Thayer Consultancy Background Brief

ABN # 65 648 097 123

Sino-Vietnamese Border War,
1979-2019
January 23, 2019

Today I am writing to ask for your views about an important event in Vietnam's history:
the China-Vietnam border war in 1979. On February 17, 1979, more than 600,000
Chinese troops crossed Vietnam's northern border, launching a bloody war along the
600-kilometer border that the two nations share.
It is a sensitive topic that has rarely been mentioned before but Vietnamese veterans,
military enthusiasts, historians, and diplomats have urged the government to
reconsider their decades of deliberate silence. Therefore, we decided to ask for some
experts' opinions to help the Vietnamese people have clear and multi-dimensional
view ofthis event.
We request your assessment of the following issues:
Q1. In an interview, you stated that "A re-examination of the 1979 border war would
reveal that China was the aggressor not Vietnam". Could you expand on this
statement?
ANSWER: When China initiated an armed attack on Vietnam’s northern border on 17
February 1979 it gave two reasons. The first was to pacify the border as a result of
rising armed clashes in 1977-78. The second reason was “to teach Vietnam a lesson”
for having attacked China’s ally, the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia.
It was China that instigated border incidents with Vietnam in 1977-78. China also
sought to stir unrest among Vietnam’s ethnic minority in the northern border
provinces. China provided military assistance and weapons to the Khmer Rouge so
they could attack Vietnam’s southwest border at the same time.
Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia was a counter-attack in self-defence, a response
to continual attacks and deep penetration raids by Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge
forces. Since China instigated the northern border incidents and backed Khmer Rouge
attacks on Vietnam’s southwest, it was China that was the aggressor and Vietnam the
victim.
Q2. Scholars like Gerald Segal and Bruce Ellerman agree that in 1979 war China failed
to achieve its goals. Do you agree with them? In your point of view, what were the
biggest failures of China’s 1979 border war?
ANSWER: The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war was part of a much larger decade-
long (1977-87) Chinese grand strategy to assert hegemony over Indo-China by
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rupturing Vietnam’s relations with the Soviet Union and forcing Vietnam into
dependency on China. China applied political and military pressure on Vietnam on
three fronts – the southwest border, the northern border and Vietnam’s domestic
front by attempted subversion of the Hoa (ethnic Chinese) and ethnic minoritiy
communities.
When China initiated the 1979 border war its generals sought a “battle of quick
decision.” The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) hoped to engage and defeat Vietnam’s
main army divisions and thereby make Vietnam withdraw its forces from Cambodia
and sue for peace.
China did not succeed in defeating Vietnam’s main forces. Rather, the PLA suffered
high casualties (estimated at 28,000 killed) as a result of its lack of recent combat
experience. The PLA was unable to mass its forces and strike a decisive blow. In sum,
the PLA failed to meet their objective of a “battle of quick decision.”
Although Vietnam too suffered high casualties and destruction of its infrastructure in
the northern provinces, it was not forced to withdraw military forces from Cambodia.
Continued Chinese assistance to the Khmer Rouge, channeled through Thailand, failed
to see the Khmer Rouge return to power. Vietnam conduced a successful counter-
insurgency war and when it withdrew all military forces from Cambodia in September
1989, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea was able to stand on its own and repel
Khmer Rouge attacks.
China’s efforts on the domestic front did create tensions among the Hoa and ethnic
minority communities. But Vietnam was not destabilized and managed to maintain
internal security.
China’s efforts to rupture Vietnam’s relations with the Soviet Union failed. The two
sides signed a 25-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in November 1978 that
resulted in continued Soviet support for Vietnam including military assistance and
finance for successive five-year economic plans.
Q3. On February 16, 1979, the day before the attack on Vietnam, Deng Xiaoping
briefed senior officials and stated the war would be limited in time and space and
involve ground forces only. According to you, why didn't Deng chose to deploy air and
naval forces in the 1979 war?
ANSWER: In 1979 Vietnam maintained one of the best air defence systems in the
world, a legacy of the American War. China did not deploy military aircraft within the
slant range of Vietnam’s anti-air missiles because it had no effective countermeasures.
China’s surface to air missiles could only provide cover 50 km inside Vietnam so any
Chinese aircraft operating beyond that range would be vulnerable to Vietnam’s air
defence system.
As soon as China launched its armed attack on Vietnam’s northern border, the Soviet
Union dispatched a naval flotilla to waters off Vietnam northern shores. This served
to deter China from using naval forces against Vietnam.
Q4. Which Chinese military deficiencies and weaknesses were exposed in the 1979
border war? Some historians speculated that the war was Deng's test of the fighting
ability of the PLA troops. Do you share the same assessment?
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ANSWER: Edward O’Dowd, the former U.S. defence attaché to Beijing and later Hanoi,
wrote his PhD dissertation on the 1979 border war. It was later published with the
title Chinese Military Strategy In the Third Indochina War: The last Maoist war (London
and New York: Routledge, 2007). The sub-title is important. O’Dowd described China’s
border attack as “the last Maoist war.” He meant that the PLA had no recent military
combat experience. The last conflict involving the PLA was the 1962 border war with
India. The PLA in the late 1970s was heavily involved in internal political affairs, a
legacy of Mao’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-76), and commercial
activities. The PLA lacked battle experienced non-commissioned officers, the interface
between commissioned officers and the rank and file.
When the PLA attacked Vietnam it was not able to coordinate heavy artillery with
armour units and supporting infantry. The PLA had to learn as they went. There were
also logistic difficulties as well as organizing an effective rear area supply chain.
It was widely reported at the time that an unstated objective of the border war was
to test the PLA in actual combat. I agree with this assessment. It was a sobering
experience for the PLA because they could not achieve a “battle of quick results.”
Q5. What lessons can countries that have territorial disputes with China draw from
the 1979 border war?
ANSWER: In retrospect, China’s border war with Vietnam is an example of hybrid
warfare. Hybrid warfare has many definitions but the common elements are the use
of unconventional means along with conventional military forces to achieve one’s
objective.
China’s hybrid warfare operations were conducted over a decade from 1977. China’s
unconventional means included the use of the Khmer Rouge as a proxy, attempted
subversion of Vietnam’s Hoa and ethnic minority communities, and conventional
military means along Vietnam’s northern border.
China’s hybrid war reached a peak of intensity in the early months of 1979 when China
launched a massive conventional invasion of northern Vietnam. China’s hybrid
operations continued for another eight years after the PLA withdrew from Vietnam
and consisted of daily armed incidents on Vietnam’s northern border including
massive artillery bombardments. China halted these military actions in 1987 when
there was a shift in the strategic balance when General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
came to power and moved to repair relations with China and the United States.
The lessons for countries that share a land border or have maritime territorial disputes
with China are:
 China is likely to employ hybrid warfare
 Use third parties as proxies to pressure the target country
 Use political means – propaganda, information warfare and subversion – to
destabilize the target country
 Use kinetic force, such as paramilitary, militia and regular armed forces, in
armed combat, and
 The use of these three means will be flexible and carried out over a long period
of time
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Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Sino-Vietnamese Border War, 1979-2019,”

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