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114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Soloria, et al. vs. De la Cruz, et al.

No. L-20738. January 31, 1966.

JULIANA SOLORIA and ANACLETO PASAMONTE,


petitioners, vs. CEFRONIO DE LA CRUZ and HON.
TOMAS P. PANGANIBAN. Presiding Judge, Court of
Agrarian Relations, First Regional District, respondents.

Pleading and practice; Court of Agrarian Relations; New trial;


Failure to attend trial for lack of advance notice justifies new trial
—The failure of counsel for petitioners to attend the trial for lack
of advance notice on him constitutes an “accident” within the
meaning of Section 1, Rule 37 of the (old or revised) Rules of
Court which, in turn, is a proper and valid ground, to

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Soloria, et al. vs. De la Cruz, et al.

grant a new trial (Muerteguy vs. Delgado, 22 Phil. 109; Lavitoria


vs. Judge of Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 32 Phil. 204;
Villegas vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 349). Rule 37 is applicable to cases
filed in the Court of Agrarian Relations (Rule 20 of the Rules of
Court of Agrarian Relations).
Same; When affidavits of merits are not necessary.—Affidavits
of merits are not necessary if the granting of the motion for new
trial is not discretionary with the court, but is demandable as of
right, as where the movant has been deprived of his day in court
through no fault or negligence on his part because no notice of
hearing was furnished him in advance so as to enable him to
prepare for trial (Moran, Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., Vol. 1, p. 515;
citing Valerio vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-6446, September 19, 1955; 97
Phil. 558, 561).
Same; Where right to cross-examine and present evidence was
not waived.—The delay of appellants to apprise the court in due
time of their intention to cross-examine the witnesses of the
opposing party and produce evidence of their own, when they had
ample time to do so, can only be relevant as evidence of a waiver
of the right to be heard. But there is no evidence of any such
intention on their part, and a renunciation of such a fundamental
right (to their day in court) is not to be lightly inferred. After all,
the Rules allow a party to move for a new trial on the ground of
unavoidable accident within the period for perfecting an appeal
(Rule 37, sec. 1), as the appellants have done,; or even to ask relief
within 60 days after learning of a judgment or order against them
(Rule 38, sec. 3). That by greater diligence counsel for appellants
could have avoided the court’s rendering, and then setting aside, a
decision, is no ground for refusing his clients a relief to which they
are entitled. Especially so when the trial court had before it a
record clearly showing that appellants herein were not heaid
through no fault of their own.

PETITION for review by certiorari of a resolution of the


Court of Agrarian Relations in Pangasinan.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.


     Guillermo & Navarro for the petitioners.
     N.S. Nostratis for the respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review 1


a resolution
denying a motion for reconsideration of the decision
rendered in the case entitled “Cefronio de la Cruz,
petitioner, versus Juliana Soloria, et al., respondents,” CAR
Case

________________

1 Should be considered as moti on for new trial.

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116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Soloria, et al. vs. De la Cruz, et al.

No. 330-TP-61, of the Court of Agrarian Relations, First


Regional District, Sala II, with seat at Tayug, Pangasinan.
The facts gathered from the record of this case before Us
are: that sometime in 1961, Cefronio dela Cruz commenced
a proceeding against Juliana Soloria before the above
stated court, alleging inter alia, that since 1959 he has
been a share-tenant of said respondent Soloria over her
one-hectare parcel of first class riceland situated at Barrio
San Antonio, San Manuel, Pangasinan; that on May 20,
1961, said respondent, without any justifiable and legal
cause or prior approval of the court, summarily ejected him
from the landholding in question; that he had shared on a
fifty-fifty (50-50) basis the net harvest of 30 and 45 cavans
of palay produced in said land in the agricultural years
1959-1960 and 1960-1961, respectively, after having
furnished all farm labor, implements, working animals and
other expenses incurred in planting and harvesting said
palay, except the land which was the sole contribution of
said respondent. Wherefore, petitioner de la Cruz prays
that he be reinstated in the disputed landholding; that the
net harvest of palay be reliquidated on the sharing basis
provided for by law; that he be awarded damages for his
unrealized shares from the time he was unlawfully ejected
until he is fully reinstated in his hold-ing, and attorney’s
fees in the amount of P200.00. This petition was later
amended on December 21, 1961 to include as co-respondent
Anacleto Pasamonte, who had, in the meantime, been
allegedly placed by Soloria as her new tenant in the
disputed landholding (Cf. Annex “I” respondent Court’s
answer, record, pp. 46-49).
Respondent Juliana Soloria, through her counsel, Attys.
Guillermo and Navarro, filed her answer to the petition,
denying the material allegations thereof and setting up the
following special defenses: that no tenancy relationship
exists between her and respondent de la Cruz; that de la
Cruz has no legal capacity to sue, he being a minor, that
she is not the exclusive owner of the land in question, but
she owns it in common with Emeteria and Ignacio, both
surnamed Soloria; and that said land is being cultivated by
one Valeriano de Leon, who lives with its
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Soloria, et al. vs. De la Cruz, et al.

owners, after Pedro de la Cruz, now deceased, voluntarily


surrendered it shortly before his death in the early part of
1961, In their answer to the amended petition, both
respondents denied that said Pasamonte is a new tenant,
he being a mere hired farmhand of said Valeriano de Leon
to prepare the land for planting for the agricultural year
1961-1962 (Cf. Annex “11”, respondent Court’s answer,
record, pp. 50-52).
Issues having been joined, the court a quo set the
hearing of the case for June 8, 1962, notice of which was
each furnished by registered mail to the respective counsels
of record of the parties. On this scheduled hearing, neither
respondents nor their counsel appeared; hence, the court a
quo, upon motion, allowed petitioner De la Cruz to present
his evidence ex parte and thereafter considered the case
submitted for decision. A copy of this order was sent to
respondents’ counsel, which he received on August 8, 1962
(Cf. Annex “C” petition, record, pp. 15-19, resolution dated
December 4, 1962, p. 3).
On August 30, 1962, the court a quo rendered a decision
granting the reliefs prayed for in the petition of said
Cefronio de la Cruz (Cf. Annex “A”, petition, record, pp. 5-
10).
Three (3) days after receipt of the above decision,
counsel for respondents presented a motion to reconsider
and set aside said decision and to allow them to cross-
exam-ine petitioners’ witnesses and to present their own
evidence in support of their claims and defenses, claiming
that they were deprived of their day in court, because their
failure to attend the scheduled hearing on June 8, 1962
was due to an accident since notice thereof was received
only on June 14, 1962, which was six (6) days after said
trial. This claim was supported by an affidavit, attached to
the motion, of Atty. Dario R. Navarro, counsel of
respondents, attesting to this fact. Said motion also
reiterated and discussed the merits and validity of the
special defenses set up in their answer which, if considered,
will materially alter or change the result of said decision
(Cf. Annex “B”, petition, record, pp. 11-14).
As above stated in the beginning of this opinion, the
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118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Soloria, et al. vs. De la Cruz, et al.

court a quo denied respondents’ motion for reconsideration


and/or new trial; hence, the present petition before this
Court.
In the order of denial, the court a quo ruled that
although its records show that counsel for respondents did
not receive the notice of hearing for June 8, 1962 before
said date but only later, i.e., on June 14, 1962, which was
six (6) days after the scheduled trial, they were still
negligent in not filing, before judgment was rendered on
August 30, 1962, any pleading to indicate their intention to
cross-examine petitioners’ witnesses and to present their
own evidence despite the receipt, on August 8, 1962, of the
order dated June 8, 1962 considering the case as submitted
for decision; hence, respondents were not deprived of then-
day in court. It also refuted the arguments presented to
support the merits of the special defenses set up in
respondents’ answer which it ruled as not meritorious. It
further maintained that said denial was proper since
respondent failed to attach in their motion, an affidavit of
merits to support the validity of said defenses alleged in
the answer.
We disagree with the above conclusion of the court a
quo. It is not disputed that counsel for respondents
(petitioners herein) did not receive notice of hearing on or
before June 8, 1962, which was the scheduled date of trial;
hence, they failed to attend said hearing. This
circumstance, i.e. failure to attend trial for lack of advance
notice, has been held in previous cases to constitute an
“accident” within the meaning’ of Section 1, Rule 37, of the
(old or revised) Rules of Court which, in turn, is a proper
and valid ground lo grant a new trial (Muerteguy vs.
Delgado, 22 Phil. 109; Lavitoria vs. Judge of Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, 32 Phil. 204; Villegas vs. Roldan 76
Phil. 349). This rule (Rule 37) is applicable to cases filed in
the Court of Agrarian Relations (Rule 20 of the Rules of
Court of Agrarian Relations).
This Court has also held that:

“Where the movant has been deprived of his day in court through
no fault or negligence on his part and because no notice of hearing
was furnished him in advance so as to enable him to prepare for
trial, the judgment or order is absolutely null

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Soloria, et al. vs. De la Cruz, et al.

and void for denying him his day in court, a constitutional right.
In such case, the judgment or order suffers from an inherent
procedural defect and is absolutely void. Under such
circumstances, no showing of merits is necessary to support an
application to have the order vacated (1 Freeman on Judgments,
p. 599).” (Valerio vs. Tan, 97 Phil. 558, 561.)
“Affidavits of merits are not necessary when the granting of the
motion for new trial iis not discretionary with the court but is
demandable as of right, as where the movant has been deprived of
his day in court, through no fault or negligence of his own (Valerio
vs. Tan, et al., G.R. No. L-6446, Sept. 19, 1955).” (Navarro vs.
Bello, L-11647, January 31, 1958; 54 O.G. 6588)
“However, affidavits of merits are not necessary if the granting
of the motion for new trial is not discretionary with the court, but
is demandable as of right, x x x as where the movant has been
deprived of his day in court through no fault or negligence on his
part because no notice of hearing was furnished him in advance so
as to enable him to prepare for trial (Moran, Rules of Court, 1957
Ed., Vol. 1, p. 515; citing Valerio vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-6446,
September 19, 1955).” (Gattoc vs Sarenas, L-11752, July 30,
1958.)

Conformably with the above cited rulings, the court a quo


should have granted a new trial.
The appealed order stresses that petitioners-appellants
were negligent in failing to apprise the court in due time of
their intention to cross-examine the witnesses of the
opposing party and produce evidence of their own. When
they had from August 8, 1963 to August 30, 1963 to do so.
This delay can only be relevant as evidence to a waiver of
the right to be heard. But there is no evidence of any such
intention on the part of the appellants, and a renunciation
of such a fundamental right (to their day in court) is not to
be lightly inferred. After all, the Rules allow a party to
move for a new trial on the ground of unavoidable accident
within the period for perfecting an appeal (Rule 37, Sec. 1),
as the appellants have done; or even to ask relief within 60
days after learning of a judgment or order against them
(Rule 28, sec. 3). That by greater diligence counsel could
have avoided the court’s rendering, and then setting aside,
a decision, is no ground for refusing his clients a relief to
which they are entitled. Especially so when the trial court
had before it a record
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120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Garcia vs. Armed Forces of the Philippines, et al.

clearly showing that appellants herein were not heard


through no fault of their own.
Wherefore, the present petition for certiorari is hereby
granted, the disputed resolution (dated December 4, 1962)
reversed and set aside, and a new trial granted. The case is
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
consonant with this opinion. Without pronouncement as to
costs.

     Chief Justice Bengzon and Justices Bautista Angelo,


Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, J.P. Bengzon and Zaldivar,
concur. Mr. Justice Makalintal is on leave.

Resolution set aside; new trial granted.

_______________

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