino Benito before the probate court.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petitions in G.R Nos. 103727 and 106496 are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consequently, in G.R No. 103727, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 20,
1992 is hereby AFFIRMED.
In G.R No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and, therefore,
no rights could be derived therefrom;
(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from
the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;
(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 312-B, should be, as it is, hereby closed and terminated.
(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby disallowed to
exercise any act of possession or ownership or to otherwise, dispose of in
any manner the whole or any portion of the estate covered by Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby ordered to immediately vacate
the same, if they or any of them are in possession thereof.
This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Panganiban and
Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., took no part.
Vitug, J., is on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of
Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots.
Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of
Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the
court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be
registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system.
Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March,
1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided
for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant
also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the
wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the
certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of
Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said
wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to
the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for
the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of
said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of
the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of
the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding
upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the
plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate
they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that
theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact,
belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the
defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had
therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six
years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it
in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot,
including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the
proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the
same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme
and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that
system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title,
except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may
arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of
course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens
system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the
forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem.
(Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49
Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land
Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary
action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete
and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an
interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The
government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who
are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same
questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the
very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give
the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not
have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration
accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee
held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows
exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions,
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except
in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would
be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in
acollateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period
prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration
of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act
giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which
indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two
different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel
of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact
that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred;
there can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as
to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other
exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated,
even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system
can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is
notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the
registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has
been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens"
system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In
others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian
Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of
title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land
comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier
certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155;
Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles,
vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly
ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the
inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be
rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on
the "Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack
in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question,
said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In
successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular
estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate
or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of,
or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the
earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly
cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered
owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates
purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the
title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive
upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general
description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the
absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in
any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained
by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after
entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened,
for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one
year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a
direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral
proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of
registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his
registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the
ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two
persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of
real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it,
who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees
or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon
priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil
Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet
we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence
in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting
the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of
the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered
under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall
prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the
appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the
application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding
wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land
described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and
the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by
the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their
own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are
above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title.
If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the
law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then
nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain.
If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case,
he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured
their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of the
mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the
damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties
under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the
conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the
appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real
owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He
was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the
appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the
subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the
decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be
permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment
duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land
upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of
the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity
of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be
applied to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the
owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original
parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates?
Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his
original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has
no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor
had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against
the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule
that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No.
496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the
vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut
off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had
had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to
enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said
sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He
subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that
phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a
mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by
virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including
the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent
purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be two
innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two
innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be
protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with
which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said
sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first
original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the
public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All
persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land
so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The
purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely
necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S.,
620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its
contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15
Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill.,
500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509;
Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of
record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every
fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the
record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or
good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the
record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public
record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to
endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance
of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875
and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art
.1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not
been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were
interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of
its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a
purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea
that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona
fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the
rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory
upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance
of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of
men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory
and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance
of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of
the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had
theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that
said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that
the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded
as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original
certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of
which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an
"innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate.
The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of
the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original
certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize
the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent
purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has
been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought
under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers
thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder
in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not.
Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system.
Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very
strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said
strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of
the original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any
right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the
rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be
answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the
purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the
purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to
resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the
holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first
original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against
one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge
of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of
the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by
reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather
than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.

The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from
double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither
do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon
the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that
the record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it
will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered
and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.

It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in
the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the
requirements of the law should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is
hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the
jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and
decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the
second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all
other duplicate certificates issued.

Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 155012 April 14, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
CARMENCITA M. ALCONABA; LUISITO B. MELENDEZ; CONCEPCION M.
LAZARO; MAURICIO B. MELENDEZ, JR.; and MYRNA M. GALVEZ, represented
by CONCEPCION M. LAZARO, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
To serve the ends of social justice, which is the heart of the 1987 Constitution, the State
promotes an equitable distribution of alienable agricultural lands of the public domain to
deserving citizens, especially the underprivileged. A land registration court must, therefore,
exercise extreme caution and prudent care in deciding an application for judicial confirmation
of an imperfect title over such lands so that the public domain may not be raided by
unscrupulous land speculators.1
At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to set
aside the decision2 of the Court of Appeals of 26 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64323,
which affirmed the decision3 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao, Laguna,4 of 1
September 1998 in MTC LRC Case No. 06 ordering the registration in favor of the
respondents of parcels of land situated at Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna, designated as Lot
2111-A, 2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and 2111-E.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 14 November 1996, the respondents filed before the MTC of Cabuyao, Laguna,
an application5 for registration of title over five parcels of land, each with an area of
5,220 square meters, situated in Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. In their
application, they stated, among other things, that they are the sole heirs of Spouses
Melencio E. Melendez, Sr., and Luz Batallones Melendez, original owners of Lot
2111 of CAD-455, with an area of 2.6 hectares. Their parents had been in possession
of the said property since 1949, more or less. After the death of their mother and
father on 19 February 1967 and 5 May 1976, respectively, they partitioned the
property among themselves and subdivided it into five lots, namely, Lots 2111-A,
2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and 2111-E. Since then they have been in actual
possession of the property in the concept of owners and in a public and peaceful
manner.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
opposed the application on the following grounds: (a) neither the respondents nor their
predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to the property or have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since
1945 or prior thereto; (b) the muniments of title, i.e., tax declaration and tax receipts,
presented by the respondents do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona
fide right to registration of the land under Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as The Public Land Act,6 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073; (c)
the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant can no longer be
availed of by the respondents; and (d) the land is part of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines.7
At the trial on the merits, respondents Mauricio B. Melendez, Jr., and Carmencita M.
Alconaba testified to establish their claim over the subject lots. Mauricio claimed that he and
his co-respondents acquired by inheritance from their deceased parents Lot 2111 of Cad-455,
which is an agricultural land. Their parents had been in possession of the said land since 1949
and had been religiously paying the taxes due thereon. When their parents died, he and his
siblings immediately took possession of said property in the concept of an owner, paid taxes,
and continued to plant rice thereon. On 24 June 1996, he and his co-heirs executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement with Partition over the said lot and subdivided it into five lots.8
For her part, Carmencita testified that Lot 2111 of Cad-455 had been in the possession of their
parents since 1940 and that after the death of their parents she and her siblings immediately
took possession of it and religiously paid the taxes thereon. The land is being cultivated by
Julia Garal, their tenant. She admitted that no improvements have been introduced by their
family on the lot. On cross examination, she admitted that plans to sell the property were at
hand.9
In its decision of 1 September 1998, the trial court found that the respondents have sufficiently
established their family's actual, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession of the subject
property for more than fifty-seven years, commencing from the possession of their
predecessors-in-interest in 1940, and that such possession was in an adverse and public
manner. Likewise, it found that the land in question is alienable and disposable and is not
within any reservation or forest zone. Thus, it confirmed the title of the respondents over the
said lots; directed the Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch, to cause the registration
of said parcels of land in the name of the respondents upon payment of fees; and ordered the
issuance of a Decree of Registration once the decision becomes final and executory.
Upon appeal10 by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
The OSG argues that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in (a) giving weight to
the self-serving testimonies of Mauricio and Carmencita that the respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the lots in
question in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years; and (b) holding that respondents'
tax declaration is sufficient proof that they and their parents have been in possession of the
property for at least thirty years, despite the fact that the said tax declaration was only for the
year 1994 and the property tax receipts presented by the respondents were all of recent dates,
i.e., 1990, 1991,1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997. Finally, the OSG states that even granting for the
sake of argument that the respondents have been in possession of the property since 1940,
their adverse possession should be reckoned only from 28 September 1981 when the property
was declared to be within alienable and disposable zone.
The petition is meritorious.
While the rule is well settled that the findings of fact of appellate courts are conclusive upon
us,11 there are recognized exceptions thereto, among which is where the findings of fact are
not supported by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of
discretion.12 This exception is present in this case.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942,13 reads as follows:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to
wit:
… which reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.
14
This provision was further amended by P.D. No. 1073 by substituting the phrase "for at least
thirty years" with "since June 12, 1945"; thus:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
The date "12 June 1945" was reiterated in Section 14(1) of P. D. No. 1529,15 otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(Emphasis supplied).
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following: (a) that the
land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b)
that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since 12
June 1945.
There is no doubt that the subject property is part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain. But it is not clear as to when it was classified as alienable and
disposable by proper authorities.
We do not find merit in OSG's claim that the subject property was classified as within the
alienable and disposable zone only on 28 September 1981, and hence, possession by
respondents' predecessors-in-interest before that date cannot be considered. In support of this
claim, the OSG relies on a statement appearing in the survey plan marked as Exhibit "Q,"
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 23-A L.C.
Map No. 004 certified on September 28, 1981 and is outside any civil or military
reservation.
As postulated by the respondents, the phrase "certified on September 28, 1981" could not have
meant that Lot 2111 became alienable and disposable only on 28 September 1981. That date
obviously refers to the time thatProject No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004 was certified.
Neither can we give weight to the contention of the respondents that since Project No. 23-A
L.C. Map No. 004 of which Lot 2111 forms part was approved on 31 December 1925 by the
then Bureau of Forestry, Lot 2111 must have been disposable and alienable as early as of that
date. There is nothing to support their claim that 31 December 1925 is the date of the approval
of such project or the date of the classification of the subject property as disposable and
alienable public land. It is settled that a person who seeks registration of title to a piece of land
must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence.16 The respondents have failed to
discharge the burden of showing that Lot 2111 was classified as part of the disposable and
alienable agricultural lands of public domain as of 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Likewise, the respondent have miserably failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or
since 12 June 1945.1awphil.net
The trial court and the Court of Appeals based the finding of fifty-seven years of possession
by the respondents and their predecessors-in-interest on the testimonies of Carmencita and
Mauricio. The two were aged 6217 and 60,18 respectively, when they testified in 1997. Thus,
they must have been born in 1935 and 1937, respectively. If the asserted possession lasted for
a period of fifty-seven years at the time they testified, the same must have commenced 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997. Being of recent dates, we cannot trust the assertion of the
sometime in 1940, or at the time that Carmencita was just 5 years old and Mauricio, about 3 respondents that they immediately took possession of the property in the concept of an owner
years old. It is quite impossible that they could fully grasp, before coming to the age of reason, after the death of their parents. While belated declaration of a property for taxation purposes
the concept of possession of such a big tract of land and testify thereon nearly six decades does not necessarily negate the fact of possession,28 tax declarations or realty tax payments of
later. In short their testimonies could not be relied upon to prove the adverse possession of the property are, nevertheless, good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in
subject parcel of land by their parents. his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least,
constructive possession.29
In any case, respondents' bare assertions of possession and occupation by their predecessors-
in-interest since 1940 (as testified to by Carmencita19) or since 1949 (as testified to by Likewise, it is noteworthy that none of the respondents reside on the subject property.
Mauricio20 and declared in respondents' application for registration) are hardly "the well-nigh Carmencita even admitted that plans of selling the property were at hand. Thus, it would be
incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. Proof of specific acts of ownership rational to conclude that this move for registration is just but a camouflage by smart land
must be presented to substantiate their claim. They cannot just offer general statements which speculators who saw in the land applied for expected profits from its existence.
are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession.21 Even granting that the
possession by the respondents' parents commenced in 1940, still they failed to prove that their In a nutshell, the respondents did not have in their favor an imperfect title over the land subject
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and of the application at the time MTC LRC Case No. 06 was filed with the trial court. They failed
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. to prove that (1) Lot 2111 was classified as part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of public domain as of 12 June 1945 or earlier; (2) they and their predecessors-in-
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the interest have been in continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation thereof in
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. the concept of owners from 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decisions of the Court of Appeals of 26
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64323 and of the Municipal Trial Court of Cabuyao,
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
Laguna, of 1 September 1998 in MTC LRC Case No. 06 are hereby REVERSED and SET
possession must not be a mere fiction.22 Actual possession of a land consists in the ASIDE. The land registration case MTC LRC Case No. 06 is hereby orderedDISMISSED.
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise
over his own property.23
Costs de oficio.
No evidence on record shows that Spouses Mauricio and Luz Melendez cultivated, had control
over, or used the whole or even a greater portion of the tract of land for agricultural SO ORDERED.
purposes.24 Moreover, only one tenant worked on the land, and there is no evidence as to how
big was the portion occupied by the tenant. Moreover, there is no competent proof that the Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Melendez Spouses declared the land in their name for taxation purposes or paid its taxes.
While tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.25 The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes not only manifests one's
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but also announces an adverse claim
against the State and all other interested parties with an intention to contribute needed
revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.26

The respondents claim that they immediately took possession of the subject land upon the
death of their parents, Mauricio and Luz Melendez, who died on 5 May 1976 and 19 February
1967, respectively, and that they had been religiously paying the taxes thereon. If that were so,
why had they not themselves introduced any improvement on the land?27 We even find
unsubstantiated the claim of Carmencita that they had a tenant on the land. They did not
present any tenant. In any case, we wonder how one tenant could have cultivated such a vast
tract of land with an area of 2.6 hectares.

The records also reveal that the subject property was declared for taxation purposes by the
respondents only for the year 1994. They paid the taxes thereon only for the years 1990, 1991,
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the MINDANAO MEDICAL
CENTER, petioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor for petitioner.
Ananias C. Ona for private respondent.
MARTIN, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Apiwals in its CA-G.R. No.
39577-R, raising the question of whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has
registerable title over a full 12.8081-hectare land by virtue of an executive proclamation in
1956 reserving the area for medical center site purposes.
On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied
with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. 5436) of a 33-hectare
situated in barrio Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). 1 The property applied
for was a portion of what was then known as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre.
On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer, accepted
sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded for P20.00 per hectare,
while a certain Dr. Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare The Director of Lands,
however, annulled the auction sale for the reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus,
failed to participate in the bidding for non-service of notice on him of the scheduled bidding.
In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de
Jesus was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and
made a deposit of P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the land at P100.50 per hectare.
On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award,
the dispositive portion of which reads: 2ñé+.£ªwph!1
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the proceedings had in
connection with the Sales Application No. 5436 were in accordance with
law and existing regulations, the land covered thereby is herebyawarded to
the said applicant, Eugenio de jesus, at P100.50 per hectare or P2,211.00
for the whole tract.
This application should be entered in the records of this office as Sales
Application No. 3231,covering the tract herein awarded, which is more
particularly described as follows:
Location: Central, Davao,ñé+.£ªwph!1
Davao
Area: 22 hectares
Boundaries:ñé+.£ªwph!1
N—Maria Villa Abrille and Arenio Suazo;
SE—Provincial Road and Mary Gohn;
SW—Public Land;
W—Municipal Road;
Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed
his Sales Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey under Plan Bsd-1514. On July
29, 1936, the plan was approved and the land awarded to Eugenio de Jesus was designated as
Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400 hectares,
Bsd-10153, City of Davao.
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of
Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E-
3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes,
the said application is amended so as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in the sketch
on the back thereof, and as thus amended, it will continue to be given due course." The area
excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very land in question, consisting of 12.8081
hectares.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing
Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes,
under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army.
On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th installment
for 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales Application was amended. This
payment did not include the military camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as the same had already
been excluded from the Sales Application at the time the payment was made. 3 Thereafter, or
on May 15, 1948, then Director of Lands Jose P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to
Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales Application for "a tract of land having an area of
20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao. 4 On the same date, then
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent
to Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao, Island
of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centares. 5
On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared
the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the Public land Act for
resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao City. 6 In the following October 9,
President Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot No. 1176-
B-2 for medical center site purposes under the administration of the Director of Hospital. 7
Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for the
Torrens registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance of
Davao. The Medical Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the strength of
proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical center site purposes.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de
Jesus, opposed the registration oil the ground that his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had aquired a
vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award issued to him by the Director of
Lands.
A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim that the
2-hectare portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment on September 2,
1966, directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of Subdivision Plan Bsd-
5134, shown on Plan Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of Central, City of Davao, and containing
an area of 128,081 square meters in the name of the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of
Medical Services, Department of Health.
The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo, excepted from this judgment of
the trial court and appealed the case to the respondent Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1974, the Appellate Court held: ñé+.£ªwph!1
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby modified insofar as it
denies the claim of appellant Arsenio Suazo, the same is hereby affirmed,
in regard the appeal of appellant Alejandro Y. de Jesus, registration Lot
1176-B-2, situated in Barrio Central, Davao City, and containing an area
of 12.8081 square meters, is hereby decreed in the name of said
appellants, but said appellant is hereby ordered to relinquish to the
appellee that portion of Lot 1176-B-2 which is occupied by the medical
center and nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appartenances,
no costs.
On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration, maintaining
ownership over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but the Appellate Court in a Special
Division of Five denied the motion on June 17, 1975. 8
Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center elevated the matter to Us thru the present
appeal.
We find petitioner's appeal to b meritorious.
1. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole contested area of
12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only on a portion thereof occupied by
the Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances.
Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land
grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of
the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such
land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao
Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or
patents involving public lands, provides that "Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands
belonging to the Government of the Philippines arealienated, granted, or conveyed to persons
or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation
of this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands." 9 It would be
completely absurd to rule that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350, the Medical Center has
registerable title on the portion occupied by it, its nervous disease pavilion and the reasonable
appurtenances, and not on the full extent of the reservation, when the proclamation explicitly
reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares to the Center.
Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the recognized
competence of the president to reserve by executive proclamation alienable lands of the public
domain for a specific public use or service. 10 section 64 (e) of the Revised Administrative
Code empowers the president "(t)o reserve from sale oe other disposition and for specific
public uses for service, any land belonging to the private domain of the Government of the
Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. the land reserved "shall be used
for the specific purposes directed by such executive order until otherwise provided by law."
Similarly, Section 83 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) authorizes the President to "designate
by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use
ofthe commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof,
... or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including
reservations for ... other improvements for the public benefit.
2. Respondent Appellate Court erroneously ruled that Alejabdro's father, Eugenio de jesus,
had acquired ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 because the Sales
Award issued to him on November 23, 1934 by then Director of Lands Simeon Ramos
covered the 33 hectares applied for, including the 12.8081 hectares. We fail to see any
reasonable basis on record for the Appellate Court to draw such conclusion. On the contrary,
the very Sales Award describes the tract awarded as located in Central, Davao, Davao, with an
area of22 hectares, and bounded on the north by Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on
the southeast by a provincial road and Mary Gohn; on the southwest by a public land; and on
the west by a municipal road. 11 This area of 22 hectares was even reduced to 20.6400 hectares
upon actual survey made by the Bureau of Lands. The same area was reckoned with by then
Lands Director Jose P. Dans when he directed the issuance of a patent to Eugenio de Jesus on
May 15, 1948 for his application filed on January 22, 1921 covering "a tract of land having an
area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao." 12 In like
manner, the Sales Patent issued to Eugenio de Jesus on the same date, May 15, 1948, by then
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena indicated therein the
sale to Eugenio de Jesus of "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao,
Island of Mindanao, Philippines,containing an area of 20 hectares 64, ares 00 centares." Seen
in the light of Patent, and Sales Order for Issuance of Patent, and Sales Patent, invariably
bearing the area awarded to sales applicant Eugenio de Jesusas 20.6400 hectares, it becomes
imperative to conclude that what was really awarded to Eugenio de jesus was only 20.6400
hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for by him.
However, We observe that in the public bidding of october 4, 1934, the succesful bidder,
submitted a bid of 100.50 per hectare and made a cash deposit of only P221.00, which amount
represents 10% of the purchase price of the land. 13 At P100.50 per hectare, the purchase
would be P2,221.00 for 22 hectares, 10% deposit of which amounts to P221.00. For 33
hectares, the total purchase price would be P3,316.50 at P100.50 per hectare and the 10%
deposit would be P331.65, not P221.00, as what was actually deposited by sales applicant
Eugenio de Jesus. Withal, if Eugenio de Jesus was really awarded 33 hectares in that public
bidding, he should have made the required 10% deposit of P331.65. That he merely deposited
P221.00 strongly suggests that what was bidden for and awarded to him was only 22 hectares
and not 33 hectares as applied for. As a matter of fact, his last payment of P660.45 on
November 29, 1939 for the 8th te 10th installment intended only to cover 20.6400 hectares,
the remaining area after the amendment of the Sales Application on August 28, 1936,
excluding "the military camp site [Lot 1176B-2 of 12.8081 hectares] for the reason that the
said site, at the time of last installment was already excluded from Sale Application SA-5436
of Eugenio de Jesus, as ordered ... by the Director of Lands." 14
But, respondent Appellate Court reasons out that if the area bidden for and awarded in 1934
ws only 22 hectares and since two years thereafter the Director of Lands ordered an
amendment excluding the military camp site of 12.8081 hectares, then only 10 hectares, then
would have been left to applicant Eugenio de Jesus and not 20.6400 hectares would have been
left in the Sales Patent. The Appellate Court's reasoning is premised on wrong assumption.
What was ordered amended was the Sales Application for 33 hectares and not the Order of 22
hectares or 20.6400 hectares. The Order states: "Order: Amendment of Application."
Necessarily so, because the amendment was already reflected in the Order of Award, since
only an area of 22 hectares was awarded.
3. The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award 15 cannot be licitly seized upon as basis for the
conclusion that the area awarded to applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the applied area of 33
hectares. Such general description of "whole tract" cannot prevail over the specific description
delineating the area in quantity and in boundaries. Thus, the Sales Award specifies the area
awarded as 22 hectares, located at Central, Davao, Davao, and bounded on the north by the
property of Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southwest by a provincial road and
the property by Mary Gohn on the southwest by a public land; and on the west by a municipal
road. 16 Specific description is ordinarily preferred to general description, or that which is
more certain to what which is less certain. 17 More so, when it is considered that the series of
executive proclamations (Proclamation Nos. 85, 328, 350) continuously maintained the intent
of the Government to reserve the subject land for a specific purpose or service.
Besides, patents and land grants are construed favorably to the Governement, and most
strongly against the grantee. 18 Any doubt as to the intention or extent of the grant, or the
intention of the Government, is to be resolved in its favor. 19 In general, the quantity of the
land granted must be ascertained from the description in the patent is exclusive evidence of the
land conveyed. 20 And courts do not usually go beyond a description of a tract in a patent and
determine the tract and quantity of land apart from the patent itself. 21
4. We cannot share the view of respondent Appellate Court that eugenio de jesus's alleged
occupation, cultivation and improvement of the 33-hectare land (including the 12-hectare
camp site) since 1916 vested in him a right of preference or pre-empive right in the acquisition
of the land, which right was controverted into "a special propriety right" when the Sales
Award was issued to him in 1934. Not only for the earlier reasons that the Sales Award was
only for 22 hectares (later found to be 20,6400 fectares upon actual survey) and not for 33
hectares, the privilege of occupying public lands a view to preemption confers np contractual
or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw suchlands
for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by
the government of title threof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a
settler. 22 Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on
them can be acquired. 23 The claims o0f persons who have settled on occupied, and improved
a parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of
protection and are usually respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issuesa
proclamation reserving certain lands and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this
terminates any rights previously avquired in such lands by a person who was settled thereon in
order to obtain a preferential right of purchase. 24 And patents for lands which have been
previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriate, are void. 25
It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the same is subject to "privilege rights, if any
there be," but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed to prove any private rights
over the property reserved. Wee-settled is the rule that unless the applicant has shown by clear
and convincing evidence that a certain portion of the public domain was acquired by him or
his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory
information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, such as grants or
patents, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. 26 Nor could respondent
Alejandro de Jesus legetimately claim to have obtained title by prescription over the disputed
12.8081 hectares, inasmuch as by applying for the sale thereof (assuming hypothetically that
the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the original sales application for 33 hectares), his
father, Eugenio de Jesus, necessarily admits that the portions applied for are part of the public
domain, against which no acquisitive prescription may lie 27 except as provided in Section
48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended.
5. Respondent Appellate Court mistakenly sustained Eugenio de Jesus's pretense that the
military "camp site" (Lot 176-B-2) had been donated by him to the Philippine Army, thru
Secretary Serafin Marabut of the Department of National Defense, sometime in 1936 subject
to the condition that it would be returned to him when the Philippine Army would no longer
need it. As found by the trial court in 1936, the Department of National Defense was not yet in
existence, so that no Defense Secretary by the name of Serafin Marabut could have entered
into a deed of donation with Eugenio de Jesus over Lot 1176-B-2 consisting of 12.8081
hectares. The Department of National Defense was only organized in 1939. Nonetheless,
respondent Alejandro de Jesus, would prove by secondary evidence the existence of such
donation thru the testimony of persons who supposedly saw it. In this regard, the Rules
provides that before the terms of a transaction in realty may be established by secondary
evidence, it is n that the due execution and subsequent loss of the original instrument
evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the document and its
subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary
evidence to prove the contents of such document. And the due of the execution of the
document would be proved through the testimony of (1) the person or persons who executed it;
(2) the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or (3) any who was present and
saw it executed and delivered, or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized
the signatures, or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed
the execution thereof. 28 None of these modes of proof was ever followed by respondent
Alejandro de Jesus. His predecessor- in-interest, Eugenio de Jesus, merely made a broad
statement that he executed a deed f donation in 1936 with Defense Secretary Marabut when at
hat time the Defense Department was not yet in existence. The notary public who
presumptively acknowledged the donation or the witnesses to the instrument were never
presented. It has been ruled that the failure of the party to present the notary Public and thore s
who must have seen the signing of the document as witnesses to testify on its execution
interdicts the admission of a secondary evidence of the terms of the deed. 29 This is especially
true in realty donations where Art. 748 of the new Civil Code requires the accomplishment
thereof in a public document in order to be valid. The testimony of Marcelo Belendres that
Sesinando de jesus, brother of Eugenio de Jesus showed him a copy of the "paper" signed by
Secretary Marabut and Eugenio de Jesus; of Jose Tinio, Acting Register of Deeds of Davao,
that in May or June 1937, Col. Simeon de jesus went to his office to register a document"
executed by Eugenio de Jesus and Secretary Marabut; of former Secretary Brigido Valencia
that Col. Simeon de Jesus showed him a deed of donation signed by Eugenio de Jesus and
Serafin Marabut. hardly suffer to satisfy the requisites of the Rules, as to which very strict
compliance is imposed because of the importance of the document involved. 30 First none of
these persons was a witness to the instrument, nor any of them saw the document after its
execution and delivery ind recognized the signatures of the parties nor to whom the parties to
the instrument had previously confessed the execution; second, the reference to a "paper" or
"document" ambigous as to be synonymous with a "deed of donation;" and third, the persons
who showed the deed, Sesinando de Jesus and Col. Simeon de Jesus were not parties to the
instrument. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus's narration of the existence and loss of the
document equally deserves no credence. As found by the trial court, he testified that the copy
of the deed which his father kept was sent to him in Manila thru his uncle, Sesinando de Jesus
in July 1942, while his father himself, Eugenio de Jesus, declared that his copy of the deed
was burned in Davao during the Japanese occupation. The replies of the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Acting Executive Secretary that the property was
"still needed for military purposes" and may not therefore be released from the reservation
cannot substitute the proof so required. These replies are not confirmatory of the existence of
such donation much less official admissions thereof.
In fact, even if We were to assume in gratia argumenti that the 12.8081-hectare lot was
included in the Sales Award, still the same may not be the subject of donation. In Sales
Award, what is conferred on the applicant is merely the right "to take possession of the land so
that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law." 34 In other words, the right
granted to the sales awardee is only "possessory right" as distinguished from "proprietary
right," for the fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the sales patent and registration
thereof, title to the land is retained by the State. 35 Admittedly, the land applied for may be
considered "disposed of by the Government" upon the issuance of the Sales Award, but this
has the singular effect of withdrawing the land from the public domian that is "disposable" by
the Director of Lands under the Public Land Act. Moreover, the dsiposition is merely
provisional because the applicant has still to comply with the requirements of the law before
any patent is issued. It is only after compliance with such requirements to the satisfaction of
the Director of Lands, that the patent is issued and the land applied for considered
"permanently disposed of by the Government." This again is a circumstance that demeans the
irrevocable nature donation, because the mere desistance of the sales applicant to pursue the
requirements called for would cause the virtual revocation of the donation.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgement of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on July 2,
1974, and its resolution of Jane 17, 1975, denying petitioner's motion for reconsiderations, are
hereby reversed and set aside. The disputed Lot 1176-B-2, Plan Bsd-1514 of Davao Cadastre
and containing an area of 12.8081 hectares, is hereby adjudicated in favor of petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center. The urgent motion of the petitioner for leave to construct essential
hospitawl buildings, namely: (a) communicable and contagious diseas pavilion; (b) hospital
motorpool; and (c) physician's quarters, is hereby granted. With costs against private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and Concepcion, Jr., JJ.,
concur.1äwphï1.ñët

Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was executed
between Eugenior de jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would anyway be void,
because Eugenior de jesus held no dominical rights over the site when it was allegedly
donated by him in 1936. In that year, proclamation No. 85 of President Quezon already
withrew the area from sale or settlement and reserved it for military purposes. Respondent
Appellate Court, however, rationalizes that the subject of the donation was not the land itself
but "the possessory and special proprietary rights" of Eugenio de jesus over it. We disagree. It
is true that the gratiuitous disposal in donation may consist of a thing or right. 31 But the term
"right" must be understood in a "propriety" sense, over which the processor has the jus
disponendi. 32 This is because, in true donations, there results a consequent impoverishment of
the donor or diminution of his assets. 33 Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be possessed of
that "proprietary " right over the whole 33 hectares in 1936 including the disputed 12.8081
hectares for at that time this 12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed from the mass of
disposable public lands by Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the Sales Award.
Impoverishment of Eugenio's assets as a consequence of such donation is therefore farfetehed.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 132963 September 10, 1998
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by Opol National Secondary
Technical School), petitioner,
vs.
NICANOR DOLDOL, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27,
1997, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court and dismissing herein petitioner's
complaint, as well as its resolution of March 5, 1998, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pontacan,
Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental. On October 23, 1963, he filed an application for
saltwork purposes for the said area with the Bureau of Forest Development. The Director of
Forestry, however, rejected the same on April 1, 1968. Meanwhile, the Provincial Board of
Misamis Oriental passed a resolution in 1965 reserving Lot 4932, Cad-237, Opol Cadastre as a
school site. This reserved lot unfortunately included the area occupied by Doldol.
In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to the site in 1970.
Seventeen years later, on November 2, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 180 reserving the area, including the portion in dispute, for the Opol High
School, now renamed the Opol National Secondary Technical School (hereafter Opol National
School). Needing the area occupied by Doldol for its intended projects, the school made
several demands for him to vacate said portion, but he refused to move.
In view of Doldol's refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991 a complaint
for accion possessoria with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro. The trial court ruled
in the school's favor and ordered Doldol to vacate the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the court a quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion he
occupied, he having possessed the same for thirty-two years, from 1959 up to the time of the
filing of the complaint in 1991.
Opol National School's motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied by the
Court of Appeals in its resolution of March 5, 1998, Opol National School elevated its case to
this Court, claiming that the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it held,
contrary to the evidence on record, that respondent had been in open, continuous, notorious
and exclusive possession of the land in dispute for thirty-two years.
The petition is meritorious.
In ruling in Doldol's favor, the Court of Appeals grounded its decision on Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (otherwise known as the Public Land Act). Said provision, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1942, provides as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certification
of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter. (Emphasis ours)
In accordance with the above provision, the appellate court averred that a citizen of the
Philippines may acquire alienable land of the public domain if he has possessed the same for
thirty years. Finding Doldol to have occupied the disputed lot for thirty-two years, it ruled that
the former had acquired ownership of the same, thereby negating Opol National School's
claim over the questioned area.
To further bolster its argument, the appellate court cited Republic vs.
CA 1 where this Court, citing Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 (1991)
declared that:
The weight of authority is that open, exclusive and undisputed possession
of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal
fiction whereby the land upon completion of the requisite period ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public
land and becomes private property.
xxx xxx xxx
 . . . with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that Doldol had been occupying
years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the portion reserved for the school site only since 1959. The law, as presently phrased,
the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass requires that possession of lands of the pubic domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier,
of public land. for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

xxx xxx xxx Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed lot since his
occupation of the same started only in 1959, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the complied with the conditions set by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the
foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have land in question as to segregate the same from the public domain. Doldol cannot, therefore,
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, assert a right superior to the school, given that then President Corazon Aquino had reserved
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, the lot for Opol National School. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General:
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of
the Director of Lands to dispose of.The application for confirmation is (T)he privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of confers no contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the
the title as would he evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by
issued upon the strength of said patent. the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by the
government of title thereof stands, even though this may defeat the
imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to
The appellate court has resolved the question as to who between the parties had a better right
to possess the lot through the erroneous application of an outdated version of Section 48 of the entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired. 3
Public Land Act. Likewise, Solicitor Renan E. Ramos of the Office of the Solicitor General
erred in assuming that the thirty-year proviso in the aforementioned section was still good law. In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession over the land in dispute.
The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27,
1942, 2 whichprovided for a simple thirty year prescriptive period of occupation by an 1997, and Resolution dated March 27, 1998, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and
applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated August 25, 1992, is hereby REINSTATED.
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended,
Section 48(b) now reads:
SO ORDERED.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis ours)

Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act requires that
the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be
since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the
conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued.

The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable, in
accordance with the District Forester's Certification dated September 20, 1978, that the subject
area is within Project 8, an alienable and disposable tract of public land, as appearing in
Bureau of Forest Land Classification Map No. 585. Doldol, thus, meets the first requirement.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the Decision1 dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales,
Branch 69 in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1.
The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows:
This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan,
Botolan, Zambales, more particularly described in the amended application filed by Celestina
Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69.
Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the said parcels of
land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the
same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-
interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the
best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is
there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to
the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in
question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment
receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide
acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicant’s claim of
ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .;
and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the Republic
of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as against the whole
world, with the exception of the Office of the Solicitor General, and proceeded with the
hearing of this registration case.
After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant rested her case. The
Solicitor General, thru the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the admission of
the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor manifest (sic) that the Government had no
evidence to adduce. 3
In a decision4 dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for herein
respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in question and
decreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels of land situated
in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an area of 3,131
square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446 containing an area of 15,322 containing an
area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino
citizen, married to Rommel Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together with
all the improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees registration in her name in
accordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as amended, and
Presidential Decree No. 1529. This adjudication, however, is subject to the various
easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws, presidential decrees and/or
presidential letters of instructions which should be annotated/ projected on the title to be
issued. And once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be
immediately issued. (Words in bracket added)
With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner Republic
went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001.
As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29, 1998,
affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Republic’s present recourse on its basic submission that the CA’s decision "is not
in accordance with law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent has not established
with the required evidence her title in fee simple or imperfect title in respect of the subject lots
which would warrant their registration under … (P.D. 1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141."
In particular, petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the length
of respondent’s occupation of the property subject of her application for registration and for
not considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been
declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.
Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the
Government so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, are not capable of private appropriation.5 As to these assets, the rules on confirmation
of imperfect title do not apply.6 Given this postulate, the principal issue to be addressed turns
on the question of whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest
or other inalienable lands of the public domain.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act7 and the Constitution8 classifying lands of
the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks," do
not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense growth of
trees and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui 9-
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified
as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or
other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. xxx.
The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,10 which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State – the source of any asserted right to ownership
of land.11 All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to
the State.12 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain.13 Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of
classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to
agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not the
court.14 Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the
applicant.15
In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable and
disposable. Wrote the appellate court:
Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government
agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.18 Aside
from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions
of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of
the property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome
the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.19
It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been a
notorious practice resorted to in land registration cases.20 For this reason, the Court has made
it a point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the
case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express and
positive act from the government.21
The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-
interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in
question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by
adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.22
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated May 29,
1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, respondent’s application for original registration of title in Land Registration
Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is DENIED.
No costs.

The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public domain cannot
SO ORDERED.
be sustained as it is directly against the above doctrine. Said doctrine is a reaffirmation of the
principle established in the earlier cases . . . that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property …. (Word in bracket and
underscoring added.)

The principal reason for the appellate court’s disposition, finding a registerable title for
respondent, is her and her predecessor-in-interest’s open, continuous and exclusive occupation
of the subject property for more than 30 years. Prescinding from its above assumption and
finding, the appellate court went on to conclude, citing Director of Lands vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC)16 and Herico vs. DAR,17 among other cases, that, upon the completion
of the requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease to be public land and become
private property.

Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however, winning cards
for the respondent, for the simple reason that, in said cases, the disposable and alienable nature
of the land sought to be registered was established, or, at least, not put in issue. And there lies
the difference.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133240 November 15, 2000
RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant petition for review is filed on a pure question of law arising from the Decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Metro Manila, Branch 257, in LRC
Case No. 97-0170.
Petitioner corporation was formerly known as Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated. On July 15, 1996, it
amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. The
Amended Articles of Incorporation was approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission
on February 20, 1997.1
As a consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the transfer
certificates of title over real properties owned by the said corporation, all of which were under
the old name, Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated. For this purpose, petitioner instituted, on November
20, 1997, a petition for amendment of titles with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City,
docketed as LRC Case No. 97-0170.2
The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, apparently because
the titles sought to be amended, namely, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 99446, 99447,
99448, 102486, 102487, 102488 and 102489,3 all state that they were issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Pasay City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition that
the lands covered by the subject titles are located in Pasay City.
Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the custody of the Register of
Deeds of Parañaque City.4 Hence, on February 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion
to Admit Amended Petition.5 In the attached Amended Petition,6 petitioner impleaded instead
as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in
Parañaque City.
In the meantime, however, on January 30, 1998, the court a quo had dismissed the
petition motu proprio on the ground of improper venue, it appearing therein that the
respondent is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and the properties are located in Pasay
City.7
Before counsel for petitioner could receive an official copy of the aforesaid order of dismissal,
he filed with the lower court a Motion for Reconsideration.8 On February 20, 1998, in view of
the dismissal of the petition, the lower court denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended
Petition.9 On March 30, 1998, the lower court denied the Motion for Reconsideration.10
Petitioner, thus, is before this Court arguing that –
The court a quo acted contrary to the rules and jurisprudence on the matter for the following
reasons:
1. It has no power to immediately dismiss an initiatory pleading for improper venue;
2. Assuming the Order of 30 January 1998 was proper, it was nevertheless still a
matter of right on petitioner’s part to amend its petition in order to correct the wrong
entries therein; and
3. The unassailable reality is that the subject parcels of land are located in Parañaque
City, so venue was properly laid despite that erroneous allegation in the original
petition.11
The Solicitor General filed on November 4, 1998 his Comment.12 He contends that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the res because it appeared from the original petition
that the lands are situated in Pasay City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Parañaque court.
Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not have acted on the motion to admit
amended petition.
On February 15, 1999, petitioner filed its Reply.13 It discussed the distinction between
jurisdiction and venue, and maintained that the trial court had jurisdiction over the petition, but
that venue appeared to be improperly laid based on the erroneous allegation therein on the
location of the properties.
The issue involved herein is simple. May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on
the ground of improper venue? This question has already been answered in Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,14 where this Court held that it may not.
While the ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the petition below was clearly that of
improper venue,15the Solicitor General confuses venue with jurisdiction. A distinction
between the two must be drawn. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action is
conferred only by law.16 It may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which
otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. On the other hand,
the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties, and an
objection on improper venue may be waived by the failure of the defendant to raise it at the
proper time. In such an event, the court may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to
jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties. Venue is procedural,
not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties,
rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial.17
In Dacoycoy v. IAC, this Court ruled:
The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s complaint by respondent trial court on the ground
of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to distinguish between
jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive.
It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter.
Provisions relating to venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant and
not between the court and the subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches
more of the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case.
xxx xxx x x x.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate
course of action at this stage of the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as
well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly.
Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by
Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be
rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to belatedly challenge the
wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue
cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the
venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the
rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative
to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by
dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing
the procedure outlined in the rules of court to take its proper course. Although we are for the
speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary importance. The
ends of justice require that respondent trial court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to
afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be heard on his cause.18
Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. The court may only
dismiss an action motu proprio in case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis
pendentia, res judicata and prescription. Therefore, the trial court in this case erred when it
dismissed the petition motu proprio. It should have waited for a motion to dismiss or a
responsive pleading from respondent, raising the objection or affirmative defense of improper
venue, before dismissing the petition. However, this was overtaken by petitioner’s motion for
leave to amend its petition.
Petitioner correctly invoked the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in seeking the
amendment of its certificates of title. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over matters
involving the registration of lands and lands registered under the Torrens system is conferred
by Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, The Property Registration Decree, viz:
Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. --- Judicial proceedings for the
registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the
generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.
Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interest
therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk
of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all
pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land
registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or
issuance thereof.
More specifically, jurisdiction over petitions for amendments of certificates of title, such as
the one brought below, is provided for by Section 108 of P.D. 1529, thus:
Amendment and alteration of certificates. --- No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be
made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum
thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except upon order of the
proper Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). A registered owner or other person
having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the
approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon
the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent,
expectant inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new
interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or
error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate
certificate; or that the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the
registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been
terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected, or that a
corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not conveyed the same
within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground and the court may
hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or
cancellation of a new certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions,
requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper: xxx. (Emphasis ours.)
In the case at bar, the lands are located in Parañaque City, as stated on the faces of the titles.
Petitioner, thus, also correctly filed the petition in the place where the lands are situated,
pursuant to the following rule:
Venue of real actions. --- Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.19
Petitioner, however, named as respondent the Register of Deeds of Pasay City, under the
mistaken impression that it was still the custodian of the titles to lands in Parañaque. Later,
petitioner learned that a Register of Deeds for Parañaque City had taken over the record and
custody of titles therein. Petitioner, thus, promptly moved for leave of court to amend its
petition. This, to our mind, was justified. In preparing its amended petition, petitioner likewise
corrected its allegation on the location of the lands involved.
Before the amended petition was filed, the trial court had already dismissed the petition based
on improper venue. It relied on the allegation in the petition that the lands are located in Pasay
City. However, the titles of the land, copies of which were attached to the petition, plainly
show that the lands involved are situated in Parañaque City. The trial court should have
considered these annexes, as these form an integral part of the pleading.

At the very least, the trial court should have allowed petitioner to amend its petition, for this
was still a matter of right on its part.1ªvvph!1

Amendments as a matter of right. --- A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within
ten (10) days after it is served.20

Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every
case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of
cases or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense.21 The trial court, therefore,
should have allowed the amendment proposed by petitioner for in so doing, it would have
allowed the actual merits of the case to be speedily determined, without regard to
technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.22

The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits
and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is
greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment to the
complaint was made before the trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed
by law to answer and to prepare for trial.23

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Orders dated January 30, 1998,
February 20, 1998, and March 30, 1998 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. LRC Case No. 97-
0170 is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155051 May 29, 2007
RURAL BANK OF ANDA, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF LINGAYEN- DAGUPAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 15 October 2001 and the Resolution dated
23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66478.
The Facts
The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley,
Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is part of Lot 3.
Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot 739 also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imelda’s
Park, while on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot
1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by the national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building
of Mary Help of Christians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1.
Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of respondent
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6375 (TCT 6375). An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being
claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley.
In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating Lot 736
from the national road to prevent the caretelas from parking because the smell of horse
manure was already bothering the priests living in the seminary.3 The concrete fence enclosing
Lot 736 has openings in the east, west, and center and has no gate. People can pass through
Lot 736 at any time of the day.4
On 22 December 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan, passed and
approved Resolution Nos. 1045 and 105.6 Resolution No. 104 converted Lot 736 from an
institutional lot to a commercial lot. Resolution No. 105 authorized the municipal mayor to
enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot
736 with an area of 252 square meters.7
In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence
was being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736. In January 1998, the Municipal Mayor
of Binmaley, Rolando Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the seminary to discuss the
situation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for the
Rural Bank of Anda should be stopped.
On 24 March 1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fence and
restore the concrete fence. On 20 May 1998, Mayor Domalanta informed respondent that the
construction of the building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was willing
to discuss with respondent to resolve the problem concerning Lot 736.
On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions,
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan. On 24 August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
On 4 January 2000, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff [Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen-Dagupan]:
1. Making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent;
2. Ordering the defendants to cause to be restored the concrete wall with iron
railings, to cause to be removed the sawali fence, both at the expense of the
defendants, jointly and severally, and
3. Condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally, to the plaintiff the
amount of P25,000.00 as litigation expenses, attorney’s fees in the amount
of P50,000.00 and the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with the modification that the awards of
litigation expenses, attorney’s fees, and costs should be deleted. The Court of Appeals
subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration of the Municipality of Binmaley and the
Rural Bank of Anda.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found that Lot 736 is not covered by any Torrens title either in the name of
respondent or in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. The trial court held that Lot 736 is
public in nature. Since Lot 736 is property of public dominion, it is outside the commerce of
man. Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan exceeded its authority when it
adopted Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 converting Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a
commercial lot and authorizing the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25
years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a 252 square meter portion of Lot 736 .
 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that Lot 736 is property of public dominion
and is used by the public as a pathway. Respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley are
mere claimants with no sufficient evidence to prove their ownership of Lot 736. The Court of
Appeals held that property of public dominion is intended for the common welfare and cannot
be the object of appropriation either by the state or by private persons. Since Lot 736 is for
public use, it is a property of public dominion and it is not susceptible of private ownership.
Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void for being enacted beyond the powers of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley. The contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley
and the Rural Bank of Anda is therefore void.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that since neither the respondent nor the Municipality of
Binmaley owns Lot 736, there is no basis for the monetary awards granted by the trial court.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Binmaley are valid.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they do not have title over Lot
736. The Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land Management Services
in Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot 736 was ever presented to their
office.9
Respondent claims Lot 736 based on its alleged open, continuous, adverse, and uninterrupted
possession of Lot 736. However, the records reveal otherwise. Even the witnesses for
respondent testified that Lot 736 was used by the people as pathway, parking space, and
playground.10
On the other hand, the Municipality of Binmaley alleged that it is the sole claimant of Lot 736
based on the Property Identification Map, Tax Mapping Control Roll of the Municipality of
Binmaley, and the Lot Data Computation in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley.
However, these documents merely show that the Municipality of Binmaley is a mere claimant
of Lot 736. In fact, the chief of Survey Division of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, San Fernando City, La Union testified that the cadastral survey11 of Lot
736, which was surveyed for the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989, had not been
approved.12 The cadastral survey was based on the Lot Data Computation13 of Lot 736 which
was likewise contracted by the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989.
The records show that Lot 736 is used as a pathway going to the school, the seminary, or the
church, which are all located on lots adjoined to Lot 736.14 Lot 736 was also used for parking
and playground.15 In other words, Lot 736 was used by the public in general.
Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736.
Since Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode
of acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the public domain and is owned by the state. As held
in Hong Hok v. David:16
There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the
applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the
property must be held to be public domain. For it is well settled "that no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government." It is
indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law. The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an
opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes follows: "The applicant, having failed to establish his right or
title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there
being no showing that the same has been acquired by any private person from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public
domain."
This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and
waters of the public domain.17 Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: "All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the state."
Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without
prior grant from the government. 18 Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus,
Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and consequently, the contract of lease between the
Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 October 2001
and the Resolution dated 23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133698 April 4, 2001
ANTONIO TALUSAN and CELIA TALUSAN, petitioners,
vs.
HERMINIGILDO* TAYAG and JUAN HERNANDEZ, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
For purposes of real property taxation, the registered owner of a property is deemed the
taxpayer and, hence, the only one entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and the resultant
proceedings relative to an auction sale. Petitioners, who allegedly acquired the property
through an unregistered deed of sale, are not entitled to such notice, because they are not the
registered owners. Moral lessons: real property buyers must register their purchases as soon as
possible and, equally important, they must pay their taxes on time.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the November 20, 1997 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 41586.
The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision is hereunder reproduced as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision (dated February 4,
1993) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 7) in Baguio City in Civil Case No. 1456-
R is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against plaintiffs/appellants."
Also assailed is the April 27, 1998 CA Resolution2 which denied petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
The questioned CA ruling affirmed the Decision3 of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baguio City in Civil Case No. 1456-R. The RTC, in turn, dismissed an action for the
annulment of the auction sale of a condominium unit, covered by Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 651 and located in Building IV, Europa Condominium Villas, Baguio City.
The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of this case in this wise:4
"On June 28, 1988, [herein petitioners] filed a complaint wherein they alleged, inter
alia, that:
--They bought the subject property covered by Condominium Certificate of Title
No. 651, from its former owner, Elias Imperial, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale:
--On October 15, 1985, ‘[herein Respondent] Juan D. Hernandez, x x x sued x x x in
his capacity as City Treasurer of Baguio City, wrote a letter to the former owner
Elias Imperial informing him that the above described property would be sold at
public auction on December 9, 1985, x x x to satisfy the delinquent real estate taxes,
penalties and cost of sale, and demanded payment of the sum of P4,039.80,
representing total taxes due and penalties thereon;
--‘Elias Imperial and his entire family emigrated to Australia in 1974.’ Elias
Imperial never authorized ‘a certain Dante Origan x x x to receive any letter or mail
matter for and on his behalf;’
--[Respondent] Hernandez sold the above-described property to [Respondent] Tayag
for P4,400.00 ‘without any notice to the former owner thereof, [or] to [petitioners],
and without compliance with the provisions of PD No. 464, as evidenced by the
Certificate of Sale;’
--A final bill of sale was later issued ‘in favor of the [Respondent] Hermenegildo
Tayag.’ The assessed value alone of the said property is P37,310.00 and the fair
market value of the same is more than P300,000.00 and both [respondents] knew
these;
--The bid price of P4,400 ‘is so unconscionably low and shocking to the
conscience,’ thus, the sale ‘for the alleged unpaid taxes in the sum of P4,039.79,
including penalties’ is ‘null and void ab initio;’
--‘[Petitioners] have been in actual possession of the Unit in question, since they
bought the same from its former owners, and their possession is open, public,
continuous, adverse and in the concept of owners, while [Respondent] Hermegildo
Tayag has never been in possession of the said property;’
--[Petitioners] through intermediaries offered ‘to pay to the [respondents] the sum of
P4,400 plus all interests and expenses which [they] might have incurred x x x but
said offer was rejected without any just [or] lawful cause.’
There is a need to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to ‘preserve the status quo.’
They asked for: moral damages of not less than P50,000.00; exemplary damages of
not less than P20,000.00; attorney’s fee of P30,000.00, plus appearance fee of
P2,000.00 for every appearance; and litigation expenses of not less than P5,000.00
to prosecute the case. (pages 3-8 of the Record)
On July 14, 1988, [Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag filed his [A]nswer with
[C]ounterclaim (pages 28-32 of the Record), wherein he substantially denied the
allegations in the complaint and, at the same time, raised the following affirmative
defenses, among others:
--‘(T)he ownership of the Condominium unit registered under Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 651, Baguio City, has been consolidated in his name by
virtue of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on September
16, 1987 x x x . The said decision has [become] final and executory as evidenced by
the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;’
--[Petitioners have] no cause of action against him, he being a ‘buyer in good faith in
a regular and lawful public bidding in which any person is qualified to participate.’
--The lower court has no jurisdiction over [petitioners’] claim ‘because the
[petitioners] pray for the annulment of the Certificate of the Sale and the Final Bill
of Sale, which was affirmed by virtue of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16, 1987 x x x. The said decision has [become]
final and executory as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8,
1987;’
--The public auction sale complied with ‘the requirements of Presidential Decree
No. 464’ – hence, the same is ‘lawful and valid:’
--‘[Respondent] Tayag is not bound by the alleged [D]eed of [S]ale in favor of the
[petitioners] by Elias [I]mperial, because it was not registered and recorded with the
Registry of Deeds of Baguio City.’
[Respondent] Tayag then prayed for the award in his favor, of: moral damages of at
least P50,000.00; exemplary damages; attorney’s fees in the sum of P10,000.00;
and, expenses of litigation.
[Respondent] Hernandez likewise filed an [A]nswer on July 18. 1988, wherein he
denied the material averments in the complaint and stated that ‘no irregularity or
illegality was committed in the conduct of the proceedings with respect to the
delinquent real property of Elias Imperial and the actuations of the defendant herein
were all within the limits of his authority and in accordance with the provisions of
the law pertaining to delinquent real property, particularly, P.D. 464 otherwise
known as the Real Property Tax Code and therefore, no damages may be imputed
against him.’ He also claimed, by way of affirmative defenses, that:
--The complaint states no cause of action against the [respondent] herein:
--‘[Petitioners] have not complied with x x x Section 83 of P.D. No. 464 x x x thus,
the case cannot prosper;’
--‘Granting that a Deed of Sale was actually issued in favor of the plaintiffs [because
of] the fact that it is unregistered, the same does not bind third persons including
defendant herein.’"
In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that on December 7, 1981, they had acquired the
condominium from Elias Imperial, the original registered owner, for P100,000. The sale was
purportedly evidenced by a Deed of Sale which, however, had not and thenceforth never been
registered with the Register of Deeds.
Petitioners also averred that on December 9, 1985, Baguio City Treasurer Juan Hernandez
sold the property at a public auction due to nonpayment of delinquent real estate taxes thereon.
The property was sold to Respondent Herminigildo Tayag for P4,400 which represented the
unpaid taxes.
Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint seeking the annulment of the auction sale. They cited
irregularities in the proceedings and noncompliance with statutory requirements.
Dismissing the Complaint, Branch 7 of the RTC of Baguio City cited the December 16, 1987
judgment of Branch 6 of the same court in LRC Adm. Case No.207-R. This earlier Branch 6
Decision had consolidated ownership of the condominium unit in favor of Respondent Tayag.
The Branch 7 Decision also cited the May 31, 1988 Order of Branch 5 of the same court
which had granted a Petition for the Cancellation of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651
in the name of Elias Imperial and directed the Register of Deeds to issue a new Certificate of
Title in the name of Respondent Tayag. According to the trial court, the Decision in LRC
Adm. Case No. 207-R had already upheld the legality of the questioned auction sale. Hence, to
rule again on the same issue would amount to passing upon a judgment made by a coequal
court, contrary to the principle of "conclusiveness of judgment."
Ruling of the CA
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling and ratiocination. The CA explained that
LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R had already ruled on the validity of the auction sale of the subject
condominium unit. It further sustained the validity of that sale, because the city treasurer
complied with the requirements of notice, publication and posting. It added that "[i]f
[petitioners] never received the notices sent to Elias Imperial, then they have only themselves
to blame for failing to register the deed of sale between them and the former owner x x x."
Rejecting petitioners’ contention that the purchase price was inadequate, the CA ruled that
such inadequacy could not nullify the auction sale. It likewise held that petitioners had not
established bad faith on the part of respondents in conducting the auction sale. Finally, it
agreed with the latter’s contention that the former were "remiss in causing the registration of
the sale in their favor of the subject property and they likewise did not fulfill their obligation
to pay taxes. It [is] thus clear x x x they should only have themselves to blame. Laws exist to
be followed, failing in which the price must be paid."
Hence, this recourse.5
The Issues
Petitioners assigned the following alleged errors for the consideration of this Court:6
"I. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
 The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to consider that the
petitioners were deprived of their right to due process in this case due to the gross
and inexcusable negligence of their former counsel who failed to inform them of the
decision in this case and protect their interest.
"II. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to nullify the auction
sale of the subject property of petitioners due to alleged tax delinquency when there
was no compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section 46 of P.D. 464 that
such notice of delinquency of the payment of the property tax should be published.
"III. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to consider the lack of
personal notice of the sale for public auction of the subject property to its owner
which nullifies the said proceeding.
"IV. FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in holding that the decision of the
trial court in the petition for the consolidation of the title case filed by the private
respondent in LRC Admin. Case 207 is a bar to this proceeding.
"V. FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not nullifying the auction sale of subject
property on equitable considerations."
We deem it appropriate to simplify the issues in this wise: (1) whether the RTC Decision in
LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R is a bar to this proceeding; and (2) whether the auction sale of the
subject condominium unit should be annulled on the grounds of (a) non-publication of the
notice of delinquency for the payment of property tax, (b) lack of personal notice of the sale or
public auction of the subject property and (c) equitable considerations. As a preliminary
matter, we shall also consider petitioners’ submission that they were deprived of due process
because of their counsel’s failure to inform them immediately of the receipt of the CA
Decision.
Preliminary Matter:
Negligence of Petitioners’ Former Counsel
Petitioners aver that their former counsel informed them of the CA Decision only on February
5, 1998, more than two months after he had received a copy on December 3, 1997. According
to petitioners, their former counsel’s negligence effectively deprived them of their right to due
process.
We disagree. Notwithstanding its late filing, their Motion for Reconsideration was accepted
and considered by the CA. Hence, this issue has become moot, a fact which petitioners
themselves admitted in their Memorandum: "As a matter of fact, in the very resolution of the
Court of Appeals of April 27, 1998 (Annex ‘C’ to Petition) denying the motion for
reconsideration, wherein the matter of inexcusable negligence of counsel in not informing
petitioners immediately of the decision of the court a quo, were among the grounds thereof, it
was held that the issues raised therein had already been considered in the Decision of
November 20, 1997. The Court of Appeals obviously considered that the Motion for
Reconsideration was validly filed by petitioners so that the Court of Appeals favorably
considered the plea of petitioners to be afforded due process by acting on the Motion for
Reconsideration. Otherwise, it could have just denied said Motion for late filing or simply
noted the same without action."7
Moreover, petitioners themselves declared in their Reply Memorandum8 that this matter is no
longer in issue: "At any rate this issue was raised in the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision of the appellate court and obviously it was favorably considered as the said Court
denied the merit of said Motion by stating that the issues raised have already been treated in
the Decision, instead of outrightly denying the same for late filing. Hence, this is no longer in
issue in this proceeding."9
First Issue:
Bar by Earlier Judgment
Petitioners contend that the Decision in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R, rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City (Branch 6), did not preclude the filing of a separate action to annul
the auction sale. Citing Tiongco v. Philippine Veterans Bank,10 they aver that this RTC Branch
had no jurisdiction to rule on the validity of that sale. Hence, its Decision in the LRC case
cannot bar the present proceedings.
Petitioners’ reliance on Tiongco is misplaced, considering that its factual incidents are
different from those of the present controversy. In that case, the trial court was acting on
a Petition for the Surrender of Certificates of Title. In LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R, the trial
court was faced with a Petition for Consolidation of Ownership. It had jurisdiction to rule on
all matters necessary for the determination of the issue of ownership, including the validity of
the auction sale.
Indeed, this Court in several cases11 has previously declared that a petition for the surrender of
the owner’s duplicate certificate involves contentious questions which should be threshed out
in an ordinary case, because the land registration court has no jurisdiction to try
them.1âwphi1.nêt
Presidential Decree (PD) 1529, however, intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to
promote the expeditious termination of cases. In more recent cases,12 therefore, the Court
declared that this Decree had eliminated the distinction between general jurisdiction vested in
the regional trial court and the latter’s limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land
registration court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even
controversial and contentious cases, as well as those involving substantial issues.13
Thus, petitioners err in contending that the RTC is, in a land registration case, barred from
ruling on the validity of the auction sale. That court now has the authority to act not only on
applications for original registration, but also on all petitions filed after the original
registration of title. Coupled with this authority is the power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions.14 Especially where the issue of
ownership is ineluctably tied up with the question of registration, the land registration court
commits no error in assuming jurisdiction.15
It is equally important to consider that a land registration court’s decision ordering the
confirmation and the registration of title, being the result of a proceeding in rem, binds the
whole world.16 Thus, the trial court’s ruling consolidating the ownership and the title of the
property in the name of herein respondent is valid and binding not only on petitioners, but also
on everyone else who may have any claim thereon.
Second Issue:
Validity of the Auction sale
Petitioners contend that the auction sale was invalid, because several requisites regarding
notice and publication were not satisfied. We are not convinced.
It has been held that matters of notice and publication in tax sales are factual questions that
cannot be determined by this Court.17 Moreover, a recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as in this case, generally precludes the determination of factual issues. This Court will
not, as a rule, inquire into the evidence relied upon by the lower courts to support their
findings.18 In this case, the CA had already ruled on the question of compliance with the
requirements of notice and publication in this wise:
"In the case at bench, it cannot be denied that the requirements of notice, publication
and posting have been complied with by the public defendant prior to the auction
sale wherein the subject condominium unit was sold. x x x Ergo, there was nothing
irregular in the questioned public auction -- thus, the validity of the same must be
upheld in accordance with the aforementioned cases."19
The CA ruling notwithstanding, we shall proceed to discuss these factual issues in order to
assure petitioners of a complete adjudication of their case, and not a mere disposition of
procedural technicalities.
The Non-Publication of Notice of Real Property Tax Delinquency
Petitioners assert that the tax sale should be annulled because of noncompliance with the
requirement of publication prescribed in Section 65 of PD 464.
In this regard, we note that unlike land registration proceedings which are in rem, cases
involving an auction sale of land for the collection of delinquent taxes are in personam. Thus,
notice by publication, though sufficient in proceedings in rem, does not as a rule satisfy the
requirement of proceedings in personam.20 As such, mere publication of the notice of
delinquency would not suffice, considering that the procedure in tax sales is in personam. It
was, therefore, still incumbent upon the city treasurer to send the notice of tax delinquency
directly to the taxpayer in order to protect the interests of the latter.
In the present case, the notice of delinquency was sent by registered mail to the permanent
address of the registered owner in Manila. In that notice, the city treasurer of Baguio City
directed him to settle the charges immediately and to protect his interest in the property. Under
the circumstances, we hold that the notice sent by registered mail adequately protected the
rights of the taxpayer, who was the registered owner of the condominium unit.
For purposes of the real property tax, the registered owner of the property is deemed the
taxpayer. Hence, only the registered owner is entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and other
proceedings relative to the tax sale. Not being registered owners of the property, petitioners
cannot claim to have been deprived of such notice. In fact, they were not entitled to it.
Lack of Personal Notice of the Sale or of the Public Auction of the Subject Property
Petitioners also contend that the registered owner was not given personal notice of the public
auction. They cite Section 73 of PD 464, the pertinent portion of which is reproduced
hereunder:
"x x x. Copy of the notices shall forthwith be sent either by registered mail or by
messenger, or through messenger, or through the barrio captain, to the delinquent
taxpayer, at the address shown in the tax rolls or property tax records of the
municipality or city where the property is located, or at his residence, if known to
said treasurer or barrio captain. x x x." (Underscoring supplied by petitioners in their
Memorandum)
According to petitioners, the notice of public auction should have been sent to the address
appearing in the tax roll or property records of the City of Baguio. That address is Unit No. 5,
Baden #4105, Europa Condominium Villas, Baguio City; not the known address or residence
of the registered owner at 145 Ermin Garcia Street, Cubao, Quezon City. They contend that
notice may be sent to the residence of the taxpayer, only when the tax roll does not show any
address of the property.
The above-cited provision, however, shows that the determination of the taxpayer’s address to
which the notice may be sent is the treasurer’s discretionary prerogative. In this case, the city
treasurer deemed it best to send the notice of public auction to the residence of the taxpayer.
The former validly exercised this option, inasmuch as the address of the latter was known to
him. Moreover, it was more practical and favorable to the registered owner that the notice of
delinquency be sent to his permanent residence in Manila, because he was using the subject
condominium unit merely as a vacation house and not as a residence.
This Court in Pecson v. Court of Appeals21 made a clear and categorical ruling on the matter,
when it declared as follows:
"Under the said provisions of law, notices of the sale of the public auction may be
sent to the delinquent taxpayer, either (I) at the address as shown in the tax rolls or
property tax record cards of the municipality or city where the property is located or
 (ii) at his residence, if known to such treasurer or barrio captain." (emphasis
supplied)
To reiterate, for purposes of the collection of real property taxes, the registered owner of the
property is considered the taxpayer. Although petitioners have been in possession of the
subject premises by virtue of anunregistered deed of sale, such transaction has no binding
effect with respect to third persons who have no knowledge of it.
The importance of registration and its binding effect is stated in Section 51 of the Property
Registration Decree or PD 1529, which reads:
Indeed, petitioners’ suit is now barred by laches.24 The law helps the vigilant, but not those
who sleep on their rights, for time is a means of obliterating actions. Verily, time runs against
the slothful and the contemners of their own rights.25
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

"Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of

registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same
in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms, deeds, mortgages, leases
or other voluntary instrument as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease
or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or effect
registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall
operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the
Registry of Deeds to make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the
registration shall be made in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or
the city where the land lies."

Thus, insofar as third persons are concerned, it is the registration of the deed of sale that can
validly transfer or convey a person’s interest in a property.22 In the absence of registration, the
registered owner whose name appears on the certificate of title is deemed the taxpayer to
whom the notice of auction sale should be sent. Petitioners, therefore, cannot claim to be
taxpayers. For this reason, the annulment of the auction sale may not be invoked successfully.

The Annulment of the Auction Sale on Equitable Considerations

As correctly pointed out by respondents, equitable considerations will not find application, if
the statutes or rules of procedure explicitly provide for the requisites and standards by which
the matters at bench can be resolved.

While it may be assumed that both petitioners and Respondent Tayag are innocent purchasers
of the subject property, it is a well-settled principle that between two purchasers, the one who
has registered the sale in one’s favor has a preferred right over the other whose title has not
been registered, even if the latter is in actual possession of the subject property.23

Likewise, we cannot help but point out the fact that petitioners brought this misfortune upon
themselves. They neither registered the Deed of Sale after its execution nor moved for the
consolidation of ownership of title to the property in their name. Worse, they failed to pay the
real property taxes due. Although they had been in possession of the property since 1981, they
did not take the necessary steps to protect and legitimize their interest.