Cayetano vs Monsod (1991)
giving, document drafting, and negotiation.
Facts:
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the
Chairman of the Commission on Elections. His
appointment was affirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. Monsod’s appointment was opposed
by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not
qualify for he failed to meet the Constitutional
requirement which provides that the chairman of the
COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice
law for at least ten years. Monsod’s experience as a
lawyer consisted of the following: (1) Passed the bar in
1960 with a rating of 86.55%; (2) Immediately after
passing, worked in his father’s law firm for one year;
(3) Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he
had a degree in economics in the University of
Pennsylvania and held various positions in various
foreign corporations; (4) In 1970, he returned to the
Philippines and held executive jobs for various local
corporations such as the Meralco Group until 1986;
and (5) In 1986, he became a member of the
Constitutional Commission. He also became National
Chairman of NAMFREL.
Issue: Whether or not Monsod was engaged in the
practice of law to qualify him as COMELEC chairman.
Held: Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and
the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. As noted by
various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to
court appearances.
The members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in
most developed societies today, substantially more
legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both
litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most
cases they find themselves spending more time doing
what is loosely described as business counseling than
in trying cases. In the course of a working day the
average general practitioner wig engage in a number
of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines,
legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients,
and other interested parties. Even the increasing
numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually
perform at least some legal services outside their
specialty. By no means will most of this work involve
litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the
exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require
the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-
In Re: Petition to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
Michael Medado (2013)
Facts:
Medado graduated from the University of the
Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
1979 1 and passed the same year's bar examinations
with a general weighted average of 82.7. On 7 May
1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine
International Convention Center (PICC) together with
the successful bar examinees. He was scheduled to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he
failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly
because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll
of Attorneys given by the Bar Office when he went
home to his province for a vacation. Several years
later, while rummaging through his old college files,
Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys.
It was then that he realized that he had not signed in
the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of
the PICC was probably just an attendance record. By
the time Medado found the notice, he was already
working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate
and taxation work, and that he was not actively
involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated
“under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already
taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was
not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer”;
and “the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost
its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently
forgotten.” In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was
required to provide his roll number in order for his
MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed
in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his
roll number. About seven years later, or on 6 February
2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he
be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
Issue: Whether or not Medado should be allowed to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
Held: Yes (sort of). At the onset, the Court said that
Medado has demonstrated good faith and good moral
character when he finally filed the instant petition.
However, he has committed unauthorized practice of
law the moment he realized that what he had signed
was merely an attendance record. At that point,
Medado should have known that he was not a full-
fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his
failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act
of signing therein that would have made him so.
When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
practicing law without taking the necessary steps to
complete all the requirements for admission to the
Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice A.C. No. 5161
of law.
Medado was made to wait for one year before
being allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S. TORRES AS A MEMBER
OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR. ROLANDO S. TORRES … Petitioner
PRESENT: SERENO, CJ; CARPIO; VELASCO, JR; LEONARDO-DE CASTRO; PERALTA; BERSAMIN; DEL
CASTILLO*; MENDOZA**; PERLAS-BERNABE; LEONEN; JARDELEZA***; CAGUIOA; MARTIRES AND
TIJAM, JJ
Promulgated: July 11, 2017

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For resolution is the Petition1 dated March 10, 2017 filed by Rolando S. Torres (Torres) who seeks judicial
clemency in order to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
Records show that in a Resolution2 dated April 14, 2004 in Ting-Dumali v. Torres,3 the Court meted the supreme
penalty of disbarment on Torres for “presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to
advise against, the forgery of complainant’s signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross
misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery,”4 thereby committing gross misconduct
and violating Canons 1 and 10 the Code of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive portion of the said
Resolution reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and
violation of the lawyer’s oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby
rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from
the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
x x x5
Aggrieved, Torres twice moved for reconsideration,6 both of which were denied with finality by the Court,7 which
then stated that “[n]o further pleadings will be entertained.”8 This notwithstanding, Torres: (a) filed an Ex-
Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment9 dated January 26, 2006 begging for compassion, mercy, and
understanding;10 and (b) wrote letters to former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban11 and former Associate
Justice Dante O. Tinga12 reiterating his pleas for compassion and mercy. However, these were ordered
expunged through the Court’s Resolutions dated June 13, 200613 and September 5, 2006,14 considering the
previous directive that no further pleadings will be further entertained in this case. Still undaunted, Torres
continued to file numerous submissions either seeking his reinstatement to the bar15 or the reduction of his
penalty of disbarment to suspension,16 all of which were either expunged from the records17 or denied18 by the
Court.
More than ten (10) years from his disbarment, Torres filed a Petition19 dated June 11, 2015 seeking judicial
clemency from the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys.20 In a Resolution21 dated August 25, 2015
(August 25, 2015 Resolution), the Court denied the petition, holding that Torres had failed to provide substantial
proof that he had reformed himself, especially considering the absence of showing that he had reconciled or
attempted to reconcile with his sister-in-law, the original complainant in the disbarment case against him; nor
was it demonstrated that he was remorseful over the fraudulent acts he had committed against her.22
Despite the foregoing, Torres filed the instant petition, again seeking judicial clemency from the Court to reinstate
him in the Roll of Attorneys.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
The principle which should hold true for lawyers, being officers of the court, is that judicial clemency, as an act of
mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts.
Thus, the Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of
potential and promise are indispensable.23 In Re: The Matter of the Petition for Reinstatement of Rolando S.
Torres as a member of the Philippine Bar,24 the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests
for judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications
or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of
guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-
reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can
be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to
legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as
potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.25
In support of the instant petition for reinstatement, Torres merely rehashed all the several testimonials and
endorsements which he had already attached to his previous petitions, in addition to another endorsement, this
time coming from the incumbent Secretary of Justice, stating that Torres “is a person of good moral character
and a law abiding citizen.”26However, these testimonials and endorsements do not prove whatsoever that Torres
had already successfully reformed himself subsequent to his disbarment. Neither do they exhibit remorse
towards the actions which caused his delisting from the Roll of Attorneys, i.e., the fraudulent acts he committed
against his sister-in-law. In this regard, it is noteworthy to point out that since the promulgation of the Court’s
August 25, 2015 Resolution, there was still no showing that Torres had reconciled or even attempted to reconcile
with his sister-in-law so as to show remorse for his previous faults.
Moreover, Torres also failed to present any evidence to demonstrate his potential for public service or that he -
now being 70 years of age27- still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a
chance to redeem himself.
In sum, Torres failed to comply with the guidelines for the grant of judicial clemency; hence, the instant petition
must necessarily be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
SHORT TITLE: QUE VS REVILLA sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in
LONG TITLE: CONRADO N. conduct and character. x x x The lawyer has to
QUE, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing
REVILLA, evidence that he or she is again worthy of
JR., Respondent membership in the Bar. The Court will take into
A. A.C. No.7054 consideration his or her character and standing
November 11, 2014 PER prior to the disbarment, the nature and character
CURIAM of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred,
TOPIC: his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment,
Reinstatement to the Practice of Law -- The basic and the time that has elapsed in between the
inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the disbarment and the application for
practice of law is whether the lawyer has reinstatement.25
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR. (REVILLA) was
disbarred by the court from the practice of law on the
following grounds: abuse of court procedures and
processes; filing of multiple actions and forum-
shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to
falsehood and deception before the courts; maligning
the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and
unauthorized appearances in court.
Prior to said disbarment , the court had penalized him
already in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia
versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and
intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of
court procedures and processes to delay the
execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with
non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed
leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension
for six (6) months.
The court in rendering their decision stated that: He is
a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal
profession serves. Not even his ardor and
overzealousness in defending the interests of his
client can save him. Such traits at the expense of
everything else, particularly the integrity of the
profession and the orderly administration of justice,
this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
STATEMENT OF CASE:
On July 8, 2010, Revilla filed a Petition for Judicial
Clemency and Compassion3 praying that his license to
practice law be restored based on humanitarian
considerations, but the Court En Banc resolved to
deny the petition for lack of merit. Subsequently,
Revilla appealed his case and pleaded the court’s
mercy, but his prayers were denied by the court.
Albeit, Revilla continued to file appeals before the
court and continued to receive negative response from
the court.
On July 18, 2014, the respondent filed a Profound
Appeal for Judicial Clemency17 reiterating his
apologies to the Court. He stressed that the penalty of
disbarment has already taken its toll on his health; he
has now become most frail and weak; and he had
been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage
five (5) and undergoing dialysis thrice weekly. He also
stressed that in the years that he had been excluded
from the practice of law, he devoted his time to
Christian and charity pursuits serving with all humility
as a Lay Minister and a regular lecturer on Legal
Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church, Quezon City.
The respondent also pleads for clemency, not
because he intends to practice law again, but to be
made whole, to recover from being shattered, and to
finally have peace of mind. Heexpressed his sincere
repentance and deep remorse by taking full
responsibility for his misdemeanor. He also prayed
that his disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated
as a member of the Philippine bar. As part of his
petition, he submitted a Medical Abstract18evidencing
his diagnosis for chronic kidney disease, and a
certification19 from St. Peter Parish, Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his family
are dedicated parishioners.
ISSUE:
WON Atty Revilla is qualified for reinstatement in
the practice of law.
HELD:
NO, Atty Revilla is no longer qualified.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions.20 It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who demands
it, but rather, a special privilege granted and continued
only to those who demonstrate special fitness
inintellectual attainment and in moral character.21 The
same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a
disbarred lawyer. When exercising its inherent power
to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that
only those who establish their present moral fitness
and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the
Bar. Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are
never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the
Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to
the general public to ensure that if the doors are
opened,it is done so only as a matter of justice.22
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to
the practice of law is whether the lawyer has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in
conduct and character.23 Whether the applicant
shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to
a great extent on the sound discretion of the
Court.24 The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove
by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is
again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court
will take into consideration his or her character
and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature
and character of the charge/s for which he or she
was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to
the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in
between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.25
In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the
passage of more than four (4) years is sufficient to
enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his
professional transgressions.
We emphasize that this is the second timethat the
respondent was accused and was found guilty of
gross misconduct.1âwphi1 The respondent, in an
earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla,Jr.,29 was likewise found guilty of gross
misconduct for committing willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure
and processes to delay the execution of a judgment;
and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal
practice of law – mostly the same grounds on which
the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd
disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we granted
the respondent’s motion for reconsideration and
reduced the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law from two (2) years to six (6) months out of
compassion to the respondent.
Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment
case(and subsequent reduction of the penalty
imposed as an act of clemency), and another
disbarment case against him still pending review by
the Court, we are not fully and convincingly satisfied
that the respondent has already reformed. The period
of five (5) years is likewise not considerably long
considering the nature and perversityof the
respondent’s misdeeds. We believe that it is still early
for the Court to consider the respondent’s
reinstatement.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the
respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his
guilt.1âwphi1 While he expressly stated in his appeal
that he had taken full responsibility of his
misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the
blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and to
make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his
assertion. The respondent also failed to submit proof
satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is
again worthy of membership in the legal profession.
We thus entertain serious doubts that the respondent
had completely reformed.
As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the
respondent's unfortunate physical condition, we stress
that in considering his application for reinstatement to
the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to
determine whether he has established moral
reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling
of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this
requirement was not met. Until such time when the
respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has
completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to
resume his membership in the Bar, Our decision to
disbar him from the practice of law stands.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound
Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty. Anastacio
E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.
FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, the Minors
JURIS ALEXIS T. MACARRUBO and
GABRIEL ENRICO T. MACARRUBO as represented
by their Mother/Guardian, FLORENCE TEVES
MACARRUBO, complainant, v. ATTY. EDMUNDO
L. MACARRUBO, respondent.
A.C. No. 6148. February 27, 2004.
Facts:
Florence Teves Macarrubo, complainant, filed on June
6, 2000 a verified complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo,respondent, with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines alleging that
respondent deceived her into marrying him despite his
prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen
Esparza. The complainant averred that he started
courting her in April 1991, he representing himself as a
bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage
which was celebrated on two
occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the
first on December 18, 1991 in the latter’s Manila office,
and the second on December 28, 1991 at the Asian
Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that
although respondent admitted that he was married to
Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in
convincing complainant, her family and friends that his
previous marriage was void.
Complainant further averred that respondent entered
into a third marriage with one Josephine
T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant
and their children without providing them any regular
support up to the present time, leaving them in
precarious living conditions.
Respondent denied employing deception in his
marriage to complainant, insisting instead that
complainant was fully aware of his prior subsisting
marriage to Helen Esparza, but that she dragged him
against his will to a “sham wedding” to protect her and
her family’s reputation since she was then three-
months pregnant. He submitted in evidence that in the
civil case “Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Florence J.
Teves,” it declared his marriage to complainant void ab
initio. He drew attention to the trial court’s findings on
the basis of his evidence which was not controverted,
that the marriage was indeed “a sham and make
believe” one, “vitiated by fraud, deceit, force and
intimidation, and further exacerbated by the existence
of a legal impediment” and want of a valid marriage
license. Respondent raised the additional defenses
that the judicial decree of annulment of his marriage to
complainant is res judicata upon the present
administrative case; that complainant is in estoppel for
admitting her status as mere live-in partner to
respondent in her letter to Josephine T. Constantino.
Stressing that he had always been the victim in his
marital relations, respondent invoked the final and
executory August 21, 1998 in the case “Edmundo L.
Macarubbo v. Helen C. Esparza,” declaring his first
marriage void on the ground of his wife’s psychological
incapacity.
It is recommended that respondent Atty. Edmundo L.
Macarrubo be suspended for three months for gross
misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms
of the profession. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent should be suspended
for gross misconduct
Ruling:
While the marriage between complainant and
respondent has been annulled by final judgment, this
does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of
impropriety. He and complainant started living as
husband and wife in December 1991 when his first
marriage was still subsisting, as it was only on August
21, 1998 that such first marriage was annulled,
rendering him liable for concubinage. Such conduct is
inconsistent with the good moral character that is
required for the continued right to practice law as a
member of the Philippine bar. Even assuming that
respondent was coerced by complainant to marry her,
the duress, by his own admission as the following
transcript of his testimony reflects, ceased after their
wedding day, respondent having freely cohabited with
her and even begot a second child by her. Thus,
respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of
gross immorality and is hereby disbarred from the
practice of law.
Macarrubo vs Macarrubo
RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF
EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.
Facts:
For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy)
filed by respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo
(respondent) who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of
Attorneys.
Records show that in the Decision dated February 27,
2004, the Court disbarred respondent from the
practice of law for having contracted a bigamous
marriage with complainant Florence Teves and a third
marriage with one Josephine Constantino while his
first marriage to Helen Esparza was still subsisting,
which acts constituted gross immoral conduct in
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and Mercy
which the Court denied with finality. Eight years after,
respondent filed the instant Petition (For Extraordinary
Mercy) seeking judicial clemency and reinstatement in
the Roll of Attorneys.
Appealing for Clemency, the Court laid down the
following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial
clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation.
These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent
members of the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct
will give rise to a strong presumption of non
reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the
imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must
show that he still has productive years ahead of him
that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to
redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as
intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development
of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and
circumstances that may justify clemency (Citations
omitted)
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the
applicant must, like any other candidate for admission
to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good
moral character.
Issue:
WON petitioner is qualified for reinstatement in the
Roll of Attorneys.
Rulings:
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the
Court finds the instant petition meritorious.
Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and
acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession
and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness
from his children by complainant Teves and
maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown
by the herein attached pictures. Records also show
that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his
hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time
tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother
until her death in 2008. In 2009, he was appointed as
Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and
thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment
Operations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the
Assessor’s Office, which office he continues to serve
to date. Moreover, he is a parttime instructor at the
University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College
during the School Year 20112012.14 Respondent
likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by
helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire
need.
Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement is
duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Cagayan Chapter and by his former and
present colleagues. His parish priest, Rev. Fr. Camilo
Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is faithful to and puts to
actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church.
He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer.
Records further reveal that respondent has already
settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no
opposition to the instant suit was tendered by
complainant Teves. He sends regular support to his
children in compliance with the Court’s directive in the
Decision dated February 27, 2004.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had
elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred and
recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product
of Lemu National High School, and his fourteen (14)
years of dedicated government service from 1986 to
July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil
Service Attorney of the Civil Service Commission;
Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. From the
attestations and certifications presented, the Court
finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his
transgressions. At 58 years of age, he still has
productive years ahead of him that could significantly
contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and
the betterment of society. While the Court is ever
mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its
errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show
compassion to those who have reformed their ways,
as in this case.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered reinstated
to the practice of law. He is, however, reminded that
such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby
adherence to the rigid standards of intellect, moral
uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and
the law are continuing requirements.
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (1978)
Facts:
Atty. Marcial Edilion stubbornly refused to pay
the annual IBP dues resulting in an investigation which
ultimately led to the IBP Board of Governor’s
recommendation to remove his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Edilion’s arguments are as follows: (1)
Forced membership in the IBP is unconstitutional as it
violates his right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate); (2) The provision of the Rules of Court
requiring payment of a membership fee is void; (3)
The enforcement of the penalty provisions would
amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights; (4) The Supreme Court has not
power or jurisdiction to strike the name of a lawyer
from its Roll of Attorneys.
Issue: Whether or not mandatory membership in the
IBP is constitutional.
Held: Yes. The integration of the Philippine Bar was
obviously dictated by overriding considerations of
public interest and public welfare to such an extent as
more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal
interests and personal convenience of individual
lawyers. Apropos to the above, it must be stressed
that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar
have been uniformly and universally sustained as a
valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but
a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public
interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes
part in one of the most important functions of the State
— the administration of justice — as an officer of the
court.
Furthermore, Sec 5 (5) of Article VIII of the
Constitution provides that one of the powers of the
Supreme Court is to “Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar,
and legal assistance to the under-privileged.” Also,
Sec. 1 of RA 6397 provides: “Within two years from
the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.”
With respect to Edilion’s arguments:
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any
group of which he is not already a member.
He became a member of the Bar when he
passed the Bar examinations. Bar integration
does not compel the lawyer to associate with
 anyone. He is free to attend or not attend4.the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote
or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. 5.
Assuming that the questioned provision does
in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of
the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of
the State.
The fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the
objectives and purposes of integration.
Respondent's right to practice law before the courts of
this country should be and is a matter subject
to regulation and inquiry
It is but an inherent judicial function and responsibility.
Petition for authority to continue use of the firm
names “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and
Castillo” and “Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta
and Reyes” (1979)
Facts:
Two separate Petitions were filed before this
Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander
Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the
surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died
on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to
continue using, in the names of their firms, the names
of partners who had passed away. Petitioners argued
that:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from
continuing its business under a firm name which
includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact,
Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the
practice. It provides: “The use by the person or
partnership continuing the business of the partnership
name, or the name of a deceased partner as part
thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property
of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted
by such person or partnership.”
2. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
adopted by the American Bar Association declares
that: “The continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner when permissible by local custom, is
not unethical but care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use.”
3. There is no possibility of imposition or deception
because the deaths of their respective deceased
partners were well-publicized
No local custom prohibits the continued use of a
deceased partner's name in a professional firm's
name;
The continued use of a deceased partner's name in
the firm name of law partnerships has been
consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an
accepted practice in the legal profession of most
countries in the world
Issue: Whether or not petitioners should be allowed to
continue the use of the names of their deceased
partners in their firm name.
Held: No. Art. 1815 of the Civil Code provides: “Every
partnership shall operate under a firm name, which
may or may not include the name of one or more of
the partners. Those who, not being members of the
partnership, include their names in the firm name,
shall be subject to the liability, of a partner.”
Petitioners can’t invoke Art. 1840, because it treats
more of a commercial partnership with a good will to
protect rather than of a professional partnership.
Also, the legal profession cannot be likened to
other professions, because of these primary
characteristics: (1) A duty of public service, of which
the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence without making much
money; (2) A relation as an "officer of court" to the
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity, and reliability; (3) A relation to clients in the
highest degree fiduciary; (4) A relation to colleagues at
the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of
advertising and encroachment on their practice, or
dealing directly with their clients.
The right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or
franchise.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as
unethical the continued use of the name of a
deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law
partnership when such a practice is permissible by
local custom but the Canon warns that care should be
taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use. It must be conceded that in the
Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the
continued use of a deceased or former partner's name
in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names,
under our custom, Identify the more active and/or
more senior members or partners of the law firm. A
glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of
other law firms in this country would show how their
firm names have evolved and changed from time to
time as the composition of the partnership changed.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a complaint[1] dated March 19, [Respondent] intend (sic) for particular purpose that
2010 filed by complainant Datu Budencio E. HIS LAW OFFICE in Valencia City is one of the
Dumanlag (complainant) against respondent Atty. COURTS in the Philippines as to investigate
Winston B. Intong (respondent) for gross misconduct [complainant] thereat."[5] To bolster his indignation,
and negligence. complainant cited Republic Act No. (RA)
8371,[6] otherwise known as "The Indigenous
The Facts
Peoples' Rights Act of 1997," specifically Section 21
which accords equal protection and non discrimination
Complainant claims to be a leader of the Indigenous
of Indigenous Cultural Communities and Indigenous
People of Bangcud, Malaybalay and the President of
Peoples (ICCs/IPs), as follows:
the Philippine Datus Cultural Minorities Assistance,
Inc. and the Frontier's Mining Prospectors and Section 21. Equal Protection and Non-
Location Corporation.[2] On March 12, 2010, discrimination of ICCs/IPs. Consistent
complainant received a letter[3] from with the equal protection clause of the
Constitution of the Republic of the
respondent,[4] which is reproduced in full hereunder:
Philippines, the Charter of the United
February 08, 2010 Nations, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights including the Convention
TO: DATU BUDENCIO DUMANLAG on the Elimination of Discrimination
Infront Mac Feedmill, San Jose Against Women and International Human
P-1, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon Rights Law, the State shall, with due
recognition of their distinct characteristics
Sir: and identity, accord to the members of
the ICCs/IPs the rights, protections and
Please consider this as a letter request privileges enjoyed by the rest of the
for your presence on 12 citizenry. It shall extend to them the same
employment rights, opportunities, basic
February 2010 at 2:00 o'clock in the services, educational and other rights and
afternoon located at Purok 11, Poblacion, privileges available to every member of
Valencia City, Bukidnon. the society. Accordingly, the State shall
likewise ensure that the employment of
This is for the settlement and pre- any form of force or coercion against
litigation conference prior to any legal ICCs/IPs shall be dealt with by law.
action against you as complainant by my
client JAIME AJOC & ENCARNACION xxxx
DUMANLAG-AJOC ofLapu-lapu St.,
Valencia City.
He likewise quoted an Evaluation Report[7] of the
Hoping for your preferential and positive Office of the Ombudsman dated October 11, 2001
action on this matter. Thank you very
where he, as complainant, stressed that "[n]o court in
much. My highest esteem.
the Philippines, therefore, should punish any member
of a cultural community but shall extend to them
Very truly yours, courtesies in accordance with [the aforesaid] law."[8]

Complainant averred further that the incorporation

(SGD) ATTY. WINSTON B. INTONG
For and in behalf of Mr. & Mrs. Ajoc
Complainant took offense with the aforequoted letter
as it was allegedly intended "to FORCE,
COMPULSORY (sic), to investigate, or fiscalize, in the
moment (sic) [complainant] in his LAW OFFICE at
Purok 11 Poblacion Valencia City, Bukidnon.
papers of the Philippine Datus Cultural Minorities
Assistance, Inc. and the Frontier's Mining Prospectors
and Location Corporation were supposed to be
notarized at respondent's law office, but the charge for
notarization amounting to P10,000.00 was "very dear,
very expensive," and complainant could not afford the
same.[9] He then accused respondent of soliciting
cases for purposes of gain, which act constitutes
malpractice, citing Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court,[10] to wit:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
In a Resolution[11] dated July 19,2010, the Court
required respondent to file his comment on the
complaint, which he failed to do. Consequently, in a
Resolution[12] dated March 9, 2011, the Court issued
a show cause order against respondent reiterating
compliance with Resolution dated July 19, 2010. On
September 28, 2011, the Court imposed a fine of
P1,000.00 upon respondent for his continued failure to
comply with the directive to file
comment.[13] However, respondent still failed to pay
said fine,[14] or to file his comment. Thus, in a
Resolution[15] dated July 1, 2013, the Court
dispensed with the filing of respondent's comment,
and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On January 21, 2014, the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP CBD) issued a Notice of Mandatory
Conference/Hearing[16] directing the parties to submit
their respective mandatory conference briefs. In
compliance therewith, respondent filed his brief[17] on
March 11, 2014 claiming that the letter dated February
8, 2010 merely invited complainant "for his presence
and to confront, if not, sit and resolve any issue/s that
he x x x may have against JAIME AJOC and his wife
ENCARNACION";[18] and that such effort at conflict
resolution in the hope of avoiding costly and
cumbersome litigations is not an act of malpractice,
and does not constitute gross misconduct.[19]
The IBP's Findings
In his Report and Recommendation[20] dated May 27,
2014, the IBP CBD Investigating Commissioner
Cecilia A. C. Villanueva (Commissioner Villanueva)
proposed the dismissal of the complaint for failure
of the complainant to substantiate his accusations
against respondent. Commissioner Villanueva found
no force, threat or intimidation in the tenor of the letter
sent by respondent, and described the same as a
"mere request" that was "carefully worded, done in a
respectful manner."[21] He pointed out, however, the
demeanor of the complainant at the mandatory
conference as that of a senior citizen who was "very
sensitive and demanding of his reputation as a leader
of cultural group. People should be careful of things to
say to him lest he gets offended or even get mad."
Commissioner Villanueva almost cited complainant in
contempt when the latter threatened him and the
stenographer with a lawsuit before the Commission on
Human Rights, this Court, and the United Nations.[22]
Be that as it may, Commissioner Villanueva
recommended[23] that respondent
be reprimanded for his disrespectful actuations
before the Court and the IBP-CBD committed as
follows:
Respondent's propensity to ignore the
lawful orders of the [Court] as well as
those of the IBP[-CBD] is manifest from
the record. The [Court] issued three
resolutions requiring respondent to
comment on the complaint filed by
complainant, but he simply ignored the
Court's orders and did not file his
comment. Consequently, the [Court]
resolved to dispense with the filing of the
comment but referred the matter to the
IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation so as not to deprive
respondent of his right to due process.
Again, respondent was given several
opportunities to express his side on the
charge during the investigation thereof by
the IBP. Neither did he file a position
paper as required by the Commission on
Bar Discipline. Again, he merely ignored
the Commission's directives.[24]
 Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
On April 19, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Responsibility (CPR), "[a] lawyer shall encourage his
a Resolution[25] which adopted and approved with clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will
modification the aforesaid Report and admit of a fair settlement." There was nothing wrong,
Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva. In view therefore, with respondent's efforts to set up a
of respondent's propensity to ignore the lawful orders conference between complainant and his clients.
of the Court, as well as the IBP-CBD, which was found
to be unbecoming of him as officer of the court, With respect to the claim of exorbitant notarization
respondent was suspended from the practice of law fees, the same deserves scant consideration in view
for six (6) months.[26] of complainant's failure to offer corroborative proof to
support his bare allegations. While a lawyer is
Thereafter, the IBP forwarded the case to the Court as mandated under Canon 20 of the CPR to charge only
provided under Rule 139-B, Section 12 (b)[27] of the fair and reasonable fees, and that he may be
Rules ofCourt.[28] penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his
office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the
The Court's Ruling
legal profession as embodied in the CPR,[34] such
violation must be established by clear, convincing and
The Court sustains the findings of the IBP Board of
satisfactory proof, which was not done in this case.
Governors, except as to the penalty.
Respondent cannot, however, escape accountability
It has been consistently held that an attorney enjoys
for his repetitive disregard of the resolutions of the
the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
Court requiring him to file his comment to the
charges against him until the contrary is proved, and
complaint and to pay the fine imposed upon him for
that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have
his failure to do so. As correctly pointed out by
performed his duties in accordance with his
Commissioner Villanueva, the Court issued three
oath.[29]Thus, in disbarment proceedings, the burden
resolutions dated July 19, 2010, March 9, 2011, and
of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the Court
September 28, 2011, requiring respondent to file his
to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against
comment, to show cause for his failure to file, and to
the respondent must be established by clear,
pay a fine of P1,000.00 for such failure. But all three
convincing and satisfactory proof.[30] However, in this
were left unheeded. Respondent ought to know that
case, complainant failed to discharge the burden of
orders of the court are "not mere requests but
proving his accusations of gross misconduct on the
directives which should have been complied with
part of the respondent.
promptly and completely." "He disregarded the oath he
took when he was accepted to the legal profession 'to
Complainant's allegation of force and compulsion
obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly
accompanying the letter dated February 8, 2010 is
constituted legal authorities.' x x x His conduct was
negated by the very words used therein. Respondent
unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey
described said letter in the opening paragraph as a
court orders and processes and is expected to stand
"letter request for [complainant's] presence."[31] He
foremost in complying with court directives as an
then went on to close the letter with "[h]oping for your
officer of the court,"[35] pursuant to Canon 11 of the
[(complainant's)] preferential and positive action on
CPR, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall observe
this matter" and "[m]y highest esteem."[32] As aptly
and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
pointed out by Commissioner Villanueva in his Report
judicial officers x x x."
and Recommendation, the letter was "carefully
worded, done in a respectful manner."[33] There was
It has been stressed that the determination of whether
absolutely nothing on the face of the letter that would
an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended
justify complainant's indignation against any
for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial
discourtesy or discrimination against him. The letter
discretion. The penalties for a lawyer's failure to file a
was a mere invitation for complainant to attend a
brief or other pleading range from reprimand, warning
settlement and pre-litigation conference, which
with fine, suspension, and, in grave cases,
respondent, as a lawyer, is obligated to pursue. Under
disbarment.[36] In the present case, the Court finds
too harsh the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six months. After all,
respondent did file his mandatory conference brief
before the IBP where he cited the Resolution dated
July 19, 2010 of the Court, requiring him to file his
comment to the complaint. He also attended the
mandatory conference/hearing scheduled by the IBP,
although he failed to file his position paper despite the
directive to do so. Under the circumstances, and
considering that this appears to be respondent's first
infraction, the Court finds it proper to reprimand him
with warning that commission of the same or similar
infraction will be dealt with more severely. This is
consistent with the ruling in the recent case of Andres
v. Nambi,[37] where respondent therein was found to
have ignored the Court's resolution directing him to file
comment, and to have failed to attend the mandatory
conference before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline despite notice, as well as to file his position
paper. Since it was also his first infraction, respondent
therein was merely reprimanded by the Court, as in
this case.
WHEREFORE, the Court REPRIMANDS respondent
Atty. Winston B. Intong (respondent) for refusing to
obey lawful orders of the Court and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act or offense shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Roberto Soriano vs. Atty. Manuel Dizon
AC 6792
January 25, 2006
FACTS:
Atty. Manuel Dizon was driving his car under the
influence of liquor when along Abanao Street, Baguio
City, a taxi driver overtook him. Incensed, Dizon tailed
the taxi, pulled it over, and berated Roberto Soriano,
the taxi driver, and held him by his shirt. To stop the
aggression, Soriano forced open his door, causing
Dizon to fall to the ground. Soriano tried to help Dizon
get up, but the latter was about to punch him so
Soriano punched Dizon first to fend off an impending
attack. Soriano prevented another attempt by Dizon to
hit him. Dizon went back to his car and got his revolver
with the handle wrapped in a handkerchief. As Soriano
was handing Dizon’s eyeglasses, which he just picked
up from the pavement, Dizon fired and shot him.
Soriano fell on the thigh of the accused, and the latter
merely pushed him out and sped off. The bullet hit
Soriano’s neck and lacerated his carotid artery.
According to the doctors who treated him, he would
have died if not for the timely medical assistance.
Soriano sustained spinal cord injury causing the left
side of his body to be paralyzed, disabling him for his
job as a taxi driver.
Dizon was eventually convicted for frustrated homicide
but was allowed probation, conditioned on payment of
civil liabilities. However, four years after judgment was
rendered, Dizon has not yet fulfilled his civil obligation.
Soriano filed complaint before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP for Dizon’s disbarment. The
Commissioner of the CBD recommended that
respondent be disbarred for having been convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude and for violating
Rule. 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The IBP adopted the recommendation
of the CBD and sent their resolution to the Supreme
Court for review.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the crime of frustrated homicide
committed by Atty. Dizon involved moral
turpitude.
Whether or not Atty. Dizon’s guilt warrants his
disbarment.
HELD:
The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the
CBD that the crime of frustrated homicide
committed by Atty. Dizon involved moral
turpitude. The court defined moral turpitude as
“everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.” Moral turpitude was
shown when Atty. Dizon shot a taxi driver for
no justifiable reason. His act definitely did not
constitute self-defense. It was he who was the
 aggressor because he first tried to punch with great caution, and that disbarment should
Soriano. The latter was merely defending never be decreed when any lesser penalty
himself when he counterpunched Dizon. would accomplish the end desired, the court
Moreover, Dizon’s act was aggravated with held that meting out a lesser penalty would
treachery when he shot Soriano when the be irreconcilable with the lofty aspiration that
latter was not in a position to defend himself. every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth
Soriano was handing Dizon’s eyeglasses, and justice. Atty. Dizon was disbarred.
which he just picked up, when he was shot. A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
Furthermore, Dizon tried to escape
punishment by wrapping the handle of his gun
in handkerchief in order not to
leave fingerprints on the gun used. Dizon’s
violent reaction to a simple traffic incident
indicated his skewed morals.

2. The Supreme Court held that Dizon also violated

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that “A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.” Dizon failed to
obey the laws of the land through his illegal
possession of an unlicensed firearm. He failed to
respect legal processes through his unjust refusal to
satisfy his civil liabilities, the condition for his
probation. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,
Dizon also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of vs.
Professional Responsibility, which provides SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
that “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, BENGZON, C.J.:
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
Dizon’s violation was exhibited when he After successfully passing the corresponding
tried to reach an out-of-court settlement with examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was
the family of Soriano but when the admitted to the Bar.
negotiations failed, he made it appear as if it
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him
was the family who approached him to get a
with having falsely represented in his application for
referral to a neurosurgeon. In addition, Dizon
such Bar examination, that he had the requisite
fabricated a story that it was Soriano and two
academic qualifications. The matter was in due course
other persons who mauled him. According to
referred to the Solicitor General who caused the
the three doctors who examined Dizon, his
charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a
injuries were so minor that his allegation was
report recommending that Diao's name be erased
so improbable.
from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the
allegations in his petition for examination in this Court,
The court ruled that the appalling treachery
he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law
and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly
subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed
showed his unfitness to continue as a member
by the Department of Private Education, specially, in
of the bar. Membership in the legal profession
the following particulars:
is a privilege demanding a high degree of
good moral character, which is not only a (a) Diao did not complete his high school
condition precedent to admission, but also a training; and
continuing requirement for the practice of law.
While the power to disbar must be exercised
 (b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College,
and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom
— which contradicts the credentials he had
submitted in support of his application for
examination, and of his allegation therein of
successful completion of the "required pre-
legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo
A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he
claims that although he had left high school in his third
year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed
the General Classification Test given therein, which
(according to him) is equivalent to a high school
diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the
educational authorities considered his army service as
the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this
claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any
certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the
proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to
dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly
meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from
Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate
(1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had
obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in
April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due
to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in
his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to
the parties adducing other evidence to prove their
case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that
the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own
making. Had his application disclosed his having
obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also
have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby
showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester
of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his
Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have
been permitted to take the bar tests, because our
Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar
examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to
the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily
completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as
prescribed by the Department of Private Education,"
(emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified
to take the bar examinations; but due to his false
representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily
passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar.
Such admission having been obtained under false
pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact
that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing such examinations is not the only qualification
to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed
courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally
essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll
of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the
latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within
thirty days. So ordered.
Case #26 (Zosa)
 [A.C. No. 1163. August 29, 1975.]

 IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E.
GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.

 
 Topic: Requirements for application to the Bar – no
filed or pending case of moral turpitude
 
 FACTS:
 1.
The case is one of the consolidated cases in In re
Lanuevo.
2. Ramon E. Galang passed the 1971 bar examination
but his exam papers were subjected to unauthorized
re-correction and re-evaluation by 5 examiners.

3. An investigation by the NBI revealed
that Ramon (Roman/Romy) was a student of School
of Law of MLQU;
that in Sept 8, 1959, he was charged with the crime of
slight physical injuries(SPI) of another student
of the same university;
that in a 1973 hearing, he was confronted with this
information but declared he does not
remember being charged with the same.

4. Victim was summoned and narrated the case and
identified Galang as the very same person charged
with SPI in that case.

5. An administrative proceeding was filed for his
disbarment along with Bar Confidant Lanuevo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Galang must be stricken off in the roll
of attorneys for concealing his case of SPI.
DECISION: YES
 1. Under Rule 127, Sec 2 every
applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case, pending or
otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully
ascertain or determine applicant's moral
character.
 
 2. As to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine.
Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the
Court of one's personal record — whether he was
criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case
dismissed or is still pending — becomes more
compelling.
 given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the
3. In 1963 and 1964, when Galang took the Bar for the
second and third time, respectively, the application
form provided by the Court for use of applicants
already required the applicant to declare under oath
that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense
involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending
case of that nature against him."
 inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is
4. By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations
for the fourth time, the application form prepared by
the Court for use of applicants required the applicant
to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral
turpitude or not. Yet, Galang continued to intentionally
withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of
slight physical injuries which was then and until now is
pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter
repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his
applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967,
1969 and 1971.
 CONSTITUTIONAL.
5. That the concealment of an attorney in his
application to take the Bar examinations of the fact
that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an
alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license
to practice law is well — settled.
 derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring,
6. Under the circumstances in which respondent
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly
irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE
have no other alternative but to order the surrender of
his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his
name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Resolution Cunanan, et. al
18March1954
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar
of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino
Cunanan et. al petitioners.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused
so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972
popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.”
Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains
a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below
50% in any subject, although for the past few exams
the passing grades were changed depending on the
strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations
(1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-
1953 – 75%).
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice
law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C.,
and feeling that they have been discriminated against,
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a
few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar
went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill
no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was
senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill
then became law on June 21, 1953
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its
author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who had inadequate preparation for the
practice of law profession, as evidenced by their
failure in the exams.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Due to the far reaching effects that this law would
have on the legal profession and the administration of
justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is
An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital
requisites for the practice of the law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly.
The Judicial system from which ours has been
and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession is concededly judicial.
The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress
and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the
admission to the practice of law. The primary power
and responsibility which the constitution recognizes
continue to reside in this court.
Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the
law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in place by
the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of
the court, and this power is not included in the power
granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively
w/in the judiciary.
Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the
constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of
the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them,
in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the
Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, The above-named petitioners were complainants in
alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs.
bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the
the profession, and those rules promulgated are
Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on
considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and
law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18
being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of
entire law is void. record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of
HELD: attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total
backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio
Under the authority of the court:
Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable
1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3
examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their
said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of
w/o force and effect. their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services
subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is
Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages.
valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by
the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid &
are denied, and all the candidates who in the Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5%
w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the
considered as having passed whether they have filed charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through
petitions for admissions or not.) Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in
Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the
G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971 complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and
subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations
UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for
VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners, professional services rendered in the case,
vs. apportioned as follows:
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN ............................................. 10%
MUNING respondents.
Quintin Muning
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners. .............................................................
Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for ............ 10%
respondent Quintin Muning. Atty. Atanacio Pacis
.............................................................
.... 5%
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in
services rendered? This is the issue presented in this the present petition.
petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964,
and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss
of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72- the present petition on the ground of late filing but his
ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning a non- motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.1 He asked
lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion
said case. contained averments that go into the merits of the
case, this Court admitted and considered the motion
for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's
answer to the petitioner for review.2 The case was
considered submitted for decision without
respondent's brief.3
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle
enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et
al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27
March 1968,4 that an agreement providing for the
division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer
union president is allowed to share in said fees with
lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics
and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a
court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the
absence of a contract, as in the present case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875
that —
In the proceeding before the Court or
Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties
shall not be required to be
represented by legal counsel ...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person
representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial
Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to
attorney's fees: for the same section adds that —
it shall be the duty and obligation of
the Court or Hearing Officer to
examine and cross examine witnesses
on behalf of the parties and to assist in
the orderly presentation of evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be
exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the
bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to
represent or appear or defend in the said court on
behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the
representative to compensation for such
representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules
of Court, providing —
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's
agreement as to fees. — An attorney
shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his
services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship
as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Such
a relationship cannot exist unless the client's
representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent
Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-
client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino
Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore,
recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy
demands that legal work in representation of parties
litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing
tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe
the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as
being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the
protection of courts, clients and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions
is persuasive. There, it is stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions
statutes have now been enacted
prohibiting persons not licensed or
admitted to the bar from practising
law, and under statutes of this kind,
the great weight of authority is to the
effect that compensation for legal
services cannot be recovered by one
who has not been admitted to practice
before the court or in the jurisdiction
the services were rendered. 5
No one is entitled to recover
compensation for services as an
attorney at law unless he has been
duly admitted to practice ... and is an
attorney in good standing at the time.6
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession
should not be violated;7 that acting as an attorney with
authority constitutes contempt of court, which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,8 and the
law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit
of an act or an act done in violation of law; 9 and that if
were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the
public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in
case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic
condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not
amenable to disciplinary measures. 10
And the general rule above-stated
(referring to non-recovery of attorney's
fees by non-lawyers) cannot be
circumvented when the services were
purely legal, by seeking to recover as
an "agent" and not as an attorney. 11
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a proper action against the persons alleged to be
non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees should illegally engaged in the practice of law.
suffice to refute the possible argument that
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby
appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of
set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the
Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground
backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin
that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such
Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects.
special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid
Costs against respondent Muning.
reasons and cannot justify an exception.

The other issue in this case is whether or not a union

may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
deductible from the backpay of some of its members.
This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU,
alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the
present petition for review; union members Entila and
Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were
included as petitioners in the present petition that was
subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them
(Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as
co-petitioners was belated.

We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization

may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
deductible from the backpay of its members because
such union or labor organization is permitted to
institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf
of its members; and the union was organized "for the
promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and
economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is
disadvantageous to its members, the union may
prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under
Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:

Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases —

Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by
any order of the Court may appeal to
the Supreme Court of the Philippines
...,

since more often than not the individual unionist is not

in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged

in the habitual practice of law before the Court of
Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who
are not licensed to practice, registering their
appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily
before the said court. If true, this is a serious situation
demanding corrective action that respondent court
should actively pursue and enforce by positive action
to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought
in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up
in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file