PRESENTATION OF THE BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN

SALUTATION (MEJ MOHD ADHARI)

COMMANDANT SIR, CHIEF DIRECTING STAFF, DIRECTING STAFF

BODIES, AND FELLOW STUDENTS. ASSALAMUALAIKUM AND

VERY GOOD AFTERNOON.

TODAY SUB SYNDICATE 3 LEAD BY ME, MEJ MOHD ADHARI BIN

HJ AMIN WILL BE PRESENTING THE BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN.

FIRSTLY, LET ME INTRODUCE MY SYNDICATE MEMBERS AS

SHOWN ON THE SLIDE.

AIM

TO CRITICALLY EXAMINE THE FUNDAMENTAL ASPECT AND

OTHER MILITARY APPLICATION THAT COULD BE USE AS LESSON

LEARN FOR THE MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES (MAF) IN THE

MALAYSIAN ENVIRONMENT.

SCOPE

THE SCOPE OF OUR PRESENTATION WILL BE AS FOLLOWS:

 ORIENTATION OF THIS BATTLE.

 BATTLE DESCRIPTION.

 ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE.

 CONCLUSION

 QUESTION AND ANSWER

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ORIENTATION OF THE BATTLE

LET US FIRST ORIENTATE WHO ARE THE MAIN ACTORS

INVOLVED IN THIS BATTLE. THEY ARE:

 FIELD MARSHALL ERWIN ROMMEL WHO IS ALSO KNOWN

AS THE DESERT FOX, HE IS THE AXIS FORCES

COMMANDER

 GENERAL MONTGOMERY, THE ALLIED COMMANDER.

ORBAT FOR BOTH COMMANDER ARE AS SHOWN

THE MAP INDICATES WHERE THE LOCATION OF EL ALAMEIN IS.

THE BATTLE AREA IS SUPPRESSED TO THE NORTH BY THE

MEDITERRANEAN SEA AND TO THE SOUTH BY THE IMPASSABLE

QATTARA DEPRESSION. THIS AREA CAN BE SEEN TO BE A CHOKE

POINT FOR FORCES MOVING FROM THE EAST TO THE WEST.

THE BATTLE WAS NAMED AFTER A SMALL VILAGE, EL ALAMEIN

SHOWN HERE. THERE IS A RAILWAY STATION THAT WAS USED BY

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THE ALLIED FORCES FOR SUPPLIES TO SUPPORT THE ARMY

OPERATION.

THE OTHER AREA NEARBY IS KNOWN AS THE VILLAGE OF SIDI

RAHMAN SITUATED FURTHER TO THE WEST. ROADS ARE

LIMITED, THERE IS A MAIN COAST ROAD AND THE SECONDARY

TRACK.

WHY IS THIS BATTLE WORTH FIGHTING FOR? LET US BRING ALL

OF YOU BACK TO THE INCIDENTS PRIOR TO THE BATTLE.

THE ALLIED FORCES WANTED TO HAVE CONTROL OF AL

ALAMEIN BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

 THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN FELT THAT IF THE

MIDDLE EAST FELL TO THE AXIS FORCES, THEY WOULD

LOSE THE STRATEGIC VALUES IN THAT PARTICULAR AREA.

 AL ALAMEIN HAS A TACTICAL VALUE DUE TO IT’S

TOPOGRAPHY. THE LAND BELWEEN AL ALAMEIN AND

HIMEIMAT (SHOW SLIDE) ACTS AS THE CHOKE POINT AND

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 IS THE ONLY APPROACH TO INVADE EGYPT FROM THE

WEST.

AS FOR THE GERMANS, EL ALAMEIN IS PART OF THEIR NORTH

AFRICA CAMPAIGN AFTER HAVING ACHIEVING SUCCESS AT

GAZALA AND TOBRUK (SHOW MAP). THE GERMANS BELIEVED

THAT BY HAVING EL ALAMEIN, IT WILL BECOME A STRATEGIC

VALUE OF THEIR CAMPAIGN THUS FACILITATING THE GERMAN

OFFENSIVE IN THE EUROPEAN FRONT.

BATTLE DESCRIPTION

THE OP WAS DIVIDED INTO FOUR PHASES AS FOLLOWS:

PRELIM-OP (PHASE 1

PRIOR TO THE MAIN BATTLE, PRELIM OP BEGAN AT

APPROXIMATELY AT 2200H ON 23RD OCT 1942. PRIOR TO IT, THE

ROYAL AIR FORCE LAUNCHED ATTACKS ON THE AXIS

STRATEGIC VITAL POINTS AND HAD AIR SUPERIORITY THUS

ALLOWING THE LAND BATTLE TO COMMENCE WITHOUT ANY

THREATS FROM THE AXIS AIR FORCE.

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ANOTHER TACTIC WHICH BEING USED WAS THE DECEPTION

PLANS THAT WAS AIMED TO MISLEAD THE AXIS ABOUT THE

DIRECTION OF THE MAIN THRUSTS AND THE TIME OF THE

READINESS FOR THE ATTACK. THUS THE ALLIED TOOK UP

ACTIVE MEASURES SUCH AS USING DECOYS TO MAKE THE AXIS

BELIEVED THAT THE MAIN BLOW OR ATTACK WOULD BE

DELIVERED FROM THE SOUTH.

OP LIGHTFOOT (PHASE 2)

THE LAND BATTLE STARTED WITH THE 8 TH ARMY ARTILLERY

FIRE THAT FIRED ON THE AXIS BATTERIES. OVER A THOUSAND

FIELD AND MEDIUM GUNS WERE EMPLOYED.

THE FOUR DIVISION OF 30 CORPS ATTACKED IN THE NORTH, 9

AUSTRALIAN AND 51 DIVISIONS FORCED THROUGH THE

MINEFIELDS AT THE NORTHERN CORRIDOR AND ATTACKED

WEST FROM THEIR POSITIONS JUST NORTH OF THE MITERIYA

RIDGE.

WHILE THE NEW ZEALANDERS AND SOUTH AFRICANS

THRUSTED IN A SOUTH-SOUTH WESTERLY DIRECTION ONTO THE

RIDGE ITSELF, AND WERE TO ESTABLISH THE SOUTHERN

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CORRIDOR. AT THE SAME TIME 4 INDIAN DIVISION CARRIED OUT

A STRONG RAID AGAINST THE AXIS POSITION ON THE WESTERN

END OF RUWEISAT RIDGE, AND, IN THE EXTREME NORTH, AN

AUSTRALIAN BRIGADE MADE A FEINT ATTACK BELWEEN TED EL

EISA AND THE SEA.

BOTH SIDE HAD CASUALTIES. MONTGOMERY HOWEVER

MANAGED TO SECURE A GOOD BRIDGE HEAD IN THE NORTH

BUT ATTEMPTS TO PASS THE AXIS ARMOUR AND DEFENSIVE

SYSTEM AT THE WEST HAD FAILED.

IT FAILED MAINLY DUE TO THE SCATTERED MINES AND THE

SOFT DESERT SAND THAT DELAYED THEIR SUPPORTING

WEAPONS ARRIVAL.

PHASE 3 (CRUMBLING OP)

ON THE NEXT DAY, THE AXIS CONTINUED THEIR STRONG RAIDS

AND THROUGH 2 NEW ZEALAND DIVISION IN THE SOUTH-WEST

AND WESTWARDS FROM THE RUWEISAT RIDGE BY 30 CORPS

AND COMPLETION OF THE GAPS THROUGH THE SOUTHERN

MINFIELDS BY 13 CORPS.

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THE FIRM ORDERS FROM MONTGOMERY ALLOWED THE ALLIED

TO PRODUCE GOOD RESULTS AT THE NORTH CORRIDOR. BUT AT

THE SOUTHERN CORRIDOR, THE FORMATION WAS NOT GETTING

THROUGH THE MINE BELTS, AND HEAVY CASUALTIES WERE

EXPECTED IF THE ATTACK WERE TO BE CONTINUED.

MONTGOMERY DECIDED TO BACK OFF HIS 13 CORPS AND

MAINTAINED HIS 7 ARMOURED DIVISION AT EFFECTIVE

FIGHTING STRENGTH.

50 DIVISION MOUNTED AN ATTACK IN THE MUNASSIB AREA BUT

IT PELERED OUT DUE TO THE THICK WIRE AND ANTI-

PERSONNEL MINES.

IN ORDER TO CREATE FRESH RESERVES FOR FURTHER

OFFENSIVE ACTION. ON THE EVENING OF 26 TH OCTOBER, THE

ALLIED REGROUPED AND RELEIVED ITS ARMY BY TURN.

THAN ON 27TH OCTOBER THE AXIS MADE A RECCE OF THE

KIDNEY RANGE WITH TWO GERMAN PANZER DIVISIONS

WAITING IN THE REAR AND PLANNED FOR ATTACK IN THE

EVENING. BUT THE ROYAL AIRFORCE INTERVENED AND

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DEFEATED THE AXIS FORCE BEFORE THEY, COULD EVEN FORM

UP.

PHASE 4 (OP SUPERCHARGE)

ON 29TH OCTOBER, AN OPERATION WAS PLANNED TO DESTROY

THE GERMAN AFRICA CORPS AND TO OPERATE ON THE AXIS’S

SUPPLY ROUTES. THIS IS TO INTENSIFY THE AXIS’S LOGISTICS

AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES ESPECIALLY ON THE

SHORTAGE OF PETROL. THIS OPERATION WAS NAMED

“SUPERCHARGED”. THE AXIS ORERED 30 CORPS TO PERFORM

THIS MISSION AND AS A BACK UP MONTGOMERY HAD THE

ARMOURED DIVISION OF 10 CORPS TO FIGHT THEIR WAY

THROUGH, IF 30 CORPS FAILED TO REACH IT’S OBJECTIVE.

THE BULK OF THE GERMAN FORCES AT THIS PERIOD WERE

MOVING INTO THE RAHMAN AREA LEAVING ONLY THE ITALIANS

TO HOLD THE SOUTHERLY SECTORS.

OPERATION SUPERCHARGED COMMENCED ON 31 OCTOBER AND

WAS A SUCCESS, THUS A NEW CORRIDOR WAS ESTABLISHED.

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SOON ON 3RD OCTOBER THE ROYAL AIR FORCE REPORTED THAT

HEAVY AXIS TRAFFIC WERE MOVING WEST ON THE COAST

ROAD. THIS CAN BE SEEN AS A WITHDRAWAL ACTION BY THE

AXIS. THE AXIS HOWEVER STILL MAINTAIN THE ANTI-TANK

SCREEN THUS ENABLING 1 ARMOURED DIVISION TO PIERCE

THROUGH. HOWEVER ON THE NIGHT OF 3RD NOVEMBER, 51

DIVISION AND 4 INDIA DIVISION LAUNCH AND ATTACK ON THE

RAHMAN TRACK, SOUTH OF TEL EL AQUIR TO NEUTRALISE THE

AXIS ANTI-TANK GUN SCREEN. THEY SUCCEEDED AND THE AXIS

FORCE WAS SEEN NOW RETREATING IN FULL.

THE ALLIED DECIDED TO PURSUE THE RETREATING AXIS

FORCES BUT WAS HAMPERED BY HEAVY RAIN. THE RAIN

CAUSED THEIR SUPPLIES OF PETROL TO BE HELD UP MILES

BEHIND THE ADVANCING BATTLE FORCE. THIS ALLOWED THE

AXIS TO RETRIEVE SOME OF THEIR TROOPS AND TRANSPORT.

THE AXIS FLED ALONG THE COASTAL ROAD TOWARDS THE EL

AGHEILA POSITION. THE RAIN HAD ACTUALLY SAVED THE AXIS

FROM COMPLETE ANHILATION.

THE BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN HAD BEEN WON BY THE ALLIED.

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SO MUCH ABOUT HOW THE BATTLE ORCHESTRATED, LET US

NOW ANALYSE THE BATTLE.

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE

SOME OF THE CONSIDERABLE REASON WHICH HAS BEEN

CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESS AND THE FAILURE OF

MONTGOMERY AND ROMMEL ARE AS FOLLOWS:

 NUMERICAL STRENGTH THE ALLIED ENJOYED BOTH

IN HUMAN RESOURCE AND WEAPON SYSTEM WHICH

CONTRIBUTED TO COMBAT MULTIPLIER

 FLEXIBLE PLAN THAT BOTH COMMANDERS HAD

EXERCISE THE FREEDOM OF DECISION AND CHANGING

THEIR PLAN TO SUIT THE SITUATION AND THREAT.

 CONCENTRATION OF FORCE THAT 8TH ARMY ENJOYED

NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY WHEN ALL ARMS COOPERATED

SUCCESSFULLY IN AN OFFENSIVE BATTLE. MONTGOMERY

PERSISTANCE THAT THE DIVISION OF ALL ARMS SHOULD BE

THE BASIC FIGHTING FORMATION EVENTUALLY PAID OFF.

 TRI SERVICE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ALL

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 SERVICES.

 CHANGES OF AXIS STRATEGY OF MALTA WHICH

SIGNIFICANTLY JEOPARDIZED ON LOGISTIC SUPPORT

 LEADERSHIP STYLE FROM BOTH COMMANDERS.

 LACK OF AIR POWER.

 FAILURE TO ADHERE DIRECT ORDERS AND STAFF

OPINIONS

 AXIS SUSTAINED CRUSHING DEFEAT EVEN THOUGH

GERMAN DEFENCE IN ACCORD WITH RUSSIAN DEFENCE

DOCTRINE

LESSON LEARNT

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IN ANALYSING IN TERMS OF

PRINCIPLES OF WAR, OUR SYNDICATE USE THE MALAYSIAN

ARMED FORCES PRINCIPLES OF WAR AS A BENCHMARK. THE

PRINCIPLES OF WAR ARE AS SHOWN. THOSE WITH TICK ARE

THE PRINCIPLES THAT OUR TEAM CONSIDERED HAD BEEN

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APPLIED IN THE BATTLE. I WILL NOW HIGHLIGHT THREE OF

THEM

 COOPERATION. THIS WAS CLEARLY BEEN

SHOWN IN OPERATION LIGHTFOOT WHEN THE TRI

SERVICE OF THE ALLIED FORCE SUCCESSFULLY

LAUNCHED OFFENSIVE ACTION WITHOUTH FACING

MUCH PROBLEM. THIS WOULD SURELY EFFECT THE

JOINT COOPERATION WHICH IS VERY MUCH ESSENTIAL

IN THIS BATTLE ESPECIALLY IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE

CONCENTRATION OF FORCE AND TO MAXIMIZE COMBAT

POWER

 SECURITY. REASONABLE SECURITY IS THE BASIS OF

ANY PLAN AND CAMPAIGN WHICH PROVIDE ADEQUATE

DEFENCE FOR VITAL AND VULNERABLE IN ORDER TO

OBTAIN FREEDOM OF ACTION. FOR EXAMPLE; GEN

AUCHINLEK WAS DETERMINED TO MAKE EL ALAMEIN

POSITION AS IDEAL FOR DEFENCE. TAKING THE FORM

OF 61 KM BOTTLENECK BETWEEN THE

MEDITERRANEAN TO THE NORTH AND THE IMPASSABLE

SALT MASHES AND SOFT SAND OF THE QUATTARA

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 DEPRESSION ON THE SOUTH, MEANT THAT THE AXIS

FORCES COULD NOT OUTFLANK EL ALAMEIN AND THUS

COULD ONLY TAKE IT THROUGH FRONTAL ASSAULT

 ADMINISTRATION. BOTH ROMMEL AND

MONTGOMERY HAD ANTICIPATED THE IMPORTANCE OF

SUFFICIENT LOGISTIC AND SYSTEMATIC

ADMINISTRATION IN BATTLE. MONTGOMERY HAD

CAREFULLY PREPARED FOR THE BATTLE AT ALAM EL

HALFA BY NOT ALLOWING THE 8TH ARMY TO MOVE

UNTIL THEY HAVE BEEN PROPERLY SUPPLIED AND

TRAINED. THE AXIS FORCE SHOULD HAVE PAUSED FOR

CONSOLIDATION AFTER CAPTURING TOBRUK, GIVEN ITS

STRETCHED LINE OF COMMUNICATION OF 1,000 MILES

AND UNSUCCESSFUL RESUPPLY ACROSS THE

MEDITERRANEAN. ROMMEL’S DECISION TO PROCEED

FOR ALAM EL HALFA WITHOUT PROPER

ADMINISTRATION MIGHT HAVE CAUSED HIS OWN

DEFEAT. THIS WAS DESPITE AN EARLIER GERMAN

STRATEGIC APPRECIATION WHICH REVEALED A NEED

TO REINFORCE THE GERMAN AIR FORCE IN THE

MEDITERRANEAN AND TRANSPORT AT LEAST 30,000

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 TONS OF SUPPLIES A MONTH TO CARRY OUT A

SUCCESSFUL MISSION.ENSURE THAT TIRED SOLDIERS

ARE GIVEN PROPER REST AND REPLACE THEM WHEN

NECESSARY.

THERE ARE ALSO SEVERAL OTHER ASPECT WHICH BEING

IDENTIFIED BY OUR SYNDICATE TO BE COMPATIBLE TOWARDS

OUR ORGANISATION IN RELATION TO BATTLE. TWO PERTINENT

POINTS THAT I WOULD LIKE HIGHLIGHT IS:

 WARFARE AND DOCTRINE. EVENTHOUGH DESERT

WARFARE IS TOTALLY DIFFERENT TO THE MALAYSIAN

ENVIRONMENT WHICH IS COMBINATION OF JUNGLE AND

CONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND DOCTRINE SUCH AS

BREACHING AN OBSTACLE. DURING THE MALAYSIAN

EMERGENCY WHEREBY THE BRITISH WERE USING THE

SIMILAR TACTICS TO COUNTER THE COMMUNIST

TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

 MINE WARFARE AND ANTI TANK GUNS. IT HAS

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 EFFECTIVELY IMPOSED DELAY TO THE ALLIED 30TH CORPS

ASSAULT AND CREATED MASSIVE JAMS TO ITS FRIENDLY

FORCES. THE TOTAL DEPTH OF THE POSITION FROM THE

OUTPOST LINE TO THE REAR OF THE MAN INFANTRY

POSITION FROM THE OUTPOST LINE TO THE REAR OF THE

MAIN INFANTRY DEFENSES VARIED FROM FIVE TO SIX

MILES. THIS HAS CAUSED SOME DIFFICULTIES TO THE

ADVANCING FORCE CAUSING A NUMBER OF CASUALTIES.

THE USE OF ANTI TANK GUN HAD ALSO SHOWED THE

ADVANCEMENT OF THE FORCES. THE MAF SHOULD TAKE

NOTE THE TACTICS OF USING MINE WARFARE AND ANTI

TANK GUN, IT CAN HAMPER THE ENEMIES ADVANCE.

HOWEVER THE PLANNNG AND PROPER EXECUTION IS

VITAL FOR THIS TACTIC.

CONCLUSION

IN CONCLUSION EL ALAMEIN WAS SEEN AS A CLASSICAL

BATTLE AS IT SERVED AS THE TURNING POINT FOR THE ALLIED

AND AXIS FORCES IN THE NORTH AFRICA CAMPAIGN. ALLIED

FORCE WON A DECISIVE VICTORY 12 DAYS AFTER IT

COMMENCED ITS COUNTER-OFFENSIVE ON 23RDOCTOBER 1942.

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MONTGOMERY’S CAUTION AND COORDINATION HAD FOUND AN

ANSWER TO ROMMEL’S BLITZKRIEG IN NORTH AFRICA. AFTER

THOROUGH PREPARATION AND LEARNING FROM DEFEATS IN

THE PRECEDING TWO AND HALF YEARS BATTLE, AND DESPITE

ROMMEL’S UNDISPUTED TALENTS IN THE OPERATIONAL ART OF

BATTLE AND MANOEUVRE BATTLEFARE, ROMMEL WAS

OUTWITTED BY A CAUTIOUS BUT INSPIRING ‘SOLDIER’S

GENERAL’ WHO SAW THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE OF MORALE IN

WINNING BATTLES, MONTGOMERY.

TO MANY ANALYSTS, ROMMEL WAS ALSO DEFEATED BY HIS

OWN LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS AND A LACK OF COMMAND IN THE

AIR, THAT BROUGHT ABOUT THE HANDICAPS SUFFERED BY HIS

WELL-TRAINED AFRIKA KORPS. UNDER THESE ADVERSE

CIRCUMSTANCES, ROMMEL PERSONALLY ACKNOWLEDGED

THAT EL ALAMEIN WAS A BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE TO THE AXIS.

WITH THAT NOTE I END MY PRESENTATION. THANK YOU.

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