G.R. Nos. 143013-14. December 18, 2000.

* of judgment, and unless lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the
appellate court be amply demonstrated, we may not disturb such factual findings.

TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW and individual union

members DANILO G. MADARA and ROMEO L. MANAYAO, petitioners, vs. THE Labor Law; Strikes; Assumption Orders; Return-to-work Orders; The mere issuance
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, as Secretary of Labor and of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a
Employment, and TEMIC TELEFUNKEN MICROELECTRONICS, (PHILS.), INC., return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is not stated in the
respondents. assumption order.—It is clear from the foregoing legal provision that the moment
the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry
Administrative Law; Judicial Review; Evidence; The factual findings by quasi-judicial
indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall have the effect of
agencies, such as the Department of Labor and Employment, when supported by
automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not even
substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect in view of their expertise in their
necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another order directing them to
respective fields; Judicial review of labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the
return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of
sufficiency of evidence on which the labor officials findings rest—the function of
Labor automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to
the Court is to review or revision of errors of law and not to a second analysis of
return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order. However,
the evidence.—We take this occasion to emphasize that the office of a petition for
petitioners refused to acknowledge this directive of the Secretary of Labor on
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court requires that it shall raise
September 8, 1995 thereby necessitating the issuance of another order expressly
only questions of law. The factual findings by quasi-judicial agencies, such as the
directing the striking workers to cease and desist from their actual strike, and to
Department of Labor and Employment, when supported by substantial evidence,
immediately return to work but which directive the herein petitioners opted to
are entitled to great respect in view of their expertise in their respective fields.
ignore.
Judicial review of labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of
evidence on which the labor official’s findings rest. It is not our function to assess
and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced
Same; Same; Same; Same; Defiance to the assumption and return-to-work orders
by the parties to an appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court
of the Secretary of Labor after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for loss
(here, the DOLE Secretary) and the appellate court on the matter coincide, as in
of the employment status of any striking union officer or member.—The rationale
this case at bar. The Rule limits that function of the Court to the review or revision
of this prohibition is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly
of errors of law and not to a second analysis of the evidence. Here, petitioners
acquired by the competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered
would have us re-calibrate all over again the factual basis and the probative value
with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike. We have held in a
of the pieces of evidence submitted by the Company to the DOLE, contrary to the
number of cases that defiance to the assumption and return-to-work orders of the
provisions of Rule 45. Thus, absent any showing of whimsical or capricious exercise
Secretary of Labor after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for loss of the
employment status of any striking union officer or member.

1
 entitled to, and must—in the exercise of its judicial power—review the substance
of the Secretary’s award when grave abuse of discretion is alleged to exist in the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Writs of Execution; The assumption and return-to-work
award, i.e., in the appreciation of and the conclusions the Secretary drew from the
Orders issued by the Secretary of Labor are not the kind of orders contemplated in
evidence presented.” However, this Court’s “review (of) the substance” does not
Sections 1 and 4, Rule III of the NLRC Manual because such Orders do not yet
mean a re-calibration of the evidence presented before the DOLE but only a
finally dispose of labor disputes.—To cast doubt on the regularity of the aforesaid
determination of whether the Secretary of Labor’s award passed the test of
service of the two Orders issued by the Secretary of Labor, petitioners cite Section
reasonableness when he arrived at his conclusions made thereon. Thus, we
1, Rule IX of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment which provides that:
declared in Meralco, that: “In this case we believe that the more appropriate and
Section 1. Hours and Days When Writ Shall Be Served.—Writ of Execution shall be
available standard and one does not require a constitutional interpretation—is
served at any day, except Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, between the hours of
simply the standard of reasonableness. In layman’s terms, reasonableness implies
eight in the morning and five in the afternoon, x x x However, the above-cited rule
the absence of arbitrariness, in legal parlance, this translates into the exercise of
is not applicable to the case at bar inasmuch as Sections 1 and 4, Rule III of the
proper discretion and to the observance of due process. Thus, the question we
same NLRC Manual provide that such “Execution shall issue only upon a judgment
have to answer in deciding this case is whether the Secretary’s actions have been
or order that finally disposes of an action or proceeding.” The assumption and
reasonable in light of the parties positions and the evidence they presented.” Thus,
return-to-work Orders issued by the Secretary of Labor in the case at bar are not
notwithstanding any allegation of grave abuse of discretion, unless it can be amply
the kind of orders contemplated in the immediately cited rule of the NLRC because
demonstrated that the Secretary of Labor’s arbitral award did not pass the test of
such Orders of the Secretary of Labor did not yet finally dispose of the labor
reasonableness, his conclusions thereon shall not be disturbed, as in the case at
dispute.
bar.

Same; Same; Same; Notwithstanding any allegation of grave abuse of discretion,

Same; Judicial Review; For the Supreme Court to exercise the power of judicial
unless it can be amply demonstrated that the Secretary of Labor’s arbitral award
review over a decision of an administrative agency, such as the DOLE, it must first
did not pass the test of reasonableness, his conclusions thereon shall not be
be shown that the tribunal, board of officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
disturbed.—As regards the third assigned error, petitioners contend that a
functions has indeed acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there
resolution of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court should
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
include the correction of the Secretary of Labor’s evaluation of the evidence and
law.—The main thrust of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
factual findings thereon pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Meralco v. The
Court is only the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of
Honorable Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing. That contention is
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, for
misplaced. In that case, we ruled that: “The extent of judicial review over the
this Court to properly exercise the power of judicial review over a decision of an
Secretary of Labor’s arbitral award is not limited to a determination of grave abuse
administrative agency, such as the DOLE, it must first be shown that the tribunal,
in the manner of the secretary’s exercise of his statutory powers. This Court is
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has indeed acted

2
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the absence
of any showing of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse tantamount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, judicial review may not be had over an administrative agency’s
decision. We have gone over the records of the case at bar and we see no cogent
basis to hold that the Secretary of Labor has abused his discretion.
Same; Same; Judgments; The Supreme Court does not sanction the piecemeal
interpretation of a decision to advance one’s case—to get the true intent and
meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted
to but the derision must be considered in its entirety.—That declaration of the
Court of Appeals should be taken in the context of the whole paragraph and the
law and the jurisprudence cited in the assailed portion of its decision. We do not
sanction the piecemeal interpretation of a decision to advance one’s case. To get
the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be
isolated and resorted to but the decision must be considered in its entirety.
Same; Due Process; Position Papers; The requirements of due process are satisfied
when the parties to a labor case are given the opportunity to submit position
papers wherein they are supposed to attach all the documents that would prove
their claim in the event it will be decided that no further hearing should be
conducted or that hearing was not necessary.—The fact that the Hearing Officer of
DOLE admitted their demurrer to evidence is not a valid excuse for herein
petitioners not to comply with her said directive for the petitioners to submit their
position paper and to attach thereto affidavits and documentary evidence within
ten (10) days.
3
Petitioners’ non-compliance with that directive by failing or refusing to attach
affidavits and supporting evidence to their position paper should not be ascribed
as the fault of the Secretary of Labor when he denied their demurrer to evidence
and forthwith rendered decision on the illegality of the strike. Petitioners have only
themselves to blame for having defied the order of the said Hearing Officer of
DOLE to submit position papers with supporting evidence. A party who has availed
of the opportunity to present his position paper cannot claim to have been denied
due process. The requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties to a
labor case are given the opportunity to submit position papers wherein they are
supposed to attach all the documents that would prove their claim in the event it
will be decided that no further hearing should be conducted or that hearing was
not necessary.
Same; Assumption Orders; The grant of plenary powers to the Secretary of Labor
under Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, makes it incumbent for him to
bring about soonest, a fair and just solution to the differences between the
employer and the employees so that the damage such labor dispute might cause
upon the national interest may be minimized as much as possible, if not totally
averted, by avoiding stoppage of work or any lagging of the activities of the
industry or the possibility of these contingencies which might cause detriment to
national interest.—The grant of plenary powers to the Secretary of Labor under Art.
263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended, makes it incumbent for him to bring about
soonest, a fair and just solution to the differences between the employer and the
employees so that the damage such labor dispute might cause upon the national
interest may be minimized as much as possible, if not totally averted, by avoiding
stoppage of work or any lagging of the activities of the industry or the possibility of
these contingencies which might cause detriment to such national interest.
Accordingly, he may adopt the most reasonable and expeditious way of writing
finis to the labor dispute. Otherwise, the result would be absurd and contrary to
the grant of plenary powers to him by the Labor Code over a labor dispute causing
or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest.
The petition is not meritorious, and the same should be as it is hereby dismissed.

The facts as borne by the records are as follows:

DE LEON, JR., J.:
The labor dispute started on August 25, 1995 when the Company and the Union
reached a deadlock in their negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement.
On August 28, 1995, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated December 23,
1999 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 54227 and 54665 and its Resolution2 dated April 19, 2000,
denying herein petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
On September 8, 1995,3 the then Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment, Jose S. Brillantes, intervened and assumed jurisdiction over the
dispute pursuant to Art. 263, par. (g),4 of the Labor Code, as amended. Thus, the
The assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals granted the petition of
Order5 of the said Acting Secretary of Labor enjoined any strike or lockout,
private respondent TEMIC TELEFUNKEN MICROELECTRONICS, (Phils.), INC.,
whether actual or intended, between the parties. His Notice of the Assumption
(Company, for brevity) in CA-GR. SP No. 54227 reversing and setting aside the
Order6 was personally served on the representatives of the Company, namely, on
Secretary of Labor’s (1) Decision dated May 28, 1999, and (2) Resolution dated July
Atty. Allan Montano, counsel of the Union-FFW, on September 9, 1995 at 1:25 p.m.
16, 1999, insofar as the Company was directed to pay backwages and grant
and twice on Ms. Liza Dimaano, Union President, first on September 8, 1995 at
financial assistance to the striking workers.
7:15 p.m. and again on September 11, 1995 at 9:30 a.m. but both union
representatives refused to acknowledge receipt thereof.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 54665, on the other hand, the petition of TELEFUNKEN

SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW (Union, for brevity) and individual
Despite the assumption Order, the Union struck on September 14, 1995. Two (2)
union members DANILO G. MADARA and ROMEO L. MANAYAO was dismissed on a
days later, the Acting Secretary of Labor issued an Order7 directing the striking
finding that the Secretary of Labor did not abuse his discretion nor acted in excess
workers to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours and for the Company to
of his jurisdiction when he declared illegal the strike staged by the Union, its
admit them back to work under the terms and conditions prevailing prior to the
officers and members on September 14, 1995, and that as a result thereof, those
strike. Notice8 of the Return-to-Work Order9 dated September 16, 1995 of the
who participated therein have lost their employment status.
Acting Secretary of Labor was sent to the striking Union members but still some of

4
them refused to heed the order and continued with their picket. The Federation of
Free Workers (FFW) received and acknowledged receipt of the said Return to Work
Accordingly, on July 3, 1996, the Company filed a Motion to Quash, Recall or
Order on September 18, 1995. On September 23, 1995, violence erupted in the
Suspend the Writ of Execution14 issued by Secretary Quisumbing. This motion was
picket lines. The service bus ferrying non-striking workers was stoned, causing
denied15 by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE, for brevity) for lack
injuries to its passengers. Thereafter, complaints for threats, defamation, illegal
of merit and, in the same Order, the DOLE directed the issuance of an Alias Writ to
detention and physical injuries were filed against the strikers.
enforce the actual and physical reinstatement of the workers, or in case the same
was not feasible, to effect payroll reinstatement. On November 21, 1996, the
Company’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.16
On October 2, 1995, the Company issued letters of termination for cause to the
workers who did not report back to work despite the Notice of Assumption and
Return-to-Work Orders issued by the Acting Secretary Jose S. Brillantes of the
On December 9, 1996, the Company filed with this Court a petition for certiorari,
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
docketed as G.R. No. 127215, questioning the denial of its motion for
reconsideration and the Alias Writ issued by the DOLE to enforce the actual and
physical reinstatement or the payroll reinstatement of the workers (including the
On October 27, 1995, the Acting Secretary of Labor issued another Order10
Original Writ of Execution of June 27, 1996).
directing the Company to reinstate all striking workers “except the Union Officers,
shop stewards, and those with pending criminal charges, x x x” while the resolution
of the legality of the strike was pending. This exclusion Order was reaffirmed with
After we consolidated17 the petitions for certiorari of the Company and the Union
some modifications in an Order11 dated November 24, 1995.
in G.R. Nos. 122743 and 127215, respectively, we rendered a Decision therein on
December 12, 1997. The Com-pany’s petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 127215 was
dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 122743, we granted the Union’s petition
On December 5, 1995, the Union filed with this Court a petition for certiorari,
and ordered the reinstatement of all striking workers without exception. We also
docketed as G.R. No. 122743, questioning the exclusions made in the aforesaid
directed the Secretary of Labor and Employment to determine with dispatch the
Orders.
legality of the strike as well as the liability of the individual strikers, if any.

On June 27, 1996, while the said petition in G.R. No. 122743 was pending, then
Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing** issued a Writ of Execution12 for the
physical reinstatement of the remaining striking workers who were not reinstated
as contained in the thirty-two (32) page list13 attached to the aforesaid writ.
After receipt of our said Decision in G.R. Nos. 122743 and 127215, the DOLE issued
an Alias Writ of Execution on August 26, 1998. Thereafter, the Company moved to
quash the Alias Writ which was, however, denied18 by the DOLE. The motion for
reconsideration filed by the Company was similarly denied.19 Aggrieved by the

5
preceding rulings of the DOLE, the Company elevated this case to this Court via
another petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 135788.
On December 7, 1998, we resolved20 to dismiss the said petition in G.R. No.
135788 for (a) failing to state the place of service by registered mail on the adverse
party; (b) failing to submit a certification duly executed by the president of the
petitioning Company or by its representative which shows its authority to
represent and act on behalf of the Company; and (c) for lack of the requisite
certificate of non-forum shopping. We denied this petition with finality on our
March 15, 1999 Resolution21 where we held that the Secretary of Labor did not
abuse his discretion in denying the Company’s motion to quash the execution of
our Decision dated December 12, 1997.
In compliance with our order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment “to
determine with dispatch the legality of the strike,” marathon hearings were
conducted22 at the DOLE Office with Atty. Lita V. Aglibut as hearing officer. On
September 22, 1998, both the Union and the Company complied with the order to
submit their respective position papers. The Company adduced evidence and
submitted its case for decision. The Union did not adduce evidence. Instead, the
Union manifested that it would file a motion to dismiss for failure of the Company
to prove its case with the request that it be allowed to present evidence should its
motion be denied.
During the subsequent hearings23 conducted by the hearing officer of DOLE, the
Union insisted that a ruling should first be made on the Demurrer to Evidence it
previously filed notwithstanding repeated reminders by the Hearing Officer that
the technical rules of evidence and procedure do not apply to proceedings before
6
DOLE. Thereafter, an exchange of pleadings, reiterating their respective positions,
ensued between the Company and the Union.
On May 19, 1999, the Union filed a motion before the DOLE praying for the
issuance of another Alias Writ of Execution in connection with our March 15, 1999
Resolution in G.R. No. 135788. The Union contended that this Resolution has
declared the dismissals of the striking workers as illegal and therefore a writ should
be issued for the physical reinstatement of the workers with full backwages and
other benefits reckoned from June 27, 1996.
On May 28, 1999, the Secretary of Labor and Employment resolved the matter in a
Decision.24 The Secretary of Labor declared therein that in hearings and
resolutions of labor disputes, before the DOLE, his Office is not governed by the
strict and technical rules of evidence and procedure observed in the regular courts
of law, and that it will resolve the issues based on the pleadings, the documentary
evidence and other records of the case. The dispositive portion of the said Decision
dated May 28, 1999 reads:
‘WHEREFORE, PREMISED ON THE FOREGOING, this Office hereby:
a. Declares the strike conducted by the Telefunken Semiconductors Employees
Union-FFW on 14 September 1995 as illegal for having been waged in open, willful
and knowing defiance of the assumption order dated 8 September 1995 and the
subsequent return-to-work order dated 16 September 1995 and consequently, the
striking workers are declared to have lost their employment status;
b. Directs the payment of backwages and other benefits to the striking workers 1999 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE in so far as they direct the company to pay
corresponding to the temporary reinstatement periods (1) from 27 June 1996 to 28 backwages and grant financial assistance to the striking workers. The said Decision
October 1996, (2) from 21 November 1998 up to the date of this Decision; and Resolution are AFFIRMED in all other respects. The Union’s Petitions in CA-G.R.
SP No. 546654 is DISMISSED.
c. Directs the Telefunken Micro-Electronics (Phils.), Inc. to grant financial assistance
equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service to the striking workers
conformably with its grant of the same benefit to other strikers as manifested by
SO ORDERED.”
the Company to the Supreme Court on 20 November 1997.

In this connection, the Bureau of Working Conditions, this Department, is hereby

directed to compute the total award herein made and to submit its report of On January 24, 2000, only the Union sought reconsideration27 of the said Decision
computation to this Office within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision. of the appellate court. However, it was-denied for lack of merit by the Court of
Appeals on April 19, 2000 in its Resolution.28

SO ORDERED.”25
In the petition at bench, petitioners Union, Madara and Manayao submits the
following assignment of errors, to wit:
Dissatisfied, both the Company and the Union together with individual union
members Nancy Busa and Arnel Badua, filed motions for reconsideration of the
said Decision of the Secretary of Labor. On July 16, 1999,26 the Secretary of Labor
denied the said motions.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

The Company and the Union filed their respective petitions for certiorari docketed
as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 54227 and 54665 with the Court of Appeals and these were I
later on consolidated. On December 23, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its
now assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which states.
. . . IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF LABOR IN
FINDING THE STRIKE STAGE BY THE UNION ILLEGAL WHICH WAS FEEBLY BASED ON
“WHEREFORE, the COMPANY’S Petition in CA-G.R. No. SP 54227 is GRANTED. The THE COMPANY’S POSITION PAPER AND THE MATERIALS AND PICTORIALS
Secretary of Labor’s Decision dated 28 May 1999 and his Resolution dated 16 July

7
ATTACHED THERETO WHICH ARE BEREFT OF PROBATIVE VALUE BECAUSE THEY
ARE PATENTLY INADMISSIBLE AND INCOMPETENT.
V

II
. . . IN UPHOLDING THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF LA-BOR’S RULING THAT THE
NON-APPLICATION OF TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR BARS THE PETITIONERS FROM
. . . IN SUSTAINING THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY’S DECISION EFFECTING THE
WHOLESALE TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE STRIKING TEMIC WORKERS
WITHOUT ANY DETERMINATION OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY, IF ANY, AS
ADDUCING EVIDENCE AFTER THE DENIAL OF THE UNIONS DEMURRER TO
ORDERED BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ILLEGAL
EVIDENCE.
ACTS COMMITTED BY THE STRIKERS ATTENDANT TO THE STRIKE.

VI
III

. . . IN NEGATING THE PETITIONERS’ VESTED RIGHT TO BACKWAGES.

. . . IN RULING THAT “THE SOLE OFFICE OF THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS THE
CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION INCLUDING THE COMMISSION OF
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION,” DOES NOT
INCLUDE CORRECTION OF HEREIN PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF LABOR’S The petition has no merit.
EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE AND FACTUAL FINDINGS THEREON.

IV
. . . IN RULING IN A MANNER ABSOLUTE “THAT TECHNICAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
PREVAILING IN THE COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY HAVE NO ROOM IN
ADMINISTRATIVE AND/OR QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.”
As to the first and second assigned errors, herein petitioners contend that
according to the Constitution29 and jurisprudence,30 strikes enjoy the
presumption of legality and the burden of proving otherwise rests upon the
respondent Company; that the case should not have been decided on the basis of
the position paper method because in several instances31 this Court has looked
with disfavor on the position paper method in disposing labor cases; that due to
the transcendental issues involved, a hearing should have been conducted to avoid

8
the impression of denial of due process considering the dearth of evidence
submitted by respondent Company; and that the pieces of evidence submitted by
579
respondent Company are wanting in probative value.

VOL. 348, DECEMBER 18, 2000

Herein petitioners also argue that for a union officer to lose his employment status
it must be proved that he knowingly participated in an illegal strike; and that in the
case of an ordinary member, it must not only be demonstrated that he actually
participated in the illegal strike but also that he has committed illegal acts during 579
the strike and which respondent Company allegedly failed to prove.

Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals

We do not agree. Despite petitioners’ vain attempt to structure the case to show,
on its surface, a question of law, nevertheless, the case essentially involves a
question of fact. The issues raised basically boils down to a determination of
whether or not the position paper and the pieces of evidence adduced by the
Company before
_______________
the DOLE are sufficient in probative value to overthrow the constitutional
presumption of the legality of the strike. As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General in his Comment,32 “it . . . . (the first and second assigned errors)
essentially involve questions of fact.” It calls for a “re-evaluation of facts and a
re-examination of the evidence.”

29 1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3, par. 2.
30 Master Iron Labor Union v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 47, 60 [1993].
31 Batongbacal v. Associated Bank, 168 SCRA 600 [1998]; Progress Homes v. NLRC,
269 SCRA 274 [1997]; and Meralco v. Quisumbing, 302 SCRA 173 [1999].
We take this occasion to emphasize that the office of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court requires that it shall raise only
questions of law.33 The factual findings by quasi-judicial agencies, such as the
Department of Labor and Employment, when supported by substantial evidence,
are entitled to great respect in view of their expertise in their respective fields.34
Judicial review of labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of
evidence on which the labor official’s findings rest.35 It is not our function to
assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary,
adduced by the parties to an appeal, particularly where the findings of both the

9
trial court (here, the DOLE Secretary) and the appellate court on the matter 36 Olan v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 504, 509 [1998] citing South Sea Surety and
coincide,36 as in this case at bar. The Rule limits that function of the Court to the Insurance Co. v. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 744 [1995].
review or revision of errors of law and not to a second analysis of the evidence.37
Here, petitioners would have us re-calibrate all over again the factual basis and the
probative value of the pieces of evidence submitted by the Company to the DOLE, 37 Caoili v. CA, 314 SCRA 345, 353 [1999].
contrary to the provisions of Rule 45. Thus, absent any showing of whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment, and unless lack of any basis for the conclusions
made by the appellate
580

_______________
580

32 Rollo, pp. 631-663, 642.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

33 Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals

34 Labor Congress of the Philippines v. NLRC, 292 SCRA 469, 476 [1998] citing
court be amply demonstrated, we may not disturb such factual findings.
Association of Marine Officers and Seamen of Reyes and Lim Co v. Laguesma, 239
SCRA 412 [1994], Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers, 189
SCRA 179 [1990], Gubac v. NLRC, 187 SCRA 412 [1990].
Although we have ruled against the reliability of position papers in disposing of
labor cases, in the cases of Batongbacal v. Associated Bank38 and Progress Homes
v. NLRC,39 this was due to certain patent matters that should have been tried by
35 Austria v. NLRC, 310 SCRA 293, 300 [1999] citing Fernandez v. NLRC, 281 SCRA
the administrative agency concerned, such as certain factual circumstances which,
423 [1997].
however, are unavailing in the case at bar.

10
In Batongbacal, we withheld judgment on the case due to the absence of a _______________
definitive factual determination of the status of petitioner therein as an assistant
vice-president of therein respondent Bank. It has not been established by the
Labor Arbiter whether the petitioner therein was a managerial or a rank-and-file 38 168 SCRA 600 [1988].
employee, noting that there are different causes of termination for both the
managerial and rank-and-file employees. Thus, the need to remand the case was
necessary.
39 269 SCRA 274 [1997].

In Progress Homes, on the other hand, we found that despite the absence of any
581
evidence to establish and support therein private respondents’ claim that the
petitioners therein were their immediate employers, the Labor Arbiter forthwith
concluded the illegal dismissal of the private respondents. Also, there was the
apparent failure of the Labor Arbiter to justify why the private petitioner therein VOL. 348, DECEMBER 18, 2000
should be held solidarity liable with Progress Homes. There was a clear absence of
evidence to show that petitioner therein had engaged the services of private
respondents therein and that petitioner therein had acted maliciously and in bad 581
faith in terminating the services of private respondents.

Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals

The herein petitioners dismally failed to show that there really existed certain
issues which would necessitate the remand of this case at bar, or that the
appellate court misapprehended certain facts when it dismissed their petition for
certiorari.
portunity to the striking workers to cease and desist from continuing with their
picket. Ensconced in the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, is the rule
that:

The need to determine the individual liabilities of the striking workers, the union
officers and members alike, was correctly dispensed with by the Secretary of Labor Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
after he gave sufficient op-

11
xxx xxx xxx issuance of another order expressly directing the striking workers to cease and
desist from their actual strike, and to immediately return to work but which
directive the herein petitioners
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary
of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it _______________
or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such
assumption per certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or 40 Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestlé Philippines, Inc., 192 SCRA 396, 411 [1990].
certification order. If one had already taken place at the time of assumption or
certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work
and the employer shall immediately resume operations and re-admit all workers
582
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of
law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as
with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. (Emphasis Ours) 582

xxx xxx xxx SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

It is clear from the foregoing legal provision that the moment the Secretary of Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals
Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to
national interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining
the intended or impending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of opted to ignore. In this connection, Article 264(a) of the Labor Code clearly
Labor to issue another order directing them to return to work. The mere issuance provides that:
of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a
return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated
in the assumption order.40 However, petitioners refused to acknowledge this Article 264. Prohibited Activities.
directive of the Secretary of Labor on September 8, 1995 thereby necessitating the

12
(a) x x x _______________

No strike or lock out shall be declared after the assumption of jurisdiction by the 41 Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. v. NLRC, 178 SCRA 482, 491 [1989].
President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the
same grounds for the strike or lockout. 42 Allied Banking Corporation v. NLRC, 258 SCRA 724 [1996]; Marcopper Mining
Corporation v. Brillantes, 254 SCRA 595 [1996]; St. Scholastica’s College v. Torres,
210 SCRA 565 [1992]; Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong, 208 SCRA 157 [1992];
x x x. Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., supra; Asian Transmission
or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during Corp. v. NLRC, 179 SCRA 582 [1989]; and Sarmiento v. Tuico, 162 SCRA 676 [1988].
a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. Provided, that mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment even if a replacement had been hired by the 583
employer during such lawful strike. (Emphasis Ours)

VOL. 348, DECEMBER 18, 2000

The rationale of this prohibition is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has
been properly acquired by the competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be
interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike.41 We have
583
held in a number of cases that defiance to the assumption and return-to-work
orders of the Secretary of Labor after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground
for loss of the employment status of any striking union officer or member.42
Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals

Furthermore, the claim of petitioners that the assumption and return-to-work

Orders issued by the Secretary of Labor were allegedly inadequately served upon x x x, the reports of the DOLE process server, shows that the Notice of Order of 8
them is untenable in the light of what have already been clearly established in this September 1995 was actually served on the Union President. The latter, however,
case, to wit: refused to acknowledge receipt of the same on two separate occasions (on 8
September 1995 at 7:15 p.m. and on 11 September 1995 at 9:30 a.m.) The Union’s

13
counsel of record, Atty. Allan Montano, similarly refused to acknowledge receipt of
the 8 September 1995 Order on 9 September 1995 at 1:25 p.m.
Records also show that the Order of 16 September 1995 was served at the strike
area with copies left with the striking workers, per the process server’s return,
although a certain Virgie Cardenas also refused to acknowledge receipt The
Federation of Free Workers officially received a copy as acknowledged by a certain
Lourdes at 3:40 p.m. of 18 September 1995.
process servers with suspicion and hostility. The refusal to receive such orders and
other processes is, as described by the Supreme Court in an analogous case, “an
apparent attempt to frustrate the ends of justice.” (Navale, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, 253 SCRA 705)
Such being the case, We cannot allow the Union to thwart the efficacy of the
assumption and return to work orders, issued in the national interest,
through—the simple expediency of refusing to acknowledge receipt thereof.

The foregoing clearly negate the Union’s contention of inadequate service of the
Orders dated 8 and 16 September 1995 of Acting Secretary Brillantes. Furthermore,
the DOLE process server’s discharge of his function is an official act carrying the
presumption of regularity in its performance which the Union has not disproved,
much less disputed with clear and convincing evidence.
Having thus resolved the threshold issue as hereinabove discussed, it necessarily
follows that the strike of the Union cannot be viewed as anything but illegal for
having been staged in open and knowing defiance of the assumption and
return-to-work orders. The necessary consequence

584
Likewise, it would be stretching the limits of credibility if We were to believe that
the Union was unaware of the said Orders during all the conciliation conferences
conducted by the NCMB-DOLE. Specifically, in the conciliation meetings after the 584
issuance of the Order of 8 September 1995 to settle the unresolved CBA issues and
after the issuance of the Order of 16 September 1995 to establish the mechanics
for a smooth implementation of this Office’s return-to-work directive, the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Union—with its officers and members in attendance—never questioned the
propriety or adequacy by which these Orders were served upon them.

Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals

We are not unaware of the difficulty of serving assumption and return-to-work

orders on striking unions and their members who invariably view the DOLE’S

14
thereof are also detailed by the Supreme Court in its various rulings. In Marcopper assumption order dated 8 September 1995 and did not report back to work as
Mining Corp. v. Brillantes (254 SCRA 595), the High Tribunal stated in no uncertain directed in the Order of 16 September 1995.43
terms that—

To cast doubt on the regularity of the aforesaid service of the two Orders issued by
“by staging a strike after the assumption of jurisdiction or certification for the Secretary of Labor, petitioners cite Section 1, Rule IX of the NLRC Manual on
arbitration, workers forfeited their right to; be readmitted to work, having Execution of Judgment which provides that:
abandoned their employment, and so could be validly replaced.”

Section 1. Hours and Days When Writ Shall Be Served.—Writ of Execution shall be
Again, in Allied Banking Corporation v. NLRC (258 SCRA 724), the Supreme Court served at any day, except Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, between the hours of
ruled that: eight in the morning and five in the afternoon, x x x

“x x x. However, private respondents failed to take into consideration the cases _______________
recently decided by this Court which emphasized on the strict adherence to the
rule that defiance of the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor would
constitute a valid ground for dismissal. The respective liabilities of striking union 43 Rollo, pp. 555-556.
officers and members who failed to immediately comply with the return-to-work
order, are clearly spelled out in Article 264 of the Labor Code which provides that
any declaration of a strike or lock out after the Secretary of Labor and Employment
585
has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an illegal act.
Therefore, any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike
defying a return-to-work order may as a result thereof be considered to have lost
his employment status.” VOL. 348, DECEMBER 18, 2000

Viewed in the light of the foregoing, We have no alternative but to confirm the loss 585
of employment status of all those who participated in the strike in defiance of the

15
Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals correction of the Secretary of Labor’s evaluation of the evidence and factual
findings thereon pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Meralco v. The Honorable
Secretary of
However, the above-cited rule is not applicable to the case at bar inasmuch as
Sections 144 and 4,45 Rule III of the same NLRC Manual provide that such
“Execution shall issue only upon a judgment or order that finally disposes of an _______________
action or proceeding.” The assumption and return-to-work Orders issued by the
Secretary of Labor in the case at bar are not the kind of orders contemplated in the
immediately cited rule of the NLRC because such Orders of the Secretary of Labor 44 Section 1. Execution Upon Final Judgment or Order.—Execution shall issue only
did not yet finally dispose of the labor dispute. As pointed out by the Secretary of upon a judgment or order that finally disposes of an action or proceeding, except
Labor in his Decision, petitioners cannot now feign ignorance of his official in specific instances where the law provides or execution pending appeal.
intervention, to wit:

45 Section 4. Issuance of a Writ.—Execution shall issue upon an order, resolution

The admissibility of the evidence presented by the Company, however, has been or decision that finally disposes of the actions or proceedings x x x.
questioned. The Union’s arguments are less than convincing. The numerous
publications of the subject DOLE Orders in various newspapers, tabloids, radio and
television cannot be considered hearsay and subject to authentication considering
46 Rollo, p. 557.
that the subject thereof were the lawful Orders of a competent government
authority. In the case of the announcements posted on the Union’s bulletin board,
pictures of which were presented by the Company in evidence, suffice it for us to
state that the bulletin board belonged to the Union. Since the veracity of the 586
contents of the announcements on the bulletin board were never denied by the
Union except to claim that these were “self-serving, unverified/unverifiable and
thus utterly inadmissible,” We cannot but admit the same for the purpose for 586
which it was presented.46

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

As regards the third assigned error, petitioners contend that a resolution of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court should include the

16
Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals
Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing.47 That contention is misplaced. In that case, we
ruled that:
Thus, notwithstanding any allegation of grave abuse of discretion, unless it can be
amply demonstrated that the Secretary of Labor’s arbitral award did not pass the
test of reasonableness, his conclusions thereon shall not be disturbed, as in the
case at bar.

“The extent of judicial review over the Secretary of Labor’s arbitral award is not
limited to a determination of grave abuse in the manner of the secretary’s exercise
of his statutory powers. This Court is entitled to, and must—in the exercise of its
judicial power—review the substance of the Secretary’s award when grave abuse
of discretion is alleged to exist in the award, i.e., in the appreciation of and the
conclusions the Secretary drew from the evidence presented.”
The main thrust of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
only the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, for this
Court to properly exercise the power of judicial review over a decision of an
administrative agency, such as the DOLE, it must first be shown that the tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial func-

_______________
However, this Court’s “review (of) the substance” does not mean a re-calibration
of the evidence presented before the DOLE but only a determination of whether
the Secretary of Labor’s award passed the test of reasonableness when he arrived 47 302 SCRA 173, 217 [1999].
at his conclusions made thereon. Thus, we declared in Meralco, that:

48 Id., p. 192
“In this case we believe that the more appropriate and available standard and one
which does not require a constitutional interpretation—is simply the standard of
reasonableness. In layman’s terms, reasonableness implies the absence of 587
arbitrariness, in legal parlance, this translates into the exercise of proper discretion
and to the observance of due process. Thus, the question we have to answer in
deciding this case is whether the Secretary’s actions have been reasonable in light
VOL. 348, DECEMBER 18, 2000
of the parties positions and the evidence they presented.”48

587

17
Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals
tions has indeed acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.49 In the absence of any showing of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, judicial review may not be had over an
administrative agency’s decision. We have gone over the records of the case at bar
and we see no cogent basis to hold that the Secretary of Labor has abused his
discretion.
x x x, it cannot be gainsaid that technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of
law and equity have no room in administrative and/or quasi-judicial proceedings
(Lawin Security Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 273 SCRA
132; Valderama v. National Labor Relations Commission, 256 SCRA 466; De Ysasi III
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 231 SCRA 173). In fact, Article 221 of the
Labor Code expressly mandates that in proceedings before “the (National Labor
Relations) Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling x x x.” This
_______________

In the fourth and fifth assignment of errors, petitioners would have us believe that
the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision ruled in a manner absolute that 49 Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
prevailing technical rules of evidence in the courts of law and equity have no room
in administrative and/or quasi-judicial proceedings, and that the non-application of
technical rules of procedure in proceedings before the Office of the Secretary of 50 Valderama v. NLRC, 256 SCRA 466, 472 citing Policarpio v. P.V.B. and Associated
Labor should not have barred herein petitioners from adducing evidence after Ins. & Surety Co., Inc., 106 Phil. 125, 131 [1959].
their demurrer to evidence was denied.

588
We do not agree. That declaration of the Court of Appeals should be taken in the
context of the whole paragraph and the law and the jurisprudence cited in the
assailed portion of its decision. We do not sanction the piecemeal interpretation of
588
a decision to advance one’s case. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision,
no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to but the decision
must be considered in its entirety.50 The portion of the Court of Appeals assailed
Decision reads, to wit: SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

18
Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals illegality of the strike. Petitioners have only themselves to blame for having defied
the order of the said Hearing Officer of DOLE to submit position papers with
supporting evidence. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his
provision is also applicable to proceedings before the Office of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment which, under the said Code, is empowered to hear and
resolve matters arising from the exercise of its plenary power to issue assumption _______________
or (sic) jurisdiction and return-to-work orders, all in keeping with the national
interest (Article 263(g) and Article 264 of the Labor Code).”51
51 Rollo, pp. 184-185.

The contention of petitioners that they should have been allowed to present
evidence when their demurrer to evidence was denied by the Secretary of Labor, is 52 TSN, September 22, 1998, pp. 58-59; Rollo, pp. 399-400.
untenable. The record shows that in the hearing of September 22, 1998 attended
by the parties, Atty. Lita V. Aglibut, Hearing Officer, of the public respondent’s
office, who presided over the hearing directed the parties to submit their
589
respective position papers together with the affidavits and documentary evidence
within ten (10) days.52 While the Company submitted its position paper together
with supporting evidence and rested its case for resolution, herein petitioners,
however, submitted only its position paper but without attaching thereto any VOL. 348, DECEMBER 18, 2000
supporting documentary evidence. Petitioners chose to rely on the Rules of Court
by filing a demurrer to evidence in the hope of a favorable decision and
disregarded our resolution in G.R. No. 127215 ordering the Secretary of Labor to 589
determine with dispatch the legality of the strike. On the other hand, the
petitioners argued merely on the presumption that the strike was legal. The fact
that the Hearing Officer of DOLE admitted their demurrer to evidence is not a valid Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals
excuse for herein petitioners not to comply with her said directive for the
petitioners to submit their position paper and to attach thereto affidavits and
documentary evidence within ten (10) days. Petitioners’ non-compliance with that position paper cannot claim to have been denied due process.53 The requirements
directive by failing or refusing to attach affidavits and supporting evidence to their of due process are satisfied when the parties to a labor case are given the
position paper should not be ascribed as the fault of the Secretary of Labor when opportunity to submit position papers wherein they are supposed to attach all the
he denied their demurrer to evidence and forthwith rendered decision on the

19
documents that would prove their claim in the event it will be decided that no Commission, 271 SCRA 670; Capili v. National Labor Relations Commission, 270
further hearing should be conducted or that hearing was not necessary.54 SCRA 688; Aurora Land Projects Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 266 SCRA 48).

The grant of plenary powers to the Secretary of Labor under Art. 263(g) of the
Labor Code, as amended, makes it incumbent for him to bring about soonest, a fair _______________
and just solution to the differences between the employer and the employees so
that the damage such labor dispute might cause upon the national interest may be
minimized as much as possible, if not totally averted, by avoiding stoppage of work 53 Masagana Concrete Products v. NLRC, 313 SCRA 576 [1999].
or any lagging of the activities of the industry or the possibility of these
contingencies which might cause detriment to such national interest.55
Accordingly, he may adopt the most reasonable and expeditious way of writing
54 Mark Roche International v. NLRC, 313 SCRA 356 [1999].
finis to the labor dispute. Otherwise, the result would be absurd and contrary to
the grant of plenary powers to him by the Labor Code over a labor dispute causing
or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest. 55 See Manila Cordage Company v. CIR, 37 SCRA 288, 300 [1971].

And finally, with respect to petitioners’ claim of backwages, we find that the 590
ratiocination of the appellate court in its assailed Decision is in accord with law and
settled jurisprudence, to wit:
590

“On the issue of the award of backwages and financial assistance to the striking
workers, the well-entrenched doctrine is that it is only when there is a finding of SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
illegal dismissal that backwages are granted (St. Theresa’s School of Novaliches
Foundation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 289 SCRA 111; Industrial
Timber Corporation-Stanply Operations vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals
253 SCRA 623; Jackson Building Condominium Corporation, 246 SCRA 329), and
financial assistance or separation pay allowed (Mabeza v. National Labor Relations

20
Since, as correctly found by the Secretary of Labor, the strikers were not illegally
dismissed, the COMPANY is under no obligation to pay backwages to them. It is
simply inconsistent, nay, absurd, to award backwages when there is no finding of
illegal dismissal (Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation, 286 SCRA 245). x
x x when the record shows that the striking workers did not comply with lawful
orders for them to return to work during said periods of time. In fact, the Secretary
of Labor observed that while “it was obligatory on the part of both parties to
restore, in the meantime, the status quo obtaining in the workplace,” the same
“was not possible considering the strikers had defied the return-to-work Order of
this Office” (p. 8, Ibid). With such blatant disregard by the strikers of official edicts
ordering their “temporary reinstatement,” there is no basis to award them
backwages corresponding to said time frames. Otherwise, they will recover
something they have not or could not have earned by their willful defiance of the
return-to-work order, a patently incongruous and unjust situation (Santos v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 154 SCRA 166).
551). Consequently, granting financial assistance to the strikers is clearly a
“specious Inconsistency” supra. We are of course aware that financial assistance
may be allowed as a measure of social justice in exceptional circumstances and as
an equitable concession. We are likewise mindful that financial assistance is
allowed only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes
other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character (Zenco
Sales, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 234 SCRA 689) However, the
attendant facts show that such exceptional circumstances do not obtain in the
instant cases to warrant the grant of financial assistance to the
591
VOL. 348, DECEMBER 18, 2000

The same view holds with respect to the award of financial assistance or
591
separation pay. The assumption for granting financial assistance or separation pay,
which is, that there is an illegally dismissed employee and that illegally dismissed
employee would otherwise have been entitled to reinstatement, is not present in
the case at bench Here, the striking workers have been validly dismissed “Where Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals
the employee’s dismissal was for a just case, it would be neither fair nor just to
allow the employee to recover something he has not earned or could not have
earned. This being so, there can be no award of backwages, for it must be pointed striking workers. To our mind, the strikers’ open and willful defiance of the
out that while backwages are granted on the basis of equity for earnings which a assumption order dated September 16, 1995 constitute serious misconduct as well
worker or employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal, where private as reflective of their moral character, hence, granting financial assistance to them
respondent’s dismissal is for just cause, as is (sic) the case herein, there is no is not and cannot be justified (Philippines Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
factual or legal basis to order the payment of backwages; otherwise, private Commission, 282 SCRA 536, citing Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v.
respondent would be unjustly enriching herself at the expense of petitioners.” National Labor Relations Commission, 164 SCRA 671).”56
(Cathedral School of Technology v. National Labor Relations Commission, 214 SCRA

21

In fine, there is no reversible error in the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The appealed Decision dated December
23, 1999 and the Resolution dated April 19, 2000 of public respondent Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED. Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of
Appeals, 348 SCRA 565, G.R. Nos. 143013-14 December 18, 2000
G.R. No. 120751. March 17, 1999.*
PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ACTING SECRETARY OF
LABOR JOSE BRILLANTES and PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR ASSOCIATION,
respondents.
22
Labor Law; Jurisdiction; Secretary of Labor; A match factory, though of value, can
scarcely be considered as an industry “indispensable to the national interest” as it
cannot be in the same category as “generation or distribution of energy, or those
undertaken by banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries.”—The private
respondent did not even make any effort to touch on the indispensability of the
match factory to the national interest. It must have been aware that a match
factory, though of value, can scarcely be considered as an industry “indispensable
to the national interest” as it cannot be in the same category as “generation or
distribution of energy, or those undertaken by banks, hospitals, and
export-oriented industries.”
Same; Same; Same; The Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction grounded on the
alleged “obtaining circumstances” and not on a determination that the industry
involved in the labor dispute is one indispensable to the “national interest,” the
standard set by the legislature, constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or excess of jurisdiction.—It is thus evident from the foregoing that the
Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction grounded on the alleged “obtaining
circumstances” and not on a determination that the industry involved in the labor
dispute is one indispensable to the “national interest,” the standard set by the
legislature, constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction. To uphold the action of the public respondent under the premises
would be stretching too far the power of the Secretary of Labor as every case of a
strike or lockout where there are inconveniences in the community, or work
disruptions in an industry though not indispensable to the national interest, would
then come within the Secretary’s power. It would be practically allowing the
Secretary of Labor to intervene in any labor dispute at his pleasure.
_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.
748
748
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes
Same; Same; Same; Even in the exercise of his power of compulsory arbitration
under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary must follow the law.—This is
precisely why the law sets and defines the standard: even in the exercise of his
power of compulsory arbitration under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the
Secretary must follow the law. For “when an overzealous official by-passes the law
on the pretext of retaining a laudable objective, the intendment or purpose of the
law will lose its meaning as the law itself is disregarded.”
PANGANIBAN, J., Concurring Opinion:
23
Labor Law; Jurisdiction; Secretary of Labor; A labor dispute must seriously and
deleteriously affect an industry indispensable to national interest before the
secretary may assume jurisdiction over it.—I now agree with Justice Purisima’s
revised ponencia that the labor secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion in
assuming jurisdiction over a labor dispute without any showing that the disputants
were engaged in an industry indispensable to national interest. Quite the contrary,
the respondent secretary himself admits that the industry, of which petitioner is a
part, is not indispensable to national interest. Indeed, a labor dispute must
seriously and deleteriously affect an industry indispensable to national interest
before the secretary may assume jurisdiction over it.
Same; Same; Same; The secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute
is meant to be used sparingly and only if the national interest demands it.—From
the text and the tenor of the law, it is clear as daylight that the secretary’s
assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute is meant to be used sparingly and
only if the national interest demands it. He, like everyone else, must respect
labor’s paramount right to stage concerted activities.
Same; Same; Same; The Court has consistently ruled that the secretary’s
assumption of jurisdiction is intended not to interfere with or impede workers’
rights, but to obtain speedy settlement of labor disputes and only if national
interests will be affected.—Indeed, the Court has consistently ruled that the
secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction is intended not to interfere with or impede
workers’ rights, but to obtain speedy settlement of labor disputes and only if
national interests will be affected. Admittedly, the Court has allowed the
secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction in many cases, some
749 jurisdiction to carry into effect the solution it has adopted. Lastly, if the Court of
Industrial Relations has the power to fix the terms and conditions of employment,
it certainly can order the return of the workers with or without backpay as a term
or condition of the employment.”

VOL. 304, MARCH 17, 1999

Same; Same; Same; The most obvious of these powers is the automatic
enjoinment of an impending strike or lockout or the lifting thereof if one has
749 already taken place.—The most obvious of these powers is the automatic
enjoinment of an impending strike or lockout or the lifting thereof if one has
already taken place. Assumption of jurisdiction always coexists with an order for
Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes workers to return to work immediately and for employers to readmit all workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
Defiance of a return-to-work order produces forfeiture of workers’ employment.
of which are worth mentioning to show the care with which such plenary power Thus, not only does it diminish the right of labor to strike; it also limits the
should be used. prerogatives of management to hire workers under its own terms and conditions.

Same; Same; Same; When the secretary assumes jurisdiction under Article 263(g), SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
he is granted “great breadth of discretion” in order to find a solution to a labor
dispute.—When the secretary assumes jurisdiction under Art. 263(g), he is granted
“great breadth of discretion” in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. In The The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Philippine American Management Co., Inc. v. The Philippine American
Management Employees Association (PAMEA-FFW), the Court clarified the extent
of the powers vested in the then Court of Industrial Relations, as follows: “x x x If King, Capuchino, Tan & Associates for petitioner.
the Court of Industrial Relations is granted authority to find a solution in an
industrial dispute and such solution consists in the ordering of employees to return
back to work, it cannot be contended that the Court of Industrial Relations does
Isidro D. Amoroso for private respondent.
not have the power of jurisdiction to carry that solution into effect. And of what
use is its power of conciliation and arbitration if it does not have the power and

24
750 and negotiation. On April 21, 1995, when the several conciliation conferences
called by the contending parties failed to resolve their differences PILA, composed
of 3522 members, staged a strike.
750

On June 7, 1995, PILA presented a petition for the intervention of the Secretary of
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Labor in the resolution of the labor dispute, to which petition PHIMCO opposed.
Pending resolution of the said petition or on June 26, 1995, to be precise, PHIMCO
sent notice of termination to some 473 workers including several union officers.
Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes

On July 7, 1995, the then Acting Secretary of Labor Jose Brillantes assumed
jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued his Order; ruling, thus:
PURISIMA, J.:

“WHEREFORE, ABOVE PREMISES CONSIDERED, and pursuant to Article 263(g) of

At bar is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the Labor Code, as amended, this office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the
seeking to set aside the July 7, 1995 Order1 of the then Acting Secretary Jose
dispute at Phimco Industries, Inc.
Brillantes of the Department of Labor and Employment, in
NCMB-NCR-NS-03-122-95, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
________________

The antecedent facts are, as follows:

1 Annex “A”; Rollo, pp. 17-21.

On March 9, 1995, the private respondent, Phimco Industries Labor Association

(PILA), duly certified collective bargaining representative of the daily paid workers 2 Petition, Rollo, p. 52.
of the petitioner, Phimco Industries, Inc. (PHIMCO), filed a notice of strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board, NCR, against PHIMCO, a corporation
engaged in the production of matches, after a deadlock in the collective bargaining 3 Order, Rollo, p. 110.

25
751
VOL. 304, MARCH 17, 1999
751
Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes
Accordingly, all the striking workers, except those who have been handed down
termination papers on June 26, 1995, are hereby directed to return to work within
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of this Order and for the Company to accept
them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike.
The parties are further ordered to cease and desist from committing any act that
will aggravate the situation.
To expedite the resolution of this dispute, the parties are directed to submit their
position papers and evidence within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED.”4
26
On July 12, 1995, petitioner brought the present petition; theorizing, that:
“I
THE HONORABLE ACTING SECRETARY JOSE BRILLANTES ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING
THE ASSAILED ORDER.
II
THE HONORABLE ACTING SECRETARY JOSE BRILLANTES ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE
WENT BEYOND THE BASIS FOR ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION UNDER ART. 263 OF
THE LABOR CODE.”5
On July 31, 1995, two weeks after the filing of the Petition, the public respondent
issued another Order6 temporarily holding in abeyance the implementation of the
questioned Order dated July 7, 1995 for a period of thirty (30) days; directing, as
follows:
_______________
4 Rollo, pp. 20-21. SO ORDERED.”7

5 Petition; Rollo, pp. 4-5. The pivotal issue here is: whether or not the public respondent acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in assuming
jurisdiction over subject labor dispute.
6 Annex “A”; Rollo, pp. 107-112.

The petition is impressed with merit.

752

Article 263, paragraph (g) of the Labor Code, provides:

752

“(g) When, in his opinion, there exist a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary
of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it
or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration x x x.”
Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes

“The Labor Code vests in the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what
industries are indispensable to the national interest. Accordingly, upon the
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the implementation of our Order dated 7
determination by the Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to the
July 1995 is hereby temporarily held in abeyance for a period of thirty (30) days
national interest, he will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in the said
effective from receipt thereof pending the private negotiations of the parties for
industry.”8 This power, however, is not without any limitation. In upholding the
the settlement of their labor dispute. Thereafter, both the Union and the Company
constitutionality of B.P. 130 insofar as it amends Article 264(g)9 of the Labor Code,
are directed to submit to this Office the result of their negotiations for our
it stressed in the case of Free Telephone Workers Union vs. Honorable Minister of
evaluation and appropriate action.
Labor and Employment, et al.,10 the

27
______________ limitation set by the legislature on the power of the Secretary of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute, thus:

7 Order; Rollo, p. 112.

“Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to
“strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest.”11
8 Philtread Workers Union (PTWU), et al. vs. Confesor, et al., 269 SCRA 393, p. 394
[March 12, 1997].
In this case at bar, however, the very admission by the public respondent draws
the labor dispute in question out of the ambit of the Secretary’s prerogative, to
9 Now Article 263(g). wit:

10 108 SCRA 757 [October 30, 1991]. “While the case at bar appears on its face not to fall within the strict categorization
of cases imbued with “national interest,” this office believes that the obtaining
circumstances warrant the exercise of the powers under Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code, as amended.”12
753

The private respondent did not even make any effort to touch on the
VOL. 304, MARCH 17, 1999
indispensability of the match factory to the national interest. It must have been
aware that a match factory, though of value, can scarcely be considered as an
industry “indispensable to the national interest” as it cannot be in the same
753 category as “generation or distribution of energy, or those undertaken by banks,
hospitals, and export-oriented industries.”13 Yet, the public respondent assumed
jurisdiction thereover, ratiocinating as follows:
Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes

“For one, the prolonged work disruption has adversely affected not only the
protagonists, i.e., the workers and the Company, but also those directly and

28
indirectly dependent upon the unhampered and continued operations of the
Company for their means of livelihood and existence. In addition, the entire
community where the plant is situated has also been placed in jeopardy. If the
dispute at the Company remains unabated, possible loss of employment, not to
mention consequent social problems, might result thereby compounding the
unemployment problem of the country.”
Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes
Thus we cannot be unmindful of the possible dire consequences that might ensue
if the present dispute is allowed to remain unresolved, particularly when an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism obtains to dispose of the differences
between the parties herein.14

_______________
It is thus evident from the foregoing that the Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction
grounded on the alleged “obtaining circumstances” and not on a determination
11 Id., pp. 769-770. that the industry involved in the labor dispute is one indispensable to the “national
interest,” the standard set by the legislature, constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. To uphold the action of the public
12 Order; Rollo, p. 19. respondent under the premises would be stretching too far the power of the
Secretary of Labor as every case of a strike or lockout where there are
inconveniences in the community, or work disruptions in an industry though not
indispensable to the national interest, would then come within the Secretary’s
13 GTE Directories Corporation vs. Honorable Augusto Sanchez, et al., 197 SCRA
power. It would be practically allowing the Secretary of Labor to intervene in any
452, p. 471.
labor dispute at his pleasure. This is precisely why the law sets and defines the
standard: even in the exercise of his power of compulsory arbitration under Article
263(g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary must follow the law. For “when an
754 overzealous official by-passes the law on the pretext of retaining a laudable
objective, the intendment or purpose of the law will lose its meaning as the law
itself is disregarded.”15
754

In light of the foregoing, we hold that the public respondent gravely abused his
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute sued upon in the case.

29
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED; and the assailed Order, dated July 7, Romero (Chairman), Vitug and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
1995, of the Acting Secretary of Labor SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

Panganiban, J., See Concurring Opinion.

______________

CONCURRING OPINION
14 Order; Rollo, pp. 19-20.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

15 Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs. Ople, et al., 163 SCRA 323, p. 330 [June 30,
I now agree with Justice Purisima’s revised ponencia that the labor secretary acted
1988].
with grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over a labor dispute without
any showing that the disputants were engaged in an industry indispensable to
national interest. Quite the contrary, the respondent secretary himself admits that
755
the industry, of which petitioner is a part, is not indispensable to national interest.
Indeed, a labor dispute must seriously and deleteriously affect an industry
indispensable to national interest before the secretary may assume jurisdiction
VOL. 304, MARCH 17, 1999 over it.

755 Article 263(g) Requires a Labor Dispute in an

Industry Indispensable to National Interest

Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes Article 263 of the Labor Code speaks of the right of workers to engage in concerted
activities for their mutual benefit and protection.1 Concerted activities, like the
holding of a strike, are resorted to by employees in their effort to obtain more
SO ORDERED. favorable terms and conditions of work for themselves. Due to its importance, the
exercise of such right is limited only by the

30
_______________
1 “ART. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts.—x x x “(b) Workers shall have the
right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for
their mutual benefit and protection. The right of legitimate labor organizations to
strike and picket and of employers to lockout, consistent with the national interest,
shall continue to be recognized and respected. x x x.”
756
756
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes
demands of national interest under paragraph (g) of said article:
“(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary
of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it
or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such
assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
31
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or
certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work
and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of
law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with
such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
xxx xxx xxx
“The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the Philippines shall not be
precluded from determining the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to
the national interest, and from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction
over any such labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same.”
From the text and the tenor of the law, it is clear as daylight that the secretary’s
assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute is meant to be used sparingly and
only if the national interest demands it. He, like everyone else, must respect
labor’s paramount right to stage concerted activities.
Jurisprudence Requires National Interest
to Justify Assumption of Jurisdiction
Indeed, the Court has consistently ruled that the secretary’s assumption of
jurisdiction is intended not to interfere with or impede workers’ rights, but to
obtain speedy settlement of labor disputes and only if national interests will be
757
VOL. 304, MARCH 17, 1999
757
Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes
affected.2 Admittedly, the Court has allowed the secretary’s assumption of
jurisdiction in many cases, some of which are worth mentioning to show the care
with which such plenary power should be used.
In Philippine School of Business Administration v. Noriel,3 the Court has declared
that the administration of a school is of national interest because “x x x [it] is
engaged in the promotion of the physical, intellectual and emotional well-being of
the country’s youth.” Work stoppage at a school unduly prejudices the students
and entails great loss to all concerned in terms of time, effort and money.
32
In Sarmiento v. Tuico,4 an enterprise exporting 90 percent of its production and
generating more than $12 million dollars per year was declared to be of national
interest. Any disruption of operations would have caused the delay of shipments of
export consisting of finished products previously committed to customers abroad,
a delay that would have hampered the economic recovery program pursued by the
government. The manufacture of drugs and pharmaceuticals has also
been declared to belong to the same classification.5 Likewise, the operation of an
airline that services domestic routes has been deemed to be imbued with national
interest.6 In one case, a company was considered to be indispensable to national
interest, as it was responsible for 22 percent of the tire production in the
Philippines, and work disruption would have not only aggravated the already
worsening unemploy-
______________
2 Philtread Workers Union (PTWU) v. Confesor, 269 SCRA 393, 399, March 12,
1997.
3 164 SCRA 402. 407, August 15, 1988, per Cortes, J.
4 162 SCRA 676, 683-684, June 27, 1988.
5 International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 205 SCRA 59, 62,
January 9, 1992.
“The production and publication of telephone directories, which is the principal
activity of GTE, can scarcely be described as an industry affecting the national
interest. GTE is a publishing firm chiefly dependent on the marketing and sale of
6 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor & Employment, 193 SCRA 223, 226,
advertising space for its not inconsiderable revenues. Its services, while of value,
January 23, 1991.
cannot be deemed to be in the same category of such essential activities as ‘the
generation or distribution of energy’ or those undertaken by ‘banks, hospitals, and
export-oriented industries.’ It cannot be regarded as playing as vital a role in
758 communication as other mass media. The small number of employees involved in
the dispute, the employer’s payment of ‘P10 million in income tax alone to the
Philippine Government,’ and the fact that the ‘top officers of the union were
758 dismissed during the conciliation process,’ obviously do not suffice to make the
dispute in the case at bar one ‘adversely affecting the national interest.’ ”

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Secretary Is Vested with Broad Powers

When He Assumes Jurisdiction

Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes
When the secretary assumes jurisdiction under Art. 263(g), he is granted “great
breadth of discretion” in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. In The
ment situation but also discouraged foreign and domestic entrepreneurs from Philippine American Management Co., Inc. v. The Philippine American
further investing in the country.7 Management Employees Association (PAMEA-FFW),9 the Court clarified the

On the other hand, the Court has disallowed the imprudent use of this power in ________________
even more cases. Perhaps the most eloquent of these is GTE Directories
Corporation v. Sanchez,8 wherein the Court declared the secretary to be without
jurisdiction to take over a labor dispute involving a company that produced 7 Philtread Workers Union (PTWU) v. Confesor,269 SCRA 393, 400-401, March 12,
telephone directories, viz.: 1997.

33

8 197 SCRA 452, 470-471, May 27, 1991, per Narvasa, J.
9 49 SCRA 194, 201-202, January 29, 1973, per Fernando, J.
759
VOL. 304, MARCH 17, 1999
759
Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes
extent of the powers vested in the then Court of Industrial Relations, as follows:
“x x x If the Court of Industrial Relations is granted authority to find a solution in an
industrial dispute and such solution consists in the ordering of employees to return
back to work, it cannot be contended that the Court of Industrial Relations does
not have the power of jurisdiction to carry that solution into effect. And of what
use is its power of conciliation and arbitration if it does not have the power and
jurisdiction to carry into effect the solution it has adopted. Lastly, if the Court of
Industrial Relations has the power to fix the terms and conditions of employment,
34
it certainly can order the return of the workers with or without backpay as a term
or condition of the employment.”
The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoinment of an impending
strike or lockout or the lifting thereof if one has already taken place. Assumption of
jurisdiction always coexists with an order for workers to return to work
immediately and for employers to readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. Defiance of a return-to-work
order produces forfeiture of workers’ employment.10 Thus, not only does it
diminish the right of labor to strike; it also limits the prerogatives of management
to hire workers under its own terms and conditions.11
The secretary is conferred other powers, including jurisdiction over all incidents
arising from the labor dispute, in order to avoid the undesirable result of
diametrically opposed rulings being issued by the secretary and the labor arbiter.
These
________________
10 Asian Transmission Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
November 22, 1989; St. Scholastica’s College v. Torres, 210 SCRA 565, 574-578,
June 29, 1992; Sarmiento v. Tuico, 162 SCRA 676, 686, June 27, 1988.
11 Metrolab Industries, Inc. v. Roldan-Confesor, 254 SCRA 182, 190, February 28,
1996.
 “WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept. 21, 1972, was issued by me
because of a grave national emergency now prevailing throughout the country
760
which has been brought about by the activities of groups of men now actively
engaged in a criminal conspiracy to seize political power and state power in the
Philippines in order to take over the Government by force and violence, the extent
760 of which has now assumed the proportion of an actual war against our people and
their legitimate Government; and

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“WHEREAS, in order to restore the tranquility and stability of the nation in the
quickest possible manner, it is necessary to prohibit the inhabitants of the country
Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes from doing certain acts of undertaking certain activities such as rallies,
demonstrations, picketing or strikes in certain vital industries, and other forms of
group actions which would cause hysteria or panic among the populace or would
powers comprehend those that the secretary needs to dispose of the primary incense the people against their legitimate Government, or would generate
dispute effectively and efficiently.12 sympathy for the radical and lawless elements, or would aggravate the already
critical political and social turmoil now prevailing throughout the land;

The almost unlimited breadth of such powers calls for caution on the part of its
possessor and strict scrutiny of the excesses of government on the part of the
judiciary.
Precursor of Article 263(g)
“NOW, THEREFORE, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept. 21,
1972, do hereby order that henceforth and until otherwise ordered by me or by
my duly designated representative, all rallies, demonstrations and other forms of

The power to restrict strikes and lockouts is of martial law vintage. Before Republic _______________
Act 6715 was enacted, then President Ferdinand Marcos sought to quell mass
expressions of dissent, including strikes, through General Order No. 5 which
provided: 12 International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 205 SCRA 59, 65-67,
January 9, 1992.

35
 “For the guidance of workers and employers, some of whom have been led into
filing notices of strikes and lockouts even in vital industries, you are hereby
761
instructed to consider the following as vital industries and companies for firms
under PD 823 as amended:

VOL. 304, MARCH 17, 1999

1. Public Utilities:

761 A. Transportation:

1) All land, air and water companies or firms engaged in passenger, freight or
tourist transport;
Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes
2) All brokerage, arrastre, warehousing companies or firms;

B. Communications:
group actions by persons within the geographical limits of the Philippines,
including strikes and picketing in vital industries such as in companies engaged in 1) Wire or wireless telecommunications such as telephone, telegraph, telex, and
the manufacture or processing as well as in the distribution of fuel gas, gasoline, cable companies or firms;
and fuel or lubricating oil, in companies engaged in the production or processing of
2) Radio and television companies or firms;
essential commodities or products for exports, and in companies engaged in
banking of any kind, as well as in hospitals and in schools and colleges, are strictly 3) Print Media companies;
prohibited and any person violating this order shall forthwith be arrested and
4) Postal and messengerial service companies;
taken into custody and held for the duration of the national emergency or until he
or she is otherwise ordered released by me or by my duly designated C. Companies engaged in electric, light, gas, steam and water power generation
representative.” and distribution and sanitary service companies;

D. Other Public Utilities:

General Order No. 5, which was accompanied by Letter of Instructions No. 368, 1) Ice and Refrigeration plants
specifically detailed the vital industries or firms referred to, as follows:
2. Companies or firms engaged in the manufacture or processing of the following
essential commodities:

36
762 K. Sugar

L. Textile and garments

762 3. Companies engaged in the production and processing of products for export
which are holders of Central Bank or Board of Investment Certificate of Export
Orientation, including hotels and restaurants classified as three (3), four (4) or five
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED (5) star by the Department of Tourism;

4. Companies engaged in exploration, development, mining, smelting or refining of

coal, oil, iron, copper, gold, and other minerals;
Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes
5. Companies or firms engaged in banking, including:

A. Commercial Banks
A. Animal feeds
B. Savings Banks
B. Cement
C. Development Banks
C. Chemicals and fertilizers
D. Investment Banks
D. Drugs and medicines
E. Rural Banks
E. Flour
F. Savings and Loans Associations
F. Products which are classified as essential commodities in the list of National
Economic and Development Authority except the following: rice, corn, some basic G. Cooperative Banks
cuts of meat, cooking oil, laundry soap, lumber and plywood, galvanized iron
H Credit Unions
sheets, writing pads and notebooks.
6. Companies or firms which are actually engaged in government infrastructure
G. Iron, steel, copper, tin plates and other basic mineral products.
projects and in activities covered by Defense contracts;
H. Milk
7. Hospitals as defined in Section 2, Rule 1-A, Book III of the Rules and Regulations
I. Newsprint Implementing the Labor Code of the Philippines;

J. Tires 763

37
VOL. 304, MARCH 17, 1999 Police Power Requires Public Necessity

After martial law was lifted and democracy was restored, the assumption of
jurisdiction in Art. 263(g) has now been viewed as an exercise of the police power
763
of the state with the aim of promoting the common good. A prolonged strike or
lockout can be inimical to the national economy.13 Therefore, it is imbued with
public necessity and the right of the state and the public to self-protection. But
Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes such public necessity and need for self-protection are absent in labor disputes in
industries not indispensable to national interest. In the spirit of free enterprise, it is
more in keeping with national interest to allow labor to negotiate with
8. Schools and Colleges duly recognized by the Government. management for decent pay and

The Secretary of Labor may include in/or exclude from the above list any industry,
firm, or company as the national interest, national security, or general welfare may
_______________
require.”

13 Philtread Workers Union (PTWU) v. Confesor, supra, p. 399; and Union of

When Republic Act 6715 took effect and General Order No. 5 was repealed, there
Filipino Employees v. Nestlé Philippines, Inc., 192 SCRA 396, 409, December 19,
was no more listing of industries indispensable to national interest. The labor and
1990.
employment secretary was given discretion in determining which industries would
qualify as such. But the discretion cannot be abused. It is subject to judicial review.

764
Under General Order No. 5, the state prohibited the holding of strikes for a stated
public purpose: a national emergency and only in enumerated industries
considered vital to the ailing economy. Even at the height of martial rule in the 764
country, there was no intention to provide a blanket authority to the secretary to
assume jurisdiction over labor disputes without any showing that national interest,
national security or general welfare demanded it. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

38

Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes
humane working conditions without intervention from the government.
As stated earlier, Petitioner PHIMCO is a company which manufactures matches
and, thus, does not qualify as one engaged in an “industry indispensable to
national interest.” The respondent labor and employment secretary admits this
fact, expressly declaring that “the case at bar appears on its face not to fall within
the strict categorization of cases imbued with ‘national interest.’” He nevertheless
assumed jurisdiction over petitioner’s labor dispute with PHIMCO Industries Labor
Association (PILA), rationalizing thus:14

Not Always Beneficial to Labor

_______________
Even for labor, it is not always beneficial to allow the secretary’s intervention in a
labor dispute under Art. 263. Although the intention may be to find a balance
between the demands of labor and the resources of management, intervention
from the state and the derogation of the right to strike are not always the 14 Rollo, pp. 19-20.
solutions to the just demands of labor. More often than not, the intervention is
more to the advantage of management, which would not incur overhead expenses
that would otherwise be wasted during a work stoppage. For the same reason, it 765
does not necessarily follow that intervention works for the protection of labor.

VOL. 304, MARCH 17, 1999

Other Available Remedies

Even without compulsory arbitration, other remedies for resolving their labor
765
disputes are still available to labor and management. Striking employees can file
illegal dismissal cases if they are dismissed without cause. On the other hand,
management can dismiss employees engaged in illegal strikes, or it can negotiate
with those involved in legal strikes. Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes

The Secretary Found No National Interest “While the case at bar appears on its face not to fall within the strict categorization
of cases imbued with ‘national interest,’ this Office believes that obtaining

39
circumstances warrant the exercise of the powers under Article 263(g) of the Labor The case at bar is peculiar in the sense that it was the union (PILA), rather than
Code, as amended. management, that petitioned the

“For one, the prolonged work disruption has adversely affected not only the direct
protagonists, i.e., the workers and the Company, but also those directly and
indirectly dependent upon the unhampered and continued operations of the
Company for their means of livelihood and existence. In addition, the entire
community where the plant is situated has also been placed in jeopardy. If the
dispute at the Company remains unabated, possible loss of employment, not to
mention consequent social problems, might result thereby compounding the
unemployment problem of the country.
________________
15 Export-oriented industries are firms exporting 50 per cent or more of their
products worth at least $1 million or those annually exporting at least $10 million
worth of their products or those exporting manufactured or processed goods with
high value or labor value added as distinguished from traditional exports.

766
“Thus, we cannot be unmindful of the possible dire consequences that might
ensue if the present dispute is allowed to remain unresolved, particularly when an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism obtains to dispose of the differences
766
between the parties herein.”

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

These excuses fail to show how petitioner falls within the category of “industries
indispensable to national interest.” The allegation of the public respondent that
the “match industry like the textile or garment industry may be classified as
export-oriented” is sufficiently rebutted by petitioner’s simple argument pointing Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes
out that its export is very negligible and would not qualify under the definition of
“export-oriented industries” in Section 14, Book V, Rule XIII of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code.15 Besides, such allegation does not appear to be secretary to assume jurisdiction over the controversy. It appears that PILA had lost
supported by the secretary, who in his assailed Order, found that petitioner’s belief in the efficacy of its own strike and had chosen to seek refuge in the
business was not an industry indispensable to national interest. secretary’s power of compulsory arbitration. Petitioner, on the other hand,
questions the intervention, obviously because it is not amenable to accepting all

40
the returning workers, some of whom were dismissed by reason of the strike.16
The assumption of jurisdiction merely muddled the issues.
How true it is that the road to damnation is paved with good intentions. The
secretary’s intention to reconcile the disputants may have been noble but it does
not imbue the labor dispute with national interest. Neither does it clothe him with
power to assume jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition. Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes,
304 SCRA 747, G.R. No. 120751 March 17, 1999
G.R. No. 123426. March 10, 1999.*
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL), petitioner, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO E.
LAGUESMA, UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, AND ALLIANCE OF NATIONALIST GENUINE LABOR
ORGANIZATION-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (ANGLO-KMU), respondents.
41
Labor Law; Remedial Law; Certiorari; Court asserted power to pass upon the
decisions and discretionary acts of the NLRC as well as the Secretary of Labor in the
face of the contention that no judicial review is provided by the Labor Code.—We
have always emphatically asserted our power to pass upon the decisions and
discretionary acts of the NLRC as well as the Secretary of Labor in the face of the
contention that no judicial review is provided by the Labor Code. We stated in San
Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor thus: x x x. It is generally understood that
as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is
an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on
questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute
(73 C.J.S. 506, note 56). The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative
agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its
decision (73 C.J.S. 507, Sec. 165). It is part of the system of checks and balances
which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications.
Same; Same; Same; The remedy of an aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for
reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then
seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.—Considering the above dictum and as affirmed by decisions of
this Court, St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC succinctly pointed out, the remedy of
an aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition
for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
_________________
* EN BANC.
406
406
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma
Same; Same; Same; The special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper
vehicle for judicial review of decision of the NLRC.—The propriety of Rule 65 as a
remedy was highlighted in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, where the legislative
history of the pertinent statutes on judicial review of cases decided under the
Labor Code was traced, leading to and supporting the thesis that “since appeals
from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment
was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for
judicial review of decision of the NLRC” and consequently “all references in the
amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65.”
Same; Same; Same; All such petitions should be initially filed in the Court of
Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of
42
courts.—Proceeding therefrom and particularly considering that the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC
concluded and directed that all such petitions should be initially filed in the Court
of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.
Same; Same; Same; Court asserted in Scott v. Inciong that while appeal did not lie,
the corrective power of the Court by a writ of certiorari was available whenever a
jurisdictional issue was raised or one of grave abuse of discretion amounting to a
lack or excess thereof.—Significantly, we also asserted in Scott v. Inciong that while
appeal did not lie, the corrective power of this Court by a writ of certiorari was
available whenever a jurisdictional issue was raised or one of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess thereof, citing San Miguel Corporation v.
Secretary of Labor.
Same; Same; Same; P.D. No. 1367 gave the President the power to assume
jurisdiction over any cases which he considered national interest cases.—P.D. No.
1367 amending certain provisions of the Labor Code eliminated appeals to the
President, but gave the President the power to assume jurisdiction over any cases
which he considered national interest cases. The subsequent P.D. No. 1391,
enacted “to insure speedy labor justice and further stabilize industrial peace,”
further eliminated appeals from the NLRC to the Secretary
407
VOL. 304, MARCH 10, 1999

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

407

Armando M. Alforque for petitioner.

National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma

Marcelino F. Malate, Jr. Law Office for private respondent.

of Labor but the President still continued to exercise his power to assume
jurisdiction over any cases which he considered national interest cases.
KAPUNAN, J.:

Same; Same; Same; Decisions of the Secretary of Labor come to the Court by way
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Resolution in
of a petition for certiorari even beyond the ten-day period provided in the Labor
OS-A-7-142-93 (RO700-9412-RU-037) dated August 8, 1995 of Undersecretary
Code and the implementing rules but within the reglementary period set for Rule
Bienvenido E. Laguesma, by authority of the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
65 petitions under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.—From the foregoing we see
setting aside the Resolution of the Med-Arbiter dated March 13, 1995.
that the Labor Code and its implementing and related rules generally do not
provide for any mode for reviewing the decision of the Secretary of Labor. It is
further generally provided that the decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be final
and executory after ten (10) days from notice. Yet, like decisions of the NLRC which The antecedents are summarized in the assailed Resolution of Undersecretary
under Art. 223 of the Labor Code become final after ten (10) days, decisions of the Laguesma as follows:
Secretary of Labor come to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari even
beyond the ten-day period provided in the Labor Code and the implementing rules
but within the reglementary period set for Rule 65 petitions under the 1997 Rules 408
of Civil Procedure.

408
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

43
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma
Records show that on 27 December 1994, a petition for certification election
among the rank and file employees of Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Work, Inc.
was filed by the Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization
(ANGLO-KMU), alleging among others, that it is a legitimate labor organization;
that respondent Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Work, Inc. is a company engaged
in the business of shipbuilding and repair with more or less, four hundred (400)
rank and file employees; that the Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Baradero—National
Federation of Labor is the incumbent bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of the respondent company; that the petition is supported by more
than twenty-five percent (25%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit; that the
petition is filed within the sixty (60) day period prior to the expiry date of the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) entered into by and between the
Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Baradero-NFL and Cebu Shipyard Engineering Work,
Inc. which is due to expire on 31 December 1994; and, that there is no bar to its
bid to be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file
employees of the respondent company.
On 2 January 1995, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order, the pertinent portion of
which reads as follows:
The petitioner is given five days from receipt of this Order to present proofs that it
has created a local in the appropriate bargaining unit where it seeks to operate as
44
the bargaining agent and that, relative thereto, it has submitted to the Bureau of
Labor Relations or the Industrial Relations Division of this Office the following: 1) A
charter certificate; 2) the constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of
officers, and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the
Secretary or Treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter and attested to
by its President, OTHERWISE, this case will be dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
On 9 January 1995, forced-intervenor National Federation of Labor (NFL) moved
for the dismissal of the petition on grounds that petitioner has no legal personality
to file the present petition for certification election and that it failed to comply
with the twenty-five percent (25%) consent requirement. It averred among others,
that settled is the rule that when a petition for certification election is filed by the
federation which is merely an agent, the petition is deemed to be filed by the
local/chapter, the principal, which must be
409
VOL. 304, MARCH 10, 1999
409
National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma
 that it is clear from the said certification that when the present petition was filed
on 27 December 1994, petitioner and its alleged local/chapter have no legal
a legitimate labor organization; that for a local to be vested with the status a
personality to file the same. It claimed that the fatal defect in the instant petition
legitimate labor organization, it must submit to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)
cannot be cured with the submission of the requirements in question as the
or the Industrial Relations Division of the Regional Office of the Department of
local/chapter may be accorded the status of a legitimate labor organization only on
Labor and Employment the following: a) charter certificate, indicating the creation
6 January 1995 which is after the freedom period expired on 31 December 1994.
or establishment of a local or chapter; b) constitution and by-laws; c) set of officers;
Forced intervenor further claimed that the documents submitted by the petitioner
and d) books of accounts; that petitioner failed to submit the aforesaid
were procured thru misrepresentation, and fraud, as there was no meeting on 13
requirements necessary for its acquisition of legal personality; that compliance
November 1994 for the purpose of rati-
with the aforesaid requirements must be made at the time of the filing of the
petition within the freedom period; that the submission of the aforesaid
requirements beyond the freedom period will not operate to allow the defective
410
petition to prosper; that contrary to the allegation of the petitioner, the number of
workers in the subject bargaining unit is 486, twenty-five percent (25%) of which is
122; that the consent signatures submitted by the petitioner is 120 which is below
the required 25% consent requirement; that of the 120 employees who allegedly 410
supported the petition, one (1) executed a certification stating that the signature,
Margarito Cabalhug, does not belong to him, 15 retracted, 9 of which were made
before the filing of the petition while 6 were made after the filing of the petition; SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
and, that the remaining 104 signatures are way below the 25% consent
requirement.
National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma

On 16 January 1995, forced-intervenor filed an Addendum/Supplement to its

Motion to Dismiss, together with the certification issued by the Regional Office No. fying a constitution and by-laws and there was no election of officers that actually
VII, this Department, attesting to the fact that the mandatory requirements took place.
necessary for the petitioner to acquire the requisite legal personality were
submitted only on 6 January 1995 and the certification issued by the BLR, this
Department, stating that as of 11 January 1995, the ANGLOCebu Shipyard and
On 15 February 1995, petitioner filed its opposition to the respondent’s motion to
Engineering Work has not been reported as one of the affiliates of the Alliance of
dismiss. It averred among others, that in compliance with the order of the
Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization (ANGLO). Forced intervenor alleged
Med-Arbiter, it submitted to the Regional Office No. VII, this Department, the

45
following documents; charter certificate, constitution and by-laws; statement on insisting that it is a legitimate labor organization at the time of the filing of the
the set of officers and treasurer’s affidavit in lieu of the books of accounts; that the petition for certification election, and claiming that whatever
submission of the aforesaid document, as ordered, has cured whatever defect the
petition may have at the time of the filing of the petition; that at the time of the
filing of petition, the total number of rank and file employees in the respondent _______________
company was about 400 and that the petition was supported by 120 signatures
which are more than the 25% required by law; that granting without admitting that
it was not able to secure the signatures of at least 25% of the rank and file
1 Rollo, pp. 23-27.
employees in the bargaining unit, the Med-Arbiter is still empowered to order for
the conduct of a certification election precisely for the purpose of ascertaining
which of the contending unions shall be the exclusive bargaining agent pursuant to
the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of California Manufacturing 411
Corporation vs. Hon. Undersecretary of Labor, et al., G.R. No. 97020, June 8, 1992.

VOL. 304, MARCH 10, 1999

On 20 February 1995, forced-intervenor filed its reply, reiterating all its arguments
and allegations contained in its previous pleadings. It stressed that petitioner is not
a legitimate labor organization at the time of the filing of the petition and that the 411
petitioner’s submission of the mandatory requirements after the freedom period
would not cure the defect of the petition.
National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma

On 13 March 1995, the Med-Arbiter issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the
petition, after finding that the submission of the required documents evidencing defect the petition may have had was cured by the subsequent submission of the
the due creation of a local was made after the lapse of the freedom period.1 mandatory requirements.

The Alliance of Nationalist Genuine Labor OrganizationKilusang Mayo Uno In a Resolution dated August 8, 1995, respondent Undersecretary Bienvenido E.
(ANGLO-KMU) filed an appeal from the March 13, 1995 Med-Arbiter’s resolution Laguesma, by authority of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, set aside the
Med-Arbiter’s resolution and entered in lieu thereof a new order “finding

46
petitioner [ANGLO-KMU] as having complied with the requirements of registration
at the time of filing of the petition and remanding the records of this case to the
______________
Regional Office of origin x x x.”2

2 Id., at 29.
The National Federation of Labor thus filed this special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court raising the following grounds:

412
A. THE RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA
DATED 8 AUGUST 1995 AND HIS ORDER DATED 14 SEPTEMBER 1995 WERE ISSUED
IN DISREGARD OF EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE; AND 412

B. GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN APPLYING THE RULING IN THE CASE OF

FUR V. LAGUESMA, G.R. NO. 109251, MAY 26, 1993, IN THE PRESENT CASE.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
We will not rule on the merits of the petition. Instead, we will take this opportunity
to lay the rules on the procedure for review of decisions or rulings of the Secretary
of Labor and Employment under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. (P.D. National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma
No. 442 as amended)

In St. Martin Funeral Homes v. National Labor Relations Commission and
Bienvenido Aricayos, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, the Court re-examined
the mode of judicial review with respect to decisions of the National Labor
Relations Commission.
The course taken by decisions of the NLRC and those of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment are tangent, but all are within the umbra of the Labor Code of the
Philippines and its
implementing rules. On this premise, we find that the very same rationale in St.
Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC finds application here, leading ultimately to the
same disposition as in that leading case.
We have always emphatically asserted our power to pass upon the decisions and
discretionary acts of the NLRC as well as the Secretary of Labor in the face of the
contention that no judicial review is provided by the Labor Code. We stated in San
Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor3 thus:

47
x x x. It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising 3 64 SCRA 56 (1975). Cited fn. 11 St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC.
quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to
scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even
though no right of review is given by statute (73 C.J.S. 506, note 56). 413

The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its VOL. 304, MARCH 10, 1999
jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decision (73
C.J.S. 507, Sec. 165). It is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts
the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
413

Considering the above dictum and as affirmed by decisions of this Court, St. Martin
National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma
Funeral Homes v. NLRC succinctly pointed out, the remedy of an aggrieved party is
to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or
subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. vehicle for judicial review of decision of the NLRC”4 and consequently “all
references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer
to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.”5
The propriety of Rule 65 as a remedy was highlighted in St. Martin Funeral Homes
v. NLRC, where the legislative history of the pertinent statutes on judicial review of
cases decided under the Labor Code was traced, leading to and supporting the
thesis that “since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, Proceeding therefrom and particularly considering that the special civil action of
the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still certiorari under Rule 65 is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the
is the proper Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC
concluded and directed that all such petitions should be initially filed in the Court
of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.

_______________

48
In the original rendering of the Labor Code, Art. 222 thereof provided that the
decisions of the NLRC are appealable to the Secretary of Labor on specified
grounds.6 The decisions of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the
President of the Philippines subject to such conditions or limitations as the
President may direct.
Thus under the state of the law then, this Court had ruled that original actions for
certiorari and prohibition filed with this Court against the decision of the Secretary
of Labor passing upon the decision of the NLRC were unavailing for mere error of
judgment as there was a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, which was an appeal to the President. We said in the 1975 case,
Scott v. Inciong,7 quoting Nation Multi Service Labor Union v. Ag-
_______________
4 At pp. 13-14.
5 At p. 15.
6 Art. 223. x x x.
(a) If there is a prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion;
(b) If made purely on questions of law; and
49
(c) If there is a showing that the national security or social and economic stability is
threatened.
7 68 SCRA 473 (1975).
414
414
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma
caoili:8 “It is also a matter of significance that there was an appeal to the President.
So it is explicitly provided by the Decree. That was a remedy both adequate and
appropriate. It was in line with the executive determination, after the
proclamation of martial law, to leave the solution of labor disputes as much as
possible to administrative agencies and correspondingly to limit judicial
participation.”9
Significantly, we also asserted in Scott v. Inciong that while appeal did not lie, the
corrective power of this Court by a writ of certiorari was available whenever a
jurisdictional issue was raised or one of grave abuse of discretion amounting to a
lack or excess thereof, citing San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor.10
 12 Entitled “Amending Book V of the Labor Code of the Philippines to Insure
Speedy Labor Justice and Further Stabilize Industrial Peace.” Issued May 29, 1978.
P.D. No. 136711 amending certain provisions of the Labor Code eliminated appeals
to the President, but gave the President the power to assume jurisdiction over any
cases which he considered national interest cases. The subsequent P.D. No.
13 Section 7, Rule II of the Rules Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1391
1391,12 enacted “to insure speedy labor justice and further stabilize industrial
effective September 15, 1978 provides that “[t]here shall henceforth be no appeal
peace,” further eliminated appeals from the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor but the
from decisions [of the Commission] to the Minister of Labor except as provided in
President still continued to exercise his power to assume jurisdiction over any
PD 1367 and its implementing rules concerning appeals to the Prime Minister, and
cases which he considered national interest cases.13
the

_________________
415

8 64 SCRA 274 (1975).

VOL. 304, MARCH 10, 1999

9 Also Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions (CCLU) v. National Labor Relations

415
Commission, 60 SCRA 450 (1974).

National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma

10 See footnote No. 3.

Though appeals from the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor were eliminated,
11 Entitled “Further Amending Certain Provisions of Book V of Presidential Decree
presently there are several instances in the Labor Code and its implementing and
No. 442, Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, As Amended.”
related rules where an appeal can be filed with the Office of the Secretary of Labor
Issued May 1, 1978.
or the Secretary of Labor issues a ruling, to wit:

50
(1) Under the Rules and Regulations Governing Recruitment and Placement (10) calendar days from receipt of the case records. The filing of a petition for
Agencies for Local Employment14 dated June 5, 1997 superseding certain certiorari before the
provisions of Book I (Pre-Employment) of the implementing rules, the decision of
the Regional Director on complaints against agencies is appealable to the Secretary
of Labor within ten (10) working days from receipt of a copy of the order, on _________________
specified grounds, whose decision shall be final and inappealable.

decisions of the Commission en banc or any of its Divisions shall be final and
(2) Art. 128 of the Labor Code provides that an order issued by the duly authorized executory.
representative of the Secretary of Labor in labor standards cases pursuant to his
visitorial and enforcement power under said article may be appealed to the
Secretary of Labor.
14 Issued by then Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing pursuant to Art. 5 of
the Labor Code.

Section 2 in relation to Section 3 (a), Rule X, Book III (Conditions of Employment) of

the implementing rules gives the Regional Director the power to order and
15 Issued by then Secretary of Labor and Employment Franklin M. Drilon.
administer compliance with the labor standards provisions of the Code and other
labor legislation. Section 4 gives the Secretary the power to review the order of the
Regional Director, and the Secretary’s decision shall be final and executory.
416

Section 1, Rule IV (Appeals) of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards

Cases in the Regional Offices dated September 16, 198715 provides that the order 416
of the Regional Director in labor standards cases shall be final and executory unless
appealed to the Secretary of Labor.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Section 5, Rule V (Execution) provides that the decisions, orders or resolutions of

the Secretary of Labor and Employment shall become final and executory after ten National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma

51
Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the order or decision unless the
aggrieved party secures a temporary restraining order from the Court within
fifteen (15) calendar days from the date of finality of the order or decision or posts
a supersedeas bond.
Section 6 of Rule VI (Health and Safety Cases) provides that the Secretary of Labor
at his own initiative or upon the request of the employer and/or employee may
review the order of the Regional Director in occupational health and safety cases.
The Secretary’s order shall be final and executory.
(2) Art. 236 provides that the decision of the Labor Relations Division in the
regional office denying an applicant labor organization, association or group of
unions or workers’ application for registration may be appealed by the applicant
union to the Bureau of Labor Relations within ten (10) days from receipt of notice
thereof.
Section 4, Rule V, Book V (Labor Relations), as amended by Department Order No.
9 dated May 1, 199716 provides that the decision of the Regional Office denying
the application for registration of a workers association whose place of operation
is confined to one regional jurisdiction, or the Bureau of Labor Relations denying
the registration of a federation, national or industry union or trade union center
may be appealed to the Bureau or the Secretary as the case may be who shall
decide the appeal within twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of the records of
the case.
52
(3) Art. 238 provides that the certificate of registration of any legitimate
organization shall be canceled by the Bureau of Labor Relations if it has reason to
believe, after due hearing, that the said labor organization no longer meets one or
more of the requirements prescribed by law.
Section 4, Rule VIII, Book V provides that the decision of the Regional Office or the
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations may be appealed within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof by the aggrieved party to the Director of the Bureau or the
Secretary of Labor, as the case may be, whose decision shall be final and
executory.
(4) Art. 259 provides that any party to a certification election may appeal the order
or results of the election as determined by the Med-Arbiter directly to the
Secretary of Labor who shall decide the same within fifteen (15) calendar days.
________________
16 Issued by the Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing.
417
VOL. 304, MARCH 10, 1999
417
National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma
Section 12, Rule XI, Book V provides that the decision of the Med-Arbiter on the
petition for certification election may be appealed to the Secretary.
Section 15, Rule XI, Book V provides that the decision of the Secretary of Labor on
an appeal from the Med-Arbiter’s decision on a petition for certification election
shall be final and executory. The implementation of the decision of the Secretary
affirming the decision to conduct a certification election shall not be stayed unless
restrained by the appropriate court.
Section 15, Rule XII, Book V provides that the decision of the Med-Arbiter on the
results of the certification election may be appealed to the Secretary within ten (10)
days from receipt by the parties of a copy thereof, whose decision shall be final
and executory.
Section 7, Rule XVIII (Administration of Trade Union Funds and Actions Arising
Therefrom), Book V provides that the decision of the Bureau in complaints filed
directly with said office pertaining to administration of trade union funds may be
appealed to the Secretary of Labor within ten (10) days from receipt of the parties
of a copy thereof.
53
Section 1, Rule XXIV (Execution of Decisions, Awards, or Orders), Book V provides
that the decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be final and executory after ten (10)
calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties unless otherwise specifically
provided for in Book V.
(5) Art. 263 provides that the Secretary of Labor shall decide or resolve the labor
dispute over which he assumed jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from the date of
the assumption of jurisdiction. His decision shall be final and executory ten (10)
calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties.
From the foregoing we see that the Labor Code and its implementing and related
rules generally do not provide for any mode for reviewing the decision of the
Secretary of Labor. It is further generally provided that the decision of the
Secretary of Labor shall be final and executory after ten (10) days from notice. Yet,
like decisions of the NLRC which under Art. 223 of the Labor Code become final
after ten (10) days,17 decisions
________________
17 Observation made in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC.
418
418
 conduct a certification election “shall not be stayed unless restrained by the
appropriate court.”
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

(2) Section 5, Rule V (Execution) of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards
National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma
Cases in Regional Offices provides that “the filing of a petition for certiorari before
the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the [appealed] order or decision
unless the aggrieved party secures a temporary restraining order from the Court.”
of the Secretary of Labor come to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari even
beyond the ten-day period provided in the Labor Code and the implementing rules
but within the reglementary period set for Rule 65 petitions under the 1997 Rules
_________________
of Civil Procedure. For example, in M. Ramirez Industries v. Secretary of Labor,18
assailed was respondent’s order affirming the Regional Director’s having taken
cognizance of a case filed pursuant to his visitorial powers under Art. 128 (a) of the
18 266 SCRA 111 (1997).
Labor Code; in Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex v. Secretary of Labor,19 assailed
was respondent’s order setting aside the Med-Arbiter’s dismissal a petition for
certification election; Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Laguesma,20
assailed was respondent’s order affirming the Med-Arbiter’s decision on the 19 G.R. No. 107792, March 2, 1998.
results of a certification election; in Philtread Workers Union v. Confessor,21
assailed was respondent’s order issued under Art. 263 certifying a labor dispute to
the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. 20 267 SCRA 303 (1997).

In two instances, however, there is specific mention of a remedy from the decision 21 269 SCRA 393 (1997).
of the Secretary of Labor, thus:

419
(1) Section 15, Rule XI, Book V of the amended implementing rules provides that
the decision of the Secretary of Labor on appeal from the Med-Arbiter’s decision
on a petition for certification election shall be final and executory, but that the VOL. 304, MARCH 10, 1999
implementation of the Secretary’s decision affirming the Med-Arbiter’s decision to

54
 ___________________

419

National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma
We perceive no conflict with our pronouncements on the proper remedy which is
Rule 65 and which should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Accordingly, we read “the
appropriate court” in Section 15, Rule XI, Book V of the Implementing Rules to
refer to the Court of Appeals.
Section 5, Rule V of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in
Regional Offices specifying the Supreme Court as the forum for filing the petition
for certiorari is not infirm in like manner or similarly as is the statute involved in
Fabian v. Desierto.22 And Section 5 cannot be read to mean that the petition for
certiorari can only be filed exclusively and solely with this Court, as the provision
must invariably be read in relation to the pertinent laws on the concurrent original
jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals in Rule 65 petitions.
22 G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998, where we declared invalid Section 27 of
R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman),
and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and
insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the
Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, on the ground that these violate
the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
We note parenthetically that rules and regulations issued by administrative or
executive officers in accordance with, and as authorized by, law have the force and
effect of law or partake the nature of a statute. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social
Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555 (1962).
420

420

In fine, we find that it is procedurally feasible as well as practicable that petitions

for certiorari under Rule 65 against the decisions of the Secretary of Labor
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
rendered under the Labor Code and its implementing and related rules be filed
initially in the Court of Appeals. Paramount consideration is strict observance of
the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts,
National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma

55
emphasized in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, on “the judicial policy that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of
our primary jurisdiction.”23

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for certiorari, together
with all pertinent records thereof, is hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action and disposition.

SO ORDERED. National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma, 304 SCRA 405, G.R. No.
123426 March 10, 1999

56