RULES ON EVIDENCE CASES:

Second Set:

LBP vs. Banal

ISSUE: Can the Trial Court, in concluding the valuation of Sps. Banal’s property, authorized to take judicial notice of the
average production figures in another case pending before it and applying the same to the present case without
conducting a hearing and without the knowledge and consent of the parties?

Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.

Exception: They may only do so “in the absence of objection” and “with the knowledge of the opposing party”. This is
exception is not present in this case.

Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Sec. 3, Rule 129 of Revised
Rules on Evidence is explicit on necessity of HEARING before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter.

Sec. 3. Judicial Notice, when hearing necessary.-

During the trial, the court…

in its own initiative, or
on request of a party
 may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.

After the trial, and before Judgement, OR

On Appeal…
The proper court….
In its own initiative, or
On request of a party,
 may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter
is decisive of a material issue in the case.

FACTS:

Sps. Banal are registered owners of Agricultural Land in Camarines Norte. Portion of that land was compulsorily acquired
by DAR pursuant to Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657, as amended). There was a valuation made by
Landbank with regard to the subject land however it was rejected by Sps. Banal, hence a summary administrative
proceeding was conducted before PARAD (Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator) to determine the valuation of land.
PARAD affirms the Landbank’s valuation. Dissatisfied with PARAD’s decision, Sps. Banal filed a petition with RTC to
determine just compensation. In determining the valuation of the land RTC based the same on the facts that was
established in another case pending before it, which seems to be adverse to that of the LandBank.

PEOPLE VS. KULAIS

ISSUE: Is the Trial Court erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness testimony in another case (also pending before
it), affects the conviction of Kulais, whose guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and
overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and documentary.
HELD:

Appeal of Kulais is bereft of merit.

He was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the
dinap victims. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross examinations conducted by Kulais’s counsel. At best,
Trial court’s mention of testimony of witness in another case (i.e. Lieutenant Feliciano) is a decisional surplusage which
neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced Kulais.

As a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these
have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same judge.
This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him.

Jurisprudence give greater weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of
the defense. Kulais bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of prosecution witnesses’
positive identification of him. Between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand,
and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails. Prosecution’s witnesses’ clear, straightforward and frank
manner were compatible on material points.

Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and none was found by the court.

FACTS:

5 Info for Kidnapping for ransom + 3 Info for kidnapping were filed before RTC-Zamboanga against Kulais et.al. Out of 12
accused only 9 were apprehended. Trial court found Kulais guilty of 5 counts of kidnapping for ransom and 1 count of
kidnapping a woman and public officer (6 terms of life imprisonment). It also found him guilty of 2 counts of slight illegal
detention for kidnapping Saavedra and Francisco. Kulais et.al. filed their joint notice of appeal. Some withdraw their
appeal because of their application for amnesty until only the appeal of Kulais remains for the consideration of SC.

LAUREANO VS. CA

ISSUE: W/N Singaporean Law can be applied in this Case.

HELD:

No. Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. Singapore Airlines, being the party who claims
the applicability of the Singapore Laws has the burden of proof, but it failed to prove which specific laws of Singapore
can be applied to this case, Hence Philippine Law shall apply.

The Specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of Laureano is not proven in court. As such, the trial court
cannot make a determination if the termination is indeed valid under Singaporean Law.

However, the case must be dismissed on the ground of estoppel.

Laureano’s action for damages due to illegal termination is governed by Art. 291 of Labor Code rather than Art. 1144 or
1146 of the Civil Code. Per Labor Code, Where the money claim was based on a written contract, the CBA, The language
of Art. 291 of Labor Code does not limit its application only to money claims specifically recoverable under said Code but
convers all money claims arising from an employer-employee relations.
 Under our Laws, all money claims arising from employer-employee relationships must be filed within 3 yrs. from the
time the cause of action accrued. Laureano’s cause of action accrued in 1982 when he was terminated but he only filed
the money claim in 1987 (or after almost 5 yrs.). Hence, he is already barred by prescription.

FACTS:

Laureano (Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot) of Air Manila, applied as pilot with Singapore Airlines, and was
accepted. Sometime in 1982, Singapore Airline, because of recession, lay off some of its employees. It expatriate pilots
including Laureano. Realizing that recession would not be for a short time, it made some review of its pilot for possible
promotion to another fleet, 12 were qualified and Laureano was not among them. Laureano instituted a case for illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Complaints were later withdrawn and thereafter, Laureano filed the case for
damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before RTC in Phils. Singapore Airline moved to dismiss on
jurisdictional grounds but it was denied. Singapore Airline alleged, on trial, that the termination of Lauriano is valid
pursuant to Singaporean Law. RTC ruled in favor of Laureano. Singapore airline appealed the case raising the issue of
lack of jurisdiction, non-applicability of Phil. Laws and Estoppel, among others. CA reversed RTC’s decision on the
ground of prescription.

MAQUILING VS. COMELEC

ISSUE: Is the use of foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amount to undoing a renunciation earlier made.

HELD:

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship= is a positive and voluntary act of representation
as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino Citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants
(withdraw) the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Sec. 5(2) of the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003

Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Phils. and the following conditions:

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Phils. shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and , at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renounciation of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer oath.

After Arnado took all the necessary step to qualify to run for a public office (e.g. took the Oath of Allegiance and
Renounced Foreign Citizenship). After performing such, he became eligible to run for public office. However, this legal
presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the
citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship. Arnado himself subjected the
issue of his citizenship to attach when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US Passport to
travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy. His used of US passport 4 times within the date
he renounced foreign citizenship (4/3/2009) and the date he filed his certificate of candidacy (11/30/2009), runs counter
to the affidavit of renounciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, which in effect he is declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that
he is an American Citizen.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated
the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all
civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.

While act of using passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation
and loss of Phil. citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for former
Filipino Citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

The act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation.
However, by representing himself as an American citizen, he voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a
dual citizen. Such reversion is not retroactive, it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American
Citizen by using his US Passport. This effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and
country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election
or appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust.

His makes him disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010
elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Rule on Succession under the LGCode will not apply.

FACTS:

Arnado is a natural born Filipino Citizen. However, subsequently he was naturalized as citizen of USA and lost his Filipino
citizenship. He applied for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consulate General of the PHils. in San Francisco., USA
and took the Oath of Allegiance to the RP. His citizenship retention and reacquisition was issued in his favor. He took
again his Oath of Allegiance to RP and executed an affidavit of renunciation of his foreign citizenship. He filed his
certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan Lanao del Norte. BAlua another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arando and presented a record indicating that Arnado has been using his US passport in entering and
departing the PHils. In 2010 election, Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed
as the winning candidate for Mayor. COMELEC 1st division ruled for his disqualification. Maquiling, another candidate for
mayor, who garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc
a motion for reconsideration claiming the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation
and he (Maquiling), the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest lawful votes should be proclaimed as the winner.
But COMELEC En Banc ruled in Favor of Arnado. Thus, Maquiling filed the instant petition before SC.

PEOPLE vs. BAHARAN

ISSUE:

Is the statement of conspirator against a co-conspirator admissible as evidence?

RULING:

While it is true that statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during
the existence of the conspiracy, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a
judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators.
Distinction between Extrajudicial Confession and Judicial Confession:

Extrajudicial Confession Judicial Confession

-may be given in evidence against the confessant but not -admissible against the declarant’s co-accused since the
against his co-accused as they are deprived of the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the
opportunity to cross-examine him. former.

Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where
the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.

Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his
co-accused is competent evidence against the latter.

Other Notes:

Sec. 3, Rule 113. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.

When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the
precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.

The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. The requirement to conduct a
searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the
consequences of a guilty plea to the accused, as appears in this case. The conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty
of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or
duress; mistaken impressions or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea.
This requirement is stringent and mandatory.

In this case Accused plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration.

FACTS:

Feb. 2005-RRCG bust was plying its usual route via EDSA. Two men insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor
obliged and let them in. As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Ave. the two immediately got off
the bus and ran. Moments after, they felt an explosion and then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. Previously, there was
an announcement over radio station DZBB that Abu Sayyaf Group had a Valentine’s Day gift for former Pres. Gloria
Arroyo. The documents showing that announcement were presented by Prosecution. Trinidad, one of the accused gave
ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview sometime after the incident, confessing his participation in the
Valentine’s Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his
role in the bombing incident. The bus conductor identified Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two
men who had entered the RRCG Bus on evening of Feb. 14. Members of Abu Sayyaf Group were then charged with
multiple murder and multiple frustrate murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali and Rohmat were arrested, while the other
remains at large. Baharan, Asali and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple murder. But Trinidad and Baharan
pleaded not guilty on multiple frustrated murder; Asali on the other hand pleaded guilty thereon. Rohmat pleaded not
guilty to both charges.

During Pretrial, there is an stipulation by the parties that three accused Baharan, Trinidad and Asali admitted knowing
one another before Feb. 14 incident; and such that Accused Asali admitted knowing also the other accused Rohmat
whom he claims taught him how to make explosive devises. Likewise, Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat. The
accused B, T and A all admitted to causing the bomb explosion inside the RRCG Bus, leaving 4 people dead and more or
less 40 persons injured. In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and
Trinidad were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that
they pled guilty to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defense
counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two
accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was
read to them, BAharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.

REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

LIGTAS VS. PEOPLE

ISSUE: Is the DARAB Decision which finds petitioner Ligtas as tenant of the land owned by Pacate conclusive, or can it be
taken judicial notice in criminal case for theft?

HELD:

Issue of tenancy (e.g. whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not)= generally a question of fact.

The existence of tenancy relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts presented corresponding to statutory elements
of tenancy.

SC hold that DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is conclusive and binding on the courts if
supported by substantial evidence.

Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal proceedings. Administrative cases are different
from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an
administrative prosecution or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability, quite another thing is criminal liability.
Considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in
criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions on one should not necessarily binding on the
other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be
presented in the criminal cases.

This case does not involve an administrative charge stemming from the same set of facts involved in criminal
proceedings. This is not the case where one act results in both criminal and administrative liability. DARAB case involves
determination of whether there exists a tenancy relationship, while Criminal Case involves determination of whether
there is a commission of theft. However, tenancy relationship is a factor in determining whether all the elements of
theft were proven by prosecution.

DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether there is a tenancy
relationship between adverse parties. SC has held that “judicial determinations [of DARAB] have the same binding effect
as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body.

DARAB Decision that tenancy exist has long lapsed into finality. It is also established that private complainant
participated in the initial stages of the DARAB Proceedings. Therefore, the issue of the existence of tenancy relationship
is final as between the parties.

FACTS:
Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft and he pleaded not guilty into it.

According to prosecution witness, Pacate was the owner of an abaca plantation.

Sometime in June 2000, Plantation’s Administrator Cabero, and several men (including Cipres) went to the plantation to
harvest Abaca upon Pacate’s instructions. About 10am, Cabero and his men were surprised to find Ligtas harvesting
abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was accompanied by three (3) unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas threatened that there
would be loss of life if they... persisted in harvesting the abaca. Cabero reported the incident to Anecita Pacate and the
police.
Andres Pacate installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in the criminal case.
Ligtas filed a Complaint before DARAB which rendered the Decisionruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land.
DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before the trial court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was
considered by both the trial court[27] and Court of Appeals[28] and without... any objection on the part of the People of
the Philippines.
Regional Trial Court held that "the prosecution was able to prove the elements of theft. Ligtas' "defense of tenancy was
not supported by concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest... sharing between him and Pacate duly
corroborated by any witness. His "defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification ... by prosecution
witnesses."
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. According to it, "the burden to prove the existence of the
tenancy relationship belonged to Ligtas. He was not able to establish all the essential elements of a... tenancy
agreement.
The Court of Appeals declared that Ligtas' reliance on the DARAB Decision "declaring him as a bonafide tenant of the . . .
land is irrelevant in the case at bar