A.M. No. 1334 November 28,
1989
ROSARIO DELOS REYES, vs .ATTY.
JOSE B. AZNAR
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment
filed against respondent on the
ground of gross immorality.
Complainant, a second year medical
student of the Southwestern
University (Cebu), alleged in her
verified complaint that respondent
Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of
said university, had carnal
knowledge of her for several times
under threat that she would fail in
her Pathology subject if she would
not submit to respondent's lustful
desires. Complainant further alleged
that when she became pregnant,
respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil
Ramas, had her undergo forced
abortion.
In compliance with the Resolution of
the Court dated July 9, 1974,
respondent filed his Answer
denying any personal knowledge of
complainant as well as all the
allegations contained in the
complaint and by way of special
defense, averred that complainant is
a woman of loose morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court
Resolved to refer the case to the
Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The findings of the Solicitor General
is summarized as follows:
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Complainant Rosario delos Reyes
testified that:
1) she was a second year medical
student of the Southwestern
University, the Chairman of the
Board of which was respondent Jose
B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6,
1975);
2) she however failed in her
Pathology subject which prompted
her to approach respondent in the
latter's house who assured her that
she would pass the said subject (pp.
15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
3) despite this assurance, however,
she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
4) sometime in February, 1973,
respondent told her that she should
go with him to Manila, otherwise,
she would flunk in all her subjects
(pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975);
5) on February 12, 1973, both
respondent and complainant
boarded the same plane (Exh. "A")
for Manila; from the Manila
Domestic Airport, they proceeded to
Room 905, 9th Floor of the
Ambassador Hotel where they
stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K-
1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1 975);
6) after arriving at the Ambassador
Hotel, they dined at a Spanish
restaurant at San Marcelino, Malate,
Manila for around three hours (pp
56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);
7) they returned to the hotel at
around twelve o'clock midnight,
where respondent had carnal
knowledge of her twice and then
thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn,
June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157,
tsn, July 18, 1975);
8) complainant consented to the
sexual desires of respondent
because for her, she would sacrifice
her personal honor rather than fail
in her subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6,
1975); ... ... ...;
9) sometime in March, 1973,
complainant told respondent that
she was suspecting pregnancy
because she missed her
menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July 17,
1975); ... ... ...;
10) later, she was informed by Dr.
Monsanto (an instructor in the
college of medicine) that
respondent wanted that an abortion
be performed upon her (p.82, tsn,
July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;
11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a
confidant of respondent, and Dr.
Monsato fetched her at her boarding
house on the pretext that she would
be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp.
87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975);
12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr.
Ramas she was given an injection
and an inhalation mask was placed
on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90,
tsn, July 17, 1 975);
13) as a result, she lost
consciousness and when she woke
up, an abortion had already been
performed upon her and she was
weak, bleeding and felt pain all over
her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17,
1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that
she met complainant and a man
whom complainant introduced as
Atty. Aznar in front of the
Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184,
tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio
Ingco, witnesses for the
complainant, testified that
abdominal examinations and x-ray
examination of the lumbro-sacral
region of complainant showed no
signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).
The evidence for the respondent as
reported by the Solicitor General is
summarized as follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:
1. In December, 1972, respondent
Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador
Hotel with his wife and children;
respondent never came to Manila
except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,.
tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);
2. He usually slept with respondent
everytime the latter comes to Manila
(p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp.
42-43).
Oscar Salangsang, another witness
for the respondent stated that:
1. In February, 1973, he went to
Ambassador Hotel to meet
respondent; the latter had male
companions at the hotel but he did
not see any woman companion of
respondent Aznar;
2. He usually slept with respondent
at the Ambassador Hotel and ate
with him outside the hotel together
with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan.
13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).
The Court notes that throughout the
period of the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General,
respondent Aznar was never
presented to refute the allegations
made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar
alleges that he does not have any
knowledge of the allegations in the
complaint. As special defense,
respondent further alleged that the
charge levelled against him is in
furtherance of complainant's vow to
wreck vengeance against
respondent by reason of the latter's
approval of the recommendation of
the Board of Trustees barring
complainant from enrollment for
the school year 1973-1974 because
she failed in most of her subjects. It
is likewise contended that the
defense did not bother to present
respondent in the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General
because nothing has been shown in
the hearing to prove that
respondent had carnal knowledge of
the complainant.
Contrary to respondent's averments,
the Solicitor General made a
categorical finding to the effect that
respondent had carnal knowledge of
complainant, to wit:
From the foregoing, it is clear that
complainant was compelled to go to
Manila with respondent upon the
threat of respondent that if she
failed to do so, she would flunk in all
her subjects and she would never
become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50,
tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent
was Chairman of the College of
Medicine, complainant had every
reason to believe him.
It has been established also that
complainant was brought by
respondent to Ambassador Hotel in
Manila for three days where he
repeatedly had carnal knowledge of
her upon the threat that if she
would not give in to his lustful
desires, she would fail in her
Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-
1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn,
June 6, 1975);
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent did
not bother to appear during the
hearing. It is true that he presented
Edilberto Caban and Oscar
Salangsang who testified that
respondent usually slept with them
every time the latter came to Manila,
but their testimony (sic) is not much
of help. None of them mentioned
during the hearing that they stayed
and slept with respondent on
February 12 to February 14, 1973 at
Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides,
Edilberto Caban testified that
respondent stayed at Ambassador
Hotel with his wife and children in
December, 1972. The dates in
question, however, are February 12
to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's)
testimony, therefore, is immaterial
to the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-
44).
In effect, the Solicitor General found
that the charge of immorality
against respondent Aznar has been
substantiated by sufficient evidence
both testimonial and documentary;
while finding insufficient and
uncorroborated the accusation of
intentional abortion. The Solicitor
General then recommends the
suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for a period of not
less than three (3) years.
On March 16, 1989, the Court
Resolved to require the parties to
Move in the premises to determine
whether any intervening event
occurred which would render the
case moot and academic (Rollo, p.
69).
On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor
General filed a manifestation and
motion praying that the case at bar
be considered submitted for
decision on the bases of the report
and recommendation previously
submitted together with the record
of the case and the evidence
adduced (Rollo, p. 75).
After a thorough review of the
records, the Court agrees with the
finding of the Solicitor General that
respondent Aznar, under the facts as
stated in the Report of the
investigation conducted in the case,
is guilty of "grossly immoral
conduct" and may therefore be
removed or suspended by the
Supreme Court for conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar
(Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Respondent failed to adduce
evidence sufficient to engender
doubt as to his culpability of the
offense imputed upon him. With the
exception of the self-serving
testimonies of two witnesses
presented on respondent's behalf,
the records are bereft of evidence to
exonerate respondent of the act
complained of, much less contradict,
on material points, the testimonies
of complainant herself.
While respondent denied having
taken complainant to the
Ambassador Hotel and there had
sexual intercourse with the latter, he
did not present any evidence to
show where he was at that date.
While this is not a criminal
proceeding, respondent would have
done more than keep his silence if
he really felt unjustly traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever
his moral character is put in issue, to
satisfy this Court that he is a fit and
proper person to enjoy continued
membership in the Bar. He cannot
dispense with nor downgrade the
high and exacting moral standards
of the law profession (Go v. Candoy,
21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once
pronounced by the Court:
When his integrity is challenged by
evidence, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him; he
must meet the issue and overcome
the evidence for the relator (Legal
and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p.
93) and show proofs that he still
maintains the highest degree of
morality and integrity, which at all
times is expected of him. ... In the
case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil.
303, Justice Moreland, speaking for
the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes
a duty to himself if not to the State.
If he does not perform that duty, he
may not always expect the State to
perform it for him. If he fails to meet
the obligation which he owes to
himself, when to meet it is the
easiest of easy things, he is hardy
indeed if he demand and expect that
same full and wide consideration
which the State voluntarily gives to
those who by reasonable effort seek
to help themselves. This is
particularly so when he not only
declines to help himself but actively
conceals from the State the very
means by which it may assist him
(Quingwa SCRA 439 [1967]).
The Solicitor General recommends
that since the complainant is partly
to blame for having gone with
respondent to Manila knowing fully
well that respondent is a married
man ,with children, respondent
should merely be suspended from
the practice of law for not less than
three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).
On the other hand, respondent in his
manifestation and motion dated
April 18, 1989 alleges that since a
period of about ten (10) years had
already elapsed from the time the
Solicitor General made his
recommendation for a three (3)
years suspension and respondent is
not practicing his profession as a
lawyer, the court may now consider
the respondent as having been
suspended during the said period
and the case dismissed for being
moot and academic.
We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case
for disbarment not because
respondent reneged on a promise to
marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
More importantly. complainant's
knowledge of of respondent's
marital status is not at issue in the
case at bar. Complainant submitted
to respondent's solicitation for
sexual intercourse not because of a
desire for sexual gratification but
because of respondent's moral
ascendancy over her and fear that if
she would not accede, she would
flunk in her subjects. As chairman of
the college of medicine where
complainant was enrolled, the latter
had every reason to believe that
respondent could make good his
threats. Moreover, as counsel for
respondent would deem it
"worthwhile to inform the the Court
that the respondent is a scion of a
rich family and a very rich man in
his own right and in fact is not
practicing his profession before the
court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere
suspension for a limited period, per
se, would therefore serve no
redeeming purpose. The fact that he
is a rich man and does not practice
his profession as a lawyer, does not
render respondent a person of good
moral character. Evidence of good
moral character precedes admission
to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of
Court) and such requirement is not
dispensed with upon admission
thereto. Good moral character is a
continuing qualification necessary
to entitle one to continue in the
practice of law. The ancient and
learned profession of law exacts
from its members the highest
standard of morality (Quingwa v.
Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a)
member of the bar may be removed
or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to
practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang
(106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court
had occasion to define the concept
of immoral conduct, as follows:
A lawyer may be disbarred for
grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. A
member of the bar should have
moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision
and to fix an inflexible standard as
to what is grossly immoral conduct
or to specify the moral delinquency
and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a
member of the bar. The rule implies
that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined
as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members
of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf
possessing the intellect of a child
became pregnant by reason of
intimacy with a married lawyer who
was the father of six children,
disbarment of the attorney on the
ground of immoral conduct was
justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd
896).
In the present case, it was highly
immoral of respondent, a married
man with children, to have taken
advantage of his position as
chairman of the college of medicine
in asking complainant, a student in
said college, to go with him to
Manila where he had carnal
knowledge of her under the threat
that she would flunk in all her
subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B.
Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his
name is ordered stricken off from
the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO v.
ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO,
A.C. No. 6396; October 25, 2005
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
This administrative case concerns a
lawyer who hurled invectives at a
Clerk of Court. Members of the bar
decorum must at all times comfort
themselves in a manner befitting
their noble profession.
Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-
Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May
2003, she filed with the Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) a Complaint-Affidavit[1] with
supporting documents[2] against
respondent Atty. Virgil R. Castro for
Unprofessional Conduct, specifically
violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03,
Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[3] The
charge in the complaint is summed
up as follows:
Respondent Atty. Castro was a
private practitioner and Vice-
President of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya
Chapter. On 5 May 2003, respondent
went to complainants office to
inquire whether the complete
records of Civil Case No. 784,
entitled Sps. Crispino Castillano v.
Sps. Federico S. Castillano and
Felicidad Aberin, had already been
remanded to the court of origin,
MCTC Dupax del Norte, Alfonso
Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be
noted that respondent was not the
counsel of record of either party in
Civil Case No. 784.
Complainant informed respondent
that the record had not yet been
transmitted since a certified true
copy of the decision of the Court of
Appeals should first be presented to
serve as basis for the transmittal of
the records to the court of origin. To
this respondent retorted scornfully,
Who will certify the Court of
Appeals Decision, the Court of
Appeals? You mean to say, I would
still have to go to Manila to get a
certified true copy? Surprised at this
outburst, complainant replied, Sir,
its in the Rules but you could show
us the copy sent to the party you
claim to be representing.
Respondent then replied, Then you
should have notified me of the said
requirement. That was two weeks
ago and I have been frequenting
your office since then, but you never
bothered to notify me. Complainant
replied, It is not our duty, Sir, to
notify you of the said requirement.
Respondent then answered, You
mean to say it is not your duty to
remand the record of the case?
Complainant responded, No, Sir, I
mean, its not our duty to notify you
that you have to submit a copy of the
Court of Appeals decision.
Respondent angrily declared in
Ilocano, Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan
pakialam yon? Kasdiay? (You mean
to say you dont care anymore? Is
that the way it is?) He then turned
and left the office, banging the door
on his way out to show his anger.
The banging of the door was so loud
it was heard by the people at the
adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a
hearing was taking place.[4]
After a few minutes, respondent
returned to the office, still enraged,
and pointed his finger at
complainant and shouted, Ukinnan,
no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek
haan mo nga ibales kaniak ah!(Vulva
of your mother! If you are harboring
ill feelings against my client, dont
turn your ire on me!) Complainant
was shocked at respondents words
but still managed to reply, I dont
even know your client, Sir.
Respondent left the office and as he
passed by complainants window, he
again shouted,Ukinnam nga babai!
(Vulva of your mother, you woman!)
[5]
Complainant suffered acute
embarrassment at the incident, as it
happened in her office of which she
was, and still is, the head and in
front of her staff. She felt that her
credibility had been tarnished and
diminished, eliciting doubt on her
ability to command full respect from
her staff.[6]
The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three
days after the incident, was
supported by an Affidavit[7] signed
by employees of RTC-Bambang,
Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the
incident. The Affidavit narrated the
same incident as witnessed by the
said employees. A Motion to File
Additional Affidavit/Documentary
Evidence was filed by complainant
on 25 September 2003.[8]
On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP
issued an Order[9] requiring
respondent to submit his answer to
the complaint. Respondent
submitted his Compliance[10] dated
18 June 2003. Respondent explained
that he was counsel for the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 847, entitled Sps.
Federico Castillano, et al. v. Sps.
Crispin Castillano, et al., filed with
the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch
30.He learned of the finality of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 64962 with respect to
Civil Case No. 847 before the lower
court. Prior to the incident, he went
to the office of the complainant to
request for the transmittal of the
records of the case to the MCTC and
the complainant reassured him of
the same.
Respondent admits having inquired
about the status of the transmittal of
the records on 5 May 2003.
However, he has no explanation as
to what transpired on that day.
Instead, he narrates that on 25 May
2003, twelve days after the incident,
the records had not yet been
transmitted, and he subsequently
learned that these records were
returned to the court of origin.
The hearing for the administrative
complaint before the CBD was set on
25 September 2003 by the
Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan. However, on
said date, only complainant
appeared. The latter also moved that
the case be submitted for resolution.
[11] Respondent later on filed a
Manifestation stating that the
reason for his non-appearance was
because he was still recuperating
from physical injuries and that he
was not mentally fit to prepare the
required pleadings as his vehicle
was rained with bullets on 19
August 2003. He also expressed his
public apology to the complainant in
the same Manifestation.[12]
Complainant filed a Manifestation
expressing her desire not to appear
on the next hearing date in view of
respondents public apology, adding
that respondent personally and
humbly asked for forgiveness which
she accepted.[13]
The Investigating Commissioner
recommended that respondent be
reprimanded and warned that any
other complaint for breach of his
professional duties shall be dealt
with more severely.[14]The IBP
submitted to this Court a Notice of
Resolution adopting and approving
the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.[15]
At the onset, it should be noted that
respondent was not the counsel of
record of Civil Case No. 784. Had he
been counsel of record, it would
have been easy for him to present
the required certified true copy of
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
He need not have gone to Manila to
procure a certified true copy of the
decision since the Court of Appeals
furnishes the parties and their
counsel of record a duplicate
original or certified true copy of its
decision.
His explanation that he will enter
his appearance in the case when its
records were already transmitted to
the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being
the counsel of record and there
being no authorization from either
the parties to represent them,
respondent had no right to impose
his will on the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly
or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another
lawyer; however, it is the right of
any lawyer, without fear or favor, to
give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against
unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Through his acts of constantly
checking the transmittal of the
records of Civil Case No. 784,
respondent deliberately encroached
upon the legal functions of the
counsel of record of that case. It
does not matter whether he did so
in good faith.
Moreover, in the course of his
questionable activities relating to
Civil Case No. 784, respondent acted
rudely towards an officer of the
court. He raised his voice at the
clerk of court and uttered at her the
most vulgar of invectives. Not only
was it ill-mannered but also
unbecoming considering that he did
all these to a woman and in front of
her subordinates.
As held in Alcantara v. Atty.
Pefianco,[16] respondent ought to
have realized that this sort of public
behavior can only bring down the
legal profession in the public
estimation and erode public respect
for it.[17] These acts violate Rule
7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage
in conduct that adversely reflect on
his fitness to practice law, now shall
he, whether in public or private life
behave in scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
demands that lawyers conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward their fellow
lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to
uphold the dignity of the legal
profession. They must act honorably,
fairly and candidly towards each
other and otherwise conduct
themselves without reproach at all
times.[18]
As correctly evaluated by the
Investigating Commissioner,
respondent did not categorically
deny the charges in the complaint.
Instead, he gave a lengthy narration
of the prefatory facts of the case as
well as of the incident on 5 May
2003.
Complainant also alleged in her
Complaint-Affidavit that
respondents uncharacteristic
behavior was not an isolated
incident. He has supposedly done
the same to Attys. Abraham Johnny
G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino,
the latter having filed a case against
respondent pending before this
Court.[19] We, however, cannot
acknowledge such allegation absent
any evidence showing the veracity
of such claim. No affidavits to that
effect were submitted by either Atty.
Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.
Nonetheless, the penalty to be
imposed should be tempered owing
to the fact that respondent had
apologized to the complainant and
the latter had accepted it. This is not
to say, however, that respondent
should be absolved from his
actuations. People are accountable
for the consequences of the things
they say and do even if they repent
afterwards. The fact remains that
things done cannot be undone and
words uttered cannot be taken back.
Hence, he should bear the
consequences of his actions.
The highest reward that can be
bestowed on lawyers is the esteem
of their brethren. This esteem
cannot be purchased, perfunctorily
created, or gained by artifice or
contrivance. It is born of sharp
contexts and thrives despite
conflicting interest. It emanates
solely from integrity, character,
brains and skills in the honorable
performance of professional duty.
[20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
respondent is hereby FINED in the
amount of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning
that any similar infraction with be
dealt with more severely. Let a copy
of this Decision be furnished the Bar
Confidant for appropriate
annotation in the record of the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000]
MANUEL N. CAMACHO vs. ATTYS.
LUIS MEINRADO C.
PANGULAYAN, REGINA D.
BALMORES, CATHERINE V.
LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P.
BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND
ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES,
D E C I S IO N
VITUG, J.:
Respondent lawyers stand indicted
for a violation of the Code of
Professional Ethics, specifically
Canon 9 thereof, viz:
"A lawyer should not in any way
communicate upon the subject of
controversy with a party
represented by counsel, much less
should he undertake to negotiate or
compromise the matter with him,
but should only deal with his
counsel. It is incumbent upon the
lawyer most particularly to avoid
everything that may tend to mislead
a party not represented by counsel
and he should not undertake to
advise him as to law."
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a
complaint against the lawyers
comprising the Pangulayan and
Associates Law Offices, namely,
Attorneys Luis Meinrado C.
Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores,
Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert
Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the
hired counsel of some expelled
students from the AMA Computer
College ("AMACC"), in an action for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction and for
Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-
97-30549 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City,
charged that respondents, then
counsel for the defendants,
procured and effected on separate
occasions, without his knowledge,
compromise agreements ("Re-
Admission Agreements") with four
of his clients in the aforementioned
civil case which, in effect, required
them to waive all kinds of claims
they might have had against AMACC,
the principal defendant, and to
terminate all civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings filed
against it. Complainant averred that
such an act of respondents was
unbecoming of any member of the
legal profession warranting either
disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law.
In his comment, Attorney
Pangulayan acknowledged that not
one of his co-respondents had taken
part in the negotiation, discussion,
formulation, or execution of the
various Re-Admission Agreements
complained of and were, in fact, no
longer connected at the time with
the Pangulayan and Associates Law
Offices. The Re-Admission
Agreements, he claimed, had
nothing to do with the dismissal of
Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were
executed for the sole purpose of
effecting the settlement of an
administrative case involving nine
students of AMACC who were
expelled therefrom upon the
recommendation of the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal. The students,
namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira
O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo,
Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B. De
Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A.
Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo
B. Villareiz,, were all members of the
Editorial Board of DATALINE, who
apparently had caused to be
published some objectionable
features or articles in the paper. The
3-member Student Disciplinary
Tribunal was immediately
convened, and after a series of
hearings, it found the students
guilty of the use of indecent
language and unauthorized use of
the student publication funds. The
body recommended the penalty of
expulsion against the erring
students.
The denial of the appeal made by
the students to Dr. Amable R.
Aguiluz V, AMACC President, gave
rise to the commencement of Civil
Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March
1997 before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City.
While the civil case was still
pending, letters of apology and Re-
Admission Agreements were
separately executed by and/or in
behalf of some of the expelled
students, to wit: Letter of Apology,
dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason
Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and
Re-Admission Agreement of 22 June
1997 with the AMACC President;
letter of apology, dated 31 March
1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon
for her daughter Melyda B. De Leon
and Re-Admission Agreement of 09
May 1997 with the AMACC
President; letter of apology, dated
22 May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted
by her mother, and Re-Admission
Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the
AMACC President; letter of apology,
dated 22 September 1997, of Cleo
Villareiz and Re-Admission
Agreement of 10 October 1997 with
the AMACC President; and letter of
apology, dated 20 January 1997, of
Michael Ejercito, assisted by his
parents, and Re-Admission
Agreement of 23 January 1997 with
the AMACC President.
Following the execution of the
letters of apology and Re-Admission
Agreements, a Manifestation, dated
06 June 1997, was filed with the
trial court where the civil case was
pending by Attorney Regina D.
Balmores of the Pangulayan and
Associates Law Offices for defendant
AMACC. A copy of the manifestation
was furnished complainant. In his
Resolution, dated 14 June 1997,
Judge Lopez of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court thereupon
dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-
30549.
On 19 June 1999, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines ("IBP") passed
Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and
APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as
Annex 'A,' and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, with an
amendment Atty. Meinrado
Pangulayan is suspended from the
practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS
for being remiss in his duty and
DISMISSAL of the case against the
other Respondents for they did not
take part in the negotiation of the
case."
It would appear that when the
individual letters of apology and Re-
Admission Agreements were
formalized, complainant was by
then already the retained counsel
for plaintiff students in the civil
case. Respondent Pangulayan had
full knowledge of this fact. Although
aware that the students were
represented by counsel, respondent
attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to
negotiate with them and their
parents without at the very least
communicating the matter to their
lawyer, herein complainant, who
was counsel of record in Civil Case
No. Q-97-30549. This failure of
respondent, whether by design or
because of oversight, is an
inexcusable violation of the canons
of professional ethics and in utter
disregard of a duty owing to a
colleague. Respondent fell short of
the demands required of him as a
lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
The allegation that the context of
the Re-Admission Agreements
centers only on the administrative
aspect of the controversy is belied
by the Manifestation[1] which,
among other things, explicitly
contained the following stipulation;
viz:
"1.......Among the nine (9)
signatories to the complaint, four
(4) of whom assisted by their
parents/guardian already executed
a Re-Admission Agreement with
AMACC President, AMABLE R.
AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for
violating the AMA COMPUTER
COLLEGE MANUAL FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed
among others to terminate all civil,
criminal and administrative
proceedings which they may have
against the AMACC arising from
their previous dismissal. Esm
"x x x......x x x......x x x
"3. Consequently, as soon as
possible, an Urgent Motion to
Withdraw from Civil Case No. Q-97-
30549 will by filed them."
The Court can only thus concur with
the IBP Investigating Commission
and the IBP Board of Governors in
their findings; nevertheless, the
recommended six-month
suspension would appear to be
somewhat too harsh a penalty given
the circumstances and the
explanation of respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis
Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered
SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of THREE (3)
MONTHS effective immediately
upon his receipt of this decision. The
case against the other respondents
is DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be
entered in the personal record of
respondent as an attorney and as a
member of the Bar, and furnished
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
---------xxx---------
ATTY. IRENEO L. TORRES and
MRS. NATIVIDAD CELESTINO v.
ATTY. JOSE CONCEPCION JAVIER,
Adm. Case No. 5910 September
21, 2005
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By complaint[1] dated November
26, 2002, Atty. Ireneo L. Torres and
Mrs. Natividad Celestino
(complainants) charge Atty. Jose
Concepcion Javier (respondent) for
malpractice, gross misconduct in
office as an attorney and/or
violation of the lawyers oath.
The charges stemmed from the
statements/remarks made by
respondent in the pleadings he filed
in a petition for audit of all funds of
the University of the East Faculty
Association (UEFA), as counsel for
the therein petitioners UEFA then
Treasurer Rosamarie Laman, and
his wife-former UEFA President
Eleonor Javier, before the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR), Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
against herein complainants,
docketed as NCR-OD-0105-004-LRD
(audit case),[2] and from the
pleadings filed by respondent in
another labor case as counsel for the
one hundred seventy six (176)
faculty members of the University of
the East complainants against
herein complainant Atty. Ireneo L.
Torres, et al.,[3] docketed as NCR-
0D-0201-0005-LRD (attorneys fees
case).[4]
The complaint sets forth three (3)
causes of action against respondent.
The first cause of action is based on
respondents Urgent Motion to
Expedite with Manifestation and
Reiteration of Position (Motion to
Expedite) filed in the audit case
which complainants allege
contained statements which are
absolutely false, unsubstantiated,
and with malicious imputation of
crimes of robbery, theft of UEFFAs
funds, destruction or concealment
of UEFAs documents and some
other acts tending to cause dishonor,
discredit or contempt upon their
persons.[5] Portions of the
questioned motion read:
Undersigned attorney would like to
manifest just so it can not be said
later on that he kept mum on the
matter that when individual
respondents-appellants realized
that an audit of Union funds was
looming, it appears that they
decided to destroy or conceal
documents as demonstrated by an
Incident Report Re Robbery dated
May 6, 2002 (a copy just recently
secured by the undersigned),
attached hereto as Annex A, where
the police investigator stated that no
forcible entry was noted by him but
that air condition on the respective
rooms were (sic) slightly move (sic)
to mislead that suspect as the same
as their point of entry.
The police officers stated that no
cash of (sic) money were stolen but
instead claimed that still
undetermined documents and/or
important papers were stolen by the
suspects.
This brings to mind the United
States case against Andersen
officials who shredded documents
related to the Enron scandal when
they thought nobody was looking.
As in the Andersen/Enron case, the
individual respondents-appellants
in the instant case knew that the law
was going to come knocking at their
door, asking a lot [of] questions
about financial matters.
From the undersigneds standpoint,
the alleged robbery of still
undetermined documents/papers
was an inside job as investigation
has shown that there is no evidence
of forced entry. Besides, it would be
a cinch to establish a motive by
individual respondents-appellants
Torres and Celestino to destroy
documents related to the audit
ordered by Regional Director Alex E.
Maraan. In any event, the
undersigned thinks that the legal
process should go on. Lumang
gimmick na yang robbery ng mga
evidensya. They may try to cover up
the looting of union funds, but there
is such a thing as secondary
evidence, not to mention the power
of this Honorable Office to issue
subpoenas even to the unions
depositary banks.[6](Underscoring
supplied)
Complainants aver that respondent
violated the attorneys oath that he
obey the laws and do no falsehood,
the Code of Professional
Responsibility particularly Rule
10.01 thereof, and Rule 138,
specifically paragraph 20 (f) of the
Rules of Court for directly pointing
to them as the persons who
intentionally committed the robbery
at the UEFA office, and for citing the
Andersen/Enron case which is
irrelevant, impertinent, and
immaterial to the subject of quasi-
judicial inquiry.[7]
As second cause of action,
complainants allege that in the
attorneys fees case, respondent, in
his Reply to Respondents (Torres
and Marquez) Answer/Comment
filed before the DOLE, used
language that was clearly abusive,
offensive, and improper,[8]
inconsistent with the character of an
attorney as a quasi-judicial officer.
[9]
As third/last cause of action,
complainants quote respondents
statement in the aforesaid Reply, to
wit:
It is not uncommon for us trial
lawyers to hear notaries public
asking their sons, wives, girlfriends,
nephews, etc. to operate a notarial
office and sign for them. These
girlfriends, nephews, etc. take
affidavits, administer oaths and
certify documents. x x x,[10]
and allege that the statement is
demeaning to the integrity of the
legal profession, uncalled for and
deserve[s] censure, [as] the same
might shrink the degree of
confidence and trust reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the legal profession and
the solemnity of a notarial
document.[11]
By his Comment, respondent
candidly professes that he was
angry[12] while he was preparing
his Motion to Expedite in the audit
case, it having come to his
knowledge that the UEFA office had
been burglarized and complainant
Atty. Torres had been spreading
reports and rumors implicating his
clients including his wife to the
burglary. [13]
Respondent stresses that he felt that
it was his duty to inform the BLR of
the loss of the vital documents so
that the resolution of the pending
motion for reconsideration filed by
complainants would be expedited;
[14] and that the information
regarding the burglary and his use
of the Andersen/Enron case as a
figure of speech were relevant in
drawing a link between the burglary
and the audit the burglary having
rendered the complete
implementation of the audit
unattainable.[15]
With respect to the attorneys fees
case, respondent claims that Atty.
Torres did not in his Answer
confront the issues thereof but
instead mock[ed] his wife and
fabricat[ed] and distort[ed]
realities[16] by including malicious,
libelous and impertinent statements
and accusations against his wife
which exasperated him.[17] A
portion of Atty. Torres Answer in the
attorneys fees case reads:
x x x in her incumbency as President
of the UEFA for 12 years (1987-
1999) she got only about P2.00/hr
CBA increase which took effect only
[in] 1994, with no other substantial
improvements of the teachers
benefits, and yet she spent for more
than half a million negotiation
expenses from the UEFAs funds. Her
1994-1999 CBA was only a carbon
copy of her old 1989-1994 CBA with
no substantial improvements, with
uncertain amount of her expenses,
because she removed/concealed all
the financial records of the UEFA
during her term. . . I and the other
lawyers/teachers denounced her
unlawful deduction of 10%
attorneys fees from the small
backwages received by the teachers
on April 28, 1993 although there
was actually no lawyer who worked
for itand there was no Board nor
General Membership Assembly
Resolutions passedthe assembly
[Nov. 24, 2001] was apparently
irked to Mrs. Eleanor Javier when
she was booed while talking on the
floor, like a confused gabble (sic)
[18]
Not wanting to allow his wife to be
maligned by Atty. Torres,
respondent admits having
responded with a counter-attack in
his Reply to Respondents (Torres
and Marquez)
Answer/Comment[19] wherein he
stated:
What kind of a lawyer is this Atty.
Torres? The undersigned feels that
Atty. Torres just cannot kick the
habit of injecting immaterial,
irrelevant, and impertinent matters
in his pleadings. More than that, he
lies through his teeth. The
undersigned thinks that if he has
any common sense at all he should
shut up about his accusation that
Prof. Javier spent more than half a
million pesos for negotiation
expensesshe obtained only P2-
increase in union members salary,
etc. because of the pendency of the
damage suit against him on this
score. He easily forgets the sad
chapter of his life as a practitioner
when he lost out to Prof. Javier in
the petition for audit (Case No. NCR-
OD-M-9401-004) which he filed to
gain pogi points prior to the UEFA
election in 1994.[20]
xxx
To repeat, if respondent Atty. Torres
has any common sense at all, he
should stop making irrelevant,
libelous and impertinent allegations
in his pleadings. This means
changing his standard tactic of
skirting the main issues by injecting
a web or a maze of sham,
immaterial, impertinent or
scandalous matters.[21]
(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent adds that he merely
wanted to bring to the BLRs
attention that Atty. Torres had the
habit of hurling baseless accusations
against his wife to embarrass her,
including one for unjust vexation
and another for collection and
damages both of which were
dismissed after trial on the merits,
thus prompting him to state that
these dismissed cases indubitably
indicate Atty. Torres pattern of
mental dishonesty.[22]
Respondent further claims that in
his Answer in the same attorneys
fees case, Atty. Torres accused his
client, Prof. Maguigad, of forging the
signature of a notary public and of
deliberately us[ing] a witted first-year law student would
falsified/expired Community Tax
Certificate in order to justify the
dismissal of the case against him
(Atty. Torres);[23] and that Atty.
Torres continued harassing his
clients including his wife by filing
baseless complaints for falsification
of public document.[24] Hence, in
defense of his clients, the following
statements in his Reply:
Respondent further concluded that
lead petitioner Prof. Maguigad
falsified the said petition by causing
it to appear that he participated in
the falsification when he did not in
truth and in fact participate thereat .
. . obviously oblivious of the obvious
that it is highly improbable for Prof.
Maguigad to have forged the
signature of the notary public. If he
intended to forge it, what was the
big idea of doing so? To save Fifty
Pesos (P50.00) for notarial fee?
Needless to say, the allegation that
lead (sic) petitioner Maguigad used
a falsified Com. Tax Cert. is patently
unfounded and malicious.
But that is not all. Respondents went
further and charged Profs. Mendoza,
Espiritu, Ramirez and Javier with
the same crime of falsification of
public document . . . by causing it to
appear that Rogelio Maguigad had
indeed participated in the act of
verifying/subscribing and swearing
the subject petition before notary
public Atty. Jorge M. Ventayen, when
in truth and in fact he did not
participate thereat.
To the mind of the undersigned, this
is the height of irresponsibility,
coming as it does from a member of
the Philippine Bar.There is no
evidence to charge them with
falsification of public document, i.e.
the verification appended to the
present petition. They did not even
sign it. The crime imputed is clearly
bereft of merit. Frankly, the
undersigned thinks that even a dim-
not oblige with such a very serious
charge.
It is not uncommon for us trial
lawyer[s] to hear notaries public
asking their sons, wives, girlfriends,
nephews, etc. to operate a notarial
office and sign for them. These
girlfriends, nephews, etc. take
affidavits, administer oaths, and
certify documents. Believing that
the said veification was signed by an
impostor-relative of the notary
public [Atty. Jorge M. Ventayan]
through no fault of his client, Prof.
Maguigad, the undersigned sought
the assistance of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On
May 2, 2002, an NBI agent called up
the undersigned to inform him that
he arrested in the area near UE one
Tancredo E. Ventayen whom he
caught in flagrante delicto
notarizing an affidavit of loss and
feigning to be Atty. Jorge M.
Ventayen, supposedly his uncle.[25]
xxx
Petitioners devoted so much space
in their answer/comment vainly
trying to prove that Profs. Maguigad,
Mendoza, Espiritu, Ramirez, and
Javier committed the crime of
falsification of public document
reasoning out that they made
untruthful statements in the
narration of facts in the basic
petition.
Respondent Torres is a member of
the Philippine Bar. But what law
books is he reading?
He should know or ought to know
that the allegations in petitioners
pleading are absolutely privileged
because the said allegations or
statements are relevant to the
issues.[26] (Underscoring supplied)
The Investigating Commissioner of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) found respondent guilty of
violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility for using
inappropriate and offensive remarks
in his pleadings.
The pertinent portions of the
Investigating Commissioners Report
and Recommendation read:
Respondent admits that he was
angry when he wrote the
Manifestationand alleges that
Complainant implicated his wife in a
burglary. Moreover, Respondent
alleges that Complainant has been
engaged in intimidating and
harassing his wife.
It appears that herein Complainant
and herein Respondents wife have
had a series of charges and counter-
charges filed against each other.
Both parties being protagonists in
the intramurals within the
University of the East Faculty
Association (UEFA). Herein
Complainant is the President of the
UEFA whereas Respondents wife
was the former President of UEFA.
Nevertheless, we shall treat this
matter of charges and counter-
charges filed, which involved the
UEFA, as extraneous, peripheral, if
not outright irrelevant to the issue
at hand.
xxx
Clearly, [r]espondents primordial
reason for the offensive remark
stated in his pleadings was his
emotional reaction in view of the
fact that herein Complainant was in
a legal dispute with his wife. This
excuse cannot be sustained. Indeed,
the remarks quoted above are
offensive and inappropriate. That
the Respondent is representing his
wife is not at all an excuse.[27]
(Underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that
respondent be reprimanded.
The Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), by Resolution[28] of October
7, 2004, adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
The Report of the IBP faulting
respondent is well-taken but not its
recommendation to reprimand him.
It is well entrenched in Philippine
jurisprudence that for reasons of
public policy, utterances made in the
course of judicial proceedings,
including all kinds of pleadings,
petitions and motions, are
absolutely privileged so long as they
are pertinent and relevant to the
subject inquiry, however false or
malicious they may be.[29]
The requirements of materiality and
relevancy are imposed so that the
protection given to individuals in
the interest of an efficient
administration of justice may not be
abused as a cloak from beneath
which private malice may be
gratified.[30] If the pleader goes
beyond the requirements of the
statute and alleges an irrelevant
matter which is libelous, he loses his
privilege.[31]
A matter, however, to which the
privilege does not extend must be so
palpably wanting in relation to the
subject matter of the controversy
that no reasonable man can doubt
its irrelevancy or impropriety.[32]
That matter alleged in a pleading
need not be in every case material to
the issues presented by the
pleadings. It must, however, be
legitimatelyrelated thereto, or so
pertinent to the subject of the
controversy that it may become the
subject of inquiry in the course of
the trial.[33]
The first cause of action of
complainants is based on
respondents allegation in his Motion
to Expedite that a burglary of the
UEFA office took place, and his
imputation to complainants of a
plausible motive for carrying out the
burglary the concealment and
destruction of vital documents
relating to the audit. The imputation
may be false but it could indeed
possibly prompt the BLR to speed
up the resolution of the audit case.
In that light, this Court finds that the
first cause of action may not lie.
As regards the second cause of
action, it appears that respondent
was irked by Atty. Torres Answer to
the complaint in the attorneys fees
case wherein he criticized his
(respondents) wifes performance as
past President of UEFA.
This Court does not countenance
Atty. Torres incorporating in his
Answer in the attorneys fees case
statements such as the assembly . . .
was apparently irked by Mrs.
Eleonor Javier when she was booed
while talking on the floor like a
confused gabble (sic). But neither
does it countenance respondents
retaliating statements like what
kind of lawyer is Atty. Torres?, he
lies through his teeth, if he has any
common sense at all he should shut
up, and Atty. Torres forgets the sad
chapter of his life as a practitioner
when he lost out to Prof. Javier in
the petition for audit which he filed
to gain pogi points. Nor respondents
emphasis that Atty. Torres is of the
habit of hurling baseless accusations
against his wife by stating that the
dismissal of the cases against his
wife, of which Atty. Torres was the
complainant, indubitably indicate
Atty. Torres pattern of mental
dishonesty.
The issue in the attorneys fees case
was whether the 10% attorneys fees
checked off from the initial
backwages/salaries of UEFA
members is legal. Clearly, the above-
quoted statements of respondent in
the immediately preceding
paragraph cannot be said to be
relevant or pertinent to the issue.
That Atty. Torres may have
conducted himself improperly is not
a justification for respondent to be
relieved from observing
professional conduct in his relations
with Atty. Torres.
Clients, not lawyers, are the
litigants, so whatever may be the ill-
feeling existing between clients
should not be allowed to influence
counsel in their conduct toward
each other or toward suitors in the
case.[34]
In the attorneys fees case, Atty.
Torres was acting as counsel for
himself as respondent and
complainant was acting as counsel
for his wife as complainant.
Although it is understandable, if not
justifiable, that in the defense of
ones clients - especially of ones wife
or of ones self, the zeal in so doing
may be carried out to the point of
undue skepticism and doubts as to
the motives of opposing counsel, the
spectacle presented by two
members of the bar engaged in
bickering and recrimination is far
from edifying, and detract from the
dignity of the legal profession.[35]
Moreover, in arguing against the
dismissal of the attorneys fees case
on the basis of the alleged forgery of
the notary publics signature,
respondent did not only endeavor to
point out that Atty. Torres erred in
advancing such an argument, but
personally attacked Atty. Torres
mental fitness by stating that the
undersigned thinks that even a dim-
witted first-year law student would
not oblige with such a very serious
charge, and [r]espondent Torres is a
member of the bar [b]ut what law
books is he reading.
In keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession, a lawyers language
must be dignified and choice of
language is important in the
preparation of pleadings.[36] In the
assertion of his clients rights, a
lawyer even one gifted with
superior intellect is enjoined to rein
up his temper[37]
As reflected above, the inclusion of
the derogatory statements by
respondent was actuated by his
giving vent to his ill-feelings
towards Atty. Torres, a purpose to
which the mantle of absolute
immunity does not extend. Personal
colloquies between counsel which
cause delay and promote unseemly
wrangling should be carefully
avoided.[38]
If indeed Atty. Torres filed criminal
complaints for falsification of public
documents against respondents
clients as a scheme to harass them,
they are not without adequate
recourse in law, for if they plead for
a righteous cause, the course of
justice will surely tilt in their favor,
the courts being ever vigilant in the
protection of a partys rights.[39]
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
CANON 8 A LAWYER SHALL
CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH
COURTESY, FAIRNESSS AND
CANDOR TOWARD HIS
PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND
SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS
AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in
professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
instructs that respondents
arguments in his pleadings should
be gracious to both the court and
opposing counsel and be of such
words as may be properly
addressed by one gentleman to
another.[40] The language vehicle
does not run short of expressions
which are emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.[41]
As to the reference by respondent to
the unfortunate and contemptible
practice of notaries public basis of
the last cause of action, while it may
detract from the dignity that should
characterize the legal profession
and the solemnity of a notarial
document, respondent, who justifies
the same as legitimate defense of his
client who was being accused by
Atty. Torres of forgery, may, given
the relevance of the statement to the
subject matter of the pleading, be
given the benefit of the doubt.
Respecting the verified complaint
Annex EJ-A[42] to the Comment of
respondent filed by his wife, Prof.
Eleonor R. Javier, against
complainant Atty. Torres, the same
cannot be consolidated with the
present administrative case since
the parties and causes of action of
such complaint are completely
different from those of the present
complaint.
WHEREFORE, for employing
offensive and improper language in
his pleadings, respondent Atty. Jose
C. Javier is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for One (1)
Month, effective upon receipt of this
Decision, and isSTERNLY
WARNED that any future infraction
of a similar nature shall be dealt
with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be

furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts in the
country for their information and
guidance. SO ORDERED.