FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 122544. January 28, 1999.]

REGINA P. DIZON, AMPARO D. BARTOLOME, FIDELINA D. BALZA,

ESTER ABAD DIZON and JOSEPH ANTHONY DIZON, RAYMUND A.
DIZON, GERARD A. DIZON, and JOSE A. DIZON, JR. , petitioners, vs .
COURT OF APPEALS and OVERLAND EXPRESS LINES, INC. ,
respondents.

[G.R. No. 124741. January 28, 1999.]

REGINA P. DIZON, AMPARO D. BARTOLOME, FIDELINA D. BALZA,

ESTER ABAD DIZON and JOSEPH ANTHONY DIZON, RAYMUND A.
DIZON, GERARD A. DIZON, and JOSE A. DIZON, JR. , petitioners, vs .
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, and
OVERLAND EXPRESS LINES, INC. , respondents.

M.M. Lazaro & Associates for petitioner.

SYNOPSIS

In 1974, Overland Express Lines, Inc. entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to
Buy with herein petitioners involving a land in Quezon City. The term of the lease was for
one (1) year, during which period, the lessee was granted an option to purchase the lot for
P3,000.00 per square meter. Thereafter, the lease shall be on a per month basis with a
monthly rental of P3,000.00. Later, for failure to pay the increased rental of P8,000.00 per
month effective June 1976, herein petitioners led an action for ejectment to which the
Corporation was ordered to vacate the leased premises. The Corporation, however,
questioned the jurisdiction of the City Court over the ejectment case. Subsequently, the
Corporation led its own action for speci c performance and xing the period for
obligation. It sought to compel the execution of a deed of sale pursuant to the option to
purchase, and the receipt of the partial payment it made and to x the period to pay the
balance thereof.
Petitioners have established a right to evict private respondent from the subject
premises for non-payment of rentals. In this regard, the then City Court had exclusive
jurisdiction over the ejectment suit. The ling by the Corporation of a suit with the RTC for
speci c performance did not divest the City Court of its jurisdiction over the ejectment
case. The decision of the City Court was a rmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court and
the Supreme Court. Having failed to exercise the option to purchase within the stipulated
one-year period, private respondent Corporation cannot now enforce its option. An implied
new lease on a monthly basis does not ipso facto carry with it an implied revival of the
option to purchase the leased premises. The right to exercise the option to purchase
expired with the termination of the original contract of lease for one year. The private
respondent delivered a check of P300,000.00 to Alice Dizon who allegedly acted as agent
of petitioners pursuant to the supposed authority given by petitioner as payee thereof
does not amount to a perfected contract of sale pursuant to the contract of lease with
option to buy. There was no valid consent by the petitioners on the supposed sale entered
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 into by Alice Dizon, as petitioner's alleged agent, and private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; LEASE; NON-PAYMENT OF RENTALS

GIVES RIGHT TO EVICT, REGARDLESS OF THE ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE TO
ENFORCE OPTION TO PURCHASE WHICH WAS ALSO INSTITUTED. — Petitioners have
established a right to evict private respondent from the subject premises for non-payment
of rentals. Since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period of lease is considered to
be from month to month in accordance with Article 1687 of the New Civil Code. Where the
rentals are paid monthly, the lease, even if verbal may be deemed to be on a monthly basis,
expiring at the end of every month pursuant to Article 1687, in relation to Article 1673 of
the Civil Code. In such case, a demand to vacate is not even necessary for judicial action
after the expiration of every month. When private respondent failed to pay the increased
rental, the petitioners had a cause of action to institute an ejectment suit against the
former with the then City Court. In this regard, the City Court (now MTC) had exclusive
jurisdiction over the ejectment suit. The ling by private respondent of a suit with the
Regional Trial Court for speci c performance to enforce the option to purchase did not
divest the then City Court of its jurisdiction to take cognizance over the ejectment case. Of
note is the fact that the decision of the City Court was a rmed by both the Intermediate
Appellate Court and this Court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO EXERCISE OPTION TO PURCHASE WITHIN THE
STIPULATED PERIOD; EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. — Having failed to exercise the option to
purchase within the stipulated one year period, private respondent cannot enforce its
option to purchase anymore. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the right to exercise
the option still subsists at the time private respondent tendered the amount, the suit for
speci c performance to enforce the option to purchase was led more than ten (10) years
after accrual of the cause of action as provided under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code.
In this case, there was a contract of lease for one (1) year with option to purchase. The
contract of lease expired without the private respondent, as lessee, purchasing the
property but remained in possession thereof. Hence, there was an implicit renewal of the
contract of lease on a monthly basis. The other terms of the original contract of lease
which are revived in the implied new lease under Article 1670 of the New Civil Code are
only those terms which are germane to the lessee's right of continued enjoyment of the
property leased. Therefore, an implied new lease does not ipso facto carry with it any
implied revival of private respondent's option to purchase (as lessee thereof) the leased
premises. The provision entitling the lessee the option to purchase the leased premises is
not deemed incorporated in the impliedly renewed contract because it is alien to the
possession of the lessee. Private respondent's right to exercise the option to purchase
expired with the termination of the original contract of lease for one year.
3. ID.; ID.; CONTRACT OF SALE; WHEN PERFECTED. — Under Article 1475 of the
New Civil Code, "the contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of
minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. From that
moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of
the law governing the form of contracts." Thus, the elements of a contract of sale are
consent, object, and price in money or its equivalent. It bears stressing that the absence of
any of these essential elements negates the existence of a perfected contract of sale. Sale
is a consensual contract and he who alleges it must show its existence by competent
proof.
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 4. ID.; ID.; CONTRACT OF AGENCY; NOT APPRECIATED. — There was no valid
consent by the petitioners (as co-owners of the leased premises) on the supposed sale
entered into by Dizon, as petitioners' alleged agent, and private respondent. The basis for
agency is representation and a person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must
discover upon his peril the authority of the agent. As provided in Article 1868 of the New
Civil Code, there was no showing that petitioners consented to the act of Dizon nor
authorized her to act on their behalf with regard to her transaction with private respondent.
The most prudent thing private respondent should have done was to ascertain the extent
of the authority of Dizon. Being negligent in this regard, private respondent cannot seek
relief on the basis of a supposed agency. CcSEIH

DECISION

MARTINEZ , J : p

Two consolidated petitions were led before us seeking to set aside and annul the
decisions and resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals. What seemed to be a simple
ejectment suit was juxtaposed with procedural intricacies which nally found its way to
this Court. LLphil

G.R. No. 122544:

On May 23, 1974, private respondent Overland Express Lines, Inc. (lessee) entered
into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with petitioners 1 (lessors) involving a 1,755.80
square meter parcel of land situated at corner MacArthur Highway and South "H" Street,
Diliman, Quezon City. The term of the lease was for one (1) year commencing from May 16,
1974 up to May 15, 1975. During this period, private respondent was granted an option to
purchase for the amount of P3,000.00 per square meter. Thereafter, the lease shall be on a
per month basis with a monthly rental of P3,000.00.
For failure of private respondent to pay the increased rental of P8,000.00 per month
effective June 1976, petitioners led an action for ejectment (Civil Case No. VIII-29155) on
November 10, 1976 before the then City Court (now Metropolitan Trial Court) of Quezon
City, Branch VIII. On November 22, 1982, the City Court rendered judgment 2 ordering
private respondent to vacate the leased premises and to pay the sum of P624,000.00
representing rentals in arrears and/or as damages in the form of reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises during the period of illegal
detainer from June 1976 to November 1982 at the monthly rental of P8,000.00, less
payments made, plus 12% interest per annum from November 18, 1976, the date of ling
of the complaint, until fully paid, the sum of P8,000.00 a month starting December 1982,
until private respondent fully vacates the premises, and to pay P20,000.00 as and by way
of attorney's fees.
Private respondent led a certiorari petition praying for the issuance of a restraining
order enjoining the enforcement of said judgment and dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction of the City Court.
On September 26, 1984, the then Intermediate Appellate Court 3 (now Court of
Appeals) rendered a decision 4 stating that:
". . ., the alleged question of whether petitioner was granted an extension of
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 the option to buy the property; whether such option, if any, extended the lease or
whether petitioner actually paid the alleged P300,000.00 to Fidela Dizon, as
representative of private respondents in consideration of the option and, whether
petitioner thereafter offered to pay the balance of the supposed purchase price,
are all merely incidental and do not remove the unlawful detainer case from the
jurisdiction of respondent court. In consonance with the ruling in the case of
Teodoro, Jr. vs. Mirasol (supra), the above matters may be raised and decided in
the unlawful detainer suit as, to rule otherwise, would be a violation of the
principle prohibiting multiplicity of suits. (Original Records, pp. 38-39)."

The motion for reconsideration was denied. On review, this Court dismissed the
petition in a resolution dated June 19, 1985 and likewise denied private respondent's
subsequent motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated September 9, 1985. 5
On October 7, 1985, private respondent led before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-45541) an action for Speci c Performance and
Fixing of Period for Obligation with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order
pending hearing on the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to compel
the execution of a deed of sale pursuant to the option to purchase and the receipt of
the partial payment, and to x the period to pay the balance. In an Order dated October
25, 1985, the trial court denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the
ground that the decision of the then City Court for the ejectment of the private
respondent, having been a rmed by the then Intermediate Appellate Court and the
Supreme Court, has become final and executory.
Unable to secure an injunction, private respondent also led before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 102 (Civil Case No. Q-46487) on November 15, 1985 a complaint for
Annulment of and Relief from Judgment with injunction and damages. In its decision 6
dated May 12, 1986, the trial court dismissed the complaint for annulment on the ground
o f res judicata, and the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued was dissolved. It
also ordered private respondent to pay P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. As a consequence of
private respondent's motion for reconsideration, the preliminary injunction was reinstated,
thereby restraining the execution of the City Court's judgment on the ejectment case.
The two cases were thereafter consolidated before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
77. On April 28, 1989, a decision 7 was rendered dismissing private respondent's
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-45541 (speci c performance case) and denying its motion
for reconsideration in Civil Case No. 46487 (annulment of the ejectment case). The motion
for reconsideration of said decision was likewise denied.
On appeal, 8 respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision 9 upholding the
jurisdiction of the City Court of Quezon City in the ejectment case. It also concluded that
there was a perfected contract of sale between the parties on the leased premises and
that pursuant to the option to buy agreement, private respondent had acquired the rights
of a vendee in a contract of sale. It opined that the payment by private respondent of
P300,000.00 on June 20, 1975 as partial payment for the leased property, which
petitioners accepted (through Alice A. Dizon) and for which an o cial receipt was issued,
was the operative act that gave rise to a perfected contract of sale, and that for failure of
petitioners to deny receipt thereof, private respondent can therefore assume that Alice A.
Dizon, acting as agent of petitioners, was authorized by them to receive the money in their
behalf. The Court of Appeals went further by stating that in fact, what was entered into was
a "conditional contract of sale" wherein ownership over the leased property shall not pass
to the private respondent until it has fully paid the purchase price. Since private respondent
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 did not consign to the court the balance of the purchase price and continued to occupy the
subject premises, it had the obligation to pay the amount of P1,700.00 in monthly rentals
until full payment of the purchase price. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision in Case No. 46487 is AFFIRMED. The
appealed decision in Case No. 45541 is, on the other hand, ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The defendants-appellees are ordered to execute the deed of absolute sale
of the property in question, free from any lien or encumbrance whatsoever, in
favor of the plaintiff-appellant, and to deliver to the latter the said deed of sale, as
well as the owner's duplicate of the certi cate of title to said property upon
payment of the balance of the purchase price by the plaintiff-appellant. The
plaintiff-appellant is ordered to pay P1,700.00 per month from June 1976, plus
6% interest per annum, until payment of the balance of the purchase price, as
previously agreed upon by the parties.
SO ORDERED."

Upon denial of the motion for partial reconsideration (Civil Case No. Q-45541) by
respondent Court of Appeals, 10 petitioners elevated the case v i a petition for certiorari
questioning the authority of Alice A. Dizon as agent of petitioners in receiving private
respondent's partial payment amounting to P300,000.00 pursuant to the Contract of Lease with
Option to Buy. Petitioners also assail the propriety of private respondent's exercise of the option
when it tendered the said amount on June 20, 1975 which purportedly resulted in a perfected
contract of sale.

G.R. No. 124741:

Petitioners led with respondent Court of Appeals a motion to remand the records
of Civil Case No. 38-29155 (ejectment case) to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), then
City Court of Quezon City, Branch 38, for execution of the judgment 11 dated November 22,
1982 which was granted in a resolution dated June 29, 1992. Private respondent led a motion
to reconsider said resolution which was denied.

Aggrieved, private respondent led a petition for certiorari, prohibition with

preliminary injunction and/or restraining order with this Court (G.R. Nos. 106750-51) which
was dismissed in a resolution dated September 16, 1992 on the ground that the same was
a re led case previously dismissed for lack of merit. On November 26, 1992, entry of
judgment was issued by this Court.
On July 14, 1993, petitioners led an urgent ex-parte motion for execution of the
decision in Civil Case No. 38-29155 with the MTC of Quezon City, Branch 38. On
September 13, 1993, the trial court ordered the issuance of a third alias writ of
execution. In denying private respondent's motion for reconsideration, it ordered the
immediate implementation of the third writ of execution without delay. cdasia

On December 22, 1993, private respondent led with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 104 a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction/restraining order (SP. PROC. No. 93-18722) challenging the enforceability and
validity of the MTC judgment as well as the order for its execution.
On January 11, 1994, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 104 issued an order 1 2 granting
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon private respondent's posting of an
injunction bond of P50,000.00.
Assailing the aforequoted order after denial of their motion for partial
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 reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition 1 3 for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for
a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals. In its
decision, 1 4 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and ruled that:
"The avowed purpose of this petition is to enjoin the public respondent
from restraining the ejectment of the private respondent. To grant the petition
would be to allow the ejectment of the private respondent. We cannot do that now
in view of the decision of this Court in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 25153-54. Petitioners'
alleged right to eject private respondent has been demonstrated to be without
basis in the said civil case. The petitioners have been shown, after all, to have no
right to eject private respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED due course and is accordingly

DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED." 1 5

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution 1 6 by the Court of

Appeals stating that:
"This court in its decision in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 25153-54 declared that the
plaintiff-appellant (private respondent herein) acquired the rights of a vendee in a
contract of sale, in effect, recognizing the right of the private respondent to
possess the subject premises. Considering said decision, we should not allow
ejectment; to do so would disturb the status quo of the parties since the
petitioners are not in possession of the subject property. It would be unfair and
unjust to deprive the private respondent of its possession of the subject property
after its rights have been established in a subsequent ruling.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED." 1 7

Hence, this instant petition.

We find both petitions impressed with merit.
First. Petitioners have established a right to evict private respondent from the
subject premises for non-payment of rentals. The term of the Contract of Lease with
Option to Buy was for a period of one (1) year (May 16, 1974 to May 15, 1975) during
which the private respondent was given an option to purchase said property at P3,000.00
per square meter. After the expiration thereof, the lease was for P3,000.00 per month. LLphil

Admittedly, no de nite period beyond the one-year term of lease was agreed upon
by petitioners and private respondent. However, since the rent was paid on a monthly
basis, the period of lease is considered to be from month to month in accordance with
Article 1687 of the New Civil Code. 1 8 Where the rentals are paid monthly, the lease, even if
verbal may be deemed to be on a monthly basis, expiring at the end of every month
pursuant to Article 1687, in relation to Article 1673 of the Civil Code. 1 9 In such case, a
demand to vacate is not even necessary for judicial action after the expiration of every
month. 2 0
When private respondent failed to pay the increased rental of P8,000.00 per month
in June 1976, the petitioners had a cause of action to institute an ejectment suit against
the former with the then City Court. In this regard, the City Court (now MTC) had exclusive
jurisdiction over the ejectment suit. The ling by private respondent of a suit with the
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 Regional Trial Court for speci c performance to enforce the option to purchase did not
divest the then City Court of its jurisdiction to take cognizance over the ejectment case. Of
note is the fact that the decision of the City Court was a rmed by both the Intermediate
Appellate Court and this Court.
Second. Having failed to exercise the option within the stipulated one year period,
private respondent cannot enforce its option to purchase anymore. Moreover, even
assuming arguendo that the right to exercise the option still subsists at the time private
respondent tendered the amount on June 20, 1975, the suit for speci c performance to
enforce the option to purchase was led only on October 7, 1985 or more than ten (10)
years after accrual of the cause of action as provided under Article 1144 of the New Civil
Code. 2 1
In this case, there was a contract of lease for one (1) year with option to purchase.
The contract of lease expired without the private respondent, as lessee, purchasing the
property but remained in possession thereof. Hence, there was an implicit renewal of the
contract of lease on a monthly basis. The other terms of the original contract of lease
which are revived in the implied new lease under Article 1670 of the New Civil Code 2 2 are
only those terms which are germane to the lessee's right of continued enjoyment of the
property leased. 2 3 Therefore, an implied new lease does not ipso facto carry with it any
implied revival of private respondent's option to purchase (as lessee thereof) the leased
premises. The provision entitling the lessee the option to purchase the leased premises is
not deemed incorporated in the impliedly renewed contract because it is alien to the
possession of the lessee. Private respondent's right to exercise the option to purchase
expired with the termination of the original contract of lease for one year. The rationale of
this Court is that:
"This is a reasonable construction of the provision, which is based on the
presumption that when the lessor allows the lessee to continue enjoying
possession of the property for fteen days after the expiration of the contract he
is willing that such enjoyment shall be for the entire period corresponding to the
rent which is customarily paid — in this case up to the end of the month because
the rent was paid monthly. Necessarily, if the presumed will of the parties refers to
the enjoyment of possession the presumption covers the other terms of the
contract related to such possession, such as the amount of rental, the date when
it must be paid, the care of the property, the responsibility for repairs, etc. But no
such presumption may be indulged in with respect to special agreements which
by nature are foreign to the right of occupancy or enjoyment inherent in a contract
of lease." 2 4

Third. There was no perfected contract of sale between petitioners and private
respondent. Private respondent argued that it delivered the check of P300,000.00 to Alice
A. Dizon who acted as agent of petitioners pursuant to the supposed authority given by
petitioner Fidela Dizon, the payee thereof. Private respondent further contended that
petitioners' ling of the ejectment case against it based on the contract of lease with
option to buy holds petitioners in estoppel to question the authority of petitioner Fidela
Dizon. It insisted that the payment of P300,000.00 as partial payment of the purchase
price constituted a valid exercise of the option to buy.
Under Article 1475 of the New Civil Code, "the contract of sale is perfected at the
moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and
upon the price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance,
subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts." Thus, the elements
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 of a contract of sale are consent, object, and price in money or its equivalent. It bears
stressing that the absence of any of these essential elements negates the existence of a
perfected contract of sale. Sale is a consensual contract and he who alleges it must show
its existence by competent proof. 2 5
In an attempt to resurrect the lapsed option, private respondent gave P300,000.00
to petitioners (thru Alice A. Dizon) on the erroneous presumption that the said amount
tendered would constitute a perfected contract of sale pursuant to the contract of lease
with option to buy. There was no valid consent by the petitioners (as co-owners of the
leased premises) on the supposed sale entered into by Alice A. Dizon, as petitioners'
alleged agent, and private respondent. The basis for agency is representation and a person
dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the authority of
the agent. 2 6 As provided in Article 1868 of the New Civil Code, 2 7 there was no showing
that petitioners consented to the act of Alice A. Dizon nor authorized her to act on their
behalf with regard to her transaction with private respondent. The most prudent thing
private respondent should have done was to ascertain the extent of the authority of Alice
A. Dizon. Being negligent in this regard, private respondent cannot seek relief on the basis
of a supposed agency.
In Bacaltos Coal Mines vs. Court of Appeals, 2 8 we explained the rule in dealing with
an agent:
"Every person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover
upon his peril the authority of the agent. If he does not make such inquiry, he is
chargeable with knowledge of the agent's authority, and his ignorance of that
authority will not be any excuse. Persons dealing with an assumed agent, whether
the assumed agency be a general or special one, are bound at their peril, if they
would hold the principal, to ascertain not only the fact of the agency but also the
nature and extent of the authority, and in case either is converted, the burden of
proof upon them to establish it."

For the long years that private respondent was able to thwart the execution of the
ejectment suit rendered in favor of petitioners, we now write finis to this controversy and
shun further delay so as to ensure that this case would really attain finality.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, both petitions are GRANTED. The decision
dated March 29, 1994 and the resolution dated October 19, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No.
25153-54, as well as the decision dated December 11, 1995 and the resolution dated April
23, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33113 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court for immediate execution
of the judgment dated November 22, 1982 in Civil Case No. VIII-29155 of the then City
Court (now Metropolitan Trial Court) of Quezon City, Branch VIII as a rmed in the decision
dated September 26, 1984 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) and in the resolution dated June 19, 1985 of this Court.
However, petitioners are ordered to REFUND to private respondent the amount of
P300,000.00 which they received through Alice A. Dizon on June 20, 1975. cdrep

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

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 Footnotes
1. The original petitioners were Fidela P. Dizon, Regina Dizon, Amparo D. Bartolome, Ester
A. Dizon, Alice A Dizon and Fidelina D. Balza.
2. Per Judge Fernando Gorospe, Jr.
3. The Intermediate Appellate Court took cognizance over the case after it was referred by
the Supreme Court.
4. Penned by Justice Simeon M. Gopengco and concurred in by Justices Lino M. Patajo,
Jose F. Racela, Jr. and Fidel P. Purisima; Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, p. 60.
5. "Whatever claims petitioner (private respondent herein) may have as to what it allegedly
paid to and received by private respondent Fidela Dizon, under the receipt issued by Mrs.
Alicia Dizon, or with regard to the enforceability or non-enforceability of its stated option
to buy, against the private respondents (petitioners herein), which were matters merely
raised as defenses of the petitioner in the unlawful detainer suit filed against it may be
better presented for ultimate resolution in a separate suit and before the proper forum";
Annex "A" of Petition in G.R. No. 124741; Rollo, p. 48.
6. Per Judge Wilhelmo C. Fortun.
7. Per Judge Ignacio L. Salvador.
8. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 25153-54, entitled "OVERLAND EXPRESS LINES, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant vs. FIDELA P. DIZON, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees."
9. CA Decision (Eight Division) dated March 29, 1994, penned by Justice Eubulo G. Verzola,
and concurred in by Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, Chairman and Justice Serafin V.C.
Guingona; Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 57-72.
10. CA Resolution (Thirteenth Division) dated October 19, 1995, penned by Justice Eubulo
G. Verzola, and concurred in by Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Chairman and Justice
Oswaldo D. Agcaoili; Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 74-78.
11. See note 2.

12. Per Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, ruling that:

"After evaluating the evidence and arguments presented by the parties during
the hearing of this case, the Court believes that the petitioner (herein private
respondent) will suffer an irreparable injury unless a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued enjoining the respondents (herein petitioners) or any person acting in their
behalf from implementing the execution of the Judgment and the Resolution of the
MTC, Br. 38 of Quezon City. Likewise, in view of the pendency of cases before the
Court of Appeals under CA-G.R. No. 25153-54 for Specific Performance and for
Annulment and Relief of Judgment, following the ruling of Supreme Court in the case
of Vda de Sayman vs. Court of Appeals, 121 SCRA 650. "That it is the rule when a
petition for relief is filed, the Court may issue preliminary injunction as may be
necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties'. Further, it said that "The
judgment of the trial court, the enforcement of which is sought to be restrained has not
yet attained the status of being beyond modification or reversal. Hence, the
enforcement of the same at this stage of the proceedings is premature'"(Annex "A" of
Petition; Rollo, pp. 50-51)
13. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 33113, entitled "AMPARO DIZON, ET AL., Petitioners vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, as RTC Judge of Quezon City, Branch 104 and
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 OVERLAND EXPRESS LINES INC., Respondents."
14. CA Decision (Thirteenth Division) dated December 11, 1995, penned by Justice Eubulo
G. Verzola and concurred in by Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Chairman and Justice
Oswaldo D. Agcaoili; Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 46-53.

NOTE: CA-G.R. SP No. 33113 was transferred to the Thirteenth Division by virtue
of the Resolution from the Fifteenth Division dated January 16, 1994 (pursuant to
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals) which states
that a Special Case may be consolidated to the Justice to whom the civil case is
assigned for study or report when the cases involve the same parties and/or related
questions of fact and/or law.
15. Ibid., Rollo, p. 52.
16. CA Resolution (Special Former Thirteenth Division) dated April 23, 1997, penned by
Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, and concurred in by Justice Jaime M. Lantin (New member
vice J. Torres, Jr.) and Justice B.A. Adefuin-dela Cruz (Vice J. Agcaoili, pursuant to Office
Order No. 19-96-DP); Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 55-57.
17. Ibid., Rollo, pp. 56-57.
18. Article 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed; it is understood to be from
year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly;
from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid
daily."

19. Heirs of Manuel T. Suico vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 444, 456 [1997]; citing Rantael
vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 453, 460 [1980]; Cruz vs. Puno, 120 SCRA 497, 502 [1983];
Lesaca vs. Cuevas, 125 SCRA 384, 388 [1983]; Baens vs. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA
634, 644 [1983]; Zablan vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 487, 493 [1987].
"Article 1637. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following
causes:
(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of
lease under Articles 1682 and 1687, has expired; . . . ."
20. Ibid., citing Racaza vs. Susan Realty, Inc., 18 SCRA 1172, 1176-1177 [1966].
21. "Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract:
xxx xxx xxx
22. "Article 1670. If at the end of the contract, the lessee should continue enjoying the thing
leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the
contrary by either party has previously been given, it is understood that there is an
implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for the time established
in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract shall be revived."

23. Dizon vs. Magsaysay, 57 SCRA 250, 254 [1974].

24. Ibid.
25. Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 89, 101 [1997].

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 26. See Bordador vs. Luz, 283 SCRA 374, 382 [1997].
27. "Article 1868. By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service
or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or
authority of the latter."
28. 245 SCRA 460, 467 citing the cases of Pineda vs. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 754
[1993], Veloso vs. La Urbana, 58 Phil. 681 [1933], Harry E. Keller Electric Co. vs.
Rodriguez, 44 Phil. 19 [1922], Deen vs. Pacific Commercial Co., 42 Phil. 738 [1922], and
Strong vs. Repide, 6 Phil. 680 [1906].

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