Consti1 Digests 1AA JJ Digest Team PDF

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
CASE DIGESTS
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
Faculty of Civil Law
Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier

Professor
1ST SEM AY 2016-2017

1AA Digest Team
Joyce Wyne Nomil
Edvinson Quintin
Junius Benedict Corpuz
Rejean Monton
Christine Joyce Andres
Ma. Charlene Cadiz
Fidel Salo
C ONS TI TU TI ONA L LAW 1 CAS E DIGES TS |1
PRELIMINARY
CONSIDERATIONS
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL
G.R. No. 122156 | 267 SCRA 408 | February 3, 1997 | Bellosillo
WRITER: JOYCE WYNE NOMIL
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates

any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution
is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract.
FACTS
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization

program of the government opened to public bidding the sale of 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only two bidders
participated: 1) herein petitioner, Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
Corporation, which offered to buy 51% of MHC shares at P41.58 per share, and 2)
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian Firm, with a bid of P44.00 for the same number of
shares.
Pending the declaration of the winning bidder/strategic partner and the

execution of the contract, MHC matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered
by Renong Berhad. GSIS, however, refused to accept MHC’s offer.
MHC, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS would disregard the matching bid it
tendered and that the respondent would hasten the sale of the subject shares, filed a
petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner invokes Section 10, par. 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution and submits that Manila Hotel is a part of the national
patrimony and its business unquestionably a part of the national economy.
ISSUE
Whether the provisions on National Economy and Patrimony of the

Constitution is self-executing and binding to GSIS in the conduct of its businesses
RULING
YES. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there
is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi
jus ibi remedium . xxx
In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the

government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a "public function;" (2) when the government is so-
significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible
for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action.
It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent
MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt
therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is
not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest
bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the
Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified
Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest
bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound
to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the
highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by
the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be
known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject

constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules
issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of
the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and
contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate
the Constitution lose their reason for being.
THE STATE
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA
HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS vs. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON.
ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION
AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
G.R No. 187167 | 655 SCRA 476| July 16, 2011| Carpio
Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States
parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental
shelves.
FACTS
In 1961, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3046 was passed demarcating the maritime
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State in consonance with UNCLOS I.
After forty eight years, the Congress amended this law by enacting RA 9522
in compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS
III). Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour
of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the
filing of application for the extended continental shelf. The new law shortened one
baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine
archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group
(KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate
their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their

respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or . . . legislators," assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522 on the following grounds: 1) it reduces the Philippine
maritime territory, in violation of Article 1 of the Constitution, and 2) it opens the
country’s waters to maritime passage by all vessels, thus undermining Philippine
sovereignty.
ISSUE
Whether R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional
RULING
NO. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It
is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones
(i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone
[24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles
from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III
was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members
to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world's oceans and
submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States' graduated authority
over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional
international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through
occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the
treaty's terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims
to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on
general international law.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-
recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines' maritime zones and
continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the
Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and
our national interest.
WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. L-26379| 30 SCRA 968 | December 27, 1969 | Fernando, J.
"By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine

Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain
cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency over
the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction
over offenses committed therein."
FACTS
William C. Reagan, a civilian employee of an American corporation providing

technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines, imported a tax-
free 1960 Cadillac car. The car was thereafter sold to a member of the United States
Marine Corps, an American Citizen, in Clark Field Air Base, Pampanga.
As a result of the transactions, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue

assessed Reagan for income taxes amounting to P2,979.00. After paying the sum, he
sought a refund from respondent claiming that he was exempt, but pending action
on his request for refund, he filed the case with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
seeking recovery of the sum of P2,979.00 plus the legal rate of interest.
CTA found nothing objectionable in the assessment and thereafter the

payment the subject income tax and denied the refund on the same. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the sale was made outside the Philippine territory and therefore
beyond its jurisdictional power to tax
RULING
NO. The sale having taken place on what indisputably is Philippine territory,
petitioner's liability for the income tax due as a result thereof was unavoidable.
Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion
there of that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its
commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies
must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and
personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a
diminution of its sovereignty.
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied,

submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of
what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty
as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a
state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and
self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what
otherwise is illimitable competence.
Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control.
Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to
participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory.
If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien
character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its
authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with
the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases
agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory. xxx
There is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to such
an assertion (that the Clark Air Force is foreign [American] soil or territory). It has
not become foreign soil or territory. This country's jurisdictional rights therein,
certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved.
SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS [Special Former Twelfth
Division], HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26 (San Fernando City, La Union) & The
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 143377 | 352 SCRA 334| February 20, 2001| Melo, J.
Government cannot make use of the rule that prescription does not run against
it to assist a government agency (BCDA) which had been created to exercise
proprietary functions.
FACTS
Rafael Galvez sold two parcels of land, covered in an Original Certificate Title
(OCT), to Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana, Regina Bustos, and Erlinda Balatbat.
These lots were purchased by Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, which later
conveyed the same to herein petitioner, Shipside Incorporated.
Unknown to Lepanto Company, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of La Union

declared Galvez’s land title null and void and ordered the cancellation of the OCT.
The decision of the CFI was made final and executory by the Court of Appeals.
Twenty four years later, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), after being
notified that the trial court’s decision was not executed by the Register of Deeds,
filed a complaint for the revival of judgment and cancellation of titles. The Solicitor
General argues that the State's cause of action in the cancellation of the land title
issued to petitioner's predecessor-in-interest is imprescriptible because it is
included in Camp Wallace under the ownership and administration of Bases
Conversion Development Authority (BCDA). Thus, this belongs to the government.
ISSUE
Whether the Republic has a cause of action in the instant case
RULING
NO. From the records of this case, it is clear that the judgment sought to be
revived became final on October 23, 1973. On the other hand, the action for revival
of judgment was instituted only in 1999, or more than twenty-five (25) years after
the judgment had become final. Hence, the action is barred by extinctive
prescription considering that such an action can be instituted only within ten (10)
years from the time the cause of action accrues.
While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may
not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the
subject matter. While Camp Wallace may have belonged to the government at the
time Rafael Galvez’s title was ordered cancelled in Land Registration Case No. N-
361, the same no longer holds true today.
With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA under Section 2 of

Proclamation No. 216, the government no longer has a right or interest to protect.
Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the
instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being
applicable only in cases where the government is a party in interest…Being the
owner of the areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is the BCDA, not the Government,
which stands to be benefited if the land covered by TCT No. T-5710 issued in the
name of petitioner is cancelled.
Having the capacity to sue or be sued, it should thus be the BCDA which may
file an action to cancel petitioner's title, not the Republic, the former being the real
party in interest… The rule that prescription does not run against the State does not
apply to corporations or artificial bodies created by the State for special purposes, it
being said that when the title of the Republic has been divested, its grantees,
although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the same category as ordinary
persons (Kingston v. LeHigh Valley Coal Co., 241 Pa 469). By raising the claim of
imprescriptibility, a claim which cannot be raised by the BCDA, the Government not
only assists the BCDA, as it did in E.B . Marcha, it even supplants the latter, a course
of action proscribed by said case.
C O N S T I T U T I O N A L L A W 1 C A S E D I G E S T S | 10
STATE IMMUNITY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS
and ROBERT GOHIER vs. HON. V.M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court
of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC.,
G. R. No. L-35645 | 136 SCRA 487| May 22, 1985| Abad Santos
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the

proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to
have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case
the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government
of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business
purposes.
FACTS
In 1972, United States invited the submission of bids for projects consisting
of repairs of wharves and shorelines in its naval base in Subic, Zambales. Eligio de
Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Thereafter, a
letter was sent saying that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the
projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair
contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.
The letter further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties.
The company sued herein petitioners. The civil complaint is to order the
petitioners to allow the company to perform the work on the projects and, in the
event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the petitioners to
pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties
for work on the projects. The trial court ruled in favor of the company.
Herein petitioners question the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject
matter of the complaint and their persons, especially United States of America which
is a foreign sovereign.
ISSUE
Whether the company may sue a foreign sovereign
RULING
NO. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued
in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the
rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and
evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary
to distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State
immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states
in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law, pp.
207-209 [1984].)
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the
conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia
vs. Lopez…In this case, United States concluded contracts with private individuals
but the contracts notwithstanding the States was not deemed to have given or
waived its consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure
imperii and not for jure gestionis.
MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC. vs. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE

and BUREAU of CUSTOMS
G.R. No. L-23139| 18 SCRA 1120| December 17, 1966 | Bengzon, J.P.
The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function

proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-
governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function,

there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such
government entity.
FACTS
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad and was consigned
to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment was discharged to the
custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then
handling arrastre operations. Unfortunately, only three cases of rotary drill parts
were delivered.
The petitioner filed a suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the
undelivered case plus other damages. Respondents maintained they cannot be sued.
The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither the Customs
Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable. Petitioner appeals the order of
dismissal.
ISSUE
Whether the respondents have immunity from suit
RULING
YES. The Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of Finance (Sec. 81,
Rev. Adm. Code), with no personality of its own apart from that of the national
government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting
lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees,
charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R. A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service
is a necessary incident. For practical reasons said revenues and customs duties can
not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship agent's or
consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and imposing the duty
provided in the Tariff law. Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the
declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this checking up
requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable
place in the customs premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it
requires arrastre operation.
Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed

proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of
the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render
said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental
function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as
to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.
Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons
of public policy, cannot be sued without its consent. Plaintiff should have filed its
present claim with the General Auditing Office, it being for money, under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under which
money claims against the Government may be filed.
ANGEL MINISTERIO and ASUNCION SADAYA vs. THE COURT OF FIRST

INSTANCE OF CEBU, FOURTH BRANCH, PRESIDED BY THE HONORABLE, JUDGE
JOSE C. BORROMEO, THE PUBLIC HIGHWAY COMMISSIONER, AND THE
AUDITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. L-31635| 40 SCRA 464| August 31, 1971| Fernando
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an

instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the
procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been
filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after
tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the
right to enter in and upon the land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the
public use defined in the judgment."
FACTS
Ministerio and Sadaya filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu a
complaint alleging that the National Government, through its authorized
representatives, took physical and material possession of their registered lot for the
road widening of the Gorordo Avenue without paying just compensation or without
any agreement. The complaint seeks the payment of just compensation or the
restoration of possession of said lot.
The CFI dismissed the suit. It held that the petitioners could not sue the
Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General, in their capacity as public
officials because it violates the principle of government immunity from suit without
its consent. Hence, herein appeal by certiorari to review the decision of the lower
court.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners could sue defendants Public Highway Commissioner

and the Auditor General, in their capacity as public officials
RULING
YES. The government is immune from suit without its consent. Nor is it
indispensable that it be the party proceeded against. If it appears that the action
would in fact hold it liable, the doctrine calls for application. It follows then that
even if the defendants named were public officials, such a principle could still be an
effective bar. This is clearly so where a litigation would result in a financial
responsibility for the government, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of
property. Under such circumstances, the liability of the official sued is not personal.
The party that could be adversely affected is the government. Hence the defense of
non-suability may be interposed.
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his

capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As
was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications v. Aligean: "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by
its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the
State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been
invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against
the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has
been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director
of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he
violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is
not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not
be sued without its consent."
If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property

taken for public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character
should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the
government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a
complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation
fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the
amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned" to
appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment." If there were an
observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they
are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by
what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as
important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of
officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that
when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon
the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest
that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the
doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N.

FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA, LAUREANO BANIÑA, JR., SOR MARIETA
BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA ORJA BANIÑA AND LYDIA R. BANIÑA
G.R. No. 52179| 195 SCRA 692| April 8, 1991 | Medialdea
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because
their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the
claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental
capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions
recognized by law.
FACTS
A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney, a gravel and sand truck

and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union. Due to the impact,
several passengers of the jeepney died as a result of the injuries they sustained and
four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
The heirs filed a complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the
jeepney, as well as the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union. Herein respondent
judge ruled that the Municipality of San Fernando is jointly and severally liable with
the driver of the dump truck. Petitioner maintains that the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing
assailed orders and in rendering a decision.
ISSUE
Whether the Municipality can be held liable for the tort committed
RULING
NO. Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts
committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on
whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing
governmental or proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio v.
Fontanilla (G.R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599, 606), the distinction of
powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the
municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because
their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting
in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely
gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under
the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that
"he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the
repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." (Rollo, p. 29.)
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the

performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was
performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et al. v. Province of Ilocos Norte, the
District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the construction
or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the
accident are admittedly governmental activities."
After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at

the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by
its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental
functions. Hence, the death of the passenger — tragic and deplorable though it may
be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. VICENTE A. HIDALGO, IN HIS

CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA,
BRANCH 37, CARMELO V. CACHERO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SHERIFF IV,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, AND TARCILA LAPERAL MENDOZA
G.R. No. 161657| 534 SCRA 619 | October 4, 2007 | Garcia
It is basic that government funds and properties may not be seized under writs
of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments. Republic v. Palacio teaches that
a judgment against the State generally operates merely to liquidate and establish the
plaintiff's claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise, they can not be
enforced by processes of law.
FACTS
Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed a suit before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila for the reconveyance and the corresponding declaration of nullity of a deed
of sale and title against the Republic, the Register of Deeds of Manila, and one Atty.
Fidel Vivar. Petitioner alleged that she was the owner of the disputed Arlegui
property, wherein the Presidential Guest House and office building of the Office of
the President now stands, was forcibly taken by the Republic during the Martial
Law.
RTC held that the Republic must pay the plaintiff the sum of
P1,480,627,688.00 representing the reasonable rental for the use of the subject
property, the interest thereon at the legal rate, and the opportunity cost at the rate
of three (3%) per cent per annum, commencing July 1975 continuously up to July
30, 2003, plus an additional interest at the legal rate, commencing from this date
until the whole amount is paid in full.
ISSUE
Whether government funds and properties maybe seized under writs of

execution or garnishment
RULING
NO. The assailed trial court's issuance of the writ of execution against
government funds to satisfy its money judgment is also nullified. It is basic that
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments. Republic v. Palacio teaches that a judgment
against the State generally operates merely to liquidate and establish the plaintiff's
claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise, they can not be enforced by
processes of law.
Albeit title to the Arlegui property remains in the name of the petitioner
Republic, it is actually the Office of the President which has beneficial possession of
and use over it since the 1975 takeover. Accordingly, and in accord with the
elementary sense of justice, it behooves that office to make the appropriate
budgetary arrangements towards paying private respondent what is due her under
the premises. This, to us, is the right thing to do. The imperatives of fair dealing
demand no less. And the Court would be remiss in the discharge of its duties as
dispenser of justice if it does not exhort the Office of the President to comply with
what, in law and equity, is its obligation. If the same office will undertake to pay its
obligation with reasonable dispatch or in a manner acceptable to the private
respondent, then simple justice, while perhaps delayed, will have its day. Private
respondent is in the twilight of her life, being now over 90 years of age. Any delay in
the implementation of this disposition would be a bitter cut.
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., AS JUDGE RTC OF MAKATI, BRANCH CXLII,
ADMIRAL FINANCE CREDITORS CONSORTIUM, INC., AND SHERIFF SILVINO R.
PASTRANA
G.R. No. 89898-99| 190 SCRA 206 | October 1, 1990 | Cortes
In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to
levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the
properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public
use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against
the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and
which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution.
FACTS
The Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by Admiral

Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After due hearing, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the
private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of
P338,160.00. The RTC issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with
a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB.
However, petitioner opposed this through a motion for reconsideration, contending
that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for
to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper
appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines
v. Palacio.
ISSUE
Whether the funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from

garnishment and levy upon execution
RULING
YES. Admitting that its PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was specifically
opened for expropriation proceedings it had initiated over the subject property,
petitioner poses no objection to the garnishment or the levy under execution of the
funds deposited therein amounting to P99,743.94. However, it is petitioner's main
contention that inasmuch as the assailed orders of respondent RTC judge involved
the net amount of P4,965,506.45, the funds garnished by respondent sheriff in
excess of P99,743.94, which are public funds earmarked for the municipal
government's other statutory obligations, are exempted from execution without the
proper appropriation required under the law.
There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second PNB
Account are public funds of the municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-
settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless
otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties of a
municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be
attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the
municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and
which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from
execution. The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. Absent a showing
that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its
public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision
dated June 4, 1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-
537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of
petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN,

RUBEN P. ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO S.
ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R. LICUANAN vs. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY, BRANCH 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., AND SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 171182| 679 SCRA 54| August 23, 2012 | Bersamin
WRITER: EDVINSON QUINTIN
The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They
include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be
spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives.
FACTS
On August 30, 1990, University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a

contract with Stern Building Incorporated for the construction of an extension
building and renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences building in the campus of
University of the Philippines in Los Banos (UPLB). Upon the course of its
implementation, the UP failed to pay the amount due to the contractor. Hence, Stern
Building Inc. filed a suit against UP before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Consequently, the RTC ruled in favor of the contractor and ordered the garnishment
of UP funds in the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
Meanwhile, UP filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals

challenging the jurisdiction of the RTC to execute its own decision with regard to the
garnishment of governmental funds and properties. Pending the review, the CA
issued temporary restraining order (TRO) upon application by UP. After the 60-day
suspension of execution had lapsed, RTC then directed the sheriff to execute its
decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not UP funds are subject to garnishment
RULING
NO. UP is an educational institution performing a legitimate government

function. It is an institution of higher learning, not a corporation established for
profit and declaring any dividends. Undeniably, the UP is a government
instrumentality performing the State’s constitutional mandate of promoting quality
and accessible education.
The jurisdiction of the RTC involving money claims against the government
does not include the implementation of its own decision. The execution of monetary
judgment against the UP falls within the primary jurisdiction of Commission on
Audit (COA) as provided by Presidential Decree No. 1445.
The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They
include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may
be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds
subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of
execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit
to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution

against the UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, VICAR APOSTOLIC OF PUERTO PRINCESA D.D.;

MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, JR., BISHOP-EMERITUS OF CALOOCAN,
FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., KALIKASAN-PNE, MARIA
CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN, HON. NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST,
ROLAND G. SIMBULAN, PH.D., JUNK VFA MOVEMENT, TERESITA R. PEREZ,
PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, PETER SJ.
GONZALES, PAMALAKAYA, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH. D., AGHAM, ELMER C.
LABOG, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR, GABRIELA, JOSE
ENRIQUE A. AFRICA, THERESA A. CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN A. GUAN, NESTOR
T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A. EDSEL F. TUPAZ vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT IN HIS CAPACITY
AS COMMANDER OF THE U.S. 7TH FLEET, MARK A. RICE IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE USS GUARDIAN, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S.
AQUINO III IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HON. VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, HON. RAMON JESUS P.
PAJE, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, VICE ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS M. ALANO, PHILIPPINE NAVY FLAG
OFFICER IN COMMAND, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ADMIRAL
RODOLFO D. ISORENA, COMMANDANT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD,
COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN EVANGELISTA, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD
PALAWAN, MAJOR GEN. VIRGILIO O. DOMINGO, COMMANDANT OF ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES COMMAND AND LT. GEN. TERRY G. ROBLING, US
MARINE CORPS FORCES, PACIFIC AND BALIKATAN 2013 EXERCISE CO-
DIRECTOR
G.R. No. 206510| 735 SCRA 54 | September 16, 2014| Villarama, Jr.
Waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction
and not to special civil actions such as for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan.
FACTS
Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls located at the Coral triangle,
in Puerto Prinsesa City, Palawan. It was declared as a National Marine Park by virtue
of Proclamation No. 306 and inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site.
Under the Republic Act (R.A) No. 10067, otherwise known as the "Tubbataha
Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009”, a “no-take” policy was strictly enforced to
ensure the protection and conservation of it for the enjoyment of the present and
future generations.
On the other hand, a Warship of the United States of America (USA) named
USS Guardian requested diplomatic clearance to “enter and exit the territorial
waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of
routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” However, while
traversing the Philippine waters, the USS guardian ran aground the South Shoal of
the Tubbataha Reefs.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations

of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage that affects
different provinces in which events violate their constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology. Specifically, petitioners cited several violations committed by
US respondents under R.A. No. 10067. Furthermore, petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and thereafter, filed a
petition for Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and/or Writ of
Kalikasan against the respondents.
ISSUE
Whether the court has jurisdiction over the respondents in their official
capacity
RULING
NO. Waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as for the issuance of the Writ of
Kalikasan.
Moreover, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as

commanding officers of the US Navy who have control and supervision over the
warship USS Guardian. The satisfaction of the claims against the US would require
appropriations from the US government and as such the action is deemed as against
the State itself, hence, the principle of State immunity applies which bars the
exercise of jurisdiction of the court over the US respondents.
Liability of The US Government
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a
restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef
system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
While it is true that warships enjoy sovereign immunity because it is

considered as an extension of their flag state, the mantle of sovereign immunity may
be waived in consonance with Article 31 of the UNCLOS.
Furthermore, non-membership of the US in the UNCLOS does not mean that

it may disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal
waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear "international
responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which
adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs.
CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP) vs. HON. CESAR
D. SANTAMARIA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH
145, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY, HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE,
JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, ROMEL R. BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER
FRANCISCO C. BOLASTIG, LEAGUE OF URBAN POOR FOR ACTION (LUPA),
KILUSAN NG MARALITA SA MEYCAUAYAN (KMM-LUPA CHAPTER), DANILO M.
CALDERON, VICENTE C. ALBAN, MERLYN M. VAAL, LOLITA S. QUINONES,
RICARDO D. LANOZO, JR., CONCHITA G. GOZO, MA. TERESA D. ZEPEDA,
JOSEFINA A. LANOZO, AND SERGIO C. LEGASPI, JR., KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG
MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY), EDY CLERIGO, RAMMIL DINGAL, NELSON B.
TERRADO, CARMEN DEUNIDA, AND EDUARDO LEGSON
G.R. No. 185572| 665 SCRA 189| February 7, 2012| Sereno
It is necessary and crucial to ascertain the legal nature of an act involved

before the principle of State immunity would apply. It has been restricted only to
sovereign or governmental functions.
FACTS
Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance of
the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, wherein China
agreed to extend preferential buyers credit to the Philippine government to finance
the Northrail Project. Meanwhile, The Ambassador of China wrote a letter to the
DOF secretary designating China National Machinery & Equipment Group (CNMEG)
as the prime contractor of the expected project.
Thereafter, Northrail and China National Machinery & Equipment Group

contracted an agreement for the construction of the North Luzon Railway System.
Subsequently, Harry Roque et al. filed a complaint for Annulment of contract and
injunction with urgent motion for summary hearing to determine the Existence of
Facts and Circumstances Justifying the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory
and Mandatory Injunction and/or TRO against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive
Secretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and Management, the National
Economic Development Authority and Northrail. On the contrary, CNMEG invoked
State immunity and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground
that it acted merely as an agent of the Chinese government.
ISSUE
Whether or not CNMEG is entitled to State immunity
RULING
NO. CNMEG is engaged in proprietary activity. According to the classical or

absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in
the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure
imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. As it
stands now, it is necessary and crucial to ascertain the legal nature of an act
involved before the principle of State immunity would apply. It has been restricted
only to sovereign or governmental functions.
While the agreement is silent on the nature of the transaction, the intention
of the parties to classify the venture as proprietary was revealed in the foregoing
provisions of the agreement. In addition, the perusal of the records shows that
CNMEG initiated the undertaking, and not the Chinese government, its desire to
secure the North Rail project was in the ordinary course of its business as a global
construction company. The intention of the parties to classify the venture as
proprietary was revealed in the foregoing provisions of the MOA.
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 125865| 323 SCRA 692| January 28, 2000| Ynares-Santiago

It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done
with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
FACTS
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

He was charged of defamation before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) for
allegedly uttering defamatory words to his co-worker. Subsequently, the MeTC
judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45
of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government. It prompted the
judge to dismiss the cases filed against the petitioner. However, upon petition for
reviewi before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the decision of the lower court was
reversed and set aside. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not Liang is covered by immunity as provided under the

agreement
RULING
NO. Under Section 45 of the Agreement, Officers and staff of the Bank
including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing
missions for the Bank shall be immune from legal process with respect to their acts
in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.
The immunity accorded with the consultants of ADB is not absolute. It is

necessary therefore to ascertain whether the act was done in his official capacity.
Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by immunity because our

laws does not allow the commission of the crime, It is well-settled principle of law
that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond
the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
SEPARATION OF
POWERS AND
CHECK AND BALANCES
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO vs. SATURNINO DAVID AS
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. L-6355-5| 93 Phil 969| August 31, 1953| Montemayor

When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the
legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act
unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of
office.
FACTS
Petitioners filed a petition before the Court of First Instance (CFI) to declare
section 13 of Republic Act No.590 which states that no salary wherever received by
any public officer of the Republic of The Philippines shall be considered as exempt
from income tax and it shall not be construed as a reduction thereof. Petitioners
supported their argument and cited Section 9 of Article VIII of the Constitution
which mandates that judicial officers specifically all Justices and Judges are exempt
from payment of income tax on their salaries.
Herein petitioners also challenged the authority of the private respondent to

collect income taxes from them. While Republic Act No 590 provides for no
exemption to any public officer, the Constitution mandates that judicial officers are
exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof
was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Legislature can lawfully declare the collection of income
tax on a judicial officer even the Supreme Court decided otherwise.
RULING
NO. The collection of income tax is an actual and evident diminution of the
salary of judicial officers. Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection
with House Bill No. 1127, which became Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that
one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was the feeling among
certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not enjoy any
exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country, they
should pay income tax on their salaries.
The main reason of the exemption under the Constitution is to preserve

independence in the Judiciary. It is attached to their office as provided and secured
by the Fundamental law.
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the

legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act
unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of
office. Further, the legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a
constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts,
by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional
inhibition.
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. vs. JOY C. CABILES

G.R. No. 170139| 732 SCRA 22| August 5, 2014| Leonen

No branch or office of the government may exercise its powers in any manner
inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports
such exercise.
FACTS
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency Inc. is engaged in the business of

recruitment and placement for employment abroad. Petitioner deployed the
worker, Joy C. Cabiles for Taiwan to work there as a quality control officer.
Thereafter, Joy was terminated from work without prior notice. The termination
prompted her to file a complaint before the Labor Arbiter but it was subsequently
dismissed. Upon appeal, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and decided on her favor. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the NLRC and granted moral and exemplary
damages against Sameer Overseas. CA ordered the payment of three-month
equivalent in consonance with Republic Act 8042 as amended by Republic Act
10022 which provides the clause `or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.”
Consequently, the Supreme Court modified the decision of the CA and ruled
that the limitation on the computation of the monetary claim as provided under the
law is unconstitutional for violating equal protection clause and substantive due
process.
ISSUE
Whether or not the reinstated unconstitutional clause under the new law is
valid
RULING
NO. As decided in Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime, limiting the wages that
should be recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is in
violation with the Constitution. In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme.
No branch or office of the government may exercise its powers in any manner
inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that
supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All
laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a
nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with

the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of
the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already
declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as
to warrant a reverse conclusion.
BLAS F. OPLE vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR

VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA,
CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE

NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
G.R. No. 127685| 293 SCRA 141| July 23, 1998| Puno

Administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and application.
Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that
Congress enacts in the form of a public law.
FACTS
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 308 (A.O. No. 308)
which provides for a National Identification Reference System. Upon its
implementation, Senator Blas F. Ople challenged the Administrative Order on two
constitutional grounds. First, the issuance of the President of such order is a form of
usurpation of the legislative powers to enact laws or to legislate. Second, it intrudes
the right of the citizenry to privacy.
The petitioner further averred that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every
Filipino citizen and foreign resident, violates their right to privacy and also not a
mere administrative order but a law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Administrative order No. 308 is unconstitutional
RULING
YES. Under the Constitution, the power of executive department as headed by

the President is limited to the implementation of laws. In contrast, the power of
enactment or creation of laws lies within the province of legislature.
Administrative power shall be regarded as an instrument of the executive

branch to properly apply policies and enforce orders as determined by proper
governmental organs, these orders shall relate to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. Moreover, it must be in harmony with the
law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy
A.O No. 308 does not merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987, it
establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference
System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state
policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against
dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. The basic and inherent
right of the citizenry to privacy would be affected. In addition, it is the most
threatened right of a man living in a mass society.
Thus, this subject matter shall be covered by law which is solely under the
powers of Congress and not of the President.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG

MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, EMILIA P. DAPULANG,
SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and ROQUE M. TAN, vs.
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
and THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT
G.R. No. 167798| 487 SCRA 623| April 19, 2006| Carpio

Under the constitutional power of control, the President can direct all
government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a
uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability,
compatibility, and convenience to the public. It does not involve the exercise of any
legislative power.
FACTS
Kilosang Mayo Uno (KMU) challenged the constitutionality of the Executive

Order No. 420 (EO No. 420) issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the
ground that the act constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive
branch of the government. EO No. 420 requires all government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations to streamline and harmonize their
Identification System.
Furthermore, it seeks to adopt unified multi-purpose identification system

for government. Accordingly, the information which shall be collected and recorded
is very limited to basic information that would suffice for identification.
ISSUE
Whether or not EO 420 constitutes usurpation of legislative power
RULING
NO. EO 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of
their functions under existing laws.
What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID

card system. First, when the implementation of an ID card system requires a special
appropriation because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second,
when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the
independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens
whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card system
requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or
usually required for such purpose, such that the citizen’s right to privacy is
infringed.
Certainly, under the constitutional power of control, the President can direct
all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to
adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency,
reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public.
This is in compliance with the mandate of the President to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed. The implementation of multi-purpose ID system only
covers the entities under the Executive branch and does not affect transactions
outside the scope of the President’s watch. Thus, it does not constitute usurpation of
legislative power.
In addition, EO 420 does not establish National ID card system nor it does
compel the citizens to have an ID card for them to transact business with the
government. If government entities under the Executive department decide to unify
their existing ID data collection and ID card issuance systems to achieve savings,
efficiency, compatibility and convenience, such act does not involve the exercise of
any legislative power.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS

CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, JUAN M. FLAVIER, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SENATE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS MAJORITY LEADER, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
MINORITY LEADER, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S.
CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.
LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, MAR ROXAS AND
MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND ALTER-EGO OF PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, AND ANYONE ACTING IN HIS STEAD AND IN BEHALF OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 169777| 488 SCRA 1| April 20, 200| Carpio Morales

Courts shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance of order from a co-
equal branch of government, entitles it to a strong presumption of constitutionality.
Once the challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the Constitution, it is duty-
bound to declare it so. For the Constitution, being the highest expression of the
sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over any issuance of the government
that contravenes its mandates
FACTS
The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials

of the Executive Department for them to appear in a public hearing as resource
speakers regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation
with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail
Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other
unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.
Subsequently, the President issued Executive Order No. 464 (EO No. 464)
otherwise known as "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public
Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes” which took effect immediately at the height of
the controversy. As part of the President’s Executive privilege, section 2 (b) in
relation to section 3 of EO No. 464 requires all department heads and some high
ranking officials to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress.
Thereafter, Executive Secretary Ermita addressed the Senate President and

cited EO No. 464 for the non-appearance of the invited executive officials. It
prompted the Petitioners to petition the court to declare EO No. 464 as
unconstitutional because it contravenes the legislative power of inquiry in aid of
legislation.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 2 & 3 of EO No. 464 interferes with and impedes the
valid exercise of the Senate’s powers of inquiry.
RULING
YES. The Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke
the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the
privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the
authority is "By order of the President," which means that he personally consulted
with her.
Executive Privilege is recognized with respect to information the confidential

nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of
the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is
necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. However,
Section 2 (b) in relation to section 3 of EO No. 464 shall be invalidated because it
allows the department heads and other covered officials to invoke executive
privilege through their own discretion or by mere silence. This extraordinary power
must be wielded only by the highest official of the Executive department so as not to
cripple the constitutional power of a co-equal branch to inquire or investigate in aid
of legislation. It follows, therefore, that the President can only invoke the executive
privilege. If the officials being summoned by the congress believe in their own
judgment that the information being sought is covered by Executive Privilege, then
it shall be necessary to inform the President for the possible need of invoking the
privilege.
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 174689| 537 SCRA 373| October 22, 2007| Corona

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so,
to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment.
FACTS
Petitioner Rommel Silverio filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate. In support of
his argument, petitioner alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically
male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself
with girls since childhood. Further, He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok,
Thailand. Thereafter, the RTC ruled in favor of Silverio but it was then reversed by
the Court of Appeals (CA) upon the petition of Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
on the ground that there is no law that allows change on birth certificate by reason
of sex alteration.
ISSUE
Whether or not change on the birth certificate by reason of sex reassignment

is valid
RULING
NO. The existing laws only allow change of first name or gender on the birth
certificate only with regard to corrections or clerical errors or other reasonable
grounds. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same
kind or with something that serves as a substitute. In sum, there is no law or statute
that expressly allows substantial change on birth certificate on the basis of sexual
reassignment. It is within the power of Congress to determine who may file
petitions and what grounds may be invoked. If the legislature intends to confer on a
person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and
sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. FLORENCIO M. REYES, OFFICER-

IN-CHARGE, AND RENE DE GUZMAN, CLERK, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
31, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA
A.M. No. P-08-2535| 621 SCRA 511| June 23, 2010| Per curiam

The laws passed by the legislature shall not encompass the exclusive
administrative supervision granted by the Constitution to the Supreme Court.
FACTS
Rene De Guzman is working as a clerk in Regional Trial Court of Guimba

Nueva Ecija. Complaint was filed against him for alleged incompetence/inefficiency
in the transmittal of the records. Further, it was alleged that he has been manifesting
irrational and queer behavior in office. It prompted the presiding Judge to request
the Crime Laboratory office to conduct a drug test on De Guzman who consequently
tested positive for the use of marijuana and shabu. As a result, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA)recommended that De Guzman shall be dismissed from service
due to gross misconduct.
The recommendation by OCA was adopted by majority of the Justices.

However, two Justices disagreed on the ground that the recommended sanction is
against public policy as provided in Republic Act 9165 (RA 9165) otherwise known
as imprisonment for drug dealers and users, rehabilitation for victims.” They further
state that they state that the Court’s real strength is not in its righteousness but in
its willingness to understand that men are not perfect and that there is a time to
punish and a time to give a chance for contrition and change.
ISSUE
Whether or not De Guzman must be sanctioned as recommended by OCA

despite of the policy provided under Republic Act 9165.
RULING
YES. RA 9165 must be considered in light of the Court’s constitutional power

of administrative supervision over courts and its personnel. The legislative power
imposing policies through laws is not unlimited and is subject to the substantive and
constitutional limitations that set parameters both in the exercise of the power itself
and the allowable subjects of legislation. The laws passed by the legislature shall not
encompass the exclusive administrative supervision granted by the Constitution to
the Supreme Court. As such, it cannot limit the Court’s power to impose disciplinary
actions against erring justices, judges and court personnel.
The Court cannot subscribe to idea that De Guzman’s irrational behavior

stems solely from his being a drug user. Such queer behavior can be attributed to
several factors. However, it cannot by any measure be categorically stated at this
point that it can be attributed solely to his being a drug user.
BAGUAN M. MAMISCAL vs. CLERK OF COURT MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH,

SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURT, MARAWI CITY
A.M. No.SCC-13-18-J| 761 SCRA 39| July 1, 2015| Mendoza

Shari’a Circuit Court which, under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines (Muslim Code) enjoys exclusive original jurisdiction to resolve disputes
relating to divorce.
FACTS
Mamiscal decided to divorce his wife Adelaidah by repudiating her (talaq) as

embodied in the agreement. Thereafter, Mamiscal had a change of mind and decided
not to pursue the divorce he intended to file. However, his wife pursued the petition
for divorce with the office of Abdullah for registration. Although the certificate was
unsigned by Mamiscal, it was purportedly executed by Mamiscal in the presence of
two witnesses and in accordance with Islamic Law. As a result, Abdullah issued
Certificate of Registration of Divorce (CRD) on the same day between Mamiscal and
Adelaidah. Mamiscal assailed the validity of CRD for purported violation of due
process but his motion was denied by Abdullah.
Petitioner now comes to the Supreme Court and alleged that Abdullah, in his
official capacity, acted with partiality and violated the rights of Mamiscal to due
process of law. dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming of a court employee.
ISSUE
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over Abdullah for his acts in relation
to his job
RULING
NO. Under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim
Code), Sharia Circuit Courts enjoy exclusive original jurisdiction to resolve disputes
relating to divorce. While Mamiscal is undoubtedly a member of the Judiciary as
Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court, a review of the subject complaint reveals
that he seeks to hold Abdullah liable for registering the divorce and issuing the CRD
pursuant to his duties as Circuit Registrar of Muslim divorces.
It becomes apparent that the Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court enjoys
the privilege of wearing two hats: first, as Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court,
and second, as Circuit Registrar within his territorial jurisdiction. Although the
Constitution vests the Court with the power of administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel this power must be taken with due regard to other
prevailing laws.
In this case, the Muslim Code specifically grants jurisdiction to Sharia Circuit
Courts over disputes relating to divorce and it includes disciplinary measures which
may be imposed to its own personnel for their acts which are done in their official
capacity.
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR. vs. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR.,

VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOSE J. ROY,
FAUSTO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO,
FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B.
FERNANDEZ, AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS MEMBERS OF
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE CREATED BY HOUSE RESOLUTION NO. 59
G.R. No.L-17144| 109 Phil 863| October 28, 1960| Bengzon

Judicial Interference with Legislature provides the well-established principles
that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by
the judicial department with the legislature since each department is equally
independent within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution.
FACTS
Honorable Sergio Osmena Jr. is an incumbent representative from the Second

District of Cebu. He delivered a privilege speech entitled ‘A message to Garcia” in
which he alleged that crime and irregularities are being committed by the President.
However, he failed to adduce substantial evidence to support his claim in the same
speech.
His act prompted the Congress to pass house resolution no. 59 which created
a special committee to investigate and summon Osmena to prove his allegations
against the Chief Executive. He challenged the resolution of his colleagues and
sought for a declaratory relief before the Supreme Court to enjoin the Special
Committee from the proceedings because according to him it is an infringement of
his parliamentary immunity. Thereafter, the Congress passed another resolution
which declared him guilty of disorderly behavior and suspended him from office.
Congress opposed the petition of Osmena contending that it is within the discretion
of Congress to punish its own members.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Supreme Court may assume jurisdiction over disciplinary
measure against member of Congress
RULING
NO. The question of whether the speech of Osmena constitutes disorderly

behavior is for the House only to determine. In contrast, the house is the best judge
of what constitutes disorderly behavior. The matter involves political question
which can only be resolved by the people in their sovereign capacity as a member of
Congress. Furthermore, full discretionary authority is given to them with respect to
disciplinary actions against its own members, provided however that the act would
not contravene the Constitution.
Judicial Interference with Legislature provides the well-established

principles that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an
interference by the judicial department with the legislature since each department
is equally independent within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. The
general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to
intervene in what are exclusively legislative functions.
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E.

TAÑADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA,
RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 127255| 277 SCRA 268| August 14, 1997| Mendoza

The three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the
others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our
constitutional order rests.
FACTS
Honorable Joker Arroyo is an incumbent member of the House of

Representatives. He seeks to declare Republic Act No. 8240 (RA No. 8240) as null
and void because it was passed in violation of the internal rules of the house. Arroyo
further averred that Constitutional mandates that the House may determine its own
rules of its proceedings and consequently, violation of it would be tantamount to
violation of the Constitution itself.
On the other hand, respondents argued that the courts are not the proper
forum for the enforcement of the rules of the house. Although the Constitution
provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings,
enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they
implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on
separate days before a bill may be passed. Further, they averred that there was no
violation of constitutional requirement with regard to enactment of the said law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Courts may invalidate RA No. 8240 due to alleged breach
of House rules
RULING
NO. What is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of RA No. 8240
are merely internal rules of procedure rather than constitutional requirements for
enacting a law. Under the doctrine of enrolled bill, the signing of the Speaker of the
House, the President of the Senate, and the certification of both houses of congress
that it was already passed are conclusive of its due enactment.
The Constitutional provision that each House may determine its own rules of
proceedings is meant to empower the autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct
its business without any interference from the courts. In this case no rights of
private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more
power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House
have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions
is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our

government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade without
upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard
for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels
reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules
of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.
DELEGATION OF
POWERS
J. ANTONIO ARANETA vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, AND JOSE P. BENGZON, FISCAL OF CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. L-2044| 84 Phil 368| August 26, 1949| Tuason

After the convening of Congress, new legislation had to be approved if the
continuation of the emergency powers was desired.
FACTS
Commonwealth Act No. 671(CA No. 671) or Emergency Powers Act was
passed by the Congress making the state under total emergency as a result of war.
The law authorizes the President to exercise rule making power to meet such
emergency expeditiously. Araneta was charged in violation of Executive Order No.
62. In his defense, he assailed the validity of the executive order issued by virtue of
CA 671 which he claimed that it already ceased to exist because the Congress had
already convened in session. Thus, executive order has no legal basis.
ISSUE
Whether CA No. 671 ceased to exist
RULING
YES. CA No. 671 is deemed to be inoperative when the congress met in

session. As a result, executive orders which were issued after the congress had
reconvened are without the authority of law, thus, it is deemed as void.
The silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face
of the express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in
pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly
that there was no necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if having
no idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National
Assemble failed to make a provision for this termination in the same way that it did
for the termination of the effects and incidents of the delegation. There would be no
point in repealing or annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if
the law itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only
make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by
the legislature.
There can be a state of confusion if there are two government branches

concurrently performing legislative functions. In a regular session, the power
Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the
organic law. Also, it would be contrary to the Constitution to delegate the mandate
of congress to enact laws without any limiting period.
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION vs. CEMENT MANUFACTURERS

ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
G.R. No. 158540| 465 SCRA 532| July 8, 2004| Tinga

The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.
FACTS
Philippine Cement Manufaturers Corporation (Philcemcor) is an association

of domestic cement manufacturers. The importation of Gray Portland Cement
affected the local cement industry in production, market share, and sales, hence, the
prices of domestic cement depreciated.
Philcemcor sought the imposition at first of provisional, then later, definitive

safeguard measures on the import of cement pursuant to the SMA.
Philcemcor filed the application in behalf of twelve (12) of its member-

companies. Thereafter, Tariff Commission received a request from DTI to
investigate if there is a reasonable cause to impose definitive safeguard measures
against Gray Portland Cement. Consequently, the commission recommended that no
definitive measures be imposed upon the importation of Portland cement.
Thereafter, DTI declined the application of Philremcor but the decision was
set aside by the Court of Appeals (CA)
DTI, in conformity with the order of (CA) came up with a different resolution
and imposed provisional remedies in violation of the Safeguard Measures (SMA). It
was then challenged by South Cement that DTI cannot impose provisional remedies
since Tariff Commissioner did not approve such. It was contended by South Cement
that the power delegated by Congress to President in case of tariff and customs is
absolute.
ISSUE
Whether the delegated power of tariff to the President is absolute
RULING
NO. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the Government. This
is in conformity with section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The restrictions and limitations that may be imposed by Congress take on the
mantle of a constitutional command, which the executive branch is obliged to
observe. Moreover, Congress did intend to bind the DTI Secretary to the
determination made by the Tariff Commission. It is of no consequence that such
determination results from the exercise of investigatory powers by the Tariff
Commission since Congress is well within its constitutional mandate to limit the
authority of the DTI Secretary to impose safeguard measures in the manner that it
sees fit.
This delegation of the taxation power by the legislative to the executive is

authorized by the Constitution itself. At the same time, the Constitution also grants
the delegating authority (Congress).
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. vs. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD AND GRAND
INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC.
G.R. No. 119528| 270 SCRA 538| March 26, 1997| Torres, Jr.

It is generally recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the
state through a duly designated agency, and to this extent, the power to grant
franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies other than those of a
legislative nature.
FACTS
Petitioner seeks to prohibit respondent Civil Aeronautics Board(CAB) from

exercising jurisdiction over private respondent's Application for the issuance of a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, and to annul and set aside a
temporary operating permit issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board in favor of Grand
International Airways(Grand Air). Philippine Air Lines (PAL) argued that Grand Air
does not possess legislative franchise to engage in air transportation services.
Accordingly, the issuance of the said certificate is incompatible with the Constitution
because it requires legislative franchise.
On the other hand, Grand Air averred that such franchise is no longer
required to obtain the above-mentioned certificate as decided by the Supreme Court
and with authority derived from Republic Act No.776 otherwise known as Civil
Aeronautics Board Act.
ISSUE
Whether Congress has delegated the authority to authorize the operation of

domestic air transport services to the respondent Board by virtue of RA No. 776
RULING
YES. The Board is expressly authorized by law to issue a temporary operating

permit or Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity.
Section 10 of RA No. 776 provides that: CAB shall have the following specific
power and duty to issue, deny, amend, revise, alter, modify, cancel suspend or
revoke, in whole or in part, upon petitioners complaint, or upon its own initiative,
any temporary operating permit or Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity;

Provided, however, That in the case of foreign air carriers, the permit shall be issued
with the approval of the President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Congress has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant

licenses for, or to authorize the operation of certain public utilities. With the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws,
there is a constantly growing tendency towards the delegation of greater powers by
the legislature, and towards the approval of the practice by the courts.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the law nor in the Constitution, which

indicates that a legislative franchise is an indispensable requirement for an entity to
operate as a domestic air transport operator.
EMMANUEL PELAEZ vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. L-23825| 15 SCRA 569| December 24, 1965| Concepcion

In order for a delegation of legislative power to be valid the law shall pass be
(a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
FACTS
Petitioner challenged the validity of Sec 68 of Revised Administrative

Code(RAC) on the ground that the said provision was already repealed by Sec 3 of
Republic Act No. 2370(RA No. 2730) which states that barrios shall not be created
nor be changed. The action of Pelaez was prompted by the executive order of the
President creating 33 municipalities.
On the other hand, the respondent Auditor General argued that the power to
create municipalities are expressly delegated by the Congress to the President and
Sec 3 of RA No. 2370 does not repeal the Sec 68 of RAC
ISSUE
Whether the Congress delegates the power to create municipality to the

President
RULING
NO. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well
settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President.
The creation of municipalities shall not be considered as an administrative

function, it is a function which is legislative in nature. In order to be a delegation of
legislative power to be valid the law shall pass be (a) be complete in itself — it must
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.
In this case, Sec 68 of RAC does not comply with the foregoing requirements.
It is important so as to prevent the possibility that the delegate may formulate or
determine policies on its own will and discretion. Hence, there is no valid delegation
of power.
SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID vs. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF

THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM
MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AND THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE)
G.R. No. 161414| 448 SCRA 711| January 17, 2005| Tinga

President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory
effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before SC.
FACTS
Camid is a resident of Andong, Lanao Del Sur. He alleged that even in the
absence of appropriation, the said municipality continues to develop. Petitioner
prays for the declaration of it to be an official municipality. Andong is located in
Lanao Del Sur, it is one of the municipalities created by virtue of an order which was
later declared void ab initio in the case of Pelaez vs. Auditor General.
Despite of the declaration, Camid maintains that the above-mentioned

locality deserves to be classified as a Municipality because of its continuing
development and self-sufficiency.
ISSUE
Whether Andong shall be considered as a municipality despite of being

declared as non-existent Municipality since 1965
RULING
NO. Andong is not entitled to be recognized as a de facto municipal

corporation Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the
Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality
created by executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of the Local Government Code." Camid admits that Andong has never
elected its municipal officers at all. This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong
was judicially annulled in 1965.
In addition, the certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-

CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting
to Andong’s legal efficacy since the state does not recognize it as a municipal
corporation way back in 1965.
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DIDAGEN P.

DILANGALEN
G.R. No. 177597| 558 SCRA 700| July 16, 2008| Carpio
WRITER: JUNIUS BENEDICT CORPUZ
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to

regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays,
provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of
provinces and cities is another matter.
FACTS
The ARMM Regional Assembly, in the exercise of its power to create

provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) which created the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a
plebiscite held on October 29, 2006.
Months later, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed a

resolution requiesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of the city in view of the
conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province. In its
answer, the COMELEC maintained that Cotabato City was still a part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. However, this position
was changed when the COMELEC promulgated a resolution in preparation for the
May 2007 elections stating that Maguindanao’s legislative district is composed only
of Cotabato City.
ISSUES
Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional

Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional
RULING
NO. Although there is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the
delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and
barangays, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. In reference to
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, a province cannot be created without a
legislative district. In the same view, a city with a population of 250,000 or more
cannot also be created without a legislative district. This, the power to create a
province or a city with a population of 250,000 or more involves the power to create
a legislative district. Under the present and past Constitutions, the power to
reapportion legislative districts is exclusively vested in Congress.
RAMON P. BINAMIRA vs. PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR.

G.R. No. 92008| 188 SCRA 154| July 30, 1990| Cruz
Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is
that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will
by the appointing authority.
FACTS
Upon approval of President Aquino, Minister of Tourism Jose Antonio

Gonzales designated Ramon P. Binamira as the General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA) on April 7, 1986. Binamira assumed office on the same
date and continued to discharge his duties as the General Manager of the PTA until
he was demanded by Peter D. Garrucho, Jr. to resign from office as the latter was
designated by the President to take over through a memorandum. Petitioner
Binamira, based on the fact that his designation was approved by President Aquino,
now claims that he must be reinstated as the General Manager of the PTA as his
removal was without just cause and that it was in violation of his security of tenure.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner must be reinstated to the office of the General

Manager of the PTA.
RULING
NO. Designation must be distinguished with appointment as the former

merely connotes the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official
in a temporary capacity and such official may be replaced by the appointing
authority at will. However, designation may also be loosely defined as an
appointment as it also involves the naming of a particular person to a specific office.
In the present case, even if such designation would be considered as an
appointment, the petitioner cannot sustain that he has been illegally removed,
because appointments for the position can only be made by the President of the
Philippines, and not by any other officer, as provided by Section 23-A of P.D. 564,
which created the PTA.
RODOLFO D. LLAMAS vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and MARIANO

UN OCAMPO III
G.R. No. 99031| 202 SCRA 844| October 15, 1991| Paras
It is the Court’s considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutation and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases with much
more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases.
FACTS
Rodolfo D. Llamas, the incumbent Vice-Governor of the Province of Tarlac,

assumed governorship on March 1, 1991 when the incumbent Governor Mariano Un
Ocampo III was suspended for a period of 90 days. Ocampo’s suspension was a
result of a violation found by the then Department of Local Government of Section
3(g) of Republic Act. No. 309 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act when the governor entered into a loan agreement amounting to
P20,000,000.0 in favor of Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc. (LTFI), a non-stock and
non-profit organization headed by himself.
Upon showing that the funds disbursed to LTFI were indeed used for a
livelihood loan program for the benefit of the province, respondent Ocampo was
granted executive clemency through the office of the Executive Secretary Oscar
Orbos in a Resulotion dated May 15, 1991, which reduced his 90-day suspension
period to that which he has already served. This executive clemency was questioned
by Llamas, contending that executive clemency can only be granted by the President
only in criminal cases, and no law or provision in the Constitution allows such for
administrative cases.
ISSUE
Whether the executive clemency granted to the respondent governor is valid,

although such was given in an administrative case.
RULING
YES. The argument of the petitioner that the President may only grant
executive clemency in criminal cases is based on Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution:
"Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
"He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the
Congress."
It must be noted that with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases, the
Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency can be
exercised. If the petitioner’s contention that executive clemency applies only to
criminal cases, it would then be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
impeachment cases from the coverage of the provision in the Constitution. In
addition, the Court views that if the President can grant executive clemency to
criminal cases, with much more reason can this be granted to administrative cases,
as these are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION, (NPC DAMA), REPRESENTED BY

ITS PRESIDENT ROGER S. SAN JUAN, SR., NPC EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION
(NEWU) — NORTHERN LUZON REGIONAL CENTER, REPRESENTED BY ITS
REGIONAL PRESIDENT JIMMY D. SALMAN, IN THEIR OWN INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITIES AND IN BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATIONS AND
ALL AFFECTED OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION (NPC), ZOL D. MEDINA, NARCISO M. MAGANTE, VICENTE B.
CIRIO, JR., NECITAS B. CAMAMA, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES AS
EMPLOYEES OF NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. THE NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION (NPC), NATIONAL POWER BOARD OF DIRECTORS (NPB), JOSE

ISIDRO N. CAMACHO AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL POWER BOARD OF
DIRECTORS (NPB), ROLANDO S. QUILALA, AS PRESIDENT — OFFICER-IN-
CHARGE/CEO OF NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION AND MEMBER OF
NATIONAL POWER BOARD, AND VINCENT S. PEREZ, JR., EMILIA T. BONCODIN,
MARIUS P. CORPUS, RUBEN S. REINOSO, JR., GREGORY L. DOMINGO AND
NIEVES L. OSORIO
G.R. No. 156208| 503 SCRA 138| September 26, 2006| Chico-Nazario
The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment
and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical
administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates, so long as it is the legally
authorized official who makes the final decision through the use of his own personal
judgment.
FACTS
Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law) took effect on June 26, 2001. Under this law, a new
National Power Board of Directors (NPB) was constituted composed of the
Secretary of Finance as Chairman, with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of
Budget and Management, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Director-General of the
National Economic and Development Authority, the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, the Secretary of
the Department of Trade and Industry, and the President of the National Power
Corporation as members.
Pursuant to the provisions of the EPIRA Law, a restructuring committee was

created to facilitate the privatization and restructuring of the NPC, the National
Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO), and the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Corporation (PSALM). With the proposal of the restructuring committee, the NPB
passed NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125, stating that all NPC personnel
shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003 and a Transition Team shall be
constituted to manage the NPC’s separation program.
Petitioners argue that the NPB Resolutions are void as these were not passed
by a majority vote of the members of the Board of Directors. The Petitioners claim
that in passing the resolutions, only three of the board members were actually
present, and the other four who took part in the meeting were only the
representatives or the designated alternates of the officials who constituted the
board. Invoking the principle that “delegated power cannot further be delegated”,
the petitioners conclude that the Resolutions have been illegally issued since no
quorum existed when these were passed.
ISSUE
Whether Resolution No. 2002-124 and Resolution No. 2002-125 passed by

the NPB are valid, it being passed by seven board members, four of whom are
merely representatives
RULING
YES. The resolutions issued are not valid. In enumerating those who shall
compose the National Power Board of Directors, the legislature has vested upon
these persons the power to exercise their judgment and discretion in running the
affairs of the NPC. It is presumed that persons named to be in a certain position are
chosen on the basis of their personal qualifications. Thus, in the present case, the
department secretaries cannot delegate their duties as members of the NPB, which
includes their power to vote and approve board resolutions. In voting and
approving board resolutions, their personal judgment must be exercised, and this
can only be performed by them personally, as it is not a ministerial act which can be
performed by their delegates.
STATE
PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES
LEON G. MAQUERA vs. JUAN BORRA, CESAR MIRAFLOR, AND GREGORIO
SANTAYANA, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS
OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. L-24761| 15 SCRA 7| September 7, 1965| Per curiam
The underlying principle in a Republican political system is social justice which

gives equal opportunity for all individuals, rich and poor alike, and that accordingly;
no person shall be denied the chance to run for public office by mere reason of his or
her poverty.
FACTS
Republic Act No. 4421 was passed requiring all candidates for national,
provincial, city and municipal offices to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-
year salary or emoluments to the position to which he is a candidate. In compliance
with the said Republic Act, the Commission on Elections required all candidates for
President, Vice- President, Senator, and the Members of the House of
Representatives to file surety bonds in the amount of P60,000 for Presidential
candidates, P40,000 for Vice-Presidential candidates, and P32,000 for both the
Senatorial and candidates for the House of Representatives.
The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 4421 was questioned, it having the
effect of disqualifying candidates who although having the required qualifications
for an office, do not have the funds to pay for the required bond.
ISSUE
Whether Republic Act No. 4421 is constitutional.

RULING
NO. The said Republic Act imposes property qualifications to candidates who
possess the qualifications to run for office which is inconsistent with the Republican
system ordained in our Constitution. The underlying principle in this political
system is social justice which gives equal opportunity for all individuals, rich and
poor alike, and that accordingly, no person shall be denied the chance to run for
public office by mere reason of his or her poverty.
ZACARIAS VILLAVIVENCIO ET AL., vs. JUSTO LUKBAN ET AL.

G.R. No. 14639| 39 PHIL 778| March 25, 1919| Malcolm
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or

liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor
will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the
law of the land.
FACTS
One hundred and seventy women who were branded as prostitutes were
isolated from society through the orders of the Mayor of the City of Manila, Justo
Lukban. The order was carried out by the police and kept the women confined in
their houses. On the night of October 25, 1918 the women, without their prior
consent, were hustled on board streamers going to Mindanao to work as laborers.
The women, while on board were not aware that they were destined for a life in
Mindanao and had not been asked if they wished to depart from their residences in
Manila. Sometime after, an application for habeas corpus has been filed asserting
that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban and the
chief of police of the City of Manila, Anton Hohmann when they confined them in
their houses and subsequently deported them to Mindanao.
ISSUE
Whether Mayor Justo Lukban had the right to deport the women and force
them to a new domicile against their will.
RULING
NO. There is no law, order, or regulation giving the Mayor of the City of
Manila or its chief of police the right to force any citizen to change their domicile to
another locality. In the present case, the women, even though they are considered as
of ill repute, are still Philippine citizens protected by the Constitution. Their choice
of profession does not authorize Mayor Lukban to order their isolation from the rest
of the society.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA,

vs. ABELARDO SUBIDO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE
G.R. No. L-27714| 109 SCRA 1| November 5, 1981| Fernando
A public official must point to a particular law or rule on which he bases his
authority. He cannot refuse to process the appointment of women as street sweepers
simply because he believes women should not be appointed street sweepers.
FACTS
Ninety one women were appointed as street sweepers with the approval of
the Mayor of the City of Manila, Antonio Villegas. This appointment however was
nullified by the Civil Service Commissioner Abelardo Subido through Memorandum
Circular No. 18, dated April 10, 1964. This Memorandum Circular specifically
disapproves appointments extended to females as street sweepers on the ground
that making women perform such work exposes them to contempt and ridicule and
constitutes a violation of traditional dignity and respect accorded to Filipino
womanhood. In his contention, the petitioner pointed out that the Memorandum
Circular has already been set aside by the Office of the President and must not be
given any force and effect.
ISSUE
Whether the disapproval of the Civil Service Commissioner is valid

RULING
The disapproval is invalid. Memorandum Circular No. 18 which was the basis
for the disapproval was solely based on his personal belief that to allow women to
work as street sweepers would run counter to Filipino tradition. Public officials are
required to point out a particular provision of the law justifying the way in which
they exercise their functions, as they exercise only the powers conferred upon them,
and not rights. Public officials are guided by the principle that the government is
merely an agent through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. As
such, in performing their functions, they should be adherent to the provisions of
statues, and not base their judgment on their beliefs alone.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, HENRY

LAGARTO Y PETILLA AND ERNESTO CORDERO
G.R. Nos. 119987-88| 249 SCRA 244| October 12, 1995| Kapunan
Courts are not concerned with wisdom, efficacy, or morality of laws.
FACTS
Two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of the Regional Trial

Court of Manila presided by Judge Lorenzo Veneracion. The cases are about the rape
of a seven year old girl named Angel Laquiza y Lagman committed by the parties of
Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero. After the trial, Petilla and Cordero
were found guilty of the crime of rape with homicide and were sentenced with
reclusion perpetua. Not satisfied with the trial court’s decision, the City Prosecutor
of Manila filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 8, 1995, praying that the
penalty of death be imposed to the respondents to which the respondent judge

refused to act upon.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge has the authority to impose a penalty less
than that which prescribed by the law
RULING
NO. Upon rendering the judgment that the accused were guilty of the crime of
rape with homicide, the judge is duty-bound to impose the proper penalty and civil
liability provided for by the law on the accused. The law in effect at the time
judgment was rendered was Republic Act No. 7659 which contained a provision
stating that “when by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed,
the penalty shall be death.” This gives no authority to the judge to impose a penalty
other than what is provided by the said Republic Act. Although he may have
misgivings on the matter due to his religious or moral convictions, it is still his duty
to apply the provisions laid down by the law.
2nd LT. SALVADOR PARREÑO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT and CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 162224| 523 SCRA 390| June 7, 2007| Carpio
The constitutional right of the state to require all citizens to render personal
and military service necessarily includes not only private citizens but also citizens who
have retired from military service. A retiree who had lost his Filipino citizenship
already renounced his allegiance to the state. Thus, he may no longer be compelled by
the state to render compulsory military service when the need arises.
FACTS
Salvador Parreño served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for
thirty-two years prior to his resignation from the Philippine Constabulary on
January 5, 1982. Sometime after Parreño migrated to Hawaii wherein he became a

naturalized American citizen, the AFP stopped providing him his monthly pension
pursuant with Section 27 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 (PD 1638). PD 1638, as
amended, provides that retirees who lose their Filipino citizenship shall be removed
from the retired list and follows with it the termination of their retirement benefits.
Petitioner Parreño requested for a reconsideration regarding termination of

his monthly pension but the Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied his request.
This instigated the petitioner to file a claim before the Commission on Audit (COA)
to which the COA denied for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, is constitutional.
RULING
YES. While one of the arguments in the case is that the termination of the
petitioner’s monthly pension when he became an American Citizen is contrary to
public welfare, oppressive, discriminatory, and violative of the due process clause of
the Constitution, it must be noted that the constitutional right to equal protection of
the laws is not absolute but is subject to reasonable classification. To be reasonable,
the classification (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
There is a substantial difference between retirees who are citizens of the

Philippines and retirees who lost their Filipino citizenship by naturalization in
another country, such as petitioner in the present case. The constitutional right of
the state to require all citizens to render personal and military service necessarily
includes not only private citizens but also citizens who have retired from military
service. A retiree who had lost his Filipino citizenship already renounced his
allegiance to the state. Thus, he may no longer be compelled by the state to render
compulsory military service when the need arises. Petitioner’s loss of Filipino
citizenship constitutes a substantial distinction that distinguishes him from other
retirees who retain their Filipino citizenship. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from another.
ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC vs. OFFICE OF THE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the Office of the President of the Philippines, and
the OFFICE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS
G.R. No. 153888| 405 SCRA 497| July 9, 2003| Corona
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our

fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well
aware that it is “designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to
allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as
he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good.
FACTS
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc (IDCP), was given an

accreditation by the Regional Islamic Da’wah Council of Southeast Asia and the
Pacific (RISEAP) to issue halal certification on the Philippines. In line with this, IDCP
formulated internal rules and procedures for the inspection and analysis of food and
the issuance of halal certifications. Subsequently, the Office of the Executive
Secretary issue EO 46 which created the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and
designated the Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation, and
gave it the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates.
Petitioner now alleges that EO 46 is unconstitutional being violative of the

constitutional provision on the separation of the Church and the State. IDCP further
argues that a food product becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic
religious ritual and prayer and only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter
animals for food. A government agency like OMA is incapable of performing
religious functions like certifying qualified food products as halal.
ISSUE
Whether EO 46 is constitutional.
RULING
NO. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function

because the standards used are drawn from the Qur’an and Islamic beliefs. By giving
OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the
religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for
Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by
arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect
forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah on halal
food.
MAXIMO CALALANG vs. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 47800| 70 Phil 726| December 2, 1940| Laurel
Social justice is neither “communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor

anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic
for-ces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated.
FACTS
A.D. Williams, Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, recommended in

its resolution dated July 17, 1940 to the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along a number of streets at certain hours of the day in the
City of Manila. This recommendation was approved and was given an effectivity
period of one year and as consequence, animal-drawn vehicles were not allowed to
pass and pick-up passengers during certain hours of the day.
Petitioner Maximo Calalang now contends the validity of the rules and
regulations enforced as it would be to the detriment not only of the owners of the
vehicles, but of the riding public as well. Also, the petitioner argues that the rules
and regulations are in contrary to the constitutional pre-cept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people.
ISSUE
Whether the rules and regulations implemented in the streets of Manila are
violative of the constitutional provision regarding social justice.
RULING
NO. The rules and regulations are not violative of the Constitution. Social
justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State
so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. The promotion of social justice is achieved not through a mistaken
sympathy towards any given group but through the adoption of measures calculated
to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY vs. THE NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MARILYN ABUCAY
G.R. No. L-80609| 164 SCRA 671| August 23, 1988| Cruz
Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can
equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social
justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not
simply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not
meant for the protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the
workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own
character.
FACTS
Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone

Company (PLDT), was accused by two complainants of having demanded and
received from them the total amount of P3,800.00 in as a facilitation fee for the
approval of their applications for telephone installation. Upon discovery of the said
fact, Abucay was separated from the service. In accordance with her separation,
PLDT was ordered by the National Labor Relations Board to provide financial
assistance to Abucay in the amount equivalent to one month worth of pay for every
year of her service. PLDT questions the order regarding the payment of financial
assistance as the employee was dismissed for a valid cause and that she should not
be provided any relief as her dismissal is in accordance with the law. In addition,
petitioner PLDT further argues that Abucay, was in effect rewarded rather than
punished for her dishonesty, and that the award was granted out of equity and
compassion, without any legal authorization or justification.
ISSUE
Whether an order to provide financial assistance for employees who are

validly dismissed is valid.
RULING
NO. The order is not valid. It is true that in some cases, in view of social
justice, the award to the employee of separation pay would be sustainable, as in
cases where an employee would not have the necessary aptitude for his work or a
dismissal due to the feckless performance of an employee. But where the cause of
the separation is more serious than mere inefficiency, the generosity of the law must
be more discerning. The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance
wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best it may
mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. In the present case,
the dismissal of the employee was due to dishonesty. The fact that she has worked
for PLDT for more than a decade should be taken against her as it reflects her lack of
loyalty that she should have strengthened rather than betraying in doing the act.
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO AND JOSE ALFONSO, ALL SURNAMED OPOSA,
MINORS, AND REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS ANTONIO AND RIZALINA
OPOSA, ROBERT A NICOLE SADIUA, MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HER PARENTS
CALVIN AND ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD AND PATRISHA, ALL
SURNAMED FLORES, MINORS AND REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS ENRICO
AND NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HER
PARENTS SIGFRID AND DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II AND MA. CONCEPCION,

ALL SURNAMED MISA, MINORS AND REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS
GEORGE AND MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PASIGAN, MINOR, REPRESENTED
BY HIS PARENTS ANTONIO AND ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, MINOR,
REPRESENTED BY HER PARENTS JOSE AND MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA
CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HER PARENTS FREDENIL
AND JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HER
PARENTS JOSE AND ANGELA DESAMPARADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA,
MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS GREGORIO II AND CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA AND MARIE
GABRIELLE, ALL SURNAMED SAENZ, MINORS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR
PARENTS ROBERTO AND AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY,
GOLDA MARTHE AND DAVID IAN, ALL SURNAMED KING, MINORS,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS MARIO AND HAYDEE KING, DAVID,
FRANCISCO AND THERESE VICTORIA, ALL SURNAMED ENDRIGA, MINORS,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS BALTAZAR AND TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE
MA. AND REGINA MA., ALL SURNAMED ABAYA, MINORS, REPRESENTED BY
THEIR PARENTS ANTONIO AND MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. AND
MARIETTE, ALL SURNAMED CARDAMA, MINORS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR
PARENTS MARIO AND LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL AND
IMEE LYN, ALL SURNAMED OPOSA, MINORS AND REPRESENTED BY THEIR
PARENTS RICARDO AND MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN AND
ISAIAH JAMES, ALL SURNAMED QUIPIT, REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS
JOSE MAX AND VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL AND
FRANCISCO, ALL SURNAMED BIBAL, MINORS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR
PARENTS FRANCISCO, JR. AND MILAGROS BIBAL, AND THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN,
JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AND THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO
U. ROSARIO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC, MAKATI, BR
G.R. No. 101083| 224 SCRA 792| July 30, 1993| Davide Jr.
DOCTRINE
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
FACTS
The petitioners, represented by their parents filed an action before the court
against the granting of timber license agreements (TLA) to various corporations in
the Philippines for commercial logging purposes. They prayed for a judgment
cancelling the TLA’s issued by the then Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Honorable Fulgencio S. Factora, Jr. and for
prohibition of the approval of any future license agreements. In filling the complaint,
the petitioners further allege that as citizens and taxpayers of the Republic of the
Philippines, they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the country’s
natural resources. The defendant on the other hand asserts that the petitioners do
not have a cause of action in filling the said complaint.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners have a course of action.
RULING
The petitioners have a cause of action. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizes the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.
The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. This right also implies the management
and preservation of the country’s forests. The management of the country’s natural
resources, which includes the management of forests, is mandated to the DENR by
the government as provided by Section 4 of Executive No. 192. A denial or violation
of the right by the one who has the obligation to respect or protect the same gives
rise to a cause of action.
METROPOLITAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL

RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT vs. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and
joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR.,
DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA
CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH
JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and

JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
G.R. Nos. 171947-48| 574 SCRA 661| December 18, 2008| Velasco Jr.
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial

duty; Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving
discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the
other.
FACTS
The concerned citizens of Manila Bay filed a complaint against several

government agencies, which included the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority. Their complaint prayed for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of
the Manilay Bay and alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen
below the allowable standards set by Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152, or the
Philippine Environment Code. The trial court ruled in favor of the citizens and
ordered the government agencies to cleanup and rehabilitate Manila Bay. The
petitioner in the present case, the MMDA, now argues that the cleaning of Manila
Bay is not a ministerial act which cannot be compelled by mandamus.
ISSUE
Whether or not the cleaning of Manila Bay cannot be compelled by

mandamus, it being a discretionary act
RULING
The cleaning of the Manila Bay can be compelled by mandamus. The writ of
mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty
connotes an act which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. The
duty of the petitioners as defined by law, and the manner on how they carry out
such duty, are two different concepts. While implementation of their mandated
tasks would require a decision-making process on the part of MMDA, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. vs. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY

GOVERNOR CARLITO S. MARQUEZ, THE PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION
AUTHORITY, AND THE DENR-EMB (REGION VI)
G.R. No. 196870| 674 SCRA 555| June 26, 2012| Leonardo-De Castro
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or

controlled corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of
any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-
renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of
animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental
organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the
project or program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms of
environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to
prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
FACTS
Based on the need to meet the influx of tourists in Boracay, the Province of
Aklan devised a plan to expand the port facilities of Barangay Caticlan, located in the
Municipality of Malay. Upon learning that the respondent province had filed an
application with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for
a foreshore lease of areas along their shorelines, the Sangguniang Barangay of
Caticlan issued Resolution No. 13. In the said resolution, the Sangguniang Baranggay
expressed their strong opposition to the application before the DENR and further
stated that the respondent province did not conduct prior consultations with them
regarding the proposed foreshore lease. They also allege that the proposal was for
business enterprise purposes at the expense of the local government of Malay,
which has exclusive right to develop, utilize and reap the benefits from the natural
resources found within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether a consultation must be made with all stakeholders before

commencing a national project affecting the environment.
RULING
YES. The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national

government agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance, and requires them to
secure prior public consultation and approval of local government units for the
projects described therein. In the present case, the respondent province was
authorized by the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) to reclaim certain
portions of Barangay Caticlan in order to expand its port facilities. The project, being
classified as one that affects the environmental and ecological balance of a local
community, requires prior consultation with the local government unit. In the
absence of prior consultation and approval, the project cannot be implemented.
REV. ELLY VELEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 161872| 427 SCRA 96| April 13, 2004
There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly,
to seek the presidency—what is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law.
FACTS
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) declared petitioner Rev. Elly Velez

Pamatong along with thirty five (35) other candidates as nuisance candidates under
Omnibus Resolution No. 6604. The COMELEC declared them as nuisance candidates
as they were considered to not have the capability to wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated or supported by a political party. Petitioner now seeks to
reverse the resolution of the COMELEC as he claims that it is in violation of his right
to equal access to opportunities for public service under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether a constitutional right has been violated by the COMELEC in ruling

that the petitioner was a nuisance candidate.
RULING
NO. The constitutional provision which the petitioner invokes merely

recognizes the privilege of a person for public service subject to the limitations
imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution neither gives one a
right, nor elevates his privilege for public service to the level of an enforceable right.
The equal access provision in Article II, like the rest of the policies enumerated
therein, does not contain any judicially enforceable right but merely specifies a
guideline for legislative or executive action.
LEGISLATURE
THE CITY OF DAVAO, CITY TREASURER AND THE CITY ASSESSOR OF DAVAO
CITY, petitioners, vs. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XII, DAVAO CITY
AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)
G.R. No. 127383| 467 SCRA 280| August 18, 2005| Tinga
It would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to

have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both
assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary
powers.
FACTS
The Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) of Davao City received
a notice of public auction scheduling the bidding of GSIS properties for non-payment
of realty taxes for the years 1992 to 1994. The GSIS filed a petition before the RTC of
Davao City for the prohibition of the public auction as they contend that they are
exempt from realty taxation.
In its decision, the RTC held that the GSIS was exempted from the payment of
real estate taxes citing Section 33 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1146 or the
Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977, as amended by PD No. 1981
mandating such exemption. The RTC ruled that despite the effectivity of the Local
Government Code, Section 33 of PD 1146 provided two requirements for its repeal,
namely: (1) that it be expressly and categorically repealed by law; and (2) that a
provision be enacted to substitute the policy of the exemption.
ISSUE
Whether Section 33 of PD 1146 has been repealed by the Local Government

Code, lifting the exemption of the GSIS from realty taxation.
RULING
YES. The effectivity of the Local Government Code, even if it did not meet the
requirements set by the PD, repeals the provision of Section 33. The provision of
Section 33 imposing requirements for its repeal places undue restraint on the
plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws. Only the Constitution may
place such restrictions, as constitutional dicta is of higher order than statutes, with
the latter yielding in cases of irreconcilable conflict. Moreover, it would be noxious
anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind
the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded
with equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA)
G.R. No. 157870| 570 SCRA 410| November 3, 2008| Velasco, Jr.
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall
be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions,
the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
FACTS
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive

Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was passed which requires the mandatory drug-
testing of a number of personalities which includes the candidates for public office.
In implementing RA 9165, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued
Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations of the mandatory drug
testing for candidates for public office for the May 10, 2004 elections. Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., a candidate for re-election, now questions the constitutionality of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those mentioned in the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether requiring candidates for public office to submit to a mandatory

drug-test is valid, it constituting an imposition of additional qualification to those
already provided in the Constitution.
RULING
NO. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the COMELEC

resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the
Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. Accordingly, RA 9165 must be declared
unconstitutional and deemed null and void. The Constitution is the basic law to
which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO,vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN JOSE A.R. MELO
AND ITS COMMISSIONERS, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO
LARRAZABA
G.R. No. 189793| 617 SCRA 623| April 7, 2010| Perez
For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing

mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000
in order to be similarly entitled.
FACTS
The validity of Republic Act No. 9716 (RA 9716), an Act which increased the
legislative districts of Camarines Sur from four districts to five, was questioned by
the petitioners. They base their contention on the constitutional standard which
requires a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district.
In their petition, they claim that RA 9716 is unconstitutional as the proposed first
district of Camarines Sur will end up with a population of only 176, 383 which is
violative of the provision found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether the 250,000 population requirement for the creation of legislative

districts is applicable to provinces.
RULING
NO. The 250,000 population requirement is not applicable to provinces. The

provision draws The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a
district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative,
with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. The use by the subject
provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other
conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city,
but not for a province.
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, AND

MINERVA ALDABA MORADA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 188078| 611 SCRA 137| March 15, 2010| Carpi, J
WRITER: REJEAN MONTON
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative
district must be based on an official and credible source.
FACTS
Before May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress

through four legislative districts. On May 1, 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law,
amending Malolos City Charter, by creating a separate legislative district for the city.
At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, the
population of Malolos City was 223,069 but there were unofficial projections issued
by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) claiming that the
population of Malolos will reach two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) before the
upcoming election, if this be true, Malolos will be entitled to one district
representative.
ISSUES
Whether or not the undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the

National Statistics Office (NSO) be used as sufficient basis in the creation of a new
legislative district for the city of Malolos.
RULING
NO. The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on

demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda
has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void
on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of
Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal
demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city
whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district
only in the immediately following election after the attainment of the 250,000
population. Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a
legislative district must be based on an official and credible source.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA vs.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, REPRESENTING THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES; SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE
SENATE PRESIDENT; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY THE
HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, REPRESENTING THE
MOTHER PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL NORTE; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO
VILLAROMAN, REPRESENTING THE NEW PROVINCE OF DINAGAT ISLANDS
G.R. No. 180050| 612 SCRA 131 (May 12, 2010)| 648 SCRA 137 (April 12, 2011)
| Nachura
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation
of local government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and
capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the
LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these
results.
FACTS
A petition was filed to declare Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as An
Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, unconstitutional. Petitioners alleged
that Dinagat Islands failed to comply with the population requirement having only a
total population of 120,813 as opposed to the 250,000 minimum requirement and a
land area of 802.12 square kilometres as opposed to 2,000 square kilometres.
On February 10, 2010, the petition seeking Republic Act No. 9355 be
declared unconstitutional was granted and the proclamation of the Province of
Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof were declared NULL and
VOID. In addition, the provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or
more islands," was also declared NULL and VOID because the exemption is not
found in Section 461 of the Local Government Code.
ISSUE
Whether the creation of the province of Dinagat Islands is valid despite its
failure to comply with the land and population requirement provided by the
Constitution and the Local Government Code.
RULING
YES. It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the
creation of local government units are economic viability, efficient administration,
and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed
by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish
these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the
relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them
should enjoy preferential consideration. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in
the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is economic
viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a

local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a
province, taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the
time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is
four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation
of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven
possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the
May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in
favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective
that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 176970| 573 SCRA 290| December 8, 2008| Brion
The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite
to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a
local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the
apportionment or reapportionment provision.
FACTS
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro’s then Congressman Constantino G.

Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: An Act Providing for the
Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro. This
proposed bill eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371. The aforementioned
law increased Cagayan de Oro’s legislative district from one to two and on the
election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro’s voters would be classified as belonging to
either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence.
Consequently, on March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution
No. 7837 implementing R.A. No. 9371. Petitioner now claims that the COMELEC
resolution is unconstitutional, arguing that, the COMELEC cannot implement R.A.
No. 9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct
of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local
government unit.
ISSUE
Whether a plebiscite is required in the reapportionment of Congressional
Districts
RULING
NO. A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X,

Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local
Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local
government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the
apportionment or reapportionment provision.
Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is
not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact;
there is only the addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the
city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House of
Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into
play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two
districts.
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FORNATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND

TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (SITTING AS THE
NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS)
The continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.
FACTS
The May 14, 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), petitioned to: proclaim the full number of party-list
representatives provided by the Constitution; harmonize Paragraph (b), Section 11
of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes with Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable
only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their
initial/first ranking; apply the 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941; initially give all
party-list groups the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they
received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of
RA 7941, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats
under the 2% threshold rule; declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7941 and follow the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative
prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941. After such petition has been made, COMELEC
denied the same for being moot and academic and declared that that the total
number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined
pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon
completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
However, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC to

reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula, alleging that the same violates
both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941.
ISSUE
Whether the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 in

allocation of additional seats is constitutional
RULING
NO. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the

continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in
relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives. The continued operation of the two
percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MR. ALAN IGOT vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register

under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections.
Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented"
or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
FACTS
54 petitions for certiorari and petitions for certiorari and Prohibition

were filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued
by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating
in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. The COMELEC, in its assailed resolutions,
ruled, among others, that the said party-list groups failed to represent a
marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees not coming from or are
not members of a marginalized and underrepresented sector.
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections
RULING
NO. We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
following prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the
Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national,
regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the
rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we
remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine
who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in
this Decision.
Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register

under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative
district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself
an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition
Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and

underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector.
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 206952| 708 SCRA 133| October 22, 2013| Reyes
Sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer

required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they
have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. If at all, evidence
showing a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do not factually belong to the
sector represented by their party or organization.
FACTS
On November 7 2012, COMELEC cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as
a party-list group assailing that the latter failed to establish its track record in
uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented and that it failed to
show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that
they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
ISSUE
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it cancelled

ABANG LINGKOD's registration upon failure to establish its track record and failure
to show that its nominees belong to a marginalized and underrepresented sector
RULING
YES. Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such

as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track
record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the
sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that
the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of
the sector/s, which they represent.
If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized

and underrepresented sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do not
factually belong to the sector represented by their party or organization.
There is thus no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that

groups seeking registration under the party-list system still comply with the track
record requirement. Indeed, nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that groups
seeking registration thereunder must submit evidence to show their track record as
a group.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS CHAIR, DANTON

REMOTO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 190582| 618 SCRA 32| April 8, 2010| Del Castillo
We hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental

interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list
system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more
to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further
any substantial public interest.
FACTS
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify

themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). It
first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial
membership base. Petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and
under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity. Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration
with the COMELEC but was dismissed on moral grounds. COMELEC further stated
that Ang Ladlad apparently advocates sexual immorality and is not in faithful
compliance with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against
the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly,
and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of
the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
ISSUE
Whether COMELEC can use moral and religious grounds in denying Ang
Ladlad’s application for registration as a party-list.
RULING
NO. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government
neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible
and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be

prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the
COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the
party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.
We hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than
a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications
give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals
themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is
this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

(SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST), REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS CHAIRPERSON
AND FIRST NOMINEE, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. Nos. 206844-45| 701 SCRA 786| July 23, 2013| Leonardo-De Castro
COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration and

accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS. The reason for this is that the ground invoked by
the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing agreement among the nominees of
SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented.
FACTS
On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement,
entitled Irrevocable Covenant which contains the list official candidates of the
SENIOR CITIZENS party-list and their term-sharing agreement. After the conduct of
the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-
list candidates and was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The
first seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was
given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho). In compliance with the term-
sharing agreement, the term of Kho as member of the House Representatives was
cut short to 1 year and 6 months. In line with this, Kho tendered his resignation to
be effective on December 31, 2011.
On February 21, 2012 however, COMELEC Resolution was promulgated and

it was stated therein that the filing of vacancy as a result of term-sharing agreement
among nominees of winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be allowed.
COMELEC found the term-sharing agreement contrary to public policy because it
subjects a Constitutionally-ordained fixed term to hold public elective office to
contractual bargaining and negotiation and treats the same as though it were
nothing more than a contractual clause, an object in the ordinary course of the
commerce of men. As a consequence of this, COMELEC resolved to CANCEL the
registration of SENIOR CITIZENS under the Party-List System of Representation.
ISSUE
Whether the term-sharing agreement of SENIOR CITIZENS can be a valid
ground for COMELEC to cancel the registration of the said party-list insofar as it is
against public policy
RULING
NO. The Court finds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the
registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS. The reason for this is that the
ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing agreement among
the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. Subsequently, there was
also no indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement,
much less succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by

the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization,
had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how
can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in
fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an
election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of
SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no
legal leg to stand on.
MILAGROS E. AMORES vs. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J.
VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 189600| 622 SCRA 593| June 29, 2010| Carpio Morales
As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must
at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election, so it must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not
qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941,
the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list
representative seats.
FACTS
In Milagros Amores’ petition for Quo Warranto seeking the ouster of private
respondent, petitioner alleged that, among other things, private respondent was
disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of Citizens’ Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination
and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant
to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas
Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior
to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under
Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
Respecting the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees under Section 9
of RA No. 7941, public respondent held that it applied only to those nominated as
such during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the
Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered
exclusively as representing the youth sector, which CIBAC, a multi-sectoral
organization, is not.
ISSUE
Whether or not private respondent is still qualified to be a nominee of the

youth sector even when he exceeded the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941.
RULING
NO. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and
free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. There is only room for application. As the law states in unequivocal
terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a
candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector
nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act,
it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.
There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondent’s ratiocination

that after the third congressional term from the ratification of the Constitution,
which expired in 1998, Section 9 of RA No. 7941 would apply only to sectoral parties
registered exclusively as representing the youth sector. This distinction is nowhere
found in the law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law
does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.
The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of
either the youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in
the May, 2007 elections. The records disclose that private respondent was already
more than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in
August, 1975. Moreover, he did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six months
before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that he shifted to CIBAC’s
overseas Filipino workers and their families sector only on March 17, 2007.
DR. HANS CHRISTIAN M. SEÑERES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

MELQUIADES A. ROBLES
G.R. No. 178678| 585 SCRA 557| April 16, 2009| Velasco, Jr.
One can conclude that as long as the acts embraced under Sec. 79 pertain to or
are in connection with the nomination of a candidate by a party or organization, then
such are treated as internal matters and cannot be considered as electioneering or
partisan political activity. The twin acts of signing and filing a Certificate of
Nomination are purely internal processes of the party or organization and are not
designed to enable or ensure the victory of the candidate in the elections.
FACTS
In 1999, private respondent Robles was elected president and chairperson

of BUHAY, a party-list group duly registered with COMELEC. The constitution of
BUHAY provides for a three-year term for all its party officers, without re-
election. BUHAY participated in the 2001 and 2004 elections, with Robles as its
president. On March 29, 2007, Robles signed and filed a Certificate of Nomination of
BUHAY’s nominees for the 2007 elections. Earlier, however, or on March 27, 2007,
petitioner Hans Christian Señeres, holding himself up as acting president and
secretary-general of BUHAY, also filed a Certificate of Nomination with the
COMELEC, nominating himself and four others.
On April 17, 2007, Señeres filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due
Course to Certificates of Nomination. In it, petitioner Señeres alleged that he was the
acting president and secretary-general of BUHAY, having assumed that position
since August 17, 2004 when Robles vacated the position. Pushing the point, Señeres
would claim that the nominations made by Robles were, for lack of authority, null
and void owing to the expiration of the latter’s term as party president.
Furthermore, Señeres asserted that Robles was, under the Constitution, disqualified
from being an officer of any political party, the latter being the Acting Administrator
of the Light Railway Transport Authority (LRTA), a government-controlled
corporation. Robles, so Señeres would charge, was into a partisan political activity
which civil service members, like the former, were enjoined from engaging in.
ISSUE
Whether or not private respondent Robles was into a partisan political

activity when signed and filed a Certificate of Nomination of BUHAY’s nominees for
the 2007 elections.
RULING
NO. Even if Robles performed any of the previously mentioned acts, Sec. 79 of
the Code is nonetheless unequivocal that if the same is done only for the purpose of
enhancing the chances of aspirants for nominations for candidacy to a public office
by a political party, agreement, or coalition of parties, it is not considered as a
prohibited electioneering or partisan election activity.
From this provision, one can conclude that as long as the acts embraced
under Sec. 79 pertain to or are in connection with the nomination of a candidate by
a party or organization, then such are treated as internal matters and cannot be
considered as electioneering or partisan political activity. The twin acts of signing
and filing a Certificate of Nomination are purely internal processes of the party or
organization and are not designed to enable or ensure the victory of the candidate in
the elections. The act of Robles of submitting the certificate nominating Velarde and
others was merely in compliance with the COMELEC requirements for nomination
of party-list representatives and, hence, cannot be treated as electioneering or
partisan political activity proscribed under by Sec. 2(4) of Art. IX(B) of the
Constitution for civil servants.
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. and TERESITA F. PLANAS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(COMELEC), CITIZENS’ BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION PARTY LIST
represented by VIRGINIA S. JOSE SHERWIN N. TUGNA, and CINCHONA CRUZ-
GONZALES
G.R. No. 193808| 674 SCRA 538| June 26, 2012| Sereno
The COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case

brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.
FACTS
Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) party-list is a multi-sectoral party
registered under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7941, otherwise known as the Party- List
System Act. OnmNovember 20, 2009, two different entities, both purporting to
represent CIBAC, submitted to the COMELEC a "Manifestation of Intent to
Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the May 10, 2010
Elections." The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed
to be the party’s acting secretary-general. On the same day, another
Manifestation was submitted by herein respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and
Virginia Jose as the party’s vice-president and secretary-general, respectively.
On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson

Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the
COMELEC Law Department. The nomination was certified by Villanueva and
Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla submitted a second Certificate of
Nomination which included petitioners Luis Lokin, Jr. and Teresita Planas as party-
list nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her signature as "acting secretary-
general" of CIBAC. As a result, respondents filed with the COMELEC a “Petition to
expunge from the records and/or for disqualification”, alleging that the nomination
made by Derla was unauthorized and that the latter had misrepresented herself as
“acting secretary-general”.
On 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution expunging

the Certificate of Nomination which included herein petitioners as representatives
of CIBAC. The COMELEC en banc affirmed, prompting Luis Lokin, Jr. and Teresita F.
Planas to file the present Petition for Certiorari. Petitioners allege grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC and prayed that they be declared as the
legitimate nominees of CIBAC party-list.
Petitioners sought recourse with the Supreme Court in accordance with

Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging whether the authority of
Secretary General Virginia Jose to file the party’s Certificate of Nomination is an
intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by special commercial courts, and
over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners are right in arguing that the controversy on who has
authority to file the nomination in a party-list is not under the jurisdiction of
COMELEC, it being an intra-corporate dispute.
RULING
NO. The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has

already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on
Elections that the COMELEC’s powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and
its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court also declared in another
case that the COMELEC’s power to register political parties necessarily involved the
determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may
resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political parties.
DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON vs. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and
AGUSTIN C. DOROGA
G.R. No. 189466, 612 SCRA 375, February 11, 2010, Abad, J.

Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list
nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the
district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications.
FACTS
Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007
elections. Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto claiming that Aangat Tayo
was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Respondents further
pointed out that Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list
nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative.

Consequently, Abayon claimed that House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since private
respondents collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list
organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Petitioner
claimed that it was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of
Representatives, and not her who was just its nominee. HRET dismissed the petition
against Aangat Tayo but upheld its jurisdiction over the qualifications of Abayon.
ISSUE
Whether HRET has jurisdiction over the qualifications of the nominees of
party-list groups who already won seats in the House of Representatives.
RULING
YES. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list
nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the
district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party
or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has
taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and
the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
ABC (ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS) PARTY LIST, represented herein

by its Chairman, JAMES MARTY LIM vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
MELANIO MAURICIO, JR.
G.R. No. 193256, 646 SCRA 93, March 22, 2011, Peralta, J.

The Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority to register political parties,
organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the registration of the same on
legal grounds.
FACTS
Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a petition with the COMELEC for the cancellation of
registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List, claiming that the said
party-list is a front for a religious organization more popularly known as Ang Dating
Daan; thus, it is disqualified to become a party-list group under Section 6 (1) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 794. The COMELEC, Second Division dismissed the petition
based on substantial grounds, as it found that ABC is not a religious sect, and is,
therefore, not disqualified from registration.
On June 22, 2010, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Annul Proclamation and Suspend its Effects. Subsequently, the COMELEC
en banc issued a Resolution partially granting private respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner however, contended that the COMELEC en banc no
longer had jurisdiction to entertain the petition for cancellation of registration and
accreditation of ABC Party-List after it was already proclaimed as one of the winners
in the party-list elections of May 10, 2010, it further claimed that any question as to
its qualification should be resolved by the HRET and not by the COMELEC.
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC still has jurisdiction to cancel the registration and
accreditation of ABC Party-List after it was already proclaimed as one of the winners
in the party-list elections
RULING
YES. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of
registration of any political party, organization or coalition is derived from Section 2
(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
The Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority to register political

parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the registration of
the same on legal grounds. The said authority of the COMELEC is reflected in Section
6 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on the ground that it is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association organized for religious purposes. It is, therefore, clear that the COMELEC
has jurisdiction over the instant petition for cancellation of the registration of the
ABC Party-List.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS

G.R. No. 132875-76| 324 SCRA 689| February 3, 2000| Ynares-Santiago
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of

Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions
and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a
non-bailable offense.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He

states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte
chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his
constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls
this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State.
He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from
pending criminal cases.
ISSUE
Whether Jalosjos should be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a

Congressman despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-
bailable offense.
RULING
NO. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the
House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the
privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning
of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted
from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of
Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the
absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by
law, it has constitutional foundations.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows

different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons
validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the
"mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the
duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-
appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members.
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV vs. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS

PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN
DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEÑA
G.R. No. 179817| 556 SCRA 471| June 27, 2008| Carpio Morales
The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a

hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to
provisional liberty. Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of
public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted
prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
FACTS
On July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by
junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the
resignation of the President and key national officials. In the aftermath of this
episode, Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup
d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, won a
seat in the Senate. Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007,
petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for
Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests"
(Omnibus Motion). The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion,
petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied. Hence, the petitioner’s
present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos,

petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already
convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar
to petitioner’s Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention
prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the
presumption of innocence is still in his favor. Petitioner further contends that as
opposed to Jalosjos who was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, he
(petitioner)is indicted for coup d’etat which is regarded as a "political offense."
ISSUE
Whether the trial court rightly ruled in denying his request in the Omnibus
Motion
RULING
YES. The Constitution provides that all persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required. The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both
being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as
to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail

and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of
guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or
imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an
accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the
proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of
the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale
of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or
convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E.

GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS
PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128055| 356 SCRA 636| April 18, 2001| Vitug
Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the
suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
FACTS
A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID) filed criminal cases against Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago for the alleged
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Subsequently, on July 31, 1995, the prosecution filed with
the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending the petitioner, such
motion was later on granted and as a result, petitioner was suspended for 90 days
from her position as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and from any other
government position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Petitioner now
assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive
suspension of a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government
position.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the authority to order a ninety-day
preventive suspension of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and from any other government position
she may be holding at present or hereafter.
RULING
YES. In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan
merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the
jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans
authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before
it. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the
use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer
charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands
accused. Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order.
ANTERO J. POBRE vs. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

A.C. No. 7399| 597 SCRA 1| August 25, 2009| Velasco, Jr.
A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses

punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
FACTS
Petitioner Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary
actions be taken against Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago speech delivered on the
Senate floor where the senator said the following statements:
“I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am

suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated.
I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme
Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots.”
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago,
through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however,
explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her
duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according
to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a
view to future remedial legislation.
ISSUE
Whether Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago can invoke parliamentary
immunity
RULING
YES. The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the

provision of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or
Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof."
This legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a

means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative
department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would
degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune
from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their
private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if
they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial
upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based
upon a judges speculation as to the motives.
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI vs.

RICHARD J. GORDON
G.R. No. 175352 |593 SCRA 68| July 15, 2009| Carpio
The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a

government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
FACTS
Petitioners who are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red
Cross Chapter filed a petition to declare Richard J. Gordon as having forfeited his
seat in the senate after he was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC) on February 23, 2006. Petitioners alleged that by accepting the
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a
member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
In his Comment, respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file

this petition which appears to be an action for quo warranto, since the petition
alleges that respondent committed an act which, by provision of law, constitutes a
ground for forfeiture of his public office. Petitioners do not claim to be entitled to
the Senate office of respondent. Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation and that the prohibition under
Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since
volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.
ISSUE
Whether Philippine National Red Cross is a government-owned or controlled
corporation
RULING
NO. The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast
majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including
students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund
campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus,
any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon
contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year. Even foreigners, whether
residents or not, can be members of the PNRC. Section 5 of the PNRC Charter. Thus,
the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable
organization.
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government
office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of
the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH

SOCORRO B. TAN
G.R. No. 207264| 699 SCRA 522| June 25, 2013| Perez
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a

concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath,
and (3) assumption of office.
FACTS
On October 31, 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and
resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an
Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) of petitioner on the ground that it contained misrepresentations material to
the qualification of her candidacy specifically her residency, date of birth and
citizenship. On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution
cancelling petitioner’s COC. COMELEC First Division found that petitioner is not a
citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 and that she did not have the one year residency
requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, she is
ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the lone district of
Marinduque. On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Four days later,
petitioner was proclaimed winner of the elections. On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc final and executory. On same day, petitioner took her oath of
office but will assume office at noon of June 30, 2013. Petitioner filed a Petition for
certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order.
ISSUE
Whether or not the COMELEC still has jurisdiction over Reyes considering
that she was already been proclaimed and has already taken her oath of office for
the position of Member of the House of Representatives.
RULING
YES. To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must

be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper
oath, and (3) assumption of office. Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a
Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet
assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member
of the House of Representatives begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election.” Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains
jurisdiction.
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO vs. HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.,
SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP AND REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
G.R. No. 211140| 12 January 2016| Leonardo-De Castro
WRITER: SABRINA DELA ROSA
Mandamus is correct remedy to compel an officer to do the ministerial duty of

administration an oath which does not require discretion on the part of the officer. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done.
FACTS
Velasco filed a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
against Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap, and Hon. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes (Reyes). Velasco contended that he must be proclaimed winner of
the congressional district of Marinduque because of the COMELEC resolution that
Reyes’ COC is null and void. On the other hand, Reyes contended that a petition for
quo warranto must be filed before HRET to settle the dispute who among them
should be the representative of Congressional district of Marinduque and determine
the qualification of Reyes.
ISSUE
Whether Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap can be compelled to

administer oath and to delete the name of Reyes in the Roll of the members of the
House of Representatives respectively
RULING
YES, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap have no discretion
whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter’s
name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, respectively. There is
in existence final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264
affirming the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053
(DC) cancelling Reyes’s Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a final and
executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the
proclamation of Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the
position of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL AND PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY
G.R. No. 219603| 26 January 2016| Carpio
Under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, a sentence by final judgment

for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disqualification to run for any
position.
FACTS
On September 2008, the Supreme Court in Tulfo v. People convicted Pichay

for libel. In lieu of imprisonment, he was sentenced to pay fine. On October 2012,
Pichay filed his COC for congressman and garnered the highest number of votes. His
opponent (Ty-Delgado) then filed a Petition for Quo Warranto reiterating Pichay’s
ineligibility to serve as member of the House of Representatives because (1) he was
convicted by final judgment of four counts of libel: a crime involving moral
turpitude; and (2) only two years have passed since he served his sentence or paid
on February 17, 2011 the penalty imposed on him. The same was dismissed by the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which concluded that Pichay’s
conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude, reasoning that he was not the
author of the libelous articles but the president of the publishing company.
ISSUE
Whether Pichay was ineligible to become a member of the House of

Representatives
RULING
YES, the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or

excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a
crime involving moral turpitude. Supreme Court held that libel still involves moral
turpitude even if the penalty of imprisonment imposed was reduced to a fine. Pichay
made a false material representation as to his eligibility when he filed his COC. Since
he was not a qualified candidate under Sec.12, Omnibus Election Code, all votes for
him were stray votes. Ty-Delgado was declared the winner for the position of
Member of the House, 1st Legislative District, Surigao del Sur in the May 2013
elections.
DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC vs. REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA,

MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., OR ANY OTHER
REPRESENTATIVE WHO MAY BE APPOINTED VICE REPRESENTATIVE JUANITO
G. CAMASURA, JR., AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 97710| 201 SCRA 792| 26 September 1991| Griño-Aquino
HRET is the sole judge of all contests in relation to the election, returns and
qualification of their respective members. It’s supposed to provide an independent and
impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office devoid of
partisan consideration. “Disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not
valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.
FACTS
Pineda from the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc of the
Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for Representative of the 4th district
of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner of the election. Bondoc filed a protest
before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The decision held
that Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of 23 votes. The LDP insisted a recount
and the which resulted to an increase in Bondoc’s win by 107 votes. Congressman
Camasura, who was a member of the HRET, revealed to Chief Congressman
Conjuanco that he voted for Bondoc and he did so in view of what was in line with
truth, justice, and self-respect. The revelation prompted efforts by the LDP to
neutralize pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal. On the eve of promulgation of
Bondoc’s win, Congressman Jose Conjuangco thru a letter, stated that Camasura and
Bautista were expelled from LDP. The LDP informed Herrera that they were no
longer part of LDP hence; his (Camasura’s) vote in favor of Bondoc should be
withdrawn. Proclamation of Bondoc was cancelled because the decision lacked the
concurrence of 5 members as required by Section 24 of the rules of the tribunal.
Bondoc asked the court to annul the decision of the House in rescinding Camasura’s
nomination and restrain the replacement of Camasura through a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE
Whether the House of Representatives can validly removed Congressman

Camasura from the HRET
RULING
NO, Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the HRET
is the sole judge of all contests in relation to the election, returns and qualification of
their respective members. The operative term found in the section was “sole Judge”.
It (HRET) was made to function as a non-partisan court although 2/3 of its members
are politicians. It’s supposed to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for
the determination of contests to legislative office devoid of partisan consideration.
“Disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the tribunal. Its independence would be undermined if the
removal of Camasura as a punishment for “party disloyalty” for voting for Bondoc
would allow them to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case. If
allowed so, then the HRET isn’t really a sole judge of senatorial elections. The
members of the HRET are entitled to security of tenure just as the members of the
judiciary are. They can only be replaced in cases of expiration, death, permanent
disability, resignation, and formal affiliation with another party of any valid cause.
JEAN L. ARNAULT vs LEON NAZARENO, SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, PHILIPPINE

SENATE, AND EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. No.L-3820| 87 Phil 29| July 18, 1950| Ozaeta
The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and
contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject to judicial
interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and
a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional
limitations.
FACTS
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of

land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the
Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment
to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5
million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to
Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate
sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the government. Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as
agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of the witnesses
summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the
petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave
the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds
pertaining to Ernest Burt. Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and
was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment
until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas
corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.
ISSUE
Whether the Senate has the authority to punish petitioner for contempt.
RULING
YES, the legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This
power is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied
or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said
power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on
which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of
such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power
and authority? The legislative department should not be constrained to look to the
courts whenever for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of
contumacy with which it is faced. The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal
with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject to
judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute disregard of
discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of
constitutional limitations.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (Philippine Branch), PAUL SIMON MORRIS,

SUNDARA RAMESH, OWEN BELMAN, SANJAY AGGARWAL, RAJAMANI
CHANDRASHEKAR, MARIVEL GONZALES, MA. ELLEN VICTOR, CHONA G. REYES,
ZENAIDA IGLESIAS, RAMONA BERNAD, MICHAELANGELO AGUILAR, and
FERNAND TANSINGCO vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, AS REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON,
HON. EDGARDO J. ANGARA
G.R. No. 167173| 541 SCRA 456| December 27, 2007| Nachura
The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a

quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation.
FACTS
Standard Chartered Bank Phil. Branch (SCB) had criminal and civil charges
against them pending before the Court of Appeals and trial courts in Metro Manila
for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code
(RA 8799). Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately conduct
an inquiry in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent act
in the future. The respondent Committee then set an initial hearing to investigate, in
aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there were cases allegedly involving the
same issues subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction
of respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent committee may conduct the subject inquiry and
compel the petitioners to testify, notwithstanding the pendency of cases involving
the same subject matter of the inquiry.
RULING
The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a

quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The
intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or
may not be enacted into law. The exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of
which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS

CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, JUAN M. FLAVIER, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SENATE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS MAJORITY LEADER, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
MINORITY LEADER, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S.
CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.
LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, MAR ROXAS AND
MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND ALTER-EGO OF PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, AND ANYONE ACTING IN HIS STEAD AND IN BEHALF OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 169777, 169659, 169660, 169667, 169834 & 171246| 488 SCRA 1|
April 20, 2006| Carpio Morales
Congress enjoys the right to information from the executive branch especially
on matters sought in aid of legislation. It has the right to know why the executive
considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare
that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so.
FACTS
The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive

Department and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005.
Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President
Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford
said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues
so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate
refused the request.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which,
among others, mandated that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of
the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita
communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able
to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the
lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials
invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.
Hence, the Senate of the Philippines filed a petition to Supreme Court assailing the
validity of EO 464.
ISSUE
Whether EO 464 is unconstitutional because it contravenes the power of

inquiry vested in Congress
RULING
Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Sections 1 and 2 (a) are
however, valid.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) should secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view thereof, whenever an
official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such invocation must be
construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office
authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is
privileged. The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not
explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are
being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the
privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack
of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The
letter assumes that the invited official possesses information that is covered by the
executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive
considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare
that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so. The
claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus
invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise
and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an
announcement that the President has not given her consent.
ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643| 549 SCRA 77| March 25, 2008| Leonardo-De Castro
The elements of presidential communications privilege are 1) The protected

communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.” 2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself, and 3) The presidential
communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority. the claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases
where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution
to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations.
FACTS
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication

(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion
Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate
passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power
brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue
Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and
during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to
accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on: (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it; and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita
sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri
are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied.
He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE
Whether the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions are
covered by executive privilege
RULING
YES, the claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the
subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the
President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution,
the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning,
and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications
privilege: 1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power.” 2) The communication must be authored or
“solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself.
The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the
President. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. In the case at
bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under
conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials”
necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy
or foreign relations.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS OF CAMILO L. SABIO
G.R. No. 174340| 504 SCRA 704| 17 October 2006| Sandoval-Gutierrez
Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not
only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective
committees.
FACTS
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate

Res. No. 455 “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT
Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by
their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator
Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of
the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same
time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission
shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”
ISSUE
Whether Sec. 4(b) of EO No. 1 has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution
RULING
YES, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is
inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry
(Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of
full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access to public information (Art. III,
Sec. 7). Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry
not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their
respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to
the committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in
order to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the
committees.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. Nos. 115455, 115525, 115543, 115544, 115754, 115781, 115852, 115873,
115931| 235 SCRA 630| August 25, 1994| Mendoza
The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the
revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of
the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate.
FACTS
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act

that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various
suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various
grounds. Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the
House of Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No.
1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus
violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively. Art. VI,
Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments. Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a
law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof
in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
ISSUE
Whether RA 7716 is a violation of Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution
RULING
NO, the phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the
revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage
of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate. Senate Bill No. 1630,
having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not
only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and RAMON

A. GONZALES vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, AS SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT; HON. VICENTE T. TAN, AS NATIONAL TREASURER AND
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766 & 113888| 235 SCRA 506|
August 19, 1994| Quiason
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the
legislative process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of
validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show
that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
FACTS
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of

1994. GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the
Re-alignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said
allocation is not exceeded. Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives are the ones authorized under the
Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed
certain provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use
savings to augment the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits
of the AFP.
ISSUE
Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is

constitutional and valid?
RULING
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the
legislative process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of
validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to
show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress provided for a debt-ceiling.
Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said
provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are
appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire
item/appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU’s – said provision allows for
the use of income & creation of revolving fund for SCU’s. Provision for Western
Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCU’s enjoying the
privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law.
VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Road Maintenance – Congress specified 30% ratio of
works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by
DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an
inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be
vetoed w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. – AFP modernization, prior
approval of Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-
called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or
requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions – allows Chief of Staff to
augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Constitution,
only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed.
VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGU’s – use of special
fund for the compensation of the said CAFGU’s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior
approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A
provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws.

VETO VALID.
CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO,

ET AL. vs. HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY; HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, AND HON. ROSALINA
CAJUCOM IN HER CAPACITY AS NATIONAL TREASURER
G.R. No. 103524 & A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA| 208 SCRA 133| April 15, 1992 |
Gutierrez Jr.
The power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the

appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve
the remaining portion of said item.
FACTS
The issue in this petition is the constitutionality of the veto by the President
of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992
relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No, 910 was enacted
to provide the retirement pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court
of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty (20) years service either in the
Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both, having attained the
age of seventy (70) years or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the
duties of the office. The retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural
life the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation.
Republic Act No. 910 was amended by Republic Act No. 1797 (approved on June 21,
1957) which provided that: Sec. 3-A. In case the salary of Justices of the Supreme
Court or of the Court of Appeals is increased or decreased, such increased or
decreased salary shall, for purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the salary or the
retirement pension which a Justice who as of June twelve, nineteen hundred fifty-
four had ceased to be such to accept another position in the Government or who
retired was receiving at the time of his cessation in office. Provided, that any
benefits that have already accrued prior to such increase or decrease shall not be
affected thereby. Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the members
of the Judiciary and the Constitutional Commissions, Congress approved in 1990 a
bill for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of Republic Act No. 1797 and
Republic Act No. 3595. Congress was under the impression that Presidential Decree
644 became law after it was published in the Official Gazette on April 7, 1977. In the
explanatory note of House Bill No. 16297 and Senate Bill No. 740, the legislature
saw the need to reenact Republic Act Nos. 1797 and 3595 to restore said retirement
pensions and privileges of the retired Justices and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, in order to assure those serving in the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and Constitutional Commissions adequate old age pensions even during the
time when the purchasing power of the peso has been diminished substantially by
worldwide recession or inflation. This is underscored by the fact that the petitioner
retired Chief Justice, a retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and the retired
Presiding Justice are presently receiving monthly pensions of P3,333.33, P2,666.66
and P2,333.33 respectively. President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill No. 16297
on July 11, 1990 on the ground that according to her "it would erode the very
foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce
strictly the policy on standardization of compensation as articulated in Republic Act
No. 6758 known as Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." She
further said that "the Government should not grant distinct privileges to select
group of officials whose retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy
preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil service servants."
ISSUE
Whether such executive veto is valid
RULING
NO, the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to

disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority
to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. The
Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and
override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the
power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to
the repeal of existing laws. The provisions regarding retirement pensions of justices
arise from the package of protections given by the Constitution to guarantee and
preserve the independence of the Judiciary. Any argument which seeks to remove
special privileges given by law to former Justices of this Court and the ground that
there should be no "grant of distinct privileges" or "preferential treatment" to
retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and, in effect, asks that
these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.
The integrity of our entire constitutional system is premised to a large extent on the
independence of the Judiciary. All these provisions are intended to preserve that
independence. So are the laws on retirement benefits of Justices.
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, JOSE M. VILLEGAS, JR., JOSE L.

GONZALEZ, REUBEN M. ABANTE, and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER
ROSALIA V. DE LEON, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY
FRANKLIN M. DRILON IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493& 209251| 710 SCRA 1| November 19, 2013| Perlas-
Bernabe
The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant

to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
FACTS
The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the

Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was
created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-
President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate
government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of
indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund
was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993
issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding
facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through
which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not
funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in
the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
Over the years, “pork” funds have increased tremendously. In 1996, an

anonymous source later identified as former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed
that huge sums of government money went into the pockets of legislators as
kickbacks. In 2004, several citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted
in the 2004 General Appropriations Act for being unconstitutional, but the Supreme
Court dismissed the petition. In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) began its probe into allegations that “the government has been defrauded of
some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork
barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.”
The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation – “JLN” standing for Janet Lim Napoles – had swindled
billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20
dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August 2013, the
Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation
covering the use of legislators’ PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3)
years of the Arroyo administration.
ISSUE
Whether the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional for violating the principle of non-delegability of
legislative powers
RULING
YES, it is unconstitutional because the 2013 PDAF Article violates the

principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to individually
exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in
Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation,
pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.” The power of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law a certain
sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF
Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they
are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the
2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow.
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG

MAKABAYAN; JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON, PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN,
CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN, GABRIELA WOMEN'S
PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. TERRY L. RIDON, KABATAAN PARTYLIST
REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE, BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAYAN;
MANUEL K. DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E.
CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR,
YOUTH ACT NOW vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
G.R. No. 209287| 728 SCRA 1| July 1, 2014| Bersamin
The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had
sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes
in the country’s economic situation.
FACTS
The Supreme Court, in a Decision dated July 1, 2014, partially granted the
consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition and declared the following acts
and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National
Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances unconstitutional for
violating Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of
separation of powers, namely: (a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from
the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated

allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal
year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the
General Appropriations Acts; (b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the
Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any
appropriation in the General Appropriations Acts. The Court further declared void
the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by the
National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for
non-compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General
Appropriations Acts (GAAs).
ISSUE
Whether DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).
RULING
NO, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. The
President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient
discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the
country’s economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He
could pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. DAP was
merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a
program for prioritizing government spending. In DAP no additional funds were
withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have
been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were
merely being realigned via the DAP.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON

S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE
AND EDWIN R. SANDOVAL VS. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY
AS COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, AND HON.
ALBERTO D. LINA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF BUREAU OF

CUSTOMS
G.R. No. 166715| 562 SCRA 251| August 14, 2008| Corona
Only the executive branch has the power to implement laws promulgated by
the legislative department. Any participation of the legislative department in the any
process of implementing the law is an encroachment to the executive’s functions.
FACTS
ABAKADA GURO Party List, as tax payers, assails the constitutionality of RA

9335 or the Attrition Act of 2005. RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status. The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC
in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development
Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Petitioners assert that the law unduly
delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient
standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR
and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall
short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue
targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to
the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President
to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC
personnel. Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on
the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative
function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval
of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE
Whether the creation of a Congressional Oversight Committee violates the

doctrine of Separation of Powers?
RULING
YES, Sec 12 or RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee

to approve the IRR of the law is unconstitutional. The requirement that the
implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for
their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and
the rule on presentment. From the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional because it allows Congress or its members to
overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch
charged with the implementation of the law.
PRESIDENCY
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC AND ESTRELLA
C. ELAMPARO, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ
G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700| March 8, 2016| Perez
The Constitution provides that only the Senate Electoral Tribunal and House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal have sole jurisdiction over the election contests,
returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the President
and Vice President, only the Supreme Court sitting en banc has sole jurisdiction.
FACTS
Grace Poe declared in her COC that she is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines up to the day before the elections on May 9, 2016 would
be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005. She was born in 1968,
found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the
US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the
BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship
under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then
on, she stopped using her American passport. Petitions were filed before the
COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among others,
that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove
that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc
cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and
residence requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her
COC. On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is
qualified as a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote
on the natural-born citizenship issue.
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications

of candidates
RULING
NO, Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and
functions of the COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a
candidate is not one among them. In contrast, the Constitution provides that only
the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over the election contests,
returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the President
and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the
qualifications of candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is
simply no authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates
before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for
the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification
in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the intent of the
Constitution. Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
decided on the qualification issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for
cancellation of her COC.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. VS JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS TO CANVASS

THE VOTES CAST FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT IN THE MAY 10, 2004
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 163783| June 22, 2004| EN BANC
Notwithstanding the adjournment sine die of Congress, the Joint Committee

may complete the tasks assigned to it and transmit its report for the approval of the
joint public session of both Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of
call by the President to a special session.
FACTS
By a petition for prohibition, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a

judgment declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of
Congress to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice
Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following the adjournment of
Congress on June 11, 2004. Petitioner’s claim that his arguments are supported by
“legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both
Houses of Congress” is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules
adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. This section clearly
provides that the Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or
compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later
than 30 days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution. The petition prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further
proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing.
ISSUE
Whether Pimentel’s action will prosper
RULING
NO, Pimentel’s claim that his arguments are buttressed by “legislative

procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of
Congress” is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by
the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. Moreover, the precedents set by
the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop the
ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee. Thus, during the 1992 Presidential
elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned on 25 May 1992. Thereafter, on 22
June 1992, the Eight Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board
of Canvassers, and on even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito
Estrada as President and Vice President, respectively. In sum, despite the
adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to the Joint
Committee completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the
approval of the joint public session of both Houses of Congress, which may
reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session.
ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO vs JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO ESTRADA and

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 191988| 629 SCRA 530| August 31, 2010 | Corona
There exists a constitutional prohibition against a president from having the

highest position twice. However, he is not considered as having two terms if he does
not win the elections.
FACTS
Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May
1998 elections but was not able to finish his term because he was ousted by former
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. He sought the presidency again in the May 2010
elections. Pormento opposed Estrada’s candidacy and filed a petition for
disqualification. COMELEC (Division) denied his petition as well as his subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration (En Banc). Pormento then filed the present petition for
certiorari before the Court. In the meantime, Estrada was able to participate as a
candidate for President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second
highest number of votes.
ISSUE
Whether Estrada violated the Constitution when he ran for president in the
May 10, 2010 elections
RULING
NO, the respondent did not win the second time he ran. The issue on the
proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be premised on a person
second election as President. Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior
to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010
elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections,
private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any
discussion of his "reelection" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will
serve no useful or practical purpose.
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL vs PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

G.R. No. 191618| November 23, 2010| Nachura
The Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is not simply an agency to which

Members of the Court were designated. The PET, as intended by the framers of the
Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
FACTS
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo B.

Macalintal from a decision dismissing his petition and declaring the establishment
of respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as constitutional. Petitioner
reiterates his arguments on the alleged unconstitutional creation of the PET that
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET.
Thus, PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. To bolster his
arguments that the PET is an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution, petitioner invokes our ruling on the constitutionality of the
Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). Petitioner cites the concurring opinion of
Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro that the PTC is a public office which cannot be
created by the President, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress.
Thus, petitioner submits that if the President, as head of the Executive Department,
cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in the
absence of an act of legislature.
ISSUE
Whether the establishment of respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal

(PET) is constitutional
RULING
YES, PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit
it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was
constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it
faithfully complies not unlawfully defies the constitutional directive. The adoption
of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and
the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was
designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals
functions as a special electoral court. the PET, as intended by the framers of the
Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs ANIANO DESIERTO

G.R. No. 146710-15| 135 SCRA 317 AND 356 SCRA 108 | March 2, 2001| Puno
The immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and
not his term. A non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged
criminal acts committed while a sitting President.
FACTS
After Estrada’s impeachment proceedings were aborted and his resignation

from the Presidential post, several cases previously filed against him in the Office of
the Ombudsman were set in motion including among others, bribery and graft and
corruption, plunder, perjury, serious miscounduct, malversation of public funds,
illegal use of public funds. A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by
the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner.
Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
“conducting any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may be
filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if
legally warranted Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should
be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to
the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent
Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in violation of
his right to due process.
ISSUE
Whether Estrada may invoke immunity from suit

RULING
NO, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended not to retain the 1973
Constitution provision on executive immunity. It is, then, untenable for petitioner to
demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be
prosecuted. The petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive
immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From
the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the
president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

GR No. 83896 |194 SCRA 317| February 22, 1991| Fernan,C.J
WRITER: CHRISTINE JOYCE ANDRES
It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or
employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself
and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of
their office.
FACTS
The case at hand is a consolidation of two (2) petitions that both seeks the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Petitioners assails that the Executive Order permits Cabinet members, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to occupy other government offices or
positions in addition to their primary positions despite being prohibited by Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines also seeks in its petition in GR

No. 83815 to restrain the respondents from holding their additional offices and
from receiving salaries and other privileges from the contested additional offices.
ISSUE
Whether Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional by allowing members

of the Cabinet and their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government positions
RULING
YES, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional for being in direct conflict
with Section 13, Article VII of 1987 Constitution. The said Constitutional statute
states that members of the Cabinet and their deputies shall not hold any other office,
unless provided in the Constitution.
The disqualification stated in Sec. 13, Article VII is also absolutory - the
prohibition covers not only public office or employment, but also private office or
employment. Also, the language used Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
is prohibitory. In Constitutional construction, when the language used is
prohibitory, it is to be construed as a positive and unequivocal negation.
The purpose of this Constitutional statute is to enable department heads to

perform their functions with the best of their abilities and to allow them to attend to
their duties without distraction from other offices whether it may be private or
public. Being a department head is not an easy job. It is more than a full-time job
that has a need for full attention, knowledge, and expertise.
DENNIS A.B. FUNA vs. ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, IN

HIS OFFICIAL CONCURRENT CAPACITIES AS ACTING SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND AS ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
GR No. 191644 | 691 SCRA 196| February 19, 2013| Bersamin
Except as to those officers whose appointments require the consent of the

Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art.
VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
FACTS
The case before us is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed
on April 7, 2010.
On March 1, 2010, Alberto C. Agra (Agra) was appointed by then President

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as Acting Secretary of Justice. The Agra was also later on
designated by then President Macapagal-Arroyo as Acting Solicitor General.
The Dennis A.B. Funa (Funa) , invoking his capacity as a taxpayer, a citizen,
and a lawyer filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of the respondent’s
concurrent appointments. Funa assails that Agra’s synchronal designations is
violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Executive Secretary Leandro R. Mendoza (respondent) contends that Agra’s

designations were both in temporary capacity and that the only effect is additional
duties. Therefore, Agra was not holding both offices because an appointment, to be
covered by constitutional prohibition, must be regular and permanent instead of a
mere designation. They further contend that Agra’s continued service as Acting
Solicitor General is just hold-over which allowed him to perform the duties of a
Solicitor General until a successor is elected and qualified.
ISSUE
Whether or not the concurrent designation of Agra as Acting Solicitor

General and as Acting Secretary of Justice is constitutional
RULING
NO, the synchronal designation of Agra, in both acting capacity, as Solicitor

General and Secretary of Justice is unconstitutional. It is violative of Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, and their deputies to hold any other office during their
tenure. The contention of the respondent that Agra’s appointments were just of
acting capacity holds no merit for the Constitution did not make any reference to the
nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition against occupying two or

more offices by one official applies to all appointments or designations, may it be
permanent or temporary. Furthermore, the responsibilities of a Solicitor General
and the duties of the Secretary of Justice is too much for a single official to bear.
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA vs. SALVADOR MISON, IN

HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
G.R. No. 83896 | 194 SCRA 317| December 17, 1987 |Padilla
Except as to those officers whose appointments require the consent of the

Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art.
VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
FACTS
This is a petition for prohibition that seeks to prohibit Salvador Mison

(Mison) and Guillermo Carague (Carague) from performing their functions as a
Commissioner of Bureau of Customs and Secretary of the Department of Budget,
respectively.
Petitioners Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcilla contends that the
appointments of Mison and Carague are unconstitutional because they were not
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Respondents, on the hand, claims
the constitutionality of Mison’s appointment without the concurrence or approval of
the Commission of Appointments.
ISSUE
Whether or not the appointments of the respondents are unconstitutional for

not being confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
RULING
NO, the appointment were not unconstitutional. Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution which reads:
"The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank
in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments,
agencies, commissions or boards.
"The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress."
This case enumerated four (4) groups of officers that the President shall appoint:
1. the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers

and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution
2. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
3. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
4. officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.
The first group is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. By rules of statutory construction, an express enumeration of
subjects excludes others that are not enumerated; thus, only those appointments
referring to the first group requires the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. The 1987 Constitution also deliberately excluded the appointments

of head of bureaus to need confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z.

BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, AND GIDEON C. DE
GUZMAN IN HIS CAPACITY AS OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, FINANCE SERVICES
DEPARTMENT OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GR No. 149036 |380 SCRA 49| April 2, 2002 | Carpio
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect

immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. In order to determine whether the renewal of an ad interim
appointment violates the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-
C of the Constitution we must distinguish those which weredisapproved from those
which were by-passed, for the by-passed reappointment is valid and allowed while the
disapproved is not and can no longer be renewed.
FACTS
This is an original petition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
COMELEC En Banc appointed Ma.J.Angelina G. Matibag (Matibag) as Acting

Director IV of the EID on February 2, 1999. Her appointment was renewed by
Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou in a temporary capacity. This appointment was
also renewed by Commissioner Rufino S.B Javier on February 15 2001.
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed, ad

interim, Alfredo L. Benipayo (Benipayo) as COMELEC Chairman, and Resurreccion Z.
Borra (Borra) and Florentino A. Tuason (Tuason) as COMELEC Commissioners.
They will each serve a term of seven years that will expire on February 2, 2008. The
Office of the President submitted to the Commission on Appointments the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra, and Tuason on May 22, 2001. The
Commission on Appointments failed to act on the said appointments for

confirmation.
President Macapagal-Arroyo renewed their ad interim appointments on June

1, 2001, then on June 5, 2001, the Office of the President submitted their
appointments for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. This time, the
Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointment could act on the said
appointments. June 8, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo renewed their ad interim
appointments again.
Benipayo, in his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a memorandum on

April 11, 2001, addressed to Matibag as Director IV of the EID and Velma J. Cinco as
Director III of the EID, designating the latter as Officer-In-Charge of the EID and
reassigning the former to the Law Department.
Matibag requested Benipayo to reconsider her reassignment but Benipayo

rejected her request citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000.
Matibag then filed the instant petition questioning the appointment of Benipayo,
Borra, and Tuason, and their right to remain in office as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC.
Matibag contends that their appointments violate the constitutional

provisions on the independence of the COMELEC and cited that there are
prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairmen and
members.
ISSUE
Whether the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borras, and Tuason is a

temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING
NO, the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borras, and Tuason does not
violate the said constitutional provision. The purpose of the said constitutional
provision is to guarantee the independence of COMELEC by freeing the members of
COMELEC from the influence of the President thru security of tenure. Ad interim
appointments are permanent appointments because it can no longer be withdrawn
by the President once the appointe has qualified into the office. Its permanent
character is not changed by the fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments and ad interim appointments are permanent
appointments unless disapproved or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LUISA

P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.
LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III vs. EXEC. SECRETARY
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, FLORENCIO B. ABAD, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., MICHAEL T.
DEFENSOR, JOSEPH H. DURANO, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, ALBERTO G. ROMULO,
RENE C. VILLA, and ARTHUR C. YAP
GR No. 164978| 472 SCRA 587| October 13, 2005| Carpio
Being an alter ego of the president, a department secretary may be appointed

in an acting capacity even when the congress is in session in line with its purpose as a
stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office.
FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments of
the respondents by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo thru Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita.
On July 26, 2004, Congress commenced their regular session. Then, on

August 25, 2004, the Commission on Appointments was formed; but, before its
constitution, President Macapagal-Arroyo issued appointments to the respondents
as acting secretaries of their respective departments.
Senators of the Republic of the Philippines filed this petition on September 8,

2004. The Congress once again adjourned on September 22, 2004, then the
following day, President Macapagal-Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to the
respondents as secretaries of the departments which they were previously
appointed in acting capacity.
ISSUE
Whether the appointments of the respondents as acting secretaries without

the consent of the Commission on Appointments is constitutional
RULING
YES, it is constitutional. The purpose of an appointment in an acting capacity

is temporary in nature. It is a measure intended to fill an office for a limited time
until the appointment of the permanent occupant. In cases of vacancies in offices
occupied by the alter egos of the President, the President must necessarily appoint
his alter ego of his choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of his
choice could assume office. The Congress cannot order the President to
automatically appoint the undersecretary as her acting alter ego because an alter
ego holds a position of trust and confidence, thus, the Congress cannot impose on
the President who her alter ego should be.
ARMITA B. RUFINO, ZENAIDA R. TANTOCO, LORENZO CALMA, RAFAEL SIMPAO,

JR., and FREDDIE GARCIA vs. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA, MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO,
PATRICIA C. SISON, IRMA PONCE-ENRILE POTENCIANO, and
DOREEN FERNANDEZ
GR No. 83896 | 496 SCRA 13| July 21, 2006 | Carpio
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution excludes a situation where the
appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him for what it allow are heads
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in
rank" than such "heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
FACTS
This is a consolidation of two (2) petitions for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30 on June 25,

1960 which created the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP). The original
founding trustees were all appointed by the President. After the declaration of
Martial Law, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 15 or the CCPs charter
which turned it into a non-municipal public corporation. It also increased the CCPs
Board from seven (7) to nine (9). Later on, EO No. 1058, issued on October 10, 1985,
increased the number of trustees to 11.
After the People Power Revolutions, President Corazon C. Aquino asked for
the resignations of the incumbent CCP trustees and appointed new trustees to the
Board. On December 22, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada appointed the petitioners
as trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four (4) years that replaced the Endriga
group.
ISSUE
Whether Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional by allowing members

of the Cabinet and their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government positions
RULING
YES, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional for being in direct conflict
with Section 13, Article VII of 1987 Constitution. The said Constitutional statute
states that members of the Cabinet and their deputies shall not hold any other office,
unless provided in the Constitution.
The disqualification stated in Sec. 13, Article VII is also absolutory - the
prohibition covers not only public office or employment, but also private office or
employment. Also, the language used Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
is prohibitory. In Constitutional construction, when the language used is
prohibitory, it is to be construed as a positive and unequivocal negation.
The purpose of this Constitutional statute is to enable department heads to

perform their functions with the best of their abilities and to allow them to attend to
their duties without distraction from other offices whether it may be private or
public. Being a department head is not an easy job. It is more than a full-time job
that has a need for full attention, knowledge, and expertise.
DOMINADOR R. AYTONA VS ANDRES V. CASTILLO, ET AL.

GR No. L-19313| 4 SCRA 1| January 19, 1962| Bengzon
As early as this case midnight or last minute appointments were already

abhorred for an incumbent president is no more than a "care-taker" administration
and should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the
policies of his successor such as having midnight appointments.
FACTS
On December 29, 1961, Dominador R. Aytona was appointed as ad interim

Governor of the Central Bank by then President Carlos P. Garcia. Then on at noon of
December 30, 1961, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed his office. On the
following day, he issued Administrative Order No.2 which withdraws and cancels all
ad interim appointments of then President Garcia after December 13 1961.
President Macapagal appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of

the Central Bank on January 1, 1962 and was immediately qualified. The following
day, Castillo informed Aytona of his title and some unpleasantness developed in the
premises of the Central Bank and Aytona was prevented from holding office in
Central Bank.
Aytona commenced this quo warranto petition and challenges Castillo’s right
to the office and powers of Governor of the Central Bank. He claims that he was
validly appointed by the President Garcia; therefore, Castillo’s appointment was
void.
ISSUE
Whether President Macapagal has the power to cancel ad interim

appointments made by the past President after they had already qualified
HELD
YES, President Macapagal has the power to revoke ad interim appointments

that are contrary to good faith.
The record shows that President Garcia submitted to the Commission on

Appointments on December 29, 1961 a list of ad interim appointments for
confirmation for the positions of assistant director of lands, councilors, mayors,
members of provincial boards, fiscals, justices of peace, among others. Aytona’s
name as appointed Governor of the Central Bank can be found on number 45.
Another list bearing the same date was submitted to the Commission on
Appointments which now includes appointments of Foreign Affairs officers, judges,

chiefs of police, councilors, etc. This time, Aytona’s name as appointed Governor of
the Philippines in the Boards of International Monetary Fund, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, etc is found on number 63. A third list which
bears the same date was submitted to the Commission on Appointments. It contains
an additional 124 names of persons appointed as fiscals, justice of peace, and one for
associate justice of the Supreme Court and two for associate justices of the Court of
Appeals. There were other appointments submitted by President Garcia on
December 29, 1961 which amounts to about three-hundred fifty (350) midnight or
last minute appointments.
It is common sense that after a proclamation of the election of the new

President, the outgoing President is no more than a care-taker. He is bound to
prepare the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President. The issuance of
350 appointments in a single night and the planned induction of almost all of them a
few hours before the inauguration of the incoming President may be regarded as an
abuse of Presidential prerogatives.
IN RE APPOINTMENTS DATED MARCH 30, 1998 OF HON. MATEO A.

VALENZUELA AND HON. PLACIDO B. VALLARTA AS JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF BRANCH 62, BAGO CITY AND OF BRANCH 24, CABANATUAN
CITY, RESPECTIVELY
AM No. 98-5-01-SC| 298 SCRA 408 | November 9, 1998| Narvasa
The prohibited appointments contemplated by Article VII section 15 not only

applies to the executive department but also to appointments by the president to the
members of the judiciary. Nonetheless, as an exception appointments to the judiciary
can be made during the period of the ban in the interest of public service.
FACTS
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Villarta was assigned by the
President as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of
Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively. The appointments were received by the
Chief Justices’ chambrs on May 12, 1998.
ISSUE
Whether these appointments made by the President is void for being a

midnight appointment
RULING
YES, the appointments of Messrs. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Placido B. Villarta

are void for being made during the period of the ban. They also come within the first
prohibition that relates to appointments which are considered to be for the purpose
of influencing the election. Even though the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is
considered a public interest, there is no compelling reason in this case to justify the
reason behind making the appointments during the ban.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
GR No. 191002| 615 SCRA 666| March 17, 2010| Bersamin
In reversing the Valenzuela ruling, the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII
is now deemed inapplicable to the appointments in the judiciary.
FACTS
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno is set to compulsory retire by May 17, 2010
which clearly occurs after the May 10, 2010 Presidential elections.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus,

requesting that the Judicial Bar and Council (JBC) be compelled to submit to the
President the list of at least three (3) nominees for the position of the next Chief
Justice. They also questioned whether the President can appoint the successor of the
Chief Justice during election ban.
ISSUE
Whether the incumbent President has the power to appoint the next Chief
Justice during the ban
RULING
YES, the President can appoint the next Chief Justice. Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution prohibits the President from making appointments within
two months before the election until the end of his term but this does not apply to
appointments that fills a vacancy in the Supreme Court or other appointments in the
judiciary. Section 15 confines the prohibition to appointments made in the
Executive Department, and not in the Judicial Department.
Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically provides that

appointments of Supreme Court Justices can only be done by the President after JBC
have submitted a list of at least three nominees while Section 4(1), Article VIII
mandates that these vacancies be filled within 90 days from the occurrence of such
vacancy.
The intervention of the JBC eradicates the hazard that such appointments in
the Judiciary is made for the purpose of vote-buying or of satisfying partisan
considerations. Through the JBC, appointments in the judiciary is de-politicized and
this process is clearly seen to be absent in the Aytona case where 350 midnight
appointments were done by then President Garcia.
ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA-GARAFIL vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and HON.

SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ
GR No. 203372 |June 16, 2015| Carpio
Appointment is a process in which all of its requisites starting with the selection
by the appointing power up to the acceptance of the appointment by the appointee
must be present. Hence, if the act of acceptance falls within the prohibited
appointment contemplated by Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution such
appointment even if the other requisites were done prior to the ban shall be void.
FACTS
The case at hand is a consolidation four (4) petitions that questions that
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2) for being inconsistent with Section
15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Before the May 2010 elections, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued

more than 800 appointments to different positions in several government offices.
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibits appointments two (2)
months before the election until the end of the President’s term, except for
temporary or acting appointments. Thus, March 10, 2010 was declared to be the cut
off date for valid appointments.
Paper evidence shows that some of these appointments such as Atty.

Velicaria-Garafil’s appointment as State Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor
General were transmitted days before the cut off date for the valid appointments
before the election ban, specifically, on March 8, 2010. Atty. Velicaria-Garafil was
able to take his oath on March 22, 2010 and assumed his office on April 6, 2010.
On June 30, 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino (President Aquino) took his
oath of office and on July 30, 2010, he issued EO 2 that recalled and revoked
appointments made by former President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the
constitutional ban on midnight appointments.
As a result of EO 2, Atty. Velicaria-Garafil, upon reporting to work on August

9, 2010, was made to return office-issued laptop and cellphone and was informed
that her salary has ceased as of August 7, 2010. Atty. Velicaria-Garafil then filed a
petition for certiorari on September 1, 2010 which prays for the nullification of EO 2
and for her reinstatement as State Solicitor II.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner’s appointment violates Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution
RULING
YES, the petitioner’s appointment is a midnight appointment and is considered

void for being violative of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. For an
appointment to be considered valid and complete, there should be the concurrence
of the following elements:
1. Authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;

2. Transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of transmittal;
3. A vacant position at the time of the appointment; and,
4. Receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee who possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.
These elements should be present before the start of the election ban. The mere
signing by the President of the transmittal letters of appointment before the election
ban is not enough to claim that those appointments are not midnight appointments.
The President can simply sign those letters and stack it away in his drawer. These
transmittal letters must be released to Malacañang Records Office (MRO) for
purposes of verification and appointment letters will be released together with the
transmittal letter from the MRO. For an appointment not to be declared as a
midnight appointment, acceptance of appointment must be within the period for
valid appointments and should not fall within the duration of the election ban.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON STRAIT,

E.G., TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN
SPECIES, JOINED IN AND REPRESENTED HEREIN BY HUMAN BEINGS GLORIA
ESTENZO RAMOS AND ROSE-LIZA EISMA-OSORIO, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS
LEGAL GUARDIANS OF THE LESSER LIFE-FORMS AND AS RESPONSIBLE
STEWARDS OF GOD'S CREATIONS, Petitioners, v. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE),
SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR REGIONAL DIRECTOR-REGION VII AND IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CHAIRPERSON OF THE TANON STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE
MANAGEMENT BOARD, BUREAU OF FISHERIES AND AQUATIC RESOURCES
(BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM I. SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR

FOR REGION VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO.,
LTD. (JAPEX), AS REPRESENTED BY ITS PHILIPPINE AGENT, SUPPLY OILFIELD
SERVICES, INC.
GR No. 180771| 756 SCRA 513| April 21, 2015| Leonardo-De Castro
Under the principle of qualified political agency the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally.
FACTS
The case at hand is a consolidation of two (2) petitions filed under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Court. The petitions deals with the Service Contract No. 46 (SC-
46) which allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum
resources within Tanon Strait.
The petitioners seek to prohibit the respondents from implementing SC-46

for violation of the 1987 Constitution and other international and municipal laws.
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the
Department of Energy (DOE), entered a Geophysical Survey and Exploration
Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX
converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of
petroleum resources in a block that covers approximately 2,850 square kilometers
offshore of the Tanon Strait.
After a series of research and exploration, JAPEX began to drill an

exploratory well with a depth of 3,150 meters nears Pinamungajan town in western
Cebu. This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008. Petitioners now protest the
adverse ecological impact of JAPEX’s oil exploration and showed that after the
surveys and explorations done by JAPEX, fish catch were reduced by 50 to 70
percent. They also argued that SC-46 is null and void for being violative of Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or not SC-46 is constitutional
RULING
YES, because the President was not a signatory to SC-46 and the same was
not submitted to the Congress. Section 2 (4), Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
clearly requires that the President himself enter into any service contract for the
exploration of petroleum. SC-46 is clearly have been entered and signed into only by
the DOE through Secretary Vicente S. Perez. Public respondent have not shown that
the Congress was notified of the execution of SC-46.
Our Constitution requires that the President himself be the signatory of service
agreements with any foreign-owned corporations involving the exploration,
development, and utilization of our minerals and other mineral oils. Respondents
have failed to show that the President had any participation in SC-46.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S.

ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; and HONORABLE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR
GR No. 168056| 469 SCRA 1 | September 1, 2005| Austria-Martinez
When the act of the Secretary of Finance is in pursuance of a mandate as an

agent of the congress and not as the president’s alter ego the President cannot alter or
modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
FACTS
RA No. 9337 or the Expanded Value-Added Tax of 2005, is a consolidation of

three legislative bills,namely: House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No.
1950.
Petitioners contend that Section 4, 5, and 6 of RA No. 9337, amending

Sections 106, 107, and 108 of National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, gives the
President the stand-by authority to raise the value-added tax (VAT) rate to 10% to
12% when a certain condition is met, is an undue delegation of the legislative power
to tax. They further claim that this grant of stand-by authority is an abdication of the
Congress exclusive power to tax because this is not within the ambit of Section
28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners further contest that delegating
such power to the President is contrary to republicanism and insist that it nullified
the President’s power of control which includes the authority to set aside and nullify
the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of Finance.
ISSUE
Whether RA No. 9337 violates the doctrine of non-delegation of powers
RULING
NO, it is merely a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which the

administrations of the increase rate under the law is contingent. There would be no
discretion that would be exercised by the President and it is the ministerial duty of
the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the
conditions specified by the Congress. The Congress also simply granted the
Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact; therefore,
there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of the law.
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO VS THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

GR No. 192935| 637 SCRA 78| December 7, 2010 | Mendoza
Pursuant to Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution which mandates the
President to faithfully execute all laws, the President may create ad hoc committees
such as truth commissions to investigate against class of previous administrations
graft and corruptions.
FACTS
For consideration before the Court are two (2) consolidated cases that assails
the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1,entitled Creating the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 , dated July 30, 2010.
Prior to the May 2010 elections, then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III
declared his condemnation of graft and corruption with a slogan, Kung walang
corrupt, walang mahirap. The said slogan convinced the Filipino people of his
sincerity which led to his presidency. To transform this campaign into reality,
President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO 1) which established the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.
ISSUE
Whether or not the President has the power to create ad hoc commissions
RULING
YES, he has the power to create ad hoc commissions. The President’s power
to conduct investigations aids him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws. The
creation of Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 supports the faithful execution of
fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency. This powers are
inherent to the President as the Chief Executive.
Allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to occur is to allow an inquiry into

matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly guided
and counselled in the performance of his duties that are relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land.
VIRGILIO ALMARIO, ET AL. VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL.

GR No. 83896| 701 SCRA 269| July 16, 2013| Leonardo-De Castro
The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists

should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws.
FACTS
On April 27, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation

No. 1001 and created the category of Award and Decoration of National Artist to be
awarded to Filipinos who made distinct contributions to arts and letters.
On May 15, 1973, former President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1144
which amended Proclamation No. 1001 by creating a National Artist Awards
Committee. Members of Board of Trustees of the CCP constitutes the Committee and
was tasked to create rules to guide its deliberations in choosing the National Artists.
Republic Act No. 7356 or the Law Creating the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts was signed into law on April 3, 1992. It created the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). They were tasked to plan, organize,
and implement order of National Artists in coordination with CCP. They also
established the criteria for selection,nomination procedure, and screening and
selection process of the National Artist nominees.
Executive Order No. 236, Establishing the Honors Code of the Philippines to
Create an Order of Precedence of Honors Conferred and for Other Purposes, was
issued on September 19, 2003. It created a Committee on Honors to assist the
President in evaluating nominations for recipients of honors.
A joint meeting of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and CCP Board of

Trustees was held to discuss the 2009 Order of National Artists. The nomination
period was set for September 2007 to December 31, 2007 but was extended to
February 28, 2008. The pre-screening was held from January to March 2008. On
April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met and a total of 87 nominees were
considered during the deliberation, then a shortlist of 32 names was compiled.
Final list for the awards signed jointly by the Chairperson of the NCCA,
Undersecretary Vilma Labrador, and President and Artistic Director of CCP, Nestor
Jardin, was sent to the President. Meanwhile, the Office of the President received
nominations from various sectors and the Committee on Honors purportedly
processed these nominations.
The Committee on Honors submitted a memorandum to President

Macapagal-Arroyo recommending the conferment of the awards to the four
recommendations of NCCA. Proclamation No. 1823 was issued on June 30 2009
declaring the four recommendations of NCCA as National Artists. Later on July 6,
2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued, proclaiming the respondents as
National Artists.
Petitioners filed this petition for prohibition, certiorari, and injunction

praying that the Order of National Artists on respondents be rendered as grave
abuse of discretion.
ISSUE
Whether the President has the discretion to confer the Order of the National
Artists to nominees who are not nominated by NCCA and CCP Board of trustees
RULING
NO, the President does not have the power or discretion to confer the award
on nominees who are not recommended by the proper authority. The powers of the
CCP Board of Trustees and of the NCCA Board of Commissioners when it comes to
the conferment of the Order of National Artists are clear - they jointly administer the
said award and upon their advice, the President confers the Order of National
Artists.
The advice of NCCA and CCP Board is subject to the President’s approval but
the discretion of the President in the conferment of the award must be exercised in
accordance with his duty to see that laws are faithfully executed. The rules and
guidelines regarding the Order of National Artists issued by the CCP Board of
Trustees and the NCCA pursuant to their statutory mandates have the force and
effect of law,
CESAR R. DE LEON VS J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO

GR Nos. 85243 & 85442| 178 SCRA 457| October 12, 1989 | Feria
It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined in the

Constitution and honored not in the breach but in the observance, that all executive
departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the President of the
Philippines.
FACTS
The case at hand is a consolidation of two (2) petitions that involve the same
issue against the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, J. Antonio Carpio,
who declined to reinstate the petitioners.
The employment of Francisco R. Estavillo and Cesar R. De Leon (Petitioners)

as Agent III and Head Agent in National Bureau of Investigation,respectively, were
terminated by Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales on January 27, 1987. Estavillo
was notified of his dismissal on March 6 1987, while De Leon was notified on
February 6, 1987. Petitioners appealed to the Review Committee created under
Executive Order No. 17 but the said committee refused to act on their petitions for it
had lost jurisdiction due to the ratification of the new Constitution on February 2,
1987. They advised the petitioners to solicit relief from the Civil Service Commission
which they did. The petitioners were sustained by the Merit Systems Protection
Board of the said Commission and that their dismissals were invalid and
unconstitutional because it violated their security of tenure under the 1987
Constitution.
On September 29, 1987, Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro

sent an order referring to the reinstatement of Estavillo to the respondent “for his
information and appropriate action” and on March 4, 1988, Justice Silvestre H. Bello
III also sent an order to the respondent to reinstate De Leon. The respondent
returned the said orders to the Civil Service Commission without action. The
respondent claim that these orders were null and void for having been rendered
without jurisdiction. The Board of the Commission sent another Order dated June
20,1988, rejecting the contention of the respondent.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation can

disobey a direct order issued to him by the Secretary of Justice.
RULING
NO, the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation cannot disobey the
orders of Secretary of Justice. Secretary Ordonez, the Secretary of Justice, was acting
in the regular discharge of his functions as an alter ego of the President. His orders
and decisions should be respected and obeyed by the respondent, after all, the
National Bureau of Investigations is under the Department of Justice which is under
the direct control of its Secretary.
LORETO BARRIOQUINTO AND NORBERTO JIMENEZ vs. ENRIQUE A.

FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO BELMONTE AND FELIISIMO OCAMPO AS
COMMISSIONERS OF THE 14TH GUERRILLA AMNESTY COMMISSION
GR No. L-1278| 82 Phil. 642| January 21, 1949| Cruz
Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be
declared by the court or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the
amnesty.
FACTS
This is petition for special action of mandamus against the respondents who
are members of the 14th Guerilla Amnesty Commission to urge them to act and
decide whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty.
Petitioners were charged with murder. They became aware of Proclamation

No.8 which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with a felony
penalized under the Revised Penal Code due to resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed from December 8,
1941 to the date when a particular area of the country where the offense was
committed was liberated from enemy control. Petitioners herein submitted their
cases to the Guerilla Amnesty Commission.
After the preliminary hearing, the Commission issued an order returning the
cases of the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga without deciding
whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of the said Amnesty
Proclamation. The Commission contends that the petitioners cannot invoke the
benefits of the amnesty for they have not admitted committing their offense.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners are entitled to invoke the Amnesty Proclamation

without admitting their offense.
RULING
YES, the petitioners can invoke the Amnesty Proclamation. It is not necessary
that the petitioners, as a condition precedent, admit having committed the criminal
act which they are charged with and allege amnesty as defense. It is enough that the
evidence of the complainant or the accused shows that the offense comes within the
terms of said Amnesty Proclamation.
The right to the benefits of amnesty cannot be waived once established by

the evidence presented by the complainant or the prosecution. There is also no need
for the accused to admit his responsibility for the offense before a court of Amnesty
Commission may investigate and extend or not to him the benefits of amnesty.
SALVACION A. MONSANTO vs. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.

G.R. No. 78239| 170 SCRA 190| February 9, 1989| EN BANC| Fernan, C.J
WRITER: MA. CHARLENE CADIZ
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon
undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
FACTS
Petitioner was then the Assistant Treasurer of Calbayog City. She was
convicted of estafa through falsification of public documents along with three others
by Sandiganbayan. While her Motion for Reconsideration was pending, President
Ferdinand Marcos granted her absolute pardon.
Petitioner then requested reinstatement to her former post. Her request was
forwarded to the Ministry of Finance for resolution. The latter ruled for her
reinstatement without the need for appointment from the date she was extended
with absolute pardon. Consequently, petitioner sought for reconsideration on the
ground that absolute pardon extinguished her criminal liability. Hence, her service
should be deemed uninterrupted and it entitled her to reinstatement with payment

of backwages from the date she was preventively suspended.
ISSUE
Whether a public officer can be reinstated without appointment after being

granted with absolute pardon
RULING
NO. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence
of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never
committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a
pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase
the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash
out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
The Supreme Court emphasized that Pardon granted after conviction frees
the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his
civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person’s innocence (which is
rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office
necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such
pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. Petitioner
may reapply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her
conviction.
VICENTE GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,

THE HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE
NO. IV
G.R. No. 75025| 226 SCRA 3356| September 14, 1993| FIRST DIVISION |
Bellosillo
When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the
pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby
restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the
finding of guilt.
FACTS
Petitioner, a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of

Telecommunications in Lucena City, was dismissed from service due to the loss of
several telegraph poles by the Ministry of Public Works. Likewise, he was charged
with qualified theft with the Court of First Instance—which eventually acquitted
him. Thereafter he requested to be reinstated, but was denied by the Bureau of
Telecommunications.
The President subsequently granted him executive clemency. Petitioner then

claimed for payment of back salaries from the Commission on Audit (COA). On the
other hand, COA dismissed it on the grounds that executive clemency was silent
regarding the payment of back salaries, he was not reinstated and that executive
clemency only freed him from criminal liability, but not to his administrative
liability. However, records showed that he was actually recalled from service—
although it was not clear whether or not it was to the same position. Hence,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prayed for mandamus against COA.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner who was acquitted is entitled to reinstatement after

being granted with absolute pardon
RULING
YES. If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this
innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he has not been found
guilty of the offense charges. When a person is given pardon because he did not truly
commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his
criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained
character prior to the finding of guilt.
It is to be noted that petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind the

grant of executive clemency to him. The bestowal of executive clemency on
petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative
decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the
service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating
petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement,
which is rendered automatic by the grant of pardon. This signifies that petitioner
need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to
his office ipso facto upon the issuance of clemency.
LEO ECHEGARAY vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.

G.R. No. 132601| 301 SCRA 96| January 19, 1999| EN BANC| Puno
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can
protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
FACTS
On January 4, 1990, the Court issued a Resolution temporarily restraining the
execution of Leo Echegaray and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
Respondent then filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution -- on
the ground that it has encroached executive authority because he contended that
once a decision of the court has become final and executory, its execution transfers
to the exclusive authority of the Executive.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court trenched on executive authority by issuing a TRO

on the execution of petitioner
RULING
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of

jurisdiction. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal,
is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the
circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of
the litigants to prevent unfairness. Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution cannot
be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their
decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final
judgment
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life
of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no
higher right than the right to life. For the public respondents therefore to contend
that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final
conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three
branches of our government.
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
G.R. No. 206666| January 21, 2015| EN BANC| Leonardo-De Castro
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored
all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended
to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
FACTS
On September 12, 2007, former President Joseph Estrada was convicted of

plunder. Later on, he was granted with executive clemency by way of pardon by
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Former President Estrada then filed for
candidacy for the mayoralty position in the City of Manila during the 2012 election.
Consequently, petitioner Atty. Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against
former Pres. Estrada on the ground that he is not qualified for having been
convicted for Plunder. The said petition was dismissed by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Estrada eventually won in the mayoralty race. Hence, Atty.
Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for certiorari. Likewise, Alfredo Lim moved for leave to
intervene in the case.
ISSUE
Whether or not former President Estrada, a public official who was convicted
of plunder then later on granted with executive clemency, is qualified to run for
public office
RULING
YES. The statement "he is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," to
the mind of the Court, is crystal clear – the pardon granted to former President
Estrada was absolute, meaning, it was not only unconditional, it was unrestricted in
scope, complete and plenary in character, as the term "political rights" adverted to
has a settled meaning in law and jurisprudence.
The form or manner by which the President, or Congress for that matter,
should exercise their respective Constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot be
interfered with unless it is so provided in the Constitution. A close scrutiny of the
text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in
the pardon.
In relation to the effects that pardon restored Estrada’s civil and political
rights, the right to seek public elective office is recognized by law as falling under
the whole gamut of civil and political rights. Hence, the pardon granted to former
President Estrada admits no other interpretation, that he regained his full civil and
political rights – including the right to seek elective office.
Finally, the “Whereas” clause of the pardon did not make the pardon
conditional. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the
decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S. TULAWIE, HJI. MOH. YUSOP ISMI, JULHAJAN

AWADI AND SPO1 SATTAL H. JADJULI vs. GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF SULU; GEN. JUANCHO SABAN, COL. EUGENIO
CLEMEN PN, P/SUPT. JULASIRIM KASIM AND P/SUPT. BIENVENIDO G. LATAG,
IN THEIR CAPACITY AS OFFICERS OF THE PHIL. MARINES AND PHIL.

NATIONAL POLICE, RESPECTIVELY
G.R. No. 187298| 675 SCRA 482| July 34, 2012| EN BANC| Sereno
It is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency

powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what
became known as the calling out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.
FACTS
Three members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Patikul, Sulu. Consequently, the ICRC
and the Philippine National Police (PNP) organized a local group headed by
Governor Abdusakar Makail Tan. Governor Tan then created the Civilian Emergency
Force (CEF).
Eventually, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1 series of 2009, declaring

a state of emergency in the province of Sulu and called upon the PNP and CEF to
setup checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including
arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.
Petitioners herein contend that Proclamation No. 1 was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the grounds that it
threatened fundamental freedoms under the Constitution and that it was issued
ultra vires, null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency
powers and calling-out powers.
ISSUE
Whether the Calling out power of the President may be exercised by a Local
Government Unit, such as a governor
RULING
NO. In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission, the framers never

intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in
emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over police units
in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance
from the police in day to day situations.
Hence, respondent is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed
forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan
exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the
Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out
powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and
may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE SAHALI-GENERALE

vs. HON. RONALDO PUNO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ALTER-EGO OF
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AND ANYONE ACTING IN HIS
STEAD AND ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), OR ANY OF THEIR UNITS OPERATING IN
THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO (ARMM), AND PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, OR ANY OF THEIR UNITS OPERATING IN ARMM
G.R. No. 190259| 651 SCRA 228| June 7, 2011| EN BANC| Abad
The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in
such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not
need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
FACTS
On November 24, 2009, after the massacre of 57 men and women, President
Gloria Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1946, declaring the provinces of
Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency. Pursuant to such proclamation, she commanded both the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP) to conduct measures
allowed by the Constitution and laws to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence. President Arroyo also issued AO 273 transferring the supervision
of ARMM from the Office of the President to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG). Later, she amended AO 273 to AO 273-A, delegating instead of
transferring the supervision of ARMM to DILG.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1946, AO 273 and

AO 273-A on the ground that the President had no factual basis for declaring state of
emergency in Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato—specifically because no critical violent
incidents occurred in such areas.
ISSUES
Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers

when she called out the AFP and PNP
RULING
The deployment of AFP and PNP was not by itself an exercise of emergency
powers under Section 23(2), Article VI of the Constitution. The President only
declared a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. Moreover, she did not
act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise
extraordinary powers. The calling out of the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the
President. She did not need a Congressional authority to exercise the same. It is
clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need
for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it
is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the
Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment.
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN AND ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES vs. GLORIA

MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EDUARDO ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), OR ANY OF THEIR UNITS,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), OR ANY OF THEIR UNITS, JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES ACTING UNDER THEIR DIRECTION AND CONTROL
G.R. No. 190293| 668 SCRA 504| March 20, 2012| EN BANC| Abad
Given the prompt lifting of that proclamation before Congress could review it
and before any serious question affecting the rights and liberties of Maguindanaos
inhabitants could arise, the Court deems any review of its constitutionality the
equivalent of beating a dead horse. Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments
of the government dictate that the Court should be cautious in entertaining actions
that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative
department.
FACTS
Following the killing of 57 innocent civilians in Maguindanao, President
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1946, declaring a state of emergency in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City. Subsequently, she issued
Proclamation No. 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of writ of
habeas corpus.
Within 48 hours after such declaration, President Arroyo submitted her

report to the Congress. However, before the Congress could review and act on it,
President Arroyo lifted martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
Petitioners then assailed the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1959.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court can exercise its power of judicial review to
determine the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1959
RULING
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the case was already moot and academic.
President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress,
which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in
these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of
martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
Also, since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have
not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the operation
and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue
any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by
Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were
arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in
court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting
arrests made in those eight days.
B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO V. GUDANI AND LT. COL. ALEXANDER F. BALUTAN

vs. LT./ GEN. GENEROSO S. SENGA AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPPINES, COL. GILBERTO JOSE C. ROA AS THE PRE-TRIAL
INVESTIGATING OFFICER, THE PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL
G.R. No. 170165| 498 SCRA 671| August 15, 2006| Tinga
The Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to
the President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as
commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon the
office, the other functions being clearly civil in nature.
FACTS
Senator Biazon invited several officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) — including B/Gen. Gudani, Lt. Col. Balutan and Lt./Gen. Senga, to attend a
public hearing at the Senate, regarding the issue on the phone conversation between
President Arroyo and COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano.
On the night before the hearing, Gen. Senga prohibited, as per the instruction
of President Arroyo, any AFP personnel to appear before any Congressional or
Senate hearing without the latter’s approval. However, both of them still appeared
during the hearing. President Arroyo then issued Executive Order No. 464. It
enjoined officials of both the executive department and the military establishment
from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her prior approval.
ISSUE
Whether or not the President has the power to bar military officers from
appearing before Congressional Inquiries
RULING
The Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP
to the President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose
duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties imposed
upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil in nature.
The Supreme Court held that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by
virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military
officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. Also, any chamber
of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the
consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance.
Moreover, where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and
obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to
choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President,
and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, DULY REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR

JESUS SACDALAN AND/OR VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIÑOL, FOR AND IN
HIS OWN BEHALF vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), REPRESENTED BY
SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY
CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN AND/OR GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON,
JR., THE LATTER IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESENT AND DULY-APPOINTED
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON THE PEACE PROCESS (OPAPP) OR THE SO-CALLED
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON THE PEACE PROCESS
G.R. No. 183591| 568 SCRA 402| Ocotber 14, 2008| EN BANC| Carpio Morales
The Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in

her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.
FACTS
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and MILF were set to sign
the final form of the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-
AD). However, the consolidated petitions herein assailed the constitutionality of the
signing of the MOA-AD and invoked their right to information on matters of public
concern—thereby asked the Court to furnish them with complete and official copies
of the MOA-AD.
ISSUE
Whether in the course of peace negotiations, the president may pursue

reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments
RULING
YES. That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with
rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she
has no such authority. Similarly, the Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations
is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As
Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public
peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and
suppress rebellion and lawless violence.
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of
office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does
not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to
recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to
recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for
constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be
construed as an unconstitutional act. Given the limited nature of the Presidents’
authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third
party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as
recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are

vested.
RAMON A. GONZALES vs. RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,

MACARIO PERALTA, JR., AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PEDRO GIMENEZ, AS
AUDITOR GENERAL, CORNELIO BALMACEDA, AS SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
AND INDUSTRY, AND SALVADOR MARINO, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. L-21897| 9 SCRA 230 | October 22, 1963| EN BANC| Concepcion
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws
enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the
legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not
defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly
repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of
the very act prohibited by said laws.
FACTS
Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice

from private sources. The Government entered into two contracts with Burma and
Republic of Vietnam for the purchase of rice—which allegedly constitute valid
executive agreements under international law.
Petitioner then filed a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the

respondents from implementing the decision. Allegedly, respondents acted with
grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction on the ground that such
importation violated Republic Act Nos. 3452 and 220, both explicitly prohibiting the
importation of rice and corn “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency”.
ISSUE
Whether or not executive agreements can repeal a law

RULING
NO. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system,
enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not,
by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes
enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is
to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto
power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of
laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for
the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN) vs. AQUINO

G.R. No. 170516| 558 SCRA 468| July 16, 2008| EN BANC| Carpio Morales
While the Court should guard against the abuse of executive privilege, it should
also give full recognition to the validity of the privilege whenever it is claimed within
the proper bounds of executive power
FACTS
Petitioners sought to obtain the full-text of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiation process. The respondents’ refusal to provide it, as
contended by the petitioners, was a violation of their right to information on public
matters and contravened other constitutional provisions on transparency.
On the other hand, respondents asserted that diplomatic negotiations were

covered by the doctrine of executive privilege. As such, it is an exception to the right
of information and full public disclosure.
ISSUE
Whether diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive
privilege
RULING
YES. In discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court

in Chavez v. PCGG held that information on inter-government exchanges prior to the
conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable
safeguards for the sake of national interest.
In PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court stressed that secrecy of negotiations with

foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of
speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information
Also, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept
perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunity for discussion
before a treaty is approved the offers exchanged by the parties during the
negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published.
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to public
scrutiny would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly
expressing their views during negotiations. Verily, while the Court should guard
against the abuse of executive privilege, it should also give full recognition to the
validity of the privilege whenever it is claimed within the proper bounds of
executive power, as in this case.
SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, et. al. vs. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY, represented by HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, and the DEPARTMENT
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, represented by HON. BLAS OPLE
G.R. No. 158088| 462 SCRA 622| July 6, 2005| EN BANC| Puno
It is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the

Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it.
FACTS
The Philippines, through its Charge d Affairs, signed the Rome Statute
establishing the International Criminal Court on December 28, 2000. The said
Statute required that its provision be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval

of the signatory states first. In line with this, the petitioners filed a petition for
mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and Department of
Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the said Statute to the Senate for
ratification.
ISSUE
Whether the Executive Secretary or the Department of Foreign Affairs have

the duty to transmit to the Senate a copy of the Rome Statute without the signature
of the President
RULING
NO. Ratification is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the
provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an
executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government. It should be
emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however,
is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a
treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify
it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf
is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the
competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a
writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official duties.
BAYAN (BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN), JUNK VFA MOVEMENT, BISHOP

TOMAS MILLAMENA (IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE), BISHOP ELMER
BOLOCAN (UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST OF THE PHIL.), DR. REYNALDO
LEGASCA, MD, KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KILUSANG MAYO UNO,
GABRIELA, PROLABOR, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY
DOMINGO SIAZON, DEFENSE SECRETARY ORLANDO MERCADO, BRIG. GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO FERNAN, SENATOR
FRANKLIN DRILON, SENATOR BLAS OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO BIAZON, AND
SENATOR FRANCISCO TATAD
G.R. No. 138570| 342 SCRA 449| October 10, 2000| EN BANC| Buena
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the

Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least
two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate.
FACTS:
The Philippines and United States entered into a Military Bases Agreement
on March 14, 1947. Upon its expiration, both states negotiated a possible extension
of the said agreement. The US and Philippines panel then exchanged notes on the
complementing strategic interests of both sides. Consequently, they were able to
produce a draft text which was made the subject of conferences and negotiations
thereafter.
On October 6, 1998, President Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA. Subsequently,

the instrument of ratification, letter of the President and the VFA were transmitted
to the President in compliance with Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition on the
ground that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the VFA
and that it was unconstitutional.
ISSUE
Whether or not the President committed grave abuse of discretion in

ratifying the VFA
RULING
NO. In this case, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the
VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the
elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken
equally as a treaty.
Moreover, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the
agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful
exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it. Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of
the President involving the VFA-specifically the acts of ratification and entering into
a treaty and those necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts -
squarely fall within the sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be
validly struck down, much less calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear
showing of grave abuse of power or discretion
ISABELITA C. VINUYA, et. al., vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ALBERTO G. ROMULO
G.R. No. 162230| 619 SCRA 533| April 28, 2010| EN BANC| Castillo
The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its
nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches.
FACTS
Petitioners are members of the Malaya Lolas, a non-stock, non-profit

organization established to support rape victims of the Japanese Military forces
during the Second World War. They requested assistance from the Executive
Department through DOJ, DFA and OSG in filing a claim against the Japanese officials
and military offices who establish the comfort women stations in the Philippines.
However, officials of the Executive Department declined to render assistance on the
ground that their due compensation have been satisfied already by the compliance
of Japan in its Peace Treaty with the Philippines.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE
Whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in

declining to espouse the claims of the petitioners
RULING
NO. It is well-established that "the conduct of the foreign relations of our

government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-- 'the
political'--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. The question
whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case,
the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to
waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of
1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR.,

IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO
ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ AND PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA vs. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS,
CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO,
FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONER, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
CHIEF OF STAFF, RESPECTIVELY
G.R. No. 88211| 177 SCRA 668| October 27, 1989| EN BANC| Per Curiam
It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested,
has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution.
FACTS
On September 15, 1989, the Court dismissed the petition to allow President
Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines. It was made after finding that the
President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in prohibiting
their return on the ground that it poses a threat to national interest and welfare.
Consequently, the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners claim
that the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; and if she
has, she exercised it arbitrarily; and that there is no basis to bar their return.
ISSUE
Whether President Aquino has the power to bar a Filipino from his own
country
RULING
YES. The court ruled that it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom
executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the
grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties
under the Constitution. That the President has powers other than those expressly
stated in the Constitution is nothing new. This is recognized under the U.S.
Constitution where we patterned the distribution of governmental powers among
three separate branches. Moreover, among the duties of the President under the
Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote
the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses
and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present
circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty.
JUDICIARY
FERNANDO LOPEZ vs GERARDO ROXAS and PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL
G.R. NO. L-25716| 17 SCRA 756| July 28, 1866| EN BANC| Concepcion
PET has the judicial power to determine whether or not said duly certified
election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with, or reflect the true
result of the elections in the areas covered by each, and if not, to recount the ballots
cast, and incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine
whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which the
Congress has power to do.
FACTS
Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the main contenders for Vice
Presidency during the general elections on November 19, 1965. Lopez garnered the
largest number of votes and was declared the winner. However, Roxas contended
that he was the one who garnered the largest number of votes. Roxas then filed an
election protest against Lopez with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).
Subsequently, Lopez filed an action for prohibition with preliminary

injunction against Roxas to prevent the PET from hearing and deciding the case.
This is upon the ground that Republic Act No. 1793 which created the Tribunal, is
unconstitutional and that all proceedings taken by it are a nullity.
ISSUE
Whether the Presidential Electoral Tribunal has the judicial power to hear
and decide electoral protests
RULING
YES. Republic Act No. 1793, by providing, further, that the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal “shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten
Members of the Supreme Court,” it conferred upon such Court an additional original
jurisdiction of an exclusive character. RA No. 1793 has not created a new or
separate court. It has merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
The PET is not inferior to the Supreme Court, since it is the same court
although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than
those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Moreover, the
power to be the “judge … of contest relating to election, returns, and qualifications”
of any public officer is essentially judicial. PET has the judicial power to determine
whether or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or
tampered with, or reflect the true result of the elections in the areas covered by
each, and if not, to recount the ballots cast, and incidentally thereto, pass upon the
validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the
affirmative, in whose favor, which the Congress has power to do.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO

LANSANG RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, AND BAYANI ALCALA VS. BRIGADIER-
GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY
G.R. No. L-33964| 42 SCRA 448| December 11, 1971| EN BANC| Concepcion
When there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has
overridden private rights secured by that Constitution, the subject is necessarily one
for judicial inquiry in an appropriate proceeding directed against the individuals
charged with the transgression
FACTS
On August 21, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at Plaza Miranda while
the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding its public meeting. Consequently,
several were injured and eight persons were killed. President Marcos then issued
Proclamation No. 889, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Several petitions for habeas corpus were then filed by persons who were
arrested without warrant and detained-- who also assailed the validity of the said
Proclamation.
ISSUE
Whether or not Proclamation No. 889 can be subject to judicial review
RULING
YES. In Sterling v. Constantin, the Supreme Court of the United States,

speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, declared that when there is a substantial
showing that the exertion of state power has overridden private rights secured by
that Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry in an appropriate
proceeding directed against the individuals charged with the transgression. To such
a case the Federal judicial power extends and, so extending, the court has all the
authority appropriate to its exercise.
The Court also stated that "a majority of the Court" had "tentatively arrived
at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the
factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A and
thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the
requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par 2, of the
Philippine Constitution.
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT

OF EDUCATION, CULTURE & SPORTS, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, IN HER
CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT OF CITY SCHOOLS OF MANILA
vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA
BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL
CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER
G.R. No. 96681| 204 SCRA 483 | December 2, 1991| EN BANC| Narvasa
Fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial

function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function.
FACTS
Some 800 public school teachers, undertook mass concerted actions to

dramatize and highlight their grievances which were not acted upon. Subsequently,
the Secretary of Education ordered them to return to work in twenty-four hours—
otherwise, they shall face dismissal. Some were preventively suspended and
temporarily replaced.
The respondents teachers then filed a complaint with the Commission on

Human Rights—claiming that they were denied due process because they were not
notified of their sudden replacement and even for reasons unknown to them. The
Commission then scheduled a dialogue and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño.
Petitioners now contend that the Commission on Human Rights has no

jurisdiction on the case.
ISSUE
Whether the Commission on Human Rights has the power to hear and
resolve the complaint filed by the teachers
RULING
NO. The Court declared the Commission on Human Rights to have no such
power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions
of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the

faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS and THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. ANG CHO KIO
@ ANG MING HUY and the COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-30001| 33 SCRA 494| June 23, 1970| EN BANC | Zaldivar
The matter of whether an alien who violated the laws in this country may
remain or be deported is a political question that should be left entirely to the Chief
Executive to decide. Under the principle of separation of powers, it is not within the
province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or express a suggestion, that would
reflect on the wisdom or propriety of the action of the Chief Executive on matters
purely political in nature
FACTS
Ang Cho Kio (Ang Ming Huy) was convicted for various offenses. However,
the President granted him pardon on the condition that he will voluntarily leave the
Philippines upon his release and never to return to the country. He then accepted it
and left the country.
On June 26, 1966, Ang Cho Kio arrived at the Manila International Airport
under the name of Ang Ming Huy. He held a round trip ticket to Honolulu and has to
stop-over for 72 hours in Manila. His friends invited him to stay longer thus they
requested a fourteen-day extension of his stay in the Philippines from the Bureau of
Immigration. Subsequently, he was identified then arrested.
The Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, ordered him

recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence for having
violated the condition of his pardon. Ang Cho Kio then filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus from the Court of First Instance of Rizal—which dismissed it. He then
appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance as well as recommended to allow Ang Cho Kio to leave the country on the
first available transportation abroad.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court can advise to allow Ang Cho Kio to leave the
country
RULING
When the Chief Executive, exercising his powers purusuat to Section 64(i) of
the Revised Administrative Code, ordered Ang Cho Kio recommitted to prison, it is
assumed that the Chief Executive had decided that Ang Cho Ki should be dealt with
that way under the circumstances. For the court to suggest to the Chief Executive to
modify his decision to recommit Ang Cho Kio to prison by allowing him to leave the
country instead is indeed to interfere with the functions of the Chief Executive.
The matter of whether an alien who violated the laws in this country may
remain or be deported is a political question that should be left entirely to the Chief
Executive to decide. Under the principle of separation of powers, it is not within the
province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or express a suggestion, that would
reflect on the wisdom or propriety of the action of the Chief Executive on matters
purely political in nature.
LEO ECHEGARAY vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, et. al.

G.R. No. 132601| 301 SCRA 96| 19 January 1999| Puno
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
The rule on finality of judgment cannot divest the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment—the finality of a judgment
does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers over the case.
FACTS
On 4 January 1999, petitioner’s execution day, the Supreme Court convened

on a Special Session to hear whether petitioner’s allegations about the moves in
Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not.
The Court believed there were good reasons why it should not dismiss petitioner’s
allegations as mere speculations or surmises and hence temporarily restrained the
execution until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present
regular session of Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or
modification of the law is going to be made. The respondent filed a motion assailing
the authority of the Supreme Court to do so, arguing that since the decision on the
case has become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of
executive authority, rendering the Court’s action as trenching upon it.
ISSUE
Whether the execution of the decision, having become final and

executory, enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department.
RULING
NO. The stay order is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does
not trench on executive powers, or on congressional prerogatives. The finality of a
judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers over the case. What
the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same, but the
jurisdiction to execute its judgment continues even after the judgment has become
final.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of

jurisdiction as supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and
compel the courts to intervene to prevent unfairness. These are spelled out in the
rules on execution of judgments which the Court now has exclusive power to
promulgate since the 1987 Constitution took away the legislative power of Congress
to repeal, alter, or supplement these rules.
The constitutional provision on the pardoning power of the President cannot

be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their
decisions after their finality, for an accused, who has been convicted by final
judgment, still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the
appropriate courts. Neither can Congress be denied exercise of its power to enact a
law reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The powers of the Executive,
the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE

PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF
THE SUPREME COURT
A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC| 678 SCRA 1| July 31, 2012| Per curiam
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
FACTS
The Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on
Audit (COA), in its opinion dated June 8, 2010, found that an underpayment
amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices
purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during
their incumbency in the Court. COA attributed the difference to the application by
the Supreme Court of the formula prescribed in Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines, based on Resolution of the
Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004, instead of COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A.
In her Memorandum dated August 10, 2010, Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy
Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services, to
the Office of the Chief Justice ,recommended that the Court advise COA to respect
the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula.
ISSUE
Whether COA can compel the Supreme Court to adopt its formula in
computing the purchase price of personal properties assigned to its retiring Justices
during their incumbency in the Court.
RULING
NO. Under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its
independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide
the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to
justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the
Court’s granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the
grant as grantor. As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by
the Judiciary contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require.
The tradition of selling to retired Justices specially designated properties has

been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. The En Banc Resolution also
deems the grant of the privilege as a form of additional retirement benefit that the
Court can grant its officials and employees in the exercise of its power of
administrative supervision. Thus, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 is part of the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to
determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed
of.
To allow COA to substitute the Court’s policy in the disposal of its property
would be tantamount to an encroachment into this judicial prerogative, anathema to
fiscal autonomy, and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution
but, specially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of
powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et. al vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
ASIAN RECRUITMENT COUNCIL PHILIPPINE CHAPTER (ARCO-PHIL.), INC.,
REPRESENTING ITS MEMBERS
G.R. No. 131719| 429 SCRA 81| May 25, 2004| Callejo, Sr.
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
DOCTRINES OF THE CASE
1. An association has standing to file suit for its members despite its lack of direct
interest if its members are affected by the action.
2. One who alleges the unconstitutionality of a statue must prove so beyond
reasonable doubt. This presumption of constitutionality is based on the doctrine of
separation of powers, which enjoin upon each department a becoming respect for
the acts of the other departments.
FACTS
Respondent ARCO-PHIL., Inc., the association representing its member

recruitment agencies, assails certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise
known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as
unconstitutional and enjoins petitioners from enforcing the same. It claims that its
member recruitment agencies will suffer grave and irreparable damage or injury
with the implementation of the law. Petitioners contend that ARCO-PHIL., being a
mere association, has no locus standi being not the real party-in-interest in the
action. They likewise posited that there is presumption of constitutionality of the
law being assailed based on the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Regional Trial Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining

herein petitioners from enforcing the assailed order and writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioners claimed the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
and filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which the latter denied.
Hence, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
1. Whether ARCO-PHIL., Inc. has locus standi to file petition in representation of its
members.
2. Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion in granting the
respondent’s plea for injunctive relief, and the appellate court erred in affirming
the order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.
RULING
1. YES. It has been held that standing jus tertii would be recognized if it can be
shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or
that the right of the third party would be diluted unless the party in court is
allowed to espouse the third party’s constitutional claims. The modern view is
that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members, despite
lack of direct interest. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with
that of its members.
In this case, the respondent filed the petition for declaratory relief under Rule 64
of the Rules of Court for and in behalf of its members who approved separate
resolutions expressly authorizing ARCO-PHIL. to file the said suit for and in their
behalf. The respondent and its members are in every practical sense identical.
ARCO-PHIL. asserts that the assailed provisions violate the constitutional rights
of its members and the officers and employees thereof. It is but the medium
through which its individual members seek to make more effective the
expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances.
2. YES. One who alleges the unconstitutionality of a statue must prove so beyond
reasonable doubt. This presumption of constitutionality is based on the doctrine
of separation of powers, which enjoin upon each department a becoming respect
for the acts of the other departments. The possible unconstitutionality of a
statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an injunction against good faith
attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any
other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. Further, the fear
or chilling effect of the assailed penal provisions of the law on the members of the
respondent does not by itself justify prohibiting the State from enforcing them
against those whom the State believes in good faith to be punishable under the
laws.
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law

assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it
is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favour. In
the case at bar, the respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and
registered recruitment agencies would close shop and stop business operations
because of the assailed penal provisions of the law.
In issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court, and the Court of
Appeals for sustaining it, considered paramount the interests of ARCO-PHIL. and
its members and capriciously overturned the presumption of the
constitutionality of the assailed provisions on the barefaced claim of the

respondent that the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 are unconstitutional.
Both committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction as to the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction.
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, et. al. vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, et. al

G.R. No. L-63915| 136 SCRA 27| April 24, 1985| Escolin
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
When the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party
in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need
not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to
show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.
FACTS
Petitioners, based on people’s right to be informed on matters of public

concern, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondents to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.
Respondents would have the case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. They
aver that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly
affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
question, said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this
mandamus proceeding, they are not being “aggrieved parties” within the meaning of
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
ISSUE
Whether petitioners have standing to institute the mandamus proceeding.
RULING
YES. When the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus
is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 115455. August 25, 1994, MENDOZA, J.
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
Public actions by “non-Hohfeldian” or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable

provided they meet the standing requirement of the Constitution. There must be before
the Court a fully developed factual record that alone can impart to its adjudication the
impact of actuality to insure that decision-making is informed and well grounded.
FACTS
Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system
and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
Tolentino and others questioned the constitutionality of the Act on grounds of
various irregularities in its passage into law and its infringement on constitutionally
mandated rights. This includes substantive issues raised by “non-Hohfeldian” or
ideological plaintiffs that were presented in abstract hypothetical form that lack
concrete record.
ISSUE
1. Whether “non-Hohfeldian” or ideological plaintiffs have legal standing.

2. Whether the Courts may adjudicate cases that lack concrete record.
RULING
1. YES. Public actions by “non-Hohfeldian” or ideological plaintiffs are now

cognizable provided they meet the standing requirement of the Constitution, that
is, a citizen has legal standing in matters concerning public rights.
2. NO. The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented in abstract,
hypothetical form because of the lack of a concrete record. The case presented
before the court do not have a fully developed factual record that alone can
impart to the Court’s adjudication the impact of actuality to insure that decision-
making is informed and well grounded. The Court does not have power to render
advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory judgment.
By the power of judicial review, the Court is duty bound by the Constitution to
settle actual controversies or grave abuse of discretion, and this cannot justify the
Supreme Court’s intervention in what is essentially a case that at best is not ripe
for adjudication. For, as judges, what the Supreme Court is called upon to render
is judgment according to law, not according to what may appear to be the opinion
of the day.
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-

ENDRIAN vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES
G.R. No. 187883| 589 SCRA 356| June 16, 2009| Puno
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
The “case-or-controversy” requirement bans the Court from deciding “abstract,

hypothetical or contingent questions,” lest the court give opinions in the nature of
advice concerning legislative or executive action.
FACTS
Petitioners filed their petitions as concerned citizens and taxpayers for the
nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the
Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to
Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of
Congress.” The House Resolution resolved that the House of Representatives shall
convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to
the Constitution. In essence, the petition seeks to trigger a justiciable controversy
that would warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII,
which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. No
actual convention has yet transpired, no rules of procedure have yet been adopted,
and no proposal has yet been made.
ISSUE
Whether the Court may decide abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions

brought before it.
RULING
NO. The “case-or-controversy” requirement bans the Court from deciding

“abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,” lest the court give opinions in the
nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action.
An aspect of “case-or-controversy” is ripeness. A question is ripe for

adjudication either when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it, or when an action has already been accomplished or
performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in. In the present
case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly
lacking. First, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or
hardship from the act complained of. Second, no actual convention has yet
transpired, no rules of procedure have yet been adopted, and no proposal has yet
been made. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example
of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed
may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would
warrant an intervention from this Court.
Another requisite of judicial review is locus standi or standing to sue.

Petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act
complained of. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a
controversy for significant reasons, petitioner’s lack of which is no more evident
than their petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential basis. This lack
of locus standi cannot be cured by petitioner’s claim that they are instituting the
cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayer’s suit requires that the
act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived
from taxation. It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of

public funds in this case as of yet.
JELBERT B. GALICTO vs. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, IN

HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; ATTY.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
G.R. No. 193978| 667 SCRA 150| February 28, 2012| Brion
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
FACTS
On September 8, 2010, respondent issued Executive Order (EO) No. 7,

entitled “Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification
System in the [GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes.” EO 7 provided for the
guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position
classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. It ordered (1) a moratorium on the
increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary
adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an
indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances,
bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until
December 31, 2010.
The petitioner is a Court Attorney IV at the PhilHealth Regional Office in

CARAGA and claims that said EO was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. He contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he
“stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the
grants of salary increases or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of
GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the prerogative of those officers who are to fix and
determine his compensation.” The petitioner also claims that he has standing as a
member of the bar in good standing that has an interest in ensuring that laws and
orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued and implemented.
Respondents moved for the dismissal of the petition as petitioner lacks

standing, among others.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner has locus standi to question the constitutionality of EO 7
RULING
NO. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” This requirement of
standing relates to the constitutional mandate that the Court settles only actual
cases or controversies.
A party is allowed to raise a constitutional question when (1) he can show

that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Jurisprudence defines interest as “material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved,
or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest,
as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest.
Based on the foregoing, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he has a
personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if
any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of
future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as
contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary
increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal
standing to assail EO 7.
MOLDEX REALTY, INC. vs. HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD,
OFFICE OF APPEALS, ADJUDICATION AND LEGAL AFFAIRS, EDITHA U.
BARRAMEDA IN HER CAPACITY AS REGIONAL OFFICER AND METROGATE
COMPLEX VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 149719| 525 SCRA 198| June 21, 2007| Tinga
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or

invalid, a party may raise its unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that
the regulation is being enforced. The requisite for judicial review that the party
assailing the regulation must show that the question of constitutionality has been
raised at the earliest opportunity should not be taken to mean that the question of
constitutionality must be raised immediately after the execution of the state action
complained of—a contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional,
would lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper party to promptly
file a case to challenge the same.
FACTS
Petitioner, as owner-developer of Metrogate Complex Phase I, has been

subsidizing the electric bill for its streetlights since 1988. In 2000, he decided to
stop and advised respondent association Metrogate Complex Village Homeowners’
Association to assume the same. Respondent association’s refusal led to
discontinuance of the service, prompting it to apply for a preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) against petitioner. The HLURB granted respondent association’s
application for injunction based on Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council (HUDCC) Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was rebuffed, and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
was granted to respondent association thereafter. Petitioner then filed a Petition for
Prohibition and Certiorari with the Court of Appeals for the reversal of the HLURB
decision and to assail the constitutionality of the Resolution. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition on the ground that the constitutionality issue should have
been raised directly to the Supreme Court. Petitioner thus instituted an action for
certiorari and prohibition with the same prayers at the Supreme Court which is
anchored on the unconstitutionality of the HUDCC resolution for being a void
exercise of legislative power, grave abuse of discretion by the HLURB in issuing the
mandatory injunction, and not commanding the respondent association to shoulder
the electricity bill. HLURB commented that said petition was filed beyond the 60-
day reglementary period but petitioner maintains otherwise.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed within the 60-
day reglementary period.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that
the constitutionality issue may be brought only to the Supreme Court.
RULING
1. YES. When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or

invalid, a party may raise its unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion
that the regulation is being enforced. For the Court to exercise its power of
judicial review, the party assailing the regulation must show that the question of
constitutionality has been raised at the earliest opportunity. This requisite should
not be taken to mean that the question of constitutionality must be raised
immediately after the execution of the state action complained of. That the
question of constitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid reason for
refusing to allow it to be raised later. A contrary rule would mean that a law,
otherwise unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure
of the proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the same. Petitioner had
already raised the question of constitutionality in its petition filed with the Court
of Appeals. The alleged injury caused to petitioner as a result of the
implementation of the HUDCC Resolution is continuous in nature in that as long
as the assailed resolution is effective, petitioner is obliged to pay for the
electricity cost of the streetlights. For every occasion that petitioner is directed to
comply with the assailed resolution, a new cause of action to question its validity
accrues in favor of petitioner. Thus, the instant petition is not time-barred.
2. YES. It must be emphasized that the Supreme Court does not have
exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions assailing the constitutionality of a
law or an administrative regulation, the lower courts also have jurisdiction at the
first instance. The general rule is that the Supreme Court shall exercise only
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality of a statute, treaty
or regulation, except in circumstances where the Court believes that resolving the
issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance is of
paramount importance and immediately affects the social, economic and moral
well being of the people. Ultimately, the Court is called upon to resolve the
question of who bears the obligation of paying electricity cost, a question that the
lower courts undoubtedly have the competence to resolve.
TERESITA G. FABIAN vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS

OMBUDSMAN; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON; AND NESTOR V. AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 129742| 295 SCRA 470| September 16, 1998| Regalado
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and consent. The Court is not
precluded from inquiring into its own jurisdiction, in which case it may be raised at
any time or on the court’s own motion, or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks
jurisdiction to enter. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of
jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a
clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.
FACTS
Petitioner had an amorous relationship with respondent Engr. Nestor V.

Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Region IV-A of the Department of Public Works and
Highways. When the former tried to end their relationship, the latter refused and
resorted to harassment, intimidation and threats, prompting petitioner to file an
administrative case in the Office of the Ombudsman. Respondent was initially found
guilty of misconduct but was later exonerated by Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F.
Guerrero in the Joint Order of June 18, 1997. On appeal, petitioner argues that Sec. 7,
Rule III of Administrative Order (AO) No. 07 (Rules of Procedures of the Office of the
Ombudsman), which provides that “when a respondent is absolved of the charges in
an administrative proceeding, the decision of the Ombudsman is final and
unappealable”, has no authority under the law in so far as it restricts the power of
the Supreme Court provided in Sec. 27 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that
“all administrative cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari”. She thus found it necessary to “take an alternative recourse under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeal
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court”.
ISSUE
Whether the direct appeal in administrative cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court is valid.
RULING
NO. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, together with Section 7, Rule III of
AO No. 07 and any other provision of law insofar as they provide for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases directly from the Office of the Ombudsman to the
Supreme Court are invalid. Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides
that “no law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent“. There is no
showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred to
the Court for its advice and consent. The constitutional prohibition was intended to
give the Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appelate jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging the appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
None of the parties raised a constitutional challenge to Sec. 27 of RA 6770.

While courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not
raised in the pleadings, it is not precluded from inquiring into its own jurisdiction, in
which case it may be raised at any time or on the court’s own motion, or compel it to
enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. The Court ex mero motu may take
cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is
developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction
in any proceeding.
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. vs. JOY C. CABILES

G.R. No. 170139| 732 SCRA 22| August 5, 2014| Leonen
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
DOCTRINES OF THE CASE
1. When a law is passed, the Supreme Court awaits an actual case that clearly raises
adversarial positions in their proper context before considering a prayer to declare
it as unconstitutional.
2. When a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or re-enactment of the
same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already
declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as
to warrant a reverse conclusion.
FACTS
Sameer is a recruitment and placement agency. Through Sameer, Joy applied

for a quality control job in Taiwan but was made to work as a cutter instead. Barely
a month into her work, Joy was suddenly informed that she was being terminated
and immediately sent back to Manila. She filed an illegal dismissal case with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and asked for the return of her
placement fee and the withheld repatriation costs, and payment of her salary for 23
months as well as moral and exemplary damages. The Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s
complaint as based on mere allegations, but the NLRC, on appeal, decided that Joy
was illegally dismissed and awarded her three months worth of salary, the amount
withheld and attorney’s fees. Sameer filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, which upheld the NLRC’s decision. Sameer filed a petition assailing the CA’s
decision, maintaining that Joy was dismissed for just cause.
The Supreme Court has previously ruled that the clause “or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” portion of Section
10 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause
and substantive due process. This was, however, reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042
upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
ISSUE
Whether Joy Cabiles was properly dismissed and awarded for her illegal
termination case.
RULING
Petitioner failed to show that there was just cause for dismissing Joy. There
was no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards against
which her work efficiency and performance were judged. Petitioner likewise failed
to specify what requirements were not met, what efficiency standards were
violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted inefficiency. The
abruptness of the termination and repatriation meant that she was neither properly
notified nor given the opportunity to be heard. She is thus entitled to her salary for
the unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together with
attorney’s fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.
When a law is passed, the Supreme Court awaits an actual case that clearly
raises adversarial positions in their proper context before considering a prayer to
declare it as unconstitutional. The case at hand presented a unique situation where
the law passed incorporates the exact clause already declared as unconstitutional,
without any perceived substantial change in the circumstances.
It was held that when a law or a provision of law is null because it is

inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or
re-enactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law
that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances
have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion. In this case, the Supreme Court
is not convinced by the pleadings submitted by the parties that the situation has so
changed so as to cause a reversal of a binding precedent.
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. vs. FERTIPHIL CORPORATION

G.R. No. 166006| 548 SCRA 485| March 14, 2008| Reyes R.T.
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies
as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an

undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
FACTS
On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative

powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition by
the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority (FPA) of a capital recovery component (CRC) on
the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines which shall be
collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Fertiphil paid a total
P6,689,144 to FPA for all its sale of fertilizers from July 8, 1985 to January 24, 1986.
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the levy.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI
with the RTC in Makati, questioning the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465. FPA
countered that the issuance of LOI No. 1465 was a valid exercise of the police power
of the State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer industry and averred that
Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI because the burden imposed by
the levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller. The RTC ruled in favour of
Fertiphil, ordering PPI to pay the principal, interest, attoryney’s fees and cost of suit,
and stating that taxes can only be levied for public purposes. On appeal by PPI with
the Court of Appeals, the RTC’s decision was held except for the deletion of the
attoryney’s fees. PPI’s move for reconsideration was denied, so it filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court. PPI wants to retain the levies paid under LOI No.
1465 even if it is subsequently declared to be unconstitutional based on the doctrine
of operative fact.
ISSUE
Whether or not PPI can retain the refund even if LOI 1465 is declared
unconstitutional.
RULING
NO. The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no

rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in
legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed. Being void, Fertiphil is
not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance with
the general civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The doctrine of operative
fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair
play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative

fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law.
In the case at bar, there is nothing iniquitous in ordering PPI to refund the
amounts paid by Fertiphil under LOI No. 1465 as it unduly benefited from the levy.
To do otherwise would unjustly enrich PPI at the expense of Fertiphil. Article 22 of
the Civil Code explicitly provides that “every person who, through an act of
performance by another comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground shall return the same to him.” We cannot allow
PPI to profit from an unconstitutional law. Justice and equity dictate that PPI must
refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil.
PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS, INC., vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS EMPLOYEES UNION-TUPAS
G.R. No. 110068| 241 SCRA 380| February 15, 1995| Feliciano
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
Additional payments made to employees, to the extent they partake of the

nature of profit-sharing payments, are properly excluded from the ambit of the term
"basic salary" for purposes of computing the 13th month pay due to employees.
FACTS
On 11 November 1993, the Supreme Court’s Third Division rendered a

decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by Philippine Duplicators, Inc.
(Duplicators) in G.R. No. 110068. The Court upheld the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) directing petitioner to pay 13th month pay to
private respondent employees based of their fixed wages plus sales commissions. It
likewise denied with finality on 15 December 1993 the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioner.
On 17 January 1994, Duplicators filed (a) a Motion for Leave to Admit Second
Motion for Reconsideration and (b) a Second Motion for Reconsideration, invoking
the Second Division’s decision on 10 December 1993 in the two (2) consolidated
cases of Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. Hon. Dionisio de la Serna and Philippine Fuji
Xerox Corp. vs. Hon. Cresenciano B. Trajano declaring inter alia null and void the
second paragraph of Section 5(a)1 of the Revised Guidelines issued by then
Secretary of Labor Drilon. Petitioner submits that the decision in the
Duplicators case should now be considered as having been abandoned or reversed
by the Boie-Takeda decision, considering that the latter went "directly opposite and
contrary to" the conclusion reached in the former. The Third Division referred the
motions to the Court en banc en consulta which the latter accepted.
ISSUE
Whether salesmen’s commission based on predetermined percentage of the

selling price is the same as commission based on productivity and can be included in
the computation of 13th month pay.
RULING
YES. The decision rendered in Boie-Takeda cannot serve as a precedent

under the doctrine of stare decisis as it was promulgated a month after the Third
Division’s dismissal of the instant case and the first motion had already been
denied, with finality, before the Boie-Takeda decision became final. The decision
in Boie-Takeda is not "directly opposite or contrary to" the decision in the present
(Philippine Duplicators), rather, the doctrines enunciated in the two (2) cases in fact
co-exist one with the other.
In Duplicators, the Third Division correctly held that the salesmen's

commissions, comprising a pre-determined percent of the selling price of the goods
sold by each salesman, were properly included in the term "basic salary" for
purposes of computing their 13th month pay. In Boie-Takeda, the so-called
commissions were excluded from the term "basic salary" because these were paid as
"productivity bonuses" which are additional monetary benefits not properly
included in the term "basic salary" in computing their 13th month pay but partake
of an act of enlightened generosity and self-interest on the part of the employer,
rather than as a demandable or enforceable obligation. Additional payments made
to employees, to the extent they partake of the nature of profit-sharing payments, are
properly excluded from the ambit of the term "basic salary" for purposes of
computing the 13th month pay due to employees. Such additional payments are
not "commissions" within the meaning of the second paragraph of Section 5 (a) of
the Revised Guidelines Implementing 13th Month Pay.
IN RE: PETITION SEEKING FOR CLARIFICATION AS TO THE VALIDITY AND

FORCEFUL EFFECT OF TWO (2) FINAL AND EXECUTORY BUT CONFLICTING
DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
Colonel PEDRO R. CABUAY, JR vs. DR. POTENCIANO MALVAR AND MARCELINO
LOPEZ, RESPONDENTS. HEIRS OF ELINO ADIA, REPRESENTED BY JULIANA
ADIA
G.R. No. 123780| 389 SCRA 493| September 24, 2002| Sandoval-Gutierrez
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
The Supreme Court’s decision in any given case constitutes the law of that
particular case. Once its judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts,
and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify.
FACTS
Following his continuous possession of his land since 1920, Hermogenes

Lopez applied for and was granted homestead under Plan No. H-138612 in February
7, 1939. He eventually transferred the land to Ambrosio Aguilar through a deed of
sale executed on July 31, 1959. Unknown to him, a title has been issued to Fernando
Gorospe for the same property that ended up with Eduardo Santos under TCT No.
72439 after the same was sold to him by the widow Beatriz de Zuzuarregui on
December 16, 1959. The title under the name of Gorospe and all its derivatives was
eventually declared void ab initio by the Supreme Court’s First Division on April 15,
1981 in G.R. No. 90380 for failing to show compliance with the requirements for
homestead registration.
In 1983, the Adia heirs questioned the homestead patent of Hermogenes

Lopez but were unsuccessful. On the other hand, the Lopez heirs filed in 1984 for
the cancellation of the sale with Aguilar which was adjudged void ab initio and
restored to the Lopezes possession of the property. The Adia heirs tried to prevent
the execution of judgment in favor of the Lopezes but were dismissed by the Court
of Appeals on July 15, 1985. On July 8, 1985, they filed another protest docketed as
B.L. Claim 653 with the Land Management Bureau (LMB) assailing Plan H-138612
issued to Hermogenes Lopez and praying that the property be titled in their names.
The LMB sided with the Adia heirs, so did the Court of Appeals which said that the
Supreme Court’s decision in G.R. No. 90380 did not bind the government, specially
the LMB, since it was not impleaded in the nullification of title case against Gorospe.
The Lopezes filed a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 110900 with the
Third Division of the Supreme Court which denied the same. By this ruling, the
Third Division reversed and set aside the previous Decision of the First Division
in G.R. No. 90380 declaring Hermogenes Lopez and his heirs the lawful owners of
the land.
In relation to the nullification of sale with Aguilar by the Lopezes, the latter
filed with the RTC a motion for issuance of an alias writ of execution which was
granted on December 11, 1995. It called for the demolition of the communication
facilities and other structures belonging to the Intelligence and Security Group (ISG)
of the Philippine Army which also purchased a portion of the property from the Adia
heirs. This prompted Col. Pedro R. Cabuay, Jr., Group Commander of the ISG, to file
with the Supreme Court on February 27, 1996 its “Petition Seeking for Clarification
as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of Two (2) Final and Executory but Conflicting
Decisions (in G.R. No. 90380 and G.R. 110900)of the Honorable Supreme Court.”
ISSUE
Whether G.R. No. 110900 by the Third Division of the Supreme Court is valid.
RULING
NO. Based on the “law of the case” doctrine, the Supreme Court’s decision in
any given case constitutes the law of that particular case. Once its judgment
becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts, and hence beyond their power and
authority to alter or modify. The decision of the First Division of the Court in G.R. No.
90380 is the law of the case binding upon the LMB and the Court of Appeals and is
beyond their authority to reverse. Therefore, the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in affirming the LMB decision in B.L. Claim 653 and ignoring the Decision
of this Court in G.R. No. 90380. The Third Division of this Court was misled, so to
speak, in resolving in G.R. 110900 that “no reversible error was committed by the
Appellate Court.” The Resolution dated August 11, 1993 of the Third Division in G.R.
No. 110900 upholding the validity of the land titles in the names of the Adia heirs is
SET ASIDE.
RE: REQUEST OF JURISCONSULT SAMANODIN L. AMPASO FOR UPGRADING OF

HIS POSITION TO SALARY GRADE 31, EQUIVALENT TO ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT
A.M. No. 91-10-160-Shari’a| 256 SCRA 679| May 15, 1996| Per curiam
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
It is incumbent upon an aspiring member of the Bench to check and double-

check important personal data being supplied through required forms.
FACTS
Samanodin L. Ampaso was appointed as Jurisconsult in Islamic Law on March

26, 1991 and took his oath of office on April 10, 1991. The said position was created
by virtue of Section 164, paragraph 2 of P.D. No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. On May 2, 1991, he requested the
Supreme Court for the upgrading of his position to Salary Grade 31, equivalent to an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and for the creation of 209 staff positions for
the Office of the Jurisconsult. However, upon checking by the Court Administrator
into the 201 files, it was found that Mr. Ampaso was born on January 2, 1952, which
means he was only 39 years, 3 months and 8 days when he took his oath and was
thus short of the age requirement. On March 31, 1992, the Court required Mr.
Ampaso to show cause why he should not be removed from office.
ISSUE
Whether Mr. Ampaso should be removed from office for failing to meet the
age requirement for his position.
RULING
YES. The Senior Deputy Court Administrator found unacceptable Mr.

Ampaso’s excuse of inadvertence by his brother in preparing the personal data
sheet and GSIS information sheet on his behalf. As an aspiring member of the Bench,
it was incumbent upon Mr. Ampaso to check and double-check important personal
data being supplied through such forms. Thus, his appointment was declared void
ab initio.
IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, PETITIONER IN BIRAOGO

V. NOGRALES AND LIMKAICHONG G.R. No. 179120
A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC| February 24, 2009| PER CURIAM
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
The subsequent retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service
does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he is answerable.
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy
between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of
the case.
FACTS
On July 15, 2008, the Supreme Court Justices unanimously decided to

withhold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy of the ponencia of Justice Ruben T.
Reyes on the Limkaichong case which they approved at their En Banc session earlier
that day. On December 9, 2008, Louis C. Biraogo held a press conference and
circulated to the media an undated letter signed by him, together with what
appeared to be a xerox copy of the unpromulgated ponencia. Noting that the
unauthorized release of a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia infringed on the
confidential internal deliberations of the Court and constituted contempt of court,
the Court created an Investigating Committee to look into the matter. The
Committee found that Justice Reyes himself leaked the unpromulgated ponencia.
Justice Reyes was about to retire when the controversy happened.
ISSUE
Whether Justice Reyes will be administratively liable even after his

retirement.
RULING
YES. Justice Reyes was found liable for grave misconduct for the leak, and
liable for gross misconduct for violating his oath as member of the Bar and Code of
Professional Responsibility. The subsequent retirement of a judge or any judicial
officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability
to which he is answerable. A case becomes moot and academic only when there is
no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served
in passing upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not moot and academic,
despite Justice Reyes’s retirement. The Court retains jurisdiction either to
pronounce a respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him/her guilty
thereof.
RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GOVERNMENT

SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES. GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0| 612 SCRA 193| February 11, 2010| Corona
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
As one of the safeguards of the Court’s institutional independence, the power to

promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive
domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with
the Executive. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or
issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by this Court.
FACTS
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on
government-owned or controlled corporations under Section 22, Rule 141 (Legal
Fees) of the Rules of Court. The GSIS anchors its petition on Section 39 of The GSIS
Act of 1997 which provides that “the GSIS, its assets, revenues including accruals
thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges
or duties of all kinds”. It then avers that courts still assess and collect legal fees in
actions and proceedings instituted by the GSIS notwithstanding its exemption.
ISSUE
Whether Congress may exempt the GSIS from the payment of legal fees
RULING
NO. The payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an
integral part of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making
power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Since the payment of legal
fees is a vital component of these rules, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or

modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of the Court’s institutional
independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is
now the Court’s exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress, much less with the Executive. The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify
any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Further, grant by Congress to
GSIS of exemption from the payment of legal fees would be a transgression of
another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence—
fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to
levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.
ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR
G.R. No. 202242| 676 SCRA 579| July 17, 2012| Mendoza
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
The word “Congress” is used in its generic sense, no particular allusion

whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being
referred to. The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. Any circumvention of the
constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land.
FACTS
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) was created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Member, a representative
of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private sector. Its principal function is to recommend
appointees to the Judiciary. Congress traditionally sent one representative to the
JBC. In 1994, however, one representative each from the House of Representative
and Senate began sitting in the JBC, each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. From 2000
to 2001, the JBC decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House
of Representatives one full vote each.
ISSUE
Whether the constitution allows more than one member of Congress to sit in
the JBC.
RULING
NO. It is clear that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one
whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. To allow otherwise would
“negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is
enshrined in the Constitution.” Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution,
providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in
recommending appointees to the Judiciary, is explicit. The word “Congress” is used
in its generic sense, no particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the
Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to. The use of the singular
letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room
for any other construction. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should
not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA vs. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO, THE
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC
proceedings, however, the fact that a proceeding is sui generis and is impressed with
discretion does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process,
the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing.
FACTS
Petitioner, then incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic, was nominated

for the post to be vacated by outgoing Associate Justice Roberto Abad. Upon
acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza was included in the names of candidates, as
well as in the schedule of public interviews. It came to Jardeleza’s knowledge that
Chief Justice and JBC ex officio Chairperson, Maria Lourdes Sereno (CJ Sereno),
manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, i.e., the
“unanimity rule”, against him. Jardeleza filed a letter-petition to the Supreme Court
praying for it to exercise its power of supervision and order the JBC to give him
notice of and opportunity to defend himself. At the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC,
Jardeleza demanded a sworn statement from CJ Sereno specifying her objections to
this nomination and that he be given the right to cross-examination her in a public
hearing. He likewise requested for the deferral of the JBC’s meeting to vote for the
nominees who will be included in the short list, but the same pushed through the
same day. The short list released did not include Jardeleza.
Jardeleza filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking to compel the
JBC to include him in the short list on the grounds that it and CJ Sereno acted in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding
him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
He averred that he was not accorded due process in the events leading up to and
during the vote on the short list; and that his exclusion from the list of nominees is
against the JBC’s ministerial duty, its “unanimity requirement”, and the President’s
power to appoint.
ISSUE
Whether or not due process is demandable as matter of right in JBC

proceedings.
RULING
YES. The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC
proceedings, however, the fact that a proceeding is sui generis and is impressed with
discretion does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due
process, the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. In cases where an
objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process
neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC to recommend.
This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process.
Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the
exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the
objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer
understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an
unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not
expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection
against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged
complies with the dictates of fairness for the only test that an exercise of discretion
must surmount is that of soundness.
Jardeleza should have been included in the list submitted to the President
due to the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due
process. There have been palpable defects in the implementation of the “unanimity
rule”. Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 requires a unanimous vote for a nominee when
an integrity question arises. Said rule was misapplied as the invocation of the
“unanimity rule” on integrity traces its roots to a choice of a legal strategy by a
lawyer rather than a treacherous intent to trounce upon the country’s interests or to
betray the Constitution. While Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of
insider trading fall within the contemplation of a “question on integrity” and would
have warranted the application of the “unanimity rule,” he was not afforded due
process in its application.
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

G.R. No. 211833| 755 SCRA 182| 7 April 2015| Reyes
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the
standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject
only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every
position. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its
duties.
FACTS
The petitioner applied for vacancies in several RTCs barely a year from his
appointment as Presiding Judge of a MCTC. The JBC did not include him in the list of
candidates due to its long-standing five-year experience policy for candidates as

second level judge. Petitioner argued against said policy as being unconstitutional
for violating the equal protection clause, adding that the JBC cannot add more
qualifications than that required by the Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judge of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional.
RULING
YES. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the minimum qualifications of
members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of
rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate. In
carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria
in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the
minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. The
adoption of the five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner’s case
is necessary and incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.
Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
The equal protection clause was not violated as the Constitution allows
classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law
as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary. The assailed criterion or
consideration for promotion to a second-level court is a direct adherence to the
constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of “proven
competence.” In determining competence, the JBC considers, among other
qualifications, experience and performance.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF

UNSUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES OF 1946 TO 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL.
94 Phil. 534| RESOLUTION March 18, 1954| Diokno J.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function and is an

inherent power of the court.
FACTS
Republic Act No. 972 (RA 972) or the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953” was passed
in 1953. In essence, it sought to admit to the Bar, those candidates between the
years 1946 up to 1953 who flunked the Bar examinations. The reason for the law
was that allegedly because of the recently concluded wars in the Philippines, the
flunkers suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation.
This petition questions the constitutionality of RA 972.
ISSUE
Whether RA 972 is unconstitutional
RULING
YES. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to
repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or
amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to
its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and
this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar,
inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial
functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the
primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate
decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according
to existing rules.
CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR. vs. HAYDEE B. YORAC, IN HER CAPACITY AS ACTING
CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 93867| 192 SCRA 358| December 18, 1990| Cruz
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the

Constitutional Commissions as "independent." Although essentially executive in nature,
they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of
their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings
under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion.
FACTS
Herein petitioner questions the legality of the President’s action in

appointing Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac as acting Chairman of the
COMELEC when then Chairman Hilario Davide was named Chairman of the fact-
finding commission to investigate a coup d’ etat attempt.
Sixto contends that the President has no authority to appoint an official of an

independent commission created by the Constitution such as the COMELEC and
therefore such act is void for having been made outside the ambit of law. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE
Whether the action of the President in appointing Assoc. Comm. Yorac as

Chairman of the COMELEC was valid.
RULING
NO. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular

chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it,
even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary

and therefore revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its
revocation. Assuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as Acting
Chairman of the Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the
Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the
respondent, having accepted such designation, will not be estopped from
challenging its withdrawal.
It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent cannot be
removed at will from her permanent position as Associate Commissioner. It is no
less true, however, that she can be replaced as Acting Chairman, with or without
cause, and thus deprived of the powers and perquisites of that temporary position.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for
the President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary
designation in favor of the respondent. This is still a government of laws and not of
men. The problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for
presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the members of the
Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President,
however well-meaning.
THELMA P. GAMINDE v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or Hon. CELSO D.

GANGAN, Hon. RAUL C. FLORES and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN
G.R. No. 140335| 347 SCRA 655| December 13, 2000| Pardo J.
The operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both

indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3) Commissioners
should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or
disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the unexpired
balance of the term. Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners
of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a
common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and
qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven,
five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval
between the expiration of the terms.
FACTS
The President appointed herein petitioner as ad interim Commissioner of the

Civil Service Commission (CSC) on June 11, 1993. Her term would expire on
February 2, 1999 pursuant to provisions of existing law as stated in her
appointment paper. Come February 24, 1998, Gaminde sought clarification from the
President as to the date of the end of her term in office. The Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel opined that Gaminde’s term of office would expire on February 2, 2000 and
not on February 2, 1999. Thereafter, Gaminde remained in office after February 2,
1999. Then, the Commission on Audit (COA) questioned the extension of Gaminde’s
term since as per her appointment letter, Gaminde’s term of office should have been
only until February 2, 1999.
ISSUE
Whether the term of Gaminde expired on February 2, 1999 as per her letter
of appointment
RULING
YES. The term of office of Gaminde expired on February 2, 1999. The term of
office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in
the 1987 Constitution, as follows:
"Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be

appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for
five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired

term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."
In a string of cases, we said that "the operation of the rotational plan requires
two conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first
three (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy
due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only
be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term."
Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the

Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common
date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of
the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three
years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the
expiration of the terms.
On June 11, 1993, the President appointed Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde

Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, for a term expiring February 02, 1999.
This terminal date is specified in her appointment paper. On September 07, 1993,
the Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment. She accepted the
appointment and assumed office on June 22, 1993. She is bound by the term of the
appointment she accepted, expiring February 02, 1999. In this connection, the letter
dated April 07, 1998, of Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona clarifying that
her term would expire on February 02, 2000, was in error. What was submitted to
the Commission on Appointments was a nomination for a term expiring on February
02, 1999. Thus, the term of her successor must be deemed to start on February 02,
1999, and expire on February 02, 2006.
DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A.

VILLAR
G.R. No. 192791 | 742 SCRA 579| April 24, 2012| Velasco
Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation,

disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this
will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
FACTS
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Guillermo N. Carague

(Carague) as Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7)
years. Carague’s term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2,
2008.
Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, the President appointed Reynaldo A. Villar

(Villar) as the third member of the COA for a term of seven (7) years starting
February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011. Following the retirement of Carague on
February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar
was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman
of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly
indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his
office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Villar, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh
term of seven (7) years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of
office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from
February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
Now, Dennis Funa questions the constitutionality of Villar's appointment as

Chairman of COA on the ground that an appointee of a vacant office shall only serve
the unexpired portion of the term of the vacated office. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether the appointment of Villars as Chairman was unconstitutional
RULING
YES. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional

commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of
commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment
for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot
validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term
as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the
Constitution. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,
resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of
the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the
unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down
under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC,
who were appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the entire period,
are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollary, the
first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the
prohibition against reappointment. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the
Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position
of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such
appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the
aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period
of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further
that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation,
disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that "reappointment"
found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office
(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an
appointment involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner
to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal
sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution. Any member of the
Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Thus, Villar’s appointment as chairman ending February 2, 2011 which

Justice Mendoza considers as valid is likewise unconstitutional, as it will destroy the
rationale and policy behind the rotational system or the staggering of appointments
and terms in COA as prescribed in the Constitution. It disturbs in a way the
staggered rotational system of appointment under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987
Constitution.
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON.

ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
AND HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
G.R. No. 157013| 405 SCRA 614| July 10, 2003| Austria-Martinez
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is

circumscribed by other constitutional provisions, it includes the guarantee of
independence of the COMELEC.
FACTS
Petitioner Romulo Macalintal challenged the constitutionality of certain

provisions under Republic Act No. 9189 otherwise known as An Act Providing for A
System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes. Under the same is the creation
of Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to supervise in the implementation of
the law according to the guidelines set by the Congress. Petitioner specifically
assailed the power of Congress to review, modify, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and regulations (IRR) before its implementation as provided
under R.A. No. 9189.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Congress can approve, review, amend, or revise the IRR
of R.A No. 9189 through its oversight function
RULING
NO. The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to

play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of
its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully
warranted in the case of a less responsible organization.
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed

by other constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the
COMELEC shall be independent.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for
The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no
option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law
unconstitutional.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC) V DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND

MANAGEMENT (DBM)
G.R. No. 158791| 464 SCRA 115| July 22, 2005| Carpio Morales
Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution provides that the Commission shall
enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.
FACTS
Civil Service Commission (CSC) filed a petition for mandamus to compel the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to release the balance of its budget
for the fiscal year 2002. DBM withheld the release of the funds on the basis of no
report, no release policy. Under the policy, agencies of the government pending their
submission of the required documents. However, petitioner contends that the rules
does not apply to constitutional bodies as it would undermine their constitutional
guarantee of fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE
Whether or not the funds of the CSC can be validly withheld by the DBM
under no report, no release policy.
RULING
NO. Such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal

autonomy violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution.
The Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the

Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the
Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction
of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner
and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others
which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the
distinction established by the Constitution.
The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should
thus be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other
agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall. The Constitution
provides for the automatic and regular release of approved funds in favour to them.
CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
ERLINDA P. MERAM v. FILIPINA V. EDRALIN, THE MINISTER OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS
G.R. No. 71228| 154 SCRA 238| September 24, 1987| Gutierrez, Jr.
The civil service system rests on the principle of application of the merit system
instead of the spoils system in the matter of appointment and tenure of office.
FACTS
Filipino V. Edralin, is a training officer of the Bureau of Forest Development

(BFD) and was proposed for appointment to the position of Administrative Officer
V. The proposed appointment was challenged by Petitioner who was then classified
as the next-in-rank for the position according to the memorandum sent by the BFD
Director. Meanwhile, respondent Minister of Natural Resources (Minister) still
appointed Edralin to the position of Administrative Officer V. The Civil Service
Commission (CSC) approved the appointment but noted that it would be subject to
the outcome of the protest.
In view of the foregoing, Merit Systems Board ruled against the fitness of
Edralin to assume the position of administrative officer V. Unfazed, she appealed to
the office of the President and the same was subsequently granted.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Edralin is fit to the position of administrative

officer V despite of being declared otherwise.
RULING
NO. The BFD personnel who are considered next-in-rank to the vacated
position were identified. And respondent Edralin was not one of them. In fact, she
was nine or ten salary ranges below the next-in-rank personnel. Subsequently, the
MSB made the same finding in its decision.
Civil Service laws are enacted to eradicate the system of appointment to

public office based on political considerations and to eliminate as far as practicable
the element of partisanship and personal favoritism in making appointments. These
laws intend to establish a merit system of fitness and efficiency as the basis of
appointment; to secure more competent employees, and thereby promote better
government.
Court must strike down the practice of political, ethnic, religious, or blood
ties being used to get choice appointments for it goes against the very purpose
behind the establishment of the civil service in our country. As earlier stated,
appointments under the civil service law should be based on merit and fitness and
should never depend on how intimate a friend or how closely related an appointee
is to the powers that be.
EDUARDO DE LOS SANTOS v. GIL R. MALLARE, LUIS P. TORRES

G.R. No.L-3881| 87 Phil. 289| August 31, 1950|Tuason, J.
No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except

for cause as provided by law.
FACTS
Petitioner De Los Santos is appointed as City Engineer of Baguio by the

President, such appointment was also confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. Subsequently, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim
appointment by the President to the same position. Thereafter, the Undersecretary
of the Department of Public Works and Communications directed Santos to report
to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. The petitioner refused to
vacate his office and averred that he shall not be removed from his post without any
just cause
ISSUE
Whether or not his removal from his post is valid

RULING
NO. The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-

determining, nor highly technical.
A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government or
any its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. With specific
reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are essentially
ministerial in character. Furthermore, the position of city engineer is technical but
not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a
technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in
which "highly technical" is, we believe, employed in the Constitution.
In sum, his position is under the category of career-service which is covered

by security of tenure.
The herein petitioner is entitled to remain in office as City Engineer of Baguio

with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, until he resigns
or is removed for cause, and that respondent Mallare's appointment is ineffective in
so far as it may adversely affect those emoluments, rights and privileges of Engr. De
Los Santos
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTEv. BEATRIZ O.

GONZALES
G.R. No. 185740| 701 SCRA 635| July 23, 2013| Brion
Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in

the provincial administrator position and to reclassify it as a primarily confidential,
non-career service position. The primarily confidential employee’s term of office
expires when the appointing authority loses trust in the employee
FACTS
Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the province of

Camarines Norte on a permanent capacity. Years later, Governor Jess B. Pimentel
sent Gonzales a memorandum directing her to explain in writing why no
administrative charges should be filed against her for gross insubordination/gross
discourtesy in the course of official duties, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. After filing her comment, she was declared guilty of the
charges against her, and recommended that she should be held administratively
liable.
She then appealed to the Civil Service Commission which held that she
should be reinstated as the Provincial Administrator. . As a permanent appointee,
Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after due notice and hearing. Loss of trust
and confidence is not among the grounds for a permanent appointee’s dismissal or
discipline under existing laws. However, through the enactment of RA 7160, the
Congress reclassified the position of provincial administrator as a primarily
confidential which is a non-career service position.
ISSUE
Whether or not the position of Provincial Administrator is now considered

primarily confidential non-career service position
RULING
YES. Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial

changes in the provincial administrator position and to reclassify it as a primarily
confidential, non-career service position.
In this case, Congress reclassified the position of the provincial administrator

position in RA 7160. It is a valid exercise of legislative power that does not violate
Gonzales’ security of tenure. Modifications in public office, such as changes in
qualifications or shortening of its tenure, are made in good faith so long as they are
aimed at the office and not at the incumbent.
It is now a primarily confidential position under the non-career service

tranche of the civil service which makes her tenure as based on the trust and
confidence of the appointing authority.
The primarily confidential employee’s term of office expires when the

appointing authority loses trust in the employee. When this happens, the
confidential employee is not “removed” or “dismissed” from office; his term merely
“expires” and the loss of trust and confidence is the “just cause” provided by law that
results in the termination of employment
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION v. MARITA A. ANGARA

G.R. NO.142937| 475 SCRA 41 | November 15, 2005| Austria-Martinez
Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary

confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The
latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the
duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom
FACTS
Respondents Beatriz T. La Victoria (La Victoria) and Marita A. Angara

(Angara) were Slot Machine Roving Token Attendants (SMRTAs) of petitioner
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) assigned at its casino in
Davao City. They were dismissed by the herein Petitioner on account of loss of trust
and confidence due to alleged short selling of tokens. Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration to PAGCOR Board of Directors but it was subsequently denied.
Thereafter, La Victoria and Angara appealed before the Civil Service Commission
and the petition was granted and ordered the reinstatement of the respondents.
However, Petitioners contended that the dismissal of respondents is justified

because their positions are primarily confidential. Hence, they can be validly
dismissed due to loss of trust and confidence of the appointing authority.
ISSUE
Whether or not the position of slot machine roving token attendant is

considered as primarily confidential in which dismissal from service can be validly
done through loss of trust and confidence
RULING
NO. From the nature of respondents’ functions, their organizational ranking,

and their compensation level, it is obviously beyond debate that respondents,
occupying one of the lowest ranks in petitioner, cannot be considered confidential
employees. Their job description spells out their routinary functions. As enumerated
in their functions, there is nothing to suggest that their positions were highly, or
much less primarily confidential in nature. There is no showing of that element of
trust indicative of a primarily confidential position.
As regular career employees, the respondents are entitled to due process in

which they cannot be dismissed from service without notice, just cause, and hearing.
As covered by security of tenure, the petitioner cannot justify its move to remove
respondents from service on account of loss of trust and confidence. Such
justification can only be applied to positions which are primarily confidential in
nature.
In this case, the respondents were dismissed due to loss of trust and
confidence, hence, they are not validly dismissed from service.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. NITA P. JAVIER

G.R. No. 173264| 534 SCRA 485| February 22, 2008| Austria-Martinez
It is the rule that executive and legislative identification or classification of

primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical positions in government
is no more than mere declarations, and does not foreclose judicial review, especially in
the event of conflict.
FACTS
Respondent was first employed as Private Secretary in Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS). She was then promoted on several occasions where she
gained a permanent status. Respondent spent her entire career working with GSIS.
She was occupying the position of Corporate Secretary of the Board of Trustees of
the GSIS when she opted to retire early.
Nearly a year after her retirement, she was reappointed in the same position
with the approval of GSIS President and its Board of Trustees. In its resolution, the
appointment was classified as "confidential in nature and the tenure of office is at
the pleasure of the Board."
Thereafter, the appointment was challenged by the herein petitioner on the

ground that the action of the board was meant to illegally extend her service and
circumvent laws on retirement. Hence, she shall not be reappointed because she is
beyond her retirement age. Civil Service Commission (CSC) further contended that
the position of Corporate Secretary is a career-service position.
ISSUE
Whether or not courts may determine the classification of a government

position in resolving conflict before it despite of the findings of CSC.
RULING
YES. The Court is not bound by the classification of positions in the civil
service made by the legislative or executive branches, or even by a constitutional
body like the petitioner. The Court is further expected to make its own
determination as to the nature of a particular position, such as whether it is a
primarily confidential position or not, without being bound by prior classifications
made by other bodies. The findings of the other branches of government are merely
considered initial and not conclusive to the Court.
Though there are declarations which may be made by Executive and

Legislative departments, it is the nature of the position which finally determines
whether it is primarily confidential, policy determining or highly technical, and no
department in government is better qualified to make such an ultimate finding than
the judicial branch.
HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND DR. BIENVENIDO
A. ICASIANO,
Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of

our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed
without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to
illegal removals.
FACTS
Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent,
Division of City Schools, Quezon City, by former President Corazon Aquino. Years
after, he was recommended by Secretary Gloria to be reassigned as the
Superintendent of the Marikinia Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) in order

to fill up the vacancy resulting from the retirement of its Superintendent, Bannaoag
F. Lauro. When he was informed of the reassignment, Icasiano requested Secretary
Gloria to reconsider such, but it was denied by the latter.
ISSUE
Whether the reassignment of private respondent from School Division
Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational School Superintendent of MIST is
violative of his security of tenure.
RULING
YES. Icasiano’s reassignment to the MIST appears to be indefinite. This can be
inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to
the effect that the reassignment will best fit his qualifications and experience being
an expert in vocational and technical education. Also, the Memorandum did not
provide that the reassignment is temporary in character or would last only until the
permanent replacement is found. This evinces the intention to reassign Icasiano
without a definite period. Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely
violative of his security of tenure.
CESAR Z. DARIO vs. HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME AND
HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
G.R. No. 81954| 176 SCRA 84| August 8, 1989| Sarmiento
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they

are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, reorganization is carried out in “good
faith” if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that
event, no dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to
exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall.
FACTS
President Corazon Aquino reorganized various institutions and government

offices in order to provide for an orderly transition to a government under a new
constitution. In doing so, the President issued a number of executive orders for the
reorganization of various offices, one of which is Executive Order No. 127 (EO 127),
“Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance”. This Executive Order, in addition to the
reorganization, also prescribed new staffing pattern for the Bureau of Customs
(BOC). In conformity with EO 127, Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued
a memorandum which laid down the procedures in personnel replacement. A
Reorganization Appeals Board was also created to settle the appeals from the
removals. Further, a total of 394 employees of the BOC were given notices of
separation.
ISSUE
Whether or not the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs was violative of

the security of tenure of the employees.
RULING
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided

they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, reorganization is carried out in
“good faith” if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. In that event, no dismissal or separation actually occurs because the
position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a
Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the “abolition,” which is nothing else but a
separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security
of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid “abolition” takes place and
whatever “abolition” is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid “abolition” as
where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of
economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY

G.R. No. 135805| 306 SCRA 425| April 29, 1999| Pardo
Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is

issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of
any of the following: a) appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of
the bureau or office; and d) person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee. Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned
situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To
constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued
in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee.
FACTS
Pedro O. Dacoycoy, the Vocational School Administrator of Balicuatro College
of Arts and Trades (BCAT), was found guilty of nepotism on two counts by the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and
Ped Dacoycoy as driver and utility worker, respectively. The CSC imposed on him
the penalty of dismissal from service. This decision was contested by Dacoycoy
before the Court of Appeals claiming that he did not appoint or recommend his two
sons, and therefore was not guilty of nepotism.
ISSUE
Whether or not Dacoycoy was guilty of nepotism
RULING
Pedro Dacoycoy was guilty of nepotism. It is true that he was not the one who
appointed his two sons in Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr.
Jaime Daclag, Head of the Department of the BCAT, who recommended the
appointment of Rito. Mr. Daclag’s authority to recommend the appointment of first
level positions such as watchmen, security guards, drivers, utility workers, and
casuals and emergency laborers for short durations of three to six months was
recommended by respondent Dacoycoy and approved by DECS Regional Director
Eladio C. Dioko, with the provision that such positions shall be under Mr. Daclag’s
immediate supervision. However, it was respondent Dacoycoy who certified that
“funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy” and even rated
his performance as “very satisfactory.” On the other hand, his son Ped stated in his
position description form that his father was “his next higher supervisor.” The
circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag
was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school
administrator. He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first
level employees under his immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended
the appointment of respondent’s two sons and placed them under respondent’s
immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. MARICELLE M. CORTES

G.R. No. 200103| 723 SCRA 609| April 23, 2014| Abad
Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the

third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing
authority; (2) recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4)
person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. By way of exception, the
following shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1) persons employed in a
confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians; and (4) members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.
FACTS
The Commission En Banc of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)

approved the appointment of Maricelle M. Cortes to the position of Information
Officer V (IO V). Commissioner Eligio P. Mallari, the father of Cortes abstained from
the voting and requested the CHR to render an opinion on the legality of Cortes’
appointment. In its Memorandum, the CHR rendered an opinion that the
appointment is not covered by the rule on nepotism as the appointing authoirity the
Commission En Banc has a personality separate and distinct from its members.
However, upon investigation, the Civil Service Commission-NCR Field Office (CSC-
NCR) ruled that the appointment of Cortes is not valid because it is covered by the
rule on nepotism under Section 9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments

and Other Personnel Actions. According to the CSC-NCR, Commissioner Mallari is
considered an appointing authority with respect to respondent Cortes despite being
a mere member of the Commission En Banc. Consequently, the CHR terminated
Cortes’ services through its Officer-in-Charge Ma. Victoria V. Cardona. Cortes then
filed a petition before the Court of Appeals which the latter granted and ordered
Cortes to be reinstated to her position in the CHR.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled that the appointment of
respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR is not covered by the prohibition against
nepotism.
RULING
YES. Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of

Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the
daughter of Commissioner Mallari. The purpose of the rule against nepotism is to
take out the discretion of the appointing and recommending authority on the matter
of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative. The rule insures the
objectivity of the appointing or recommending official by preventing that objectivity
from being in fact tested. Clearly, the prohibition against nepotism is intended to
apply to natural persons. It is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the
efficiency of its personnel. To rule that the prohibition applies only to the
Commission, and not to the individual members who compose it, will render the
prohibition meaningless. In the present case, respondent Cortes’ appointment as IO
V in the CHR by the Commission En Banc, where his father is a member, is covered
by the prohibition. Commissioner Mallari’s abstention from voting did not cure the
nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the
prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for the
appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the
impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc.
LUCIANO VELOSO, ABRAHAM CABOCHAN, JOCELYN DAWIS-ASUNCION and

MARLON M. LACSON vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 193677| 656 SCRA 767| September 6, 2011| Peralta

There is nothing wrong with the local government granting additional benefits
to the officials and employees. The laws even encourage the granting of incentive
benefits aimed at improving the services of these employees. Considering, however,
that the payment of these benefits constitute disbursement of public funds, it must not
contravene the law on disbursement of public funds.
FACTS
Ordinance No. 8040 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of
Exemplary Public Service Award to Elective Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been
Elected for Three (3) Consecutive Terms in the Same Position was passed by the City
Council of Manila. Section 2 of this ordinance provided that the Exemplary Public
Service Award (EPSA) shall include a retirement and gratuity pay remuneration
equivalent to the actual time served in a position for three consecutive terms.
However, Atty. Gabriel J. Espina, the Supervising Auditor of the City of Manila issued
an audit memorandum stating that the monetary reward would be excessive and
tantamount to double compensation which violates Article 1709(c) of the IRR of RA
7160.
ISSUE
Whether or not the monetary award included in the EPSA amounts to double
compensation
RULING
YES. It was disclosed through the recomputation of the award that it is

equivalent to the total compensation of the awardees during their terms which
included their basic salary, additional compensation, Personnel Economic Relief
Allowance, representation and transportation allowance, rice allowance, financial
assistance, clothing alowance, 13th month pay and cash gift. Undoubtedly, the
computation of the reward is excessive and tantamount to double and additional
compensation. This cannot be justified by the mere fact that the awardees have been
elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Neither can it be
justified that the reward is given as a gratuity at the end of the last term of the
qualified elective official. The fact remains that the remuneration is equivalent to
everything that the awardees received during the entire period that he served as
such official. Indirectly, their salaries and benefits are doubled, only that they
receive half of them at the end of their last term.
CONRADO L. DE RAMA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION, THE

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION), ELADIO MARTINEZ, DIVINO DE JESUS, MORELL
AYALA, ARISTEO CATALLA, DAISY PORTA, FLORDELIZA ORIASEL, GRACIELA
GLORY, FELECIDAD ORINDAY, MA. PETRA MUFFET LUCE, ELSA MARINO,
BERNARDITA MENDOZA, JANE MACATANGAY, ADELFO GLODOVIZA and
FLORINO RAMOS
G.R. No. 131136| 353 SCRA 94| February 28, 2001| Ynares-Santiago
There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments
during the last days of his or her tenure.
FACTS
Conrado L. de Rama, Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon wrote a letter to the Civil

Service Commission (CSC) seeking to recall the appointments of 14 municipal
employees alleging that these were midnight appointees of the former Mayor, Ma.
Avelyn S. Abeja. De Rama claimed that the appointments were in violation of Article
VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits appointments to be made
two months immediately before the next presidential election and up to the end of
the official’s term. The CSC denied de Rama’s petition pointing out the tha
constitutional provision prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing
President and is not applicable to appointments made by local elective officials.
ISSUE
Whether or not the appointments shall be treated as midnight appointments and

shall be declared violative of the Constitution.
RULING
NO. When the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of
the fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the only reason he cited to
justify his action was that these were “midnight appointments” that are forbidden
under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution. However, the CSC ruled, and
correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. In
truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
RENATO L. CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE
G.R. No. 100113| 201 SCRA 210| September 3, 1991| Paras
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in
the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device
or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
FACTS
Christian Monsod was nominated by former President Corazon Aquino to the

position of Chairman of the COMELEC. This nomination was opposed by Renato
Cayetano as he alleges that Monsod does not possess the qualification of having
been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. Despite the opposition, the
Commission on Appointments still confirmed the nomination of Monsod as the
Chairman of the COMELEC. Cayetano now challenges the appointment and
confirmation, seeking it to be declared null and void.
ISSUE
Whether or not the appointment of Atty. Christian Monsod as the Chairman

of the COMELEC is valid.
RULING
YES. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage
in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term “practice of law”,
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the
liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod’s past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur
of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a Iawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor—verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement—that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN

EDGARDO J. ANGARA V. THE COMMISION ON ELECTIONS AND AGAPITO A.
AQUINO
G.R. No. 161265| 423 SCRA 665| February 24, 2004| Tinga, J.

Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is empowered to register political parties
[Sec. 2(5), Article IX-C.] Necessarily, the power to act on behalf of a party and the
responsibility for the acts of such political party must be fixed in certain persons acting
as its officers.
FACTS
On December 8, 2003, the General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP), a registered political party, informed the Commission on Election
(COMELEC) that only Senator Edgardo J. Angara, in his capacity as Party Chairman
or his representative, may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the party’s official
candidates. In the he same Manifestation, it further stated that Sen. Angara had
placed the LDP Secretary General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on indefinite
forced leave. In the meantime, Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated
Acting Secretary General.
On December 16, 2003, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment, contending that the
Party Chairman does not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the
Secretary General. As the Manifestation filed by the LDP General Counsel has no
basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard the same.
COMELEC granted the petitions with legal equity for both Petitioner and
Oppositor, splitting the two opposing parties to their respective “wing”. The
candidates for President down to the last Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad nominated
and endorsed by LDP Chairman Edgardo J. Angara are recognized by the
Commission as official candidates of LDP Angara Wing. The candidates from
President down to the last Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad as nominated and endorsed
by LDP Secretary General Agapito Butz Aquino are recognized as official candidates
of LDP Aquino Wing. Sen. Angara thus filed the present petition for Certiorari
assailing the COMELEC Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUES
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide who is authorized to
nominate candidates for a political party.
RULING
YES. This Court ruled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the issue of
leadership in a political party. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is empowered
to register political parties [Sec. 2(5), Article IX-C.] Necessarily, the power to act on
behalf of a party and the responsibility for the acts of such political party must be
fixed in certain persons acting as its officers. In the exercise of the power to register
political parties, the COMELEC must determine who these officers
are. Consequently, if there is any controversy as to leadership, the COMELEC may, in
a proper case brought before it, resolve the issue incidental to its power to register
political parties.
ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

DAN ERASMO, SR.
G.R. No. 191970| 683 SCRA 1| April 24, 2012| En Banc| Abad.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative
bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to
correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations.
FACTS
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He
migrated to Australia in 1981 there acquired Australian citizenship. At age 35, he
decided to return to the Philippines specifically in Barangay Veteran’s Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On September
1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of
the same in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225. He applied for registration as
a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but it was initially opposed by respondent Dan
Erasmo, Sr., the Barangay Captain of Barangay Veteran’s Village. On application,
however, the Election Registration Board approved it and the petitioner’s name was
included in the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) voters list. Respondent
Erasmo filed for the exclusion of Jalosjos’ name from the official voters list. MCTC
denied the petition. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MCTC and the
same became final and executory.
On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo
promptly filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos’ COC on the ground
that the latter made material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to
comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year residency
requirement of the Local Government Code. The Second Division of the COMELEC
favoured the respondent and argued that petitioner indeed failed to prove that he
has complied with the residency requirement. COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
decision. Acting on Jalosjos’ prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order, the Court enjoined the COMELEC from enforcing its February 11, 2010
decision pending further orders. Meanwhile, Jolosjos won the election and was
proclaimed winner of the 2010 gubernatorial race in the Province of Zamboanga
Sibugay.
ISSUE
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present
ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.
RULING
YES. While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of
administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its
review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or
irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in holding otherwise.
MA. SALVACION BUAC AND ANTONIO BAUTISTA v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS AND ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO
G.R. No. 155855| 421 SCRA 92| January 26, 2004| En Banc| Puno

Article LX-C, Section 2(1) is very explicit that the COMELEC has the power to
"enforce administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
FACTS
On April 25, 1998, a plebiscite was held in Taguig for the ratification of the
Taguig Cityhood Law (Republic Act No. 8487) proposing the conversion of Taguig
from a municipality into a highly urbanized city. On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite
Board of Canvassers (PBOC), declared that the "NO" votes won without completing
the canvass of sixty-four (64) other election returns. COMELEC en banc ordered the
Board of Canvassers to reconvene and complete the canvass. The Board did and the
negative votes still prevailed in the plebiscite conducted. Salvacion Buac and
Antonio Bautista filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the results of the
plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots cast therein. Cayetano
intervened then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a
plebiscite. COMELEC treated the petition akin to an election protest. Cayetano filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was granted. It dismissed the petition to annul
the results of the Taguig plebiscite and ruled that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction
over said case as it involves an exercise of quasi-judicial powers not contemplated
under Section 2 (2), Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or not it falls under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct plebiscite.
RULING
YES. Article LX-C, Section 2(1) is very explicit that the COMELEC has the power
to "enforce administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." To enforce means to cause to take effect
or to cause the performance of such act or acts necessary to bring into actual effect
or operation, a plan or measure. When we say the COMELEC has the power to
enforce all laws relative to the conduct of a plebiscite, it necessarily entails all the
necessary and incidental power for it to achieve the holding of an honest and
credible plebiscite. Obviously, the power of the COMELEC is not limited to the mere
administrative function of conducting the plebiscite. The law is clear. It is also
mandated to enforce the laws relative to the conduct of the plebiscite. Hence, the
COMELEC, whenever it is called upon to correct or check what the Board of
Canvassers erroneously or fraudulently did during the canvassing, can verify or
ascertain the true results of the plebiscite either through a pre-proclamation case or
through revision of ballots. To remove from the COMELEC the power to ascertain
the true results of the plebiscite through revision of ballots is to render nugatory its
constitutionally mandated power to "enforce" laws relative to the conduct of
plebiscite.
All that the Constitution provides is that the COMELEC shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to elective officials. The provision is
not a limiting provision in the sense that it only limits the quasi-judicial power of the
COMELEC to said cases. To repeat, the power of the COMELEC to ascertain the true
results of the plebiscite is implicit in its power to enforce all laws relative to the
conduct of plebiscite.
ALROBEN J. GOH v. HON. LUCILO R. BAYRON AND COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 212584| 742 SCRA 303| November 25, 2014| En Banc| Carpio
The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the COMELEC with the power to
"[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." The 1987 Constitution not only
guaranteed the COMELEC's fiscal autonomy, but also granted its head, as authorized
by law, to augment items in its appropriations from its savings.
FACTS
On 17 March 2014, Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition, docketed
as SPA EM No. 14-004 (RCL), against Mayor Bayron due to loss of trust and
confidence brought about by "gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, Incompetence, and other
related gross inexcusable negligence/dereliction of duty, intellectual dishonesty and
emotional immaturity as Mayor of Puerto Princesa City. COMELEC its promulgated
Resolution No. 9864, found the recall petition sufficient in form and substance,
however, COMELEC also suspended the funding of any and all recall elections until
the resolution of the funding issue.
On 28 April 2014, Mayor Bayron filed with the COMELEC an Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration and for Clarification which prayed for the dismissal of the recall
petition for lack of merit. COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the division.
ISSUE
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
Resolution No. 9864.
RULING
YES. The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the
COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections.
There is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct
recall elections for 2014. The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the COMELEC
with the power to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." The 1987
Constitution not only guaranteed the COMELEC's fiscal autonomy, but also granted
its head, as authorized by law, to augment items in its appropriations from its
savings. The 2014 GAA provides such authorization to the COMELEC Chairman.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS v. HON LUCENITO N. TAGLE, PRESIDING JUDGE,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20, IMUS, CAVITE
G. R. Nos. 148948 & 148951-60| 397 SCRA 618| February 17, 2003| Davide Jr.,
C.J.

One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of
prosecuting those committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal liability in
favor of the party whose vote was bought. This grant of immunity will encourage the
recipient or acceptor to come into the open and denounce the culprit-candidate, and
will ensure the successful prosecution of the criminal case against the latter.
FACTS
During the May 11, 1998 elections, Florentino A. Bautista ran for the position
of mayor in the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite. On July 8, 1998, he filed with the
COMELEC a complaint against then incumbent mayor Atty. Federico Poblete,
Bienvenido Pobre, Reynaldo Aguinaldo, Arturo Ganibe, Leonardo Llave, Diosdado
del Rosario, Manuel Ubod, Angelito Peregrino, Mario Espiritu, Salvador Olaes and
Pedro Paterno, Jr., for their alleged vote-buying activities. The Law Department filed
the corresponding information against the respondents before the RTC, Branch 90,
Imus, Cavite.
On April 10, 2000, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor resolved to file
separate information for vote-selling in the various branches of the RTC in Imus,
Cavite, against the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080. The Law Department of the
COMELEC filed motions to suspend proceedings which was later on granted by the
Presiding Judge of Branch 22. The COMELEC en banc declared null and void the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-108 and held the
respondents therein are exempt from criminal prosecution pursuant to the fourth
paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as The Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987, which grants immunity from criminal prosecution persons who
voluntarily give information and willingly testify against those liable for vote-buying
or vote-selling. The Law Department filed a motion to dismiss Criminal Cases
presided by herein respondent judge but the latter denied the said motion and the
motion for reconsideration. According to respondent judge, before one can be

exempt from prosecution under the fourth paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646,
it is necessary that such person has already performed the overt act of voluntarily
giving information or testifying in any official investigation or proceeding for the
offense to which such information or testimony was given. It was thus premature to
exempt the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 from criminal prosecution, since they
have not yet testified.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents of I.S. No. 1-99-1080 should be exempted
from criminal liability pursuant to the immunity to witnesses of vote-buying or
vote-selling.
RULING
YES. One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying
and of prosecuting those committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal
liability in favor of the party whose vote was bought. This grant of immunity will
encourage the recipient or acceptor to come into the open and denounce the culprit-
candidate, and will ensure the successful prosecution of the criminal case against
the latter.
We agree with the petitioner and hold that the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-
1080, who are the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00,
are exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling by virtue of the proviso in the
last paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646. Respondent judge lost sight of the fact
that at the time the complaint for vote-selling was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 had already executed
sworn statements attesting to the corrupt practice of vote-buying in the case
docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99. It cannot then be denied that they had
already voluntarily given information in the vote-buying case. In fact, they willingly
testified in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 per petitioners Memorandum filed with this
Court.
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND

TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) PARTY-LIST, REPRESENTED BY SALVADOR B.
BRITANICO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 177508| 595 SCRA 477| August 07, 2009| Carpio

It is clear that the grant of the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute
election offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881,
a legislative enactment. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution were to give
the COMELEC the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute election offenses, the
framers would have expressly so stated in the Constitution.
FACTS
On May 7, 2007, Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) Party List, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization,
filed this petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioner also assails the constitutionality of Sections
34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369. According to petitioner, these provisions are of
questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the
provisions of the Constitution.
The COMELEC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their
respective Comments. At the outset, both maintain that RA 9369 enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality, save for the prayer of the COMELEC to declare
Section 43 as unconstitutional.
ISSUE
Whether or not Constitution gave the COMELEC the exclusive power to
investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws.
RULING
NO. We do not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that the Constitution
gave the COMELEC the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of
violations of election laws. Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the
COMELEC the power to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices. This was an important innovation introduced by the
Constitution because this provision was not in the1935 or 1973 Constitutions. The
phrase [w]here appropriate leaves to the legislature the power to determine the
kind of election offenses that the COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively or
concurrently with other prosecuting arms of the government.
The grant of the exclusive power to the COMELEC can be found in Section
265 of BP 881. The history of election laws shows that prior to BP 881, no such
exclusive power was ever bestowed on the COMELEC.
It is clear that the grant of the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute
election offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP
881, a legislative enactment. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution were
to give the COMELEC the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute election
offenses, the framers would have expressly so stated in the Constitution.
COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC. v. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER BARTOLOME C. FERNANDEZ and HONORABLE
COMMISSIONER ALBERTO P. CRUZ
G.R. No. 92585| 208 SCRA 726| May 8, 1992| Davide, Jr.

The audit power of the Auditor General under the 1935 Constitution and the
Commission on Audit under the 1973 Constitution authorized them to
disallow illegal expenditures of funds or uses of funds and property. Our present
Constitution retains that same power and authority, further strengthened by the
definition of the COA's general jurisdiction in Section 26 of the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines and Administrative Code of 1987.
FACTS
On February 2, 1989, the COA sent a letter to Caltex Philippines, Inc. (CPI),
hereinafter referred to as Petitioner, directing the latter to remit to the OPSF its
collection, excluding that unremitted for the years 1986 and 1988, of the additional
tax on petroleum products authorized under the aforesaid Section 8 of P.D. No. 1956
which, as of December 31, 1987, amounted to P335,037,649.00 and informing it
that, pending such remittance, all of its claims for reimbursement from the OPSF
shall be held in abeyance. On 9 March 1989, the COA sent another letter to
petitioner informing it that partial verification with the OEA showed that the grand
total of its unremitted collections of the above tax is P1,287,668,820.00.
In its letter of May 3, 1989, petitioner requested the COA for an early release
of its reimbursement certificates from the OPSF covering claims with the Office of
Energy Affairs since June 1987 up to March 1989 but COA denied petitioner's
request.
Petitioner, in a letter dated May 31, 1989, submitted to the COA a proposal
for the payment of the collections and the recovery of claims and was later on
granted but COA also prohibited the petitioner from further offsetting remittances
and reimbursements for the current and ensuing years. Caltex filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. Unsatisfied with the decision, petitioner filed on March 28, 1990
the present petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Constitution gives the COA discretionary power to
disapprove irregular or unnecessary government expenditures.
RULING
YES. The audit power of the Auditor General under the 1935 Constitution and
the Commission on Audit under the 1973 Constitution authorized them to
disallow illegal expenditures of funds or uses of funds and property. Our present
Constitution retains that same power and authority, further strengthened by the
definition of the COA's general jurisdiction in Section 26 of the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines and Administrative Code of 1987. Pursuant to its power to
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations for the prevention of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of
funds, 36 the COA promulgated on 29 March 1977 COA Circular No. 77-55. Since the
COA is responsible for the enforcement of the rules and regulations, it goes without
saying that failure to comply with them is a ground for disapproving the payment of
the proposed expenditure.
Indeed, when the framers of the last two (2) Constitutions conferred upon
the COA a more active role and invested it with broader and more extensive powers,
they did not intend merely to make the COA a toothless tiger, but rather envisioned
a dynamic, effective, efficient and independent watchdog of the Government.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, JESUS P. ESTANISLAO, DOLORES A.

SANTIAGO, LYNN H. CATUNCAN, NORMA O. TERREL, MA. ANTONIA G. REBUENO
vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 88435| 373 SCRA 356| 16 January 2002| Carpio
The framers of the Constitution intentionally omitted the word "exclusive" in

the first paragraph of Section 2 precisely to allow concurrent audit by private external
auditors. The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2
is that the COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive.
FACTS
The Philippine government obtained from the World Bank and Economic
Recovery Loan (ERL) in the amount of US$ 310 to support the recovery of the
Philippine economy from the financial crisis during the latter part of the Marcos
regime. As a condition for granting the loan, the World Bank required the Philippine
government to rehabilitate the DBP. On November 28, 1986, the Monetary Board
adopted Resolution No. 1079 which states that an annual financial audit of all banks
whether Government-owned or controlled or private shall be conducted by an
external independent auditor be in addition to and without prejudice to that
conducted by the Commission on Audit. On January 8, 1987, the Phil. Govt. and
World Bank agreed to the private audit of DBP. The COA Chairman (Guingona)
interposed no objection to the proposed audit to be undertaken by private external
auditors. DBP hired Joaquin Cunanan & Co. as DBP’s private external auditor for the
calendar year 1986. On April 27, 1987 the new COA Chairman (Domingo) objected
CBC No. 1124 and ordered to disallow any payment to private auditors whose
services were unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary. Petitioner argued that the
two COA letter-decisions are contrary to the Constitution and existing laws. Also,
that COA has no legal standing to invoke CBC 1124’s unconstitutionality for it does
not possess any binding and conclusive effect upon COA and that it was not the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development which required the audit of
government banks by private auditing firm, but the Central Bank itself.
ISSUE
Whether the Constitution vest in the COA the sole and exclusive power to
examine and audit government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private
external auditors under any circumstance
RULING
NO, COA does not have the exclusive power to examine and audit
government agencies. NO. COA does not have the exclusive power to examine and
audit government agencies. COA vigorously asserts that under the first paragraph of
Section 2, the COA enjoys the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit all
government agencies, including the DBP. The COA contends this is similar to its sole
and exclusive authority, under the second paragraph of the same Section, to define
the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, including rules on
the disallowance of unnecessary expenditures of government agencies. The bare
language of Section 2, however, shows that the COA's power under the first
paragraph is not declared exclusive, while its authority under the second paragraph
is expressly declared "exclusive." There is a significant reason for this marked
difference in language. The framers of the Constitution intentionally omitted the
word "exclusive" in the first paragraph of Section 2 precisely to allow concurrent
audit by private external auditors. The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a
reading of the entire Section 2 is that the COA's power to examine and audit is non-
exclusive. On the other hand, the COA's authority to define the scope of its audit,
promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures
is exclusive. The Central Bank has been conducting periodic and special examination
and audit of banks to determine the soundness of their operations and the safety of
the deposits of the public. Undeniably, the Central Bank's power of "supervision"
includes the power to examine and audit banks, as the banking laws have always
recognized this power of the Central Bank. Hence, the COA's power to examine and
audit government banks must be reconciled with the Central Bank's power to
supervise the same banks.
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THEPREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS vs

COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 169752| 534 SCRA 356| September 25, 2007| Austria-Martinez
The fact that a private corporation is impressed with public interest does not
make the entity a public corporation. They may be considered quasi-public
corporations which are private corporations that render public service, supply public
wants and pursue other exemplary objectives.
FACTS
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THEPREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS

(PSPCA) was incorporated as a juridical entity by virtue of Act No. 1285 by the
Philippine Commission in order to enforce laws relating to the cruelty inflicted upon
animals and for the protection of and to perform all things which may tend to
alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare. In order to enhance its
powers, PSPCA was initially imbued with (1) power to apprehend violators of
animal welfare laws and (2) share 50% of the fines imposed and collected through
its efforts pursuant to the violations of related laws. However, Commonwealth Act
No. 148 recalled the said powers. President Quezon then issued Executive Order No.
63 directing the Commission of Public Safety, Provost Marshal General as head of
the Constabulary Division of the Philippine Army, Mayors of chartered cities and
every municipal president to detail and organize special officers to watch, capture,
and prosecute offenders of criminal-cruelty laws. On December 1, 2003, an audit
team from the Commission on Audit visited petitioner’s office to conduct a survey.
PSPCA demurred on the ground that it was a private entity and not under the CoA’s
jurisdiction, citing Sec .2 (1), Art. IX of the Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether PSPCA is subject to CoA’s Audit Authority
RULING
PSPCA’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any

agency of the State. The mere fact that a corporation has been created by a special
law doesn’t necessarily qualify it as a public corporation. At the time PSPCA was
formed, the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the applicable law and no proscription
similar to the charter test can be found therein. There was no restriction on the
legislature to create private corporations in 1903. The amendments introduced by
CA 148 made it clear that PSPCA was a private corporation, not a government
agency. Like all private corporations, the successors of its members are determined
voluntarily and solely by the petitioner, and may exercise powers generally
accorded to private corporations. PSPCA’s employees are registered and covered by
the SSS at the latter’s initiative and not through the GSIS. The fact that a private
corporation is impressed with public interest does not make the entity a public
corporation. They may be considered quasi-public corporations which are private
corporations that render public service, supply public wants and pursue other
exemplary objectives. The true criterion to determine whether a corporation is
public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporate to the
State. It is public if it is created by the latter’s own agency or instrumentality,
otherwise, it is private.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. Nos. 89679-81| 190 SCRA 154 | 28 September 1990| Melencio-Herrera
LBP is not an ordinary government agency within the scope of Section 36 of

P.D. No 1445, but a unique and specialized banking institution. Nonetheless, LBP is
still subject to COA's general audit jurisdiction.
FACTS
The Loan Executive Committee of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
waived the penalty charges in the amount of P9,636.36 on the loan of Home Savings
Bank and Trust Company (HSBTC) pursuant to Resolution No. 80-222. According to
LBP, they have been vested with the power to condone penalties being a commercial
bank clothed with authority to exercise all the general powers mentioned in the
Corporation Law and the General Banking Act. COA argues that pursuant to Section
36 of Pres. Decree No. 1445, or the Government Auditing Code, such power is
exclusively vested in the Commission.
ISSUE
Whether LBP is authorized to release claims or liabilities.
RULING
YES, LBP is authorized to release claims or liabilities for the reason that it
was created as a body corporate and government instrumentality to provide timely
and adequate financial support in all phases involved in the execution of needed
agrarian reform under RA 3844. Section 75 of its Charter also authorizes it to
exercise the general powers mentioned in the General Banking Act including
writing-off loans and advances with an outstanding amount of one hundred
thousand pesos or more. Thus, LBP is not an ordinary government agency within
the scope of Section 36 of P.D. No 1445, but a unique and specialized banking
institution. Nevertheless, LBP is still subject to COA's general audit jurisdiction, to
see to it that the fiscal responsibility that rests directly with the head of the
government agency has been properly and effectively discharged.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 101976| 218 SCRA 203| 29 January 1993| Narvasa
COA is not only vested with the power and authority, but it is also charged with
the duty, to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the expenditures or
uses of funds owned by, or pertaining to, the Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities.
FACTS
On June 25, 1986, Petitioner Savellano furnished the Bureau of Internal

Revenue (BIR) with a confidential affidavit of information denouncing the National
Coal Authority (NCA) and the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) for non-
payment of taxes totalling P234 Million on interest earnings of their respective
money placements with the Philippine National Bank (PNB). By a letter dated
Novermber 28, 1986, BIR Commissioner Bienvenido Tan, Jr. recommended to the
Minister of Finance payment to petitioner Savellano of an informer's reward
equivalent to 15% of the amount of P15,986,165.00. Respondent COA rendered COA
decision no. 740 disallowing in audit the payment of informer's reward to Savellano
on the ground that payment of an informer's reward under Section 281 of the
National Internal Revenue Code is conditioned upon the actual recovery or
collection of revenues, and no such revenue or income was actually realized, since
two government agencies were involved. Under Sec 90, the final determination by
the Department of Finance, through the recommendation of the BIR, of petitioner
Savellano's entitlement to the informer's reward is conclusive only upon the
executive agencies concerned.
ISSUE
Whether the final determination made by the Finance Department can bind
respondent COA or foreclose its review thereof in the exercise of its constitutional
function and duty
RULING
NO, the final determination by the Department of Finance, through the

recommendation of the BIR, of petitioner Savellano’s entitlement to the informer’s
reward is conclusive only upon the executive agencies concerned. Respondent COA
is not an executive agency. It is one of the three (3) independent constitutional
commissions. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the clear mandate and
implications of Section 3 of Art IX (D) of the Constitution. COA is not only vested
with the power and authority, but it is also charged with the duty, to examine, audit
and settle all accounts pertaining to the expenditures or uses of funds owned by, or
pertaining to, the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities. The disallowance in audit by respondent COA is however, not in
itself final. The same may be set aside and nullified by this Court, if done with grave
abuse of discretion.
FELIX UY, ROMAN CAGATIN, JAMES ENGUITO et al., vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 130685| 328 SCRA 607 | March 21, 2000| Puno
The audit authority of COA is intended to prevent irregular, unnecessary,

excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds
and properties. Payment of back wages to illegally dismissed government employees
can hardly be described as irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable.
FACTS
Former Governor Paredes dismissed from service more than sixty

employees, allegedly to scale down the operations of the office. The Merit Systems
Protection Board (under CSC) rendered a decision that the reduction in work force
was not done in accordance with civil service rules and regulations, and ordered the
reinstatement of the workers. The Commission on Audit (COA) rendered a decision

ruling that the back salaries of the workers have become the personal liability of the
Governor because the illegal dismissal was done in bad faith.
ISSUE
Whether COA, in the exercise of its power to audit, can disallow the payment
of back wages of illegally dismissed employees by the Provincial Government of
Agusan del Sur which has been decreed pursuant to a final decision of the CSC.
RULING
NO, the audit authority of COA is intended to prevent irregular, unnecessary,

excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government
funds and properties. Payment of back wages to illegally dismissed government
employees can hardly be described as irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant
or unconscionable. Further, Gov. Paredes was never made a party to nor served a
notice of the proceedings before the COA and it would be unfair to hold him
personally liable for the claims of petitioners without giving him an opportunity to
be heard and present evidence in his defense.
GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA vs THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER
G. R. No. 180989| 665 SCRA 176| February 7, 2012| Sereno
The conduct of pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that the Court may compel
the COA to perform.
FACTS
Petitioner Dela Llana wrote to the Commission on Audit (COA) regarding the
recommendation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food that the
Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service. The COA replied
informing him of the prior issuance of Circular No. 89-299, which provides that
whenever the circumstances permits it, the COA may reinstitute pre-audit or adopt
such other control measures as necessary and appropriate to protect the funds and
property of an agency. The petitioner filed the petition for Certiorari. He alleges that
the pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the
1987 Constitution. He further claimed that the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious
irregularities in government transactions have been committed. Respondents, filed
their Comment on the petition and argued that the petition must be dismissed
because it is not proper for a petition for certiorari because: 1. there is no allegation
showing that COA exercised judicial or quasi-judicial functions when it promulgated
Circular No. 89-2992. there is no convincing explanation showing the promulgation
of the circular was done with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents claim that the
circular is valid, as COA has the power under the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether it is the constitutional duty of COA to conduct a pre-audit before the

consummation of government transaction.
RULING
NO, it is not the constitutional duty of COA to conduct a pre-audit. The Court
found that there is nothing in the Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution
that requires COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all
government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found
in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain
government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the
internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. During such, the COA may
adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the
deficiencies. Hence, the conduct of pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that the Court
may compel the COA to perform.
ACCOUNTABILITY
OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST OFFICERS vs HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, HON.
GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR. and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA
G.R. No. 166715| 562 SCRA 251| 14 August 2008| Corona
A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not
anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces
dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving
government personnel.
FACTS
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT
Reform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO
enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions
for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase
the VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such
delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Constitution. They argue that
VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which can’t be
included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this
refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the
government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. Petitioners further
alleged that delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to
republicanism. They insist that accountability, responsibility and transparency
should dictate the actions of Congress and they should not pass to the President the
decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law also effectively nullified the
President’s power of control, which includes the authority to set aside and nullify
the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of
the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
ISSUE
Whether the implementation of RA 9335 is contrary to the concept of public

accountability
RULING
NO, petitioners’ argument is purely speculative and bereft of factual and legal
basis. Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties. This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and
employees. The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to
rebut it. It cannot be overturned by mere conjecture especially in this case where it
is an underlying principle to advance a declared public policy. Nevertheless, public
officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A
system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not
anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and
reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of
deserving government personnel.
HON. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES VS COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION)

AND JEJOMAR ERWIN BINAY, JR.
GR No. 217126-27| 774 SCRA 431| 10 November 2015| Perlas-Bernabe
The condonation doctrine is abandoned, for being inconsistent with the concept
of public office as a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the
people at all times.
FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition by the petitioner in her

capacity as the Ombudsman through the office of the Solicitor General, assailing the
resolution of the respondent, Court of Appeals,which granted the prayer of
temporary restraining order by the private respondent, Jejomar Binay, Jr., against
the implementation of the Joint Order of the Ombudsman.
A complaint was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas Enciso VI against
Binay Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati.
The said affidavit/complaint accuses the abovementioned of plunder and violation
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection with the construction of
Makati City Hall Parking Building.
The OMB complaint alleged that Binay,Jr. Was involved in anomalous

activities in the construction of Makati Parking Building that was committed during
his previous and present term as Makati City Mayor. Binay, Jr. contends that the CA
correctly prohibited the implementation of the preventive suspension order given
his clear right to public office. He also claims that he cannot be held administratively
liable for the charges against him since his re-election operated as a condonation of
any administrative charges he may have committed in his previous term.
ISSUE
Whether or not Binay,Jr. cannot be held liable for administrative charges he

committed before because of the condonation doctrine.
RULING
YES, he can be held liable. The Court came to a conclusion that the doctrine of
condonation is bereft of any legal bases. It has to be noted that a public office is a
public trust and it has a corollary requirement of accountability to people at all
times. The idea of an elective official’s administrative liability for misconduct
committed in his past terms can be wiped off by the fact of re-election is
inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense and in this jurisdiction, liabilities arising from administrative
offenses may be condoned by the President.
MAYOR FRANCISCO LECAROZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR No. L-56384| 128 SCRA 324| March 22, 1984| Relova,J
Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution proscribes removal from office of
the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to allow a
public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally
while holding his office with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from office,
would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law.
FACTS
On July 2, 1979 in Sta.Cruz, Marinduque, the petitioner who is a public officer

took advantaged of his public position by unlawfully and wilfully taking over the
operation and control of the gasoline station owned by Pedro Par. The petitioner
herein ordered his policemen companions to sell gasoline to the public, issue
invoices, and padlock the dispensing pumps of the said gasoline station. In doing so,
the petitioner deprived Pedro Par the right to exercise a lawful occupation by means
of threat, force, or violence. Due to these facts, petitioner was charged with the
crime of grave coercion filed before the respondent court.
The petitioner filed this petition to pray for a motion to quash the facts of the
case on the ground that the respondent court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the said
case which was filed before it.
Petitioner claims that it should have been filed with the ordinary courts in
Marinduque where the professed crime was executed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction over the case filed
against the petitioner
RULING
YES, the respondent court has jurisdiction over the case. The facts of the case
clearly alleged that the petitioner took advantaged of his position as a public official
when he intimidated the gasoline station’s owner. If he were not the mayor, he
would not have directed the policemen and they would have not followed his orders
to sell Pedro Par’s gasoline and padlock his station.
The respondent court also has concurrent jurisdiction with regular courts,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 as amended.
In case of concurrent jurisdiction, it is fundamental that the court which first
acquired the jurisdiction should now exclude other courts. Therefore, the
respondent court’s denial of the petitioner’s request to have his case transferred to
the Court of First Instance of Marinduque is not a grave abuse of discretion. The
New Constitution also provided the respondent court jurisdiction over public
officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporation; however, there are exceptions to this power, like those declared to be
removed by impeachment which who are stated in Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution. The said provision states that the aforementioned constitutional
officers,in “judgment in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment in accordance with the law.”
MIGUEL CUENCO VS HON. MARCELO B. FERNAN

A.M No. 3135| 158 SCRA 29| February 17, 1988| Per Curiam
Members of the Supreme Court may be removed from office only by

impeachment and not through disbarment during the Member’s incumbency.
FACTS
On October 10, 1987, Atty.Miguel Cuenco, a former member of the House of

Representative, filed a sworn statement praying for judgment ordering the
disbarment of Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, a Chairman of the Third Division of this
Court.
Vito Borromeo died on March 13, 1952 without any heirs but left behind
extensive properties in Cebu. On April 19, 1952, a petition for probate of a one-page
document - believed to be the last will and testament of Vito Borromeo - was filed
with the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Those established under the said will as the
sole heirs of Vito Borromeo’s estate were Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia, all
surnamed Borromeo.
This will was declared to be a forgery by the decision of the probate court on
May 28, 1960.
During the intestacy proceedings, nine people were declared by the trial
court as the rightful successors of the lat Vito Borromeo. Several petitions were also
filed during the said proceedings which were later consolidated and decided by the
Third Division of the Court.
Petitioner, who had represented a group of heirs in the Vito Borromeo

intestate proceedings claimed numerous allegations against the respondent:
1. That the respondent appeared as counsel for the three instituted heirs
despite having already accepted his appointment as Associate Justice of this
Court;
2. That the respondent “had exerted personal efforts to take away from the
Supreme Court En Banc, First and Second Divisions of the Tribunal, the Vito
Borromeo estate proceedings” to enable him to influence the decisions;
3. That the respondent has fabricated false and fictitious heirs of Vito
Borromeo; and
4. That the respondent’s “strong and unyielding determination” to collect

huge amounts of “money in payment of his legal services rendered to his
clients has induced the Honorable Justice to unduly influence the Members of
the Court into dismissing the petitioner’s complaint against Judge Francisco P.
Burgos.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred and therefore

impeached as Associate Justice due to the allegations against him.
RULING
NO, he cannot be disbarred. The charges against the respondent is

unsupported by facts and bereft of any evidence. There is no record that the
respondent appeared as counsel in such proceedings representation of the
instituted heirs and claimant, Fortunato Borromeo, who is found to be represented
by Atty. Juan Legarte Sanchez as early as January 19, 1953.
The complaint for disbarment must also be dismissed because the members
of the Supreme Court, under Section 7(1) Article VIII of the Constitution, who must
be members of the Philippine Bar, may be removed only by impeachment. To grant
the disbarment complaint of a Member of the Court during his incumbency would
run afoul of the constitutional mandate that the Members of the Court may be
removed from office only by impeachment.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND

FORMER DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS ARTURO C. MOJICA
G.R. No. 146486| 435 SCRA 714| March 4, 2005| Chico-Nazario
The list of impeachable officials under the Constitution is exclusive and it

excludes the Deputy Ombudsman.
FACTS
Officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman requesting an investigation on Arturo Mojica, then Deputy
Ombudsman who allegedly committed offenses including sexual harassment,
forfeiture of money from confidential employees and oppression against employees.
The Ombudsman directed his Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) to
conduct a verification and fact-finding investigation. The FFIB report was referred
by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers. The Committee of Peers
initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for
purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the
Ombudsman after careful study that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special
Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment.
ISSUE
Whether the Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer.
RULING
NO. Sec 2, Art XI of the Constitution provides the list of impeachable officers
namely the President, Vice-President, Members of the Supreme Court, Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission reveal that the term Ombudsman refers to the person
and not to the office. Therefore only the Ombudsman may be removed through
impeachment, excluding his deputies. Moreover, the leading legal luminaries of the
Constitution agree that the list under Sec 2 is exclusive and may not be increased or
reduced by legislative enactment. The power to impeach is essentially a non-
legislative prerogative and can be exercised by the Congress only within the limits of
the authority conferred upon it by the Constitution. This authority may not be
expanded by the grantee itself even if motivated by the desire to strengthen the
security of tenure of other officials of the government.
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG

MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, WORLD
WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.v.THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, JAIME N. SORIANO
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 160261| 415 SCRA 44| November 10, 2003| Carpio Morales
Judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks

and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers,
forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast
powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
FACTS
Former President Estrada filed an the first impeachment complaint against

Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. (CJ Davide) for culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. The House
Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was sufficient in
form, but voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in substance.
Four months after the dismissal of the first complaint, the second
impeachment complaint was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William B. Fuentebella against CJ Davide, Jr. founded on the alleged results of
the investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF).
The instant petitions arose against the House of Representatives, et. al., most
of which contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year."
ISSUE
Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from

impeachment proceedings.
RULING
YES. As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power
of judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of

the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution which
states that the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

government. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government and the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine
the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system
of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and
one section is not to be allowed to defeat another. Both are integral components of
the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no

branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice

Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,FELICIANO
BELMONTE, JR.et al.
G.R. No. 19345| 643 SCRA 198| February 15, 2011| Carpio Morales
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where
the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the
people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.
FACTS
Respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and

Evelyn Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against Ma.
Merceditas Gutierrez. Also, respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John
Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon
(Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint against Ombudsman Gutierrez.
During its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously

referred both complaints to the public respondent HOR Committee on Justice. After
hearing, public respondent, through two separate Resolutions, found both
complaints sufficient in form and in substance which both allege culpable violation
of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust.
Petitioner Gutierrez, challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition the
Resolutions of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice. Respondents
raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that
public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial

function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was
exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature.
ISSUE
Whether HOR Committee on Justice committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions.
RULING
NO. Petitioner alleges that public respondent’s chairperson, Representative

NielTupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is conducting, while
his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To
petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and his father
influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias and
vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaints against her.
The Court finds petitioner’s allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of

merit, there being hardly any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does
not suffice. The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the
entire body itself.
The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment

complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers
of the House of Representatives which committed such determinative function to
public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its
discretion, the House has formulated determinable standards as to the form and
substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the
Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the
constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional
guidelines.
In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process,

questions the lack of or, more accurately, delay in the publication of the
Impeachment Rules. Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case
refers to "the publication of rules in any medium of information, not necessarily in

the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation."
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally

understood—that is, to make known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia.
What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted
sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was
clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used.
Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to

"publication," the former should be understood to have been used in its general
sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to
determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of
court for filing and publication. Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of
general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to make known its rules.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as

an IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PHILIPPINE
SAVINGS BANK, ARLENE "KAKA" BAG-AO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, MARILYN
PRIMICIAS-AGABAS, NIEL TUPAS, RODOLFO FARINAS, SHERWIN TUGNA, RAUL
DAZA, ELPIDIO BARZAGA, REYNALDO UMALI, NERI COLMENARES (ALSO
KNOWN AS THE PROSECUTORS FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES)
G.R. No. 200242| 676 SCRA 578| July 17, 2012| Villarama, Jr.
Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary in
impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective
functioning of the separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and
balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally entrusted to the
political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave
abuse or arbitrariness.
FACTS
A caucus was held by the majority bloc of the House of Representatives

(HOR) during which a verified complaint for impeachment against Chief Justice
Renato Corona (CJ Corona) was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on
Justice. On the same day, the complaint was voted in session and 188 Members
signed and endorsed it. The complaint was transmitted to the Senate which
convened as an impeachment court the following day.
CJ Corona received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable

violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption. On
January 16, 2012, the Senate, acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced trial
proceedings against CJ Corona.
CJ Corona filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for immediate issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction assailing
the impeachment case initiated by the Members of the HOR and trial being
conducted by Senate. Senate contends that unless there is a clear transgression of
these constitutional limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded
judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail

matters or incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain
injunctive relief for alleged violations of right to due process of the person being
tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.
RULING
YES. Impeachment, described as the most formidable weapon in the arsenal

of democracy, was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or
highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that the decision will be
regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real
demonstrations of innocence or guilt. Our own Constitution’s provisions on
impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution. CJ Corona was impeached
through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he claims
was accomplished with undue haste and under a complaint which is defective for
lack of probable cause.
In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., the
Court ruled that the power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power
of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in
Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, the Court resolved the
question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints
against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the due process
clause and of the one-year bar provision.
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the
conviction of CJ Corona by more than the required majority vote of the Senator-
Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated
his office. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by CJ Corona had been mooted
by supervening events and his own acts. An issue or a case becomes moot and
academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination
thereof would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual
substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth

Division) and EFREN L. ALAS
G.R. No. 147706-07| 451 SCRA 413| February 16, 2005| Corona
Concerned officers of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether

created by special law or formed under the Corporation Code, come under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for purposes of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
FACTS
Efren L. Alas (Alas) was the President and Chief Operating Officer of
Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB). Two separate informations for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act were filed against him due to alleged anomalous advertising contracts he
entered into with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company—to the prejudice and damage
of the government.
Alas moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that Sandiganbayan
does not have jurisdiction over his case. Sandiganbayan ruled that PPSB is a private
corporation and its officials do not fall under its jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over presidents, directors or

trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations organized
and incorporated under the Corporation Code
RULING
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that PPSB fits the bill as a government-owned
or controlled corporation, and organized and incorporated under the Corporation
Code as a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal Corporation (PHILPOST). More than
99% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to the government while the
rest is nominally held by its incorporators who were themselves officers of
PHILPOST.
The legislature, in mandating the inclusion of presidents, directors or trustees,
or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, has consistently refrained from making any
distinction with respect to the manner of their creation. The deliberate omission, in
our view, clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to include the presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of both types of corporations within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in graft and
corruption. Had it been otherwise, it could have simply made the necessary
distinction. But it did not.
Hence, in Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, the Court ruled that the concerned officers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether created by special law or
formed under the Corporation Code, come under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan for purposes of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 159940| 451 SCRA 570| February 16, 2005| Carpio Morales
It bears emphasis that that under P.D. No 807, Sec. 9(h) which authorizes the
CSC to approve appointments to positions in the civil service, except those specified
therein, its authority is limited only to determine whether or not the appointees
possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate eligibility, nothing else.
FACTS
On March 7, 1994, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved the

Qualification Standards for several positions in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Subsequently, CSC classified the position of Graft Investigation Officer III as a Career
Executive Service Position thus governed by the rules on CES on eligibility.
Melchor Carandang, Paul Clemente and Jose Tereso De Jesus were appointed
as Graft Investigation Officer III by the Ombudsman. Such appointment was
approved by CSC-- subject to the condition that they must first obtain Civil Service
Executive eligibility to acquire security of tenure. Later, the Ombudsman requested
to make their temporary appointment permanent.
Carandang and Clemente were conferred with CSE eligibility. Subsequently,

the Petitioner reclassified several positions in the office. It included the shift from
Graft Investigation Officer III to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III. Then
the Petitioner requested approval of the Qualification Standards for the reclassified
position—which were the same as the previous one.
The CSC approved the permanent appointment of Carandang and Clemente

while De Jesus was not; on the ground that he has not met the eligibility
requirements. CSC contended that appointments by the Ombudsman are still subject
to Civil Service Law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CSC has the power to curtail the specific discretionary
power of appointment and grant of security of tenure, by the Ombudsman which is
an independent constitutional body
RULING
NO. Persons occupying positions in the CES are presidential appointees. A
person occupying the position of Graft Investigation Officer III is not, however,
appointed by the President but by the Ombudsman as provided in Article IX of the
Constitution. To classify the position of Graft Investigation Officer III as belonging to
the CES and require an appointee thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before
acquiring security of tenure would be absurd as it would result either in 1) vesting
the appointing power for said position in the President, in violation of the
Constitution; or 2) including in the CES a position not occupied by a presidential
appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code.
It bears emphasis that that under P.D. No 807, Sec. 9(h) which authorizes the
CSC to approve appointments to positions in the civil service, except those specified
therein, its authority is limited only to determine whether or not the appointees
possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate eligibility, nothing else.
Except for his lack of CES or CSE eligibility, De Jesus possesses the basic
qualifications of a Graft Investigation Officer III. Such being the case, the CSC has the
ministerial duty to grant the request of the Ombudsman that appointment be made
permanent effective December 18, 2002. To refuse to heed the request is a clear
encroachment on the discretion vested solely on the Ombudsman as appointing
authority. It goes without saying that the status of the appointments of Carandang
and Clemente, who were conferred CSE eligibility pursuant to CSC Resolution No.
03-0665 dated June 6, 2003, should be changed to permanent effective December
18, 2002 too.
EMILIO A. GONZALES III vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,

ACTING THROUGH AND REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M.
AMORANDO, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA
TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, AND ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG
G.R. No. 196231| 679 SCRA 614| September 4, 2012 | Perlas-Bernabe;
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT vs. ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN HIS CAP A

CITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F.
ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D. SULAY AND ATTY. FROILAN D. MONTALBAN, JR., IN
THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF OFFICE OF MALACANANG
LEGAL AFFAIRS
G.R. No. 196232| September 4, 2012| Perlas-Bernabe;
G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232| January 28, 2014| Brion
Betrayal of public trust refer to "acts which are just short of being criminal but
constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power,
inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary
powers."
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly

cannot be inferior – but is similar in degree and kind – to the independence similarly
guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions since all these
offices fill the political interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its
existence and proper functioning
FACTS
G.R. No. 196231
In 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct was filed before the Philippine
National Police- National Capital Region against Manila Police District Senior
Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others. Subsequently, upon the
recommendation of Emilio Gonzales III, P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and four others
were found guilty of Grave Misconduct which was thereafter approved by the
Ombudsman.
Hence, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. It remained pending for final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas-
Gutierrez until P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus filled with foreign tourists on April
27, 2010. It resulted to the death of P/S insp. Mendoza, eight Hongkong Chinese
Nationals and injury to several others.
After the incident, the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC)
were created to determine the accountability for the incident. IIRC then
recommended its findings with respect to Petitioner Gonzales to the Office of the
President (OP). The latter charged him with Gross Neglect of Duty and for Grave
Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust. Petitioner Gonzales was then
ordered for dismissal.
G.R. No. 196232
In April 2005, Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife and two sons were
charged with Plunder and Money Laundering. Subsequently, the government,
represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit (Barreras-
Sulit) and her staff sought the approval of the Plea Bargaining Agreement
(PLEBARA) entered with the accused. The Sandiganbayan found the plea warranted
and compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.
Consequently, the House of Representative’s Committee on Justice conducted

public hearings on the PLEBARA and recommended the Barreras-Sulit’s dismissal
and filing of other charges against her Deputies and Assistants to the Office of the
President (OP). The OP proceeded with the preliminary investigation. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President power to
discipline Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is constitutional
2. Whether or not the questioned acts of petitioner Gonzales constitutes
betrayal of public trust
RULING
1. YES. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is

extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective,
with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment, the
members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means
exclusive.
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions -

Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an
external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise
the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and
plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and
employees.
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power
to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not
resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is
tenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested
with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its
constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution
secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political
independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the
salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are
"reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."
2. NO. Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not impeachable

officers. However, by providing for their removal from office on the same
grounds as removal by impeachment, the legislature could not have intended
to redefine constitutional standards of culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, as well as betrayal
of public trust, and apply them less stringently. Hence, where betrayal of
public trust, for purposes of impeachment, was not intended to cover all
kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment, this should remain
true even for purposes of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the grounds for impeachment
have been made statutory grounds for the removal by the President of a
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness
of their nature nor the acuity of their scope. Betrayal of public trust could not
suddenly "overreach" to cover acts that are not vicious or malevolent on the
same level as the other grounds for impeachment.
G.R. No. 196231 &

G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014
FACTS
The Office of the President (OP) filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the
September 4, 2012 decision of the Supreme Court which reversed the OP ruling that
found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Gross Misconduct constituting
betrayal of public trust and imposed on him dismissal.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President power to
discipline Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is constitutional
RULING
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to
discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the
Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority,
cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman
itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its
key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her
mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence
is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did.
The Court resolved to reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner
Gonzales is concerned without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to
conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible
administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent
Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
GEORGE UY vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, OMBUDSMAN AND ROGER C. BERBANO, SR.,

SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER III, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
G.R. Nos. 105965-70| 312 SCRA 77| August 9, 1999| Pardo|
March 20, 2001| Puno
The prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the

direct exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases
cognizable by regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the
Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined. The law recognizes a
concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and other
investigative agencies of government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular
courts.
FACTS
George Uy was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine Navy. He was assigned

to act on behalf of Captain Luisito Fernandez, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for
Comptrollership on matters relating to the operation of the Fiscal Control Branch
which included the authority to sign disbursement vouchers relative to the
procurement of equipment in the Philippine Navy.
On July 2, 1991, six informations for estafa through falsification of official

documents and one for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 were initially filed
against petitioner and nineteen co-accused. Later, the Special Prosecutor
recommended that six informations for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 be
filed against LCDMR. Rodolfo Guanzon, LT. Pan and petitioner only.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that

Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over his case.
ISSUE
Whether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to

cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan
RULING
NO. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the

Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any
public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been
held that the clause any illegal act or omission of any public official is broad enough
to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.
The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is armed with the

power to prosecute erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in
the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses
that may be committed by such officers and employees. The legislature has vested
him with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions. Recognizing
the importance of this power, the Court cannot derogate the same by limiting it only
to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. It is apparent from the history and the
language of the present law that the legislature intended such power to apply not
only to cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those within the
jurisdiction of regular courts.
The prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the

direct exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases
cognizable by regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the
Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined therein. The law
recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and
other investigative agencies of government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by
regular courts.
RENATO A. TAPIADOR vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and ATTY. RONALDO

P. LEDESMA
G.R. No. 129124| 379 SCRA 322| March 15, 2002| De Leon, Jr.
The Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public official or
employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned
FACTS
On July 4, 1994, Walter Beck, a foreigner, filed a complaint-affidavit against

Renato Tapiador, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) Special Investigator
and Technical Assistant in the office of the then Commissioner Bayani M. Subido Jr.
In the said complaint-affidavit, Beck alleged that Tapiador demanded and received
Php10, 000 in exchange for the issuance of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR).
Moreover, Tapiador allegedly demanded an additional payment.
Tapiador was subsequently found to be both administratively and criminally

liable by the BID Resident Ombudsman. Upon review of the case, the Ombudsman
dismissed the criminal charge and held him liable solely for grave misconduct then
imposed his dismissal from government service.
Tapiad or’s Motion of Reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Ombudsman can directly order the dismissal of a

government employee
RULING
NO. The complainant clearly failed to present the quantum of proof necessary
to prove the charge in the subject administrative case, that is, with substantial
evidence. Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable,
the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the
government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section
13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can
only recommend the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault,
to the public official concerned.
EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA vs. EDWARD F. RANADA AND THE HONORABLE

OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO (NOW SUCCEEDED BY HON. SIMEON
MARCELO), AND HIS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR MINDANAO, HON. ANTONIO E.
VALENZUELA
G.R. No. 159314| 492 SCRA 652| June 26, 2006| Quisimbing
The Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government
service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.
FACTS
Edward Ranada filed an administrative complaint against Edgardo Estarija

for Gross Misconduct before the Office of Ombudsman. In the complaint, Estarija,
Harbor Master of the Philippine Airports Authority (PPA), was alleged to have
demanded monetary payment for the issuance and approval of berthing permits as
well as contribution to the Davao Pilots Association Inc.
The Ombudsman found him guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Consequently, he was ordered to be dismissed from the public service with
forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits. Estarija thereafter claimed
that the Ombudsman has no direct and immediate power to remove government
officials under Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as “The Ombudsman Act of
1989”.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to remove a

public official from government service
RULING
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that in passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress
deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute offenses
committed by public officers and employees to make him a more active and effective
agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office.
Thus, the Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in
Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, but allows the Legislature to enact a
law that would spell out the powers of the Ombudsman. Through the enactment of
Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the
Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials and employees, except
members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Hence, the powers of the Ombudsman are
not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional
body not merely functional but also effective.
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 12, REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT, ANTIQUE vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and ATTY.
NAPOLEON A. ABIERA
G.R. No. 102781| 221 SCRA 464| April 22,1993| Nocon
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
FACTS
Napoleon Abiera filed an affidavit-complaint before the Office of the

ombudsman. He alleged that petitioner has falsified his Certificate of Service.
Petitioner contended that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case because
the offense charged arose from judge’s performance of his official duties, which is
under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, that the
investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme
Court’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case

RULING
NO. The Court agreed with the petitioner that in the absence of any
administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates
of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into
the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. It is only the Supreme Court that
can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof.
RENATO A. TAPIADOR vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and ATTY. RONALDO

P. LEDESMA
G.R. No. 129124| 379 SCRA 322| March 15, 2002| De Leon, Jr.
The Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public official or
employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned
FACTS
On July 4, 1994, Walter Beck, a foreigner, filed a complaint-affidavit against

Renato Tapiador, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) Special Investigator
and Technical Assistant in the office of the then Commissioner Bayani M. Subido Jr.
In the said complaint-affidavit, Beck alleged that Tapiador demanded and received
Php10, 000 in exchange for the issuance of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR).
Moreover, Tapiador allegedly demanded an additional payment.
Tapiador was subsequently found to be both administratively and criminally

liable by the BID Resident Ombudsman. Upon review of the case, the Ombudsman
dismissed the criminal charge and held him liable solely for grave misconduct then
imposed his dismissal from government service.
Tapiador’s Motion of Reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Ombudsman can directly order the dismissal of a government
employee
RULING
NO. The complainant clearly failed to present the quantum of proof necessary
to prove the charge in the subject administrative case, that is, with substantial
evidence. Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable,
the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the
government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section
13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can
only recommend the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault,
to the public official concerned.
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR. vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN and

JUDGE FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES
G.R. No. 132177| 361 SCRA 395| July 19, 2001 BUENA, J.
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
By virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all

courts and court personnel, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’
and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation thereof.
FACTS
Judge Alumbres filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal

complaint against the petitioner for physical injuries, malicious mischief, and assault
upon a person in authority, and an administrative case with the Supreme Court
praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave
misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer, both arising from herein
petitioner punching Judge Alumbres. Petitioner requested the Ombudsman to refer
the case to the Supreme Court as it, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the
authority over them as they are both members of the bench. The Ombudsman
issued orders denying the request, hence, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court
for the reversal of the denials and barring the Ombudsman from taking further
action in the implementation of the challenged orders.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the
criminal complaint filed before it and refer the same to the Supreme Court.
RULING
YES. The Supreme Court is vested with exclusive administrative supervision

over all courts and its personnel, hence, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself
and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee,
involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the
Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not have administrative
implications. By virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision
over all courts and court personnel, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee
the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE

LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY
ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE
G.R. No. 87193| 174 SCRA 245| June 23, 1989| Cruz
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by

naturalization, or by repatriation. The returning renegade must show, by an express
and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
FACTS
The League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, and its President, Salvador

Estuye, in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition
for the annulment of Juan Frivaldo’s election and proclamation as Governor or
Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized
in the United States. Frivaldo, for his defense, said he was merely forced to seek
naturalization to escape persecution by agents of former President Marcos. Frivaldo
sought for reconsideration of COMELEC’s decision to set a hearing on merits but
was denied, hence this petition for certiorari. In his comments, Frivaldo posited that
his oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a
sufficient act of repatriation, and that his active participation in the 1987
congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of
the United States.
ISSUE
Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his
election.
RULING
NO. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by

naturalization, or by repatriation, it does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these
categorical acts. His oath and claimed forfeiture of American citizenship do not
qualify as repatriation, for what is required is to claim back the abandoned
citizenship by formally rejecting their adopted state and reaffirming their allegiance
to the Philippines. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty
and fidelity to any other state. The returning renegade must show, by an express
and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
MATEO CAASI vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL
G.R. No. 88831| 191 SCRA 229| November 8, 1990| Griño-Aquino
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
To be “qualified to run for elective office” in the Philippines, the law requires
that the candidate who is a green card holder must have “waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country.” The waiver of such
immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it.
FACTS
Mateo Caasi petitions for the review of the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the
appealed disqualification case against respondent Miguel for the position of
municipal mayor of Bolinao for being a green card holder, hence, a permanent
resident of the United States. COMELEC has earlier dismissed the petitions on the
ground that the possession of a green card by Miguel does not sufficiently establish
that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.
ISSUE
Whether a green card holder is qualified to run for public office in the
Philippines.
RULING
NO. Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent residence in

the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive
proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the
Philippines. To be “qualified to run for elective office” in the Philippines, the law
requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have “waived his status
as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country.” Miguel’s act of filing a
certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines did not of itself
constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United
States. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his
application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that
status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities
before he ran for mayor of Bolinao, it is conclusive that he was disqualified to run
for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST

LOANS vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO AS OMBUDSMAN, et. al.
G.R. No. 130140| 317 SCRA 272| October 25, 1999| Davide, Jr.
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
FACTS
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (the

Committee) filed administrative and judicial actions against Philippine Seeds, Inc.
(PSI) for the behest loans it obtained from DBP. The Ombudsman dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescription, arguing that the prescriptive period
commenced to run from the time of the commission of the crime, not from the
discovery thereof. The Committee, on the other hand, argues that the right of the
Republic of the Philippines to recover behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is
imprescriptible pursuant to Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in holding that the
prescriptive period should be counted from grant of the behest loans and not from
discovery thereof.
RULING
YES. The Ombudsman was right that Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution
is not applicable, since what is sought is to hold the respondents criminally liable for
violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), which is a special law.
Thus, the prescriptive period is covered by Section 2 of RA 3326 (An Act to Establish
Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run), as amended, which
provides that “prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment”.
However, it was impossible for the State to have known the violations of RA
3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the
public officials concerned connived or conspired with the “beneficiaries of the
loans”. The prescription thus begins to run only from the discovery of the unlawful
nature of the constitutive act or acts. The Ombudsman clearly acted with grave
abuse of discretion as it forthwith dismissed the complaint without even requiring
the respondents to submit their counter-affidavits and solely on the basis of the
dates the alleged behest loans were granted, or the dates of the commission of the
alleged offense was committed. It should have first received the evidence from the
complainant and the respondents to resolve the case on its merits and on the issue
of the date of discovery of the offense.
ILUMINADO URBANO and MARCIAL ACAPULCO vs. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,

RAMON BARCELONA and AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
G.R. No. 87977| 183 SCRA 347| March 19, 1990| Gancayco
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
Inasmuch as the State can speak and act only by law, whatever it does say
and do must be lawful, and that which is unlawful is not the word or deed of the
State, but is the mere wrong or trespass of those individual persons who falsely
speak and act in its name.
FACTS
Petitioners filed a special civil action to prohibit respondents from

representing certain government officers during preliminary investigation in a
criminal case filed by petitioners to prevent a possible conflict with respondents’
role as appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines. The Office of the Solicitor
General posited that on the basis of PD 478 (Defining the Powers and Functions of
the Office of the Solicitor General), it can represent or otherwise defend any public
official without any qualification or distinction in any litigation.
ISSUE
Whether the Office of the Solicitor General may represent a public officer or
employee in the preliminary investigation of a criminal action.
RULING
No. There is a clear conflict of interest where the Office of the Solicitor
General, as counsel for the public official, defends the latter in the preliminary
investigation stage of the criminal case, and where the same office, as appellate
counsel of the People of the Philippines, represents the prosecution when the case is
brought on appeal. Further, inasmuch as the State can speak and act only by law,
whatever it does say and do must be lawful, and that which is unlawful is not the
word or deed of the State, but is the mere wrong or trespass of those individual
persons who falsely speak and act in its name. Therefore, the accused public official
should not expect the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, to defend him
for a wrongful act which cannot be attributed to the State itself. In the same light, a
public official who is sued in a criminal case is actually sued in his personal capacity
inasmuch as his principal, the State, can never be the author of a wrongful act, much
less commit a crime. Thus, the Court rules that the Office of the Solicitor General is
not authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case.
HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO A. ABAD, VIRGILIA

M. BANDIGAS, ELIZABETH A. SOMEBANG and NICANOR MARGALLO
G.R. No. 131012| 306 SCRA 287| April 21, 1999| Mendoza
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty but only a

means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered
investigation. Preventive suspension pending appeal is punitive although it is in
effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the
administrative decision finding an employee guilty is reversed.
FACTS
Private respondents were administratively charged and placed under

preventive suspension for not reporting for work during the teachers’ strikes. The
investigation lasted less than the 90-day suspension and respondent Margallo was
initially ordered dismissed. This was later commuted to a six-month suspension,
similar to what his three colleagues were meted. On appeal with the CSC, Margallo’s
sentence was affirmed while those of the rest were reduced to reprimand. The latter
were hence ordered reinstated thereafter. Respondents appealed with the Court of
Appeals (CA) that they should be exonerated of all charges and that they be paid
salaries during their suspension. The CA decided for all to be reprimanded and be
paid salaries during their suspension beyond 90 days. Petitioner appealed the order
for payment of salaries, contending that the suspension beyond 90 days was due to
private respondents’ appeal, but was denied by the CA, hence this petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not private respondents who were either dismissed or

suspended but were eventually ordered reinstated are entitled to back salaries
beyond the ninety (90) day preventive suspension.
RULING
YES. The preventive suspension of civil service employees is authorized by

the Civil Service Law, hence, cannot be considered “unjustified,” even if later the
charges are dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee
concerned. It is one of those sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the
public good. For this reason, it is limited to ninety (90) days unless the delay in the
conclusion of the investigation is due to the employee concerned. Employees are
however entitled to compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal
if eventually they are found innocent. Preventive suspension pending investigation is
not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an
unhampered investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension pending
appeal, is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if
respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding an employee
guilty is reversed. Hence, the employee should be reinstated with full pay for the
period of the suspension pending appeal. Thus, the award of salaries to private
respondents shall be computed from the time of their dismissal/suspension until
their actual reinstatement, for a period not exceeding five years. On the other hand,
if his conviction is affirmed, i.e., if he is not exonerated, the period of his suspension
becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal.
AMENDMENTS AND
REVISIONS
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL
ONGPIN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA &
CARMEN PEDROSA, AS FOUNDING MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE
FOR REFORMS, MODERNIZATION AND ACTION (PIRMA)
G.R. No. 127325| 270 SCRA 106 | March 19, 1997| Davide, Jr.
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
The Constitutional provision on people’s initiative is not self-executing and

Congress has yet to pass a law that provides for its implementation. RA 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
FACTS
In 1996, private respondent Atty. Delfin filed with COMELEC a "Petition to

Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative". The petition sought to amend Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of
Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. The petition asked the
COMELEC for an order to fix the time and dates for the gathering of signatures
representing at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the
country, after which it will be formally filed with the COMELEC. Petitioner Santiago
and others filed an action for prohibition arguing that RA 6735 is inadequate insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 6735 is adequate insofar as initiative on amendments to

the Constitution is concerned.
RULING
NO. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution on people’s initiative is not

self-executing and Congress has yet to pass a law that provides for its
implementation. An examination of interpellations of framers of the constitution
reveals that the intention is for initiative to relate only to "amendments" and not to
"revisions”. RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. The
Definition of Terms thereof does not provide for the contents of a petition for
initiative on the Constitution. Its provisions that refer specifically to proposed laws
cannot be used to fill in this gap. Further, while RA 6735 provides separate Subtitles
for initiative and referendum on laws and ordinances, no subtitle is provided for
initiative on the Constitution. This can only mean that Congress did not really intend
for RA 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments
to the Constitution but left that to a separate and future law.
These deficiencies of RA 6735 are fatal and cannot be cured by

"empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act”. This would amount to an invalid
delegation of legislative authority as it fails both the “completeness” and “sufficient
standard” tests.
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952

REGISTERED VOTERS vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 174153| 505 SCRA 160| October 25, 2006| Carpio
WRITER: FIDEL SALO
The requirement of Section 2, Article XVII that the initiative must be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition contemplates that: (1) the
people must author and thus sign the entire proposal themselves, and (2) the
proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present
only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people
who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
FACTS
In February 2006, petitioners gathered signatures for an initiative petition to

shift from a Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government. Petitioners alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters,
with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. They filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act. COMELEC denied the petition citing the Supreme Court’s
declaration of the inadequacy of RA 6735 to implement the initiative clause of the
Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether the initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.
RULING
NO. The requirement of Section 2, Article XVII that the initiative must be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition contemplates
that: (1) the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal themselves, and
(2) the proposal must be embodied in a petition. The petition must contain the full
text of the proposed amendments. These essential elements are present only if
the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who
express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. What
was submitted was a mere copy of the signature sheet that neither shows the
proposed changes nor contains any indication that the draft petition is attached to,
or circulated therewith. This is clearly not the petition envisioned in the initiative
clause of the Constitution.
Further, the people’s initiative contemplated in the constitution applies only

to amendments and not revisions. The proposed initiative is not a mere amendment
as it proposes to overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII
on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government,
from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral

legislature.
In addition, the proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, which

mandates the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of
government and thus violates the principle on no logrolling of legislation.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier

1ST SEM AY 2016-2017

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization

Pending the declaration of the winning bidder/strategic partner and the

Whether the provisions on National Economy and Patrimony of the

In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their

Whether R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional

WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

"By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine

William C. Reagan, a civilian employee of an American corporation providing

As a result of the transactions, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue

CTA found nothing objectionable in the assessment and thereafter the

It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied,

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Unknown to Lepanto Company, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of La Union

Whether the Republic has a cause of action in the instant case

With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA under Section 2 of

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the

Whether the company may sue a foreign sovereign

MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC. vs. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function

governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function,

Whether the respondents have immunity from suit

Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed

ANGEL MINISTERIO and ASUNCION SADAYA vs. THE COURT OF FIRST

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an

Whether the petitioners could sue defendants Public Highway Commissioner

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his

If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N.

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney, a gravel and sand truck

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the

After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. VICENTE A. HIDALGO, IN HIS

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Whether government funds and properties maybe seized under writs of

MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by Admiral

Whether the funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN,

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

On August 30, 1990, University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a

Meanwhile, UP filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals

Whether or not UP funds are subject to garnishment

NO. UP is an educational institution performing a legitimate government

to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, VICAR APOSTOLIC OF PUERTO PRINCESA D.D.;

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations

Moreover, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as