International Journals

LOGICAL BARRIERS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Author(s): Mark Krain
Source: International Journal of Sociology of the Family, Vol. 5, No. 2 (AUTUMN, 1975),
pp. 186-203
Published by: International Journals
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23027853
Accessed: 19-01-2019 07:06 UTC

REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/23027853?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

International Journals is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
International Journal of Sociology of the Family

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 LOGICAL BARRIERS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY*

Mark Krain

The University of Iowa

Many sociologists interested in theory pursue formal (complete, con

ductively articulated) theory. Most sociologists see their research
conforming to the hypothetico-deductive method and feel that this m
made sufficiently rigorous to achieve desired formalized theory. This
in principle that formal theory can be achieved. The actual pattern
activity, termed "casual abstraction" method, is very different from the
deductive method, and, though critically deficient in key formal pro
close to the limit of the capacity for sociological knowledge to be form
points are based on recent thought in logic and philosophy of science
that there are firm limits on formal logic that bar formal theory of com
These limits act proximatety and concretely at present levels of the
Examples from ethnomethodology and socio-linguistics illustrate the effe
limits, yield evidence that these limits have already been encountered
methods in social research are affected by them, imply limits on data use
new means of procedure in analytic empirical science not bound by th
Interpretive and "informal" accounts are possible and not subject to th
The paper calls for systematic development of informal empirical the

on reconstructed as opposed to nat

Many sociologists
terested who uralare
in theory development in
language. This view posits that
are pursuing formal strategies. formal logic is adequate (or nec
They are seeking more explicit for essary) to constitute a framework for
mulation and more deductive re the statement of a theory of natural
latedness in more elaborate pro social and behavioral processes and
positional structures. In general they events. Symbolic logic becomes a
see theory in terms of the formatsystematic
of language that eliminates
the logical positivist position in the the equivocation, hidden assumption,
philosophy of science (c.f. Brodbeck,internal contradiction, and other
1963, and Homans, 1964, for con flaws and faults that plague ordin
venient summaries of this position) ary natural language. Reconstructed
and accept that position's emphasis languages are the superior mecha
nisms of statement in science which
♦This paper was presented at the Theory Con enable us to dispense with obscure
struction Workshop of the National Council onand confusing language-in-use. It is
Family Relations at the NCFR annual meeting
in St. Louis, Mo., October 22-26, 1974. It is a probably fair to say that most
revised version of a paper originally presented modern social and behavioral scien
to the annual meeting of the Midwest Sociological
Society in Milwaukee, Wise., April 25-28, 1973. tists accept this viewpoint and
Encouragement and critical comments on early understand their own scientific acti
drafts were furnished by Stephen G. Wieting,
Theodore N. Ferdinand and members of the vities as conforming to the "hypo
Theory Development Section of the NCFRthetico-deductive
in method," i.e., the
cluding Darwin Thomas, Andrew Weigert, Brent
Miller and David Klein. scientific program of the logical
186

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

positivists. Most sociologists feel with known limitations on formal

that their process of developing logic to "map" or represent complex
hypotheses, doing research, andsystems.
re These limitations are not
lost in rarefied levels of theory or in
asoning from the research findings
back to the ideas from which the exotic phenomena but bear proxi
hypotheses were developed conforms mately, intimately, and concretely
to the general program of develop even at present phases of theory
ing formal theory in reconstructed development. A second stream is
language. drawn from the literature in ethno

This paper is skeptical in regard methodology* and linguistics which

to the possibility of fully formalizedinclude illustrations of the effect of
theory. It posits that there are ab these logical problematics and as
solute limits on the ability of re evidence that these limitations have
constructed language and formal already been encountered in at
logic to represent natural social and tempts to theorize about everyday
behavioral phenomena. It further social and behavioral phenomena.
posits that the current actual patternThese limitations imply internal
of research activity, which will be problems in social science methodo
termed the "casual abstraction" logy and data utilization. At the
method, is actually quite radically same time, these skeptical points of
different from the "hypothetico view also imply some suggestions for
deductive" method. This paper a renovated, though informal, ap
asserts that the casual abstraction proach to theory construction and
method is actually fairly close these to the suggestions will be made.
maximal limit of the capacity of
Casualness vs. Rigor
social science knowledge to be for
malized even though the method is In general most social scientists in
critically deficient in explicitness, their research endeavors follow a
deductive relatedness, etc. This as format that they would assume con
sertion is in contrast to programs stitutes
of a relaxed version of the strict
formalization-oriented theorists who scientific format. They frequently
feel that the casual abstraction metemploy a body of more or less
hod is but a first step to what theyprimitive theory. That is, they use
see as the possible (though perhaps some sort of stock of ideas taken
only in the long range) achievement from classical or recent written

of full rigorous formalization. Pro literature and infer a set of testable

grams such as that specified by hypotheses from this stock. They
Zetterberg (1963) and more recently then go out and gather data and
by Gibb (1972) and Hage (1973) ex make decisions on the basis of statis
press such optimism. tical principles (or simpler ones)
about
By interweaving two intellectual whether the data supports or
streams together we may confront casts doubt on the hypotheses. They
the assumptions which underlie thethen reason back to the stock of
orientations toward formalization. ideas and make comments on these
ideas that are based upon the fate of
The first such stream stems from the
the hypotheses.
mathematical, physical, and inform
ation-theory sciences which deal All of this is in reality a caricature

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY

of the strict scientific (or "hypo offered and accepted conditionally.

thetico-deductive") method. The cur If nobody exposes any major con
rent feeling in the social sciences is tradictions, then by an implicit con
that this is a reasonable approxi sensus we just go ahead with our
mation of that method given that projects. Indeed this entire para
things are the way they are: given graph is likely to be seen as a labor
that we can't define most of our ed lingering on formality which just
terms, and given that we do not is not seen as the point of theory.
suspect a good many of the relation But that is just the point!
ships that may actually be the case, We try to say something substant
and given that we may be askingively the interesting and then contact
wrong questions in the first place, empirical "reality" to see if there is
and given that we can't at this time justification out there for our ideas.
specify all the variables, and . . . etc.,This process is subject to some "rules
etc. There is a feeling that we are of evidence." Thus the development
doing what we can in pursuit of the of explicit attention to research
classically conceived scientific rigor design and to methodology over the
with the tools at hand. years is of indispensible value. These
This falls very far short of the methods constitute the discriminat
classical degree of rigor. So much so ing processes of contact with the
that it is probably in poor taste real world. But this is not the core of
ly to insist that we are following thesocial science or of science in general.
basic hypothetico-deductive format. Other types of activities are as dep
Our sets of hypotheses are not rigorendent upon such rules of evidence
ously derived from theory. They areas science. For instance: law and
in fact abstracted rather casually. jurisprudence, business or govern
Ultimately their relationship to ment decision making, journalism,
theory is not a formal deductive medicine, and others. None of these
relationship but rather a looser and fields would be any less devastated
more open one which is advanced by the loss or lack of these rules of
and accepted conditionally. If no evidence than would science. The
body points out any problems withpoint is that the research activities
it, all who read it will acquiesce in common in scientific enterprises do
it. The body of theory itself is of not define science. What is central
"open texture," not a tight system of to science is the weaving together of
deductively interrelated statements these findings into a broader fabric
explicitly formulated and logically of general explanation.
sound. It is not even an approxi In a few studies we do in fact
mation of this. It is just as termed reason very rigorously and logically
above, a stock of ideas, persuasive in from our data to conclude about the
an intuitive sense, but its formal fate of our hypotheses. This, how
structure always remaining un ever, is a process restricted to those
examined. In general the deductive studies within which strictly applied
relatedness of the formulation is not logical reasoning can be effective
even addressed. We do not even because there are few enough vari
conceive of our theories in terms of ables and clearly notable relatedness
their logical nature. They too are between them. Logic and formality

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

close
may have great pay-offs within the texture. Define things,
given
studies (i.e., as "rules of evidence"). "unpack" the verbal formulations
But a simple extension of this into "simpler" components, analyze
strategy to all kinds of research the nature of statements, identify all
or to
variables,
the weaving-together-of-findings pro make explicit the relation
blem probably will not have similarbetween them, and so on. It
ships
pay-offs. is obvious that this is an enormous

Before we continue, it might be task. Even the thoroughgoing at

profitable to summarize the elements tempts to formalize social science
of the current actual pattern of re formulations, though moving in this
search activity in the social sciences: direction, have not anywhere ne^r
It is a pattern of: accomplished this (see, for instance,
Burr, 1973; Berger, Zelditch, and An
(1) casual abstraction of proposi
derson, 1966). These attempts are
tions (or, hypotheses) . . .
probably as far as this textural clos
(2) ... from a body of theory (i.e.,
ing process will get. Moreover, it is
a stock of ideas) . . .
likely that they are not movements
(3) ... that is of open-texture ...
toward true formal deductively relat
(4) ... the formal deductive nature
of which has not been examin
ed formats but are merely highly
elaborated forms of "casual abstrac
ed .. .
tion." As such they are substantive
(5) ... and which is accepted con
ly quite valuable but no more than
ditionally . . .
this. The attempt to close the tex
(6) ... and consensually; . . .
ture of scientific formulations is cal
(7) ... where isomorphism with as
led "axiomitization" and in fact very
pects of the empirical world is
few axiomitized formulations are
investigated to find justification
or its lack . . .
known even in physics. It seems
that as social sicentists we anticipate
(8) ... by rules of evidence and dis formulations that are held to more
criminating methods.
rigid standards than are currently
To reiterate, this is not the hy accepted by the "precise" sciences
pothetico-deductive method. It is not
while at the same time being very
really even an approximation of it. far from achieving them. But
entirely aside from the matter of
Toward Closed Texture Language?
size and difficulty of the task there is
Many, if not most, social scientists the fact that recent thought in philo
argue that the "casual abstraction" sophy, logic, and mathematics strong
model is just a relaxed form of the ly imply that full formalization is
rigorous classical format. They take jiOt possible in principle.
the position that as a hypothetico It is getting very tedious to refer
deductive format, if it is weak and to some of the renovations in scienti
sloppy, it is only tentatively so. It fic thinking occasioned by recent
can be strengthened. This may be so, mathematical developments by such
but there is some compelling evid figures as Heisenberg, Godel, and
ence against this position. Turing. Though accepted by most
The obvious strategy in the face of social scientists as fascinating, these
an open-texture formulation is to renovations are regarded by them as

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY

inapplicable to social science at the unambiguous system which is also

present time. They are assumed to complete. And if at any stage in
be so abstracted in nature that we scientific discovery the laws of
can afford to be formalizing and clos nature did seem to make a complete
ing texture for quite a while before system then we should have to con
we will run into trouble, so-to-speak. clude that we had not got them
Again, this may be so, but there is right" (1966:5).
some evidence that we are already Bronowski makes it clear that the
running into trouble. A layman's problem is with science, not in any
tour of this renovated thinking may necessary arbitrariness in nature:
be worth the effort. "Of course we suppose nevertheless
In one of a number of recent that nature does obey a set of laws
summaries of these renovations, of her own which are precise, com
Bronowski, a mathematician, discus plete, and consistent. But if this is
ses them as a family of limitations so, then their inner formulations
on logic. These limitations apply to must be of some kind quite different
any system as sophisticated as from any that we know; and at pre
simple arithmetic or more so. The sent, we have no idea how to con
human mind is clearly more so ceive it" (p. 5). The problem, as
phisticated than that. In addition, Bronowski sees it, is precisely with
the rules which govern the inter the reconstructed nature of scientific
action in and structure of natural language: "Any description in our
human groups are also more sophis present formalisms must be incom
ticated than simple arithmetic and plete, not because of the obduracy of
are included in the limitations nature, but because of the limitation
Bronowski discusses. He points out of language as we use it. And this
limitation lies not in the human fal
that ". . . every axiomatic system of
any mathematical richness is sub libility of language, but on the contr
ject to severe limitations, whose in ary in its logical insufficiency. This
cidence cannot be foreseen and yet is a cardinal point: it is the language
which cannot be circumvented. Inthat we use in describing nature that
the first place, not all sensible asser (by its arrangement of
imposes
definitions and axioms) both the
tions in the language of the system
can be deduced (or disproved) from form and the limitations of the laws
the axioms: no set of axioms can be that we find" (p. 5, added).
complete. And in the second place, It is less clear whether or not this
an axiomatic system can never be statement of the futility of formal
guaranteed to be consistent: any day ization and logic implies a blanket
some flagrant and irreconcilable limitation on the ability of the mind
contradiction may turn up in it. Anto extricate the laws of nature. For
axiomatic system cannot be made toinstance Bronowski speculates on the
generate a description of the world possibility of an informal language
which matches it point for point . . for physics which would be com
(1966:4). The implications of this plete and consistent, that is, the pos
point for science is clear: "the lawssibility of a complete and consistent
of nature cannot be formulated as theory in natural language as oppos
an axiomatic, deductive, formal and ed to reconstructed logical language.

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Bronowski himself doubts such a

ations on logic are very proximate
possibility, but it certainly ones and ex
is not that they bear even on pre
cluded by the established limitations
sent day theory building enterprises.
on logic.
Gray and Formalized Theory
Blanche, in his discussion of the
history and nature of "axiomatics" The possibility or impossibility o
(1962; 56-64), points out that recent formal theory has been debated as
developments as discussed by Bro part of an ongoing discussion in the
nowski have dashed the hopes of American Sociologist for the past
those logicians who had sought to several years (Ferdinand, 1969; Brad
dispense entirely with intuition in ley and Reynolds, 1970; Ferdinand,
the construction of complex logical 1971; Gray, 1972; Ferdinand, 1973).
systems. Blanche points out (pp. 62 Gray's contribution to this discussion
63) that it cannot be the case that a notes that such issues do not fore
simple correspondence can exist be close the possibility of a "quasi
tween a complex (i.e., at or above general" theory of behavior (Gray,
the degree of complexity of simple 1972). He points out that a theory of
arithmetic) formal axiomatized sys a formal axiomatic nature might be
tem and the statement of that sys empirically complete without being
tem in informal language. This cor logically complete (p. 6): ". . . it is
respondence is always mediated by possible that the sum of facts in the
intuitive presuppositions and by an empirical domain will be less than
unreducible grounding in ordinary the sum of statements that the axio
language. The ordinary language matic system is able to generate and
version of the system has a richness
that the sum of statements in turn
that the formal version lacks. The will not exhaust the logical truths of
limitations on logic pertain to the the system's language." Although
formal version essentially as a matterGray does not draw an explicit con
of an impossibility of a complete and clusion from this, he seems to imply
consistent formalization of the ordin that such a theory would be satis
ary language version. Bronowski's factory because the problems would
speculation on the possibility of an not be among the statements of facts
informal theory implies in Blanche'sin the empirical domain but would
terms that an ordinary language be among the residual statements,
theory can be produced that accept i.e., among those statements (excess
ably accounts for phenomena that its to the empirical ones) necessary to
counterpart in formal axiomatic bring the theory up to logical com
language cannot derive from its pleteness. Indeed this is an interest
deductive structure. ing possibility but it assumes that
We will return shortly to the the problems are not well-diffused
consideration of the possibility of throughout the axiomatic system.
informal theory as a source of ac Further, it counsels us to go through
counts of social and behavioral all of the work of developing an
phenomena that cannot in principle axiomatic empirical theory and then
be derived from formal theories. take the additional steps of deducing
First, however, arguments must be the remainder of all possible state
ments to be sure that the problems
reviewed that imply that these limit

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY

are among the remainder. Obviously Machines and Minds:

this last step is impossible, leaving The mind-machine discussion has
us with the doubts about the ad
been carried on by a number of
equacy of the theory we began with.
philosophers (Crosson and Sayre,
Most importantly, though, the con
1967: 18-29; Lucas, 1964; Nagel and
verse of Gray's depiction is more Newman, 1958) on the basis of
likely to be the case, i.e., the domain
Godel's theorem. This theorem posits
of empirical facts is larger than thethat there is a fundamental differ
set of statements in any axiomatic ence between minds and machines.
theory than the mind of man can Machines, in the observable facts of
deal with (in the foreseeable future), their nature and construction, have
whether or not that theory is com a deterministic set of principles that
plete and consistent. account for their operation. The
operation of a machine can be re
Gray's idea that we may be able presented as a formal theory, i.e., it
to develop a good formalized theory can be made fully explicit with com
as an unproblematic substructure of plete logical consistency. "The initial
a larger axiomatic system where all status of the machine and of its
of the ugliness is outside of the environment correspond to the "ax
fortunate substructure must, there ioms of the formal system, its in
fore, be rejected if alone on the variant operations to the definitions,
practical grounds that it calls for an
its operational procedures to rules of
unmanageable amount of work. inference, and the results of its
There are grounds, however, for be operation upon its input to the the
ing skeptical about the possibility orems
of which follow in the formal
any such fortunate substructuresystem"be (Crosson and Sayre, 1967:
ing developed whether its logical 22).
environs are ugly or otherwise. The Minds are frequently, in some
following section argues that the philosophical and some common
limitations on logic intervene in thesense viewpoints, likened to machin
construction of theories at the level es. These viewpoints admit dif
of the immediate basis of social ferences in scales of complexity and
of qualities of structure but assert
science data. The basic unit of data
that a basic likeness exists between
is a person or a small group and both
persons and groups are capable of minds and machines in that they are
producing and being governed by material mechanisms. Thus the
both
principles or rule systems more comcommon observation that the work
plex than simple arithmetic. As ings of a machine can be fully and
such, the limits on logic apply to formally specified is often taken as a
them and no formal description of basis for an assertion that the same
can be accomplished for a mind, the
their operation is possible as would
be possible, for instance, with the
difference residing in an increment
in complexity of the formal speci
specification of the operating princ
iples of a machine. In just thesefication. Godel's theorem proves that
terms, "mind vs. machine" this arguthe possibility of full formalization
ment has been spelled out in great for common machines is not in fact
detail. extendible to minds (or even, it

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

turns out, to "complex" machines). theory is possible at all regardless of

Basing this theorem on the known whether social behavior is produced
logical paradoxes in the structure of by mind alone (a "psychologistic"
mathematics, Godel points out that position) or in confluence with any
any consistent system with the cap other sorts of things (a "sociolog
acity to produce simple arithmetic istic" position).
has a characteristic which can be At the same time chaos is not
seen to be troublesome: such a implied (Lucas, 1964; 53-55). Thoug
system can produce statements or no formal consistent theory exist
formulae which cannot be formally principle, human activity is never
derived by that system's formally theless ordered and integrated. Bro
representable structure, i.e., its "the nowski's position is that there is an
ory." Whereas human minds can informal structuring to this process
produce simple arithmetic and much that is totally resistant to foi'mal
more sophisticated structures of specification but that can be describ
thought, all known machines cannot. ed by informal methods.
(If any machine could produce The discussion of machines and
simple arithmetic, it would then be minds is decisive because it has
a "complex" one and, whether it be
direct bearing on what is common
nerve or steel, it too would possess taken to be a ubiquitous starting
the troublesome characteristic.) Thus point for the social and behavioral
human minds can produce statements sciences. The position of "metho
and execute behaviors that cannot
dological individualism" as an ac
be derived from a formal represent cepted tenet of the dominant logical
ation of its operating structure. Yet positivist standpoint in modern times
that operating structure is producingposits that the individual social per
the statements and behaviors never
son is the fundamental data base for
theless.
developing theory (Brodbeck, 1963:
If one accepts the general point 53-55). The mind-machine discussion,
that human action is coherent and however, makes it clear that the
integrated on a long-term basis, then limitations on logic do not act only
this implies the existence of a set of at elevated levels of abstraction at
"statements" or "formulae" as the which many statements that involve
basis for this action. In fact, it many actions of many people in
implies that they are being produced many settings at many times and
in large quantity in an ongoing and places are involved. These
many
continuous process. If this is so, then
limitations act even in connection
what is troublesome is that no for with the individual. We cannot be
mal logically consistent theory of gin a large theory of society on the
the operation of the human mind assumption that small theory-of
exists to constitute the basis for machine formalizations are possible
predicting or deriving the action. for individual social persons and
Further, if human action can be then work "up from there." The
stated to possess the same or a great problems start from the ground up.
er degree of complexity and sophis The limitations of logic, therefore,
tication as does simple arithmetic, pertain to formal theories of even
then no formal logically consistent ordinary seemingly concrete social

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY

and behavioral phenomena and maythat they assume that a reader

be said to pervade all or most at would know what the conversants
tempts at formalization in the social
had actually talked about only from
sciences. Moreover, this discussion reading literally what the students
has pointed out that though formalwrote. The students wrote increas
ization is not possible, there is a ingly expanded descriptions and, up
on analysis, concluded that each one
manifest order and integration to the
phenomena. This order and integra was insufficient, Finally they gave
tion is produced by a network of up concluding that no description
forces that can be accounted for ulti could be total and sufficient.
mately only in theories structured In
in their comments on this demon
informal natural language. stration, the editors Gumperz and
The following sections consider Hymes note that . . the students
some evidence for the natural and found the task impossible because, as
informal structuring of these proces would most social scientists, they
ses in human language and inter took the task to be one of remedying
action and refer to some attempts to the sketchiness of the conversation
develop a basis of scientific state by elaborating its contents, by ap
ment that is structured by informal pealing outside the speech event to
or "interpretive" discourse. what became, under prodding, an in
finite regress of context. Their error
Some Evidence on Informality of
was to assume a theory of signs in
Social Process
which the way something is said is
Ethnomethodologists and some divorced from what is being said
sociolinguists have long resisted the (form vs. content), and in concentrat
trend toward reconstructed languageing on the "what," neglecting the
and formal theory in the social andhow. In fact, the conversation was
behavioral sciences. They have pro intelligible to its participants not be
duced some studies and demonstra cause of some shared infinity of sub
tions that argue that human affairs stantive knowledge as to what was
are not structured in a formal deduc being talked about but in the first
tive mold and cannot be fit into for instance because they agreed at the
mal deductive theories. In a recent time on how the talking was to be
sociolinguistic compendium (Gum interpreted. The fact that such
perz and Hymes, 1972) a leading momentary agreements can be reach
ethnomethodologist, Harold Garfink ed, however, does not mean that con
el, summarizes two of his case tent can be reconstructed later under
studies (Garfinkel, 1972). One of different conditions" (1972:303).
these studies was in actuality a For sociolinguistics as well as for
demonstration. Garfinkel assigned toethnomethodology the speech event
some of his students the task of ex is not primarily a representation by
plicating a short segment of a con its participants of their experiences
versation. The students found much with external reality and is therefore
difficulty with the task. Garfinkel not dependent upon external reality
held them to increasingly strict for its impact. Hence "appealing
standards of accuracy, clarity, and outside the speech event" is futile in
distinctness. Finally, he required this view. Categories of speech

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

events defined in terms of reference countability of everyday affairs is in

to external factors are useless if this this view absurd. Any set of rules is
is the case because defined in this essentially incomplete no matter how
way they have no systematic re elaborately specified. The integration
lationship with each other. Instead of everyday affairs is a "contingent,
categories of speech events are to be ongoing accomplishment" and is a
analyzed in terms of "how the talk process of interpretation. This order
ing is being done." These are liness, rationality, and accountability
qualitative depictions of ways of is then to be sought in a special type
speaking. They are matters ". . . of of formula, i.e., one that is informal
furnishing a method for saying what ly (interpretively) structured but
formally underivable.
ever is to be said, like talking synon
ymously, talking ironically, talking
Informality of social science
metaphorically, talking cryptically, procedures
talking narratively, talking in a
questioning or answering way, lying, The implications of this fo
glossing, double-talking, and the science is made somewhat more clear
rest" (Garfinkel, 1972: 319). in the second of Garfinkel's case
Interaction is then a matter of studies. This study is essentially an
sequences of such "ways of talking."
investigation of the factors involved
The factors by which an actor decidin acquiring intercoder reliability in
es how he will furnish such a "way a study of procedures in an out
of talking" as his next move after patient psychiatric clinic. Two gradu
his partner has furnished a previous
ate students examined clinic folders
"way of talking" is demonstrably and coded the contents into cate
(and for Garfinkel already demon gories for subsequent analysis. Inter
strated in his case study) an intecoder reliability, if high, furnishes
pretive matter rather than a deter credence to the supposition that cod
ministic one. "Common understand ed events are actual events of clinic
ing is never simple recognition of activity. Garfinkel found that in
shared contents or rules, but it is their work the coders were making
always open-ended, brought about assumptions about the clinic activit
in any given case because particip ies that the coding methods were
ants bring it about as their artful (ifintended to produce descriptions of.
unconscious) accomplishment. Ad Garfinkel then decided to examine
hoeing remains the ultimate concern. the coding process itself; just what
People understand each other be were the ways in which the coders
cause 'for the while' they assume made decisions?
the reasonableness of each other's
It was found that coders could not
statements and impute and construct come to decisions without "ad hoc"
reasonableness, where needed, out of considerations. These considerations
often fragmentary data" (Gumperz are not provided for in the specifica
and Hymes, 1972: 304).
tions for the use of coding categories
The very notion that sets of rules or, in fact, anywhere else in the
that are formally derived and logical "official" set-up of the research pro
ly consistent, etc., are responsible for ject but were necessary for the cod
the orderliness, rationality, and ac ers' ability to assign documents to

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY

categories. Attempts to eliminate same nature as that which occurs be

this informal "ad hoeing" made cod tween ordinary people. We are
ing impossible. Now normally the engaged essentially in a mediated
design of coding schemes seeks to sequence of "ways of talking" with
eliminate "ad hoeing" as an informal people we study. For a discussion of
flaw in the formal procedure. "The this issue with direct relevance for
prevailing view holds that good research on the family see Cicourel
work requires researchers, by ex (1967).
tending the number and explicitness
Garfinkel implies that there is no
of their coding rules, to minimize
alternative to the "casual abstrac
the occasions in which . . . [ad hoeing
tion" process for social science. An
procedures] would be used" (Gar
finkel, 1972: 313). But it is Garfinkel'sattempt to close the open texture of
social science language would be
point that to do so would entirely
undermine the coder's sense of the futile. Even a theory that at present
relevance of the coding instructions
is quite modest would expand be
yond management very quickly and
to the given situation he is analyzing.
would move toward infinite regress.
"To treat instructions as though ad
hoc features in their use was a It would very soon lose deductive
nuisance, or to treat their presence strength as more and more non
logical informally structured argu
as grounds for complaint about the
ments assumed a larger share of the
incompleteness of instructions, is
very much like complaining that if explanatory load inasmuch as "inter
pretive" factors were being identified
the walls of a building were only
as the actual operating account for
gotten out of the way, one could see
better what was keeping the roof up"
the phenomena under examination.
Gumpers and Hymes (1972: 306-308)
(Garfinkel, 1972; 313).
themselves speculate on the nature
The implication here is that codingof a science under these (assumed)
is the same kind of open-ended in realities: "one gains the impression
formal interpretive process as that that all the investigator can do is to
involved in explaining conversations. collect and exhibit instances" (p.
Logical operations on coded data 306). Such a science is more familiar
assumes that the formal coding to linguistics perhaps than sociology
instructions are the only "instru in that for the former descriptive
mentation premises" in the chain of
linguistics is a recognized division of
logic but in fact they are not. The
the field though its lack of theory is
"ad hoeing" procedures must (but also recognized.
cannot) be specified and brought into
the logical chain if there is really go Social phenomena structuring
ing to be a fully integrated deductive through linguistics research

system (Gibb, 1972: 43-49). The

situation is not otherwise in other The underlying argument
methodologies. For instance respond critical position of Garfinke
ent "ad hoeing" is brought into theto depend on a theory of l
situation with survey methods. To that is radically different fr
that proceeded it, Chomsk
sum up, data reaches social scientists
in a linguistic process that is of erative-Transformational
the Grammar

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

(Chomsky, 1965, 1969). It isbasis of this is bedrock for the ethno

a theory
which asserts that language is go methodological critique of contem
porary social science. If all behavior
verned by a quite remarkable system
of rules that enables speakers to is in fact organized in accordance
generate and understand meaningful with linguistic processes (or on a
utterances that they have not pre linguistic model) then all behavior
viously heard. These rules enable is subject to the same problems of
speakers to differentiate between analysis. The arguments of Garfinkel
ambiguous meanings of a single and Cicourel do provide substantial
utterance (e.g., "the shooting of the
support for this view.
hunters") that cannot be differentiat
Chomsky's approach to language
ed on formal grounds and to supply seems to involve interpretive as op
meaning where none can be supplied posed to mechanistic assumptions
on formal grounds (e.g., the reading since the mystery and depth of the
of some poems in Carroll's Alice in
remarkable system of generative
Wonderland). These rules are not
rules seems to place the issue far be
learned in the traditional sense. A
yond the explanatory power of any
child, after being exposed unsyste
present day theory. Chomsky himself
matically to an irregular and in accepts a "mentalist" position which
explicit sampling of these rules in
asserts that human linguistic be
the ordinary casual speech of those havior is not determined by external
around him, comes by about four or stimuli or internal physiological
five years of age to be able to use states. He seems for the most part to
the entire body of rules naturally, see a highly specific language
competently, and comfortably. The "faculty," the operations of which
position of ethnomethodological the are specified by its own working
ory with respect to this approach to principles. If it is undetermined by
language is made explicit by Cicourel external stimuli or by physiological
(1970a, 1970b).
states, there is great difficulty in
By any means of reckoning Chom understanding what basis there is
sky has pointed out that an extra for analysis (Lyons, 1970: 119-131).
ordinarily complex set of phenomena Chomsky's point is nevertheless
is implied by very ordinary and compelling. He correctly makes ex
routinely observable features of plicit that some sort of generative
language. Whether this complexity faculty is necessary to account for
is in fact of the nature of the inter very commonly observable language
pretive processes discussed above, behavior. If it is difficult to see how
and therefore fundamentally infinite such a faculty can be analyzed then
and unanalyzable, is by no means so much the worse for the would-be
settled. Certainly ethnomethodolog analysts. Ethnomethodologists would
ists seem to enjoy trading on the have us believe that no formal the
mysterious status of the underlying ories or models can constitute an
remarkable system of rules. The effective analysis, i.e., that only
enormous difficulty in accounting for interpretive accounts can be offered.
the understanding and production of Some general orientations toward
utterances never previously heard further analysis seem based on the
by the speaker and the nonlearninggeneral proposition that whatever is

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY

involved in language (or more gen tic neural circuitry will, like that fo
erally in behavior) there must be any other machine, be subject to th
some basic structures involved that limitations on logic. It is indeed
account for its operating characteris tempting to view Chomsky's "gen
tics. In effect this position holds erative faculty" as a generator of in
that at some point the neural "circui formally structured but not formally
try" will be examinable and this derivable statements.
will settle all issues. Aside from any In a series of essays spanning now
inherent reductionism problems, fifteen years MacKay (1969) attempts
there is a basic issue of whether to join the engineering and informa
principles of operation can intion fact be
sciences with the behavioral
stated from knowledge of circuitry. and social ones by marshalling con
In their survey of the implications of the information sciences
cepts from
cybernetics, Crosson and Sayre (1967)
to clarify and organize ideas about
include an essay by J. L. Massey such things as language, meaning,
(1967) that points out an interesting and choice. MacKay's essays are
outcome from the mathematical the fascinating but come on their own to
ory of digital computing machines. conclusions
It similar to Chomsky's by
has been determined that there is denying the possibility of a com
little control that can be effected pletely mechanistic theory of langu
over computing machines. For ex age (MacKay, 1969; Chapters 6 and
ample it has been shown that it is 7). Interestingly enough for the
impossible to formulate a test which, position of the ethnomethodologists,
when applied to an arbitrary com the strongest basis for this conclu
puter program with its input data, sion seems to be his feeling that no
can determine even so little as mechanistic theory can match the
whether or not the machine will flexibility of natural language in its
ever stop computing (Massey, 1967:
adaptability across wide variations
64). The situation is yet more dis in identities of communicators and
turbing when computers are equip settings within which it is used (pp.
ped with effector and sensor organs 74-77).
and can generate their own decisions
about inputs. Though circuitry, pro Limited formalization in theory

gramming, and data are known, the development

operation of the computer cannot be The preceding paragraphs (1)

entirely predicted. Though some Chomsky's view of language, (2)
thing like a "Hal" in the motion accept the position of ethnometho
picture "2001" is not implied, the dologists that this view is a valid
examination of circuitry, even if at basis for understanding behavior in
some point possible, cannot yield a general, and (3) support the idea
finite formula for accounting for thethat no mechanistic (formal deduc
operation of even a complex manu tive) model can account for behavior
factured mechanism, much less that given the Chomsky-ethnomethodolog
of language "faculty." This is in factical assumptions. These points do
simply another version of the mind not suggest that no account is pos
machine issue discussed earlier. A sible, only that a formal deductive
formalized description of the one is not. (Nor does it suggest that
Unguis

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

formal deductive thought modes is theare

process not the conditions and,
nowhere worthwhile. Such thought as we have seen, there are no
modes were seen as indispensible as grounds to believe that this proc
rules of evidence in individual re must have a finite formula. More

search enterprises.) The pointover, the nature of the process has

is that
the "casual abstraction" method is ontological implications which rend
the best we can do and constitutes ers problematic some basic approach
the limit of the formalization strat es to data gathering.
egy rather than its starting point. A Limitations on data usage
small increment in formalization is
If there can be no formal theory
possible with great effort but will of elemental everyday personal and
never eventuate in axiomatic theory. interpersonal communicative pheno
It may well, however, reduce the mena, what does that imply for the
ambiguity in earlier bodies of knowemployment of data gathered from
ledge and this incremental factor, these phenomena in theorizing more
rather than aims of full formal state
broadly and about larger units of
ment, is probably the best way to structure? If the ultimate
social
understand the value of formaliza account of such phenomena is in
tion.
formal and interpretive in nature
rather than finite, formal, and
For any given body of knowledge
some degree of formal-style presenta deductively structured, then it is
tion is probably possible. Increments likely that the interpretive princ
in formalization (i.e., increasingly iples permit wider variability in
explicit definitions, procedures, logic)features of the phenomenon than we
will initially be easy also, but if the might suspect to be the case if for
world is like Garfinkel pictures it, mally statable principles governed.
the formal body will not only get The situations in any given analysis
very large and unmanageable but are considerably more complex than
will also yield patterns in which we might anticipate. This should be
many of the same types of things willunderstandable since we have argued
have different antecedents, and sim that phenomena cannot be represent
ilar sets of antecedents will have dif ed formally due to their complexity
ferent results. This is what systems and lack of determinate relatedness.
theorists refer to as "equifinality" If this is so then there is a question
and "multifinality" (Buckley, 1967: about the assumed standardization
60). The attempt to find better of common social situations. The
and better "predictor" variables working descriptions of such situa
and "criterion" variables will be tions may not contain enough in
the response of the formal strat formation to assure that any given
egists. But if Garfinkel is correct, set of them is comparable. It be
this will be analogous to the infinite comes difficult to know what degree
regress to which his students almost of variability is variation within
resorted. Under identical conditions phenomena and what degree is varia
the interpretive process may not tion between phenomena. If we are
yield identical outcomes; and it may investigating family decisions to buy
yield identical outcomes even under a car, it may not be enough simply
widely varying conditions. The issue to sample from among validly marri

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
200 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY

ed opposite sex pairs communicating er agree?) Yet the adequate service

in connection with the topical theme of these working descriptions may
of car purchasing. Controlling for not be due to any degree of truth to
the common control variables helps the assumption of "literal descrip
little. Details of the conversations' tion" but rather to the "ad hoc"
form, tone, phrasing, and language nature of their application to data.
may be crucial. Specifics of sub Finally, the denial of "literal descrip
jective intentions, beliefs, attitudes,
tion" is not limited to ethnometho
definitions, self images, perceptions dologists. Philosophers such as
of and attributions to others etc. mayToulmin (1969) and Cappella (1972)
also be important (Blumer, 1966). Ahave also argued against assump
more totalistic sense of the embed tions that there are phenomena that
dedness of all utterances in the total are invariant in time and space in
unique situation may yet also be human affairs.
pivotal (see Garfinkel and Sacks, The point is not at all that "ad
1970, on "indexicality"). Unless all hoeing" is bad. It is ineviatable in
of these things are in fact brought principle and would have to be in
into the research design there may cluded as a set of instrumentation
be problems in viewing any two premises in a fully explicit deductive
situations as two valid instances of a theory. This would destroy the
common phenomenon as opposed to deductive relatedness of the theory
one instance each of two different
because "ad hoeing" is interpretive.
phenomena. If the latter is theIncase
short, this section has argued that
then data abstracted from the two the interpretive or informal nature
situations are not suitable for formal
of things implies that (1) a simple
generalization about a putative uniformity across presumed multiple
single phenomenon. instances of a given phenomena does
Sociological theory and research
not in fact exist and thus general
has been heavily dependent upon
ization from a multiplicity of in
what Wilson (1970) terms "literal stances is not routinely possible and/
description," an assumption that or (2) that even where this multi
common situations are standardized plicity has been presumed with no
and that they and the events withinapparent disaster to the process of
them can be literally, simply,generalization
and full formalization will
unambiguously identified. Thus re still be barred due to the "ad hoc"
search methodology has been proce nature of the methodological pro
eding apace on the basis of very cedures which yielded the apparent
simple working descriptions of com (but unreal) multiplicity when the
mon situations. The contemporary instrumentation premises are includ
sociologist is likely to feel that the ed in the attempt at formalization.
issue is just so much fluff as things This position does have important
now stand because the old working implications for the future of the
descriptions have adequately demar social and behavioral sciences though
cated phenomena. This is to say that it does not constitute a rejection of
the present state of findings is not science itself. Douglas (1970: 3-44)
utterly confounded. (Does the read argues that commitment to such

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

things as rigor and objectivity are methods. Most attempts at formal

not forsworn in the ethnomethodo izations are more respected for their
logical position. The position does imagery and metaphorical qualities
imply a rather strong determination than for their systematic deductive
to consider phenomena in their fullrelatedness, firmness of conceptual
integrity, in such complexity, com ization, and clarity of principles. As
pleteness, and detail that the "in formal and deductive as we get in
dexicality" of communicative acts isthe social sciences, the equations and
explored. On the theoretical level definitions, etc. are still almost al
the ethnomethologists strongly as ways adjuncts to an ordinary prose
sert that the natural science model language discourse. This is not to
of determinate or even probabilistic say that these formalizations are
theory is impossible: "no doubtbad. our They are often quite forceful
objective knowledge will always re and helpful. But the field of effect
main partially grounded in the un here is persuasiveness and not logical
explicated situations of everyday implication.
use, but this is only to recognize that
the scientific existence shares the Formal deductive strategies as they
ultimate absurdity of everyday life"now employed really constitute
are
(Douglas, 1970: 44). a form of ordinary language rhet
oric as opposed to an alternative to
Toward reconstruction
it. The decision to employ formal
Formal deductive strategies of deductive strategies is one made
within the scientists' interpretive
theory development can be seen as
quite arbitrary ones indeed. In fact, processes but should not be viewed
the claim that they have some as a mechanism for escaping it. We
special advantage in this direction as social scientists may be well advis
either in terms of clarity or economy ed to employ interpretive processes
and efficiency in presentation is more directly in their full bloom. In
fatuous. They are convenient for a word: forget deductive theory as
mats for recording findings in certain a special goal and write ever more
small to medium-sized research enter discerning explanations of social life
prises in the social sciences, but asin a ordinary prose. Regard ordinary
program for organizing a compre prose not as a stunted primitive beg
hensive fabric of knowledge they are inning but as a relatively advanced
useless. It has been pointed out that format which supports understand
the object of formalization, a com ing of the complexity which in fact
prehensive and consistent deductive exists. This interpretive form of
ly articulated account of the phenounderstanding is uncomfortable be
mena, is in principle unattainable. cause it gives us no sense of the
If so then formalization strategies as basic nature of explanation. Some
they are being currently undertaken how a formal logical format gives us
must be justified on other grounds a bedrock feeling of the basic nature
than in terms of movement toward of explanation, but it should be clear
this goal. In fact, they can be justithat this feeling is a cultural artifact
fied as adjuncts to (rather than as and not a matter of reality. Inter
replacements for) casual abstraction pretive understanding in principle is

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL. OF SOCIOLOGY OF TFIE FAMILY

as good as any other; it is better if in Hans Peter Dreitzel (ed.), Recent

Sociology, No. 2: Patterns of Com
it can be more comprehensive.
municative Behavior. New York:
Macmillan.
References Crosson, Frederick J., and Kenneth M. Sayre.
1967 Philosophy and Cybernetics. New York:
Berger, Joseph, Morris Zeldith, and Bo Anderson.
Clarion Books, Simon and Schuster.
1966 Sociological Theories in Progress, Vol. I.
Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
Douglas, Jack D. (ed.).
Blanche, Robert. 1970 Understanding Everyday Life. Chicago:
Aldine.
1962 Axiomatics Period London: Routledge &
Ferdinand, Theodore N.
Kegan Paul Ltd.
Blumer, Herbert. 1969 "On the impossibility of a complete
1966 "Sociological implications of the thought
general theory of behavior." American
Sociologist 4 (November): 330-332.
of George Herbert Mead." American
1971 "A response to Bradley and Reynolds."
Journal of Sociology 71 (March): 535
544. American Sociologist 6 (May): 180-182.
1973 "A reply to Professor Gray "
Bradley, Gerald P., and Robert R. Reynolds, Jr.
American Sociologist 8 (February):
1970 "Reply to T. N. Ferdinand " American
45-47.
Sociologist 5 (November): 345-347.
Brodbeck, May. Garfinkel, Harold.
1963 "Logic and Scientific Method in Research 1972 "Remarks on Ethnomethodology." Pp.
on Teaching." Pp. 44-93 in N. L Gage 301-324 in Gumperz and Hymes (eds.),
(ed.), Handbook of Research on Teach Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethno
ing. Chicago: Rand McNally. graphy of Communication. New York:
Bronowski, J. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
1966 "The logic of the mind." AmericanGarfinkel, Harold, and Harvey Scaks.
Scientist 54 (Spring): 1-14. 1970 "On Formal Structures of Practical
Buckley, Walter. Actions" Pp. 332-366 in McKinney
1967 Sociology and Modern Systems Theory. and Tiryakian (eds.), Theoretical Socio
Englewood Cliffs, N. J : Prentice-Hall. logy. New York: Appleton Century
Burr, Wesley. Crofts.

1973 Theory Construction and the SociologyGibb, Jack.

of the Family. New York: Wiley Inter 1972 Sociological Theory Construction. Hins
science. dale, 111.: Dryden Press.
Cappella, J. N. Gray, Don.
1972 "Style and the functional prerequisites 1972 "On the logical possibility of a quasi
of intentional communication systems." general theory of behavior." American
Journal of Philosophy and Rhetoric 15: Sociologist 7 (May): 6-7.
231-247. Gumperz, John J., and Dell Hymes (eds.)
Chomsky, Noam. 1972 Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethno
1965 Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cam graphy of Communication. New York:
bridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
1968 Language and Mind. Cambridge, Mass.:Hage, Jerald.
M.I.T. Press.
1972 Techniques and Problems of Theory
Cicourel, Aaron V. Construction in Sociology. New York:
1967 "Fertility, family planning, and the John Wiley & Son.
social organization of family life: some
Homans, George Casper.
methodological issues." Journal of Social
1964 "Contemporary Theory in Sociology."
Issues XXIII (October): 57-81. Pp. 951-977 in R.E.L. Faris (ed.), Hand
1970a "The Acquisition of Social Structure: book of Modern Sociology. Chicago:
Toward a Developmental Sociology of Rand McNally
Language and Meaning." Pp. 136-168 Lucas, J. R.
in Jack Douglas (ed.), Understanding 1964 "Minds, Machines, and Godel." Pp.
Everyday Life. Chicago. Aldine. 43-59 in Alan Ross Anderson (ed.),
1970b "Basic and Normative Rules in the Nego Minds and Machines. Englewood Cliffs,
tiation of Status and Role." Pp. 4-45 N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Lyons, John. Toulmin, Stephen.

1970 Noam Chomsky. New York: Viking Press. 19G9 "Concepts and the Explanation of Human
MacKay, Donald M. Behavior." Pp. 71-104 in T. Mischel
1969 Information, Mechanism and Meaning. (ed.), Human Action. New York.
Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. Wilson, Thomas P.
Massey, J. L.
1970 "Normative and Interpretive Paradigms
1967 "Information, Machines, and Men."
in Sociology." Pp. 57-79 in Jack Douglas
Pp. 37-69 in Crosson and Sayre (eds.),
(ed.), Understanding Everyday Life.
Philosophy and Cybernetics. New York:
Chicago: Aldine.
Clarion Books, Simon and Schuster.
Nagel, Ernest, and J. R. Newman. Zetterberg, Hans L.
1958 Godel's Proof. New York: New York 1963 On Theory and Verification in Sociology
UniversityPress. Totowa, N-J.: Bedminster Press.

This content downloaded from 213.149.51.113 on Sat, 19 Jan 2019 07:06:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms