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ABSTRACT
Maritime piracy is a threat to global security which is firmly anchored in international
criminal networks who, by means of its smuggling actions, armed attacks and terror lead to
destabilization of trade and economy worldwide. Sea trade within the dynamics of economy is
experiencing a period of rapid development and, for this reason, it is vital to develop itself in a safe
climate for ships and crews. International military participation in the fight against maritime piracy
should be considered as a prompt response to easing the situation in the area and to ensure freedom
of navigation. Success in eradicating piracy is the cooperation between the participating nations in
the fight against piracy and regional commitments with neighboring countries risk area directly
affected by piracy phenomenon. The effort of the international community is focused on discouraging
any form of armed attack directed on merchant vessels and maintain the control of the sea in areas
with high risk of piracy .
1
Roman Empire. Roman Empire mobilized 500 warships that destroyed more than 1700 pirate ship
managing to restore the commercial traffic on the route.1
Another interesting episode concerns the kidnapping of Julius Caesar by pirates during a trip
in the year 74 BC. The pirates have demanded a ransom of 20 taels, but the king gave 50 taels for his
release. After the ransom was paid, Julius Caesar was taken to shore and released. The Emperor
wasted no time and ordered the pirates’ punishment by crucifixion.
Piracy has experienced a thriving period during the time when countries like Portugal, Spain,
and England extended their influence to other territories and continents. Commerce developed rapidly
and pirates identified opportunities of capturing goods. Pirates have not always robbed and captured
goods for themselves, great nations of those times often legalized piracy actions to capture ships that
transported goods from the New World and at the same time protected their merchant ships against
attacks by rival states. Corsairs, in this respect, have written a page of history in the evolution of the
phenomenon of piracy between the 16th and 19th century.
Despite the panic spread by corsairs, their humanity often emerged out of gestures like freeing
the slaves from attacked ships and integrating them into their caste. Golden age of piracy coexisted
with imperialism, the form of government during which commercial vessels, crammed with products
were intersecting on all navigation channels. In straits and near berths, security of fleets was provided
by warships employed by the signatory of the agreement on trade at sea.2
The area that was operated by Corsairs was the North West coast of Africa and were called
"the punishment of the merchant ships in the Mediterranean Sea". States in the area authorized and
even paid corsairs in the Mediterranean. Some states had no way to defend themselves against the
attacks and therefore agreed to pay for protection. Corsairs success is a prime example of obstacle in
the fight against piracy. For a long while conflicts of interest between states made it impossible to
launch a joint offensive against the Corsairs’ threat. Chapter Corsairs ended in 1830 when France
conquered Algeria and managed to neutralize pirate activities in the area.
Although piracy has officially lost its legitimacy due to the Sea Declaration of Paris in 1856
and the Act of Brussels through which slavery was abolished in 1980, it continues to survive through
its robbery and kidnapping acts nowadays.
1
Munich Re,Piracy – Threat at sea
2
Pirateria – O nouă față modernă a criminalității organizate, Buletinul Statului Major al Forțelor Terestre nr.2 din 2010
2
International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Shipping defines piracy as "an
act of boarding or boarding attempt at any ship manifested with the intention or capacity to use force
in the commission of such acts."
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS ) classifies pirate attacks in three basic categories:
1. Low - Level Armed Robbery (LLAR). It is an assault with the intent to rob, usually
performed in the dark. Looters take goods that can be transported. Violence only occur if
there is crew resistance.
2. Medium - Level Armed Assault and Robbery (MLAAR). The attack is manifested through
violent or threatening violence. Attackers use force to get money and other goods
sometimes ship is detained. The attack is performed in less than an hour and seeks
confiscation of money and other property on board.
3. Major Criminal Hijack (MCHJ). The attack is planned in detail, details about the ship and
cargo are known. While some bullies keep the crew trapped in a compartment, others
transfer the load to another ship. At the end of the attack the ship is allowed to drift. In the
worst case the vessel is seized, the crew is kept on board, let on lifeboats and transferred to
another vessel. Captured ship can be repainted and recorded under another name and
another flag. These vessels are called "ghost ships" and it has been present since the 1980s
in Southeast Asia. In these cases, organized crime works hand in hand with local
authorities. Hijacking of ships and ransom request for ship and crew is frequently found
along the coast of Somalia.
Yachts are valuable targets for pirates intercepted in coastal regions which are far from the
trade routes. Increased piracy risk areas are: the Caribbean, Philipine, China Sea, Gulf of Aden and
the Somali coast. Recent attacks have been reported in the area of South America, Morocco,
Mauritania and Albania. It is difficult to estimate the number of attacks carried out each year, but
experts estimate the number of unknown attacks is that at least two times higher than those reported.
3
assessed redemptions in 2009-2010 to 830 million and the annual cost of equipment deterrent /
private armed guards to 360 million - 2.5 billion USD.
In terms of human costs of piracy in 2011 data was registered as it follows: over seven sailors
were killed and 39 were wounded by pirates. In 2012 (data updated on 24 September 2012), six
sailors were killed and 448 were taken hostages, recorded 225 attacks and 24 hijackings. On June 30,
2012, Somali pirates had seized 11 ships and 218 sailors were kept hostage. Since 2007, over 43
sailors were killed and 2653 were taken hostages during acts of piracy occurring off the Somali
coast.4
Despite measures taken by Somali pirates piracy acts have doubled from 2005 to 2011. 2009
was the third consecutive year of growth of such acts: from 239 in 2006 to 263 in 2007, 293 in 2008 ,
406 in 2009 to 445 in 2010. In the first half of 2011 there were 97 attacks against 35 of the same
month last year.
4
year UNOSOM II assumed the leadership of Somalia forces already deployed in December 1992,
forces executing humanitarian mission called Operation Restore Hope. 5 Withdrawal of foreign forces
from Somali territory ended in 1995, being considered by the Somali population as the main enemy
and generator of instability. The objective of resolving the political situation in Somalia was never
achieved under UN shield.
In 1995 the two major factions of the Somali National Alliance of Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi
's Somali Salvation Alliance signed a peace agreement, despite UN opposition. "Cairo Declaration"
was signed in 1997 by most factions, but it does not lay the foundation for the restoration of the
Somali Republic, the country being divided by regions6. In the decade that followed better results
have been achieved by creating the National Transitional Government, which at first was
internationally recognized. Internationally, the government was agreed at Djibouti, but failed to
extend its jurisdiction in Mogadishu, not being approved by the majority of local leaders, or the
neighboring Ethiopia, a state which has an interest in keeping Somalia broken and threatened by
emerging Islam.
The second experiment of a National Transitional Government took place in 2004 and
suffered of the same problems as the previous government. Taking the largest part of the country by
the Islamist militias and the creation in mid-2006 of the Islamic Courts government, has brought
stability to the country for six months, but led to the Ethiopian intervention to remove the new power
and restoring the rights of the National Transitional Government led by President Abdullah Yusuf
being supported by the U.S.. In this way the country was thrown into a state of war and humanitarian
disaster7, Islamist regime collapsing rapidly under the Ethiopian intervention. However, the new
Transitional National Government found itself in the same situation as before the takeover by the
Islamist leadership, that is, a limited government at the Mogadishu area and far from having control
over the rest of the country, especially in Somaliland and Puntland .
But even more important is that the only government who could have brought stability to the
country after 15 years of chaos was overthrown and Somalia returned to its previous state, even
worse, becoming the ideal refuge for pirates.
In 2012 a new government was installed that tries to take measures for the stability of the
country and international confidence. The mission is very difficult because in this area where anarchy
has reigned for over 20 years and it is also difficult to create structures that would benefit from a staff
uninvolved in connection with piracy or terrorist Islamist groups like Al- Shabab. Because of poverty
and terror created by the Islamist groups much of the Somali population's migrated to Ethiopia and
Kenya. Life expectancy in Somalia is somewhere around 41 years and if we do a simple calculation
of the current Somali youth have not known any form of government, had no other rules than the
local leaders and had no means of information and education. From this point of view seems almost
impossible to normalize life in the Somalia.
5
Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/restore_hope.htm accesat pe data de 12.09.13
6
Global Security, in http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia-south.htm accesat la 12.09.13;
7
Gentleman, Jeffrey; Mazzetti, Mark, “Somalia’s Islamists and Ethiopia Gird for a War”.
5
through the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, 80% of the total traffic carried through the Gulf is aimed to
Europe.
Maritime routes linking, for example, Arab and American ports from the Atlantic Ocean are
either Suez or the Cape of Good Hope. The second route involves bypassing Africa and is longer by
2700 Nautical Miles and requests for extra costs of approximately $3.5 million, not taking into
account delays causing additional costs overall of about 25% of annual shipments. Choosing this
route not only affects the economies of the Americas, but also in the old continent or Egypt, a country
obviously affected because it owns the Suez Canal.
Instability in Somalia and Yemen is another aspect of the problem in the area, where
connections between fundamentalist groups and Al-Quida group are possible. It is possible that some
redemptions obtained by the pirates to fund conflicts between local leaders and the group's terrorist
activities mentioned above. Besides, the Puntland region of Somalia and Yemen are considered to be
sources of voluntary war of Taliban rebels in Afghanistan.
After September 11, 2001 naval group, which originated in the U.S. 5th Fleet adopted a
multinational structure patrol in the Horn of Africa as part of the Maritime Interdiction operations
under the name of CTF 150. Of the group there are ships belonging to countries whose purpose is to
combat terrorism and promote international stability in the region.
Range of CTF 150 was extended beyond the Horn of Africa to the shores of the Strait of
Hormuz and Pakistan. The most important result of maritime interdiction operation was recorded with
the discovery by the Spanish frigate " Navarra " of 15 SCUD missiles on board of the North Korean
"So San" addresed to Yemen.
In October 2008 the disclosure document at Chatham House was issued on the phenomenon
of piracy in the Somali coast, becaming the basic document on a topic that was not discussed in detail
at a high level.
By 2007 it would not see an outbreak of piracy. Indeed, after the lowering from 2004, the
number of attacks rose steadily between 2007 and 2008 and, more than that, have doubled on the
coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Alarm signals on multiplication of piracy acts in 2007 were
the most important to date, although the positive results of the Straits of Malacca, at the time the
scariest place of maritime trade, induced current of opinion in favor of reducing risk in the Gulf
Aden.8 2009 Annual Report of the global security threats highlighted propagation trend of piracy
cases. A significant increase occurred between 2004 and 2005, from 2 cases to 35, but with the
overthrow of the Islamist government in charge of Somalia following the Ethiopian intervention in
late 2006, actively supported by the United States 9, chaos restored in Somalia. During the following
period, 31 pirate attacks have taken place in the Gulf of Aden, Somali pirates still have not fully
covered the bay. The highlight that changed the situation in the Gulf of Aden was marked in 2008,
when the Somali pirates have acted in the whole bay. The figures show that between January and
September 2007 only 10 pirate attacks were performed, but in the same period of 2008, an
unprecedented wave of attacks was recorded reaching 51 attacks, raising four times compared to past
years. After this period 92 of the 36 successful attacks were counted10.
It is necessary to outline the evolution of equipment and weapons available to the pirates that
gave greater power and allowed them greater enforcement actions never happened before.
8
Nizza, Mike: “After a Dip in Attacks, Pirates Mount a Comeback”, New York Times, October in
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/16/after-a-dip-in-attacks-pirates-mount-a-comeback/ .
9
Stevenson, Jonathan: “A Fleeting Victory”, New York Times, 14 January 2007.
10
“La vigilancia internacional hace aguas ante los piratas de Somalia”, El País, 18 de noviembre de 2008,
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/vigilancia/internacional/hace/aguas/piratas/Somalia/elpepuint/2008 accesat
la 12.09.13;
6
The main innovation is the use of "mother ships" instead of using only high-speed boats that
limited their action only in the coast. Since 2007 "mother ships" have been carrying boats (skiffs) at
great distances from the shore to capture ships in the Gulf of Aden. The advantage of these ships is
that they are mistaken for fishing ships, making their identification more difficult. Furthermore
Somali pirates use weapons which is constantly improved by using not only individual infantry
weapons, and grenades that are much more effective than automatic weapons. Moreover they use
GPS receivers for navigation and to determine distances to the pirated vessels on suspicion of being
connected to the information network ports in Asia, Europe and the Gulf countries 11. The presence of
warships in the area reduces the range of the pirates because the pirate boat maneuvering speed is
around 25 knots speed attainable by most frigates and destroyers.
Despite this fact, handling the boats used by pirates has the advantage of avoiding direct
contact with naval vessels, furthermore the execution of fire on them is limited by international law,
which is permitted only in cases of self defense12. Moreover pirates have the ability to adapt to the
increasingly more stringent measures taken against them. They adopted new tactics of attack in
groups of up to 10 or even 20 crafts, circling the ship to be captured and thus making it more difficult
to defend. To extend their autonomy and action area pirates also use boats for fuel replenishment at
great distances from the coast, allowing them to cover more areas located east off the island of
Socotra in the Indian Ocean. As of modus operandi, Somali pirates seize ship with its crew and given
that security is better ensured, they try kidnapping people on board.
As a first step to prevent piracy, the International Maritime Bureau recommended that vessels
transiting the Gulf of Aden to stay away from Somali coast at a distance of less than 500 miles.
International organizations such as NATO and the European Union took the strongest measures
against piracy deploying naval forces in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali coast. NATO launched
Ocean Provider in 2008, which later became Ocean Shield. Also in order to integrate efforts against
piracy of other countries that are not part of NATO and act together in the Gulf of Aden, it has been
created an international force called Combined Task Force 151 which includes countries such as
USA, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Qatar, UK, Japan, Canada, Bahrain, Singapore,
UAE, etc.
A challenge for the EU maritime actions allowed for the creation of the first community
organization in November 2008 under the name of Atalanta. EU naval mission is part of the European
Naval Force (Navrofor) and has a staff of about 2,000 people. Atalanta was created to materialize
UNSC Resolutions 1814 , 1816 , 1838 , 1846 (2008 ) 1918 (2009) and 1950 ( 2010).
In 2012 Operation Atalanta was extended until December 2014. The aims of this operation are
to protect ships passing through the area, escorting of ships with humanitarian aid of the World Food
Programme & African Union for Somalia and monitoring fishing around the coasts of Somalia.
These are not the only forces acting against piracy in the region. Countries such as Russia,
Turkey, Japan sent warships to escort commercial vessels performing under their flag in convoy
system during transit through the Gulf of Aden.
All these measures taken to deter and combat piracy at sea is a very expensive extra financial
effort of the participating countries that require decisive action of the international community to
resolve the crisis in the Indian Ocean.
11
Middleton, Roger: “Piracy in Somalia, Threatening global trade, feeding local wars”, Chatham House, Briefing Paper,
Africa Programme (October 2008), p. 6.
12
Rizzi, Andrea: “Obstáculos legales para combatir el fenómeno”, El Pais, 19 November 2008,
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Obstaculos/legales/combatir/fenomeno/elpepiint/20081119elpepiint_2/Tes?
print=1.
7
Eradicating piracy in the area of Somalia is a big challenge for international organizations
because of the large area requiring to be monitored which demands for the presence in the area of a
number of vessels at least triple than today. Instability and chronic poverty for over 20 years have
forced many Somalis to renounce almost to any business or production and become pirates, especially
if their previous work was fishery.
Another big problem is the classification of pirate vessels. Somali fishermen use the same
type of boats and all have weapons on them. Non-disclosure of relevant evidence (ladders, ropes,
grenade launchers) cannot lead to the classification of fishing boats that are used as for piracy actions
and therefore legal actions against them is not permitted by international law.
8
not on board of attacked ship. However, the storming of a ship already captured by pirates would
endanger the captured crew while the pirates aim is to obtain financial benefits and not murdering
people, such as in the case of terrorists. Therefore shipping organizations advise for avoiding the use
of weapons by crews on which a pirate attack is underway.
From the point of view of the most effective defensive measure is to maintain a high level of
alert in districts where pirate attacks have been reported, but given the number of crew members
decreases, fatigue accumulation decreases alertness, especially at night when most attacks happen.
However on boar of ships considered potential victims of piracy one can take a series of measures
such as the installation of fire use to prevent attacks, advanced warning systems, the "false" sentinels
on the freeboard of the ship, and even electric barbed wire fence. Of course crews can be trained in
the use of firearms or protective boarding teams, a method which is increasingly used by ship-owners,
but this leads to risk bloodshed.
Another solution is the use of coast guard vessels and warships in general in areas with high
risk of pirate attack both to deter pirates and to protect maritime traffic by means of escorting
convoys. However, the deployment of military marine forces gives rise to costs, and hence it is a
suitable solution for certain areas only for a short period of time. Systematically research flight runs
along the Somali coast in order to discover the new camps or fuel depots indication of the prospect of
a new attack in the area. All forces involved in combating piracy exchange information permanently
trying to create a more real danger zones and transmit the coordinates to the civilian naval authorities
where they observed suspicious activity.
Involving as many countries as possible in the fight against maritime piracy in particular the
countries from the pirates’ action area of such as Tanzania, Kenya, Seychelles, Djibouti, Oman, South
Africa is a priority for international organizations. These states can provide the necessary support for
the prosecution, conviction and imprisonment of people who were detained as a result of piracy acts.
In this way funds were allocated by the European Union to build prisons but the incarceration of
pirates sites prove to be insufficient and the costs of maintenance and security proved beyond the
means of African countries. Currently efforts are underway to conclude new international agreements
to support joint efforts to combat piracy. Harmonization of international law with the law of the
countries which are at risk is developed quite difficult due to cultural differences and legal African
states.
As a result of the actions of NATO and the European Union combined with the activities of
other international actors in the past year no vessel has been pirated. The results of 2012 are very
encouraging but further action at sea and air requires significant resources provided by States
Member’s contribution. The solution to reduce the resources allocated to combat piracy can be to
create an area of stability within Somalia territory with a legitimate government and with a proper
infrastructure which would deter acts of piracy.
Bibliography:
1. Munich Re,Piracy – Threat at sea
9
2. Pirateria – O nouă față modernă a criminalității organizate, Buletinul Statului Major al
Forțelor Terestre nr.2 din 2010
3. Lauren Ploch, Piracy off the Horn off Africa
4. TEN/496 Pirateria maritimă consolidarea capacității de reacție a UE, Bruxelles, 3 decembrie
2012;
5. Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/restore_hope.htm
6. Global Security, in http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia-south.htm
7. Gentleman, Jeffrey; Mazzetti, Mark, “Somalia’s Islamists and Ethiopia Gird for a War”.
8. Nizza, Mike: “After a Dip in Attacks, Pirates Mount a Comeback”, New York Times, October
in http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/16/after-a-dip-in-attacks-pirates-mount-a-
comeback/ .
9. Stevenson, Jonathan: “A Fleeting Victory”, New York Times, 14 January 2007 “La vigilancia
internacional hace aguas ante los piratas de Somalia”, El País, 18 de noviembre de 2008,
10. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/vigilancia/internacional/hace/aguas/piratas/Soma
lia/elpepuint/2008;
11. Middleton, Roger: “Piracy in Somalia, Threatening global trade, feeding local wars”,
Chatham House, Briefing Paper, Africa Programme (October 2008), p. 6.
12. Rizzi, Andrea: “Obstáculos legales para combatir el fenómeno”, El Pais, 19 November 2008.
10