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Planet Debate 2010-11 1

Japanese Rearmament Answers


Japan Nuclearization Answers................................................................2
Extensions – Nuclear Aversion Prevents Japanese Proliferation.............2
Ext – Public Blocks..................................................................................3
Ext – Public Opinion Stops......................................................................3
Japan Rearmament Link NU....................................................................4
General Rearmament Answers...............................................................5
General Rearmament Answers...............................................................6
Ext – Popular Opposition.........................................................................7
Planet Debate 2010-11 2
Japanese Rearmament Answers

Japan Nuclearization Answers


Japanese aversion to nuclear weapons will prevent Japan prolif
Michael Green, (Prof., Foreign Service, Georgetown U.), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND SECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 347.
Japan's "anti-nuclear" culture, rooted in the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the
institutionalization of postwar pacifist norms, has been posited as the main obstacle to Japan's
development of nuclear weapons. Public opinion polls show that even after North Korea's nuclear
test approximately 80 percent of Japanese do not want their country to acquire nuclear weapons.

Many legal restraints on Japanese nuclearization


Christopher Hughes, (Prof., International Politics, U. of Warwick, UK), JAPANS
REMILITARIZATION, 2009, 108.
Japan's nuclear thinking and freedom of action is further complicated by the plethora of domestic
and international legal and other barriers to any deviation from civilian nuclear programmes.
Japan imposed constraints on its nuclear policy with the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955, which
limits nuclear research, development and usage to peaceful purposes. Sato's Three Non-Nuclear
Principles were followed in 1968 by the enunciation of the Four Nuclear Policies: the promotion of
peaceful nuclear energy, global disarmament, reliance on the US extended nuclear deterrent and
support for the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Japan's nuclear programmes have been subject to
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring since 1957, reinforced by Japan's signing
of the NPT in 1970 and its ratification in 1976. Japan's membership of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) and Zangger Committee means that it cooperates closely with other countries on
nonproliferation measures.

Extensions – Nuclear Aversion Prevents Japanese Proliferation


Nuclear aversion remains strong in Japan
Michael Green, (Prof., Foreign Service, Georgetown U.), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND SECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 357.
The current public debate about nuclear weapons reveals several important trends. First, while
the debate is less taboo--as measured by pages in print and the willingness of senior politicians
to speak out on the subject--there is still a public reaction against those who actually advocate
nuclear weapons. Japan's so-called "nuclear allergy" is still quite strong. Asahi Shimbun's opinion
poll in 2005 found that 86 percent of the public opposed Japan's possession of nuclear weapons,
and those numbers have not diminished even in the wake of the North Korean nuclear test.

Nuclear aversion will prevent Japanese prolif


Michael Green, (Prof., Foreign Service, Georgetown U.), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND SECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 364.
In addition to technical restraints, Japan would face organizational and bureaucratic obstacles as
well. For many decades, engineers and especially nuclear physicists have been socialized
against nuclear weapons. A lack of secrecy laws and intrusive IAEA inspections would make a
clandestine program impossible. An overt program would be prohibitively expensive without the
kind of international collaboration Japan receives for peaceful nuclear use.
Planet Debate 2010-11 3
Japanese Rearmament Answers
Nuclear aversion will prevent Japan nukes
Christopher Hughes, (Prof., International Politics, U. of Warwick, UK), JAPANS
REMILITARIZATION, 2009, 146.
Japan is unlikely ever to retread the path of remilitarisation to the point that it tips into militarism
akin to that of the pre-war period. Democratic institutions are far too well developed for that, and
Japan is likely to be content with eroding and breaching a certain number of anti-militaristic
principles to allow it to perform as a more reliable US ally. It is improbable that Japan would ever
seek to breach the anti-nuclear principle, for instance.

Ext – Public Blocks


No public support for nuclear acquisition in Japan
Louis Hayes, (Prof., Political Science, U. Montana), INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE POLITICS,
2009, 267.
There is little public support for a combat role for the SDF, but there does appear to be a growing
acceptance of the need for Japan to be able to provide for its own defense. Support for the
acquisition of nuclear weapons is, however, practically nonexistent. As far as the U.S. military
presence is concerned, the Japanese public is generally supportive but has little confidence in the
reliability of the United States in the event of war.

Ext – Public Opinion Stops


Popular opposition to nuclear weapons in Japan
Yuri Kageyama, (Staff), ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Jan. 10, 2010. Retrieved Feb. 15, 2010
from Nexis.
Japanese today are more shocked by the cover-up than by the deed itself, but they remain
attached to the non-nuclear principle. A survey by the Mainichi newspaper, which interviewed
more than 4,500 people, found 72 percent of the 2,600 respondents want to stick with the
principles, and the number rose to about 80 percent among Japanese in their 20s and 30s. No
margin of error was given. Shoji Niihara, a scholar of U.S.-Japan relations, said Japanese are
hoping their new reformist prime minister will redefine Japan's relationship with the U.S. and work
with President Barack Obama in his call for a world free of nuclear weapons.

Japanese bases are exclusively for American soldiers


Alexander Cooley, (Prof., Political Science, Barnard College), BASE POLITICS: DEMOCRATIC
CHANGE AND THE U.S. MILITARY OVERSEAS, 2008, 40.
Most U.S. bases in Japan have been designated as exclusively American facilities, in part
because the Japanese government, for political reasons, has wanted to distinguish between U.S.
forces and the constitutionally restricted activities of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.

Economic limits block Japanese militarization


Christopher Hughes, (Prof., International Politics, U. of Warwick, UK), JAPANS
Planet Debate 2010-11 4
Japanese Rearmament Answers
REMILITARIZATION, 2009, 38.
Japan's stagnating defence budget suggests continuing constraints on its remilitarisation. This
impression is reinforced by the maintenance of the 1% of GNP limit on expenditure. Prime
Minister Takeo Miki first introduced the principle in 1976 to limit criticism of the NDPO.

Japan Rearmament Link NU


Japan doesn’t think US security guarantees are credible
Louis Hayes, (Prof., Political Science, U. Montana), INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE POLITICS,
2009, 272.
The Japanese have never been confident that the United States could be relied on to defend
them. Administrations from Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton took pains to define publicly the narrow
limits within which U.S. troops would be used. And when they have been used, as in Somalia in
1992 and in Haiti in 1994, both efforts ultimately ending in failure there has been public clamor to
bring them home. The Iraq War and the preemptive doctrine of the Bush administration have
created an environment in which Japan's military role, as well as those of other countries, is
transformed. Thus the Japanese have come to see the appropriateness of greater self-reliance.
Planet Debate 2010-11 5
Japanese Rearmament Answers

General Rearmament Answers


Nuclear taboo stops Japanese nuclearization
John Park, (Dir., Korea Working Group, U.S. Institute of Peace), THE LONG SHADOW:
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 288.
Some normative considerations stop nuclear dominos from falling. The atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 created a lingering aversion to nuclear weapons in Japanese
society. This nuclear taboo has found firm expression in the widely accepted principles in Japan
of not possessing, producing, or allowing nuclear weapons. A nationwide survey of Japanese
conducted in November 2006 (shortly after the North Korean nuclear test) reported that 80
percent of respondents either supported or somewhat supported upholding the Three Non-
Nuclear Principles despite the shock of the test. Such public sentiment is an important political
obstacle on the path to a nuclear-armed Japan, although there are some signs of its gradual
erosion and possibilities of political manipulation.

Extensive popular support for Japan’s peace Constitution


Andrew Oros, (Prof., International Studies, Washington College), NORMALIZING JAPAN:
POLITICS, IDENTITY, AND THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITY PRACTICE, 2008, 174.
Importantly, despite a clear sense of perceived threat, the conclusions a majority of Japanese
draw regarding an appropriate policy response to such threats differ markedly from the responses
of Americans polled under the same SAGE study, and from the prescriptions of realist
international relations scholarship as well, and hearken back to the central tenets of the security
identity of domestic antimilitarism. According to the 2004 SAGE poll, nearly half (47.7 percent) of
Japanese view war as illegitimate even if one's own state is attacked. Far less than one-quarter
(21.5 percent) believe that a strong defense will result in peace, while almost twice as many (42.3
percent) believe that disarmament will. Strikingly, Japanese overwhelmingly (85.9 percent)
believe that war can be avoided through international cooperation (versus 41.9 percent of
Americans, who view war as inevitable). When asked what is the most effective way of dealing
with terrorism, nearly two-thirds (64.4 percent) of Japanese point to the United Nations, followed
by over a third (38.6 percent) who encourage the fostering of new alliances using diplomacy
(multiple responses were permitted).

Article 9 blocks Japanese militarization


Louis Hayes, (Prof., Political Science, U. Montana), INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE POLITICS,
2009, 268.
A second major constraint on the growth of the military establishment is Article 9 of the
constitution. A strictly literal reading of this provision would seem to preclude any military, no
matter what it is called. The issue of the constitutionality of the SDF has severely tested the
Supreme Court's concept of the nature and scope of judicial review. The first constitutional
challenge to the SDF came in 1952, when the leader of the left-wing JSP asked for a declaratory
judgment that the National Police Reserve (the predecessor of the SDF) was unconstitutional.
The court held that constitutionality could not be determined in the abstract. A dispute in law
between two parties in which the issue was present would have to be raised.
Planet Debate 2010-11 6
Japanese Rearmament Answers

General Rearmament Answers


Japan fully demilitarized
Christopher Hughes, (Prof., International Politics, U. of Warwick, UK), JAPANS
REMILITARIZATION, 2009, 22.
In the immediate post-war period, during the early phases of the Allied Occupation, Japan was
pulled to the other extreme, becoming a fully demilitarised state. The Imperial Army and Navy
were disbanded, the defence-production industry was broken up and the militarism of the pre-war
period was rejected in the country's new, post-war constitution. The Preamble of the constitution
states Japanese ideals with regard to security: We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all
time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationships, and we have
determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-
loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honoured place in an international society
striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and
intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognise that all peoples of the world have the right to
live in peace, free from fear and want.
Planet Debate 2010-11 7
Japanese Rearmament Answers

Ext – Popular Opposition


Japanese Peace Constitution has overwhelming popular support
Takashi Inoguchi, (Prof., Political Science, Chuo U., Tokyo). THE UNITED STATES AND
NORTHEAST ASIA: DEBATES, ISSUES, AND THE NEW ORDER, 2009, 89.
Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution forbids Japan from using force to settle international
disputes. The preamble of the constitution also declares that Japan renounces war forever. The
constitution has played a strong role in shaping Japanese politics, and the public has been
tenaciously and overwhelmingly pacifist for more than half a century.

Unprecedented massive pacificism in Japan


David Cortright, (Fellow, Institute for International Peace Studies, Notre Dame U.), PEACE: A
HISTORY OF MOVEMENTS AND IDEAS, 2008, 11.
In Japan absolute pacifism is official national policy, as enshrined in Article 9 of the postwar
Constitution: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The
right of belligerence of the state will not be recognized. This extraordinary and unequivocal
rejection of war has no precedent in history. Other countries have renounced war in their
constitutions but never with such totality.

Personal and moral commitment to peace in Japan


David Cortright, (Fellow, Institute for International Peace Studies, Notre Dame U.), PEACE: A
HISTORY OF MOVEMENTS AND IDEAS, 2008, 12.
Support for peace in Japan is understood as both a personal moral commitment and a social-
political position that is linked to human rights, democracy, and economic well-being. The
common term for peace advocacy is heiwa shugi, which is a combination of the Japanese words
for "peace" and "ism." The ambiguity of the term makes it difficult to differentiate between
absolute and conditional pacifism, and for many the meanings overlap and often coexist. The
term heiwa shugi has no equivalent in English, although the original Glasgow definition of
pacifism was intended precisely to convey the principled yet pragmatic commitment to peace
conveyed by the Japanese term.