Rodolfo San Luis vs.
Felicidad San Luis Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar
FACTS: The instant case involves the settlement of
the estate of Felicisimo, who was the former governor
of the Povince of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942
out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo,
Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August
11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin,
with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen,
filed a Complaint for Divorce which was granted.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent
Felicidad San Luis, at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the
time of their marriage up to his death on December
18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed
a petition for letters of administration before the RTC
of Makati City.
Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure
to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of
his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Linda
invoked the same grounds and joined her brother
Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the petition. The
trial court issued an Order denying the two motions to
dismiss.
HELD: YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration
from the Order denying their motions to dismiss –
DENIED.
The trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a
resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the
petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna
and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent
was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.
Respondent moved for reconsideration and for the
disqualification of Judge Arcangel but said motions
were denied.
Respondent appealed to the CA which reversed and
set aside the orders of the trial court. The appellate
court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules
of Court, the term “place of residence” of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual
or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode of a person as distinguished from legal
residence or domicile. It noted that although
Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in
Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Thus, the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati City.
The CA also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to
marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26
of the Family Code. Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed
separate MR – DENIED.
Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition
for review on certiorari. Rodolfo later filed a
manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition
which was granted.
ISSUES: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2)
whether respondent has legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration.
Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the RTC of the
province “in which he resides at the time of his death.”
In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, we laid
down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence
– as contradistinguished from domicile – of the
decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate:
The term “resides” connotes “actual residence” as
distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. In other words, “resides” should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.
The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable
to the instant case because they involve election
cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between
“residence” for purposes of election laws and
“residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of
actions. In election cases, “residence” and “domicile”
are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has
the intention of returning. However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the “residence”
of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode,
which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity
and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person
may have his residence in one place and domicile in
another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that
Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent submitted pieces of evidence which
proved that he also maintained a residence in
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his
death.
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the RTC which has
territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus,
the subject petition was validly filed before the RTC of
Makati City.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to
marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that
the latter has the legal personality to file the subject
petition for letters of administration, as she may be
considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that
letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section
2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part: SEC. 2.
Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to
the petitioner: x x x.
An “interested person” has been defined as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and
not merely indirect or contingent. In the instant case,
respondent would qualify as an interested person who
has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by
virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was
not denied by petitioners.
G.R. No. 177099.
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner, versus
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP,
TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and
ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents.
Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a
verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate
of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap (Joaquin).
The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate
without any known debts or obligations. During his
lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with
(Lucia), and second with (Caridad). Lucia died on
April 24, 1924. Joaquin and Lucia had three
children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and
Jose (survived by three children, namely, Gloria,
Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on
February 9, 1926. They also had three children—
Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her
daughter Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left
two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City.
RTC issued an order setting the petition for initial
hearing and directing Eduardo to cause its
publication. Sebastian filed his comment, generally
admitting the allegations in the petition, and
conceding to the appointment of Eduardo as special
administrator. Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their
answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject
lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with
Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in April 1924, they
became the pro indiviso owners of the subject
properties. They opposed the appointment of Eduardo
as administrator on the following grounds: (1) he is
not physically and mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest
in the lots is minimal; and (3) he does not possess the
desire to earn. They claimed that the best interests of
the estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as special
or regular administrator. RTC issued a resolution
appointing Eduardo as regular administrator of
Joaquin’s estate. Consequently, it issued him letters
of administration. After the parties were given the
opportunity to be heard and to submit their respective
proposed projects of partition, the RTC issued an
Order of Partition. Eduardo, Sebastian, and
oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their respective
motions for reconsideration.
RTC issued a resolution denying the motions for
reconsideration of Eduardo and Sebastian, and
granting that of Joseph and Teresa. It also declared
that the real estate properties belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also
directed the modification Order of Partition to reflect
the correct sharing of the heirs. However, before the
RTC could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo
and Sebastian both appealed to the CA.
CA rendered its Decision, WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant appeals are DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
Issue: WON the RTC, acting as an intestate court with
limited jurisdiction has the power and authority to
determine questions of ownership, which properly
belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.
The Court’s Ruling
As to Sebastian’s and Eduardo’s common issue on
the ownership of the subject real properties, we hold
that the RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to
resolve the same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial
court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates
only to matters having to do with the probate of the
will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that
such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction. However, this general rule is subject to
exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in
an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece
of property without prejudice to the final determination
of ownership in a separate action.
Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the
estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of
the status of each heir and whether the property in the
inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse.
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the
instant case considering that the parties are all heirs
of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be
impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue.
More importantly, the determination of whether the
subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the
probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate of
Joaquin.
The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia
died on April 24, 1924, and subsequently, on
February 9, 1926, Joaquin married Caridad. It is
worthy to note that TCT No. 5577 (32184) contained
an annotation.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that
when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or the wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the
debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse, and if both
spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of
either.
Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether
the properties are conjugal as it had to liquidate the
conjugal partnership to determine the estate of the
decedent. In fact, should Joseph and Teresa institute
a settlement proceeding for the intestate estate of
Lucia, the same should be consolidated with the
settlement proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucia’s
spouse. Accordingly, the CA correctly distributed the
estate of Lucia (1st marriage), with respect to the
subject of this case, to her compulsory heirs.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as
correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the claim of
Sebastian and Eduardo that properties are
conclusively show that the owners of the properties
covered therein were Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of
the registration in the name of Joaquin Agtarap
casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia, deserves
scant consideration. This cannot be said to be a
collateral attack on the said TCTs. Indeed, simple
possession of a certificate of title is not necessarily
conclusive of a holder’s true ownership of property. A
certificate of title under the Torrens system aims to
protect dominion; it cannot be used as an instrument
for the deprivation of ownership. Thus, the fact that
the properties were registered in the name of Joaquin
Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, is not sufficient
proof that the properties were acquired during the
spouses’ coverture. The phrase “married to Caridad
Garcia” in the TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil
status of Joaquin as the registered owner, and does
not necessarily prove that the realties are their
conjugal properties.
Neither can Sebastian’s claim that Joaquin’s estate
could have already been settled in 1965 after the
payment of the inheritance tax be upheld. Payment of
the inheritance tax, per se, does not settle the estate
of a deceased person. As provided in Section 1, Rule
90 of the Rules of Court. Thus, an estate is settled
and distributed among the heirs only after the
payment of the debts of the estate, funeral charges,
expenses of administration, allowance to the widow,
and inheritance tax. The records of these cases do
not show that these were complied.
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs. ISABEL
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-
much-stretched imbroglio over the estate of Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We issued a
Decision in the dispute as in Inter Caetera. We now
find a need to replace the decision. FACTS: The
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died
intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was survived by her
spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five
grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren,
including herein respondent, Isabel; and two
illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio
III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A.
Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before
the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate.
Federico, opposed the petition. Federico filed a
Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of
administration on the ground that Isabel had no right
of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being
an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of
Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and
void. However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we
categorically declared that Isabel and her siblings,
having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed
to a void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of
the Civil Code, were legitimate children of Emilio I,
who can all represent him in the estate of their
legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the setback, Federico nominated Emilio
III to administer the decedent’s estate on his behalf in
the event letters of administration issues to Federico.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died. Almost a year
thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision
appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent
Cristina’s intestate estate: WHEREFORE, the petition
of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the
Opposition-in-Intervention is GRANTED.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of
Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed
respondent as administratrix of the subject estate.
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we
reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate
court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-
administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his
interest in Federico’s estate.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the
Court of Appeals’ Decision in favor of her sole
administratorship based on her status as a legitimate
grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to
administer.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section
6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the order of
preference for the issuance of letters of administration
cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil
Code must be followed. Isabel further asserts that
Emilio III had demonstrated adverse interests and
disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to
become a co-administrator thereof.
ISSUE: Who is better qualified to administer the
estate of the decedent?
HELD: Letters of Administration over the estate of
decedent Cristina AguinaldoSuntay shall solely issue
to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon
payment of a bond to be set by the RTC, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator
of the estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an
order of preference, in the appointment of an
administrator. This order of preference, which
categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next
of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an
administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence.
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an
administrator over the estate of a decedent is the
prospective administrator’s interest in the estate. This
is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78
takes into account in establishing the order of
preference in the appointment of administrator for the
estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who
will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical
administration of the estate, or, in the alternative,
suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly. In
all, given that the rule speaks of an order of
preference, the person to be appointed administrator
of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an
interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater
than any other candidate.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of
preference in the appointment of administrator of a
decedent’s estate, that the appointment of co-
administrators has been allowed, but as an exception.
We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules
of Court which specifically states that letters of
administration may be issued to both the surviving
spouse and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly,
we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of
Court which say that "x x x when an executor or
administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the
remaining executor or administrator may administer
the trust alone, x x x."
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of
interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto
entitle an interested person to co-administration
thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor
adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the
order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78.
Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the
estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said
estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.
Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as
one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and
undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of
Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate,
cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left
entirely to the sound discretion of the Court and
depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances
of the case.
[G.R. No. 146006. February 23, 2004]. JOSE C. LEE
AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as
President and Corporate Secretary, respectively, of
Philippines Internationl Life Insurance Company, and
FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP, petitioners,
vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M.
AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y.
ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G.
RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA
ENDERES claiming to be Special Administratrix, and
other persons/ public officers acting for and in their
behalf, respondents. CORONA, J.
FACTS: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the
Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc.
on July 6, 1956. At the time of the company’s
incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned ninety percent
(90%) of the subscribed capital stock. On July 21,
1980, Dr. Ortañez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana
Salgado Ortañez), three legitimate children (Rafael,
Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and five illegitimate
children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent
Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings Jose,
Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed
Ortañez).
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortañez, a legitimate
child of Ortañez, filed before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch (now Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City) a petition for letters of
administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortañez.
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and
her siblings filed an opposition to the petition for
letters of administration and, in a subsequent urgent
motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a
special administrator. The RTC appointed Rafael and
Jose Ortañez as joint special administrator of his
father’s estate.
On April 15, 1989, the decedent’s wife, Juliana S.
Ortañez, claiming that she owned 1,0144 Philinterlife
shares of stock as her conjugal share in the estate,
sold said shares with right to repurchase in favor of
herein petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group
(FLAG), represented by its president, herein petitioner
Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortañez failed to repurchase the
shares of stock within the stipulated period, thus
ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner
FLAG in its name. On October 30, 1991, Special
Administrator Jose Ortañez, acting in his personal
capacity and claiming that he owned the remaining
1,0115 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his inheritance
share in the estate, sold said shares with right to
repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner FLAG,
represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C.
Lee. After one year, petitioner FLAG consolidated in
its name the ownership of the Philinterlife shares of
stock when Jose Ortañez failed to repurchase the
same.
It appears that several years before (but already
during the pendency of the intestate proceedings at
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85),
Juliana Ortañez and her two children, Special
Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez, entered into
a memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982
for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr.
Juvencio Ortañez, partitioning the estate (including
the Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves.
This was the basis of the number of shares separately
sold by Juliana Ortañez on April 15, 1989 (1,014
shares) and by Jose Ortañez on October 30, 1991
(1,011 shares) in favor of herein petitioner FLAG.
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez–Enderes and
her siblings (hereafter referred to as private
respondents Enderes et al.) filed a motion for
appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife
shares of stock. This move was opposed by Special
Administrator Jose Ortañez. The intestate court
granted the motion of private respondents Enderes et
al. and appointed private respondent Enderes special
administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
Enderes moved to void the memorandum of
agreement earlier entered and the deed of sale of
Philinterlife shares of stock to FLAG. Both were
opposed by the Ortanez. Further, the sales in
question were entered into by Juliana S. Ortañez and
Jose S. Ortañez in their personal capacity without
prior approval of the Court, the same is not binding
upon the Estate. In addition, another order was issued
by the intestate court annulling the memorandum of
agreement. A petition for certiorari was filed before
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied the
petition reiterating that the same transactions were
void since they were not approved by the intestate
court. The case elevated to the Supreme Court which
was dismiss due to technicality. The motion for
reconsideration of Ortanez was likewise denied with
finality. Respondent Special Administrator Endres and
her siblings filed a motion for execution of the orders
of the intestate court. The court a quo granted the
motion and issued a writ of execution against
petitioners. This was appealed by the petitioners
before the Court of Appeals, however the CA did not
give credence to the petition. Private respondents
then filed a motion to direct the branch clerk of court
to reinstate the name of Dr. Ortañez in the stock and
transfer book of Philinterlife and issue the
corresponding stock certificate. The intestate court
granted the motion. Petitioners, this time, questions
the order of the intestate court directing the branch
clerk order of the intestate court directing the branch
clerk of court to issue the stock certificates. They also
questioned in the Court of Appeals the order of the
intestate court nullifying the sale made in their favor
by Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez. On November
20, 2002, the Court of Appeals denied their petition
and upheld the power of the intestate court to execute
its order. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the sale of the shares of stock to
FLAG by petitioners is valid? 2. Can the intestate
court nullify the said transaction?
HELD 1. No. What we have here is a situation where
some of the heirs of the decedent without securing
court approval have appropriated as their own
personal property the properties of [the] Estate, to the
exclusion and the extreme prejudice of the other
claimant/heirs. In other words, these heirs, without
court approval, have distributed the asset of the
estate among themselves and proceeded to dispose
the same to third parties even in the absence of an
order of distribution by the Estate Court. As admitted
by petitioner’s counsel, there was absolutely no legal
justification for this action by the heirs. There being no
legal justification, petitioner has no basis for
demanding that public respondent [the intestate court]
approve the sale of the Philinterlife shares of the
Estate by Juliana and Jose Ortañez in favor of the
Filipino Loan Assistance Group. From the above
decision, it is clear that Juliana Ortañez, and her three
sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed
Ortañez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of
agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate
estate among themselves, despite their knowledge
that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate
and before final settlement of the estate by the
intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate
properties by Juliana Ortañez and her children (Jose,
Rafael and Antonio Ortañez) was invalid, the
subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third
party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise
void.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in
the property under administration under Art. 533 of
the Civil Code which provides that possession of
hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir
without interruption from the moment of death of the
decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such
portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the
division of the estate by the probate or intestate court
after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall
have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have
been given their shares. This means that an heir may
only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not
any specific property therein. In the present case,
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific
properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of
stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This
they could not lawfully do pending the final
adjudication of the estate by the intestate court
because of the undue prejudice it would cause the
other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the
present case. Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold
specific properties of the estate, without court
approval. It is well-settled that court approval is
necessary for the validity of any disposition of the
decedent’s estate. In the early case of Godoy vs.
Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale of the
property of the estate by an administrator without the
order of the probate court is void and passes no title
to the purchaser.
HELD 2. Yes. We see no reason why it cannot. The
intestate court has the power to execute its order with
regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate
property, otherwise its power to annul the
unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate
property would be meaningless. In other words,
enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or
probate court’s power to annul unauthorized or
fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of
estate property before final adjudication. We are not
dealing here with the issue of inclusion or exclusion of
properties in the inventory of the estate because there
is no question that, from the very start, the Philinterlife
shares of stock were owned by the decedent, Dr.
Juvencio Ortañez. Rather, we are concerned here
with the effect of the sale made by the decedent’s
heirs, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, without the
required approval of the intestate court. This being so,
the contention of petitioners that the determination of
the intestate court was merely provisional and should
have been threshed out in a separate proceeding is
incorrect.
G.R. No. 118671January 29, 1996 THE ESTATE OF
HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor vs. CA,
MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN
RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA
ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE RTC OF PASIG, BRANCH 156
FACTS: Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will
naming as his heirs his only son, Petitioner Edmond
Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria
Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters,
private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine
and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The
testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash,
personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz
executor of his estate. When Hilario died, the cash
component of his estate were distributed among his
heirs named in the will but for some unknown reason
the will was never been probated. Thus, four years
later after the decedent’s death, Respondent Maria
Pilar Montes filed before the trail court a petition to
probate the will. This was opposed by Edmond on the
ground that the will was executed under undue
influence. Nevertheless, he withdrew his opposition
and the will was subsequently probated. One of the
properties in the will – a house and lot which was
bequeath to Catheryn, Candicem and Maria was
leased out by the petitioner to third persons. Hence,
the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit the rent
of the lease to the branch clerk of court. During the
pendency of the proceeding, petitioner moved to
release the rent payments deposited before the clerk
or court. Respondent on the other hand, oppose the
said motion and concurrently filed "Motion for Release
of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of
Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes
prayed for the release of the said rent payments to
Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline
and for the distribution of the testator's properties in
accordance to the holographic will. The probate court
denied the motion for release petitioner's motion for
release of funds but granted respondent Montes'
motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus
ordered the release of the rent payments to the
decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered
the delivery of the titles to and possession of the
properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters
and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of
P50,000.00. Petitioner assails the order of the probate
court to the Court of Appeals. The CA however,
dismissed the petition and sustained the probate
court.
ISSUE: 1. Whether the probate court err in the grant
of allowance for support to the grandchildren of the
decedent? 2. Whether it has authority to release the
titles to certain heirs? 3. Whether it erred to grant
possession of all properties of the estate to the
executor of the will?
HELD 1. Yes. Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family.
— The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate,
shall receive therefrom under the direction of the
court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the
widow and the minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased the right to receive allowances for support
during the settlement of estate proceedings. He
contends that the testator's three granddaughters do
not qualify for an allowance because they are not
incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal
age, married and gainfully employed. In addition, the
provision expressly states "children" of the deceased
which excludes the latter's grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section
3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the "minor or
incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 188 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law
in force at the time of the testator's death, provides
that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
the deceased's legitimate spouse and children,
regardless of their age, civil status or gainful
employment, are entitled to provisional support from
the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact
that the right and duty to support, especially the right
to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to
provisional support from the funds of the decedent's
estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow
and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or
incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the appellate
court to sustain the probate court's order granting an
allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending
settlement of his estate.
HELD 2. No. Respondent courts also erred when they
ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed
properties to private respondents six months after the
date of first publication of notice to creditors. An order
releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to
an advance distribution of the estate which is allowed
only under the following conditions set forth in Rule 90
of the Rules of Court.
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of
the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all
the debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax
have been paid; or (2) before payment of said
obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives
a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon
the payment of said obligations within such time as
the court directs, or when provision is made to meet
those obligations.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the
release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and
the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents
after the lapse of six months from the date of first
publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned
order speaks of "notice" to creditors, not payment of
debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no
debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had
not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The
estate tax is one of those obligations that must be
paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid,
the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or
make such provisions as to meet the said tax
obligation in proportion to their respective shares in
the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was
issued the properties of the estate had not yet been
inventoried and appraised.
HELD 3. Yes. The petitioner cannot correctly claim
that the assailed order deprived him of his right to
take possession of all the real and personal properties
of the estate. The right of an executor or administrator
to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute
and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary
for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration,"
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds
deposited with the clerk of court, he had been
previously granted by the probate court certain
amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the
properties of the estate, and payment of the real
estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for
the release of additional funds for the same reasons
he previously cited. It was correct for the probate
court to require him to submit an accounting of the
necessary expenses for administration before
releasing any further money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that
petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the
one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property.
Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after
renewal of the lease. Neither did he render an
accounting of such funds. Petitioner must be
reminded that his right of ownership over the
properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as
the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned.
As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's
estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust
funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities
of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot
unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his
parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first
submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and
personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true
account of his administration, the expenses of
administration, the amount of the obligations and
estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination
by the court as to their veracity, propriety and
justness.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and
FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA,
respondents.
FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside
Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañez
entered into a loan agreement in the amount of
P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the
payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford
6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view
thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal
sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of
P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st
thereafter up to May 31, 1985. On December 13,
1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
agreement, this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It
was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price
of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural AllPurpose
Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and
his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the
said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such
promissory note, they also signed a Continuing
Guaranty Agreement for the loan dated December 13,
1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a
holographic will. Subsequently in March 1981, testate
proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City,
Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706.
On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was
appointed as the special administrator of the estate of
the decedent. During the pendency of the testate
proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his
sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint
Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed
to divide between themselves and take possession of
the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for
Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of
them was to assume the indebtedness of their late
father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and
between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among
others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank. Demand letters for the
settlement of his account were sent by petitioner
Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but
the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay.
Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a
Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of
Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil
Case No. 18909. Summons was issued against both,
but the one intended for Edmund was not served
since he was in the United States and there was no
information on his address or the date of his return to
the Philippines. Accordingly, the complaint was
narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer and
alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since
she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint
agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund
was not approved by the probate court, it was null and
void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under
the joint agreement. The RTC dismiss the case on
lack of merit. It also ruled that the said agreement
executed was void, considering that it had not been
approved by the probate court, and that there can be
no valid partition until after the will has been probated.
On appeal, it affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition. The petitioner claims that the
obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the
heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code;
there was thus no need for the probate court to
approve the joint agreement where the heirs
partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and
assumed the obligations related thereto. Since
respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint
agreement without any condition, she is now
estopped from asserting any position contrary thereto.
The petitioner also points out that the holographic will
of the deceased did not include nor mention any of
the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such
was beyond the ambit of the said will. The active
participation and resistance of respondent Florence S.
Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the
petitioner’s claim amounts to a waiver of the right to
have the claim presented in the probate proceedings,
and to allow any one of the heirs who executed the
joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of
the tractors under consideration would be equivalent
to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to the
damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the agreement entered by
Edmund and Florence is valid? 2. Whether the heirs
assumption of indebtedness is binding?
HELD 1. No. In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there
can be no valid partition among the heirs until after
the will has been probated:
“In testate succession, there can be no valid partition
among the heirs until after the will has been probated.
The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public
requires it, because unless a will is probated and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a
person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will
decides no other question than such as touch upon
the capacity of the testator and the compliance with
those requirements or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of a will”
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be
partitioned are the same properties embraced in the
will. In the present case, the deceased, Efraim
Santibañez, left a holographic will which contained,
inter alia, the provision which reads as follows: (e) All
other properties, real or personal, which I own and
may be discovered later after my demise, shall be
distributed in the proportion indicated in the
immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund
and Florence, my children. We agree with the
appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-
encompassing provision embracing all the properties
left by the decedent which might have escaped his
mind at that time he was making his will, and other
properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein
are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any
partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is
not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund
and Florence, partitioning the tractors among
themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of
its execution, there was already a pending proceeding
for the probate of their late father’s holographic will
covering the said tractors.
HELD 2. No. The filing of a money claim against the
decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory.
As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v.
Herrera: … This requirement is for the purpose of
protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus
enabling him to examine each claim and to determine
whether it is a proper one which should be allowed.
The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy
settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early
delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees,
or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt
presentation and disposition of the claims against the
decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the
estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and
distribute the residue.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein
could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father.
The documentary evidence presented, particularly the
promissory notes and the continuing guaranty
agreement, were executed and signed only by the late
Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the
petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate
court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-
maker of the decedent under the said promissory
notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to
any defenses Edmund may have as against the
petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to
delve into the matter further.
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH
QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON
vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf
of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON
FACTS: This case started as a Petition for Letters of
Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon
(Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s
commonlaw wife and daughter. The petition was
opposed by herein petitioners Amelia to whom Eliseo
was married. Amelia was joined by her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer. Eliseo died intestate on 12
December 1992.
Elise, represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC
of Las Piñas City. In her Petition, Elise claims that she
is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived
and born at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other. To prove her filiation
to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the
Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of
Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same
petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties -
P2,040,000.00 and personal properties -
P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of
Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise
sought her appointment as administratrix of her late
father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly
laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and
Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to
Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by
his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas,
Tarlac at the time of his death.
The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary
bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the
petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby
discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that
Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as
hearsay.
On appeal, the decision of the RTC was affirmed in
toto. The CA held that Elise was able to prove that
Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and
wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas
City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in
1992.
ISSUES: I. THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A
RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE
PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS
PIÑAS; II. THE CA OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT
ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY
INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.
HELD: NO. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death.
"Resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and
the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in
the context of venue provisions, means nothing more
than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.
It is evident from the records that during his lifetime,
Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5,
Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the
venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in
the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration,
the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s Death
Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac
where they insist his estate should be settled. While
the recitals in death certificates can be considered
proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his
death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding
on the courts. Both the RTC and the CA found that
Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the
time of his death in 1995.
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the
petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown any
interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays
down the preferred persons who are entitled to the
issuance of letters of administration, thus: Sec. 6.
When and to whom letters of administration granted.
— If no executor is named in the will, or the executor
or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail
to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration
shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving
husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there
is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
may be granted to such other person as the court may
select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides
that a petition for Letters of Administration must be
filed by an interested person, thus: Sec. 2. Contents
of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested
person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner: (a) The jurisdictional facts; (b) The names,
ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent; (c) The
probable value and character of the property of the
estate; (d) The name of the person for whom letters of
administration are prayed. But no defect in the petition
shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one
who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir,
or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next
of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the
estate as distributes.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who
stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s
estate, is deemed to be an interested party. Certainly,
the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the
estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on
her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is
entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate
are satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution
of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise
can rightfully be considered as an interested party
within the purview of the law.
ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA
ORTIZ BRIONES, namely: ESTELA,
ERIBERTO AND VIRGILIO SANTOS, ANA
SANTOS CULTURA, ELVIRA SANTOS
INOCENTES, ERNESTO MENDOZA,
RIZALINA SANTOS, ADOLFO MENDOZA and
PACITA MENDOZA, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS
OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, namely:
SILVERIO S. BRIONES, PETRA BRIONES,
BONIFACIO CABAHUG, JR., ANITA
TRASMONTE, CIRILITA FORTUNA,
CRESENCIA BRIONES, FUGURACION
MEDALLE and MERCEDES LAGBAS,
Respondents.
Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-
Briones (Donata), consisting of her surviving sister,
Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalina’s daughter,
Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and the other nephews and
nieces of Donata, in representation of her two other
sisters who had also passed away. Respondents, on
the other hand, are the heirs of the late Maximino
Briones (Maximino), composed of his nephews and
nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in
representation of the deceased siblings of Maximino.
Maximino was married to Donata but their union did
not produce any children. When Maximino died on 1
May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to
settle her husband’s estate with the Cebu City Court.
CFI issued Letters of Administration appointing
Donata as the administratrix of Maximino’s estate.
She submitted an Inventory of Maximino’s properties,
which included, among other things, parcels of lands.
The CFI subsequently issue an Order, awarding
ownership of the aforementioned real properties to
Donata. Donata had the said CFI Order recorded in
the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, and
by virtue thereof, received new TCTs, covering the
said properties, now in her name.
Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of
Donata’s nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition for
the administration of the intestate estate of Donata.
Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed
by the RTC as administrators of Donata’s intestate
estate. Controversy arose among Donata’s heirs
when Erlinda claimed exclusive ownership of three
parcels of land, based on two Deeds of Donation
allegedly executed in her favor by her aunt Donata.
The other heirs of Donata opposed Erlinda’s claim.
This Court, however, was no longer informed of the
subsequent development in the intestate proceedings
of the estate of Donata; and as far as this Petition is
concerned, all the heirs of Donata, including Erlinda,
appear to be on the same side.
Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of Maximino,
filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino,
which was initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also
issued an Order, allowing Silverio to collect rentals
from Maximino’s properties. But then, Gregorio filed
with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order,
claiming that the said properties were already under
his and his wife’s administration as part of the
intestate estate of Donata. Silverio’s Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino
was subsequently set aside by the RTC.
Heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC
against the heirs of Donata for the partition,
annulment, and recovery of possession of real
property. They later filed an Amended Complaint
alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of
Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in
breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the
other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the
real properties belonging to the intestate estate of
Maximino. RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the
heirs of Maximino. Heirs of Donata appealed the RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision, x x x. Unsatisfied
with the afore-quoted Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the heirs of Donata filed the present Petition,
x x x.
ORDER
This is with reference to the Motion of the
Administratrix, dated January 5, 1960, that she be
declared the sole heir of her deceased husband,
Maximino Suico Briones, the latter having died without
any legitimate ascendant nor descendant, nor any
legitimate brother or sister, nephews or nieces. At the
hearing of this incident today, nobody appeared to
resist the motion, and based on the uncontradicted
testimony of Donata G. Ortiz that she was the nearest
surviving relative of the deceased Maximino Suico
Briones at the time of the latter’s death, and pursuant
to the pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code of the
Philippines, the Court hereby declares the aforesaid
Donata G. Ortiz the sole, absolute and exclusive heir
of the estate of the deceased Maximino Suico
Briones, and she is hereby entitled to inherit all the
residue of this estate after paying all the obligations
thereof, which properties are those contained in the
Inventory, dated October 2, 1952. Cebu City, January
15, 1960.
From the contents of the afore-quoted Order, this
Court is able to deduce that the CFI Order was in as
administratrix of Maximino’s intestate estate, which
was dated 2 October 1952.18 Other than such
observation, this Court finds nothing fact issued on 15
January 1960 and not 2 October 1952, as earlier
stated in the Decision. It was the inventory of
properties, submitted by Donata in the CFI Order
which could change its original position in the
Decision under consideration.
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed
that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the
court was not able to order that these siblings be
given personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it
should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate,
whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem,
and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing
of the application and of the date set for the hearing of
the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice
to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings
and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in
the publication. The publication requirement of the
notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of
informing all interested parties in the estate of the
deceased of the existence of the settlement
proceedings, most especially those who were not
named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless
of whether such omission was voluntarily or
involuntarily made.
This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order
was the result of the intestate proceedings instituted
by Donata before the trial court. As this Court pointed
out in its earlier Decision, the manner by which the
CFI judge conducted the proceedings enjoys the
presumption of regularity, and encompassed in such
presumption is the order of publication of the notice of
the intestate proceedings. A review of the records fails
to show any allegation or concrete proof that the CFI
also failed to order the publication in newspapers of
the notice of the intestate proceedings and to require
proof from Donata of compliance therewith. Neither
can this Court find any reason or explanation as to
why Maximino’s siblings could have missed the
published notice of the intestate proceedings of their
brother.
In relying on the presumptions of the regular
performance of official duty and lawful exercise of
jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned
Order, dated 15 January 1960, this Court is not, as
counsel for respondents allege, sacrificing the
substantive right of respondents to their share in the
inheritance in favor of mere procedural fiats. There is
a rationale for the establishment of rules of procedure,
as amply explained by this Court in De Dios v. Court
of Appeals20 – Procedural rules are designed to
insure the orderly and expeditious administration of
justice by providing for a practical system by which
the parties to a litigation may be accorded a full and
fair opportunity to present their respective positions
and refute each other's submissions under the
prescribed requirements, conditions and limitations.
Adjective law is not the counterfoil of substantive law.
In fact, there is a symbiotic relationship between
them. By complying faithfully with the Rules of Court,
the bench and the bar are better able to discuss,
analyze and understand substantive rights and duties
and consequently to more effectively protect and
enforce them. The other alternative is judicial anarchy.
Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the
general rule, and abandonment thereof should only be
done in the most exceptional circumstances. The
presumptions relied upon by this Court in the instant
case are disputable presumptions, which are
satisfactory, unless contradicted or overcome by
evidence. This Court finds that the evidence
presented by respondents failed to overcome the
given presumptions.
Although Donata may have alleged before the CFI
that she was her husband’s sole heir, it was not
established that she did so knowingly, maliciously and
in bad faith, so as for this Court to conclude that she
indeed committed fraud. This Court again brings to
the fore the delay by which respondents filed the
present case, when the principal actors involved,
particularly, Donata and Maximino’s siblings, have
already passed away and their lips forever sealed as
to what truly transpired between them. On the other
hand, Special Proceedings No. 928-R took place
when all these principal actors were still alive and
each would have been capable to act to protect his or
her own right to Maximino’s estate. Letters of
Administration of Maximino’s estate were issued in
favor of Donata as early as 8 July 1952, and the CFI
Order in question was issued only on 15 January
1960. The intestate proceedings for the settlement of
Maximino’s estate were thus pending for almost eight
years, and it is the burden of the respondents to
establish that their parents or grandparents,
Maximino’s surviving siblings, had absolutely no
knowledge of the said proceedings all these years. As
established in Ramos v. Ramos, 21 the degree of
proof to establish fraud in a case where the principal
actors to the transaction have already passed away is
proof beyond reasonable doubt, to wit – "x x x But
length of time necessarily obscures all human
evidence; and as it thus removes from the parties all
the immediate means to verify the nature of the
original transactions, it operates by way of
presumption, in favor of innocence, and against
imputation of fraud. It would be unreasonable, after a
great length of time, to require exact proof of all the
minute circumstances of any transaction, or to expect
a satisfactory explanation of every difficulty, real or
apparent, with which it may be encumbered. The most
that can fairly be expected, in such cases, if the
parties are living, from the frailty of memory, and
human infirmity, is, that the material facts can be
given with certainty to a common intent; and, if the
parties are dead, and the cases rest in confidence,
and in parol agreements, the most that we can hope
is to arrive at probable conjectures, and to substitute
general presumptions of law, for exact knowledge.
Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be
imputed to the living; for, the legal presumption is the
other way; as to the dead, who are not here to answer
for themselves, it would be the height of injustice and
cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and violate the sanctity
of the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be clear,
beyond a reasonable doubt (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6
Wheat. [U.S.], 481, 498).
Moreover, even if Donata’s allegation that she was
Maximino’s sole heir does constitute fraud, it is
insufficient to justify abandonment of the CFI Order,
dated 15 January 1960, considering the nature of
intestate proceedings as being in rem and the
disputable presumptions of the regular performance of
official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the
CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15
January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
RODOLFO C. SABIDONG vs. NICOLASITO S.
SOLAS (Clerk of Court IV)
 The present administrative case stemmed from a
sworn letter-complaint dated May 29, 1999 filed
before this Court by Rodolfo C. Sabidong
(complainant) charging respondent Nicolasito S.
Solas, Clerk of Court IV, MTCC, Iloilo City with grave
and serious misconduct, dishonesty, oppression and
abuse of authority.
FACTS: Trinidad Sabidong, complainant’s mother, is
one of the longtime occupants of a parcel of land,
designated as Lot 11 originally registered in the name
of C. N. Hodges and situated at Barangay San
Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City. The Sabidongs are in
possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of the said
Estate (Hodges Estate), as the other half-portion was
occupied by Priscila Saplagio. Lot 11 was the subject
of an ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate,
docketed as Civil Case No. 14706 of the MTCC Iloilo
City, Branch 4. On May 31, 1983, a decision was
rendered in said case ordering the defendant to
immediately vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased to her
and to pay the plaintiff rentals due, attorney’s fees,
expenses and costs. At the time, respondent was the
Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.
Sometime in October 1984, respondent submitted an
Offer to Purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12. The
Administratrix of the Hodges Estate rejected
respondent’s offer in view of an application to
purchase already filed by the actual occupant of Lot
12, "in line with the policy of the Probate Court to give
priority to the actual occupants in awarding approval
of Offers". While the check for initial down payment
tendered by respondent was returned to him, he was
nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to
purchase Lot 11 and that if he could put up a sufficient
down payment, the Estate could immediately endorse
it for approval of the Probate Court so that the
property can be awarded to him "should the occupant
fail to avail of the priority given to them."
The following day, respondent again submitted an
Offer to Purchase Lot 11 with an area of 234 square
meters for the amount of P35,100. Under the Order
issued by the probate court (RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27)
in Special Proceedings No. 1672, respondent’s Offer
to Purchase Lot 11 was approved upon the court’s
observation that the occupants of the subject lots
"have not manifested their desire to purchase the lots
they are occupying up to this date and considering
time restraint and considering further, that the sales in
favor of the x x x offerors are most beneficial to the
estate x x x". The probate court issued another Order
granting respondent’s motion for issuance of a writ of
possession in his favor. The writ of possession over
Lot 11 was eventually issued. Consequently, TCT No.
T11836 in the name of C. N. Hodges was cancelled
and a new certificate of title, TCT No. T-107519 in the
name of respondent was issued.
On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn
letter-complaint asserting that as court employee
respondent cannot buy property in litigation
(consequently he is not a buyer in good faith), commit
deception, dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse of
authority.
Court Administrator Benipayo issued an Evaluation
and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of
violating Article 1491 of the Civil Code. Said rule
prohibits the purchase by certain court officers of
property and rights in litigation within their jurisdiction.
On September 10, 2007, respondent compulsorily
retired from service. Eventually, the case was
assigned to Judge Roger B. Patricio, the new EJ of
the Iloilo City RTC for investigation, report and
recommendation. Judge Patricio submitted his final
Report and Recommendation finding respondent
liable for grave misconduct and dishonesty under or
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.
The Court noted Judge Patricio’s Investigation Report
and referred the same to the OCA for evaluation,
report and recommendation. Then Court Administrator
Jose P. Perez found respondent liable for serious and
grave misconduct and dishonesty and recommended
the forfeiture of respondent’s salary for six months,
which shall be deducted from his retirement benefits.
ISSUE: Whether Clerk of Court Solas violated the rule
on disqualification to purchase property in litigation
HELD: NO. Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil
Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of court
from acquiring property involved in litigation within the
jurisdiction or territory of their courts. Said provision
reads:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another:
x x x x (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys,
clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other
officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights in
litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act
of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be
the object of any litigation in which they may take part
by virtue of their profession. x x x x
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that
public policy disallows the transactions in view of the
fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust
and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by
these persons. "In so providing, the Code tends to
prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to give
occasion for fraud, which is what can and must be
done."
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of
the property must take place during the pendency of
the litigation involving the property. Where the
property is acquired after the termination of the case,
no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil
Code attaches.
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot
11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil
Case No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31,
1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it
cannot be said that the property is no longer "in
litigation" at that time considering that it was part of
the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672).

A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is

some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from
the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial
action of the judge. A property forming part of the
estate under judicial settlement continues to be
subject of litigation until the probate court issues an
order declaring the estate proceedings closed and
terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for
the distribution of the estate has not been complied
with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed
closed and terminated. The probate court loses
jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after
the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same.
Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No.
1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already
been closed and terminated at the time of the
execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated
November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in
litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of
the Civil Code.

This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11

in favor of respondent did not violate the rule on
disqualification to purchase property because Sp.
Proc. No. 1672 was then pending before another
court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of
Court.