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Ruling: No.

Jurisdiction of Actions [CA decision] Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious
organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may
be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to
determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.
Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

Doctrine of Non-interference The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization

AMISTAD: Taruc v CA, dela Cruz
Facts:
Taruc and other members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro,
Surigao del Norte, clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish
because the family of Fr. Floranos wife belonged to a political party opposed to
Taruc‘s. Bishop de la Cruz found this too flimsy a reason and denied the request.
During the town fiesta, Taruc arranged an open mass to be celebrated by a certain
Fr. Ambong, who was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao and
whose credentials as a parish priest were in doubt. This was done despite the
numerous pleas and disapproval of Bishop Dela Cruz.
In 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared Taruc et al expelled/excommunicated from the
Philippine Independent Church. Because of the order of
expulsion/excommunication, Taruc et al filed a complaint for damages with
preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the RTC of Surigao City,
contending that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus
violating their right to due process of law.
is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of
said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church
authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it
is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church
regulations.
In Fonancier v CA, the court held: The amendments of the constitution,
restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged
by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power
of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts.
Doctrine of Non-interference

Dela Cruz et al filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction. AMPARO: Clark v. Mondragon

Issue: W/N courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the Facts:
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution
Clark Development Corporation (CDC) entered into a Lease Agreement with
Mondragon covering the area now known as the Mimosa Leisure Estate.

Clark made a written demand on Mondragon to pay rental arrears amounting to

427 million to be paid within 30 days from receipt of the demand; otherwise, the
Lease Agreement would be terminated.
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Mondragon filed before the Angeles City RTC, Branch 58 an action for specific
performance with prayer for injunctive reliefs pendent lite against Clark docketed
as Civil Case No. 9242 which the trial court granted restraining Clark, from
terminating the Lease Agreement.
Meanwhile, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement. MLRC shall pay CDC
the amount of 325,000,000.00 in installments, without need of demand.
Mondragon failed to pay for the rental arrears and to open the irrevocable
domestic letter of credit. Clark informed Mondragon of the cancellation and
termination of the Compromise Agreement and demanding it to vacate all the
[10]
leased premises.
Clark filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution of Judgment by
[11]
Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 9242. Mondragon opposed the
same. Before the trial court could resolve the motion, Mondragon filed a Petition
for Declaratory Relief and Specific Performance before the Angeles City RTC,
Branch 60, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 9596.
Issue: WON the RTC Branch 60 could exercise its jurisdiction over the
petition for declaratory relief.
Ruling: No.
The vexation to the courts in this case is evident. There is a high risk of conflict
between the decisions of the RTC Branches 58 and 60 regarding their respective
civil cases. A decision by one branch of court will constitute res judicata in the
other case pending before the other branch of court. Alternatively, if the RTC
Branch 60 exercised its jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief, then it
would have to restrain the execution proceedings in the RTC Branch 58. Thus,
interference with the proceedings in another court would ensue. Under the doctrine
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of non-interference, a trial court has no authority to interfere with the proceedings
of a court of equal jurisdiction, much less
(JURISDICTION/DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY)
CABREROS: PACIFIC ACE vs. YANAGISAWA
FACTS:
Yanagisawa and Evelyn Castaneda who were married in 1989 and
purchased a townhouse unit located in Paranaque City.
Thereafter, Yanagisawa filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Evelyn which was raffled to RTC Makati.
During the pendency of the case, RTC of Makati rendered an Order stating
that Evelyn was prohibited from disposing the properties registered under her
name during the pendency of the case.
However, Evelyn obtained a loan from Pacific Ace Finance. It was secured
by a Real Estate Mortgage constituted over the townhouse unit.
During this time, Yanagisawa‘s appeal (dissolution of the marriage) was
pending before the CA. The RTC of Makati ruled on its dissolution and ordered the
liquidation of their properties including the townhouse in question.
When Yanagisawa learned about the REM, he filed a complaint for
annulment of REM which was raffled to RTC of Paranaque.
RTC of Paranaque ruled against Yanagisawa stating that he could not
have owned the property since he was a foreign national. However, on appeal, CA
proceeded to resolve his complaint stating that the RTC of Paranaque, which ruled
that he was not the owner of said townhouse, was improper for violation of the
doctrine of non-interference (courts of equal jurisdiction do not have appellate
jurisdiction over each other)
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ISSUE: WHETHER THE RTC OF PARANAQU can rule on the issue of ownership  Case was filed at the SB
of the townhouse even as the same issue was already resolved the by RTC of
MAKATI

DEFENSES (in a motion to quash)

HELD:
1. Alleged that Subido was separated from the service before the effectivity
No. The RTC of PARANAQUE cannot rule on the issue of ownership of of R.A. No. 7975(vests jurisdiction in the Sandiganbayan), hence
the townhouse. retroactive application thereof would be prejudicial to him; and

2. at the time the information was filed, petitioner Parina was not occupying
The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired during the
a position corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed by
cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for resolution of the Makati [11]
R.A. No. 6758.
RTC and is pending appeal before the CA.

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the

assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an insurmountable Due to the denial of the motion for reconsideration by the SB, this present recourse
barrier to the subsequent assumption by RTC of Paranaque. for special civil action under rule 65 of the rules of court

Retroactive Effect Note: RA 7975 provides:

CHANYEE: Subido vs SB In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
Facts Act No. 6758 ... exclusive jurisdiction therefor shall be vested in the proper courts
(RTC, MTC as the case maybe)
 BAYANI SUBIDO, JR. and RENE PARINA were charged with Arbitrary
Detention

 Bayani Subido, Jr., being then a Commissioner of the Bureau of Issue

Immigration and Deportation (BID) and accused Rene Parina, being then a
BID Special Agent, while in the performance of their official functions WON RA 7975 shall be applied retroactively
cause the issuance and implementation of a warrant of arrest dated June
25, 1992 against James J. Maksimuk, said accused knowing fully well
that the BID Decision dated June 6, 1991, requiring Maksimuk's
Ruling
deportation has not as yet become final and executory considering the
pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration, resulting in the detention of the YES, RA 7975 may validly be given retroactive effect, there being no
latter for a period of forty-three (43) days impairment of contractual or vested rights
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Finally, the petitioners invocation of the prohibition against the retroactivity
of penal laws is misplaced. Simply put, R.A. No. 7975 is not a penal law. Penal
laws or statutes are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violation; or those that define crimes, treat of their
[29]
nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A. No. 7975, in further amending
P.D. No. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, mode of appeal, and
other procedural matters, is clearly a procedural law, i.e., one which prescribes
rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for
their invasion, or those which refer to rules of procedure by which courts
[30]
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Moreover, the
petitioners even suggest that it is likewise a curative or remedial statute; one which
[31]
cures defects and adds to the means of enforcing existing obligations. As noted
by the petitioners, previous to the enactment of R.A. No. 7975:
All told, as a procedural and curative statute, R.A. No. 7975 may validly be
given retroactive effect, there being no impairment of contractual or vested
rights.
RE: RETROACTIVE EFFECT
CONFESSOR: Yu-Oh vs CA
FACTS:
checks issued by Yu-oh were dishonored by the bank for the reason "Account
Closed." On October 5, 1992, Solid Gold filed a criminal case for violation of BP
22 and Yu-Oh was adjudged guilty. YU-OH contends that the failure of the
appellate court to give retroactive application to R.A. 7691 is a violation of
Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that penal laws shall have
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of the felony;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not giving retroactive effect to R.A.
7690 in view of
Article 22 of the RPC.
RULING:
NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT.
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R.A. No. 7691 does not prohibit certain acts or provides penalties for its violation;
neither does it treat of the nature of crimes and its punishment. Consequently, R.A.
No. 7691 is not a penal law, and therefore, Art. 22 of the RPC does not apply in
the present case.
B. P. Blg. 22, which took effect on April 24, 1979, provides the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one year or by a fine of
not less than but not more then double the amount of the check which fine shall in
no case exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court.
R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on June 15, 1994, amended B.P. Blg. 129, and
vested on the Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts jurisdiction
16
to try cases punishable by imprisonment of not more than six (6) years. Since
R.A. No. 7691 vests jurisdiction on courts, it is apparent that said law
is substantive.
17
18
In the case of Cang vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "jurisdiction being a
matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time
19
of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court." R.A.
No. 7691 was not yet in force at the time of the commencement of the cases in the
trial court. It took effect only during the pendency of the appeal before the Court of
20
Appeals. There is therefore no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 7691
should be retroactively applied to this case and the same be remanded to the
MTC. The Court has held that a "law vesting additional jurisdiction in the court
cannot be given retroactive effect."21
RE: RTC’S JURISDICTION OVER INTRACORPORATE DISPUTE
Garcia v Eastern Telecom April 2009
FACTS: Atty. Virgilio R. Garcia was the VP and Head of Business Support
Services and Human Resource Departments of the Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) was dismissed from his position
which prompted him to file an illegal dismissal case before LA. NLRC reversed and
ruled that the dismissal of Atty. Garcia, being ETPI‘s Vice President, partook of the
nature of an intra-corporate dispute cognizable by Regional Trial Courts and not by
Labor Arbiters.
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ISSUE:
whether the question of legality or illegality of the removal or termination of
employment of an officer of a corporation is an intra-corporate controversy that
falls under the original exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts?
RULING: Corporation Law; Intra-Corporate Controversies; Jurisdiction; A
corporate officer’s dismissal or removal is always a corporate act and/or an
intra-corporate controversy, over which the Regional Trial Court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction.—The issue raised by Atty. Garcia—whether the
termination or removal of an officer of a corporation is an intra-corporate
controversy that falls under the original exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts—is not novel. The Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, has decreed that
a corporate officer‘s dismissal or removal is always a corporate act and/or an intra-
corporate controversy, over which the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]
(now the Regional Trial Court) has original and exclusive jurisdiction. We have
ruled that an intra-corporate controversy is one which pertains to any of the
following relationships: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and
the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State
insofar as the former‘s franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3)
between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners,
members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners or associates
themselves. In Lozon v. National Labor Relations Commission (240 SCRA 1
[1995]), we declared that Presidential Decree No. 902-A confers on the SEC
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies and cases
involving intra-corporate and partnership relations between or among the
corporation, officers and stockholders and partners, including their elections or
appointments
Jurisdiction over the subject matter
GUINOMLA: Capacete v. Baroro
ISSUE: WON the RTC decision in Civil Case No. B-3433 and the writ of demolition
must be annulled allegedly due to the courts lack of jurisdiction to issue the writ of
execution. NO
SC: Petitioners‘ contention that the writ of execution issued by the RTC is void for
lack of jurisdiction does not hold water. The complaint filed by the petitioners was
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not only for annulment of the MTC decision; it was also for accion reinvindicatoria
and quieting of title. Consequently, it may, decide on the issue of who, between
petitioners and respondent Baroro, owns the disputed land as ownership is the
crux of the matter in an accion reinvindicatoria and quieting of title.
Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
JARON: Hilado v Chavez
(GR No. 134742, September 22, 2004)
FACTS:
PHDRC (realty corporation) represented by Julieta Salgado filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against Hilado, et. al who were all occupant-farmers. Hilado, et.
al alleged that they are tenants of the agricultural land now owned by PHRDC.
They also alleged that they were granted by DAR an emancipation patents on the
property. They further aver that since the landholding had long been placed under
the Operation Land Transportation and that they became owners thereof under PD
27, the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, it being an
agrarian dispute. Lastly, they contended that it is the DARAB that has exclusive
jurisdiction over the action and not the MTCC.
ISSUE:
Whether MTCC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of unlawful detainer
HELD:
No. Section 33(2) of BP 129, as amended by RA 7691, provides that MTCs have
exclusive original jurisdiction over cases for unlawful detainer. However, such
courts have no original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian disputes
under RA 6657, as amended (CARL), and the Rules of Procedure issued by the
DARAB which are within the exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction of the
DARAB.
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The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject Jurisdiction over the Person
matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and
the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some NITURA: RAPID CITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ,
of the claims or reliefs sought therein. In Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, petitioner, vs.
Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation, the court ruled that the jurisdiction of the court
over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to ORLANDO VILLA and LOURDES PAEZ-VILLA, 1 respondents.
depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for,
otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the
defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the
G.R. No. 184197. February 11 , 2010
litigation. The court cited the case of Arcelona v. Court of Appeals and held that in
American jurisprudence, the nullity of a decision arising from lack of jurisdiction
may be determined from the record of the case, not necessarily from the face of
the judgment only. Facts: In 2004, Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation filed a complaint
for declaration of nullity of subdivision plans . . . mandamus and damages against
several defendants including Spouses Orlando and Lourdes Villa (Sps Villa).
Gregorio Zapanta, court process server resorted to substituted service by serving
The MTCC does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple
summons upon Sps Villa‘s househelp who did not acknowledge receipt thereof
expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a
and refused to divulge their names.
tenancy relationship between the parties. But it is the duty of the court to receive
evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy. If after hearing, tenancy had in
Despite substituted service, Sps Villa failed to file their Answer, prompting
fact been shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of
petitioner to file a "Motion to Declare Defendants[herein respondents] in Default"
jurisdiction.
which the trial court granted by Order of May 3, 2005

In Bayog v. Natino, the court held that if a defendant in an action for ejectment
interposed the defense of being the agricultural tenant in the property subject of
the complaint, the MTCC should hear and receive the evidence for the purpose of
determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the case, and if, upon
such hearing, tenancy is shown to be the issue, the MTCC should dismiss the
case for lack of jurisdiction.
January 30, 2006, Sps Villa filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, claiming that on
January 27, 2006 they "officially received all pertinent papers such as Complaint
and Annexes. They denied the existence of two women helpers who allegedly
refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of the summons.
July 17, 2006, the trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave Sps Villa five
days to file their Answer. They did did not file an Answer, drawing Rapid City DC to
again file a Motion to declare them in default, which the trial court again granted by
Order of February 21 , 2007

In this case, even on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint, more so On April 18, 2007, Sps Villa filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the
if the answer with motion to dismiss the petition and position papers of the parties second order declaring them in default and to vacate proceedings, this time
are considered, the DARAB, and not the MTCC, had primary and original claiming that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons due to
jurisdiction over the action of the respondent.

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invalid service of summons. In the meantime, the trial court, by Decision of
September 4, 2007, rendered judgment in favor of Rapid City.
CA reverse the order of RTC of Antipolo declaring the Sps Villa in default. Rapid
City‘s MFR denied in CA, came to SC via petition for review on certiorari stating
that the respondents filing of Motion to Lift Order of Default, voluntary submits
them to the jurisdiction of the RTC of Antipolo.
Issue: WON RTC of Antipolo had jurisdiction over the Sps Villa.
Held: YES. When the Sps Villa filed a motion and asked for an affirmative relief
from the court, this already amounted to their voluntary appearnce.
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance.
PCIB vs Sps Dy - When a party files for reconsideration of a default judgment, and
to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary
submission to the court's jurisdiction. However, is tempered by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to
challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be
considered to have submitted to its authority
Special Appearance is an exception to voluntary submission to the court‘s
jurisdiction, it must be explicitly made and failure to do so constitutes voluntary
submission to the courts jurisdiction. Sps Villa in their motion to lift the order of
default did not allege that the filing thereof was a special appearance only to
question the jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they have acquiesced to the
jurisdiction of the court.
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Jurisdiction over the Res
PASTOR: MELINA P. MACAHILIG vs. The Heirs of GRACE M. MAGALIT
[G.R. No. 141423. November 15, 2000]
Facts: On February 5, 1965, Pepito Magalit filed with the then Philippine Fisheries
Commission -- now Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) --
Fishpond Application No. 24400 for 11 hectares of land in Batan, Aklan. Later,
Bernardo Macahilig, deceased husband of petitioner, MELINA P. MACAHILIG,
filed Fishpond Application No. 29972 for 5 of the 11 has. which Magalit had applied
for. BFAR rejected Macahilig‘s application. Macahilig protested Magalit‘s
application contending that for 20 years, he had been in actual possession of the
5-ha. area included in Magalits application.
BFAR, through the Committee on Fishpond Claims and Conflict was able to
establish that Macahilig was merely Magalit‘s laborer and caretaker, hence
Macahilig‘ letter protest was dismissed and his fishpond application remained
REJECTED while Pepito Magalit‘s application was GIVEN DUE COURSE.
Macahilig elevated this disposition to the Office of the President but was denied
reconsideration.
Subsequently, Macahilig filed a Petition for Review with Prayer for an Issuance of
a Writ of Injunction and/or Restraining Order with the Supreme Court, which
referred it to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). The appellate court denied
the petition, declaring that Macahilig was indeed Magalit‘s mere caretaker and
laborer. It ordered Macahilig or anybody acting in his behalf to vacate the subject
property and to turn it over to the heirs of Pepito Magalit, considering that the
challenged decision has long become final and executor.
Later Magalit instituted Civil Case No. 3517 in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, for the
issuance of a Writ of Execution. The heirs of Pepito Magalit, represented by Dr.
Magalit, filed a Motion for Correction of the Implementation of the Decision of the
CA promulgated on March 26, 1985 and of the Decision of the Court dated
October 30, 1985. They prayed that the trial court properly implement said IAC
Decision by ordering Spouses Macahilig to turn over to her the possession of Lot
4417. Dr. Magalit contended that the Writ of Execution was not satisfied, because
the spouses had refused to give up the fishpond in question.
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On September 17, 1992, Judge Maria Carillo-Zaldivar denied the motion stating
that the land Dr. Magalit desires to be executed thru an alias writ is outside the 10
has. awarded to her by the Fisheries, and so the Court has no jurisdiction over her
claim.
On October 9, 1992, Dr. Magalit filed a Petition for Contempt Against Melina
Macahilig for the refusal to turn over Lot 4417 to her. The trial court appointed
commissioner was able to determine that Lot 4417 was included in the parcels of
land awarded to the deceased Magalit. Per Order of the BAFAR of the 10 hectare-
land granted, a portion with an area of 2.3 has. has to be excluded because it is
needed for forest purposes. This was why the Bureau of Fisheries has to include
Lot 4417 and Lot 5216, in order that the area of 10.0 hectares in said order will be
satisfied.
In the Order of June 18, 1993, the trial court adopted the Commissioners Report
and ruled in favor of Dr. Magalit. Macahilig moved for reconsideration, but her
motion was denied in the Order of July 14, 1993, which held that she had no valid
reason to possess the disputed lot, considering that her husband‘s application
therefor had been rejected. Petitioner then filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari
alleging that the trial court had acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
Orders dated June 18 and July 14, 1993.
The CA ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
issued a Writ of Execution ordering the delivery of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit.
Macahilig, hence, elevated the case to the SC contending that the trial court
gravely abused its discretion in ordering the turnover of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit,
because of its earlier ruling that it had no jurisdiction over said property.
Issue: WoN the trial court has jurisdiction over the res of Lot 4417?
Ruling: YES.
First, the September 9, 1992 Motion for Reconsideration taken up in said Order
has not been attached to or alleged in the herein Petition. Hence, we cannot fully
consider the nature of the claim that was denied by this Order or speculate on why
the trial court ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the movants claim. We cannot
even guess which Order the unidentified movant wanted to be reconsidered.
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***It was too late in the day for petitioner to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial
court. She clearly submitted to its authority by her unqualified participation in Civil
Case No. 3517. We cannot allow her to attack its jurisdiction simply because it
rendered a Decision prejudicial to her position. Participation in all stages of a case
before a trial court effectively estops a party from challenging its jurisdiction. One
cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its
jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against ones opponent or after failing to
obtain such relief. If, by deed or conduct, a party has induced another to act in a
particular manner, estoppel effectively bars the former from adopting an
inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or
injury to the latter.
Petitioner insists that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the res of Lot 4417
when it issued its September 17, 1992 Order.
Again, we disagree. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of
the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the
law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of
the court is recognized and made effective.[29] In the latter condition, the property,
though at all times within the potential power of the court, may not be in the actual
custody of said court.
The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the disputed lot by virtue of the institution
of the Petition for a Writ of Execution filed by the respondents predecessors in
interest. Without taking actual physical control of the property, it had an impliedly
recognized potential jurisdiction or potential custody over the res. This was the
jurisdiction which it exercised when it issued the Writ of Execution directing the
surrender of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit.
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RTC Jurisdiction
CABREROS: PILIPINAS SHELL vs. RP
FACTS:
Some TCC (Tax Credit Certificates) were assigned to Pilipinas Shell (SHELL).
It was accepted by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) as payment of import duties and
other taxes of Shell.
Thereafter, the Secretary of the Department of Finance informed Shell that
its TCC was fraudulently and issued and had to be cancelled. Shell filed a formal
protest before the BOC but was not acted upon. Then Shell questioned the legality
of the cancellation before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
Meanwhile BOC filed a complaint for collection against Shell before RTC
since the spurious TCCs that were used to pay were invalid, Shell still owed the
Republic in unpaid duties and taxes.
Shell now contends that RTC has no jurisdiction over the collection case in
as much as there was a pending case before the CTA (assessment has not
attained finality), an action filed before it by Shell. RTC should dismiss the said
case and transfer the same to CTA by way of a counterclaim.
ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the collection case
HELD:
YES. RTC has jurisdiction over the collection case.
The instant case does not involve a decision of the Commissioner of
Customs under any of the instances enumerated under the law applicable at that
time (RA 1125 old CTA law)
Thus it is the RTC that has jurisdiction pursuant to Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP 129)
Section 19
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(6) RTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases not within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of any court tribunal person or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial function
RE: RTC’S JURISDICTION OVER INTRACORPORATE DISPUTE
CONFESSOR: Garcia v Eastern Telecom April 2009
FACTS: Atty. Virgilio R. Garcia was the VP and Head of Business Support
Services and Human Resource Departments of the Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) was dismissed from his position
which prompted him to file an illegal dismissal case before LA. NLRC reversed and
ruled that the dismissal of Atty. Garcia, being ETPI‘s Vice President, partook of the
nature of an intra-corporate dispute cognizable by Regional Trial Courts and not by
Labor Arbiters.
ISSUE:
whether the question of legality or illegality of the removal or termination of
employment of an officer of a corporation is an intra-corporate controversy that
falls under the original exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts?
RULING: Corporation Law; Intra-Corporate Controversies; Jurisdiction; A
corporate officer’s dismissal or removal is always a corporate act and/or an
intra-corporate controversy, over which the Regional Trial Court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction.—The issue raised by Atty. Garcia—whether the
termination or removal of an officer of a corporation is an intra-corporate
controversy that falls under the original exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts—is not novel. The Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, has decreed that
a corporate officer‘s dismissal or removal is always a corporate act and/or an intra-
corporate controversy, over which the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]
(now the Regional Trial Court) has original and exclusive jurisdiction. We have
ruled that an intra-corporate controversy is one which pertains to any of the
following relationships: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and
the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State
insofar as the former‘s franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3)
between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners,
members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners or associates
themselves. In Lozon v. National Labor Relations Commission (240 SCRA 1
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[1995]), we declared that Presidential Decree No. 902-A confers on the SEC
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies and cases
involving intra-corporate and partnership relations between or among the
corporation, officers and stockholders and partners, including their elections or
appointments
Jurisdiction of the RTC
GUINOMLA: BPI v. Eduardo Hong
ISSUE: whether the RTC can take cognizance of the injunction suit. YES
SC: Perusal of the complaint reveals that HONG does not ask the trial court to rule
on its interest latter‘s properties mortgaged to BPI. The complaint principally seeks
to enjoin the foreclosure proceedings initiated by BPI over those properties on the
ground that such properties are held in trust and placed under the jurisdiction of
the appointed Liquidator in SEC Case. Thus, Civil Case is one for injunction with
prayer for damages.
As a rule, actions for injunction and damages lie within the jurisdiction of the RTC
pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7691.
SC, CA RTC
AMPARO Springfield v. RTC
Facts:
Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. (Springfield) bought from Petra
Capistrano Lot No. 2291-C with an area of 68,732 square meters, and Lot No.
1
2291-D with an area of 49,778 square meters. Springfield developed these
2
properties into a subdivision project called Mega Heights Subdivision.
10 | P a g e
DAR issued a Notice of Coverage, placing the property under the coverage of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
There being an opposition from the heirs of Petra Piit, the case was docketed as
DARAB Case No. X-305. DARAB Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision
declaring the nature of the property as residential and not suitable for
4
agriculture. The Regional Director filed a notice of appeal, which the Provincial
5
Adjudicator disallowed for being pro forma and frivolous. The decision became
6 7
final and executory and Springfield proceeded to develop the property.
The DAR Regional Director then filed a petition for relief from judgment of the
DARAB Decision. The DARAB granted the petition and gave due course to the
Notice of Coverage and also ordered the heirs of Piit and Springfield to pay the
farmer-beneficiaries P12,340,800.00 corresponding to the value of the property
since the property has already been developed into a subdivision.
Springfield and the heirs of Piit (petitioners) filed with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 40, a petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5,
1995 and all its subsequent proceedings. Petitioners contend that the DARAB
decision was rendered without affording petitioners any notice and hearing which
10
was dismissed by the RTC for lack of jurisdiction.
Springfield et.al filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari,
mandamus, and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order which was dismissed for lack of merit,
ruling that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the DARAB Decision
14
because it is a co-equal body.
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Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the
DARAB. NO
23
With the introduction of B.P. Blg. 129, the rule on annulment of judgments was
specifically provided in Section 9(2), which vested in the then Intermediate
Appellate Court (now the CA) the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of judgments of RTCs.
Significantly, B.P. Blg. 129 does not specifically provide for any power of the RTC
to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies. However, in BF Northwest
25
Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court ruled
that the RTCs have jurisdiction over actions for annulment of the decisions of the
National Water Resources Council, which is a quasi-judicial body ranked with
inferior courts, pursuant to its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, under Sec. 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, in relation to acts or
omissions of an inferior court. This led to the conclusion that despite the absence
of any provision in B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC had the power to entertain petitions for
annulment of judgments of inferior courts and administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies of equal ranking. Hence, while it is true, as petitioners contend, that the
RTC had the authority to annul final judgments, such authority pertained only to
final judgments rendered by inferior courts and quasi-judicial bodies of equal
ranking with such inferior courts.
Issue: Whether the DARAB is a quasi-judicial body with the rank of an
inferior court such that the RTC may take cognizance of an action for the
annulments of its judgments. NO
The DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure adopted on December 26,
27
1988 specifically provides for the manner of judicial review of its decisions,
orders, rulings, or awards. Rule XIV, Section 1 states:
11 | P a g e
SECTION 1. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Any decision, order, award or
ruling by the Board or its Adjudicators on any agrarian dispute xxx may be brought
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof, to the Court of Appeals by
certiorari, except as provided in the next succeeding section. Notwithstanding an
appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Board or Adjudicator appealed
from, shall be immediately executory.
Further, the prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly
28
provides for an appeal from the DARAB decisions to the CA.
The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain
administrative bodies to the CA, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the
29
RTC, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is
that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its decisions are
beyond the RTC's control. The CA was therefore correct in sustaining the RTC's
dismissal of the petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5,
1995, as the RTC does not have any jurisdiction to entertain the same.
SC, CA, RTC
MALNEGRO : Dela Cruz vs CA, Tan Te
Facts: Reyes owned a lot in Sampaloc, Manila. Dela Cruz had been renting
portion of such lot for over 40 years. In 1989, a fire struck the premises and
destroyed the houses thereon. After the fire, Dela Cruz and others returned to the
premises and rebuilt their houses. At this time, Reyes made several verbal
demands on the lessees to vacate the premises, to no avail.
Reyes sent Dela Cruz a written demand to vacate on Feb 21, 1994. Dela
Cruz refused to leave. Reyes did not file an action in court. Reyes sold lot to Tan
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Te. On Jan 14, 1997 Tan Te sent Dela Cruz a written demand to vacate the lot but
the latter refused. A barangay conciliation was done but failed.
Tan Te filed an ejectment suit against Dela Cruz in MeTC of Manila on
Sept 8, 1997. Tan Te‘s complaint had allegations that Dela Cruz forcible entered
property through stealth unlawfully depriving Tan Te of physical possession of the
property.
MeTC decided against Dela Cruz.
Dela Cruz questions MeTC‘s jurisdiction and avers that RTC has
jurisdiction because it has been more than 1 year since the forcible entry
(reckoned from Feb 21, 1994).
ISSUE: Which court between MeTC and RTC has jurisdiction?
Ruling: MeTC has jurisdiction.
MeTC > exclusive jurisdiction over cases of unlawful detainer (must be filed within
1 year from last demand to vacate) and forcible entry (must be filed within 1 year
from knowledge of unlawful entry)
RTC > jurisdiction over cases of recovery of possession of real property when:
(a) when dispossession lasted for more than 1 year
(b) when action was filed more than 1 year from date of last demand received by
lessee
An ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance of owner is a
specie of unlawful detainer case. As in this case, the last demand to vacate was
made Jan 14, 1997. The case was filed within 1 year prescription of unlawful
detainer case.
12 | P a g e
SUY TE: Brgy. San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor
Facts
Brgy. San Roque filed before MTC a complaint to expropriate a property of
the heirs of Pastor. MTC dismissed the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction. Since
the principal cause of action was the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
MTC contended that this action was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC
and not with the MTC.
RTC also dismissed complaint since action for eminent domain affected
title to real property. Value determines whether RTC or MTC has jurisdiction. Since
the value of the property is only P1740, MTC should have jurisdiction since the
value is less than P20K.
Issue Which court, the MTC or the RTC has jurisdiction over cases for eminent
domain or expropriation where the assessed value of the subject property is below
P20K?
Ruling
Sec. 19 (1) of BP 129 provides that ―RTCs shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
Expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. It does not involve
the sum of money. If the action is for the recovery of a sum of money = claim is
capable of pecuniary estimation (jurisdiction depends on the amount of the claim).
If the money claim is purely incidental to the action = it is cognizable by the RTC.
Value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms,
for the court is duty-bound to determine just compensation for it. However, this is
merely incidental to the expropriation suit. The amount is determined only after the
court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.
Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC, regardless of the
value of the subject property.
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As provided by Section 19 (2) of BP 129, the RTC has exclusive original

jurisdiction over civil cases in volving title, or possession of real property or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds 20,000
(and for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds 50,000)
SC, CA, RTC

VIOLA: Brgy. Piapi v Talip

Brgy. Piapi represented by Andres Lugnasin et al. v. Ignacio Talip

representing Heirs of Jayag
Brgy. Piapi filed with the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur an action for reconveyance
against Heirs of Jayag involving a parcel of land. In the complaint, it was alleged
that the market value of the property is 15,000.00.
Brgy Piapi only specified the market value or estimated value, which is
P15,000.00. Pursuant to the provision of Section 33 (3) of BP 129, in civil actions
where the assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000.00 (or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed P50,000.00)
it is the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts that has exclusive and original jurisdiction.

Heirs of Jayag filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction It is the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, not the
alleging that considering that the assessed value of the property is only 6,030.00, RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.
the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MCTC citing Section 33(3) of
BP 129 as amended.

Piapi alleged that jurisdiction is vested in the RTC considering that the total
assessed value of the property is P41,890.00, as shown by a Real Property Field
Appraisal and Assessment Sheet dated August 20, 1996 issued by Atty. Marcos D.
Risonar, Jr., Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur.

Issue: WON the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC or the MCTC

Ruling: The nature of the action and court having Jurisdiction over it is determined
by the allegations contained in the complaint (WON the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the claims.)

Section 7(b) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that "the assessed
value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof, shall be
alleged by the claimant."

In the case at bar, what was alleged in the complaint was the market value of –
15,000.00 (and the assessed value of P41,890.00 was only alleged in the
opposition of the motion to dismiss.)

13 | P a g e
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Rule 1 General Provisions
Section 3 RULE 1
JARON: Pilar vda. de Manalo v CA (Purita Jayme, et. al)
G.R. NO. 129242, January 16, 2001
FACTS: On February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo died intestate. He was survived by
his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children who are all of legal age. At
the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several real properties.
On November 26, 1992, Purita Jayme, et. al (eight of the surviving children of the
late Troadio Manalo) filed a petition with the RTC of Manila of the judicial
settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the
appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
However, it was opposed by Pilar vda de Manalo together with the remaining
surviving children [4 out of 11]. Pilar, et. al. filed a motion for the outright dismissal
of the petition for the judicial settlement of the estate on the ground of the failure of
the 8 children (Purita, et. al.) to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise
involving family members of the same family have been made prior to the filing of
the petition pursuant to Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court in
relation to Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Pilar, et. al claim that the
petition (SP. PROC. No. 92-63626) filed by the 8 children is actually an ordinary
civil action involving members of the same family.
ISSUE: Whether the action initiated by the 8 children is an ordinary civil action.
HELD: NO. It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an
action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the
complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling.
14 | P a g e
A careful scrutiny of the [petition entitled] ―Petition for Issuance of Letters of
Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626‖
belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary
civil action.
The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late
Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of
Manila at the time of his said death.
The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are
foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration
of the estate rest.
The petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including
a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled
in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition
leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the [8 children] to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo. to wit;
PRAYER among others.
a. That Romeo Manalo be an administrator of the estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo.
b. That after all the properties have been inventoried and expenses and just debts
have been, that the estate be settled and distributed among the legal heirs.
Concededly, the petition contains certain averments which may be typical of an
ordinary civil action. [Pilar, et. al.] took advantage of the said defect in the petition
and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is
actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative
defenses and compulsory counterclaims in an apparent effort to make out a
case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal (under Rule
16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code).
[Pilar, et. al.] argue that even if the petition were to be considered as a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j)
of the Rules of Court vis-à-visArticle 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would
nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of Rule 1,
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Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.' [Pilar, et.
al.] contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include
special proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. [Pilar, et. al.] may not validly take refuge under the
provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of
Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter
provision is clear enough. To wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035.
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions.
This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons
against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the
remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of
a right, whether at law or in equity.
A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party
sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong. Besides, an excerpt from the Report of the Code Commission
unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal
provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and
involve members of the same family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation
between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be
made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion
in the family. It is know that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper
bitterness than stranger.
It must be emphasized that [Pilar vda. de Manalo, et.al.] are not being sued for any
cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded therein. The petition is a
special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners
therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. [Purita, et.al]
15 | P a g e
merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be
duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly
exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of
the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate
court.
Sec 5 Rule1– Docket fees
AMISTAD: Montaner v Carpio
Facts:
Montaner moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground [among others] that
the court did not acquire jurisdiction because Liling failed to pay the correct amount
of docket fees.
Issue: W/N the Shariah District Court acquired jurisdiction over the complaint of
Liling against Montaner, notwithstanding the non-payment of the correct amount
filing and docketing fees
Ruling: Yes
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket
fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. If the party filing the
case paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the
amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency
assessment lies with the same clerk of court. In such a case, the lower court
concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a party‘s reliance on
the clerk of courts insufficient assessment of the docket fees. As every citizen has
the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties
knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law, the party filing the
case cannot be penalized with the clerk of courts insufficient assessment.
However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.
In the case at bar, Luisa did not present the clerk of courts assessment of the
docket fees. Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be
no determination of whether Liling correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk
of courts assessment.
[He who alleges has the burden of proving the same.]
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Sec 5 Rule 1
MALNEGRO: Manchester Development vs CA, City Land (STRICT RULE)
Facts: Manchester filed a case for specific performance against City Land to
compel the latter to execute a deed of sale. Manchester alleged that City Land
forfeited the former‘s tender of payment for a certain transaction causing them
damages amounting to P78.75 M. This amount was allegedly in the BODY of the
complaint but not in the PRAYER. Manchester paid docket fee of P410 premised
on the main action for specific performance, hence incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The lower court ruled that there was an under assessment of docket
fee thus ordering Manchester to amend its complaint. Manchester complied but it
only lowered their claim for damages to P10M. The amount was not stated in the
PRAYER.
Issue: Should the complaint be admitted? Did the court acquire jurisdiction? NO
Ruling: A case is deemed only upon payment of the appropriate docket fees
regardless of the actual date of filing in court. The docket fee, its computation,
should be based on the original complaint. Here, since the proper docket fee was
not paid for the original complaint, it‘s as if there‘s no original complaint to speak
of. There is no original complaint duly filed to amend. Thus, any subsequent
proceeding taken in consideration of the amended complaint is void.
Manchester‘s defense that the action is primarily an action for specific
performance is erroneous. Based on the allegations and the prayer, the case is an
action for damages and for specific performance. Thus, capable of pecuniary
estimation.
The amount was already provided in the BODY of the original complaint.
The omission in the PRAYER is clearly to evade payment of proper filing fees.
Thus, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be the basis for the
computation of filing/docket fees. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged
from the record. (or file a new complaint then pay appropriate docket fees)
Sec 5 Rule 1
16 | P a g e
MONTEJO: Suson v CA
ERIBERTO M. SUSON, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DAVID S.
ODILAO, JR., respondents.
FACTS:
 respondent Odilao filed civil suit for damages against petitioner Suson in
RTC Leyte
 it was denied due to improper venue.
 Odilao filed the suit before RTC Cebu.
ISSUE: whether or not a party litigant, whose complaint has been dismissed by a
Regional Trial Court due to improper venue, can seek an authorization from the
Supreme Court thru the Deputy Court Administrator to re-file his complaint in the
court of proper venue without payment of the prescribed docket fee
HELD:
 Odilao‘s complaint cannot be deemed to have been re-filed in the RTC of
Cebu City because it was not originally filed in the same court but in the
RTC of Southern Leyte. Thus, when private respondents complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16336 by the clerk of court of the RTC
Cebu City, it became an entirely separate case that was dismissed by the
RTC of Leyte due to improper venue. As a remedial measure, the plaintiff
whose complaint was dismissed due to improper venue can still file
another complaint, but this time in the court of proper venue. Note,
however, that the dismissal of the complaint filed in the court of proper
venue did not stop the running of the prescriptive period within which to file
his complaint in the court of proper venue. Theoretically, the plaintiff may
decide to file a complaint containing substantially the same allegations and
prayer as the previously dismissed complaint, or he may decide to amend
the same and pray for a different relief. In this case, the principle remains
unchanged, that is, the court (of proper venue) will only acquire jurisdiction
over the case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee thereon.
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 the RTC Cebu City is hereby ordered to require private respondent to pay
the prescribed docket fees in Civil Case No. 16336 as a condition
precedent for further hearing the case.
Sec 5 Rule 1
NITURA NATI ONAL STEEL CORPORATI ON , petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARSENI O J. MAG PALE, and JOSE MA. P.
JACINTO , respondents
G.R. No. 123215. February 2, 1999
Facts: Jose Ma. Jacinto was the former owner of 100 shares of stock of the Manila
Golf and Country Club (MGCC) now owned by and registered in the name of
petitioner National Steel Corporation (NSC). When he returned to the Philippines in
1986, he discovered that Stock Certificate No. 1361 had been cancelled and a
replacement Stock Certificate had been issued in the name of NSC.
Jacinto then filed a complaint with the trial court against NSC for the replacement
of his stock certifcate, the cancellation of National Steel‘s certifcate and the
retransfer of the said share to him. He paid the docket fee of P4,040.00. He prayed
that NSC be ordered to execute a deed of assignment transferring to him the said
shares and to issue a new one in his name.
NSC moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription, which was,
however, denied. It elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals by way of certiorari.
When the appellate court dismissed its petition, it likewise elevated the case to the
Supreme Court which suffered the same fate.
In 1993, after filing its answer, after which trial was held, NSC again filed a motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction claiming that there was no proper payment of
docket fees, as Jacndnto ent should have paid the amount of P26,805.00 since the
action in this case was for the recovery of P5,511,000 shares of stock.
17 | P a g e
In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that the principal relief prayed for was
for the execution of a deed of assignment retransferring unto Jacinto the MGCCI
certificate and that there was no allegation of the actual value of the stock
certificate. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case?
Held: NO. Even if there was incorrect payment of docket fees, NSC is already
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the court.
Jacinto in this case seeks the execution in his favor of a deed of assignment of
shares of stock, it follows that the action is for recovery of personal property, the
main purpose of which is to regain the ownership and possession of the said
shares of stock, hence, the docket fee should be based on the value of the
property sought to be recovered. This means that there was incorrect payment of
docket fees.
Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the
trial court may allow the plaintiff in an action to pay the same within a reasonable
time before the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. If
the plaintiff fails to comply with this requirement, the defendant should timely raise
the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel. In the latter
case, the balance between the appropriate docket fees and the amount actually
paid by the plaintiff will be considered a lien on any award he may obtain in his
favor.
While the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action,
nevertheless, the party raising such question may be estopped if he has actively
taken part in the very proceedings which he questions and he only objects to the
court's jurisdiction because the judgment or the order subsequently rendered is
adverse to him.
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Sec. 5 Rule 1 (Commencement of Actions, Docket Fees)
SUY TE Serrano v. Delica
Facts:
Delica filed w/ the RTC a complaint for cancellation of Deeds of Sale,
TCTs, etc. against Serrano, et al. Delica is the owner of 10 parcels of land. He was
allegedly unduly influenced, coerced, and intimidated by Serrano to executed in
Serrano‘s favor a SPA. Serrano sold the lands to MBJ Land. Delica found his old
titles were cancelled and new titles were issued in Serrano‘s name were based on
a spurious Deed of Sale.
Trial court ruled in favor of Delica. Serrano filed MRs that the complaint be
dismissed for Delica‘s failure to pay the required docket fee.
Issue: WON Delica paid the correct docket fee when he filed his complaint.
Ruling:
SC ruled on the importance of paying the correct docket fees.
Rule: Upon the filing of the pleading or other application, which initiates an
action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be paid in full.
Exception: If the litigant is a pauper; fees shall be a lien on the judgment
rendered in his favor, unless the court otherwise provides.
18 | P a g e
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fees that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
The assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof
shall be alleged by the claimant shall be the basis in computing the fees. Neither
the assessed value nor estimated value were alleged by Delica, he only stated BIR
zonal valuation.
Correct docket fees cannot be computed, and the complaint should not have been
accepted by the trial court. It had not acquired jurisdiction over the present case for
failure of Delica to pay the required docket fee. His complaint is vulnerable to
dismissal.
Sec 5 Rule 1
VIOLA: RCBDRC v Fomaran
1. RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS & REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v
FORMARAN
FACTS: Ruby Shelter obtained a loan in the total amount of P95,700,620.00 from
Tan & Obiedo, secure by a real estate mortgage over 5 parcels of land. When the
loan became due & Ruby Shelter failed to pay, the parties entered into a MOA,
granting an extension to pay & it was agreed that Ruby Shelter is to execute a
DOS over the same parcels of land in favor of Tan & Obiedo w/c shall be nullified
in case of payment and failure to pay on the expiration of the extension, Tan &
Obiedo can acquired their properties as dacion en pago.
Ruby Shelter failed to pay and so Tan & Obiedo registered the properties in their
name. Ruby Shelter filed before the RTC an action for annulment of Deed of Sale
asserting that the execution of the same constituted pactum commisorium and was
null & void.
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Upon filing, Ruby Shelters paid the sum of P13,644.25 for docket fee as assessed
by the OCC. The COC initially considered the action as incapable of pecuniary
estimation& computed the docket feee according to Sec 7(b)(1) of Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court w/c imposes a fixed flat rate of docket fee.
Tan contends that the docket fee should be computed based on Sec 7(a) of Rule
141 as amended by AM-04-2-04-SC, since the case involves real properties and
that due to the failure of Ruby Shelter to pay the proper docket fee, the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction. RTC did not out rightly dismissed the case and granted
Ruby Shelter to pay the additional docket fee, however Ruby Shelter refused
believing it already paid the correct amount.
ISSUE: What provision is applicable to the case at bar, Sec 7(a) or 7(b) of Rule
141?
RULING: Sec 7(a) is applicable
The action is a real action, involving the recovery of the title and possession of the
5 parcels of land and thus the docket fee for which must be computed in
accordance with 7(a) of Rule 141 which though dominated as an action for
annulment of DOS, provides that in cases involving real property, the fair market
value of the real property in litigation stated in the current tax declaration or zonal
valuation of the BIR whichever is higher or if there is none, the stated value of the
property in litigation instead of the assessed or estimated market value.
SC affirmed the order requiring Ruby Shelter to pay additional docket fee.
19 | P a g e
Sec 6 RULE 1
CABREROS: Republic vs. CA
FACTS:
The government filed an expropriation proceeding against Fe Manuel and
Metrobank to carry out a certain project.
RTC dismissed the complaint for expropriation
Republic filed a motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, it filed a petition for Certiorari.
CA ruled that certiorari was filed out of time by the Republic pursuant to
Bar Matter 803 which was the law in force at the time, stating that the 60 day
period within which to file the petition was to be reckoned from the receipt of the
decision (the RTC decision) and stopped upon the filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration and started to run again from the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration.
However the Republic invoked AM-00-2-03-SC which reverted the
counting of the 60 days period from the receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration which was subsequently effected. Thus, AM superseded bar
matter 803.
ISSUE: Which law is made to apply in order to count the 60 day period within
which to file a petition for certiorari.
HELD:
Strictly speaking, the law enforced at that time was Bar Matter 803 and
thus the petition was filed out of time.
However, Bar Matter 803 was subsequently superseded by AM 00-2-03
which reckoned the 60 day period within which to file a petition for certiorari from
the receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
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The amendment under AM 0203 is procedural and remedial in character. It
does not operate new or remove vested rights but only operated in furtherance of
the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.
It is settled that procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of
retroact law. They may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected in as much as there is no vested right in
rules of procedure.
Applying Rule 1 Section 6
Liberality should be observed in construing the Rules of Court in order to
promote its objective of securing a just speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action or proceeding.
Sec 6 Rule 1
CHANYEE Teoville v Ferreira
Issue
whether liberal construction or substantial compliance is permissible under Section
6 (c) and (d) of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court; and
RULING: NO
SEC. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition,
and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall
be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
SEC. 8. Action on the petition. The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to
file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from
notice, or dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit,
20 | P a g e
prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too
[32]
unsubstantial to require consideration.
Case at bar:
Procedural mistake committed:
1. Only the counsel signed the verification and certification against forum
shopping
2. Failed to attach duplicate original copies of pleadings
It is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the rules of
procedure should not be strictly enforced at the cost of substantial justice.
However, it does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at
random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues
and their just resolution. It must be emphasized that procedural rules should not be
belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in
prejudice to a partys substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be
followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons.
[35]
In the case of Republic v. Hernandez this Court stressed:
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome
rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered
according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.
We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot v. CA, et al., that:
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and
the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a
mistake to propose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to
each other, or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules
should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter
of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as complementing each
other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties.
Observance of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process,
whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a
rule of court.
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...
. . . (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of
reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed. x x x. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, this
does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the
prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just
resolution. Justice eschews anarchy.
[36]
Reiterated in Lanzaderas v. Amethyst Security and General Services, Inc.:
. . . Although technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves, they are
necessary, however, for an effective and expeditious administration of justice. It is
settled that a party who seeks to avail of certiorari must observe the rules thereon
and non-observance of said rules may not be brushed aside as mere technicality.
While litigation is not a game of technicalities, and that the rules of procedure
should not be enforced strictly at the cost of substantial justice, still it does not
follow that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice
of the orderly presentation, assessment and just resolution of the issues.
Procedural rules should not be belittled or dismissed simply because they may
have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantial rights. Like all rules, they are
required to be followed except only for compelling reasons
RE: RULE 1, SEC 6: CONSTRUCTION
CONFESSOR: MENESES VS CA
FACTS: MENESES were co-owners pro-indiviso of an irrigated rice land which
distributed to farmer-beneficiaries by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. No.
27). They filed a petition for just compensation alleging that from the time the land
was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries in 1972 up to the time of the filing of the
complaint, no payment or rentals has been made, and that the fair market value of
[1]
the property is P6,000,000.00.
RTC dismissed since the subject property was taken from petitioners on October
21, 1972 under the DARs Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27, then
just compensation must be based on the value of the property at the time of taking.
21 | P a g e
Meneses wished to remand the case to RTC for further proceedings and/or
reception of evidence on the just and fair market value of the property. They filed a
MR, but the same was denied on the grounds that it was filed 44 days late
CA Decision dated May 30, 2002 is already final and executory due to petitioners
failure to seasonably file a motion for reconsideration.
RULING:
It is true that petitioners failure to file their motion for reconsideration within
the reglementary period rendered the CA Decision dated May 30, 2002 final
and executory. For all intents and purposes, said Decision should now be
immutable and unalterable; however, the Court relaxes this rule in order to serve
substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d)
a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
[21]
thereby.
The explanation of petitioners counsel for the delayed filing of the motion for
reconsideration was that their law firm secretary failed to inform the court of
[22]
their change of address. This, of course, is not a valid excuse. As a general
rule, a client is bound by the acts of his counsel, including even the latters
mistakes and negligence. But where such mistake or neglect would result in
serious injustice to the client, a departure from this rule is warranted. To cling
to the general rule is to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to petitioners
[23]
whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his lawyer.
XXX Indeed, the Court has the power to except a particular case from the
operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice requires it because
what should guide judicial action is that a party is given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for
him to lose life, honor, or property on mere technicalities.
[27]
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Sec 6 Rule 1
GUINOMLA: Dadizon v. CA
ISSUE: WON Dadizons mode of appeal was correct – NO
SC: The mode of appeal adopted by the Dadizons was undoubtedly wrong. They
should have filed a petition for review in accordance with Rule 42, Rules of Court,
considering that the RTC had rendered the decision in question in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction.
The dismissal was unavoidable notwithstanding that the procedural rules might be
liberally construed, because the provisions of law and the rules concerning the
manner and period of appeal were mandatory and jurisdictional requirements
essential to enable the appellate court to take cognizance of the appeal.
Sec 6 Rule 1
AMPARO: Maricalum v. NLRC
Facts:
On August 17, 1984, a decision was rendered against Marinduque Mining
Industrial Corp. by Labor Arbiter ordering the reinstatement of illegally dismissed
equipment operator Cecilio Saludar. The decision was not executed as all the
assets of Marinduque had been foreclosed by PNB and DBP. These assets were
subsequently acquired by petitioner Maricalum while Marinduque had ceased its
operations.
Eight years later, Saludar moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against
Maricalum which was granted. Maricalum appealed to the NLRC contending that it
is a different entity from Marinduque which was the only party to the original
action.
22 | P a g e
On September 2, 1994, Saludar filed an Action for Revival of Judgment before the
NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch (Bacolod City). Maricalum again moved to
dismiss alleging that: (1) the complaint was not accompanied by a certificate of
non-forum shopping as required by SC Circular No. 04-94; (2) that the action was
cognizable only by regular courts; and (3) that it was not a party to the original
case.
Issue: WON the SC Circular No. 04-94 is mandatory and should apply to
NLRC (YES). WON the action for revival of judgment filed by Saludar must be
dismissed (NO).
Ruling:
The NLRC is a quasi-judicial agency, hence, initiatory pleadings filed before it
should be accompanied by a certificate of non-forum-shopping.
Nevertheless, in Loyola v. Court of Appeals, we held that substantial
compliance with the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping
is sufficient.
"x x x.
"The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely
underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its
requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial
compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances."
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In the case at bar, it is undisputed that respondent Saludar filed an affidavit of
compliance with SC Circular 04-94 on non-forum shopping albeit a little
delayed. This little delay should not defeat the action for revival of judgment which
undeniably was filed within the ten (10) year prescriptive period. Also, the
circumstance that respondent had painstakingly tried to enforce the favorable
judgment he obtained against petitioner for almost ten (10) years but to no avail,
should deter us from strictly construing the provisions of the Circular. A liberal
interpretation of the Circular would be more in keeping with the objectives of
procedural rules which is to "secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding."
Rule 2 Cause of Action
.
Section 1 RULE 2
JARON:SPS. Patrick and Rafaela JOSE v SPS. Helen and Romeo BOYON
(G.R. No. 147369, October 23, 2003)
In general, substituted service can be availed of only after a clear showing that
personal service of summons was not legally possible. Also, service by publication
is applicable in actions in rem and quasi in rem, but not in personal suits such as
the present one which is for specific performance.
“[A]n action for specific performance is an action in personam” (establishing
a claim against some particular person)
23 | P a g e
FACTS: Sps. Jose lodged a complaint for specific performance [before the RTC
of Muntinlupa City] against Sps. Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of
ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale.
The RTC issued summons to [Sps Boyon]. As per return of the summons,
substituted service [(service by publication instead of personal service)] was
resorted to by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons
personally to the spouses failed.
Sps Boyon raised the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground that the
latter never acquired jurisdiction over them because of the invalid service of
summons (summons by publication). [Sps. Boyon] argue that the case filed before
the trial court was an action for specific performance and, therefore, an action in
personam. As such, the summons by publication was insufficient to enable the
trial court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
Sps. Jose submit that although the case filed was denominated as an action for
specific performance, it was actually an action quasi in rem, because it involved a
piece of real property located in the Philippines. Sps Jose further argue that in
actions quasi in rem involving ownership of a parcel of land, it is sufficient that the
trial court acquire jurisdiction over the res. Thus, the summons by publication,
which they effected subsequent to the substituted service of summons, was
allegedly sufficient.
ISSUE: Whether the action is an action in personam or an action quasi in rem.
HELD: It is an action in personam.
In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific
performance directed against [Sps. Boyon]. While the suit incidentally involved a
piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since they
did not assert any interest or right over it.
Moreover, this Court has consistently declared that an action for specific
performance is an action in personam.
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It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by
publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem.
In rem - is an action against the thing itself instead of against the
defendant’s person.
Quasi in rem - an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose is to
subject that individual’s interest in a piece of property to the obligation or
loan burdening it.
Having failed to serve the summons on respondents properly, the RTC did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in
personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do
so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds."
Sec 1 Rule 2
In Rem vs In Personam vs Quasi-in rem proceedings
MALNEGRO: Maria Teresa Biaco vs Philippine Countryside Rural Bank
(PCRB)
Facts: Ernesto Biaco, husband of Teresa obtained several loans from PCRB from
1996 to 1998. To secure the loans, he mortgaged a certain property in favour of
the bank. He was able to pay loans from 1996-1997 but defaulted in loans
obtained in 1998 which amounted to more than P1M. Eventually PCRB filed a
complaint for foreclosure against Sps Biaco. Summons was issued by the trial
judge. The sheriff served summons to Ernesto in his office. No summons was
served to Teresa. The sps did not file a responsive pleading. The case was heard
ex-parte & the sps were ordered to satisfy the debt and failure to do so will
authorize the sheriff to auction the mortgaged property.
The property was eventually auctioned at P150k, which is insufficient to
cover more than P1M debt. Upon motion of PCRB, notice of levy was issued
24 | P a g e
against the personal properties of Tersa to satisfy the deficiency. It was only at this
point that Teresa learned on the previous ex parte proceedings. She then sought
to have the judgment annulled as she now claims that the lower court never
acquired jurisdiction over her persons (for non-service of summons) thus she can‘t
be bound by the judgment.
PCRB argued that the foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem,
hence Teresa‘s participation is no required so long as the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res which is what happened in this case.
Issue: Can the trial court‘s judgment be annulled for lack of jurisdiction? In
depends on nature of action (in personam, in rem, quasi in rem)
What is the effect of the failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
defendant in a case for quasi in rem?
Ruling: (the SC ruling actually focused on due process but Atty Suarez wanted to
emphasize that)
Teresa will still be bound by the judgment. It is admitted that a judicial
foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem and that the presence of Teresa is
not required because the trial court was able to acquire jurisdiction over the res
(mortgaged property).
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his
personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of
against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named
as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to
the obligation or lien burdening the property.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or
quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to
confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the
res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as
a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is
recognized and made effective.
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Sec 2 Rule 2
MONTEJO: Jimenez v Jordona
RAMON R. JIMENEZ JR. and ANNABELLE L. JIMENEZ, petitioners, vs. JUAN
JOSE JORDANA, respondent.
FACTS:
 Jordana offered to buy the property of Bunye. Bunye accepted.
 When Jordana payed the downpayment, Bunye refused to accept said
payment.
 Bunye sold the property instead to Jimenez.
 Jordana filed a complaint against Bunye for Specific Performance and
Damages. He also file a notice of lis pendens
 Later Jordana impleaded Jimenez as defendant
ISSUE: WON Jordana has sufficient cause of action against Jimenez
HELD:
 Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates
a right of another. It has the following elements: 1) the legal right of the
plaintiff; 2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect that legal
right; and 3) an act or omission of the defendant that violates such right.
 The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, not by the defenses
asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss. Thus, the complaint must
contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting
the plaintiffs cause of action.
 First, it is readily apparent that respondent has stated a demandable right
over the subject property. a contract of sale was deemed perfected as of
December 29, 1993, the day he received Bunyes letter of unqualified
acceptance.[36] From that moment, respondent acquired the legal right to
compel the transfer of ownership of the property to him.
25 | P a g e
 Second, respondent has the right to compel petitioners to respect, not
violate, his rights as a prior buyer.
 Third, that Jimenez had actual notice and knowledge of the claim of
Jordana against Bunye; but, they proceeded to purchase the subject
property. Such act violated Jordana‘s right.
 the allegations in the Complaint, the pleadings of the plaintiff and the
record of the case sufficiently support a cause of action for recovery of
property against petitioners. It is generally accepted that when property
belonging to a person is unlawfully or fraudulently taken by another, the
former has the right of action against the latter for the recovery of the
property
 respondent is not suing petitioners for contractual breach but for a
recovery of property. It is not relevant, therefore, even to argue that the
parties have no privity of contract. We stress that participation in a
contract is not necessarily an element that determines the existence of a
cause of action.
Sec 2 Rule 2
NITURA: SPS. EXPEDI TO ZEPEDA AND ALI CE D. ZEPEDA, petitioners, vs.
CHI NA BANKI NG CORPORATI ON , respondent
G.R. No. 172175. October 9, 2006
Facts: Spouses Expedito and Alice Zepeda filed a complaint for nullification of
foreclosure proceedings and loan documents with damages against Chinabank
before the RTC. They originally obtained a loan of about P5.8M secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land.
They encountered difficulties in the payment of the loan obligation so they
requested for restructuring which was allegedly granted by Chinabank. Hence,
they were surprised that Chinabank extrajudicially foreclosed the REM where it
also was the highest bidder. Spouses Zepeda also failed to redeem the said land.
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Spouses Zepeda wants the foreclosure proceedings annulled for failure to comply
with posting and publication requirements. They also claimed that Chinabank
unilaterally fixed the interests rates on the loan. Chinabank‘s Motion to Dismiss
was dismissed prompting it to file an answer with special affirmative defenses.
The Trial Court denied Chinabank‘s affirmative defenses for lack of merit and set
the directed the Clerk of Court to set the pre-trial conference. Chinabank filed a
petition for Certiorari in the CA which held that TC gravely abused its discretion
and that the case should be dismissed due to failure to state a cause of action.
Issue: WON the complaint states a cause of action?
Held: Yes.
The test is as follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render
a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer? The question of whether the
complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the
acts committed by the defendant. Thus it must contain a concise statement of the
ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. Failure to
make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint "warrants its
dismissal.
Notwithstanding that the Sps Zepeda failed to redeem the property and that
ownership has already been transferred to Chinabank, they still have not failed to
state a cause of action against the bank.
As defined in Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is an act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another. Its essential elements are:
1 . A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or
other appropriate relief.
In the case at bar, Sps Zepeda alleged that Chinabank acted in bad faith when it
foreclosed the mortgaged property notwithstanding the approval of the
26 | P a g e
restructuring plan for the loan. Assuming that this allegation is correct, it is
sufficient to establish a cause of action. The fact that the Spouses failed to redeem
the property and that the property is already in the bank‘s name.
Sec. 2 Rule 2
SUY TE: Heirs of Jose Santiago v. Aurea Santiago, Vicente Ong, et al.
Facts:
Heirs of Jose Santiago allege that their father and his brother Juan (both
deceased) were registered co-owners of a parcel of land. Juan allegedly sold a
portion of the land to Mark Ong, with the participation of Aurea Santiago.
According to the heirs, the signatures of the documents were spurious, forged, and
falsified by Santiago, et al. The heirs are after the annulment of the Deed of Sale,
etc. based on fraud.
Issue: WON the heirs are the real parties in interest to bring the instant suit and
that they have a cause of action against Santiago, et al.?
Ruling:
There is NO cause of action. The heirs are not real parties in interest and
therefore have no cause of action in bringing the present case.
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. A cause of
action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
In the case at bar, Jason Santiago owned half of the lot and merely
exercised his right when he sold a portion of the lot. The heirs question Juan‘s
transaction even though the heirs are neither parties to the contract nor heirs or
assigns of Juan Santiago.
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Juan left a probated will leaving his properties to Aurea, to the exclusion of
the heirs. Since the heirs did not seek to exercise their right of preemption, they
are not real parties in interest in the present case.
Rule 2, Sec 3 – Splitting
AMISTAD: Flores v Sps Lindo
Facts:
Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from Arturo Flores amounting to P400,000. To
secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering a
property in the name of Edna and her husband Enrico (Enrico) Lindo, Jr. Edna also
signed a Promissory Note and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-
in-fact.
Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds, so Flores filed a Complaint for Foreclosure of
Mortgage with Damages before RTC Manila Branch 33.
RTC Branch 33 ruled that Flores was not entitled to a judicial foreclosure of the
mortgage because the deed executed by Edna was without the consent of her
husband [because the SPA was executed after the execution of the mortgage]. It
further ruled that Flores was not precluded from recovering the load from Edna and
may still file a personal action against her.
Flores filed a complaint for collection of sum of money with damages against Sps
Lindo before RTC manila Branch 42.
Sps Lindo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground lack of cause of action. RTC
ruled in favor of Flores but the CA dismissed the case.
Issue: W/N there was splitting of cause of action
Ruling: No.
The cause of action of foreclosure is different from collection of sum of money.
Generally, while the remedies of foreclosure of a mortgage and collection are
27 | P a g e
alternative, in this case, Flores may still file the other to prevent unjust enrichment
on Edna‘s part.
The liability of Edna Lindo on the principal contract of the loan however subsists
notwithstanding the illegality of the mortgage. Indeed, where a mortgage is not
valid, the principal obligation which it guarantees is not thereby rendered null and
void. That obligation matures and becomes demandable in accordance with the
stipulation pertaining to it. Under the foregoing circumstances, what is lost is
merely the right to foreclose the mortgage as a special remedy for satisfying or
settling the indebtedness which is the principal obligation. In case of nullity, the
mortgage deed remains as evidence or proof of a personal obligation of the debtor
and the amount due to the creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action.
In Chieng v. Santos, this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may institute against
the mortgage-debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose
the mortgage. The Court ruled that the remedies are alternative and not cumulative
[…]
In that case, however, this Court pro hac vice, ruled that Sps Lindo could still be
held liable for the balance of the loan, applying the principle that no person may
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.
Sec 3 & 4 Rule 2
AMPARO: Chu v. Sps. Cunanan
Facts:
Chu executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage involving their five
parcels of land in favor of Cunanan for the consideration of P5,161,090.00.
Ownership of the lots was agreed to remain with the Chus until full payment of the
purchase price. However, Cunanan was able to transfer the title of the five lots to
her name without the knowledge of the Chus, and to borrow money with the lots as
security without paying the balance of the purchase price to the Chus.
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Cunanan later transferred two of the lots to Spouses Carloses on July 29, 1987
and assigned the remaining three lots to Cool Town Realty on May 25, 1989
despite the annotation made by the Chus.
st
Chus commenced (1 ) Civil Case in the RTC to recover the unpaid balance from
Spouses Cunanan. Five years later, the Chus amended the complaint to seek the
annulment of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and of the TCTs
issued pursuant to the deed, and to recover damages and implead other
defendants. Meanwhile, Sps. Carloses sold the two lots to Benelda Estate.
Meanwhile, the Chus, the Cunanans, and Cool Town Realty entered into a
compromise agreement whereby the Cunanans transferred to Chus their 50%
share over the parcels of land for and in consideration of of the FULL settlement of
their case.
nd
April 30, 2001, Chus brought another suit (2 civil case) seeking cancellation of
the TCTs in the name of Benelda Estate involving the two lots. It was dismissed on
appeal by the CA ruling that the compromise agreement had ended the legal
controversy between the parties with respect to the cause of action arising from
the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and that the filing of Civil Case
No.12251 contravened the rule against splitting of a cause of action, and rendered
Civil Case No.12251 subject of a motion to dismiss based on bar by res judicata.
Issue: WON petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to
enforce or rescind the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage.
Held: Yes. Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or
indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more
28 | P a g e
actions upon them. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be
split up or divided in order to be made the subject of two or more different actions.
The cause of action involved here is the failure of the Cunanans to pay in full the
purchase price of the five lots of the Chus. This is the cause of action involved in
the first civil case (annulment of deed of sale) and then again in the second civil
case (cancellation of the TCTs) involving the two lots from the five lots involved in
st
the 1 civil case.
Thus, Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits splitting of a
single cause of action, viz:
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If two or more suits
are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of
the others. (4a)
The rights and obligations of the parties over the five lots were all defined and
governed by the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, the only contract
between them. The contract was single and divisible. There can be one action
where the contract is entire and the breach total, and the Chus must therein
recover all the claims and damages. The Chus could not be permitted to split up a
single cause of action and make that single cause of action the basis of several
suits.
Their contravention of the policy merited the dismissal of Civil Case No. 12251 on
the ground of bar by res judicata.
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Sec 3 & 4 Rule 2
VIOLA: YAP v PDCP
FACTS: Sammy Yap obtained a P2 million loan from PDCP Development Bank,
Inc. (PDCP). As security, Sammys parents, petitioners Simon Yap and Milagros
Guevarra, executed a third-party mortgage on their land and warehouse standing
on it. The mortgage agreement provided that PDCP may extrajudicially foreclose
the property in case Sammy failed to pay the loan.
Sammy issued a promissory note and six postdated checks in favor of PDCP as
additional securities for the loan. Sammy defaulted on the payment of his loan,
PDCP presented the six checks to the drawee bank but the said checks were
dishonored. This prompted PDCP to file a complaint against Sammy for six counts
of violation of BP 22, which were provisionally dismissed upon the motion of
Sammy.
This prompted to file an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage on the
property of petitioners which served as principal security for Sammys loan.
ISSUE: WON PDCP is guilty of splitting of cause of action?
RULING: No. The causes of action for the filing of BP 22 and extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage are different.
Under BP 22, the cause of action is the issuance of bum checks and in filing for
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the cause of action is the failure to pay for
the loan secured by mortgaged property.
29 | P a g e
Sec 5 & 6 RULE 2
CABREROS: DECENA vs PIQUERO
FACTS:
Spouses Decena entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with
Spouses Piquero whereby the Decenas were to deliver their property to the latter
upon execution of the MOA subject to the condition that should the postdated
checks issued by Piquero would be dishonored the latter were to reconvey the
property back to the Decenas.
When 2 postdated checks were dishonored, the Decenas filed a complaint
for the nullity of the MOA, recovery of possession of the property, and damages
before the RTC of Bulacan.
Piqueros then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over the property subject of the action.
Since the principal action was for is for annulment of MOA and recovery of
possession of the property which is a real action and not a personal action, it
should be filed before the RTC of Paranaque where the property is situated.
However, the Decenas opposed this stating that, their action for damages
and attys fees is a personal action and not a real action; hence it may be filed
before the RTC of Bulacan where they reside. While the second cause of action for
the recovery of the possession of the property is a real action, the same may be
joined with the rest of their causes of action pursuant to Section 5 (c) Rule 2 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON the causes of action of the Decenas may be joined pursuant to
Section 5c Rule 2 of the Rules of Court
HELD:
No. There can be no joinder of causes of action in the instant case.
Under the Rule:
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A party may, in one pleading assert in the alternative or otherwise as
many causes of action as he may against an opposing party subject to the
conditions enumerated on of which is letter C of Section 5 Rule 2 which states:
c.) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to
different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC provided
that one of the causes of action fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the said
court.
A joinder of causes of action is the uniting of 2 demands or right of action
in one complaint. In declaring whether more than one cause of action is alleged,
the main thrust is whether more than 1 primary right or subject is present in the
controversy.
A cause of action may be single although the plaintiff seeks a variety of
remedies. The mere fact that the plaintiff prays for multiple reliefs does not indicate
that he has stated more than 1 cause of action. The prayer may be an aid in
interpreting the petition and determining whether or not more than 1 cause of
action is pleaded. If the allegation in the complaint show on primary right and one
primary wrong, only one cause of action is alleged even though other matters are
incidentally involved and although different acts, methods, and elements of injury,
items of claims or theory for recovery are set forth.
HOWEVER, WHERE 2 OR MORE PRIMARY RIGHT AND WRONGS
APPEAR, THERE IS A JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION.
In the instant case, there can be no joinder pursuant to Section 5c, Rule 2
of the Rules of Court since the Decenas as plaintiffs had only one cause of action
against the Piqueros, the Breach of the MOA upon the latter‘s failure to pay 2
installments as payment of the property as agreed upon, and turn over the
possession of the property. The claim for DAMAGES as reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation in the interim by the Piqueros and other damages
suffered are MERELY INCIDENTAL TO THE BREACH OF THE MOA and are
NOT INDEPENDENT or SEPARATE CAUSES OF ACTION.
30 | P a g e
Sec 5 & 6 Rule 2
CHANYEE: Teraña v Sagun
Facts:
 Filed an unlawful detainer case
 Both parties prayed for reimbursements and damages other than the
rentals for the reasonable use of the property
Issue
WON an action for reimbursement or recovery of damages may be properly
joined with an action for ejectment
Ruling: NO
An action for reimbursement or for recovery of damages may not be properly
joined with the action for ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action requiring
a full-blown trial, while an action for unlawful detainer is a special civil action which
requires a summary procedure. The joinder of the two actions is specifically
enjoined by Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. – A party may in one pleading assert, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an
opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of
parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by
special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to
different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial
Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court
and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of
money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
[Underscoring supplied.]
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The rationale for limiting the kind of damages recoverable in an unlawful detainer
54
case was explained in Araos v. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court held that:
The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only
damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. The reason for
this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful
possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the
plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of
the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have
suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.
Rule 3 Parties to Civil Actions
Section 2 RULE 3
JARON: EXCELLENT QUALITY APPAREL, INC v WIN MULTI-RICH
BUILDERS, INC
(G.R. No. 175048, February 10, 2009)
FACTS:
Excellent Quality Apparel entered into a contract with Multi-Rich Builders (Multi-
Rich) for the construction of a garment factory.
Win Multi-Rich Builders, Inc. (Win) filed a complaint for a sum of money against
Excellent Quality Apparel and its representative amounting to P8.6M.
31 | P a g e
In the course of hearing, the counsel of Win moved that its name in the case be
changed from "Win Multi-Rich Builders, Inc." to "Multi-Rich Builders, Inc." It was
only then that Excellent Quality Apparel apparently became aware of the variance
in the name of Win (plaintiff).
Excellent Quality Apparel moved to dismiss the case since Win was not the
contractor and neither a party to the contract, thus it cannot institute the case.
Excellent Quality Apparel obtained a Certificate of Non-Registration of Corporation/
Partnership from the SEC which certified that the latter did not have any records of
a "Multi-Rich Builders, Inc."
Win did not oppose the allegations. Win admitted that it was only incorporated
while the construction contract was executed. Likewise, it admitted that at the time
of execution of the contract, Multi-Rich was a registered sole proprietorship.
ISSUE:
Whether Win has a legal personality to institute the present case.
HELD: Win has no legal personality. He is not a real party in interest.
A suit may only be instituted by the real party in interest. Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court defines "parties in interest" in this manner:
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Win admitted that the contract was executed between Multi-Rich and Excellent
Quality Apparel. It further admitted that Multi-Rich was a sole proprietorship. A sole
proprietorship is the oldest, simplest, and most prevalent form of business
enterprise. It is an unorganized business owned by one person. The sole
proprietor is personally liable for all the debts and obligations of the business.
In the case of Mangila v. Court of Appeals, the SC held that:
[T]here is no law authorizing sole proprietorships to file a suit in court. A sole
proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from
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the personality of the owner of the enterprise. The law merely recognizes the
existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for
profit by a single individual xxx. The law does not vest a separate legal personality
on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend an action in court.
The original petition was instituted by Win, which is a SEC-registered corporation.
It filed a collection of sum of money suit which involved a construction contract
entered into by Excellent Quality Apparel and Multi-Rich, a sole proprietorship. The
counsel of Win wanted to change the name of the plaintiff in the suit to Multi-Rich.
The change cannot be countenanced. The plaintiff in the collection suit is a
corporation. The name cannot be changed to that of a sole proprietorship. Again, a
sole proprietorship is not vested with juridical personality to file or defend an
action.
Excellent Quality Apparel had continuously contested the legal personality of Win
to institute the case. Win was given ample opportunity to adduce evidence to show
that it had legal personality. It failed to do so.
In order for a corporation to be able to file suit and claim the receivables of its
predecessor in business, in this case a sole proprietorship, it must show proof that
the corporation had acquired the assets and liabilities of the sole proprietorship.
Win could have easily presented or attached any document e.g., deed of
assignment which will show whether the assets, liabilities and receivables of Multi-
Rich were acquired by Win. Having been given the opportunity to rebut the
allegations made by Excellent Quality Apparel, Win failed to use that opportunity.
Thus, we cannot presume that Multi-Rich is the predecessor-in-business of Win
and hold that the latter has standing to institute the collection suit.
Sec 2 Rule 3
GUINOMLA: Perkin Elmer v. Dakila
Facts: Perkin Elmer Singapore is owned by PEIA, but it is a separate and distinct
entity. The judgment is against PEIA, but the summon was received by petitioner,
hence argues that the case should be dismissed as it is not a real party-in-interest.
32 | P a g e
ISSUE: WON PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE is a real party-in-interest. NO
SC: In the case at bar, this Court sustains the contention of the Perkinelmer that
lower has not acquired jurisdiction over them. Extraterritorial service of summons
are only applicable in cases of an action in rem or quasi in rem. What is involved
in this case is an action in personam, as it deals with the personal liability of the
PEIA to the Dakila by reason of the alleged unilateral termination by the former of
the Distribution Agreement.
Sec 7 Rule 3
MONTEJO: Galicia v Manliquez
SIMPLICIO GALICIA, for himself, and as Attorney-in-Fact of ROSALIA G. TORRE,
PAQUITO GALICIA, NELLIE GALICIA, LETICIA G. MAESTRO and CLARO
GALICIA, Petitioners, vs. LOURDES MANLIQUEZ vda. de MINDO and LILIA
RICO MINANO, Respondents. (Third division)
Facts:
 Galicia filed a petition for Recovery of Possession and Ownership,
Annulment of Title, Documents and Other Papers against Milagros.
 RTC granted the petition. Became final and executory.
 Manliguez filed an action for Annulment of Judgment of RTC on grounds
of lack of jurisdiction contending that they are indispensable party and
when an indispensable party is not before the court then the action should
be dismissed because the absence of such indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act
not only as against him but even as against those present.
Issue: WON Manliguez are indispensable parties and what is the effect of failure to
include indispensable parties in a complaint t has already attained finality.
Held:
 Since it is not disputed that herein respondents are compulsory heirs of
Ines who stand to be affected by the judgment of the trial court, the latter
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should have granted their Motion to Intervene and should have admitted
their Answer-in-Intervention.
 respondents and their co-heirs are adversely affected by the judgment
rendered by the trial court considering their ostensible ownership of the
property.
 Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as
parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an
action. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants.
The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action
requires the joinder of all necessary parties where possible and the joinder
of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence
being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when
an indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be
dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even as to those present. The evident aim and
intent of the Rules regarding the joinder of indispensable and necessary
parties is a complete determination of all possible issues, not only between
the parties themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be
affected by the judgment. A valid judgment cannot even be rendered
where there is want of indispensable parties.
 in the absence of herein respondents and their co-heirs who are
indispensable parties, the trial court had in the first place no authority to
act on the case. thus, the judgment of the trial court was null and void due
to lack of jurisdiction over indispensable parties
 To dismiss the complaint of herein petitioners for non-inclusion of herein
respondents as indispensable parties, the former would have no other
recourse but to file anew a complaint against the latter and the original
defendants. This would not be in keeping with the Court's policy of
promoting a just and inexpensive disposition of a case. It is best that the
complaint remains which is deemed amended by the admission of the
Answer-in-Intervention of the indispensable parties
 Parties are reverted back to the stage where all the defendants have filed
their respective Answers
33 | P a g e
Sec 7 Rule 3 Indispensable Parties
MALNEGRO: Miranda vs Besa
Facts: Esperanza Besa filed an ejectment suit against Lucia Miranda after
discovering that the latter‘s house occupied a portion of her lot. Besa filed an
unlawful detainer suit after her notice to vacate failed. She prayed before the lower
court that she be ―placed in possession of the property by ousting Lucia Miranda
and/or her agents or any person occupying the same in her names/behalfs and/or
by virtue of any authority by her‖. The lower court decided in favour of Besa.
Miranda questions the decision alleging that Besa‘s complaint was
defective for failure to implead the necessary parties – her husband and her
siblings, who are also physically in possession of the disputed property. Miranda
alleges that she and her siblings are in possession of the property.
Issue: Was there failure to implead indispensable parties? NO
Ruling: Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
indispensable parties are parties in interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action. A party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other
parties, and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete
justice to the parties.
On the issue of failure to implead her siblings:
This case is one of ejectment and Besa is ejecting Miranda from the
portion of the property being unlawfully withheld by her. Obviously, the failure to
implead her brother and sister did not bar the lower court from making a final
adjudication against her considering that her brother and sister are also occupying
another portion of the disputed land.
On the issue of failure to implead her husband:
The non-joinder of her husband is not fatal, the same being merely a
formal requirement. Miranda‘s husband is bound by the judgment since the
decretal portion of which says: ―petitioner (Miranda), her agents, successors-in-
interest and members of her family, are ordered to vacate the premises and
restore possession thereof to the respondent (Besa)‖.
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Sec 7 Rule 3
NITURA: VICTORIA REGNER, petitioner, vs.
CYNTHIA R. LOGARTA, TERESA R. TORMIS and CEBU COUNTRY CLUB,
Inc., respondents
G.R. No. 168747. October 19, 2007
Facts: Luis Regner had 3 daughters with his first wife, Cynthia, Teresa and
Melinda. Victoria Regner is the second wife of Luis. Among the properties of Luis
is a share at the Cebu Country Club, Inc.
Victoria filed a complaint of Nullity of Deed of Donation, involving Luis‘ share in
Cebu Country Club, saying that such deed was caused by Cynthia and Teresa
when Luis was already in his death bed and was no longer capacitated to execute
such.
Since Cynthia and Teresa were abroad, summons were served to the clinic of
Melinda who refused to accept them. When Teresa came back to the Philippines,
she was served with summons. However, Cynthia, the co-donee was never served
with summons.
Issue: WON a co-donee is an indispensable party in an action to declare the
nullity of a Deed of Donation?
Held: YES.
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-
interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action.
34 | P a g e
It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court [that] the action
should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present
If such a declaration of annulment can directly affect the persons who made and
who were concerned in the said transfers, nothing could be more proper and just
than to hear them in the litigation, as parties interested in maintaining the validity of
those transactions, and therefore, whatever be the nature of the judgment
rendered must be included in the case as defendants."
It takes no great degree of legal sophistication to realize that Cynthia and Teresa
are indispensable parties to the case. Cynthia and Teresa allegedly derived their
rights to the subject property by way of donation from their father Luis. The central
thrust of the Victoria's complaint was that Luis could not have donated Proprietary
to his daughters Cynthia and Teresa, as Luis was already very ill and no longer of
sound and disposing mind at the time of donation.
Thus, based on the Deed of Donation, Teresa and Cynthia are co-owners of
Proprietary Membership of Cebu Country Club, Inc. The country club membership
certificate is undivided and it is impossible to pinpoint which specific portion of the
property belongs to either Teresa or Cynthia. Indeed, both Teresa and Cynthia are
indispensable parties.
Applying the foregoing definitions and principles to the present case, this Court
finds that any decision in Civil Case No. CEB 23927 cannot bind Cynthia, and the
Court cannot nullify the donation of the property she now co-owns with Teresa,
even if limited only to the portion belonging to Teresa, to whom summons was
properly served, since ownership of the property is still pro indiviso. Obviously,
Cynthia is an indispensable party without whom the lower court is barred from
making a final adjudication as to the validity of the entire donation. Without the
presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, a judgment therein
cannot attain finality.
Being an indispensable party, the trial court must also acquire jurisdiction over
Cynthia's person through the proper service of summons.
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Sec. 7 Rule 3
SUY TE Go, Sr. v. Ramos
Facts:
Luis Ramos initiated complaint-affidavits against Jimmy Go alleging that
the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Jimmy countered that the complaint for
deportation was merely a harassment case. He alleged that his father Carlos, born
from a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Filipino citizenship.
Issue: WON the deportation proceedings are null and void for failure to implead
Carlos (the father of Jimmy) as an indispensable party therein?
Ruling:
NO. Since Carlos was not an indispensable party, there is no compulsory
joinder of indispensable parties. An indispensable party is a party in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be
joined either as plaintiff or defendant.
Carlos clearly is NOT an indispensable party as he does not stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. What is sought is the deportation
of Jimmy on the ground that he is an alien. The principle issue that will be decided
on is the propriety of his deportation.
Since the citizenship of Jimmy hinges on that of his father‘s, it becomes
necessary to pass upon the citizenship of the latter. However, whatever will be the
findings as to Carlos‘ citizenship will in no way prejudice him. Res judicata does
not obtain as a matter of course in citizenship proceedings.
In the event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or his
deportation sought, the same has to be ascertained once again as the decision,
which will be rendered hereinafter shall have no preclusive effect upon his
citizenship.
35 | P a g e
As neither injury nor benefit will redound upon Carlos, he cannot be said to
be an indispensable party in this case.
Sec 11 RULE 3
CABREROS: JUANA COMPLEX HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs. FIL-
ESTATE
FACTS:
Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with
individual residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring
subdivisions (collectively referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted a complaint for
damages, in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters
and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were
deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc. (ET. AL.)
The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular commuters and
motorists who constantly travelled towards the direction of Manila and Calamba;
that they used the entry and exit toll gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by
passing through right-of-way public road known as La Paz Road; that they had
been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years; that in August 1998, Fil-
estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so
JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass through the said road; that La Paz Road
was restored by the residents to make it passable but Fil-estate excavated the
road again; that JCHA reported the matter to the Municipal Government and the
Office of the Municipal Engineer but the latter failed to repair the road to make it
passable and safe to motorists and pedestrians; that the act of Fil-estate in
excavating La Paz Road caused damage, prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance,
and loss of precious hours to them, to the commuters and motorists because traffic
was re-routed to narrow streets that caused terrible traffic congestion and hazard;
and that its permanent closure would not only prejudice their right to free and
unhampered use of the property but would also cause great damage and
irreparable injury.
However, Fil-Estate argued that the complaint was improperly filed as a
class suit for it failed to show that JCHA et al. and the commuters and motorists
represent a well-defined community of interest over La Paz Road. They claim that
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the excavation of La Paz Road would not necessarily give rise to a common right
or cause of action for JCHA et al. against them since each of them has a separate
and distinct purpose and each may be affected differently than others.
ISSUE: WON THE COMPLAINT HAS BEEN PROPERLY FILED AS A CLASS
SUIT.
HELD:
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common
or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all
as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and
representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend
for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect
his individual interest.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject
matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the
parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court;
and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or
representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who
use La Paz Road. As succinctly stated by the CA:
The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La
Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common or general interest to many persons.
The records reveal that numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the
lower court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the suit and
claiming that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they were also
prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road.
Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the
suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be
named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim to be
36 | P a g e
residents of various barangays in Bian, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro,
Laguna.
Sec 11 Rule 3
GUINOMLA: Pamplona v. Tinghil et al
ISSUE: WON the failure to implead an indispensable party is a ground for the
outright dismissal of the case.
SC: The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of
an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding, parties may be added on the
motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned.
If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the
court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff‘s failure to comply
with the order.
The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
In this case, the NLRC did not require Tinghil et al to implead the Pamplona
Leisure; instead, it summarily dismissed the Complaints.
Sec 11 Rule 3
MONTEJO: MACAWADIB vs. PNP DRECTORATE
FACTS:
 Macawadib filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in the Public Service
Records Regarding the Birth Date
 Same was granted by the RTC. It ordered PNP, NAPOLCOM, and CSC to
make the necessary corrections. Became final and executory.
 PNP filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
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Injunction, on the ground that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction
over the PNP, ―an unimpleaded indispensable party.‖
ISSUE: WON the said PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC were indispensable parties.
HELD: yes
 it is the integrity and correctness of the public records in the custody of the
PNP, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service
Commission (CSC) which are involved and which would be affected by
any decision rendered in the petition for correction filed by herein
petitioner. The aforementioned government agencies are, thus, required to
be made parties to the proceeding. They are indispensable parties, without
whom no final determination of the case can be had.
 An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the
controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in
his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest
 In the instant case, there is a necessity to implead the PNP, NAPOLCOM
and CSC because they stand to be adversely affected by petitioner's
petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations in
petitioner's service records.
 As the above-mentioned agencies were not impleaded in this case much
less given notice of the proceedings, the decision of the trial court granting
petitioner's prayer for the correction of entries in his service records, is
void. As mentioned above, the absence of an indispensable party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
37 | P a g e
Sec 3 Rule 3
VIOLA: LAPANDAY AGRI & DEV CORP v ESTITA
FACTS:
The heirs of Orval filed for a Sales Application over a 719 ha tract of agricultural
land and this was opposed by Malalag Land Petitioner‘s Association (Association).
The Office of the President gave due course to the applications to cover only 317
hectares at 63 hectare x s per heir but awarded 399 hectares to 133 protesters.
The Association through its president Mr. Mangubat, sent a letter to the
management of Lapanday Group of Companies, Inc. manifesting that they were no
longer interested in the government grant and offered to transfer and waive
whatever interest they have over the subject land for a monetary consideration.
It therefore came as a surprise when, Estital et. Al. filed against Lapanday and/or
L.S. Ventures, Inc., the Heirs of Orval Hughes, the DENR/COSLAP and Cecilio
Mangubat, Sr.] the following cases: forcible entry, reinstatement, nullification of any
documents on disposition of lands.
They averred that LAPANDAY, Orval heirs and Mangubat Sr., misled them to
receive P54,000.00 each as rentals on their respective landholdings and deceived
to sign receipts in English which turned out to be affidavits of quitclaims in favor of
LAPANDAY.
Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation opposed said actions for there
being no entity by the name of Lapanday and L.S. Ventures Inc. which has
agricultural operation in Davao del Sur. The fact is that said company had already
merged with Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation
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The DARAB ordered Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures and Orval heirs to restore
Estita, et al., to their respective farmlots and declared the nullity of the quitclaims
allegedly executed by petitioners. **This prompted Lapanday to elevate the case,
now under the name of LAPANDAY AGRI DEV CORP.**
LAPANDAY AGRI DEV CORP argued before the SC that the DARAB decision has
no valid force and effect against it because it is not a real party-in-interest, pointing
out that Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc., are separate and distinct from
petitioners corporate personality.
ISSUE: WON LAPANDAY AGRI DEV CORP is precluded from questioning its
inclusion as a party in the case at bar.
RULING: YES. Lapanday Agri failed to raise it at the earliest opportunity. It is basic
in the law of procedure that misjoinder of parties is not a ground for the dismissal
of an action, as parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion
of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the proceedings and on such
terms as are just. Here, aside from unsubstantiated denials that it is not the party
referred to in the complaint for forcible entry, LAPANDAY AGRI DEV CORP did
not even file a motion to strike its name in all the proceedings.
It is a rule that objections to defects in parties should be made at the earliest
opportunity, that is, at the moment such defect becomes apparent, by a motion to
strike the names of the parties wrongly impleaded. For objections to misjoinder
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
In fact, their Answer, bears the name LAPANDAY AND/OR L.S. VENTURES,
INC., signed by its representative. This alone negates their stance that there is no
entity by the name of Lapanday and that L.S. Ventures, Inc. is separate and6
distinct from any company.
38 | P a g e
But even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that Lapanday does not have a juridical
personality, it may nonetheless be sued under such a name considering that Estita
et.al. commonly know Lapanday Agri Dev Corp by the name Lapanday Group of
Companies, and under Section 15, Rule 3 they may be sued under the name by
which they are generally or commonly known
Sec 12 Rule 3
CHANYEE: Sulo ng Bayan v Araneta
Facts
Plaintiff corporation instituted an action in behalf of its individual members for
the recovery of certain parcels of land allegedly owned by said members;
Issue
WON the amended complaint may be treated as a class suit
Ruling: NO
In order that a class suit may prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1)
that the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons; and (2) that the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to
20
bring them all before the court.
Under the first requisite, the person who sues must have an interest in the
controversy, common with those for whom he sues, and there must be that unity of
interest between him and all such other persons which would entitle them to
21
maintain the action if suit was brought by them jointly.
As to what constitutes common interest in the subject matter of the controversy, it
22
has been explained in Scott v. Donald thus:
The interest that will allow parties to join in a bill of complaint, or that will enable
the court to dispense with the presence of all the parties, when numerous, except
a determinate number, is not only an interest in the question, but one in common in
the subject Matter of the suit; ... a community of interest growing out of the nature
and condition of the right in dispute; for, although there may not be any privity
between the numerous parties, there is a common title out of which the question
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arises, and which lies at the foundation of the proceedings ... [here] the only matter
in common among the plaintiffs, or between them and the defendants, is an
interest in the Question involved which alone cannot lay a foundation for the
joinder of parties. There is scarcely a suit at law, or in equity which settles a
Principle or applies a principle to a given state of facts, or in which a general
statute is interpreted, that does not involved a Question in which other parties are
interested. ... (Emphasis supplied )
Here, there is only one party plaintiff, and the plaintiff corporation does not even
have an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, and cannot, therefore,
represent its members or stockholders who claim to own in their individual
capacities ownership of the said property. Moreover, as correctly stated by the
appellees, a class suit does not lie in actions for the recovery of property where
several persons claim Partnership of their respective portions of the property, as
each one could alleged and prove his respective right in a different way for each
portion of the land, so that they cannot all be held to have Identical title through
23
acquisition prescription.
Having shown that no cause of action in favor of the plaintiff exists and that the
action in the lower court cannot be considered as a class suit, it would be
unnecessary and an Idle exercise for this Court to resolve the remaining issue of
whether or not the plaintiffs action for reconveyance of real property based upon
constructive or implied trust had already prescribed.
SEC. 12 [CLASS SUIT] RULE 3
CONFESSOR: OPOSA VS FACTORAN
Section 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of the controversy is one of
common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable
to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently
numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may
sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to
intervene to protect his individual interest. (12a)
39 | P a g e
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case filed by minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents vs Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
2
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The complaint was
3
instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens
of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate
that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
4
unborn." Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises."
OPOSA et al filed a complaint invoking their right to a sound environment based
on statutory and constitutional provisions recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology. Likewise, they invoke the correlative obligation of
the proper government agencies to safeguard people‘s right to a healthful
environment.
ISSUE: W/N the case is a class suit.
RULING: We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The
1. subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
2. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the
court.
3. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned
interests.
Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3
of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the
instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
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This case, however, has a special and novel element.
Minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Needless to say, every generation
has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
RE: RULE 2, SEC 5-6: JOINDER AND MISJOINDER
CONFESSOR: ADA VS BAYLON
FACTS:
Ada filed a complaint for partition, accounting, and damages against Baylon et al.
During the pendency of the case, Rita Baylon donated half of lot 4706 to Florante
which prompted Ada to file a supplemental pleading to rescind the same. The
Baylons opposed the rescission asserting that it could only be done when there is
a prior JD on who between the contending parties actually owned the properties
under litigation.
Misjoinder of Causes of Action
The complaint filed by the ADA with the RTC involves two separate, distinct and
independent actions – partition and rescission. First, ADA raised the refusal of
their co-heirs, Florante, Rita and Panfila, to partition the properties which they
inherited from Spouses Baylon. Second, in their supplemental pleading, the
petitioners assailed the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No.
4706 made by Rita in favor of Florante pendente lite.
The actions of partition and rescission cannot be joined in a single action. By
a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the
uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the
40 | P a g e
statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of
two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a
separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under
certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of
29
action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where
the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one
action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation
between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the
disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so
as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the
30
litigants.
Nevertheless, while parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as they may have against an
opposing party, such joinder of causes of action is subject to the condition, inter
alia, that the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by
special rules.
HERE, THERE WAS A MISJOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. The action for
partition filed by the petitioners could not be joined with the action for the
rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. Lest it be
overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action
governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure
in the special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action of
rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a
single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern
the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the determination of the
32
presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of action.
A misjoined cause of action, if not severed upon motion of a party or by the
court sua sponte, may beadjudicated by the court together with the other
causes of action.
Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal.
Indeed, the courts have the power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or
sua sponte, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action to be
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33
proceeded with separately. However, if there is no objection to the improper
joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then there
exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously joined
causes of action. On this score, our disquisition in Republic of the Philippines v.
34
Herbieto is instructive, viz:
 This procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for
registration of the Subject Lots.
 Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question
of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case. They are
not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. Instead, under the Rules
of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied
admission of the court‘s jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the
court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative,
to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded
with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the
dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined
party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of
35
parties). (Citations omitted)
It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the
case has jurisdiction over all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the
misjoinder of the same. If the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a
misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined cause of action has to be severed
from the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any adjudication rendered
by the court with respect to the same would be a nullity.
Here, Florante posed no objection, and neither did the RTC direct the severance of
the petitioners‘ action for rescission from their action for partition. While this may
be a patent omission on the part of the RTC, this does not constitute a ground to
assail the validity and correctness of its decision. The RTC validly adjudicated the
issues raised in the actions for partition and rescission filed by the petitioners.
41 | P a g e
Sec 16 Rule 3
GUINOMLA: Ang Kek Chen v. Judge Andrade
ISSUE: WON judge Andrade is guilty of serious inefficiency in performing her
duties.
SC: Judge ANDRADE cannot be blamed for sending copies of the orders and
notices to Tui Hok in the absence of proper manifestation to that effect from his
counsel. Atty Parungao should have given the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives in compliance with the Section 16, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 16 RULE 3
JARON: Ronald Poe v. Macapagal-Arroyo
(P.E.T. CASE No. 002, March 29, 2005)
FACTS:
In 2004, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) was proclaimed the duly elected
President of the Philippines. The second placer, Ronald Poe (FPJ) filed an election
protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). Unfortunately, during the
same year, FPJ died. The counsel of FPJ filed a formal Notice of Death of
Protestant and a "MANIFESTATION with URGENT PETITION/MOTION to
INTERVENE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ," by the
widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe (Susan Roces). On the other hand, GMA asserts
that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party to replace the
deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property that
passes on to the heirs.
ISSUE:
May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the
pendency of the latter‘s protest case?
HELD:
Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule
allows substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of
this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before PET as the legal
representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Section 16.
However, in the application of this rule to an election contest, the court ruled every
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time that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property
transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, the court consistently rejected
substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies
during the pendency of the protest. In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias, the court
recognized substitution upon the death of the protestee but denied substitution by
the widow or heirs since they are not the real parties in interest.
(Rule 3, Sec 16)
MALNEGRO: Regalado vs Regalado
Facts: The present controversy arose from an action for cancellation of title which
is an action that survives or is not extinguished upon the death of a party. The
lower court rendered a judgment against Hugo Regalado. It is important to note
that Hugo‘s son, Ramilo Regalado was the one who signed the pleadings thru
SPA. Hugo died on April 23, 2008. The RTC decision was rendered May 15, 2008.
Ramilo appealed the case to the CA. It was only on December 15, 2009
(20months after) that Atty Miguel Albar, counsel of Hugo furnished CA with a
notice of Hugo‘s death. CA dismissed the appeal.
Issue: Was it proper for CA to dismiss the case? NO
What is the effect of counsel‘s belated notice of the party‘s death?
Ruling: After receiving the notice of Hugo Regalado‘s death, together with a list of
his representatives, it was incumbent upon the appellate court to order the latters‘
appearance and cause their substitution as parties to the appeal. The belated filing
of the notice must not prejudice the deceased party‘s legal representatives; the
rules clearly provide that it is a mere ground for a disciplinary action against the
erring counsel.
42 | P a g e
Sec. 16 Rule 3
PASTOR: Pacific Rehouse v. Ngo
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 214934, April 12, 2016
PACIFIC REHOUSE CORPORATION v. JOVEN L. NGO, AS REPRESENTED BY
OSCAR J. GARCIA
Facts:
Pacific Rehouse filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against
Bautista praying for the delivery of a deed of transfer and other documents
necessary to transfer the title of a parcel of land in its favor. The case was set for
pre-trial, however, before the same could proceed, Bautista's counsel filed a
Manifestation and Notice of Death informing the RTC that Bautista had died on
February 14, 2009. Thus, the RTC directed Bautista's counsel to substitute the
latter's heirs and/or representatives in the action pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court. Unfortunately, said counsel failed to comply due to lack of
personal knowledge of the identities of the heirs of Bautista and their respective
residences.
On the other hand, Pacific Rehouse manifested that it had located Bautista's
surviving spouse, Rosita Bautista, and as a result, was directed to amend the
complaint to implead her as such.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Civil Case No. 2031-08 in view of
Bautista's death/
Whether or not substitution pursuant to Sec. 16 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure is proper?
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Ruling:
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court governs the rule on substitution in case of
death of any of the parties to a pending suit.
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the substitution of a party-litigant
who dies during the pendency of a case by his heirs, provided that the claim
subject of said case is not extinguished by his death. As early as in Bonilla v.
Barcena, the Court has settled that if the claim in an action affects property and
property rights, then the action survives the death of a party-litigant, viz.:
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the
action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive the wrong
complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the
injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which
do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of
property affected being incidental.
In the instant case, although the CA correctly pointed out that Civil Case No. 2031-
08 involves a complaint for specific performance and damages, a closer perusal of
petitioner's complaint reveals that it actually prays for, inter alia, the delivery of
ownership of the subject land through Bautista's execution of a deed of sale and
the turnover of TCT No. T-800 in its favor. This shows that the primary objective
and nature of Civil Case No. 2031-08 is to recover the subject property itself and
thus, is deemed to be a real action.
In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the
nature of a real action, although ostensibly denominated as one for specific
performance. Evidently, Civil Case No. 2031-08 is a real action affecting property
and property rights over the subject land. Therefore, the death of a party-litigant,
i.e., Bautista, did not render the case dismissible on such ground, but rather, calls
for the proper application of Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on
substitution of party-litigants.
In sum, the CA erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 2031-08 based solely on
Bautista's death. As such, it should be reinstated and consolidated with LRC Case
No. 1117-09, considering that the two cases involve the same property and, as
correctly opined by the court a quo, any adjudication in either case would
necessarily affect the other.
43 | P a g e
Section 19 Rule 3
CHANYEE: Heirs of Medrano vs De Vera
Facts
 September 1982, Hilaria and Elena, by virtue of a private document
[7]
denominated Tapno Maamoan ti Sangalobogan, waived all their
hereditary rights to Flavianas land in favor of Francisca Medrano (Medrano)
 When Hilaria and Elena died, some of their children affirmed the contents of
the private document executed by their deceased mothers
 To that end, they executed separate Deeds of Confirmation of Private Document
[8]
and Renunciation of Rights in favor of Medrano.
 They likewise affirmed in said documents that Medrano had been occupying and
possessing the subject property as owner since September 1982

[9]
Due to the refusal of the other children to sign a similar renunciation,
[10]
Medrano filed a Complaint on April 27, 2001 for quieting of title,
reconveyance, reformation of instrument, and/or partition with damages against
Pelagia M. Paguyo-Diaz (Pelagia) et al
 On April 2, 2002, respondent Estanislao D. De Vera (De Vera) filed an Answer
with Counterclaim.
 De Vera presented himself as the real party-in-interest on the ground that some of
the named defendants (Faustina, Pelagia, Francisca, Elena Kongco-Alvarado,
Jesus, and Estrellita) had executed a Deed of Renunciation of Rights in his
favor
 Medrano filed a Motion to Expunge Answer with Counterclaim of Estanislao D. De
Vera and to Declare Defendants in Default.
[18]
 She argued that respondent De Vera had no personality to answer the
complaint since he was not authorized by the named defendants to answer
in their behalf.
 the trial court disagreed with Medranos argument and admitted De Veras
Answer with Counterclaim
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 The trial court ordered the conduct of ex parte presentation of evidence on upon
motion of Medrano to set reception of evidence
Issue
WON De Vera is Transferee Pendente Lite
Ruling Yes
Summary
I. De Vera is a Transferee Pendente Lite
II. No need for TPL to be substituted and joined
III. Paramount consideration in the transfer: Protection of the rights
and interest of the parties
IV. To proceed in the ex-parte presentation of the evidence= Denial of due
process
De Vera is a Transferee Pendente Lite
The trial courts approach is seriously flawed because De Veras interest is not
independent of or severable from the interest of the named defendants. De Vera is
a transferee pendente lite of the named defendants (by virtue of the Deed of
Renunciation of Rights that was executed in his favor during the pendency of Civil Case
No. U-7316). His rights were derived from the named defendants and, as
transferee pendente lite, he would be bound by any judgment against his
[45]
transferors under the rules of res judicata. Thus, De Veras interest cannot be
considered and tried separately from the interest of the named defendants.
It was therefore wrong for the trial court to have tried Medranos case against
the named defendants (by allowing Medrano to present evidence ex parte against
them) after it had already admitted De Veras answer. What the trial court should have
done is to treat De Vera (as transferee pendente lite) as having been joined as a
party-defendant, and to try the case on the basis of the answer De Vera had filed
and with De Veras participation. As transferee pendente lite, De Vera may be allowed to
join the original defendants under Rule 3, Section 19:
44 | P a g e
SEC. 19. Transfer of interest. In case of any transfer of interest, the
action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the
court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred
to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party. (Emphasis
supplied)
No need for TPL to be substituted and joined
The above provision gives the trial court discretion to allow or disallow the
substitution or joinder by the transferee. Discretion is permitted because, in general,
the transferees interest is deemed by law as adequately represented and protected by the
participation of his transferors in the case. There may be no need for the
transferee pendente lite to be substituted or joined in the case because, in legal
contemplation, he is not really denied protection as his interest is one and the same
[46]
as his transferors, who are already parties to the case.
Paramount consideration in the transfer: Protection of the rights and interest
of the parties
While the rule allows for discretion, the paramount consideration for the exercise thereof
should be the protection of the parties interests and their rights to due process. In the
instant case, the circumstances demanded that the trial court exercise its discretion in
favor of allowing De Vera to join in the action and participate in the trial. It will be
remembered that the trial court had already admitted De Veras answer when it declared
the original defendants in default. As there was a transferee pendente lite whose answer
had already been admitted, the trial court should have tried the case on the basis of
that answer, based on Rule 9, Section 3(c):
Effect of partial default. When a pleading asserting a claim
states a common cause of action against several defending parties,
some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the
case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon
the evidence presented.
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To proceed in the ex-parte presentation of the evidence= Denial of due process
To proceed with the ex parte presentation of evidence against the named defendants after
De Veras answer had been admitted would not only be a violation of Rule 9, Section 3(c),
but would also be a gross disregard of De Veras right to due process. This is
because the ex parte presentation of evidence would result in a default judgment
which would bind not just the defaulting defendants, but also De Vera, precisely
because he is a transferee pendente lite
This would result in an anomaly wherein De Vera would be bound by a default judgment
even if he had filed an answer and expressed a desire to participate in the case.
We note that under Rule 3, Section 19, the substitution or joinder of the transferee is
upon motion, and De Vera did not file any motion for substitution or
joinder. However, this technical flaw may be disregarded for the fact remains that the
court had already admitted his answer and such answer was on record when the ex
parte presentation of evidence was allowed by the court. Because De Veras answer had
already been admitted, the court should not have allowed the ex parte presentation of
evidence.
In this case, De Vera is not a stranger to the action but a transferee pendente lite. As
mentioned, a transferee pendente lite is deemed joined in the pending action from
[49]
the moment when the transfer of interest is perfected. His participation
Sec. 19 Rule 3
PASTOR: PACIFIC REHOUSE CORPORATION, v. CA
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 199687, March 24, 2014
PACIFIC REHOUSE CORPORATION, v. CA AND EXPORT AND INDUSTRY
BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 201537
PACIFIC REHOUSE CORPORATION, PACIFIC CONCORDE CORPORATION,
MIZPAH HOLDINGS, INC., FORUM HOLDINGS CORPORATION AND EAST
ASIA OIL COMPANY, INC. v. EXPORT AND INDUSTRY BANK, INC.,
45 | P a g e
FACTS: A complaint instituted with the Makati City RTC against EIB Securities Inc.
for unauthorized sale of 32,180,000 DMCI shares of Pacific Rehouse Corporation,
Pacific Concorde Corporation, Mizpah Holdings, Inc., Forum Holdings Corporation,
and East Asia Oil Company, Inc. In its October 18, 2005 Resolution, the RTC
rendered judgment against E–Securities to return Pacific Rehouse‘s 32,180,000
DMCI shares as of judicial demand. On the other hand, Pacific Rehouse are
directed to reimburse EIB Securities for the buyback price of the KPP shares of
stocks.
The Resolution was ultimately affirmed by the SC and attained finality.
When the Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied, Pacific Rehouse moved for
the issuance of an alias writ of execution to hold Export and Industry Bank, Inc.
liable for the judgment obligation as E–Securities is ―a wholly–owned controlled
and dominated subsidiary of Export and Industry Bank, Inc., and is, thus, a mere
alter ego and business conduit of the latter.
E–Securities opposed the motion, arguing that it has a corporate personality that is
separate and distinct from Export and Industry Bank, Inc.
On July 29, 2011, the RTC concluded that E–Securities is a mere business conduit
or alter ego of Export and Industry Bank, Inc. the dominant parent corporation,
which justifies piercing of the veil of corporate fiction, and thus directed EIB
Securities, Inc., and/or Export and Industry Bank, Inc., to fully comply with the
court‘s order.
Export and Industry Bank, Inc. (Export Bank) filed before the CA a petition
for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO seeking the nullification of the
RTC Orders making reference to several rulings of the Court upholding the
separate and distinct personality of a corporation. The CA issued a 60–day TRO.
Pacific Rehouse, Pacific Concorde, Mizpah Holdings and East Asia filed their
Comment to Export Bank‘s petition and proffered that the cases mentioned by
Export Bank are inapplicable owing to their clearly different factual antecedents.
The petitioners alleged that unlike the other cases, there are circumstances
peculiar only to E–Securities and Export Bank such as:
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1. 499,995 out of 500,000 outstanding shares of stocks of E–Securities are
owned by Export Bank;
2. Export Bank had actual knowledge of the subject matter of litigation as the
lawyers who represented E–Securities are also lawyers of Export Bank.
3. As an alter ego, there is no need for a finding of fraud or illegality before
the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction can be applied.15
The CA issued a Resolution granting Export Bank‘s application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction.
On January 2, 2012, Pacific Rehouse filed before the SC a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 demonstrating its objection to the CA Resolutions.
On April 26, 2012, the CA nullified the Orders of the Makati City RTC and the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction was rendered PERMANENT.
The CA explained that the alter ego theory cannot be sustained because
ownership of a subsidiary by the parent company is not enough justification to
pierce the veil of corporate fiction. There must be proof, apart from mere
ownership, that Export Bank exploited or misused the corporate fiction of E–
Securities. The existence of interlocking incorporators, directors and officers
between the two corporations is not a conclusive indication that they are one and
the same. The records also do not show that Export Bank has complete control
over the business policies, affairs and/or transactions of E–Securities. It was solely
E–Securities that contracted the obligation in furtherance of its legitimate corporate
purpose; thus, any fall out must be confined within its limited liability.
Pacific Rehouse then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 impugning the CA
Decision.
ISSUE: WHETHER EXPORT BANK MAY NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR A FINAL
AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT AGAINST E–SECURITIES IN AN ALIAS WRIT
OF EXECUTION BY PIERCING ITS VEIL OF CORPORATE FICTION—when it
has notbeen impleaded as a party in the original or root case Pacific Rehouse
Corporation v. EIB Securities.
Otherwise stated, the question is may the alias writ of execution issued by the RTC
be enforced against Export Bank?
46 | P a g e
RULING: The Court already ruled in Kukan International Corporation v.
Reyes49 that compliance with the recognized modes of acquisition of jurisdiction
cannot be dispensed with even in piercing the veil of corporate fiction, to wit:
The principle of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, and the resulting treatment of
two related corporations as one and the same juridical person with respect to a
given transaction, is basically applied only to determine established liability; it is
not available to confer on the court a jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the first
place, over a party not impleaded in a case. Elsewise put, a corporation not
impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to the court‘s process of piercing the veil of
its corporate fiction. In that situation, the court has not acquired jurisdiction over
the corporation and, hence, any proceedings taken against that corporation and its
property would infringe on its right to due process. Aguedo Agbayani, a recognized
authority on Commercial Law, stated as much:
―23. Piercing the veil of corporate entity applies to determination of liability not of
jurisdiction. x x x
This is so because the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction comes to
play only during the trial of the case after the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over the corporation. Hence, before this doctrine can be applied, based
on the evidence presented, it is imperative that the court must first have jurisdiction
over the corporation.
x x x‖50 (Citations omitted)
Therefore the court must first acquire jurisdiction over the parties; and only then
would the parties be allowed to present evidence for and/or against piercing the
veil of corporate fiction. If the court has no jurisdiction over the corporation, it
follows that the court has no business in piercing its veil of corporate fiction
because such action offends the corporation‘s right to due process.
―Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons
or the defendant‘s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not
voluntarily submit to the court‘s jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of
summons, ‗any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is null and void.‘‖51 ―The defendant must be properly apprised of a
pending action against him and assured of the opportunity to present his defenses
to the suit. Proper service of summons is used to protect one‘s right to due
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process.‖52
As Export Bank was neither served with summons, nor has it voluntarily appeared
before the court, the judgment sought to be enforced against E–Securities cannot
be made against its parent company, Export Bank.
Export Bank has consistently disputed the RTC jurisdiction argung that ―RTC
Makati never acquired jurisdiction over it, and that Export Bank was not pleaded as
a party in this case, as it was never served with summons by nor did it voluntarily
appear before RTC Makati so as to be subjected to the latter‘s jurisdiction.
In dispensing with the requirement of service of summons or voluntary appearance
of Export Bank, the RTC applied the cases of Violago and Arcilla. The RTC
concluded that in these cases, the Court decided that the doctrine of piercing the
veil of corporate personality can be applied even when one of the affected parties
has not been brought to the Court as a party.
But the SC ruled that these cases are not congruent to the case at bar. The
disparity between the instant case and those of Violago and Arcilla is that in said
cases, although the corporations were not impleaded as defendant, the persons
made liable in the end were already parties thereto since the inception of the main
case. In short, liabilities attached only to those who are parties.
47 | P a g e
Rule 4 Venue of Actions
Sec 1-3 Rule 4
MONTEJO: Davao Light vs CA
DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. RODOLFO M. BELLAFLOR, Presiding Judge of Branch 11,
RTC-Cebu and FRANCISCO TESORERO, respondents
FACTS:
 Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. filed a complaint for damages against
Francisco Tesorero before the RTC Cebu City
 Tesorero filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of improper venue. That the
principal office of Davao light is in Davao City and not in Cebu as indicated
in several contracts Davao Light has entered into with different entities.
ISSUE: WON the case was filed on an improper venue.
HELD: NO
 Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be
conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have
no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action; but the venue of an
action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties
and an objection that the plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may
be waived by the failure of the defendant to make a timely objection. In
either case, the court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction
can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties, whether or
not a prohibition exists against their alteration.
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Sec 1-3 Rule 4

 A corporation has no residence in the same sense in which this term is NITURA REBECCA T. CABUTI HAN , petitioner, vs.
applied to a natural person. But for practical purposes, a corporation is in a
metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its principal office is LANDCENTER CONSTRUCTI ON & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATI ON ,
located as stated in the articles of incorporation respondent.
 It cannot be disputed that petitioners principal office is in Cebu City, per its
amended articles of incorporation and by-laws. An action for damages G.R. No. 1 46594. June 10, 2002
being a personal action, venue is determined pursuant to Rule 4, section 2
of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried Facts: Cabutihan and Landcenter entered into a Contract wherein the
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the former will be the ―facilitator‖ of the registration of a certain land located in
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a Parañaque including the removal of informal settlers. Under the agreement,
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the Cabutihan‘s compensation will be the 20% of the same property in
plaintiff. Parañaque.
 TESORERO is not a party to any of the contracts presented before us. He
is a complete stranger to the covenants executed between petitioner and
NAPOCOR, despite his protestations that he is privy thereto, on the rather When Cabutihan and others were able to perform their task, Landcenter
flimsy ground that he is a member of the public for whose benefit the did not give them their compensation which prompted Cabutihan to file a
electric generating equipment subject of the contracts were leased or
case for specific performance and damages in the RTC of Pasig (where
acquired. We are likewise not persuaded by his argument that the
allegation or representation made by petitioner in either the complaints or
Cabutihan Resides.)
answers it filed in several civil cases that its residence is in Davao City
should estop it from filing the damage suit before the Cebu courts. Besides
there is no showing that private respondent is a party in those civil cases
On motion by Landcenter, RTC dismissed the case due to improper venue.
or that he relied on such representation by petitioner.

Issue: WON Venue was proper?

Held: YES. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provide an

answer to the issue of venue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real
property or an interest therein (real actions), shall be commenced and tried

48 | P a g e
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in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the
real property is situated.
On the other hand, personal actions shall be commenced and tried in the
proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides.
In the present case, petitioner seeks payment of her services in
accordance with the undertaking the parties signed. Breach of contract
gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for rescission.
SC reiterated the rule that a case for specific performance with damages is
a personal action which may be filed in a court where any of the parties
reside.
Sec. 1-3 Rule 4.
PASTOR: Nocum V. Tan
ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC.- versus -
LUCIO TAN
FACTS: On September 27, 1998, Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter
Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the RTC Makati
seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory
imputations contained in a news article.
When ALPAP and UMALI filed their joint answer, they alleged therein, among
others that venue was improperly laid. It appeared that the complaint failed to state
the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and first published.
49 | P a g e
Thus, the RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground of
improper venue.
Aggrieved, Tan filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal
and admission of the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the amended
complaint, it is alleged that: This article was printed and first published in the City
of Makati, and in par. 2.04.1, that This caricature was printed and first published in
the City of Makati.
The lower court, after having the case dismissed for improper venue, admitted the
amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal.
The RTC decision was appealed; the CA affirmed such decision of the RTC, thus
the appeal before the SC.
ISSSUE: Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the civil case
upon the filing of the original complaint for damages?
RULING: We rule in the affirmative.
It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the
complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. In the case at bar, after examining the
original complaint, we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when
the case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondents cause of
action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the
RTC.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. The Hon. Florenz D. Regalado
differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows:
(a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place
where the case is to be heard or tried;
(b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law;
(c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter;
venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent;
and,
(d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may
be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
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In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the
article and the caricature were printed and first published in the City of Makati
referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction. These additional
allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would failure to include
the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the
case. Respondents failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the
power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue
was not properly laid.
It is a well-established rule that venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in
criminal actions. Assuming that venue were properly laid in the court where the
action was instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In
fact, in civil cases, venue may be waived.
Petitioners argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case because
respondent failed to allege the place where the libelous articles were printed and
first published would have been tenable if the case filed were a criminal case. The
failure of the original complaint to contain such information would be fatal because
this fact involves the issue of venue which goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. This is not to be because the case before us is a civil action where venue is
not jurisdictional.
Sec. 1-3 Rule 4
SUY TE: SALUDO JR. v. AMERICAN EXPRESS INT’L, INC.
Facts:
Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express
International, Inc. (AMEX) with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte.
The complaint alleged that Saludo "is a resident of Ichon, Macrohon,
Southern Leyte, Philippines." Saludo is a congressman of the lone district of
Macrohon, Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint.
50 | P a g e
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful
dishonor of Saludo's AMEX credit card. The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards
was allegedly unjustified.
AMEX specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. AMEX averred
that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly
laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. Saludo was not allegedly
a resident of Southern Leyte as evidenced by the fact that his community tax
certificate, was issued at Pasay City. Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay
City and signed by a lawyer of the said city.
Issue:
WON the venue was improperly laid in the court in Civil Case No. R-3172,
because not one of the parties, including Saludo was a resident of Southern Leyte
at the time of filing of the complaint? NO.
Ruling:
Saludo's complaint for damages against AMEX is a personal action. As
such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,
or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.
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The rule on venue, like other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just
and orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded
determination of every action and proceeding. The option of plaintiff in personal
actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may
be found, or the place where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is
limited to that place.
Saludo had opted to file his complaint with the court a quo which is in
Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a member of
the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte
to comply with the residency requirement of the rule.
The law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules
of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may be found,' and
not 'is domiciled.‘
There is no dispute that Saludo was the congressman or the
representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his
complaint with the court a quo. As a member of the House of Representatives,
Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a quo as possessing the requirements
for the said position, including that he was then a resident of the district which he
was representing, i.e., Southern Leyte.
Southern Leyte, as the domicile of Saludo, was also his residence, as the
term is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile,
but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited
time." Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the
time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the
contrary, he is deemed to possess the qualifications for the said position, including
that he was a resident therein. And following the definition of the term "residence"
for purposes of election law, Saludo not only had the intention to reside in
Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein, coupled with conduct
51 | P a g e
indicative of such intention. The latter element, or his bodily presence as an
inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was sufficient for Saludo to be considered a resident
therein for purposes of venue.
In the instant case, since Saludo has a house in Makati City for the
purpose of exercising his profession or doing business and also a house in Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election or political
purposes where he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then he
can have residences in these two places.
Sec. 1-3 Rule 4
SUY TE GOLDEN ARCHES DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. ST. FRANCIS SQUARE
HOLDINGS
Facts:
Golden Arches entered in a lease contract over a property owned by
Prince City Realty, Inc., which was to terminate on Feb. 27, 2008. However,
Golden Arches informed St. Francis Sqaure Holdings, successor-in-interest of
Prince Realty, of its intention to discontinue the lease before the expiration period.
St. Francis Sqaure Holdings filed an action for breach of contract and
damages against Golden Arches before the RTC of Mandaluyong. Golden Arches
claimed that St. Francis Square maintained its principal address in Makati, hence
the complaint should have been filed in Makati. St. Francis claimed that it had
closed down its Makati office on Dec. 2005 as it now holds office in Mandaluyong
City of which Golden Arches is aware.
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Issue:
WON St. Francis Square Holdings violated Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court by filing the complaint in Mandaluyong? NO.
Ruling:
In personal actions (such as this one, enforcement of contractual
provisions and recovery of damages), it is fixed for the greatest possible
convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses, and to promote the ends of justice.
Under Sec. 2, Rule 4 ROC, it shall be filed at the plaintiff‘s residence. For a
domestic corporation = where its principal office is located as stated in the articles
of incorporation.
Through letters and correspondence; Golden Arches was thus put on
notice that at the filing of the complaint, St. Francis Square Holdings‘ business
address has been at Mandaluyong.
Venue was properly laid in Mandaluyong since that is where it had actually
been ―residing‖ or holding its principal office at the time it filed its complaint. Sec. 2,
Rule 4 authorizes St. Francis Square Holdings to make a choice of venue for
personal actions – whether to file the complaint in the place where St. Francis
resides or where defendant resides. St. Francis‘ choice must be respected as the
controlling factor in determining venue for cases is the primary objective for which
said cases are filed.
52 | P a g e
Sec. 1-3 Rule 4
SUY TE: ROSA PAMARAN v. BANK OF COMMERCE
FACTS: Rosa Pamaran‘s children, (Rhodora) and (spouses Bernabe), owned
adjacent lots located at Muntinlupa City. Rosa built her residential house on these
lots with their consent.
Rhodora and spouses Bernabe constituted (REM) on their lots. Bankcom neither
included her house in determining the loan amount nor obtained her consent to the
REM. Bankcom was aware of the existence of her house on these lots. The lots
were foreclosed and their ownership was consolidated in favor of Bankcom. Rosa
was dispossessed of her house. She prayed that Bankcom be ordered to pay her
damages.
Rosa contended that this a personal action because while she cited real properties
situated in Muntinlupa City, she is not asking to be the owner or possessor thereof
but is merely praying that Bankcom be ordered to pay her damages corresponding
to the value of her house. She likewise affirmed that the venue is proper since she
resides in Olongapo City.
Bankcom alleges that the RTC Olongapo correctly dismissed the complaint on the
ground of improper venue. It maintains that while the Complaint was denominated
as one for damages and restitution of value of a house unlawfully taken, the action
is, in fact, a real action because it is based on Rosa's claim of ownership over the
house built on the subject lots. It posited that the Complaint should have been filed
before the RTC Muntinlupa where such property is located.
ISSUE: WON the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.
NO.
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RULING: Rosa made it clear that this is a personal action for damages arising
from Bankcom's violation of her right to due process and equal protection; and her
right to enjoy her house. She does not question the writs issued by the RTC
Muntinlupa, but she assails Bankcom's use thereof in depriving her of the right to
enjoy said house. She also stressed that since this is a personal action, then it was
properly filed in RTC Olongapo, as she is a resident of Olongapo.
Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 2 thereof, defines a
real action as one "affecting title to or possession of real property or interest
therein;" and, all other actions are personal actions. A real action must be filed in
the proper court which has jurisdiction over the subject real property, while a
personal action may be filed where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or if the
defendant is a non-resident, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Personal actions include those filed for recovery of personal property, or for
enforcement of contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery
of damages for injury committed to a person or property.
This case is one for recovery of damages relating to the injury committed by
Bankcom for violating Rosa's right to due process, and right to enjoy her house.
Rosa repeatedly averred that she does not seek recovery of its possession or title.
Her interest to the house is merely incidental to the primary purpose for which the
action is filed, that is, her claim for damages.
Clearly, this action involves Rosa's interest in the value of the house but only in so
far as to determine her entitlement to damages. She is not interested in the house
itself. Indeed, the primary objective of the Complaint is to recover damages, and
not to regain ownership or possession of the subject property. Hence, this case is
a personal action properly filed in the RTC Olongapo, where Rosa resided.
53 | P a g e
Given these, the RTC erred in dismissing the Complaint on the grounds of lack of
cause of action, and of improper venue.
Sec 4 Rule 4
AMISTAD: San Miguel Corporation v. Monasterio
Facts:
San Miguel Corporation [SMC] entered into an Exclusive Warehouse Agreement
[EWA] with SMB Warehousing services, represented by its manager Monasterio,
wherein SMB would provide the necessary services for the storage and
warehousing of SMC products.
The EWA also contained a stipulation on the venue of actions: ―Should it be
necessary that an action be brought in court to enforce the terms of this
Agreement or the duties or rights of the parties herein, it is agreed that the proper
court should be in the courts of Makati or Pasig, Metro Manila, to the exclusion
of the other courts at the option of the COMPANY.‖
In 1998, Monasterio [a resident of Naga City] filed a complaint for collection of sum
of money against SMC before the RTC-Naga City. He alleged that he was not paid
900k for the services he rendered as a cashier.
SMC filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. It argued that the
money claim arose from Monasterio‘s services as a warehouse contractor, thus
the EWA stipulation would apply [citing Sec 4b in relation to Sec 2, Rule 4].
Issue: W/N the filing of the case before RTC Naga was proper?
Ruling: Yes.
Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties
thereto when the suit relates to breach of the said contract. Monasterio‘s cause of
action was not based on the EWA. The cashiering service was different from his
functions as a warehouse contractor, and the EWA would not apply.
The collection for money, being a personal action, it was properly filed before the
RTC Naga City where Monasterio resides.
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Sec 4 RULE 4
CABREROS: PAGLAUM vs. UNIONBANK
FACTS:
PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION co-
owned 3 parcels of land with Benjamin Dy, the President of Healthtech.
Unionbank extended a credit line to HealthTech and in order to secure this
obligation, Paglaum, on behalf of HealthTech, executed 3 Real Estate Mortgages.
The provisions of the Real Estate Mortgage regarding the venue of all
suits and actions arising out of or in connection therewith, originally stipulate that
“the venue of all suits and actions arising out of or in connection with this Mortgage
shall be in Makati, Metro Manila or in the place where any of the Mortgaged
Properties is located, at the absolute option of the Mortgagee, the parties hereto
waiving any other venue.‖
However, under the two Real Estate Mortgages, venue shall be in Cebu
City Metro Manila or in the place where any of the Mortgaged Properties is located,
at the absolute option of the Mortgagee, the xxxxxxxxxxxxx any other venue.
Meanwhile, the same provision in the Real Estate Mortgage dated 22 April
1998 contains the following:
Section 9. Venue. The venue of all suits and actions arising out of or in
connection with this Mortgage shall be in _________ or in the place where any of
the Mortgaged Properties is located, at the absolute option of the Mortgagee, the
parties hereto waiving any other venue.
When HealthTech had difficulty meeting its obligation with Unionbank, it
entered into a RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT which stated that any action or
action arising out of or in connection therewith shall be commenced in the MAKATI
CITY, with both parties waiving any other venue.
When HealthTech defaulted in their obligation Unionbank extra judicially
foreclosed—Unionbank as the sole bidder was issued a Certificate of Sale.
Healthtech filed a complaint for annulment of sale and titles and said case
was raffled to RTC OF MAKATI.
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Unionbank filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue
stating that the Restructuring Agreement is applicable only to the contract of loan,
and not to the Real Estate Mortgage, and the mortgage contracts explicitly state
that the choice of venue exclusively belongs to it-- thus Cebu City is the proper
venue.
HealthTech and Paglaum argue that the Restructuring Agreement governs
the choice of venue between the parties and the agreement on the choice of venue
must be interpreted with the convenience of the parties in mind and the view that
any obscurity therein was caused by Union Bank.
ISSUE: WHETHER MAKATI IS THE PROPER VENUE ASSAIL THE
FORCLOSURE OF THE SUBJECT REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE.
HELD: YES. Makati is the proper venue.
As a general rule, an action to annul a Real Estate Mortgage, being a real
action must be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area where real property is situated.
An exception to this rule is when the parties have validly agreed in writing
before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof as provided in Section
3 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The mere stipulation of venue of an action is not
enough. however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other
venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the
absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as
merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place. ―Clearly, the words exclusively and waiving for this purpose any other venue
are restrictive and used advisedly to meet the requirements.‖- Both parties agree
that such an agreement exists.
THE Venue stipulation in the restructuring agreement is controlling. The
Restructuring agreement was entered into by HealthTech and Union bank to
modify the entire loan obligation as provided in the terms thereof. And as provided
therein, the venue for of any action or proceeding arising out of or connected with
this Restructuring Agreement, the Note, the Collateral and any and all related
documents shall be in Makati City, [HealthTech] and [Union Bank] hereby waiving
any other venue.
2 Manresa 2016 CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR TOP :) FROM LETURES AND SYLLABUS OF ATTY SUAREZ

dollar loans and the mortgages did not cover their dollar loans but only their peso
These quoted provisions of the Real Estate Mortgages and the later loans. Since the peso loans are already paid, the mortgages should have been
Restructuring Agreement clearly reveal the intention of the parties to implement a discharged.)
restrictive venue stipulation, which applies not only to the principal obligation, but
also to the mortgages. The phrase waiving any other venue plainly shows that the
choice of Makati City as the venue for actions arising out of or in connection with
the Restructuring Agreement and the Collateral, with the Real Estate Mortgages Planters moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of IMPROPER VENUE
being explicitly defined as such, is exclusive. since the loan agreements restricted the venue of any suit in (Makati) Metro
Manila.
Even if this Court were to consider the venue stipulations under the Real
Estate Mortgages, it must be underscored that those provisions did not contain
words showing exclusivity or restrictiveness. In fact, in the Real Estate Mortgages
Issue: WON the stipulated venue binds the parties.
dated 11 February 1994, the phrase parties hereto waiving from the entire phrase
the parties hereto waiving any other venue was stricken from the final executed
contract. Following the ruling in Sps. Lantin as earlier quoted, in the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words, the venue stipulation should only be deemed as an Ruling: YES
agreement on an additional forum, and not as a restriction on a specified place.

Under Sec. 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, the general rules on venue of
Sec 4 Rule 4 actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly
agreed in writing on an exclusive venue.
AMAPARO Sps. Lantin v. Lantion

Facts:
The mere stipulation on the venue of action is not enough to preclude parties from
Sps. Lantin obtained several peso and dollar loans from Planters Development bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such
Bank and executed several real estate mortgages and promissory notes to cover stipulation is EXCLUSIVE. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the
the loans. stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum not
as limiting venue to the specified place.

When Sps. Lantin defaulted on the payments, Planters foreclosed the mortgaged
lots and were sold at a public auction to which Planters was the winning bidder. The provisions of the REMs and PNs executed by Sps. Lantin provide:

Sps. Lantin filed a complaint against Planters for the declaration of nullity of the
mortgage, annulment of sale, reconveyance and damages before the RTC of Lipa
City. (They averred that the alleged non-payment was only with respect to their
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18. In the event of suit arising out of or in connection with this mortgage and/or
PNs xxx, the parties xxx agree to bring their causes of action EXCLUSIVELY, in
the proper court of Makati, Metro Manila, or at such other venue chosen by
the Mortgagee (Planters Bank), the Mortgagor (Sps. Lantin) waiving for this
purpose any other venue.
2 Manresa 2016 CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR TOP :) FROM LETURES AND SYLLABUS OF ATTY SUAREZ
I/We xx submit that the venue of any legal action arising out of this note shall
EXCLUSIVELY be at the proper court of Metropolitan Manila, Philippines, or
any other venue chosen by the BANK, waiving for this purpose any other
venue provided by the Rules of Court.
Clearly, the words ―exclusively‖ and ―waiving for this purpose any other venue‖ are
restrictive and used advisedly to meet the requirements. The general rules on
venue of actions shall not apply since the parties in this case have validly agreed
in writing on an exclusive venue before the filing of the complaint. The stipulation
on an exclusive venue must be followed.
(Since the issues of WON the mortgages should be properly discharged or WON
these mortgages also cover the dollar loans arose out of the said loan documents,
the stipulation on venue is also applicable thereto.) Petition is dismissed on the
ground of improper venue.
Sec 4 Rule 4
VIOLA: PILTELCOM v TECSON
FACTS: Tecson applied for six (6) cellular phone subscriptions with petitioner
Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PILTEL) which applications were each approved
and covered, respectively, by six mobiline service agreements.
Tecsob filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Lanao Del Norte, a
complaint against petitioner for a Sum of Money and Damages. PILTELCOM
moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue, citing a
common provision in the mobiline service agreements to the effect that -
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Venue of all suits arising from this Agreement or any other suit directly or
indirectly arising from the relationship between PILTEL and subscriber
shall be in the proper courts of Makati, Metro Manila. Subscriber hereby
expressly waives any other venues.
ISSUE: WON the filing of the complaint in the RTC of Iligan was proper
RULING: No. The complaint should have been filed in the courts of Makati
pursuant to the mobiline service agreement.
Section 4, Rule 4, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure allows the parties to
agree and stipulate in writing, before the filing of an action, on the exclusive venue
of any litigation between them. Such an agreement would be valid and binding
provided that the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent,
that it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto, and that it is entered into
before the filing of the suit.
The provision contained in paragraph 22 of the Mobile Service Agreement, a
standard contract made out by petitioner PILTEL to its subscribers, apparently
accepted and signed by Tecson, states that the venue of all suits arising from the
agreement, or any other suit directly or indirectly arising from the relationship
between PILTEL and subscriber, shall be in the proper courts of Makati, Metro
Manila. The added stipulation that the
subscriber expressly waives any other venue should indicate, clearly enough, the
intent of the parties to consider the venue stipulation as being preclusive in
character.