1) White Light Corporation v.

City of Manila (2009)

WHITE LIGHT CORP. VS CITY OF MANILA (2009)

3 Dec 2017

[576 scra 416; G.R. No. 122846; January 20, 2009] Constitutional Law| Police Power| Right to Privacy

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM

FACTS:

In 1992, Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the Ordinance No. 7744 that prohibits hotels, motels,
inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments from offering short-time admission, as
well as pro-rated or “wash up” rates or other similarly concocted terms, in the City of Manila.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments
for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.

Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC) et. al. filed a petition on the ground that the Ordinance
directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. RTC ruled in
favor of the petitioner. CA reversed the decision and asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power.

ISSUE:

Whether Ordinance No. 7744 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect
itself and its people. Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

However, the right to privacy independently identified with liberty, in itself, fully deserve a
constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal
life of the citizen.

Whether or not the depiction of the vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior
among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as
well. The Court also recognize that there are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room
out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel
whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest
between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or
groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other
than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient
alternative.

Petition is granted. Ordinance No. 7744 is unconstitutional.

2).Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and
Promotions, Inc.

G.R. No. 179554 December 16, 2009

Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

Respondent: Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.

Facts: In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications,
entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail Transit Corporation,
Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which MRTC
undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the
expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the Government. In 1998, respondent Trackworks
Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract for advertising
services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other
advertising media in the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks
to dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-
009, whereby MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards,
signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open
space. After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the former’s
billboards and similar forms of advertisement.

Issue: Whether MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards, signages and
other advertising media installed by Trackworks on the interior and exterior structures of the MRT3.
Ruling: That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertising media in
the MRT3 from MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial premises in the
MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising income therefrom is no longer debatable. Under the BLT
agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would
transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.

Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this case, and
until this date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising services with Trackworks was a valid
exercise of ownership by the former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc., this Court expressly recognized
Trackworks’ right to install the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to said
contract. The latter’s right should, therefore, be respected.

It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks’
billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle,
remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure
by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co.,
Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that
MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration.
Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.

The Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC Memorandum
Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertising media. The
prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media
applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT agreement between
the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied.

3) Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 100152 March 31, 2000

Petitioner: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc.

Respondent: The Honorable Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After
consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists,
respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following conditions: (1) Since it
is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store; (2) It cannot
examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of
optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been
made by an independent optometrist or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the
public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise optical
lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames; (5) It is allowed to grind
lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.
On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI lodged a
complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its
business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. On July 19, 1989, the
City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said
date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.

Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid exercise of
police power, in the grant of business permits

Ruling: Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. It is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if
exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. The
authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. However, the
power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law,
with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law.

In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to petitioner
was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court of Appeals that
respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such special conditions in its permit as
the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public respondents and private respondent SOPI are one
in saying that the imposition of said special conditions is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a
valid exercise of police power.

The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature.
The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is
essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation of the general
welfare clause of the Local Government Code.
What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of
running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of
optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit could
be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid certificate of
registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued
primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such
permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the
administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the
Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.

4) ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM (1989)

30 Nov 2017

[175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO. L-78742; 14 JUL 1989] Constitutional Law| Police Power| Power of Eminent
Domain

FACTS:
The following are consolidated cases:

1. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of
the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were
declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend
that President Aquino usurped the legislature‘s power.

2. A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victoria‘s Mill Negros Occidental against
Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with
initial fund of P50Billion.

3. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer.

4. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding seven hectares.

ISSUE:

Whether the aforementioned EO‘s, PD, and RA were constitutional.

HELD:

The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent
domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec.
6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power
and Eminent Domain

RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a
taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The
taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of
the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
favour of the farmer-beneficiary.

The Court declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in Section 18 of
the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.

WE DO NOT MIND ADMITTING THAT A CERTAIN DEGREE OF PRAGMATISM HAS INFLUENCED OUR
DECISION ON THIS ISSUE, BUT AFTER ALL THIS COURT IS NOT A CLOISTERED INSTITUTION REMOVED
FROM THE REALITIES AND DEMANDS OF SOCIETY OR OBLIVIOUS TO THE NEED FOR ITS
ENHANCEMENT. THE COURT IS AS ACUTELY ANXIOUS AS THE REST OF OUR PEOPLE TO SEE THE GOAL
OF AGRARIAN REFORM ACHIEVED AT LAST AFTER THE FRUSTRATIONS AND DEPRIVATIONS OF OUR
PEASANT MASSES DURING ALL THESE DISAPPOINTING DECADES. WE ARE AWARE THAT INVALIDATION
OF THE SAID SECTION WILL RESULT IN THE NULLIFICATION OF THE ENTIRE PROGRAM, KILLING THE
FARMER’S HOPES EVEN AS THEY APPROACH REALIZATION AND RESURRECTING THE SPECTRE OF
DISCONTENT AND DISSENT IN THE RESTLESS COUNTRYSIDE. THAT IS NOT IN OUR VIEW THE INTENTION
OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND THAT IS NOT WHAT WE SHALL DECREE TODAY. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL
LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, 175 SCRA 343, G.R.
NO. 78742, G.R. NO. 79310, G.R. NO. 79744, G.R. NO. 79777 JULY 14, 1989 — JUSTICE ISAGANI CRUZ,
PONENTE

5)

8) G.R. No. 169008 Case Digest

G.R. No. 169008, July 31, 2008

Landbank of the Philippines

vs Raymunda Martinez

Ponente: Nachura

Facts:
The land owned by Martinez was compulsory acquired by DAR for the purpose of CARP, of which the
LBP offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation. Convinced that the amount was just and
confiscatory, Martinez rejected it. Thus, PARAD conducted a summary administrative proceedings for
the preliminary determination of the just compensation.

PARAD marked some inconsistencies in the figures and factors used by LBP in its computation, so they
rendered an amount of P12,179,492.50 as just compensation.

LBP however, filed at the RTC-Romblon that the ruling of the DARAB on the just compensation has
become final after the lapse of 15 days. Martinez opposed the motion. Later on, LBP instituted a
petition for certiorari against PARAD, assailing that PARAD gravely abuse its discretion when it issued
the order for the 12m just compensation despite the pending petition in the RTC. CA, finding LBP
guilty of forum-shopping dismissed the petition, Hence, this petition.

Issue:

(1) whether or not petitioner could file its appeal solely through its legal department; (2) whether or
not petitioner committed forum shopping; and (3) whether or not the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) gravely abused his discretion when he issued a writ of execution despite the
pendency of LBP’s petition for fixing of just compensation with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC).

Ruling:

The Court went on to rule that the petition for review on certiorari could not be filed without the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) entering its appearance as the principal legal
counsel of the bank or without the OGCC giving its conformity to the LBP Legal Department’s filing of
the petition. The Court also found petitioner to have forum-shopped when it moved to quash the
PARAD resolutions and at the same time petitioned for their annulment via certiorari under Rule 65.
Most importantly, the Court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to the issuance of a writ of
certiorari by the appellate court because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion
when it undertook to execute the September 4, 2002 decision on land valuation. The said
adjudicator’s decision attained finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in Rule XIII, Section
11 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules of Procedure.
On the supposedly conflicting pronouncements in the cited decisions, the Court reiterates its ruling in
this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains finality after the
lapse of the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing of just compensation
should therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC within the said
period. Following settled doctrine, we ruled in this case that the PARAD’s decision had already
attained finality because of LBP’s failure to file the petition for the fixing of just compensation within
the 15-day period.

NPC v. HEIRS OF SANGKAY

656 SCRA 60

G.R. No. 165828

August 24, 2011

TOPIC: Eminent Domain; Just Compensation

FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project
to generate electricity for Mindanao. It included the construction of several underground tunnels to be
used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.

On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the property and a prayer for just
compensation. They alleged that the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial
and residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an unsafe place for habitation,
forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer grounds.

ISSUE: Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation

RULING: Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. It has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental
defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the
taking agency.
The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an indefinite
period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Hence, respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of
just compensation.

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not
merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. It is settled that the taking of private
property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. This
is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal
beneficial use. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the
rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful
manner, lessening or destroying its value

REPUBLIC VS HEIRS OF BORBON (2015)

26 Jan 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,

vs.
HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 165354; January 12, 2015] Constitutional Law| Eminent Domain|

FACTS:

The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) entered into a private property owned by respondents
Borbon in order to construct and maintain transmission lines for its Power Transmission Project.
NAPOCOR then filed for expropriation of an easement of right of way over a portion of the
said property. However, during the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed a motion to discontinue the
expropriation proceedings, that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for
public purpose, that because the public purpose ceased to exist, the proceedings for expropriation
should no longer continue, and the State was now duty-bound to return the property to its owners; and
that the dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in accordance of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal.

HELD:

The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, the
dismissal or discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just and
equitable. Here, NAPOCOR seeks to discontinue the expropriation proceedings on the ground that the
transmission lines constructed on the respondents’ property had already been retired. The retirement of
the transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of the element of public use.
Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue the proceedings and requires the return of the
property to the respondents.

In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the
respondents, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their property
rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of restoration of the possession by paying
actual or other compensatory damages. The compensation must be based on what they actually lost as
a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use, including the value of the
fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s construction of the transmission lines.Considering
that the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings is a development occurring during the appeal, the
Court treats the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as producing the effect of converting the
case into an action for damages.

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion

Doctrine of Incorporation

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION

G.R. No. L-139465 January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.

Facts:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Department of
Justice received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent
Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting
documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include:

1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax

 3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television

4. False statement or entries

5. Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation
and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed.
Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for
him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the following
grounds:

1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that
point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements
under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition
Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the
documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.

2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the
documents.

3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an

extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that
every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.

Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion favored
Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting
further proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar.

Issue/s:

Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.

Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation,
however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.

Ruling/s:

No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligation

Government of the USA vs Purganan

GOVERNMENT OF THE USA VS PURGANAN

G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department of

Justice, petitioner,

Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.

Facts:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a
warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark
Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards,
such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings

Discussions:

The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not
apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

Ruling/s:

No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when
a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the
requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with
the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow.
He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.