G.R. No.
109373 March 20, 1995 In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG, and
its officers and members, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAÑAGAS II, as Liquidator of
Pacific Banking Corporation, respondents.
G.R. No. 112991 March 20, 1995
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as Liquidator
of the Pacific Banking Corporation , petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, DEPUTY SHERIFF
RAMON ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG JOO, ANG KEONG LAN and E.J ANG INT'L. LTD.,
represented by their Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
These cases have been consolidated because the principal question involved is the same: whether a petition
for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, is a special
proceeding or an ordinary civil action. The Fifth and the Fourteenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals
reached opposite results on this question and consequently applied different periods for appealing.
The facts are as follows:
I.
Proceedings in the CB and the RTC
On July 5, 1985, the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership by the Central
Bank of the Philippines pursuant to Resolution No. 699 of its Monetary Board. A few months later, it was
placed under liquidation1 and a Liquidator was appointed.2
On April 7, 1986, the Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 31, a petition
entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking Corporation." 3 The petition was
approved, after which creditors filed their claims with the court.
4 G.R. No. 112991) in the case of the Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary
On May 17, 1991, a new Liquidator, Vitaliano N. Nañagas, President of the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC), was appointed by the Central Bank.
On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union for short), petitioner
in G.R. No. 109373, filed a complaint-in-intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay
differential, salary increase differential, Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its
members as employees of PaBC. In its order dated September 13, 1991, the trial court ordered payment of
the principal claims of the Union.5
The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On October 16, 1991, he filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the order. In his order of December 6, 1991, the judge
modified his September 13, 19916 but in effect denied the Liquidator's motion for reconsideration. This
order was received by the Liquidator on December 9, 1991. The following day, December 10, 1991, he
filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. On December 23,
1991, another Notice of Appeal was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of Nañagas.
ground that it was late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt of the decision. The judge declared his
September 13, 1991 order and subsequent orders to be final and executory and denied reconsideration. On
March 27, 1992, he granted the Union's Motion for issuance of a writ of Execution.
Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents in G.R. No. 112991, likewise filed claims for the
payment of investment in the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks amounting to
US$2,531,632.18. The shares of stocks, consisting of 154,462 common shares, constituted 11% of the total
subscribed capital stock of the PaBC. They alleged that their claim constituted foreign exchange capital
investment entitled to preference in payment under the Foreign Investments Law.
In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC directed the Liquidator to pay private
respondents the total amount of their claim as preferred creditors. 7
The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992. On September 30, 1992 he moved for
reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the court on October 2, 1992. He received the order denying
his Motion for Reconsideration on October 5, 1992. On October 14, 1992 he filed a Notice of Appeal from
the orders of September 16, 1992 and October 2, 1992. As in the case of the Union, however, the judge
ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it had been filed without authority
of the Central Bank and beyond 15 days. In his order of October 28, 1992, the judge directed the execution
of his September 11, 1992 order granting the Stockholders/ Investors' claim.
II.
Proceedings in the Court of Appeals
The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to
set aside the orders of the trial court denying his appeal from the orders granting the claims of Union and of
the Stockholders/Investors. The two Divisions of the Court of Appeals, to which the cases were separately
raffled, rendered conflicting rulings.
In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now G.R. No. 09373) the Fifth
Division8 held in the case of the Union that the proceeding before the trial court was a special proceeding
and, therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days. Since
the notice of appeal of the Liquidator was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision granting the
Union's claims, the appeal was brought on time. The Fifth Division, therefore, set aside the orders of the
lower court and directed the latter to give due course to the appeal of the Liquidator and set the Record on
Appeal he had filed for hearing.
On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division9 ruled in CA-G.R. SP No. 29351 (now
action. Therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 15 days and
that since the Liquidator's appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed from,
deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration was pending, the notice of appeal was
filed late. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division dismissed the Liquidator's petition.
III.
Present Proceedings
The Union and the Liquidator then separately filed petitions before this Court.
In G.R. No. 109373 the Union contends that:
 1. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of the suit.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the petition
for certiorari filed by Nañagas who was without any legal authority to file it.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the case is a special proceeding
governed by Rules 72 to 109 of the Revised Rules of Court.
4. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in concluding that the notice of appeal filed
by Nañagas was filed on time.
5. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in declaring that the second notice of appeal
filed on December 23, 1991 by the Solicitor General is a superfluity.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 112991 the Liquidator contends that:
1. The Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking Corporation s
a Special Proceeding case and/or one which allows multiple appeals, in which case
the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from receipt of the order/judgment
appealed from.
2. Private respondents are not creditors of PaBC but are plain stockholders whose
right to receive payment as such would accrue only after all the creditors of the
insolvent bank have been paid.
3. The claim of private respondents in the amount of US$22,531,632.18 is not in the
nature of foreign investment as it is understood in law.
4. The claim of private respondents has not been clearly established and proved.
5. The issuance of a writ of execution against the assets of PaBC was made with
grave abuse of discretion.
The petitions in these cases must be dismissed.
First. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in these cases is whether a petition for liquidation
under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, then the period of appeal is
30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on
appeal in order to perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action, the period
of appeal is 15 days from notice of the decision or final order appealed from.
BP Blg. 129 provides:
§39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or decision appealed
from: Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases the period for appeal shall be
forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire
record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively,
together with an index of the contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases
wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of
Court.
The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:
19. Period of Appeals. —
(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases
referred to in paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, order, resolution
or award appealed from.
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule
109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed, the period of appeals shall be thirty (30)
days, a record on appeal being required.
The Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held that the proceeding is an ordinary action similar to an
action for interpleader under Rule 63. 10 The Fourteenth Division stated:
The petition filed is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
where there are conflicting claimants or several claims upon the same subject matter,
a person who claims no interest thereon may file an action for interpleader to compel
the claimants to "interplead" and litigate their several claims among themselves.
(Section I Rule 63).
An interpleader is in the category of a special civil action under Rule 62 which, like
an ordinary action, may be appealed only within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or order appealed from. Under Rule 62, the preceding rules covering
ordinary civil actions which are not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the
provisions of the rule relating to such civil actions are applicable to special civil
actions. This embraces Rule 41 covering appeals from the regional trial court to the
Court of Appeals.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, under Section 1 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an action is defined as "an
ordinary suit in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong." On the
other hand, Section 2 of the same Rule states that "every other remedy including one
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact shall be by special
proceeding."
To our mind, from the aforequoted definitions of an action and a special proceeding,
the petition for assistance of the court in the liquidation of an asset of a bank is not
"one to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." Contrary to the
submission of the petitioner, the petition is not intended to establish the fact of
insolvency of the bank. The insolvency of the bank had already been previously
determined by the Central Bank in accordance with Section 9 of the CB Act before
the petition was filed. All that needs to be done is to liquidate the assets of the bank
and thus the assistance of the respondent court is sought for that purpose.
 It should be pointed out that this petition filed is not among the cases categorized as a
special proceeding under Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, nor among the
special proceedings that may be appealed under Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules.
We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth Division. Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provide:
§1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which
the party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.
§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy, including one to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by special
proceeding.
Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding, Chief Justice
Moran states:" 11
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special
proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or
a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the
former is a formal demand of a right by one against another, while the latter is but a
petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to
recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is
to seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special
proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of
guardianship.
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a
special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of
a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for
injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced
against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors
may be able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another
way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the
petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right of
creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's assets.
Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for
interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a person who
has no interest therein. 12 This is not the case in a liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as
representative of the corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the
creditors.13 He is thus charged with insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful
claimants and in the order of payment provided by law.
Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of deceased persons
under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the determination of all the
assets and the payment of all the debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The
Liquidator and the administrator or executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the
claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed. The court's
concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights and the determination of their order of payment.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for liquidation of
an insolvent corporation. As the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, quoting the Liquidator, correctly
noted:
A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a number of cases
properly classified as "claims." It is basically a two-phased proceeding. The first
phase is concerned with the approval and disapproval of claims. Upon the approval
of the petition seeking the assistance of the proper court in the liquidation of a close
entity, all money claims against the bank are required to be filed with the liquidation
court. This phase may end with the declaration by the liquidation court that the claim
is not proper or without basis. On the other hand, it may also end with the liquidation
court allowing the claim. In the latter case, the claim shall be classified whether it is
ordinary or preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order
allowing or disallowing a particular claim is final order, and may be appealed by the
party aggrieved thereby.
The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the distribution plan
prepared by the duly appointed liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in detail the
total amount available for distribution to creditors whose claim were earlier allowed.
The Order finally disposes of the issue of how much property is available for
disposal. Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the liquidation proceeding —
payment of all allowed claims in accordance with the order of legal priority and the
approved distribution plan.
Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of allowance or disallowance of
a particular claim cannot be overemphasized. It is the operative fact that constitutes a
liquidation proceeding a "case where multiple appeals are allowed by law." The
issuance of an Order which, by its nature, affects only the particular claims involved,
and which may assume finality if no appeal is made therefrom, ipso factocreates a
situation where multiple appeals are allowed.
A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single petition by the
Solicitor General with a court of competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All claims against
the insolvent are required to be filed with the liquidation court. Although the claims
are litigated in the same proceeding, the treatment is individual. Each claim is heard
separately. And the Order issued relative to a particular claim applies only to said
claim, leaving the other claims unaffected, as each claim is considered separate and
distinct from the others. Obviously, in the event that an appeal from an Order
allowing or disallowing a particular claim is made, only said claim is affected,
leaving the others to proceed with their ordinary course. In such case, the original
records of the proceeding are not elevated to the appellate court. They remain with
the liquidation court. In lieu of the original record, a record of appeal is instead
required to be prepared and transmitted to the appellate court.
Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation proceedings. Consequently, a
record on appeal is necessary in each and every appeal made. Hence, the period to
appeal therefrom should be thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required.
(Record pp. 162-164).
In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal was filed on
time, having been filed on the 23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not file a record on appeal with the result that he failed
to perfect his appeal. As already stated a record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules and
Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason for this is
that the several claims are actually separate ones and a decision or final order with respect to any claim can
be appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal must remain in the trial court where other claims
may still be pending.
Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors became final. Consequently. the Fourteenth Division's decision dismissing the
Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari,Prohibition and Mandamus must be affirmed albeit for a different
reason.

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), we find that the Fifth Division correctly
granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari. Prohibition and Mandamus. As already noted, the
Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file a record on appeal on December 10,
1991, i.e., within 30 days of his receipt of the order granting the Union's claim. Without waiting for the
resolution of his motion for extension, he filed on December 20, 1991 within the extension sought a record
on appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in disallowing the notice on appeal and denying the Liquidator's
motion for extension to file a record on appeal.

The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus and its decision should, therefore, be affirmed.

Second. In G.R. No. 109373, The Union claims that under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, the court
merely assists in adjudicating the claims of creditors, preserves the assets of the institution,
and implements the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board and that, therefore, as representative
of the Monetary Board, the Liquidator cannot question the order of the court or appeal from it. It contends
that since the Monetary Board had previously admitted PaBC's liability to the laborers by in fact setting
aside the amount of P112,234,292.44 for the payment of their claims, there was nothing else for the
Liquidator to do except to comply with the order of the court.

The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the function of the trial court is not limited
to assisting in the implementation of the orders of the Monetary Board. Under the same section (§29) of the
law invoked by the Union, the court has authority to set aside the decision of the Monetary Board "if there
is a convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith." 14 As this Court held
in Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 15

There is no question, that the action of the monetary Board in this regard may be
subject to judicial review. Thus, it has been held that the Court's may interfere with
the Central Bank's exercise of discretion in determining whether or not a distressed
bank shall be supported or liquidated. Discretion has its limits and has never been
held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith (Ramos v. Central Bank of
the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).

In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central Bank but also of the insolvent bank.
Under §§28A-29 of Rep. Act No. 265 he acts in behalf of the bank "personally or through counsel as he
may retain, in all actions or proceedings or against the corporation" and he has authority "to do whatever
may be necessary for these purposes." This authority includes the power to appeal from the decisions or
final orders of the court which he believes to be contrary to the interest of the bank.

Finally the Union contends that the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file the record on
appeal filed in behalf of the Central Bank was not filed by the office of the Solicitor General as counsel for
the Central Bank. This contention has no merit. On October 22, 1992, as Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio
O. Estoesta informed the trial court in March 27, 1992, the OSG had previously authorized lawyers of the
PDIC to prepare and sign pleadings in the case. 16 Conformably thereto the Notice of Appeal and the
Motion for Additional Time to submit Record on Appeal filed were jointly signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I.
Saludares in behalf of the OSG and by lawyers of the PDIC. 17

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No 112991, the decisions appealed from are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 122646. March 14, 1997]
ADELIA C. MENDOZA, for herself and Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late
NORBERTO B. MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. Hon. Angelito C. Teh, Presiding Judge,
Branch 87, RTC, Rosario, Batangas, Sps. Herminio & Clarita Tayag @ Sps. George T.
Tiglao & Clarizza T. Tiglao and/or @ Teofilo M. Esguera, Leonor M. Esguera. Leticia M.
Esguera, Joel M. Esguera, Ricardo M. Esguera, Voltaire E. Tayag, Benito I. Tayag, Merlie
Malig, Alberto T. Tayag, Rosemarie T. Tayag. Leticia E. Lulu and the Register of Deeds
for the Province of Batangas, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 28, 1994, petitioner for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate of her
deceased husband Norberto Mendoza filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas a complaint
for reconveyance of title (involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and damages with petition for preliminary
injunction docketed as Civil Case No. R94-009.[1] Paragraphs 2 and 3 of said complaint states:
2. That Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her co-plaintiff, the Intestate Estate of the late Norberto B.
Mendoza in her capacity as the surviving wife of the deceased Norberto B. Mendoza who died on
December 29, 1993;
3. That Adelia C. Mendoza should be appointed by this Honorable Court as the judicial administratrix of
her co-plaintiff for purposes of this case;[2]
Private respondents filed on January 21, 1995 [3] their answer with motion to dismiss[4] alleging
among others that the complaint states no cause of action and that petitioners demand had already been
paid.[5] On February 17, 1995, private respondents filed another pleading entitled motion to dismiss
invoking, this time, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel, laches and prescription. In support
of their argument of lack of jurisdiction, private respondents contend that a special proceedings case for
appointment of administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated in the ordinary action for reconveyance.
In her opposition to the motions, petitioner asserts among others, that the allegation seeking appointment as
administratrix is only an incidental matter which is not even prayed for in the complaint. Replying to the
opposition, private respondents argued that since petitioners husband resided in Quezon City at the time of
his death, the appointment of the estate administratrix should be filed in the RTC of that place in
accordance with Section 1 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, it is their argument that the RTC of
Batangas has no jurisdiction over the case.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, the RTC of Batangas thru respondent Judge Teh dismissed
without prejudice the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the rules governing an ordinary
civil action and a special proceeding are different. Accordingly, the lower court found it unnecessary to
discuss the other grounds raised in the motion to dismiss. [6] Upon denial of petitioners motion for
reconsideration, he filed this petition under Rule 45 on pure questions of law. The Court thereafter gave due
course to the petition.
The issue is whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking appointment as
administratrix of an estate, would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole case?
We rule in the negative. First, Section 19 of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691 provides:
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)...
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate ....
Likewise, Section 33 of the same law provides that:
Metropolitan Trial Court shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate... (italics
ours).
The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance, which involves title title to property worth millions of
pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling within its jurisdiction
are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, such as the appointment of an administratrix for an estate.
Even the Rules on venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 73 [7]) impliedly recognizes the
jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for granting of letters of administration. On the other hand, probate
proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the RTC or MTC depending on the
net worth of the estate. By arguing that the allegation seeking such appointment as administratrix ousted the
RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and private respondents confuses jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of
Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-95[8] provides that actions involving title to property shall be tried in the
province where the property is located, in this case, - Batangas. The mere fact that petitioners deceased
husband resides in Quezon City at the time of his death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the
Court.[9]
Second, the cases cited[10] by private respondents are not at point as they involve settlement of
estate where the probate court was asked to resolve questions of ownership of certain properties. In the
present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment as estate
administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise
of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. The above allegation is not even a jurisdictional fact which
must be stated in an action for reconveyance. The Court therefore, should have at least, proceeded with the
reconveyance suit rather than dismiss the entire case.
Third, jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot generally decide questions of ownership or
title to property[11] is not applicable in this case, because: there is no settlement of estate involved and the
RTC of Batangas was not acting as a probate court. It should be clarified that whether a particular matter
should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction,
is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure.[12] Moreover, the instant action for
reconveyance does not even invoke the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. [13] Considering that the RTC
has jurisdiction, whether it be on the reconveyance suit or as to the appointment of an administratrix, it was
improper for respondent judge to dismiss the whole complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction.
Finally, judges should not dismiss with precipitate haste, complaints or petitions filed before them,
just so they can comply with their administrative duty to dispose cases within 90 days at the expense of
their judicial responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated June 14, 1995 and November 14, 1995 of the RTC of
Batangas are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to immediately proceed with the
disposition of the case in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 133000. October 2, 2001]
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HEIRS OF
GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL ROSARIO-
MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO
FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance
and annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person particularly in questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision[1] of
public respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:
Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside and
another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of defendant-
appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT
No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.
So ordered.
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with
an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani,
Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Gracianas estate
on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of TCT No.
11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14
share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980
was issued in the name of Graciano and the six children.
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an Agreement of Consolidation-
Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of
land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots.Graciano then donated to his children, share and share
alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square
meters registered under Gracianos name, as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of
TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90
square meters was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square
meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot[2] to a third person but
retained ownership over the second lot.[3]
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No.
186059[4] was issued in the latters name. On 07 October 1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint[5] filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55,
herein private respondents alleged that upon Gracianos death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment
of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano
executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 1987[6] in favor of herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of
TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT No. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher.Similarly, herein
private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes
have been impaired.
In her answer[7] dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married
to Graciano on 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of
the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Gracianos lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance,
properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against Gracianos
estate or against herein petitioners property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January
1996 holding:[8]
1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is
prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation
of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a
judicial separation of property between them, the spouses are prohibited from entering
(into) a contract of sale;
2) The deed of sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally
prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be
regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory
heir of the deceased.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower courts decision ratiocinating, inter
alia:
It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The
court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction
when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased
person. XXX
X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance. What the
court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement
to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. X X X
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate courts decision for being contrary to law and the
facts of the case.
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings,
in this wise:
X X X a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions,
subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
XXX
c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a
special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed
by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established
rules. The term special proceeding may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or
right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless
the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an
application or motion.[9]
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:
It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and
prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and
that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and
prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons
and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. X X X A special
proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief,
such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice. [10]
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of
property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires
the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged
to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word may, it is nevertheless clear that the same
provision[11] contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings.
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent
to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then
the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.[16]
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment as
estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited the
exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. [17] (emphasis supplied)
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir
may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.[18] The net estate of the decedent must be
ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the
deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the
partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.[19]
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that
the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of
Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these well-
entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise
of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well
as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosarios estate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of
herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present
circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to
validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife,
herein petitioner Natcher.

At this point, the appellate courts disquisition is elucidating:

Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the estate
in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo determined the
respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the
deceased to defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of
Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to
perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the
court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance. [12]

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
Borromeo[13] and Mendoza vs. Teh[14] that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional
Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate
jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is a procedural
question involving a mode of practice which may be waived.[15]

Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the
six children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trial court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to
rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.

Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing
principle that although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
 and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the
administration. Further taking into consideration the circumstances obtaining in this case, that petitioner
Francisco de Borja though originally designated administrator, is and has for several years been one only in
name due to his physical and mental disability, as a result of which respondent Jose de Borja is now
practically the sole administrator there is no question that for all practical and legal purposes the
G.R. No. L-6476 November 18, 1955 appointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator is equivalent to and has the same effect as a sole regular
FRANCISCO DE BORJA as Executor of the Estate of the deceased JOSEFA TANGCO, petitioner, or general administrator.
vs. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and JOSE DE
BORJA, respondents.
In view of the foregoing, holding that the appointment of a co-administrator, especially in the present case,
is appealable, the petition for mandamus is granted and respondent Judge is hereby directed to approve the
MONTEMAYOR, J.: record on appeal and to give due course to the appeal. No costs.

This is a petition for mandamus to compel respondent Judge Bienvenido A. Tan to approve and admit the
record on appeal filed before him and to give due course to the appeal. The facts involved as gathered from
the record may be briefly stated as follows. On October 25, 1940, petitioner Francisco de Borja filed a
petition in the lower court for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of his deceased wife Josefa
Tangco. The will was probated on April 2, 1941, and named Francisco de Borja as executor thereof. One of
the heirs who is now one of the respondents herein Jose de Borja appealed the case to the Court of Appeals
but later his motion for dismissal of the appeal as granted. All the records of the case were destroyed or lost
during the last Pacific war but were on January 1, 1946, reconstituted. On March 26 of that year Francisco
de Borja qualified as executor and administrator.

Due to the physical inability of Francisco de Borja to fully administer the estate he being quite weak and
unable to see, on August 25, 1951, on petition of Matilde de Borja, one of the heirs, the lower court
appointed Crisanto de Borja, another heir, as co-administrator. Crisanto qualified as co-administrator on
August 29, 1951.

On April 9, 1952, the trial court according to petitioner, without petition of or notice to anyone appointed
respondent Jose de Borja as co-administrator, this, after holding in abeyance consideration of Francisco de
Borja's amended account dated March 25, 1952. Francisco, Matilde and Crisanto moved for reconsideration
of the appointment of Jose de Borja but by order of August 14, 1952, respondent Judge indirectly denied
the motion for reconsideration, and acting upon an alleged ex-parte petition of the heirs Jose, Crisanto,
Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed De Borja, revoked the appointment of Crisanto as co-administrator and
directed administrator Jose de Borja to comment on the amended account filed by Francisco de Borja.

On July 22, 1952, Francisco, Matilde and Crisanto filed a notice of appeal from the order appointing Jose
de Borja as co-administrator and the order denying the motion for reconsideration and later they filed the
corresponding record on appeal. By order of December 27, 1952, respondent Judge Tan disapproved the
record on appeal and refused to give due course to the appeal on the ground that the appointment of Jose de
Borja as co-administrator was interlocutory in nature and so was not appealable. Hence, this petition
for mandamus, as already stated, to compel respondent Judge to approve the record on appeal and to give
due course to the appeal.

An order appointing a regular administrator is appealable (See Sy Hong Eng vs. Sy Liac Suy, 8 Phil., 594).
On the other hand, according to Rule 105, section 1 (e) an order appointing a special administrator is not
appealable. Respondents contend that a co-administrator is not a regular or general administrator, and his
duties and functions rather partake those of a special administrator; consequently, his appointment is not
subject to appeal. We cannot share this view. The powers and functions of a special administrator are quite
limited. Under Rule 81, section 1, a special administrator is appointed only when there is a delay in
granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from allowance or disallowance
of a will or from any other cause, and such special administrator is authorized to collect and take charge of
the estate until the questions causing the delay are decided and an executor or administrator thereon
appointed. Under Rule 87 section 8, a special administrator is also appointed when the regular executor or
administrator has a claim against the estate he represents and said special administrator shall have the same
power and subject to the same liability as a regular executor or administrator. In other words, a special
administrator is appointed only for a limited time and for a specific purpose. Naturally, because of the
temporary and special character of his appointment, it was deemed by the law not advisable for any party to
appeal from said temporary appointment. On the other hand, a co-administrator performs all the functions

G.R. No. L-8409 December 28, 1956
In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-
appellee,
vs. AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and
CARLOS EUSEBIO,oppositors-appellants.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died
on November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953,
Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating
that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been
improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said
petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her
aforementioned sister and brothers.
The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28, 1952, for Rule 75,
section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been,
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch
as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P.
Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A España
Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2). While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the
decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr.
Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained until he was brought to the UST
Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes before November 26, 1952. On this date, he contracted marriage
in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later,
he died therein of "acute left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of
seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A). Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at España
Extention.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile,
and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a
domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70;
Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the
circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have
been one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and
freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently
(Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil.,
624; Zuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the decedent
was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had been in Quezon City several days prior to his
demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that place permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to have manifested his wish to
live indefinitely in said city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who took the witness stand, did not testify
thereon, despite the allegation, in his answer to the aforemention, opposition of the appellants herein, that
"the deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon City". Moreover, said appellee
did not introduce the testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio,
upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A España Extention was purchased, and who,
therefore, might have cast some light on his (decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This
notwithstanding, the lower court held that the decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is
"manifest" from the acquisition of said property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is
untenable.lawphil.net
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had been adviced to do so "due
to his illness", in the very words of herein appellee. It is not improbable — in fact, its is very likely — that
said advice was given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and have a more
effective treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely
for one's own health", even if coupled with "knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of
illness, to return home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172-173; see, also, Shenton vs. Abbott,
Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some
of his children, who used to live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then,
again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A España Extention, Quezon City,
was conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month before his death, the decedent gave San
Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence certificates used by the
decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to
Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior to his demise,
stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the
legitimate full brothers of the herein appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the
children of the deceased by his first marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that occasion
and would have objected to said statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from
appellee's failure to prove satisfactory that the decedent had decided to establish his home in Quezon City,
the acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the
presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1— which is particularly strong when the domicile
is one of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent — has not been
offset by the evidence of record.
The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence, and refused to
entertain the same in the order appealed from. The reason therefor are deducible from its resolution in
rejecting said documents during the hearing of the incident at bar. The court then held:
Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to the records for whatever
action oppositors may want to take later on because until now the personality of the oppositors
has not been established whether or not they have a right to intervene in this case, and the Court
cannot pass upon this question as the oppositors refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court
and they maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed. (P. 10, t. s. n.)
In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence before appellants
had established their "personality" to intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their filiation. When
appellants, however, sought, during said hearing, to establish their relation with the deceased, as his alleged
illegitimate children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained appellee's objection thereto stating:
 Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it seems that you are now had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by law, for the same would then be
trying to prove the status of your client; you are leading so that. The main point here is your defeated by the will of one of the parties. More specially, said provision refers mainly to non-resident
contention that the deceased was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why I allowed you decedents who have properties in several provinces in the Philippines, for the settlement of their respective
to cross-examine. If you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the estates may undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of said provinces, not only because
objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. This is not yet the time to said courts then have concurrent jurisdiction — and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case shall
declare who are persons who should inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.) exclude the other courts — but, also, because the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the
Rules of the Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence, which deals with non-
resident decedents, whose estate may settled the court of first instance of any province in which they have
Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the domicile of the decedent, because of
properties.lawphil.net
their alleged lack of "personality", but, when tried to establish such "personality", they were barred from
doing so on account of the question of venue raised by him. We find ourselves unable to sanction either the
foregoing procedure adopted by the lower court or the inference it drew from the circumstances In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:
surrounding the case.
. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one hand, he decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except
declared that appellants could not be permitted to introduce evidence on the residence of the decedent, for in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
they contested the jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, by record.
cross-examining the appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to the authority of the court.
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more courts,
What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing, in the lower court, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have
appellants' counsel announced that he would take part therein "only to question the jurisdiction, for the exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana Vda. De Borja vs. Tan, L-
purpose of dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.). During the cross-examination of petitioner herein, said 7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been
counsel tried to elicit the relation between the decedent and the appellants. As, the appellee objected improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings may,
thereto, the court said, addressing appellants' counsel: "Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.
of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless
you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon, appellants' counsel refused to
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando,
do so, stating: "I will insist on my stand." Then, too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected
Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator
Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason that appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they
of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have
maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed." Thus, appellants specially made of record that they
sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.
were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the
same, and the court felt that appellants were not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a fact.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's petition is dismissed, with costs
against the appellee. It is so ordered.
At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their right to object to
appellee's petition, but, also, that venue had been laid improperly. Such facts were: (a) their alleged
relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under the Civil Code of the
Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In other words, the lower court should have
admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in connection with the issue
under consideration.

Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue?" In this connection, it appears that on
November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga received a petition of appellants
herein, dated November 4, 1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio".
Attached to said petition was petition for the docketing thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3, section 22,
of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order dated November 16, 1953, which was
received by the cashier of said court on November 17, 1953, on which date the case was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 957. On December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed
Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first marriage, including petitioner herein), moved for the
dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the present case, before the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, since November 16, 1953. This motion was granted in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying
upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts."

Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did not pass
upon the question of domicile or residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking
cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of Court evidently
refers to cases triable before two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have
intended to deprive a competent court of the authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar case

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,
vs. HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means.
Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by
Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter
alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of
Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar
granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters
of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for
delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G.
Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of
the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of
the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29,
1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground
raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous,
misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and
that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a
weekly publication of general circulation in Southern Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular
Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects:
(1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional
Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of
the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that
Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia
and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia
G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this
supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer
jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning
because the original petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for letters of
administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado
G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take possession of
properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling
attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an
inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July
31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G.
Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or
over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G.
Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded
sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has
no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special administratrix
from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to
Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the
interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for
want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to
dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the
special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1subject only to the
previous qualification made by the court that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing
agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the latter;
and that the special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take
custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of
title in her name without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the
motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July
2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the
supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration
in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa
B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be
appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing
order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the
making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for
lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute
and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to
substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed the special
administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973
and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing
(cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of
special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office
of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for
reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one,
directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish
Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as
well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver
to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado
to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified
with the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule
presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon
City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that
three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G.
Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or
prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily
to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in
the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their
motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on
the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of
certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A.
Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us
on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had
already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On
February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate.
Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond
of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc.
No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings
therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp.
Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First
Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for
reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa B.
Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This
notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction"
reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the
decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to
this Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the
Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa
B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of
the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with temporary
restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño from
further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and
considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted,
and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to
letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor
should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the
necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of
assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin,
creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country
are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the
intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is
conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption
of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been
intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is
another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a
given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the
manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power
is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it
loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may
thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the
procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First
Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall
be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance
of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely
constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province
where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or
domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides"
connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used
in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. 9Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court of
First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal
properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B.
Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For
her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as
"property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On
the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule
herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically
alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the
residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was
presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of
residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence
certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated
November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his
interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering
parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at
Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-
settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case
before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by
the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to
assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the
proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that
overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under
the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent,
besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property
may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia.
With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G.
Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point,
We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be
emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the
decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of
distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis
of distribution. 21The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed
by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he
is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional
Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B.
Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be
reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its
supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly
assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay
that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G.
Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the
Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be required to
transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the
proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent Petition for
Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R.
No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of
P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in
G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is another issue of
perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80
provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an
appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take
possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors
or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the
allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment
and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any
cause e.g., parties cannot agree among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special
administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to
make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion
must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and
legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the
appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of preference in the
 Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition[9] which contained the following
averments:

"3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the following
business entities, to wit:

Business Entity Address:

[G.R. No. 124715. January 24, 2000] XXXX

RUFINA LUY LIM petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION,
SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING Alliance Marketing ,Inc. Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca
CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents.

BF Homes,
DECISION

Paraaque,
BUENA, J.:

Metro Manila.
May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the estate
of a deceased person?
XXXX
[1]
Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review on certiorari, the decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on 18 April 1996, in CA-GR SP No. 38617, which nullified and set aside the Speed Distributing Inc. 910 Barrio Niog,
orders dated 04 July 1995[2], 12 September 1995[3] and 15 September 1995[4] of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court. Aguinaldo Highway,

Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of the late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of Bacoor, Cavite.
probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim
Rufina Luy Lim, represented by George Luy, Petitioner".
XXXX
Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc.,
Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are corporations formed, organized and existing under Auto Truck TBA Corp. 2251 Roosevelt Avenue,
Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered under the Torrens system.
Quezon City.
On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented
by her nephew George Luy, filed on 17 March 1995, a joint petition [5] for the administration of the estate of XXXX
Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

Active Distributors, Inc. Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF

Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y.
Lim, then filed a motion[6] for the lifting of lis pendens and motion[7] for exclusion of certain properties
from the estate of the decedent. Homes, Paraaque,

In an order[8] dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate Metro Manila.
court, granted the private respondents twin motions, in this wise:
XXXX
"Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to lift, expunge
or delete the annotation of lis pendens on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 116716, Action Company 100 20th Avenue
116717, 116718, 116719 and 5182 and it is hereby further ordered that the properties
covered by the same titles as well as those properties by (sic) Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 613494, 363123, 236236 and 263236 are excluded from these Murphy, Quezon City
proceedings.
or
SO ORDERED."
92-D Mc-Arthur Highway
 Valenzuela Bulacan.
"3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged in business with the
public as corporations, all their capital, assets and equity were however, personally
owned by the late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders and officers
appearing in the respective articles of incorporation of the above business entities
were mere dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed therein only for purposes
of registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
"4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with the following
banks: (a) Metrobank, Grace Park, Caloocan City and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
Branches and (b) First Intestate Bank (formerly Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation and in other banks whose identities are yet to be determined.
"5. That the following real properties, although registered in the name of the above
entities, were actually acquired by Pastor Y. Lim during his marriage with petitioner,
to wit:
Corporation Title Location
XXXX
k. Auto Truck TCT No. 617726 Sto. Domingo
TBA Corporation Cainta, Rizal
q. Alliance Marketing TCT No. 27896 Prance,
Metro Manila
Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title and/or Tax Declarations
are hereto attached as Annexes "C" to "W".
XXXX
"7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late Pastor Y. Lim,
are all conjugal in nature, having been acquired by him during the existence of his
marriage with petitioner.
"8. There are other real and personal properties owned by Pastor Y. Lim which
petitioner could not as yet identify. Petitioner, however will submit to this Honorable
Court the identities thereof and the necessary documents covering the same as soon
as possible."
On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioners motion issued an order[10], thus:
"Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate the annotation of lis pendens in
case said annotation had already been deleted and/or cancelled said TCT Nos.
116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 51282.
Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123, 236256
and 236237 by virtue of the petitioner are included in the instant petition.
SO ORDERED."
On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special administrator [11] and Miguel Lim
and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of
administration were accordingly issued.
In an order[12] dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew private respondents motion for
exclusion, in this wise:
"The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether the
corporations are the mere alter egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim, Otherwise
(sic) stated, the issue involves the piercing of the corporate veil, a matter that is
clearly within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and not the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Thus, in the case of Cease vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA
483, the crucial issue decided by the regular court was whether the corporation
involved therein was the mere extension of the decedent. After finding in the
affirmative, the Court ruled that the assets of the corporation are also assets of the
estate.
A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, shows that the SECs
exclusive (sic) applies only to intra-corporate controversy. It is simply a suit to settle
the intestate estate of a deceased person who, during his lifetime, acquired several
properties and put up corporations as his instrumentalities.
SO ORDERED."
On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed by petitioner, issued an
order[13] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein under enumerated
are hereby ordered to comply strictly with this order and to produce and submit to the
special administrators , through this Honorable Court within (5) five days from
receipt of this order their respective records of the savings/current accounts/time
deposits and other deposits in the names of Pastor Lim and/or corporations above-
mentioned, showing all the transactions made or done concerning savings /current
accounts from January 1994 up to their receipt of this court order.
XXX XXX XXX
SO ORDERED."
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari[14], with an urgent prayer for a restraining order
or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals questioning the orders of the Regional Trial
Court, sitting as a probate court.
On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private respondents, rendered the
assailed decision[15], the decretal portion of which declares:
"Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil action for certiorari is
hereby granted, The impugned orders issued by respondent court on July 4,1995 and
September 12, 1995 are hereby nullified and set aside. The impugned order issued by
 respondent on September 15, 1995 is nullified insofar as petitioner corporations"
bank accounts and records are concerned.
SO ORDERED."
Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner Rufina Luy Lim now comes
before us with a lone assignment of error[16]:
"The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the lower court
which merely allowed the preliminary or provisional inclusion of the private
respondents as part of the estate of the late deceased (sic) Pastor Y. Lim with the
respondent Court of Appeals arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey or
to ignore the clear and explicit provisions of Rules 81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of
Court and thereby preventing the petitioner, from performing her duty as special
administrator of the estate as expressly provided in the said Rules."
Petitioners contentions tread on perilous grounds.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders issued by the probate court
which were subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeals.
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on jurisdiction over probate
proceedings is indeed in order.
The provisions of Republic Act 7691[17], which introduced amendments to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, are
pertinent:
"Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the
estate exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate matters in
Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000);
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases.-Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not
exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos(P100,000) or, in Metro
Manila where such personal property, estate or amount of the
demand does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs, the amount of
which must be specifically alleged, Provided, that interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys, litigation expenses and
costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees,
Provided further, that where there are several claims or causes
of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in
the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions;
xxx xxx xxx"
Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon
the gross value of the estate of the decedent.
As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily on the principle that a probate
court may pass upon title to certain properties, albeit provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether
a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory.
In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may extend its probing arms in the
determination of the question of title in probate proceedings.
This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,[18] held:
"X X X As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination
is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
to resolve title."
We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS[19]:
"X X X The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator
is one clearly within the competence of the probate court. However, the courts
determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties."
Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE[20] citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE[21], We made an
exposition on the probate courts limited jurisdiction:
"It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether
testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that
the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
 for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
cannot do so."
- A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO[22], We had occasion to elucidate, through Mr. Justice Andres modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."
Narvasa[23]:
In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the property subject of the controversy
"Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting was duly registered under the Torrens system, We categorically stated:
as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person
"x x x Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the
adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal
possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of
interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the
title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied
question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not
the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question
thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the question of whether or
from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such
not a particular matter should be resolved by the court in the exercise of its general
third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. x x x"
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. probate, land
registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one,
involving a mode of practice which may be waived. x x x Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the late Pastor Y. Lim are in the
possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, which under the law
possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to
x x x. These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens
shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private
title is not in the decedents name but in others, a situation on which this Court
respondents should stand undisturbed.
has already had occasion to rule x x x."(emphasis Ours)

Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents motion for exclusion. While it
Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under the Torrens system and
may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction
registered in the name of private respondent corporations should be included in the inventory of the estate
as a probate court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the
of the decedent Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the determination by the probate court of whether these
inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over
properties should be included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not conclusive and subject to a
properties, it is no less true that such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence,
final determination in a separate action brought for the purpose of adjudging once and for all the issue of
should be exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each
title.
individual case.

Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are registered in the name of private
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens system in the name of
respondent corporations, the jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY vs., ALCID[24] is of great essence and
private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate
finds applicability, thus:
court obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded to issue the impugned orders.

"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter disregard of the
her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their
presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents. Certainly, the probate court through
favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set
such brazen act transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on this matter.
aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include,
bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons. x x x" Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent corporations are properly part
of the decedents estate but also the private respondent corporations themselves. To rivet such flimsy
contention, petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime, organized and wholly-owned the
"x x x. In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property
five corporations, which are the private respondents in the instant case. [25] Petitioner thus attached as
covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title
Annexes "F"[26] and "G"[27] of the petition for review affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao
should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
which among others, contained averments that the incorporators of Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included on
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in
the list had no actual participation in the organization and incorporation of the said corporation. The affiants
controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action,
added that the persons whose names appeared on the articles of incorporation of Uniwide Distributing, Inc.,
particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the
as incorporators thereof, are mere dummies since they have not actually contributed any amount to the
persons named in the title. x x x"
capital stock of the corporation and have been merely asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix their
respective signatures thereon.
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was ever presented by petitioner
to bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons
1529, otherwise known as, " The Property Registration Decree", proscribes collateral attack on Torrens
composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held
Title, hence:
liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it. [28]

"xxx xxx xxx

Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and separate from
its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity
shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it.
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL
BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS[29], We enunciated:
"x x x When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or
as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes,
the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery
or crime, the veil with which the law covers and isolates the corporation from the
members or stockholders who compose it will be lifted to allow for its consideration
merely as an aggregation of individuals. x x x"
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the protective shroud which exempts
its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation
from a seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction.[30]
the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless
the affiant themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon."
As to the order[36] of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of Appeals correctly observed
that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted without jurisdiction in issuing said order; The probate court
had no authority to demand the production of bank accounts in the name of the private respondent
corporations.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which nullified and set aside the orders issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12 September 1995 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just but the
alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is
defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity
should come to naught.[31]

Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as
follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of
finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity
as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) Such control must
have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or
other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The
aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. The
absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the corporate veil". [32]

Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of
a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate
personalities.[33]

Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrong-doing must be clearly
and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.[34]

Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely acting in a limited capacity as
a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce competent evidence that would have justified the
court to impale the veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner on the affidavits
executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing considering that the aforementioned documents
possess no weighty probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us to stress that
such affidavits are inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not at all presented during the
course of the proceedings in the lower court. To put it differently, for this Court to uphold the admissibility
of said documents would be to relegate from Our duty to apply such basic rule of evidence in a manner
consistent with the law and jurisprudence.

Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. LEONIDAS[35] finds pertinence:

"Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared
by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants
statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing
them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine

G.R. No. 141634 February 5, 2001
Heirs of Spouses REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS and ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS SR. -- ROBERTO R.
SANDEJAS, ANTONIO R. SANDEJAS, CRISTINA SANDEJAS MORELAND, BENJAMIN
R. SANDEJAS, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, and heirs of SIXTO S. SANDEJAS II, RAMON R.
SANDEJAS, TERESITA R. SANDEJAS, and ELIODORO R. SANDEJAS JR., all represented by
ROBERTO R. SANDEJAS, petitioners,
vs. ALEX A. LINA, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to probate court approval. The transaction remains
binding on the seller-heir, but not on the other heirs who have not given their consent to it. In settling the estate of
the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized
powers. Such matters include selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Rule
89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, deals with the conveyance of real property contracted by the decedent while
still alive. In contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, the said provision does not limit to the executor or
administrator the right to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber realty under
administration. The standing to pursue such course of action before the probate court inures to any person who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or to be entitled to the avails of the suit.1âwphi1.nêt
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated April 16, 1999 and the Resolution2 dated January 12, 2000, both promulgated by the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 49491. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:3
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, [w]e hereby MODIFY the [O]rder of the lower court dated
January 13, 1995, approving the Receipt of Earnest Money With Promise to Buy and Sell dated June 7,
1982, only to the three-fifth (3/5) portion of the disputed lots covering the share of [A]dministrator
Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. [in] the property. The intervenor is hereby directed to pay appellant the balance
of the purchase price of the three-fifth (3/5) portion of the property within thirty (30) days from receipt
of this [O]rder and x x x the administrator [is directed] to execute the necessary and proper deeds of
conveyance in favor of appellee within thirty (30) days thereafter."
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration of the foregoing disposition.
The Facts
The facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA), are as follows:4
"On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp.
8-10) in the lower court praying that letters of administration be issued in his favor for the settlement
of the estate of his wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, who died on April 17, 1955. On July 1, 1981,
Letters of Administration [were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. as
administrator of the estate of the late Remedios Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 16).
Likewise on the same date, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. took his oath as administrator (Record, SP. Proc.
No. R-83-15601, p. 17). x x x.
"On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the records burned
were the records of Branch XI of the Court of First Instance of Manila. As a result, [A]dministrator
Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a [M]otion for [R]econstitution of the records of the case on February 9,
1983 (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 1-5). On February 16, 1983, the lower court in its
[O]rder granted the said motion (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 28-29).
"On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was
filed by [M]ovant Alex A. Lina alleging among others that on June 7, 1982, movant and
[A]dministrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, bound and obligated himself, his heirs,
administrators, and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely and in their entirety the following parcels of
land which formed part of the estate of the late Remedios R. Sandejas, to wit:
1. 'A parcel of land (Lot No.22 Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd-21121, being a
portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2029), situated in the
"Municipality of Makati, province of Rizal, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED
SEVENTY (270) SQUARE METERS, more or less, with TCT No. 13465;
2. 'A parcel of land (Lot No. 21 Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd-21141, being a
portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508 G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2029), situated in the
Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED
SEVENTY (270) SQUARE METERS, more or less, with TCT No. 13464;'
3. 'A parcel of land (Lot No. 5 Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd-21141, being a
portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508 G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2029), situated in the
Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED
EIGHT (208) SQUARE METERS, more or less, with TCT No. 13468;'
4. 'A parcel of land (Lot No. 6, Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd-21141, being a
portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508 G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2029), situated in the
Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED
EIGHT (208) SQUARE METERS, more or less, with TCT No. 13468;'
"The [R]eceipt of the [E]arnest [M]oney with [P]romise to [S]ell and to [B]uy is hereunder quoted, to
wit:
'Received today from MR. ALEX A. LINA the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, per Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
Chec[k] No. 319913 dated today for P100,000.00, x x x as additional earnest money for
the following:
xxx xxx xxx
all registered with the Registry of Deeds of the [P]rovince of Rizal (Makati Branch Office)
in the name of SELLER 'EL!ODORO SANDEJAS, Filipino Citizen, of legal age, married
to Remedios Reyes de Sandejas;' and which undersigned, as SELLER, binds and obligates
himself, his heirs, administrators and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely in their entirety
(all of the four (4) parcels of land above described, which are contiguous to each other as
to form one big lot) to said Mr. Alex A. Lina, who has agreed to buy all of them, also
binding on his heirs, administrators and assigns, for the consideration of ONE MILLION
(P1,000,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, upon such reasonable terms of payment as
may be agreed upon by them. The parties have, however, agreed on the following terms
and conditions:
'1. The P100,000.00 herein received is in addition to the P70,000.00 earnest money already
received by SELLER from BUYER, all of which shall form part of, and shall be deducted
from, the purchase price of P1,000,000.00, once the deed of absolute [sale] shall be
executed;
 '2. As a consideration separate and distinct from the price, undersigned SELLER also
acknowledges receipt from Mr. Alex A. Lina of the sum of ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, per Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company Check
No. 319912 dated today and payable to SELLER for P1,000.00;
'3. Considering that Mrs. Remedios Reyes de Sandejas is already deceased and as there is a
pending intestate proceedings for the settlement of her estate (Spec. Proc. No.138393,
Manila CFI, Branch XI), wherein SELLER was appointed as administrator of said Estate,
and as SELLER, in his capacity as administrator of said Estate, has informed BUYER that
he (SELLER) already filed a [M]otion with the Court for authority to sell the above parcels
of land to herein BUYER, but which has been delayed due to the burning of the records of
said Spec. Pro. No. 138398, which records are presently under reconstitution, the parties
shall have at least ninety (90) days from receipt of the Order authorizing SELLER, in his
capacity as administrator, to sell all THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PARCELS OF LAND
TO HEREIN BUYER (but extendible for another period of ninety (90) days upon the
request of either of the parties upon the other), within which to execute the deed of
absolute sale covering all above parcels of land;
'4. In the event the deed of absolute sale shall not proceed or not be executed for causes
either due to SELLER'S fault, or for causes of which the BUYER is innocent, SELLER
binds himself to personally return to Mr. Alex A. Lina the entire ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THOUSAND ([P]170,000.00) PESOS In earnest money received from said
Mr. Lina by SELLER, plus fourteen (14%) percentum interest per annum, all of which
shall be considered as liens of said parcels of land, or at least on the share therein of herein
SELLER;
'5. Whether indicated or not, all of above terms and conditions shall be binding on the
heirs, administrators, and assigns of both the SELLER (undersigned MR. ELIODORO P.
SANDEJAS, SR.) and BUYER (MR. ALEX A. LINA).' (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-
15601, pp. 52-54)
"On July 17, 1984, the lower court issued an [O]rder granting the intervention of Alex A. Lina
(Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 167).
"On January 7, 1985, the counsel for [A]dministrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas filed a [M]anifestation
alleging among others that the administrator, Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas, died sometime in November
1984 in Canada and said counsel is still waiting for official word on the fact of the death of the
administrator. He also alleged, among others that the matter of the claim of Intervenor Alex A. Lina
becomes a money claim to be filed in the estate of the late Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc.
No. R-83-15601, p. 220). On February 15, 1985, the, lower court issued an [O]rder directing, among
others, that the counsel for the four (4) heirs and other heirs of Teresita R. Sandejas to move for the
appointment of [a] new administrator within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this [O]rder (Record, SP.
Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 227). In the same manner, on November 4, 1985, the lower court again
issued an order, the content of which reads:
'On October 2, 1985, all the heirs, Sixto, Roberto, Antonio, Benjamin all surnamed
Sandejas were ordered to move for the appointment of [a] new administrator. On October
16, 1985, the same heirs were given a period of fifteen (15) days from said date within
which to move for the appointment of the new administrator. Compliance was set for
October 30, 1985, no appearance for the aforenamed heirs. The aforenamed heirs are
hereby ordered to show cause within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order why this
Petition for Settlement of Estate should not be dismissed for lack of interest and failure to
comply with a lawful order of this Court.
'SO ORDERED.' (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 273).
"On November 22, 1985, Alex A. Lina as petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila an
Omnibus Pleading for (1) petition for letters of administration [and] (2) to consolidate instant case with
SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601 RTC-Branch XI-Manila, docketed therein as SP. Proc. No. 85- 33707
entitled 'IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS, SR., ALEX A. LINA
PETITIONER", [for letters of administration] (Record, SP. Proc. No.85-33707, pp. 1-7). On
November 29, 1985, Branch XXXVI of the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued an [O]rder
consolidating SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, with SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601 (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-
33707, p. 13). Likewise, on December 13, 1985, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, issued
an [O]rder stating that 'this Court has no objection to the consolidation of Special proceedings No. 85-
331707, now pending before Branch XXXVI of this Court, with the present proceedings now pending
before this Branch' (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83- 15601, p. 279).
"On January 15, 1986, Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed [a] Motion for his appointment as a new
administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas on the following reasons:
'5.01. FIRST, as of this date, [i]ntervenor has not received any motion on the part of the
heirs Sixto, Antonio, Roberto and Benjamin, all surnamed Sandejas, for the appointment of
anew [a]dministrator in place of their father, Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas, Sr.;
'5.02. SECOND, since Sp. Proc. 85-33707, wherein the [p]etitioner is herein Intervenor
Alex A. Lina and the instant Sp. PROC. R-83-15601, in effect are already consolidated,
then the appointment of Mr. Alex Lina as [a]dministrator of the Intestate Estate of
Remedios R. Sandejas in instant Sp. Proc. R-83-15601, would be beneficial to the heirs
and also to the Intervenor;
'5.03. THIRD, of course, Mr. Alex A. Lina would be willing to give way at anytime to any
[a]dministrator who may be proposed by the heirs of the deceased Remedios R. Sandejas,
so long as such [a]dministrator is qualified.' (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 281-
283)
"On May 15, 1986, the lower court issued an order granting the [M]otion of Alex A. Lina as the new
[a]dministrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas in this proceedings. (Record, SP. Proc.
No. R-83-15601, pp. 288- 290)
"On August 281 1986, heirs Sixto, Roberto, Antonio and Benjamin, all surnamed Sandejas, and heirs
[sic] filed a [M]otion for [R]econsideration and the appointment of another administrator Mr. Sixto
Sandejasl in lieu of [I]ntervenor Alex A. Lina stating among others that it [was] only lately that Mr.
Sixto Sandejas, a son and heir, expressed his willingness to act as a new administrator of the intestate
estate of his mother, Remedios R. Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, pp. 29-31). On October
2, 1986, Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed his [M]anifestation and [C]ounter [M]otion alleging that he
ha[d] no objection to the appointment of Sixto Sandejas as [a]dministrator of the [i]ntestate [e]state of
his mother Remedios R. Sandejas (Sp. Proc. No.85-15601), provided that Sixto Sandejas be also
appointed as administrator of the [i]ntestate [e]state of his father, Eliodoro P . Sandejas, Sr. (Spec.
Proc. No. 85-33707), which two (2) cases have been consolidated (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707,
pp. 34-36). On March 30, 1987, the lower court granted the said [M]otion and substituted Alex Lina
with Sixto Sandejas as petitioner in the said [P]etitions (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, p. 52). After
the payment of the administrator's bond (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 348-349) and approval
thereof by the court (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 361), Administrator Sixto Sandejas on
January 16, 1989 took his oath as administrator of the estate of the deceased Remedios R. Sandejas and
Eliodoro P. Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 367) and was likewise issued Letters of
Administration on the same day (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 366).
"On November 29, 1993, Intervenor filed [an] Omnibus Motion (a) to approve the deed of conditional
sale executed between Plaintiff-in-lntervention Alex A. Lina and Elidioro [sic] Sandejas, Sr. on June 7,
1982; (b) to compel the heirs of Remedios Sandejas and Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. thru their
administrator, to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of [I]ntervenor Alex A. Lina pursuant to said
conditional deed of sale (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 554-561) to which the administrator
filed a [M]otion to [D]ismiss and/or [O]pposition to said omnibus motion on December 13, 1993
(Record, SP. Proc. No.83-15601, pp. 591-603).
"On January 13, 1995, the lower court rendered the questioned order granting intervenor's [M]otion for
the [A]pproval of the Receipt of Earnest Money with promise to buy between Plaintiff-in-lntervention
Alex A. Lina and Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. dated June 7, 1982 (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 652-
654 ). x x x."
The Order of the intestate courts disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, [i]ntervenor's motion for the approval of the Receipt Of Earnest Money With Promise
To Sell And To Buy dated June 7, 1982, is granted. The [i]ntervenor is directed to pay the balance of
the purchase price amounting to P729,000.00 within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order and the
Administrator is directed to execute within thirty (30) days thereafter the necessary and proper deeds
of conveyancing."6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was
merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four lots was to remain
in the intestate estate of Remedios Sandejas until the approval of the sale was obtained from the settlement court.
That approval was a positive suspensive condition, the nonfulfillment of which was not tantamount to a breach. It
was simply an event that prevented the obligation from maturing or becoming effective. If the condition did not
happen, the obligation would not arise or come into existence.
The CA held that Section 1, Rule 897 of the Rules of Court was inapplicable, because the lack of written notice to
the other heirs showed the lack of consent of those heirs other than Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. For this reason, bad faith
was imputed to him, for no one is allowed to enjoyed a claim arising from one’s own wrongdoing. Thus, Eliodoro
Sr. was bound, as a matter of justice and good faith, to comply with his contractual commitments as an owner and
heir. When he entered into the agreement with respondent, he bound his conjugal and successional shares in the
property.
Hence, this Petition.8
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our resolution:
"a) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. is legally obligated to convey title to the property referred
to in the subject document which was found to be in the nature of a contract to sell - where the
suspensive condition set forth therein [i.e.] court approval, was not complied with;
"b) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. was guilty of bad faith despite the conclusion of the Court
of Appeals that the respondent [bore] the burden of proving that a motion for authority to sell ha[d]
been filed in court;
"c) Whether or not the undivided shares of Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. in the subject property is three-
fifth (3/5) and the administrator of the latter should execute deeds of conveyance therefor within thirty
days from receipt of the balance of the purchase price from the respondent; and
"d) Whether or not the respondent's petition-in-intervention was converted to a money claim and
whether the [trial court] acting as a probate court could approve the sale and compel the petitioners to
execute [a] deed of conveyance even for the share alone of Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr."9
In brief, the Petition poses the main issue of whether the CA erred in modifying the trial court's Decision and in
obligating petitioners to sell 3/5 of the disputed properties to respondent, even if the suspensive condition had not
been fulfilled. It also raises the following collateral issues: (1) the settlement court's jurisdiction; (2) respondent-
intervenor's standing to file an application for the approval of the sale of realty in the settlement case, (3) the
decedent's bad faith, and (4) the computation of the decedent's share in the realty under administration.
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition is partially meritorious.
Main Issue:
Obligation With a Suspensive Condition
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in ordering the conveyance of the disputed 3/5 of the parcels of land, despite
the nonfulfillment of the suspensive condition -- court approval of the sale -- as contained in the "Receipt of
Earnest Money with Promise to Sell and to Buy" (also referred to as the "Receipt"). Instead, they assert that
because this condition had not been satisfied, their obligation to deliver the disputed parcels of land was converted
into a money claim.
We disagree. Petitioners admit that the agreement between the deceased Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was
a contract to sell. Not exactly. In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive
condition. The vendor's obligation to convey the title does not become effective in case of failure to pay. 10
On the other hand, the agreement between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent is subject to a suspensive condition -- the
procurement of a court approval, not full payment. There was no reservation of ownership in the agreement. In
accordance with paragraph 1 of the Receipt, petitioners were supposed to deed the disputed lots over to
respondent. This they could do upon the court's approval, even before full payment. Hence, their contract was a
conditional sale, rather than a contract to sell as determined by the CA.
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can take place only if and when the
condition happens or is fulfilled.11 Thus, the intestate court's grant of the Motion for Approval of the sale filed by
respondent resulted in petitioners' obligation to execute the Deed of Sale of the disputed lots in his favor. The
condition having been satisfied, the contract was perfected. Henceforth, the parties were bound to fulfil what they
had expressly agreed upon.
Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. Reference
to judicial approval, however, cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of heirs to dispose of their own pro
indiviso shares in the co-heirship or co-ownership.12 In other words, they can sell their rights, interests or
participation in the property under administration. A stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the
validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taken
out of custodia legis, but only with the court's permission.13 It would seem that the suspensive condition in the
present conditional sale was imposed only for this reason.
Thus, we are not persuaded by petitioners' argument that the obligation was converted into a mere monetary claim.
Paragraph 4 of the Receipt, which petitioners rely on, refers to a situation wherein the sale has not materialized. In
such a case," the seller is bound to return to the buyer the earnest money paid plus interest at fourteen percent per
annum. But the sale was approved by the intestate court; hence, the proviso does not apply.
Because petitioners did not consent to the sale of their ideal shares in the disputed lots, the CA correctly limited the
scope of the Receipt to the pro-indiviso share of Eliodoro Sr. Thus, it correctly modified the intestate court's ruling
by excluding their shares from the ambit of the transaction.
First Collateral Issue:
Jurisdiction of Settlement Court
Petitioners also fault the CA Decision by arguing, inter alia, (a) jurisdiction over ordinary civil action seeking not
merely to enforce a sale but to compel performance of a contract falls upon a civil court, not upon an intestate
court; and (b) that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows the executor or administrator, and no one else, to file an application
for approval of a sale of the property under administration.
Citing Gil v. Cancio14 and Acebedo v. Abesamis,15 petitioners contend that the CA erred in clothing the settlement
court with the jurisdiction to approve the sale and to compel petitioners to execute the Deed of Sale. They allege
factual differences between these cases and the instant case, as follows: in Gil, the sale of the realty in
administration was a clear and an unequivocal agreement for the support of the widow and the adopted child of the
decedent; and in Acebedo, a clear sale had been made, and all the heirs consented to the disposition of their shares
in the realty in administration.
We are not persuaded. We hold that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual differences
alleged by petitioners have no bearing on the intestate court's jurisdiction over the approval of the subject
conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and
the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of
administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a
probate court's recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the
estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that
may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries.16
In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to respondent; hence,
that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate
action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty -- will
unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.
The suspensive condition did not reduce the conditional sale between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent to one that was
"not a definite, clear and absolute document of sale," as contended by petitioners. Upon the occurrence of the
condition, the conditional sale became a reciprocally demandable obligation that is binding upon the
parties.17 That Acebedo also involved a conditional sale of real property18 proves that the existence of the
suspensive condition did not remove that property from the jurisdiction of the intestate court.
We agree. Eliodoro Sr. did not misrepresent these lots to respondent as his own properties to which he alone had a
title in fee simple. The fact that he failed to obtain the approval of the conditional sale did not automatically imply
bad faith on his part. The CA held him in bad faith only for the purpose of binding him to the conditional sale. This
was unnecessary because his being bound to it is, as already shown, beyond cavil.
Fourth Collateral Issue:
Computation of Eliodoro's Share
Petitioners aver that the CA's computation of Eliodoro Sr.'s share in the disputed parcels of land was erroneous
because, as the conjugal partner of Remedios, he owned one half of these lots plus a further one tenth of the
remaining half, in his capacity as a one of her legal heirs. Hence, Eliodoro's share should be 11/20 of the entire
property. Respondent poses no objection to this computation.22
On the other hand, the CA held that, at the very least, the conditional sale should cover the one half (1/2) pro
indiviso conjugal share of Eliodoro plus his one tenth (1/10) hereditary share as one of the ten legal heirs of the
decedent, or a total of three fifths (3/5) of the lots in administration.23
Petitioners' correct. The CA computed Eliodoro's share as an heir based on one tenth of the entire disputed
property. It should be based only on the remaining half, after deducting the conjugal share.24

Second Collateral Issue:
Intervenor's Standing
Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or administrator is authorized to apply for the
approval of a sale of realty under administration. Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in entertaining and
granting respondent's Motion for Approval.1âwphi1.nêt
We read no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, provides:
The proper determination of the seller-heir's shares requires further explanation. Succession laws and jurisprudence
require that when a marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the decedent's entire estate -
under the concept of conjugal properties of gains -- must be divided equally, with one half going to the surviving
spouse and the other half to the heirs of the deceased.25 After the settlement of the debts and obligations, the
remaining half of the estate is then distributed to the legal heirs, legatees and devices. We assume, however, that
this preliminary determination of the decedent's estate has already been taken into account by the parties, since the
only issue raised in this case is whether Eliodoro's share is 11/20 or 3/5 of the disputed lots.
WHEREFORE, The Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision and Resolution
are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent is entitled to only a pro-indiviso share equivalent to
11/20 of the disputed lots.

"SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased contracted to convey. Notice. SO ORDERED.
Effect of deed. -- Where the deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real
property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for that
purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such property according to such contract, or
with such modifications as are agreed upon by the parties and approved by the court; and if the
contract is to convey real property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of the court shall execute
the deed. x x x."

This provision should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, specifically requiring only the
executor or administrator to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estate
for the purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies (Section 2);19 or for authority to sell real or personal estate
beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees and other interested persons, although such authority is not necessary to
pay debts, legacies or expenses of administration (Section 4).20 Section 8 mentions only an application to authorize
the conveyance of realty under a contract that the deceased entered into while still alive. While this Rule does not
specify who should file the application, it stands to reason that the proper party must be one .who is to be benefited
or injured by the judgment, or one who is to be entitled to the avails of the suit. 21

Third Collateral Issue:

Bad Faith

Petitioners assert that Eliodoro Sr. was not in bad faith, because (a) he informed respondent of the need to secure
court approval prior to the sale of the lots, and (2) he did not promise that he could obtain the approval.

G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA
JUGO, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now
intermediate Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982, as amended by the resolution dated August 10, 1982, declaring
as null and void the devise in favor of the petitioner and the resolution dated December 28, 1982 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament duly signed by him at the
end of the Will on page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina
Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation clause
and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of each other and the
Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo Escareal by the testator and his three
attesting witnesses.
In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only
executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez
by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his
lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the
testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the
Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children
Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The Will reads in part:
Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my aforementioned legal wife,
Rufina Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and daughter Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I
declare and admit to be legally and properly entitled to inherit from me; that while I have
been estranged from my above-named wife for so many years, I cannot deny that I was
legally married to her or that we have been separated up to the present for reasons and
justifications known fully well by them:
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man and wife with one Sofia J.
Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love and affection, for all the
things which she has done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno
has with my full knowledge and consent, did comport and represent myself as her own
husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in
the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage;
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased
Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to
her of letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging inter
alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that
at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her
living in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary should not be
issued to her.
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his
Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to
probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the
probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the
petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set aside, the will in question declared valid
except the devise in favor of the appellant which is declared null and void. The properties
so devised are instead passed on in intestacy to the appellant in equal shares, without
pronouncement as to cost.
On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for Correction of Clerical Error"
praying that the word "appellant" in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision be changed to
"appellees" so as to read: "The properties so devised are instead passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal
shares, without pronouncement as to costs." The motion was granted by the respondent court on August 10, 1982.
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by the respondent court in a
resolution dated December 28, 1982.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction
when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass
upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.
The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be passed upon and
decided in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings because the only purpose of the probate of a
Will is to establish conclusively as against everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities required by law
and that the testator has the mental capacity to execute the same. The petitioner further contends that even if the
provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were applicable, the declaration of its
nullity could only be made by the proper court in a separate action brought by the legal wife for the specific
purpose of obtaining a declaration of the nullity of the testamentary provision in the Will in favor of the person
with whom the testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and Testament itself expressly admits
indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and the petitioner and the fact that
petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the
testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine
enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449) and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et
al. (G.R. No. L- 39247, June 27, 1975). Respondents also submit that the admission of the testator of the illicit
relationship between him and the petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise. We agree with the respondents.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to
pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed thus:
xxx xxx xxx
... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions
concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last Will
and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or
otherwise. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428)
The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to
the extrinsic validity thereof. The testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with
the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for
the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.
 xxx xxx xxx
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate.
Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first
decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the
second relates to descent and distribution (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369)
xxx xxx xxx
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was
executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to
make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a
will. (Sec. 625). The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing
more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in
the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid.
... (Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir
and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear
extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions would be superfluous.
Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452)
passed upon the validity of its intrinsic provisions.
Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of
the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of
dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the
lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court
acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity
had been established. The probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the
issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs.
Ramagosa L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996, April
30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties are agreed that
the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental
capacity to execute his Will. The petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent court when in
resolving the question of whether or not the probate court correctly denied the probate of Martin Jugo's last Will
and Testament, it ruled:
This being so, the will is declared validly drawn. (Page 4, Decision, Annex A of Petition.)
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision in toto.
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentary provision in favor
of the petitioner as null and void.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the
record, in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability
exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic
validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.
These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet
head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. (Section 2, Rule
1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there exists a
justiciable controversy crying for solution.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a
separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the
intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in
consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of
his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the
spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by
preponderance of evidence in the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
testamentary provisions.
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost six years before the testator's death on
July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez was his legal wife from whom he had been
estranged "for so many years." He also declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his
legitimate children. In Article IV, he stated that he had been living as man and wife with the petitioner since 1952.
Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He stated that Nepomuceno
represented Jugo as her own husband but "in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her
to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his
Will. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in an ostensible marital relationship
for 22 years until his death.
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno contracted a marriage before the
Justice of the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno
now contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private respondents:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the
meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee.
Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of
the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary
evidence.
In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the
will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the start of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived with as man
and wife, as already married, was an important and specific issue brought by the parties
before the trial court, and passed upon by the Court of Appeals.
THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923 is by itself conclusive
demonstration that she new that the man she had openly lived for 22 years as man and wife
was a married man with already two children.
FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent Rufina Gomez, is it
possible that she would not have asked Martin Jugo whether or not they were his
illegitimate or legitimate children and by whom? That is un-Filipino.
FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of the deceased testator,
is it possible that she would not have known that the mother of private respondent Oscar
Jugo and Carmelita Jugo was respondent Rufina Gomez, considering that the houses of the
parents of Martin Jugo (where he had lived for many years) and that of respondent Rufina
Gomez were just a few meters away?

Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner who
opted to present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator. (Testimony of
Petitioner, TSN of August 1, 1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64).
Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence that would refute the testimony of
petitioner on the point.
Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are unbelievable. They are, to say the
least, inherently improbable, for they are against the experience in common life and the
ordinary instincts and promptings of human nature that a woman would not bother at all to
ask the man she was going to marry whether or not he was already married to another,
knowing that her groom had children. It would be a story that would strain human
credulity to the limit if petitioner did not know that Martin Jugo was already a married man
in view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely his marriage to respondent Rufina
Gomez that led petitioner to break off with the deceased during their younger years.

Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator, testified at length on the
meretricious relationship of his brother and petitioner. (TSN of August 18,1975).
Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a decisive issue right
at the inception of the case.
Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the question.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons
who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even
assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator
admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals, now
Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and petitioner 'were deemed guilty SO ORDERED.
of adultery or concubinage', it was a finding that petitioner was not the innocent woman
she pretended to be.

xxx xxx xxx

3. If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless, then private respondents

respectfully offer the following analysis:

FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased testator in a town in
Tarlac where neither she nor the testator ever resided. If there was nothing to hide from,
why the concealment' ? Of course, it maybe argued that the marriage of the deceased with
private respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise done in secrecy. But it should be
remembered that Rufina Gomez was already in the family way at that time and it would
seem that the parents of Martin Jugo were not in favor of the marriage so much so that an
action in court was brought concerning the marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN
of August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30)

SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when they were still both
single. That would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo married respondent Rufina Gomez on
November 29, 1923 (Exh. 3). Petitioner married the testator only on December 5, 1952.
There was a space of about 30 years in between. During those 30 years, could it be
believed that she did not even wonder why Martin Jugo did not marry her nor contact her
anymore after November, 1923 - facts that should impel her to ask her groom before she
married him in secrecy, especially so when she was already about 50 years old at the time
of marriage.

G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,
vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A.
FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No.
05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108) ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special
Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents'
(petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial Court of the
Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss the
petition in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special pronouncement is made as to
costs.
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals,
(Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, a
petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters
testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain
died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion,
Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960
was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner without
objection raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the
appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. On the disposition of the
testator's property, the will provided:
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and money
which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother
SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C
Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the
money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute
my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion,
Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with
Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the oppositors (respondents herein
Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de
Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited.
(Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court, respondents filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently
referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the trial court to
dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the review of
respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986
(Rollo, p. 146).
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 153). Respondents'
Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on
September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity
thereof before it is admitted to probate;
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate. The
preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of
"compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not apply to private respondents who are
not compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission shall not annul the institution of
heirs;
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law;
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests that mere
institution of a universal heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share in the
inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention of the testator in the case at bar,
explicitly expressed in his will. This is what matters and should be in violable.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the petition in
Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore unconstitutional
and ineffectual.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been pretirited.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall he
effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they
are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited
(Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the
widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the
testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir,
there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil
code) however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption
by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39
of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same
rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the
adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both
adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not
expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance
including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in
Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do not
result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except
insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator
results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any
other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully
worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v.
Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has
been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs
will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper
legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he
must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one
who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not
the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any
gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the
outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person
called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted
from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an
heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special
Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the questioned order is an oppressive
exercise of j judicial authority (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117
SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138
SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available where the
petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law (DD
Comendador Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to
correct a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded on
valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the general rule is
that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the
testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The
intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra;
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and
Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v.
Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of
absolute preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in question was a complete nullity and
dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court,
induced by practical considerations. The Court said:
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the
record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case
will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of
the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the
validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution.
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by the surviving spouse was
grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the
evidence during the hearing held in connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate court's order of
dismissal.
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the petition deals with the validity
of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The Court held that as on its face
the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright.
Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the
extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of
Appeals, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra).
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited
(Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that "the grounds
for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial
on the merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on
February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on its face
the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs
coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise
in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have
denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before
the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The
remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the right to resort to
the more speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court
of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in
the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not
afford speedy and adequate relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the questioned decision of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads;
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19, 1988 of the
trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petition for probate is
hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, 2 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-
37171, and the instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand,
who died on November 25, 1982.
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private
respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand,
and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's holographic
will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under
duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature
therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed
by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The
petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot
located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by
decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. It
found, inter alia:
Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide only the question
of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix,
this probate court finds no reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its failure
to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary
capacity of the testatrix.
For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from
the will actually executed by the testatrix. The only objections raised by the
oppositors . . . are that the will was not written in the handwriting of the testatrix
which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and not to the question of
identity of will. No other will was alleged to have been executed by the testatrix
other than the will herein presented. Hence, in the light of the evidence adduced, the
identity of the will presented for probate must be accepted, i.e., the will submitted in
Court must be deemed to be the will actually executed by the testatrix.
xxx xxx xxx
While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the
testatrix has been disputed, the petitioners, however, have satisfactorily shown in
Court that the holographic will in question was indeed written entirely, dated and
signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who have convincingly
shown knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix have been presented and have
explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with which the holographic
will in question was written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the
testatrix. Given then the aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the law that the
holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the
testatrix has been complied with.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix, (private respondent)
Clemente Sand himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was completely in her
sound mind when he visited her during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or around
which time the holographic will in question was executed by the testatrix. To be of
sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making the will, knew
the value of the estate to be disposed of, the proper object of her bounty, and
the characterof the testamentary act . . . The will itself shows that the testatrix even
had detailed knowledge of the nature of her estate. She even identified the lot number
and square meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The objects of her bounty
were likewise identified explicitly. And considering that she had even written a
nursing book which contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession,
there is more than sufficient showing that she knows the character of the
testamentary act.
In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the
testamentary capacity of the testatrix has to be resolved in favor of the allowance of
probate of the will submitted herein.
Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the disallowance
of herein holographic will. While it was alleged that the said will was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or of some
other person, the evidence adduced have not shown any instance where improper
pressure or influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private respondent) Clemente
Sand has testified that the testatrix was still alert at the time of the execution of the
will, i.e., at or around the time of her birth anniversary celebration in 1981. It was
also established that she is a very intelligent person and has a mind of her own. Her
independence of character and to some extent, her sense of superiority, which has
been testified to in Court, all show the unlikelihood of her being unduly influenced or
improperly pressured to make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue
influence or improper pressure in question herein only refer to the making of a will
and not as to the specific testamentary provisions therein which is the proper subject
of another proceeding. Hence, under the circumstances, this Court cannot find
convincing reason for the disallowance of the will herein.
Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on succession that in
case of doubt, testate succession should be preferred over intestate succession, and
the fact that no convincing grounds were presented and proven for the disallowance
of the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the aforesaid will submitted herein
must be admitted to probate. 3 (Citations omitted.)
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The
Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." 4 It held
that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as follows:
 Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed
without being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date
validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will,
the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not
dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated
by decedent.
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any of the following
cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the
time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of
the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not
intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature
thereto.
In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied
with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable
of making a will, at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the
influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other
person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the
instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing
his signature thereto.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a petition to admit a
holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is,
indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time
the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of
the decedent. 6
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil
Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous.
We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand,
also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain
and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already
given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's
last will, must be disregarded.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription,
attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code.
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be
totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil
Code, thus:
A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be
made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic
will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some
of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does
not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court held:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the
testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is
not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words
erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical commentary when he said
"la omission de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia
establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1985." 8 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator's signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of
authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of
dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the
necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to
Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering holographic
wills are taken. They read as follows:

Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form
and with the requisites required in Article 688.

Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age.

In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to
the year of its execution, written in its entirety by the testator and signed by him, and
must contain a statement of the year, month and day of its execution.

If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must
identify them over his signature.

Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810
of the New Civil Code — and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are essential to
the probate of a holographic will.

The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the house and lot
located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the
will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the
situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. 11 In the case at bench,
decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of
her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in
its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property,
which she shares with her father's other heirs.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the
invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988,
admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above
qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174835 March 22, 2010
ANITA REYES-MESUGAS, Petitioner,
vs. ALEJANDRO AQUINO REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to reverse the June 23, 2006 and September 21, 2006
orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC), Branch 62 denying the petitioner’s motion to cancel a
notice of lis pendens.
Petitioner Anita Reyes-Mesugas and respondent Alejandro A. Reyes are the children of Lourdes Aquino
Reyes and Pedro N. Reyes. Lourdes died intestate, leaving to her heirs, among others, three parcels of land,
including a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 24475.
On February 3, 2000, respondent filed a petition for settlement of the estate of Lourdes, 3 praying for his
appointment as administrator due to alleged irregularities and fraudulent transactions by the other heirs.
Petitioner, her father Pedro and Arturo, a sibling of the petitioner, opposed the petition.
On August 30, 2000, a compromise agreement4 was entered into by the parties whereby the estate of
Lourdes was partitioned. A decision5 dated September 13, 2000 was rendered by the RTC pursuant to the
said compromise agreement. The compromise agreement with respect to TCT No. 24475 is reproduced
below:
5. That the parties hereto hereby agree to recognize, acknowledge and respect:
5.1. the improvements found on the parcel of land covered under TCT No. 24475 of
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal consisting of two lots namely Lot 4-A and Lot 4-B of
the new survey with two (2) residential houses presently occupied and possessed as
owners thereof by Antonio Reyes and Anita Reyes-Mesugas to constitute part of
their shares in the estate of Lourdes Aquino Reyes;
5.2 further, the improvement consisting of a bakery-store under lease to a third party.
The proceeds thereof shall be shared by Antonio Reyes and Pedro N. Reyes;
5.3 that the expenses for the partition and titling of the property between Antonio
Reyes and Anita Reyes-Mesugas shall be equally shared by them.
On December 7, 2004, petitioner filed a motion to cancel lis pendens annotation for TCT No. 244756 in the
RTC in view of the finality of judgment in the settlement of the estate. Petitioner argued that the settlement
of the estate proceeding had terminated; hence, the annotation of lis pendens could already be cancelled
since it had served its purpose.
Respondent opposed the motion and claimed that the parties, in addition to the compromise agreement,
executed "side agreements" which had yet to be fulfilled. One such agreement was executed between
petitioner7 and respondent granting respondent a one-meter right of way on the lot covered by TCT No.
24475. However, petitioner refused to give the right of way and threatened to build a concrete structure to
prevent access. He argued that, unless petitioner permitted the inscription of the right of way on the
certificate of title pursuant to their agreement, the notice of lis pendens in TCT No. 24475 must remain.
In its order8 dated January 26, 2006, the RTC denied the motion to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotation for lack of sufficient merit. It found that the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens was unnecessary as there were reasons for maintaining it in view of petitioner's non-compliance
with the alleged right of way agreement between the parties. It stated that:
A careful perusal of the compromise agreement dated September 13, 2000 revealed that one of the
properties mentioned is a parcel of land with improvements consisting [of] two hundred nine (209) square
meters situated in Makati covered under TCT No. 24475 of the Registry of Deeds [of] Rizal in the name of
Pedro N. Reyes married to Lourdes Aquino Reyes and form[s] part of the notarized right of way agreement
on TCT No. 24475, considering that the movant Anita Reyes is still bound by the right of way agreement,
the same should be complied with before the cancellation of the subject annotation. 9 (Citations omitted)
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal.10 Because the denial of a motion to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotation was an interlocutory order, the RTC denied the notice of appeal as it could not be
appealed until the judgment on the main case was rendered.11 A motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioner but the same was also denied.12
Hence, this petition.
We find for petitioner.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put
an end to one already commenced.13 Once submitted to the court and stamped with judicial approval, it
becomes more than a mere private contract binding upon the parties; having the sanction of the court and
entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any judgment. 14
Consequently, a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is immediately executory
as there is no appeal from such judgment.15 When both parties enter into an agreement to end a pending
litigation and request that a decision be rendered approving said agreement, such action constitutes an
implied waiver of the right to appeal against the said decision. 16
In this instance, the case filed with the RTC was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
Lourdes. The RTC therefore took cognizance of the case as a probate court.
Settled is the rule that a probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. It acts on matters pertaining to the
estate but never on the rights to property arising from the contract. 17 It approves contracts entered into for
and on behalf of the estate or the heirs to it but this is by fiat of the Rules of Court. 18 It is apparent therefore
that when the RTC approved the compromise agreement on September 13, 2000, the settlement of the
estate proceeding came to an end.
Moreover, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title
of the party who caused it to be recorded.19 The compromise agreement did not mention the grant of a right
of way to respondent. Any agreement other than the judicially approved compromise agreement between
the parties was outside the limited jurisdiction of the probate court. Thus, any other agreement entered into
by the petitioner and respondent with regard to a grant of a right of way was not within the jurisdiction of
the RTC acting as a probate court. Therefore, there was no reason for the RTC not to cancel the notice of lis
pendens on TCT No. 24475 as respondent had no right which needed to be protected. Any alleged right
arising from the "side agreement" on the right of way can be fully protected by filing an ordinary action for
specific performance in a court of general jurisdiction.1avvphi1
More importantly, the order of the probate court approving the compromise had the effect of directing the
delivery of the residue of the estate of Lourdes to the persons entitled thereto under the compromise
agreement. As such, it brought to a close the intestate proceedings 20 and the probate court lost jurisdiction
over the case, except only as regards to the compliance and the fulfillment by the parties of their respective
obligations under the compromise agreement.
Having established that the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Lourdes came to an end upon the
RTC’s promulgation of a decision based on the compromise agreement, Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court provides:

Sec. 4. Recording the order of partition of estate. - Certified copies of final orders and judgments of the
court relating to the real estate or the partition thereof shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the
province where the property is situated.

In line with the recording of the order for the partition of the estate, paragraph 2, Section 77 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 152921 provides:

Section 77. Cancellation of Lis Pendens – xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx

At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other disposition of the action such as to
terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in
which a memorandum or notice of lis pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding section, the
notice of lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court
in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, when the September 13, 2000 decision was recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Rizal pursuant to
Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, the notice of lis pendens inscribed on TCT No. 24475 was deemed
cancelled by virtue of Section 77 of PD No. 1529.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 62 dated June 23, 2006 and September 21, 2006 are SET ASIDE. The notice of lis
pendens annotated on TCT No. 24475 is hereby declared CANCELLED pursuant to Section 77 of the PD
No. 1529 in relation to Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.