Constitutionality of the act must be examined on the touchstone of fundamental rights nad on the

basis of test laid down in the case of State of Madras v. V.G. Row1. In this case court has reiterated
that in considering the reasonableness of the law imposing restrictions on fundamental rights rights,
both substantive and the procedural aspects of the impunged restrictive law should be examined
from the point of view of reasonableness. And the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed,
should be applied to individual Statute impunged, and no abstract standard or general pattern of
reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have
been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the
evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at
the same time, should all enter into the judicial verdict.

The right to live includes the right to fight for protection of limb against mutilation and physical
injuries, and doesn’t mean merely the fight to breathe but also includes the fight to livelihood.2 The
enforcement of the right to life calls for adequate nad appropriate releifs enforceable in in courts of
law.

Arbitratiness is anti thetical to the right of equality.3 The arts. 19 & 21 constitute watertight
compartments has been rightly overruled. Articles dealing with different fundamental rights
contained Part III of the Constitution do not represent entirely separate strems of rights which do
not mingle at any point of time. They are all parts of an integrated scheme in the Constitution and
must be preserved and cannot be destroyed arbitrarily.4 The procedure envisaged by the LWDA
deprives the just and legitimate rights of the victims to assert and obtain their just dues. The rights
cant be so destroyed. It is contended that under the laws the victims had the right to ventilate their
rights. If an Act, it is submitted, permits such a settlement or deprivation of the rights of the victims,
then the same is bad.

The LWDA was violative of principles of natural justice and the fundamental rights of citizens in the
states. In the premises, the said act is bad and these should be set aside.

There is a concept of “Parens Patriae” 5 noted in English Law. In India, the same was recognised by
court in Ram Swaroop v. S.P. Sahi.6 Parens patriae is the inherent power and authority of a
Legislature to provide protection to the person and property of persons non suijuris, the words
“parens patriae” means thereby, ‘the father of the country’. Our constitution makes it imperative for
the state to secure to all its Citizens the rights guaranteed by the constitution and where the citizens
are not in position to assert and secure their rights, the State must come into picture and protect
and fight for the citizens.

It is comprehended in the maxim salus populi suprema lex – regard for public welfare is the highest
law. It is not rule, it is an evolution. This is as broad as public welfare and as strong as the arm of

1
[1952] SCR 597
2
Charan Lal Sahu
3
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., [1974] 2SCR348.
4
R.D. Shetty v. The I.A.A. of India & Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 1014.
5
Dr. D.K. Mukherjea in his “Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts.”, Tagore Law Lectures, Fifth Edition,
at page 404.
6
[1959] 2 Supp. SCR 583.
state, this can only be measured by the legislative will of people, subject to the fundamental rights
and constitutional limitations

The Preamble to the Constitution, read with the Directive Principles, Art. 38,39 and 39A enjoins the
State to take up these responsibilities. It is the protective measure to which social welfare state is
committed. It is urged that the right to a just, fair and reasonable procedure was itself a guaranteed
fundamental right u/a 14 of the Constitution. This included right to natural justice.7 The right to
natural justice is included in art. 14.8 It is submitted that natural justice is a highly effective tool
devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision. It is calculated
as a healthy check on the abuse of power. Natural justice is not dispensable nor it is empty formality.
Denial of that right leads to the miscarriage of justice. It is submitted that U.O.I. had a duty to
consult public, the respective governments and other stake holders which it had failed and
neglected to do. It is void as offending natural justice hence violative of Arts. 14 and 21.

Denial of right to approach the Apex Court is a complete denial of access to justice for the victims.
Denial of rights to victims is so great and deprievation of right to natural justice and access to justice
is so tremendous that judged by well-settled principles by which yardsticks provisions like these
should be judged in the constitutional framework of this country, the act is violative of Fundamental
rights of people.

It is submitted that the said function is a function to decide and vesting of power in the CMWRI
amounts to making it a judge in its own case. Over the decade, Cauvery has become a regional
political identity.9 It is urged that having regard to present fact, the Central Government would have
vested interest in the matter. This would, according to the petitioners, result in deliberate under
estimation of rights of citizens.

Denial of access to justice to the stakeholders through an impartial judiciary is so great deal of denial
that it can it can only be consistent with the situation which calls for such a drastic provision.10 The
present circumstances were not such. It is submitted that in this Act, there is denial of natural justice
both in institutional form and in the conduct of the suit. It must be seen that justice is done to all.11 It
is necessary to give a reasonable notice to the parties.12

It is well settled law that right of access to courts in respect of violation of their fundamental rights
itself is a fundamental right which cannot be denied to the people.

There must be some justification for the Act being passed. The Act merely empowers CMWRI to
adjudicate the water disputes but did not lay down the procedure to be followed. The LWDA is
violative of procedure established by law.

7
Olga Tellis ; S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, [1981] 1SCR 746 at 753, 766.
8
Tulsi Ram v. Union of India, [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131.
9
10
Basheshwar v. Income Tax Commissioner, AIR 1959 SC 149; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Anr., [1988] 2SCC
602; In Re Special Courts Bill,[1979] 2 SCR 476; Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Tendulkar, [1955] SCR 279; Ambika
Prasad Mishra etc. v. State of U.P. & Ors. etc., [1960] 3 SCR 1159; Bodhan Chowdhary v. State of Bihar, [1955] 1
SCR 1045.
11
R. Viswanathan v. Rukh-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid, [1963] 3 SCR 22.
12
M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerela, [1963] Supp. 2 SCR 724.