LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES
Subject to
Sabio v. Gordon
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced
Senate Res. No. 455 “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by
their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006,
Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG
inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting
jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio
declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time,
he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure
PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad
Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened
Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained
more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to
such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it
categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover
officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the
doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the
power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”.
reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in
policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide
the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively
their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can
participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government
policies and their effective implementation.
Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail
Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to
conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the
alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued
invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak
before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and
some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to
pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga
likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the
said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already
made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect
immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of
executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are
covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent
or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the
PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security
officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered
by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined
by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress
without first securing the president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the
Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO
464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel
from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was
assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of
Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the
validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section
21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power
of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and
exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with
process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which
the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not
infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The
Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is
precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry.
The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential
not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid
of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section
21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which
anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be
held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between
inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance
was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely
related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to
the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the
power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the
principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it
cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply
with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official
may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the
power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of
the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch
of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The
requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited
as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For
under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department
heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such
inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by
the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads
are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such
information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as
Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping
with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request
their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress
requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault .
NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest
invalid.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No.
151, revoking Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No.
108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by
the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among
others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation.
NOTA BENE:
Please remember this, this is case of Arnault used in the cases.
Jean Arnault v. Nazareno
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the
Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates
sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined by the
special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a
lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of
the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the
identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a
resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and
imprisoned “until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the
Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well
as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.” Arnault
petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer
its questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying
out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein
established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the
Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing
said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the
witness’ right to due process of law.
Gudani v. Senga
Facts: Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP,
including Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing
before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security to shed
light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed
by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not
testify before said Committee. On the very day of the hearing, President
Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining
officials of the executive department including the military establishment
from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. However,
the two testified before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an
order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the
Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. The
following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military service.
After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged
with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior
officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared
unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen.
Senga and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their
behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against them,
as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate.
Issue:
1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from
testifying before a legislative inquiry?
2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend
legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise?
3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his
retirement last 4 October 2005?
Held:
1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her
power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military
officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. Our
ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers
to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based
foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the
prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds
significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget
appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on
the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief
and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again,
the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate
that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed
forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn
between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will
without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President.
After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the
military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The
Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for
Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief,
it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with
Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come
to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the
presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior
consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or
actualize.
We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a
modality by which members of the military may be compelled to attend
legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality
which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-
in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.
The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of
government to the legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that
persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is
considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches,
informed by due deference and respect as to their various constitutional
functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only
as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular
mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of
government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative
or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due
to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is
balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution
to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government.
3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be
considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when
military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the
termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the
officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has
fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of
and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he
compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005. (Gudani vs. Senga, GR No.
170165, August 15, 2006)
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability
In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount
of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to
be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various
resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia
issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers
were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue
Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11
hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe
him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He
further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However,
when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused
to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed
up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to
attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring
that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that
the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC
cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be
answered falls under executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the
President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet.
And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify
the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Alternative answer:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to
follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence,
including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are
invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept
has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the
subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the
Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a
close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is
that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege
that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of
executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between
the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy
decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with
the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to
a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a
close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President
Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling
need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s
claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We
might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear
before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during
the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11)
hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those
covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to
limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION
Belgica v. Executive Secretary
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since
about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum,
discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several
legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority
Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel
is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following
manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to –
P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads,
buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship
grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for
hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby
certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into
their department provided that the request for realignment is approved
or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the
GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been
around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived
from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy,
exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system
had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s
(non-government organizations) which would make it appear that
government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact
going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the
Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes
of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed
various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is
unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of
funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements
the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the
executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system,
what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the
legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds
should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted
– a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older
case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called
as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar
as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the
executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The
Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as
the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being,
legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate
further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall
involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other
national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of
the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to
identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation
of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses
comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members.
Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the
president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be
inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the
fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the
project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how
can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress
cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local
affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can
develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But
with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of
representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either
bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own.
This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman
is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government –
and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on
local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork
barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on
the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel
is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of
the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the
earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation
from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the
Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others,
collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special
fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy
resource development and for other purposes which the President may
direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of
PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential
Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article
VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not
have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation
as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
Araullo v. Aquino III
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed
the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the
economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch”
Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government
projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving
projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain
government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive
agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive.
Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive
and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP
program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in
fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as
noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the
General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby
appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé
claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the
President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then
Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was
taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does
not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-
Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA
(Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro
National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M
for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various
petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP.
Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which
provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly
the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI
of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49
of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures
and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law”
(Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as
impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution.
DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As
such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1),
Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn
from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have
been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA,
were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of
funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or
to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is
actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable
national government budget deficit (which did not happen).
Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s
involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is
true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of
funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within
their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations
may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the
Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate
realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP,
even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are
non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were
appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may
be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they
were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being
declared by the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA,
savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the
funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or
finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no
basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at
the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being
withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being
declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money
source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if
there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the
revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no
such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects
of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy.
It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all
actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP
effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be
asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the
validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be
applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is
so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative)
that they have not acted in good faith.
THE POWER OF TAXATION
Tan v. Del Rosario
Facts:
1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified
Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions
of the NIRC, as well as the Rules and Regulations promulgated by public
respondents pursuant to said law.
2. Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly
violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
-Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
- Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
- Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
3. Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-
making authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships.
Petitioner contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is
deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation
Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice
of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the
title actually reads,
'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-
Employed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession,
Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as
amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due process.
5. The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public
respondents.
6. The Court has given due course to both petitions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for violating due
process
NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a
clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the
exercise of the tax power. No such transgression is so evident in herein
case.
1. Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely
requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to
be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not
violate classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor
are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to
achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal,
to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies
equally well to all those belonging to the same class.
2. What is apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to
increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach
in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and
large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations. The Court
does not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not public respondents exceeded their authority in
promulgating the RR
No. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the
amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant
variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their
respective professions individually and of those who do it through a
general professional partnership.
Planters Products v. Fertiphil
Lessons Applicable: Bet. private and public suit, easier to file public suit,
Apply real party in interest test for private suit and direct injury test for
public suit, Validity test varies depending on which inherent power
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI
No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital
recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers
which resulted in having Fertiphil paying P 10/bag sold to the Fertilizer
and Perticide Authority (FPA).
FPA remits its collection to Far East Bank and Trust Company who applies
to the payment of corporate debts of Planters Products Inc. (PPI)
After the Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the
P10 levy. Upon return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded a refund but PPI
refused. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against
FPA and PPI with the RTC on the ground that LOI No. 1465 is unjust,
unreaonable oppressive, invalid and unlawful resulting to denial of due
process of law.
FPA answered that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the state in
ensuring the stability of the fertilizing industry in the country and that
Fertiphil did NOT sustain damages since the burden imposed fell on the
ultimate consumers.
RTC and CA favored Fertiphil holding that it is an exercise of the power of
taxation ad is as such because it is NOT for public purpose as PPI is a
private corporation.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Fertiphil has locus standi
2. W/N LOI No. 1465 is an invalid exercise of the power of taxation rather
the police power
Held:
1. Yes. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real party in
interest" or party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit. In public suits, there is the right of the ordinary citizen to
petition the courts to be freed from unlawful government intrusion and
illegal official action subject to the direct injury test or where there must
be personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result. Being a mere procedural
technicality, it has also been held that locus standi may be waived in the
public interest such as cases of transcendental importance or with far-
reaching implications whether private or public suit, Fertiphil has locus
standi.
2. As a seller, it bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy which made
its products more expensive and harm its business. It is also of
paramount public importance since it involves the constitutionality of a
tax law and use of taxes for public purpose.
3. Yes. Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the
state but distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power is the
power of the state to enact the legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty on property in order to promote general welfare. While,
the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes as to be used for public
purpose. The main purpose of police power is the regulation of a
behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The lawful
subjects and lawful means tests are used to determine the validity of a
law enacted under the police power. The power of taxation, on the other
hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.
In this case, it is for purpose of revenue. But it is a robbery for the State
to tax the citizen and use the funds generation for a private purpose.
Public purpose does NOT only pertain to those purpose which are
traditionally viewed as essentially governmental function such as building
roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes
designed to promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used
for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or
agrarian reform.
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
QUALIFICATIONS, ELECTION AND TERM
Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos
Facts:
The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in
the May 1992 election. In her Motion on the 16th day of August in the
year 1995, reiterated in her comment of the 29th of August of the same
year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the
remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision
process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.
The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the
protestant and protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot
and academic by her election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and
her assumption of office as such on the 30th of June in the year 1995.
Held:
YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been
abandoned or considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election
and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and
functions thereof.
The protestant abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the
public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the
electorate.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it
would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992
presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political
stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.
PEREQUISITES AND INHIBITION
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
On July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No.
284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The
Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by
CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7
of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution,
namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is
an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1),
Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks
to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or
employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the
Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of
Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate
and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials
should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override
the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7,
par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional.
Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their
primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of
Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Senate v. Ermita
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President
has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the
Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for
Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for
being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines,
through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or
investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance
of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and
offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election
fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in
the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the
President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public
officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated
in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered
by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised
on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be
kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by
definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in
this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to
outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive
branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch
withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to
evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly
asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the
mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY ISSUE(S):

Estrada v. Desierto 1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.

FACTS: 2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.

It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving 3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made
against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, 5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more publicity.
serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and
were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to RULING:
the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution,
Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local
elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. EDSA I EDSA II
On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying exercise of people power of freedom
that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her of speech and freedom of assemblyto
oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. exercise of the people power of petition the government for redress of
Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, revolution which overthrew the whole grievances which only affected the
filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the government. office of the President.
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in extra constitutional and the legitimacy intra constitutional and the
of the new government that resulted resignation of the sitting President that
cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed
from it cannot be the subject of judicial it caused and the succession of the
for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent review Vice President as President are subject
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to to judicial review.
discharge the duties of his office. presented a political question; involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues
for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in
the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the
allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues
likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit.
They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against
prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of
relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the
Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence— bearing material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed
to have resigned— constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be
doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press
release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due
to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency
as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may
come in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or
omission before, during and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its
support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83
declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been
terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo
as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly
rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in
nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine,
even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a
co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the
imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President
to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity
from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts
of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system,
the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be
easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did
not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has
influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally,
the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing
preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no
permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more
concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
THE APPOINTING POWER AND REMOVAL POWER
Banda v. Ermita
FACTS:
The present controversy arose from a Petition forCertiorari and
prohibition challenging the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378
dated October 25, 2004, issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(President Arroyo). Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed
on their own behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at the
National Printing Office (NPO).
The NPO was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term of former
President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino), by virtue of Executive
Order No. 285which provided, among others, the creation of the NPO
from the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant
printing units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA). Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 285 reads:
SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. There is hereby
created a National Printing Office out of the merger of the Government
Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the Philippine
Information Agency. The Office shall have exclusive printing jurisdiction
over the following:
a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and accountable forms
of national, provincial, city and municipal governments, including
government corporations;
b. Printing of officials ballots;
c. Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette, General
Appropriations Act, Philippine Reports, and development information
materials of the Philippine Information Agency.
The Office may also accept other government printing jobs, including
government publications, aside from those enumerated above, but not in
an exclusive basis.
The details of the organization, powers, functions, authorities, and related
management aspects of the Office shall be provided in the implementing
details which shall be prepared and promulgated in accordance with
Section II of this Executive Order.
The Office shall be attached to the Philippine Information Agency.
On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued the herein assailed
Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285
by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the
printing services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and
instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from the
private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that
the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and
lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order
No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation in the General Appropriations Act
to its income.
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure
as employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality,
contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo
to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President
Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive
Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the
way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.
ISSUE: Whether the E.O no. 378 is Constitutional.
HELD: Yes. It is constitutional
POLITICAL LAW: reorganization
In the present case, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices,
the assailed action is a mere reorganization under the general provisions
of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of
simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the authority of
the President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of the
appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could
only but accept.
In the more recent case of Tondo Medical Center Employees Association
v. Court of Appeals 527 SCRA 746which involved a structural and
functional reorganization of the Department of Health under an executive
order, we reiterated the principle that the power of the President to
reorganize agencies under the executive department by executive or
administrative order is constitutionally and statutorily recognized. We
held in that case:
This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may,
by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of
government entities under the Executive Department. This is also
sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: "[T]he
president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices." Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also
known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office -
The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President.:
The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists
of the Office of the President Proper and the agencies under it. The
agencies under the Office of the President are identified in Section 23,
Chapter 8, Title II of the Administrative Code:
Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.The agencies
under the Office of the President refer to those offices placed under the
chairmanship of the President, those under the supervision and control of
the President, those under the administrative supervision of the Office of
the President, those attached to it for policy and program coordination,
and those that are not placed by law or order creating them under any
specific department.
The power of the President to reorganize the executive department is
likewise recognized in general appropriations laws.
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of
the President to issue. The President did not usurp any legislative
prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the
Presidents constitutional power of control over the executive department,
supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by
other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature
necessarily ordains an executive agencys position in the scheme of
administrative structure. Such determination is primary, but subject to the
Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the power of control may justify the President
to deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law may expressly
grant the President the broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures. The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law.
The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is an
exercise of a delegated legislative power granted by the aforementioned
Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code of
1987, which provides for the continuing authority of the President to
reorganize the Office of the President, "in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency." This is a matter already well-entrenched in
jurisprudence. The reorganization of such an office through executive or
administrative order is also recognized in the Administrative Code of
1987.
The Petition is denied.
In Re Appointment of Hon M. Valenzuela
Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the
President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City,
respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be
expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said
constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any
appointments two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments
imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is
nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1)
and 9 of Art. VIII
Held: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term” the President is neither required to make appointments
to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII
simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts
within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of
Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6
years.
The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made
during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the
prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the
judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this
case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments
during the period of the ban.
THE CONTROL POWER
Drilon v. Lim
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of
Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer,
declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue
Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in
the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions
contrary to law and public policy. In a petition for certiorari filed by the
City of Manila, the RTC declared Section 187 of the Local Government
Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice
of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy
of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific
provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the
power of supervision over local governments. In this case, Judge Rodolfo
C. Palattao declared Section 187 unconstitutional insofar as it empowered
the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances. He cited the familiar
distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the power of
an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior
officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in
accordance with law.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is
constitutional and whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise
control, rather than supervision, over the local government
HELD:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to
revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies
or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his
own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the
measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he
did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. What
he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said
measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions
in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code. As the court sees it, that
was an act not of control but of mere supervision. Secretary Drilon set
aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion
therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the
legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.
As regards the issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in
the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court has carefully
examined every one of the exhibits and agree with the trial court that the
procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the
public hearings were sent to interested parties. The minutes of the
hearings are found in the exhibits and such show that the proposed
ordinances were published.
THE “TAKE CARE” CLAUSE POWER
Biraogo v. PTC
FACT:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was
signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under
the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-
judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render
awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and
asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena
powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It
cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the
filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.
It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to
create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority
of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to
create an entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth
Commission and vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding
those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal
protection clause. The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc
Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally
granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents
belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive
officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not
affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the
same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the
latter in conducting the inquiry.
THE MILITARY POWER
Kulayan v. Gov. Abdusakur Tan
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to
the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief
executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of
Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.
Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly
inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they
were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be
members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later
renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was then
formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The Committee convened
under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial
Governor of Sulu.
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state
of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the
kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a
terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also
invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160),
which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out
emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and
calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation,
Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up
checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures
including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.
Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was
issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to
exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive
of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a
President
HELD:
It has already been established that there is one repository of executive
powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when
Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the
President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers
as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as
what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII
thereof.
While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution
mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military,
making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net
effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that
a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the
armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must
be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief,
he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military
strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual
command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power
is his. Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power
to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed
proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a
state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his
own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated
under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by
another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and
may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local
Government Code.
Gonzales v. Abaya
FACTS: In relation to the celebrated Oakwood mutiny where a total of 321
soldiers including petitioners herein declared their withdrawal of support
to the Commander-in-chief, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declared a
state of rebellion and ordered the arrest of the said soldiers. In order to
avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to
dialogue with the soldiers. After several hours of negotiation, the
government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms
and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood
Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their barracks. The National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended
that the military personnel involved be charged with coup d'etat defined
and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them.
Meanwhile, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent
General Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and
detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed
the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation. On August 5, 2003, the
DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information
for coup d'etat against those soldiers, Subsequently, this case was
consolidated involving the other accused, pending before Branch 148 of
the RTC, Makati City. On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to
conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-2784. On the same
date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-
Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with
the military tribunal charges for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408,
4 (otherwise known as "The Articles of War"), as amended, against the
same military personnel. Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No.
03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed with the RTC, Branch
148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume
jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They
invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055. Subsequently, the Pre-Trial
Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report to the
JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those
charged with coup d'etat before the RTC should not be charged before the
military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order stating that
"all charges before the court martial against the accused . . . are hereby
declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance
of the alleged crime of coup d'etat." The trial court then proceeded to
hear petitioners' applications for bail. Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his
capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the Pre-
Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved
in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a
general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War. The same was approved
by the AFP. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to
submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with
this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be
ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the
Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. Petitioners maintain
that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11,
2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is
not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d'etat, the
military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those
who have been criminally charged of coup d’état before the
regular courts.
2. Whether the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable.
HELD:
1. Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is
expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It
bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the
alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly
caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the
charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military
officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the
offense is the penalty prescribed for the same — dismissal from the
service — imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely
disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military
profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military
discipline. Hence, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can
no longer be charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of
the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its
Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence,
triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically
amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the
jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law
has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution
or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer
over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is
only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that
such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is
merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be. Evidently,
such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
2. No. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by
holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup
d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes' is peculiar to criminal
law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike
here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies
only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of
R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected
offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of
absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior
officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command
and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood
Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP
and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding
the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief.
These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the
Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took
place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the
same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders
were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the
State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS
AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners
contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no
factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon.
Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is
a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18,
Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress
within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they
contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an
exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such
power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-
Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there
was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that
the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of
rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to
bring suit?
Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not
expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to
its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power
to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power
was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of
proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual
basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there
was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that
military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue
of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment
since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested
on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be
subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid
warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
"such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep.
Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing
to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
David v. Arroyo
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a
state of emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic
of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me
by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that:
“The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,― and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as
any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take
over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017,
directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the
necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the
emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the
constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it
violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech
and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest”
and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP
1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP
1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the
Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in
determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners
did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important
provisions, thus:
First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18,
Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress
all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution
do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision
of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
“whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed
forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.”
(Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration
allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code.
Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal
significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more
than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo
did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision
calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the
State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility
and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the
exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be
deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an
exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to
assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article
VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.”
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law
nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President
Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare
“a state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To
the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no
legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second,
manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is
evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate
such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power
not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it
may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress
to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions,
thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress
may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the
emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected
with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers
generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the
“the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it
refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President
may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may
delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms
thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by
President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such
Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to
take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have
ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point
out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be
taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise
all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of
an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which
the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is
“necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism”
have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such
portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
Lagman v. Executive Secretary
FACTS: Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days,
President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole
of Mindanao.
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on
the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for
decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence
which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government
operation to capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf IP (ASG)
and the Maute Group was conducted. These groups, which have been
unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the government
operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not only
against the government authorities and its facilities but likewise against
civilians and their properties. In particular, the President chronicled in his
Report the events which took place on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City which
impelled him to declare a state of martial law and suspend the privilege of
writ of habeas corpus
The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the
crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a
whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic
repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless
groups.
President Duterte concluded, "While the government is presently
conducting legitimate operations to address the on-going rebellion, if not
the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the continued
implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the
rebellion is completely quelled."
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued
P.S. Resolution No. 390 expressing full support to the martial law
proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory,
constitutional and in accordance with the law". In the same Resolution,
the Senate declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the
same".
The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group
petitioned (Petitions) the Supreme Court, questioning the factual basis of
President Duterte's Proclamation of martial law. The OSG sided with
President Duterte.
ISSUES:
[1] Are the Petitions the proper proceeding to invoke the SC's power of
review over proclamations of martial law?
[2] Is the President required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in
his appreciation of facts?
[3] Is the President required to obtain the favorable recommendation
thereon bf the Secretary of National Defense?
[4] Is the President is required to take into account only the situation at
the time ff the proclamation, even if subsequent events prove the situati
n to have not been accurately reported?
[5] Is the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of tlie factual basis
[of] the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actiorls that have
been taken by Congress jointly or separately
[6] Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habea~ corpus; · a. What are the parameters for review? b. Who has
the burden of proof? I !I c. What is the threshold of evidence?
[7] Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Couj
involves the calibration of graduated powers granted the President ~~
Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers, suspension of th~
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law
[8] Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of23 May 2017 may be
considered, vague and thus null and void: a. with its inclusion of "other
rebel groups;" or b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual
operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region;
[9] Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No.
216 and in the Report of the President to Congress are sufficient [bases]:
a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or b. for a declaration of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
entire Mindanao 1 region;
[10] Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are
equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements of public safety
sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; and
[11] Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of23 May 2017 will:
a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or b. also
nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell
lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.
HELD:
[0] The Constitution only requires that questions regarding the validity
and factual basis of a proclamation of martial law or a suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus be raised by any citizen, considering
the transcendental importance of such questions.
[1] Yes, the Petitions invoke the proper proceedings as contemplated by
the Constitution. "The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from filing."
Jurisdiction is conferred by law. The Constitution confers the Supreme
Court the power to review martial law proclamations.
A petition for certiorari is not the proper petition. The power of the
Supreme Court to review the factual basis of martial law proclamations is
not limited by Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution. It's a
completely different proceeding not limited by lack of or abuses of
discretion.
The factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but
precisely within the ambit of judicial review.
In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a
citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these
cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to
be resolved by the Court.
[2] The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution is independent of the actions taken by Congress. The framers
of the 1987 Constitution intended the judicial power to review to be
exercised independently from the congressional power to revoke.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of
sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by
the President. Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to
revoke by Congress are not only totally different but likewise independent
from each other although, concededly, they have the same trajectory,
which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to
say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently
from the power of revocation of Congress.
[3] The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the President's
decision of which among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given
situation.
These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the
President as Commander-in-Chief; it therefore necessarily follows that the
power and prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a
mere exercise of the calling out power; or whether the situation demands
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it
calls for the declaration of martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the
President. The power to choose, initially, which among these
extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions, is a judgment
call on the part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are
broad enough to include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats
that endanger the government, and the very integrity of the State.
It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend
to calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary
power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be
tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive
and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies
with the President.
[4] There is no vagueness because the whereas clauses of the
Proclamation explain the meaning of "other rebel groups." Also, the
vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law,
First Amendment cases. Vagueness doctrine applies only in free speech
cases.
Moreover, lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make
Proclamation No. 216 vague. Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the
Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or
operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders
issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any
act committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and
the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should be
resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court
wades into these areas, it would be deemed as trespassing into the
sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its
power to revoke.
[5] The calling out power is in a different category from the power to
declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect
Proclamation No. 55. The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way,
affect the President's declaration of a state of national emergency on
account of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55
dated September 4, 2016, where he called upon the Armed Forces and
the Philippine National Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to
suppress any and all forms of lawless violence in the Mindanao region,
and to prevent such lawless violence from spreading and escalating
elsewhere in the Philippines.
In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the
Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it
may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as
in this case.
[6] After all, the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy,
of the information at hand during the declaration or suspension;
subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the Court's review
is concerned. In any event, safeguards under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution are in place to cover such a situation, e.g., the martial law
period is good only for 60 days; Congress may choose to revoke it even
immediately after the proclamation is made; and, this Court may
investigate the factual background of the declaration.
Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in
this case. Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the
proclamation and the written report are not enough reasons for the Court
to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as there are other
facts in the proclamation and the written Report that support the
conclusion that there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public
safety requires the declaration and/or suspension. In sum, the Court's
power to review is limited to the determination of whether the President
in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would be limited to
an examination on whether the President acted within the bounds set by
the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and at
the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
[7] To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of
factual basis are as follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety
requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is
probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion
or invasion.
[8] There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review
is not the determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which
the President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the
factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that
rebellion exists. It must also be reiterated that martial law is a matter of
urgency and much leeway and flexibility should be accorded the President
As such, he is not expected to completely validate all the information he
has received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.
Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces
and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is arsenal of
other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actua1
rebellion exists, and public safety requires the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. To be
precise, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are only five out of
the seven statements bulleted in the President's Report. Notably, in the
interpellation by Justice Francis H. Jardeleza during the second day of the
oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that he was not aware or that
he had no personal knowledge of the other incidents cited.241 As it thus
stands, there is no question or challenge with respect to the reliability of
the other incidents, which by themselves are ample to preclude the
conclusion that the President's report is unreliable and that Proclamation
No. 216 was without sufficient factual basis. Verily, there is no credence
to petitioners' claim that the bases for the President's imposition of
martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were mostly
inaccurate, simulated, false and/or hyperbolic.
[9] Public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao.
Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but
definitely not the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. For a declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there
must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public
safety requirement. In his Report, the President noted that the acts of
violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not
only against government forces or establishments but likewise against
civilians and their properties.242 In addition and in relation to the armed
hostilities, bomb threats were issued;243 road blockades and checkpoints
were set up; 244 schools and churches were burned;245 civilian hostages
were taken and killed;246 non-Muslims or Christians were targeted;247
young male Muslims were forced to join their group; 248 medical services
and delivery of basic services were hampered;249 reinforcements of
government troops and civilian movement were hindered;250 and the
security of the entire Mindanao Island was compromised.
Indeed, martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ ff
habeas corpus are necessary for the protection of the security of the
natil.; suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
"precautiona , and although it might [curtail] certain rights of individuals,
[it] is for t e purpose of defending and protecting the security of the state
or the entire country and our sovereign people".253 Commissioner Ople
referred to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as
a "form of immobilization" or "as a means of immobilizing potential
internal enemies" "especially in areas like Mindanao."
To be sure, the facts mentioned in the Proclamation and the Report are
far from being exhaustive or all-encompassing. At this juncture, it may not
be amiss to state that as Commander-in-Chief, the President has
possession of documents and information classified as "confidential", the
contents of which cannot be included in the Proclamation or Report for
reasons of national security. These documents may contain information
detailing the position of government troops and rebels, stock of firearms
or ammunitions, ground commands and operations, names of suspects
and sympathizers, etc. , In fact, during the closed door session held by the
Court, some information came to light, although not mentioned in the
Proclamation or Report. But then again, the discretion whether to include
the same in the Proclamation or Report is the judgment call of the
President. In fact, petitioners concede to this. During the oral argument,
petitioner Lagman admitted that "the assertion of facts [in the
Proclamation and Report] is the call of the Preside
It is beyond cavil that the President can rely on intelligence repo1s and
classified documents. "It is for the President as [C]ommander-in- [C]hief of
the Armed Forces to appraise these [classified evidence qr
documents/]reports and be satisfied that the public safety demands thb
suspension of the writ."256 Significantly, respect to these so-called
classifietl documents is accorded even "when [the] authors of or
witnesses to thes~ 257 I documents may not be revealed."
The Court has no machinery or tool equal to that of the Commander-in-
Chief to ably and properly assess the ground conditions.
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion
or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x
suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to the
President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He
may put the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law.
This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive
Department, particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the
repository of vital, classified, and live information necessary for and
relevant in calibrating the territorial application of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It, too, is a
concession that the President has the tactical and military support, and
thus has a more informed understanding of what is happening on the
ground. Thus, the Constitution imposed a limitation on the period of
application, which is 60 days, unless sooner nullified, revoked or
extended, but not on the territorial scope or area of coverage; it merely
stated "the Philippines or any part thereof," depending on the assessment
of the President.
The Constitution has provided sufficient safeguards against possible
abuses of Commander-inChief's powers; further curtailment of
Presidential powers should not only be discouraged but also avoided.
The Court can only act within the confines of its power. For the Court to
overreach is to infringe upon another's territory. Clearly, the power to
determine the scope of territorial application belongs to the President.
"The Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without violating the
principle of separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the
foundation of our republican system."281
To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical
machinery to determine the strategical value of other places in the
military's efforts to quell the rebellion and restore peace. It would be
engaging in an act of adventurism if it dares to embark on a mission of
deciphering the territorial metes and bounds of martial law. To be blunt
about it, hours after the proclamation of martial law none of the members
of this Court could have divined that more than ten thousand souls would
be forced to evacuate to Iligan and Cagayan de Oro and that the military
would have to secure those places also; none of us could have predicted
that Cayamora Maute would be arrested in Davao City or that his wife
Ominta ' Romato Maute would be apprehended in Masiu, Lanao del Sur;
and, none of us had an inkling that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom
Fighters (BIFF) would launch an attack in Cotabato City.
TERRORISM v. REBELLION
It is also of judicial notice that the insurgency in Mindanao has be' n
ongoing for decades. While some groups have sought legal and peace 1
means, others have resorted to violent extremism and terrorism. Rebelli n
may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which has a broader sco e
covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one f
the various means by which terrorism can be committed.299 However,
while the scope of terrorism may be comprehensive, its purpose is distinct
and well-defined. The objective of a "'terrorist" is to sow and create a
condition of widespread fear among the populace in order to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand. This condition of
widespread fear is traditionally achieved through bombing, kidnapping,
mass killing, and beheading, among others. In contrast, the purpose of
rebellion, as previously discussed, is political, i.e., (a) to remove from the
allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the
Philippines or any part thereof; (ii) any body of land, naval, or armed
forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main
objective of the malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of
severing the allegiance of Mindanao to the Philippine Government to
establish a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If, on the other hand,
the primary objective is to sow and create a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand, the crime is terrorism.
Here, we have already explained and ruled that the President did not err
in believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated
under the crime of rebellion.
In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be
characterized as terrorism, the same will not in any manner affect
Proclamation No. 216. Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise
known as the Human Security Act of 2007 expressly provides that
"[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or
diminution of constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch
of the government." Thus, as long as the President complies with all the
requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of terrorism cannot
prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming
martial ' law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
After all, the ~ ~I extraordinary powers of the President are bestowed on
him by the Constitution. No act of Congress can, therefore, curtail or
diminish such powers.
Besides, there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372 which states
that rebellion and terrorism are mutuality exclusive of each other ?r that
they cannot co-exist together. RA 93 72 does not expressly or impliedly
repeal Art. 134 of the RPC. And while rebellion is one of the predicate
crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other as they have different
elements.
IBP v. Zamora
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief
of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP
questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines
to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling
the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate
the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of
the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.
The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage
the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the
necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to
these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that
military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the
deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious
incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of
Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
Lacson v. Perez
Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion
(Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1
ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR.
Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the
“rebellion” were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition,
injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the
issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners
furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information
against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this
instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly
faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being
that hold departure orders were issued against them.
Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the
warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the
same.
Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on
May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and
academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and
the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from
the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to
warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the
rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are
not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and
prohibition is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly
arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person
must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer
responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the
detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be
charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the
validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing
any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold
departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper
proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer for relief
regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being
that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime,
furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is
to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their
undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents,
representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined
from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all
acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege
of Malacañang.
THE BUDGETARY POWER
Gonzales v. Narvaza
Facts: Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer,
assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission
on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants.
The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study
and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the
Constitution, and the manner of implementing them.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case
Held: In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his
interest as a citizen and taxpayer.
A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a favorable action.
Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining
any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR and of the
positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Neither does
he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being
violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a
result of the issues raised.
In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to
raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus,
payer’s action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the creation of PCCR, it is
apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of EO 43 as
amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by
the President, not by Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were taken
from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the
Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI
of the Constitution. As to the creation of the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the
necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a
taxpayer’s interest in this particular issue.
OTHER POWERS
Marcos v. Manglapus
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in
Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to
request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to
them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their
return to the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution,
the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.
RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase,
however, does not define what is meant by executive power although the
same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such
as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making power
(Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22),
informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be
said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
THE VICE PRESIDENT
Borja v. COMELEC
Facts:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18,
1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he
became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent,
Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two
more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998
elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for
mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco would
have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998;
hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second
Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en
banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor.
Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by
operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to
have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
Held:
No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in
the next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the
first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law.
Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the
service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-
mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more
a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should
not be counted in the application of any term limit.
The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only
to prevent the establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the
freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical
background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of
the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving
the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters
of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned
were serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the
first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection
would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of
the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. (Borja vs Comelec,
G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998)